- - FOR THE ton ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET POSSESSION OF THE ATOMIC BOMB UPON THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES TAND UPON THE PROBABILITIES OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION 5 CIA REVHEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY 9 Irina tional defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act 50 S L 31 and 32 as amended Its transmission or th revelat-n of its contents in any manner to an unau gorized pern is prohibited by law DISSEMINATION NOTICE 1 This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's office who require the information for the performance of their o lcial duties Further dissemination elsewhere in the department to other omces which require the informa- tion for the performance of of cial duties may be authorized by the following a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence for the Department of State Director of Intelligence GS USA for the Department of the Army Chief Naval Intelligence for the Department of the Navy DirectOr of Intelligence USAF for the Department of the Air Force Director of Security and Intelligence AEC for the Atomic Energy Com- mission Deputy Director for Intelligence Joint Staff for the Joint Staff g Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination CIA for any other Department or Agency 75 2 This copy may be either retained or'destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Of ce of Collection and Dissemination CIA DISTRIBUTION Of ce of the President National Security Council National Security Resources Board Department of State O ice of Secretary of Defense Department of the Army Department of the Navy Department of the Air Force Joint Chiefs of Staff Atomic Energy Commission Research and Development Board ORE 91 49 ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET POSSESSION OF THE ATOMIC BOMB UPON THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND UPON THE PROBABILITIES OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION - TABLE OF CONTENTS Page FOREWORD 1 ENCLOSURE A Soviet Atomic Capabilities 11 ENCLOSURE B Soviet Intentions and Objectives Particularly with Respect to Use of Military Forces 13 ENCLOSURE C Effects of the Possession of the Atomic Bomb upon the USSR and Soviet PolicyENCLOSURE ME ecm Outside the USSR of Soviet Atomic Capabilities 27 FOREWORD The subject matter of the present estimate has been under consideration since October 1949 At the outset representatives of all the agencies concerned agreed that as a basis for estimating the e ects of the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb upon the probability of direct Soviet military action it was essential to re-examine carefully the problem of over- all Soviet objectives and intentions The ex- amination of this problem as well as of the related problems of the effects of the Soviet atomic bomb upon the probability of war and upon the security of the US revealed wide dif- ferences in attitude and'opinion among the intelligence agencies The examination of these problems also brought to light many operational and policy questions of far reach- ing importance that will require some time to resolve and which are in large part beyond the cognizance of the intelligence agencies A CIA draft was submitted to the IAC agen- cies on 10 February 1950 From the com- ments made by the IAC agencies on this draft it was apparent that no early agreement could be reached In view of the time already elapsed and the broader signi cance of many at the issues that emerged during the study CIA considered that it was more important to publish this paper at this time than to at- tempt the time'-consuming if not impossible task of obtaining agreement It considered furthermore that it would be more useful to publish a straightforward point of view ac- companied by contrary opinions than to pre- sent a watered-down version Insofar as was possible in good conscience the 10 February CIA draft has been modi ed in consideration of the comments received from the IAC agencies particularly to clarify passages regarding which agency comment revealed evident misunderstanding This re- vised estimate is now presented with the nal comments of the IAC agencies thereon The Director of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission has concurred in this estimate The several dissents of the intelligence or- ganizations of the Departments of State the Army the Navy and the Air Force are to be found in Appendixes A B C and respec- tively pp 29 36 It should be noted that these dissents are on various grounds and that the several departmental agencies dis agree among themselves as well as with CIA This paper is to be considered as an interim report The subject is under continuing ur gent consideration in an effort to obtain the greatest possible resolution of these differ ences and a subsequent report will be pub- lished when this has been accomplished ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET POSSESSION OF THE ATOMIC BOMB UPON THE OF THE UNITED- STATES AND UPON THE PROBABILITIES OF DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION I Statement of the Problem To estimate the effects of the Soviet posses- sion of the atomic bomb upon the security of the United States and upon the probabilities of direct Soviet military action I Discussion 1 Soviet atomic capabilities see Enclosure A 2 Estimate of basic Soviet intentions and objectives particularly with reSpect to the use of military force see Enclosure B 3 Effects of the possession of the atomic bomb upon the USSR and its policy see En- closure C 4 Effects outside the USSR of Soviet atomic capabilities see Enclosure D Summary and Conclusions 1 Soviet Atomic Capabilities a It is estimated tentatively that the USSR will probably have a stockpile of 100 atomic bombs approximately as destructive as the Nagasaki bomb some time during 1953 b On even less certain grounds it is esti- mated that the USSR will probably have a stockpile of 200 bombs some time between mid-1954 and the end of 1955 - c The USSR either has or can easily pro- duce enough B 29 s and trained crews willing and able to attempt the delivery against all key US targets any number of atomic bombs the USSR can produce 1 Preliminary and highly tentative US esti- mates indicate that an atomic attack of ap proximately 200 bombs delivered on pre- scribed targets might prove decisive in knockwar There is at present no reliable estimate of the size of the stock- pile required to insure the delivery of 200 bombs on the prescribed targets For more detailed analysis see Enclosure A 2 Soviet Intentions and Objectives in Re- lation to the Probabilities of War Before attempting to estimate the effect of the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb upon the probabilities of war we believe it timely to re-examine basic Soviet objectives in the world situation as the Kremlin conceives it and to estimate the means which the Kremlin deems appropriate for their accomplishment with particular reference to the use of mili- tary force Our conclusions as they apply to the probabilities of war apart from any con- sideration of the atomic bomb are given be- low a The basic objective of Soviet foreign pol- icy is clearly the attainment of a Communist world under Soviet domination In pursuit of this objective the USSR regards the US as its major opponent and will wage against it a relentless unceasing struggle in which any weapon or tactic is admissible which promises success in terms of over-all Soviet objectives Nothing in the subsequent analysis therefore should be interpreted to imply that Soviet leaders would not resort to military action at any time they considered it advantageous to do so The purpose of this analysis is ob- jectively to estimate the methods which Soviet leaders are likely to consider advantageous in terms of their over-all objectives and the cir- cumstances under which they might consider Note For the position of the other intelligence agencies with respect to this paper see Fore word on preceding page it 2 iota r1163 4 TOP a resort to military action either ad n- tageous or necessary b There would appear to be no rm basis for an assumption that the USSR presently intends deliberately to use military force to attain a Communist world or further to ex- pand Soviet territory if this involves war with a potentially stronger US An analysis of the Stalinist concepts which motivate Soviet lead- ers as opposed to an interpretation of their motives and actions in the light of Western cancepts suggests strongly that the preferred objective of Soviet policy is to achieve a Soviet- dominated Communist world through revolu- tionary rather than military means Anal- ysis of Soviet foreign policy likewise indicates that Soviet statesmen are following Stalinist doctrines and tactics in conducting Soviet in- ternational relations in the interest of the world revolution c Soviet leaders however are thoroughly aware of the fact that they are pursuing their revolutionary objectives within the context of a traditional world power conflict They are responsive in this context to the expansionist aims and the security requirements of the pre- ceding imperial Russian regime Their esti mate of the objectives and behavior of the Western Powers however probably is still de- termined primarily by the Stalinist concept of a capitalist-imperialist world ruled by mili tary force which will eventually be used against the Soviet Union To ensure the pro- tection of the base of the revolutionary move- ment in the USSR therefore they must main- tain invincible military strength and use di- plomacy to improve the strategic position of the USSR in relation to the world power situ- ation as well as to further their revolutionary objectives At the same time they recognize fully the value of the threat of Soviet military power as an adjunct to their revolutionary program d The presently active Soviet threat to US security therefore while including the ever present danger inherent in Soviet military power appears to be a Soviet intention and determination to hasten by every means short The term revolutionary is used to connote all means short of all out war involving the US ET of war the economic and political disintegra- tion of the non-Communist world which So viet leaders rmly believe will inevitably come about according to the Marxist concept of the- laws of historical development In view of the magnitude of the economic political and Social problems facing the non-Commu- nist world today it is unlikely that Soviet leaders will lose con dence in the validity of this Marxist concept until the non-Communist world has demonstrated over a considerable period of time that it can reverse the trends of the last forty years and re-establish a stable and self con dent international economic political and social order The rst line of US defense in this context therefore is the restoration of international stability and the maintenance of a sound internal structure In terms of this approach to their objec- tives the role presently assigned by Soviet leaders to Soviet military power appears to be 1 defense in the world power situation accompanied by preparations for the eventu- ality of- war 2 intimidation in support of their revolutionary program and 3 where consistent with their objectives local use against military and economic forces already weakened by Communist subversion but not in aggression that would automatically in- volve war with the US Even if the USSR should gain military superiority in over- all military potential over the US and its allies it is estimated that so long as it deems the opportunity to exist it will still prefer to seek its objectives by exploiting measures short of an all-out attack f Although the USSR may hope and intend to pursue its objectives by measures short of war at least until it has military superiority over the US and its allies there is neverthe- less a continuing danger of war based upon the following considerations - 1 The strength of Soviet military forces in being and the aggressive Soviet revolution- ary program require that the US maintain a- strong military and strategic posture Were it not for the likelihood of US intervention the USSR when the situation was ripe would probably use its military forces in actual in- tervention progressively to support the ac- rei m'r 5 cession to power of Communist parties in the states directly beyond its area of control Cor- respondingly internal resistance to the rise of Communism in these areas would weaken without the support of a strong US The USSR with its doctrinaire concepts of capitalist behavior and its hyper-sensitive- ness over security may interpret as potenti- ally aggressive future steps which the US and the other Western Powers might take to im- prove their defensive position against the threat inherent in Soviet military power Similarly continuing Soviet successes in the cold war accompanied by an increasing em- phasis on US and Western military prepara- tions could well'create a situation in which the USSR would estimate that the Western Powers were determined to prevent the future spread of Communism by military action against the USSR It is alWays possible therefore that the USSR would initiate a war if it should estimate that a Western attack was impending 3 The basic Soviet concept of hostility the cold war as the normal relationship between the Soviet Union and the non-Com- munist states operating as it does against a background of a power con ict in which each side is armed and suspicious 'of the aims of the other creates a situation in which miscal- culations or diplomatic irnpasses might result in war Furthermore as the Soviet military potential increases relative to that of the US and its allies the USSR will probably be will- ing to take greater risks than before in its ex- ploitation of diplomatic opportunities or rev0 lutionary situations 4 If after gaining military superiority in over-all military potential over the US and its allies Soviet leaders should lose con dence in the Marxist concept of the in- evitable disintegration of the capitalist world and hence in their ability ultimately to attain their objectives by means short of war the temptation to resort to military action against the US and its allies might well prove irresist ible This conclusion should be quali ed in the light of the possibilities inherent in atomic warfare as discussed in the following section For more detailed analysis see Enclosure B 3 E ects of the Soviet Possession of the Atomic Bomb upon the Probabilities of War It is not yet possible to estimate with any precision the effects of the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb upon the probability of war The implications of atomic warfare either military or not yet been fully appraised In particular we have as yet no clear indications concerning the place of atomic warfare in Soviet military con- cepts or concerning the effect of US retalia- tory capabilities upon any Soviet cdnsidera- tion of a deliberate and unprovoked atomic attack upon the US The capabilities of atomic warfare however clearly inject a new factor into an appraisal of Soviet intentions which requires the most careful evaluation and which in any event has vital implications for US defense plan- ning Although in general it appears un- likely that the possession of the atomic bomb will alter the basic considerations as out- lined above which underlie Soviet policy a Soviet capability for effective direct attack upon the continental US must be considered to increase the danger that the USSR might resort to military action to attain its objec- tives The military services have estimated that the destructive effect of atomic attack actually delivered upon selected targets in the US would be as follows 10 50 bombs 1 Would seriously hamper war mobiliza- tion and delay overseas shipments of US forces and material 2 Would delay or reduce materially the scale of the US atomic retaliation 50-125 bombs 1 Would intensify the effects of above and prevent the immediate launching of an atomic offensive against the USSR Up to 200 bombs 1 Reduce the US capability for an atomic offensive possibly to a critical degree and create conditions that might destroy the US capabilities for offensive wan Atomic attack therefore introduces the possibility that the USSR under and is TOVCRET 6 TOP SECRET above could seriously cripple the US and under might well knock the US out of the war It therefore the USSR should estimate that it had the capability of making a crippling attack upon the US that would eliminate the US margin of over-all military superiority the danger that war might develop either from a Soviet estimate that a Western attack was imminent or from miscalculations or impass es in the normal diplomatic maneuvering within the context of the world power con- ict would be increased Similarly a Soviet estimate that it could de- liver a decisive attack that would quickly knock the US out of the war would increase the possibility of a decision deliberately to resort to military action to eliminate the major obstacle to a Communist world Such a decision under these circumstances might conceivably be made prior to a Soviet convic- tion that the USSR could not ultimately attain its objectives by means short of war It could certamly be made prior to the attainment of superiority in over-all military potential as compared with the US and its allies There is no present means however of de- termining with any accuracy whether the USSR is likely to estimate that it has the capabilities to accomplish the results indi- cated above In fact no realistic US estimate has yet been made of Soviet capabilities to deliver atomic bombs on targets in the US taking into account Soviet operational factors and US defensive capabilities In terms of general Soviet objectives and the methods to which the USSR appears to be committed in attaining them it would appear that Soviet leaders would require a high degree of cer- tainty before deliberately undertaking the risk involved in a direct atomic attack in the face of the substantial US retaliatory capa bilities The following conditions would prob- ably be essential to any such decision Virtual certainty of attaining surprise only in this way could the indicated results be achieved Virtual certainty that effective US re- taliation could be prevented Although the US may appear more vulnerable to atomic attack than the USSR in terms of large con- centrations of population and industry the Soviet regime itself is probably peculiarly vul- nerable to atomic attack As a dictatorship all elements of Soviet control are centered in Moscow Initiative throughout the lower echelons and the provincial o icialdom is non- existent The destruction of the control cen- ter many of the leaders and the means of communication might therefore lead to com- plete disintegration and revolution A more effective means of delivery than the TU-4 B-29 If there are doubts about the ability of the B-36 to deliver the atom bomb against the USSR howmuch greater the doubts that the Soviet B-29 could deliver it successfully against an effective and alert US defense The greatest danger that the Soviet atomic capability would lead to avert Soviet military action would appear therefore to'derive from a Soviet estimate that it could launch a suc cessful surprise attack that would seriously cripple or virtually eliminate US retaliatory capabilities - The likelihood that the USSR will reach such an estimate will vary inversely in relation to the effectiveness and alertness of the US defenses against such an attack and to possible measures taken to make US retaliatory bases and equipment immune to attack In terms of the above analysis present US estimates of destructive effects given above of varying numbers of atomic bombs actually delivered on selected targets in the US com- bined with US estimates of the Soviet atomic bomb production schedule can furnish only the roughest guide as to the timetable of theo- retical Soviet capabilities On this tentative basis it is estimated that beginning shortly after 1 January 1951 the USSR will begin to build up a theoretical capability for launching a progressively crippling attack upon the US On the same basis it is estimated that at some indeterminate time after mid-1954 the USSR will have the theoretical capability of delivering 200 atomic bombs on targets in the US which might well constitute a decisive attack with respect to the ability of the US to wage offensive warfare It appears imperative from the foregoing that an effort be made to determine Soviet TOVCRET TOP capabilities on the most realistic basis that f is in terms of Soviet operational factors and US defensive capabilities For if it is deter- mined that an atomic attack could knock the US out of a war the implication would be that the atomic bomb is after all an absolute weapon Such a conclusion would have vast implications for US foreign policy and for the composition of the entire US military es- tablishment 4 Possible Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Its Atomic Capabilities Short of Direct Attack The precise effects of the Soviet atomic capabilities upon the security of the US will depend in part upon how the USSR chooses to use them Consideration must be given to several alternative courses of action that are available to the USSR and to the fact that we have no information on the Soviet evaluation of atomic warfare in terms of the effects upon the USSR of US atomic capabili- ties a Possession of the atomic bomb has not yet produced any apparent change in Soviet policy or tactics and probably will not do so at least through 1950 The USSR has merely integrated the bomb into its general propa- ganda and its peace offensive It will prob- ably in any event continue to stir up mass opinion in the West against rearmament and against the use of atomic weapons in the event of war In this way it may hope to create suf cient public pressure on the Western gov- ernments to neutralize the US bomb b It would appear that on balance the de- struction of existing stockpiles of atomic bombs and the barring of further production would be militarily advantageous to the USSR except with respect to the possibility of a direct Soviet attack upon the continental US Soviet considerations of security and national sovereignty probably preclude the possibility of an agreement for the control of atomic energy production that would meet the current requirements of the Western Powers but the USSR may renew pressure for an international agreement to outlaw the use of the atomic bomb in warfare CRET 7 c While the outlawing of the use of the bomb might be militarily advantageous to the USSR in terms of operations in Europe or Asia the USSR may estimate that the polit- ical and advantages of retain- ing the threat of atomic warfare outweigh the military advantages of excluding it When the USSR acquires what it considers an opera- tional stockpile of bombs its capabilities for employing threats and intimidation through diplomatic channels in an e ort to detach in- dividual states from the Western bloc will be considerably increased With the exception of the UK the US and possibly Japan how- ever this increased capability Will not result from apprehension on the part of these states that they will -be directly attacked with atomic bombs but rather from the increased Soviet military capabilities vis a-vis the US and from general apprehension concerning the effects of an atomic war The USSR could not ex- pect that the threat of direct atomic attack would carry particular weight against those states which estimated that a Soviet attack would bring the US into a war and that under those circumstances their territories would not- be of suf cient strategic importance to justify the use against them of the limited Soviet supply of atomic bombs For more detailed analysis see Enclosure C - 5 Effects of Soviet Possession of the Atomic Bomb upon the Security of the US 1 Assuming the continued stockpiling of bombs by the USSR and the US Soviet atomic capabilities have the following military im plications for the security of the US in the event of war 1 The continental US will be for the rst time liable to devastating attack This has vital implications for the mobilization of the US war potential 2 The Soviet atomic capability would ap- pear to make it imperative not only that US defenses against atomic attack particularly the requirements for air defense be greatly strengthened but that steps be taken to make US retaliatory bases and equipment in part at least invulnerable to surprise attack These measures are clearly essential to the preservation of US retaliatory capabilities which in turn would contribute the greatest deterrent to a Soviet attack 3 If it is accepted on the basis of a realis- tic estimate that an atomic attack could knock the US out of a war the implication would appear to be that the atomic bomb is after all an absolute weapon The accept- ance of this implication would in turn have vital implications with regard to the composi- tion of the entire US military establishment 4 The Soviet military potential is in- creased 5 The loss of the US monopoly of the atomic bomb has reduced the effectiveness both militarily and of the US commitment to defend the UK and Western Europe 6 The US has lost its capability of mak- ing a decisive atomic attack upon the war- making potential of the USSR without dan- ger- of retaliation in kind 7 Soviet possession of the atomic bomb would seriously affect US capabilities for air operations from the UK or other advanced bases and for amphibious operations against the European continent or other areas within range of Soviet attack 8 Soviet atomic retaliatory capabilities raise the question as to whether it is militarily desirable for the US to base its strategic plans upon the use of the atomic bomb except in re- taliation against a Soviet attack In View of the preponderance of its conventional mili- tary forces and the damage it would sustain from a US atomic attack the USSR might consider it advantageous not to use the bomb rst and hope thereby to forestall the US use of the bomb 9 If the use of the atomic bomb were eliminated US strategic concepts for the con- duct of a war with the USSR would have to be drastically revised 10 Should an international agreement be reached to outlaw the use of the atomic bomb the USSR would be in a better strategic posi- tion than the US We can probably assume that the USSR would not hesitate to violate the agreement in the event of war if it consid- ered it advantageous to do so while the US would abide by the agreement Under these circumstances the USSR would have the op- tion of using the bomb or not according to its strategic plans and thereby acquire the initia- tive If neither side used the bomb the US would lose its capabilities for immediate ef- fective attack upon the Soviet military poten- tial and the relative capabilities would be increased through the preponder- ance of its conventional military strength b The political and e fects on US security of a continuing Soviet atomic ca- pability are estimated as follows 1 The possession of the bomb and the re- sultant increase in Soviet military power will increase somewhat the effectiveness of Soviet subversive activities and propaganda in the cold war 2 Through 1950 at least Soviet posses- sion of the bomb will not cause any change in the present alignment of the principal na- tions or in the support of current US pro- grams to counter Soviet aggression It will probably result however in demands from Western Europe for larger amounts of US equipment and for further US commitments for the active defense of Western Europe 3 The UK because of its extreme vulner- ability to atomic attack may become some what cautious about joining with the US in any actions which the UK estimated might provoke the USSR into using armed force against the Western Powers It will continue through 1950 at least however to base its for- eign policy on a close strategic and economic relationship 4 The longer-range effects of Soviet atomic capabilities upon the political align- ment of the non-Communist states will de- pend in the rst instance upon the extent and soundness of European economic and military recovery and upon the policy and strength of the US If present efforts to restore the eco- nomic and military strength of Western Eu- rope fall short of their goals there will de- velop a strong though not necessarily de- cisive movement for accommodation or neu- trality If at the same time there should be indications of a serious weakening in US strength or in US commitments to resist So- viet aggression the movement for accommo- dation or neutrality would probably become decisive Assuming that US support of its NAT allies and Japan remains rm and that the eco- nomic and military recovery of Europe is ac- complished on a rm and stable basis there will be a strong probability that the non- Soviet states including the UK and Japan will remain rm in their alignments with the US if the Soviet Union should threaten atomic warfare when it has attained an operational stockpile of bombs or if a deterioration in re- lations between the USSR and the Western Powers suggested that an atomic war was im- minent In the latter circumstances the UK would be strongly in uenced by its appraisal of the issues at stake it would not be inclined to follow the US unless it considered these is- sues vital to its security In the nal analysis however the future public appraisal of the signi cance of the atomic bomb will probably be the determining factor on the will to resist It is impossible at this time to predict with any assurance what this appraisal will be In general three alternative trends appear possible in the in- terim TCRET 9 Increasing fear of the effects of an atomic struggle may have produced in all countries but particularly in the UK US and Japan an irresistible organized popular de mand for renewed efforts to bring about an agreement between the US and the USSR for at least the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons If under these circumstances this objective were not attained it must be consid- ered possible that the UK and Japan because of their extreme vulnerability could be de- tached from the US camp and that the US public might force an accommodation with the USSR b The concept may become generally ac- cepted that the threat of mutual retaliation will preclude the use of the bomb by either side Under these circumstances the effect of Soviet atomic capabilities would be neg- ligible c The present public attitude of indiffer- ence or relative unconcern may continue or a strong determination to resist regardless of consequences may develop Under either of these circumstances the countries concerned would probably stand rm in their alignment with the US For more detailed analysis see Enclosure DJ - TOWRET ENCLOSURE A SOVIET ATOMIC CAPABILITIES 1 Information at hand permits the follow ing highly tentative estimate with respect to Soviet atomic capabilities a The USSR has or can in reasonable time achieve production of an atomic bomb ap- proximame as destructive as the Nagasaki bomb causing major damage and high- rate of casualties within an area of_ 4-7 square miles circle with radius of 1 1 to 1 5 miles b The USSR either has or can easily pro- cure enough and trained crews willing and able to make one-way ights if necessary to attempt the delivery against any key US targets of any number of atomic bombs thelUSSR can produce 0 Atomic bombs could also be delivered in US harbors in Soviet ships prior to an out- break of hostilities but the effects of such at- tacks would be limited in comparison with wide-scale air attacks d The Soviet stockpile of atOmic bombs as of various dates is estimated as follows 1 Mid-1949 1 exploded Mid-1950 10-20 Mid 1951 25-45 Mid-1952 45-90 Mid-1953 70 135 2 Beyond 1953 a well-founded estimate cannot be made and even for mid-1953 there is a large degree of uncertainty For plan- ning purposes however an estimate for mid- 1954 of 120 200 bombs is suggested on the basis that plant capacity may be increased by approximately 50 percent after 1952 2 An estimate of the number of atomic bombs that the USSR would stockpile before considering it possible to launch attacks of varying degrees of intensity on the US must be very imprecise Four essential elements of information are largely lacking at present and will remain hard to determine with any certainty ff blank a Soviet estimates of the size of an atomic air attack required to accomplish a crippling or decisive attack and of the size of the stock- pile the USSR would consider nec'essary be- fore launching such attacks b Firm US estimates of the character and scope of a decisive attack on the US both in terms of 1 direct military and industrial damage 2 impact on the national will to resist c Estiinates of Soviet operational capabili- ties in terms of atomic sorties including per- centage factors for 1 operational losses and malfunctions 2 gross aiming errors - 3 losses due to total US anti air defense system d The Kremlin s estimate of Soviet capa- bilities with respect to above 3 Without consideration cf either Soviet operational factors or US defensive capabili- ties the US military services have estimated that the effects of Soviet military application of atomic bombs against the US during the following periods would be a Initial period target objectives political and population centers most important re taliatory targets when the USSR has the capability of delivering 10 to 50 atomic bombs ON TARGET 1 Mobilization for war would be seriously hampered for a considerable period in that the attacks would cause the destruction of the headquarters of the Federal Government the partial destruction of large cities and the shock effects of more than one million casualties 2 A successful attack on the most impor- tant installations of the Strategic Air Com- mand would delay or reduce materially the scale of the planned strategic air offensive 3 The neutralization of the key ports in the United States would cause great delay in 11 12 TOP projecting United States forces and materials overseas 13 Intermediate period target objectives political and population centers retaliatory targets including manpower mobilization centers and selected industrial facilities when the the capability of deliver- ing 50 to 125 atomic bombs 0N TARGET 1 An intensi cation of the effects of the initial period 2 Prevent the IMMEDIATE launching of an atomic offensive against the USSR 3 Serious e ect on certain vital elements of the war economy c Long-range period target objectives political and population centers retaliatory targets including manpower and mobiliza- tion centers and industrial complexes when the USSR has the capability of delivering up to 200 atomicbombs ON TARGET 1 Atomic attacks during the long-range period would probably Reduce the United States capability for an atomic offensive possibly to a critical de- gree Delay inde nitely the industrial and military mobilization in the United States Canada and the United Kingdom TOP CRET Reduce over-all military industrial ca- pacity for production in the United States up to 30-50 percent Cause total casualties of more than 10 - 000 000 people in the United States Create conditions which might be de- cisive as to the ability of the United States to wage o ensive war 4 In terms of the above analysis present US estimates of destructive e ects given above _of varying numbers of atomic bombs actually delivered on selected targets in the US combined with US estimates of the So- viet atomic bomb production schedule can furnish only the roughest guide as to the time- table of theoretical Soviet capabilities On this tentative basis it is estimated that beginning shortly after 1 January 1951 the USSR will begin to build up a theoretical ca- pability for launching a progressively crip- pling attack upon the US 011 the same basis it is estimated that at some indeterminate time after mid-1954 the USSR will have the theoretical capability of delivering 200 atomic bombs on targets in the US which might well constitute a decisive attack with respect to the ability of the US to wage offensive warfare CRET TOP RET ENCLOSURE SOVIET INTENTIONS AND OBJECTIVES PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT To USE OF MILITARY FORCES l The Problem Before attempting to estimate the use which the USSR will make of its capability to wage atomic warfare we believe it timely to re-examine carefully basic Soviet objectives in the world situation as the Kremlin con- ceives it and to estimate the means which the Kremlin deems appropriate for their ac- complishment with particular reference to the use of military force 2 Approach to the Problem It must be recognized at the outset that there is no factual information on any of the decisions or plans of the Politburo which would permit a de nite and authoritative answer with respect to the timing and meth- ods which the USSR will employ in pursuit of its objectives Lacking such evidence it would be as unjusti able to assume that the USSR de nitely intends to resort to military aggres- sion involving the United States as it would be to assume the contrary In either case an erroneous assumption could lead to a disas trous mis direction of US policy The essential character of the Soviet threat in the present world situation is clear The USSR emerged from World War II not only as the seat of Communist ideology which aims to subvert the world but as the predominant military power on the Eurasian continent It has avowed its intention to attempt to bring about a Communist world under Soviet domi nation and to this end to wage a relentless unceasing struggle against the US its major opponent in which any tactic orweapon is admissible which appears advantageous in terms of over-all Soviet objectives The problem therefore is to estimate the tactics and weapons which Soviet leaders will deem appropriate to success in this struggle and the factors which are likely to impel them to or restrain them from a resort to direct military action Fortunately a basis for estimating the prob- able behavior of Soviet leaders in pursuit of their objectives does exist' 1n the past conduct of Russian foreign relations and in the known ideological concepts of the present rulers of the USSR Analysis in these terms reveals that Soviet foreign-policy is governed by two distinct but interlocking sets of in uences These are a The power relationship between the So- viet bloc and the West and the security re- quirements of the USSR therein 1 The Communist ideology which sup- posedly a ords an infallible explanation of the existing world situation the direction in which it must inevitably develop and the mis- sion of the USSR in the premises 3 Impact of Communist Ideology An analysis of the behavior and tactics of Soviet leaders in conducting both the foreign relations and the internal affairs of the Soviet state indicates clearly that Marxist ideology as developed by Lenin and Stalin hereafter called Communism is the predominant influ- ence on the pattern of their thought and ac- tions It is the basis for the Soviet ambition for world domination as opposed to- the less ambitious expansionist aims of Tzarist Rus- sia It is an essential ingredient in the proc ess by which Soviet leaders de ne their own objectives both domestic and foreign and es- timate the objectives of the Western Powers It provides the framework within which they interpret all developments in the capitalist world and a blueprint of tactics to be used in gaining Soviet objectives Its basic tenets with respect to the historical development of society are deemed to have the validity of scientific truth Communist ideology affords Tor jan'r 13 14 then a key to past present and future Soviet behavior Communism holds that all social develop- ment is the result of a constant struggle be- tween opposing interests leading inevitably'to the establishment of a Communist society There can be no peace or mutual tolerance at least not until this ideal Communist So ciety has been achieved Progress toward this goal is of necessity resisted by the vested in- terests in the dying capitalist social order Moreover the exploited masses also cannot be expected to see the light The goal will be too distant therefore if sought by persuasion and democratic processes Force must be used to overcome the resistance of the capitalists and the inertia of the_masses Satisfactory prog- ress can be achieved only by violent revolu- tio n Conducted by the militant minority who do see the vision Three conditions are essential however to the existence of a revolutionary situation a situation in which the militant Commu- nist minority can hope to succeed in a revo- lutionary effort 1 the masses must be dis- illusioned and disaffected toward the regime 2 the rulers must be themselves disorganized and unable to operate their former system of control and 3 a revolutionary minority must be organized and ready to take over by force A practical corollary to these three conditions would be the unavailability of strong outside aid for the reactionary forces then in control The Revolution having occurred in one country the USSR that country must ex- pect the undying enmity of the capitalist world No accommodation is possible except as a tactical maneuver to gain time to develop strength for the continuing struggle In its own interest as well as that of the world revo- lution the USSR must provide a secure base and strong support for the revolution in other countries In turn all Communists through out the world must serve and defend the USSR since its preservation is essential to the advancement of the world revolution Capitalism however bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction and will inevi tably succumb Its disintegration will take place through a process of ebb and flow pe- riods of recuperation and stability will follow periods of weakness The timetable is wholly exible The last stages of capitalism will be marked by increasingly severe depressions 1929 and-by imperialistic wars in which predatory capitalist states seek survival by preying on others 1939 These devel- opments will weaken the capitalist world and create revolutionary situations for Commu nist exploitation But throughout this pe- riod there will be grave danger that capital- ist states perceiving the trend of events may combine to attack and destroy the USSR in the hope of averting their own inevitable fate The basic objective of Soviet foreign policy is thus clearly the attainment of a Communist world under Soviet domination Communist doctrine suggests equally clearly that in its design to bring about a Communist world the primary aggressive instrument of Soviet for- eign policy is the international Communist apparatus acting through subversion and revolution rather than military conquest by the Soviet armed forces Neither Lenin nor Stalin has ever questioned the basic Marxist concept that the capitalist world is inevitably doomed to disintegrate The function of in- ternational Communism is to hasten this dis- integration and to be prepared to grab the pieces as they fall The mission of the Soviet Union is to support the revolutionary move- ment with its diplomacy backed by Soviet power and propaganda A period of ebb in the tide of revolutionary opportunity would not be likely to cause the USSR to abandon this method for an ensuing period of ow would be con dently expected Only if the capitalist world succeeded in dem- onstrating over a considerable period of time that it had reversed the trend of the last forty years and the Communists in consequence lost faith in the verity of their basic doctrine of the inevitability of capitalist disintegration could a radical new departure be expected Soviet military power is essentially an ad- junct to international Communism in attain- ing this objective of a Communist world In terms of Communist doctrine its primary and overriding function is to guarantee the secu- rity of the USSR and the revolutionary move- ment against anticipated capitalist attack TVCRET TOP Its offensive function appears to be secondary and limited to be used locally against mili- tary and economic forces already weakened by Communist subversion but not in head-on attack against strength in which the issue might be in doubt It might be used for ex- ample in the form of intimidation of the ex- isting government to support the accession to power of a Communist party in a neighboring state by intimidating the existing government It might even be used to intervene in exploi- tation of a genuine revolutionary situation in a neighboring state when the use of Soviet military power would insure the success of the revolutionary attempt and would not at the same time con ict with over-all Soviet policy or involve the USSR prematurely in military con ict with a stronger adversary The revo- lutionary situations which Communist doc- trine anticipates will result from wars be- tween sovereign states are those resulting from imperialist Wars between capitalist states and not from wars in which the USSR itself would-willingly participate Thus while military action is recognized in Communist doctrine as a means of extending the revolu- tion its use 'is strictly circumscribed Any military venture prejudicial to the basic se curity of' the USSR and the ultimate success of the revolutionary movement is clearly un- intended Flagrant military aggression against sov ereign states moreover would not be advan- tageous to the USSR in terms of its objective of advancing the world revolution The pre- requisite of world revolution is social disinte- gration Resistance to foreign aggression which Soviet military action would induce is a unifying force both within and among na- tions The world has long known how to combine against a would-be conqueror How- ever formidable the military strength of the USSR its unique power lies in its revolution- ary doctrine and apparatus Flagrant resort to military conquest would stultify the revo- lutionary professions and the anti-imperialist propaganda of the USSR deprive it of its revolutionary power and reduce it to the sta- tus of just another powerful imperialist ag- gressor Whatever its initial success on that basis the result would not be world revolu- K RET 15 tion but rather what the USSR most fears the combination of the world in arms against it in a war of survival However no Communist with his concept that the end justi es the means can have any scruples regarding the use of force in- cluding military aggression to advance the world revolution Were the USSR in the full- ness of time to achieve total military power suf cient to enable it to defy the interventions of the United States it might be under strong temptation to impose its domination on Eura- sia by military force Even in such a case however it would have reason to consider the effect of agrant military aggression upon its world revolutionary pretensions Considera tion of the question however assumes a con- tinuing state of disintegration and impotence in Europe and Asia The potential strength of Western Europe alone if realized is suf- cient to preclude an easy Soviet conquest Were the USSR to achieve the over-all strength or an atomic or similar capability necessary for a decisive direct attack on the United States one resulting in a quick vic- tory it would be under much stronger temp- tation to resort to military force for if the USSR could decisively defeat the United States no power on earth could resist its dom- ination 4 The Power Relationship between the Soviet Bloc and the West and the Security Require- ments of the USSR Therein Soviet leaders are rulers of the Soviet state as well as heads of the world Communist revolutionary movement Even though their basic objective may be to extend Communism by revolutionary methods they are thor- oughly alive to the fact that they are pursu ing this objective within the context of an in- ternational system in which power has been a decisive factor in national existence The military strength and the strategic position of the USSR in terms of this world power situa- tion therefore must be of vital concern to them in the attainment of their revolutionary objectives Soviet leaders in their concern for the se curity of the USSR as the base of the revolu tionary movement or in the use of their power TOVRET 16 3 position to extend either Soviet territo or areas of Communist control are inevitably responsive to the same geopolitical and power factors that in uenced the rulers of the old Russian empire Similarly they can hardly escape the in uences of the historical experience of the Russian people An analysis of Russian history in these terms reveals several characteristics that may be useful in providing a clue to the probable behavior of any rulers of the Russian state be they Tzarist or Communist in an inter- national system governed by power politics These are - - a The lack of secure frontiers resulting in an immemorial experience since the Tartar invasion of being overrun by more civilized and technologically advanced foreigners con- stitutes the basis for a morbid sense of na- tional insecurity and inferiority Moscow was occupied by the Poles 1610- 1713 the Swedes almost occupied it in 1709 the French in 1812 and the Germans made deep inroads in both World Wars The con- clusions which the Russians have drawn from this experience are that the outside world is hostile that space is an essential factor in de- fense and that Russia can never be secure against invasion as long as a potential in- vader exists b The corollary to this sense of insecurity has been a driving urge for expansion The expansionism which resulted in the creation of the pre-World War I Russian empire how- ever was characterized to a large degree by caution and opportunism It succeeded by means of persistent nibbling at the territories of neighboring powers already in the throes of internal disintegration and by following up upon foreign incursions which exhausted the invaders c Despite its generally opportunistic char- acter Russian expansion affords instances of patent miscalculation where the resistance encountered proved stronger than was ex- pected when the worth of allies had been overestimated or when stronger powers inter- vened to protect the intended victim The record also affords instances in which Russia accepted diplomatic defeat rather than face the threatened intervention of major powers ET- The whole of this sorry Russian experience was the result of the inherent weaknesses of the Russian state in the international power system With their accession to power in 1917 the present Communist leaders of the Soviet state fell heirs to the position of their Tsarist predecessors They were immediawa subjected to experiences in the world power situation similar to those which had created the sense of insecurity already inherent in the Russian people The German occupation of Finland the Baltic States White Russia and the Ukraine and Turki i occupation of the Caucasus 1918 later British French US and Japanese armed intervention in the civil war 1918-1922 and the Polish invasion of 1920 and above all the German onslaught which reached Leningrad Moscow Stalin- grad and Grozny in 1941-42 In the context of the international power situation there- fore the Five Year Plans of the Soviet state appear less as a matter of building socialism in one country than of improving the power position of 'the USSR for thesele are pat- ently less concerned with quickly bringing the blessings of abundance to the Soviet people than with enhancing the war potential of the Soviet state - Communist doctrine has reinforced this basic sense of insecurity inherent in the ex- perience of the Russian people and in the his- tory of the early years of the present Soviet regime It provides present Soviet leaders with rigid and well-de ned concepts of the pattern of behavior of the Western capitalist states in the imperialistic stage of historical development These capitalist states condi tioned to a world of power politics will inevit- ably ght among themselves for markets and raw materials They may at any time attack the Soviet Union in an effort to rid themselves of the menace of Communism If they do not launch the attack at an early stage they will do so ultimately in a nal effort to fore stall the inevitable decay of the capitalist sys tem Soviet leaders therefore in terms of their revolutionary ambitions must build up the military strength and improve the strate gic position of the Soviet state in order to pro- tect it in this world of power politics in which the new Communist state has grown up Toyns'r TOP Thus the geopolitical position of the USSR the historical experience of the Russian people and the Communist concept of the capitalist threat combine to indoctrinate pres- ent Soviet leaders with a basic sense of in- security in the world power situation and a correlative urge for expansion in search of se- curity At the same time they are heirs to a tradition of caution and opportunism in power relationships which coincides with the Com- munist revolutionary injunction to retreat before superior strength to refrain from striking until a situation is ripe and to as- sume no risks that would jeopardize the base of the revolution in the USSR Against this background the postwar Soviet emphasis on military strength in being and the actual ter- ritorial annexations during World War II can- not in themselves be taken as a certain indi- cation of an intent to employ military aggres- sion on a world-wide scale From a strictly power point of view there- fore the danger of war as long as the US re- mains a formidable opponent would appear to be not that of a Soviet attack on the United States but that of a Soviet miscalculation of the cumulative effect of characteristic piecemeal aggressions in Eurasia in provoking a warlike US reaction There is obviously no assurance that the rulers of the Soviet Union will act in the fu- ture as Russian or Soviet leaders have acted in the past particularly in view of the greatly en- hanced world power position which the USSR has now attained and the postwar power vac- uum in Western EurOpe yet they cannot quickly or wholly escape the in uence of their environment and historical experience On historical performance the Soviet Union could be expected to take every advantage of the contemporary disintegration of power in Eu- rope and Asia to expand the area of its terri torial control in search of further security Also on past performance the Soviet state could be expected to go no further in terri- torial aggrandizement than supposedly could be done without serious risk of provoking US intervention at least until the USSR had achieved a power parity with the US The following analysis of Soviet foreign policy indicates that the enhanced Soviet TOP I izE'r 17 power position has not yet at least induced Soviet leaders to reject the in uences of Rus- sian tradition and the methods and tactics prescribed by Communist ideology as outlined above 5 The Course of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1945 Soviet foreign policy since 1917 has con formed to both Russian tradition and Com- munist ideology Disastrous defeat in the war with Germany in 1917 created the revolu tionary situation which enabled the Com- munist minority to seize power in Russia In the enthusiasm of that moment there were those who believed that universal revolution was at hand and that the war should be con- tinued not in cooperation with the capitalist West but to liberate proletarian brethren in Germany and eventually in the West as well Lenin brought them back to reality by point- ing out that no revolutionary situation then existed in Germany The gist of his doc- trine was that for the USSR to make war for the purpose of carrying the revolution to a country in which no revolutionary situa- tion already existed would be reprehensible adventurism for it would jeopardize the achievement of the revolution in the USSR without prospect of gain commensurate with that risk The USSR therefore accepted the costly Treaty of Brest Litovsk as the price of a period of release from war in which to consoli date the revolution in one country and gather strength to exploit the revolutionary situa- tions expected to deveIOp as the capitalist powers continued to make war against each other The war did produce revolutionary situations in Eastern Europe Germany Italy Greece and Turkey but the local Com- munists proved incapable of seizing and hold- ing power and except with respect to the Ukraine and the Transcaucasus former Russian territories the USSR itself was un- able to render effective support to such local Communist revolutionary efforts as did occur Thereafter the USSR reconciled itself to a period of stability in the West and in true Tsarist fashion redirected its effort to an- other theater China There also a revolu CRET 18 TOWET tionary situation existed but there also it was not the Communists who emerged as the successful revolutionists After the Chinese asco in 1927 the USSR devoted itself to internal development and to perfecting the international Communist ap- paratus in certain expectation of new dangers and new opportunities The economic col- lapse of the capitalist world in 1929 was fore- seen and a consequent period of imperialist wars anticipated Fearing that desperate capitalist states would take the occasion to attack and destroy the Socialist Fatherland the USSR became an advocate of disarma- ment non-aggression pacts and collective se curity through the League of Nations In the light of Communist ideology how- ever the outcome of the Munich crisis avert- ing war among the capitalist powers was in terpreted as a sure sign of a secret combina- tion against the USSR or at least of a success- ful attempt to turn Hitler's aggressive inten tions eastward It became theprime task of Soviet diplomacy to turn the tables on the West to bring about a war between Germany and the West in which the capitalist powers would destroy each other while the USSR re- mained aloof conserving its strength and ready to pick up the pieces Thus from the standpoint of security the function of the 1939 pact with Germany was essentially the same as that of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk although super cially the effects of it were to reverse that document by restoring to the USSR much territory lost in 1918 The basic purpose was to keep the USSR out of the war until the capitalists themselves had created revolutionary situations which a stronger USSR could exploit This strategy back red of course when the war in the west reached a relatively quick stalemate and the real battle of attrition de veIOped in the East after all This situation constituted a realization of the fears of the USSR at the time of Munich Germany and the USSR were in the process of destroying each other while Great Britain and the United States remained relatively disengaged building up their strength instead of expend- ing it the reverse of Soviet expectations in 1939 To any Communist it would be obvious that the Second Front was being deliberately delayed until Germany and the USSR had collapsed from exhaustion when the United States would move in to take advantage of the imperialistic opportunities which would exist in both countries Thus the clamor for a Second Front had a deeper political as well as an immediate military signi cance Even after D-Day until itself the USSR was fearful lest the Germans succeed in mak- ing their peace with the West and combining with it against the USSR That in Soviet estimation would have been the proper course of action for the capitalist world The corre- sponding course of action for the make a new Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Ger- many restoring the fundamental situation to its 1939 1941 status must have been tempt- ing but was too risky for Germany would cer- tainly have used any evidence of Soviet per- dy to further its preferred solution of recon- ciliation with the West and combination against'the USSR As the Soviet armies advanced into Europe the USSR of course acted to perpetuate its control over the territories actually occupied and also to exploit or develop the revolution- ary situation sure to exist not only in de- feated Germany but also in all the lands which Germany had occupied This review of the broad aspects of Soviet policy reveals three cardinal preoccupations 1 To keep the USSR free of involvement in imperialist wars among capitalist states 2 In particular to prevent a combination of the capitalist world against the USSR 3 To take advantage of revolutionary situations resulting from war to extend the area of Soviet control and advance the world revolution 6 Soviet Postwar Policy It has been asserted that only the existence of the US atomic bomb prevented the USSR from carrying out an intention to continue its military advance to the Atlantic in 1945 There can be no doubt that the US atomic bomb had a sobering and deterrent effect on the USSR There is no reason to suppose however that the USSR had any such inten tion in 1945 or subsequently The evidence Tor nsr TOP 19 advanced in support of that contention 80v viet interest in hastening US demobilization is explainable in terms of a well-established Soviet fear of US intentions and an obvious Soviet interest in developing the revolution- ary situation in Europe by removing the pos- sibility of strong outside support for the gov- emments to be subverted Even without the atomic bomb outrightSoviet military aggres- sion would have been self-defeating - for it Would certainly have brought about remobili zation and that combination of the capitalist world against the USSR in a war of survival which the USSR chie y fears Certainly the burden of proof lies on those who would assert that the Soviet rulers had become so drunk with power asto disregard all the precepts of Russian tradition and Communist doctrine and to substitute a hazardous program of world-conquest unlikely to succeed for a sup- posedly infallible program of world revolution Actually Soviet policy since is ex- plicable only in terms of Russian tradition and Communist ideology At the close of the war the USSR enjoyed in the West immense pres- tige and goodwill A cooperative policy would have consolidated these advantages facilitated Communist accession to power in Western Europe by democratic processes and secured US assistance in the rehabilitation of the Soviet economy and war potential But Soviet thought rigidly predetermined by Com- munist ideology could not comprehend the idea of peace and security through mutual tolerance and goodwill The alternative prescribed by Communist ideology however was not military conquest but subversion and revolution Soviet post- war policy was true to its Tsarist precedents and Communist frame of reference to con- solidate the control over Eastern Europe actu- ally existing through the presence of Soviet troops and police or of Communist revolu- tionary governments in the cases of Yugo- slavia and Albania to exploit the revolu- tionary situation apparently existing in con- tinental Western Europe and in Greece to take advantage of its power position to impose its will on Turkey and Iran as any Tsarist government would have done and to exploit the revolutionary situation existing in east- ern and southern Asia These policies were deemed to cost nothing in terms of Western goodwill for ideologically no such thing could exist They would expose the USSR to no risk such as that inherent in direct military aggression They were the ideologically pre- scribed courses of action for the estimated situation - Atrue revolutionary situation did appear to exist in Europe and Asia The masses were disillusioned and ready to accept a change The former rulers were discredited and in- capable of governing in the old way No ef- fective outside support seemed available to them after the precipitate demobilization of the United States Communists were organ- ized and ready to take over The powerful support of the USSR was at hand Yet the revolution failed to come all in Western Europe and the USSR was checked in the Near East The United States re- sponded with aid and support thereby thwart- ing the development of the revolutionary sit- uation and took over the former role of Great Britain in Near Eastern power politics Moreover with the assurance of_ US support there developed a patriotic reaction to the aggressive conduct of the USSR and the sub- servience of local Communists to Soviet interests This situation is one in which both Russian tradition and Communist doctrine counsel pa- tience and restraint and it appears that the USSR is prepared to accept the status quo for the time being The USSR can afford to be patient being rmly convinced that time is on its side that the con icting interests of the capitalist powers will prevent any truly dangerous development and that the even- tual economic collapse of the capitalist world will present new revolutionary opportunities Meanwhile the revolution has succeeded in Asia to the extent that it has been able to identify itself with the dominant political force in that region a nationalistic reaction against Western imperialism In the Philip- pines India and latterly Indonesia where na- tionalism 'has been satis ed in cooperation with the West Communism has not prevailed Nevertheless Communism has prevailed in China the outcome in Southeast Asia re TOP 20 TOP ver mains in doubt and the USSR has no reason to be dissatis ed with the situation and pros-' pects In Eastern Europe with the exception of Finland and Yugoslavia the USSR has estab- lished a degree of control comparable to that which it exercises over its constituent repub- lics It is signi cant that although the USSR could have imposed its will on these countries in the role of a military conqueror it deemed it preferable to do so ostensibly through the processes of internal revolution In the case of Finland where these-processes could not be made to work the USSR has re- frained from military coercion although it could have exercised that power with impu- nity but not without discrediting its revolu- tionary pretensions befOre the world The defection of Yugoslavia is a matter of gravest concern to the USSR not merely be- cause of the loss 'of Yugoslavia itself or even because of the bad example set in Eastern Europe but because ultimately it threatens Soviet control of the revolutionary potential of Communism everywhere outside of the area of Soviet territorial domination It is conse- quently a matter of primary importance that Tito be overthrown and a Stalinist orientation restored in Yugoslavia Yet even in so urgent a matter as this the USSR is proceeding on a basis of conspiracy and apparently internal revolution rather than by direct military aggression - Over and above the Soviet policy with re- spect to particular situations the general So- viet policy in the postwar world appears to be to apply in international relations the proved techniques of internal revolutiOn and the class struggle Thus the USSR has injected into its diplomatic relationships with the Western Powers the language tactics and propaganda of the revolutionist But this conduct so foreign to traditional diplomatic practice does not in itself imply an intent of the Soviet state to launch a military attack upon the governments which it is trying to subvert By analogy to a revolutionary sit- uation in one country the global effort of the USSR is to 1 Sow disillusionment and disaffection among the masses throughout the capitalist world 2 Promote antagonisms among capitalist states deprive them of effective means of mutual support and in particular to dis- credit the leadership of the United States in international affairs and disrupt the means whereby it exerts its in uence 3 Provide revolutionary organization and leadership prepared to act wherever revolu- tionary situations develop The conclusion to be derived from this con- sideration of Soviet postwar policy is that the altered power position of the USSR in the postwar world has not caused the Soviet rulers to deviate from the course prescribed by Rus- sian tradition and Communist doctrine Their objective is still a Communist world order under their own domination Their preferred method of attaining it is still in ternal revolution as revolutionary situations develop 7 Conclusions The Communist foundations of the modern Soviet state the revolutionary character and background of its leaders military men are de nitely subordinated and the peculiar fea- tures of its diplomacy and propaganda sug- gest strongly that the preferred objective of Soviet policy is to achieve through the instru ment of international Communism supported by Soviet diplomacy and propaganda a Com- munist world under Soviet leadership rather than to conquer the world by military force In terms of basic Marxist concepts of histori cal evolution developed by Lenin and Stalin into an operating and tactical procedure as well the USSR is using international Com- munism supported by the threat of Soviet power to speed up the inevitable historical development by which the capitalist world according to doctrine will collapse as a result of its inherent contradictions Actual Soviet policy however in working toward this objective will obviously re ect a of Marxist and traditional power considerations Soviet leaders recognize that they are pursuing their objectives of a world Communist revolution within the context of a TOP nd traditional power rivalry in a world in which power has not become polarized They expect the capitalist states to be fully prepared to use - military force either to support their imperi- alistic-aims or in a nal attempt to stave off 'collapse Military power and strategic con- siderations are therefore essential concomi- - tents of their revolutionary approach They recognize fully both the value of a strong military force in being as an adjunct to their revolutionary operations and the necessity of being prepared to defend the USSR and its revolutionary gains against capitalist attack In pursuing their revolutionary objectives therefore they keep clearly in mind at the same time the strategic position of the USSR in relation to a possible armed con ict and View changes in the strategic position of their adversaries particularly the in similar terms Thus the military strength of the Soviet Union appears to be presently committed basi- cally for the defense of the revolutionary base in the USSR and for the support of the world revolution only insofar as such support does not involve the USSR in a war that would en- danger its security or con ict with its revolu- tionary pretensions Only if the USSR should gain military superiority in over-all mili- tary potential over the US and its allies and at the same time should lose con dence in the Marxist concept of the inevitable disintegra- tion of the capitalist world and hence in its ability ultimately to attain its objectives by revolutionary methods are Soviet leaders likely deliberately to resort to direct military action against the US and its allies This lat- ter conclusion should be quali ed in the light of the possibilities inherent in atomic warfare as discussed elsewhere in the paper ENCLOSURE EFFECTS OF THE POSSESSION OF THE ATOMIC BOMB UPON THE USSR AND SOVIETJPOLICY I Effect upon the Attitudes of Soviet Leaders and Population 1 Possession of the atomic bomb has prob- ably reduced somewhat the so-called fear and inferiority complex of Soviet leaders They have now eliminated or are in a posi- tion to eliminate a major element of weakness in their international power position At the Same time they may have some apprehension that the Us will launch a preventive war be- fore they can build up an adequate stockpile of atomic bombs There is no reasonable basis for estimating at this time however whether the possession of the bomb will tend to make Soviet leaders more reasonable or more intransigent It seems probable that as the USSR acquires a stockpile of bombs it may be willing to assume greater risks in its diplomatic disputes with the Western Powers Although'the Soviet Union has played down the importance of the atomic bomb in its domestic propaganda the announcement that the USSR now has the bomb should have a reassuring effect upon the apprehensions of the Soviet population concerning a new war 2 E ect upon the Soviet Approach to the Con- trol of Atomic Energy a Does the USSR genuinely desire to elim- inate the atomic bomb as a weapon of war While no positive answer can be given to this question and many arguments can be ad- vanced pro and con it would at least appear that on balance the destruction of existing stockpiles of bombs and the prohibition of further production would be militarily ad vantageous to the USSR except with respect to the possibility of a direct attack upon the continental US 1 The elimination of the bomb would leave Soviet ground strength supreme on the Eurasian continent Soviet military capabil- ities would therefore be relatively increased and at the same time the USSR could launch a war in Europe or Asia without danger of an atomic attack upon its industrial resources 2 The elimination of the bomb would de- prive the US of its sole means of a possibly decisive attack upon the Soviet Union It would corre3pondingly reduce the con dence of Western Europe in the value of US support b However even if the USSR appraises the situation in these terms it seems highly im- probable that it will be willing to accept in- ternational ownership and control of atomic energy production or an unrestricted system of international inspection as long as its con- cepts of security and sovereignty remain as they are today It might be willing however to reach an agreement which did not provide for international Ownership and control but which included the limited inspection pro- gram outlined in present Soviet atomic pro- posals c The Soviet Union however may well re- new pressure for an international agreement to outlaw the use of the atomic bomb 1 Regardless of how it appraises the ef- fect of the possible use of the bomb upon its power position it might regard an agreement to outlaw the bomb as advantageous The Soviet Union would remain free to build up its stockpile at any rate considered desirable and would obtain protection against a US atomic attack in the meantime If it cor- rectly estimates US public opinion it will probably consider that the US Will live up to the agreement in the event war breaks out and that the US will therefore lose the in itiative The USSR on the other hand could in the event of war either abide by the agree ment and capitalize upon its predominant ground strength in con dence that the US would not use the atomic bomb or Jom i M--u s than 24 sired could violate the agreement and launch 5a surprise attack thereby gaining the initia- tive 3 once with the requirements of an agreement last war would probably depend upon an ap- In the last analysis however compli- praisal of the value of the attack as compared with the losses from retaliation 2 The Soviet Union purely for propa ganda purposes might also make the pro posal to outlaw the use of the bomb in anti i- pation that the Western Powers would turn it down A Soviet estimate of such a reaction might be based upon two factors 1 the con sistent requal of the Western Powers in the UN to agree to any Soviet preposals on control of atomic energy and a possible convic- tion that the US was basing its military strat- egy so rmly upon the use of the atomic bomb as to be unwilling to outlaw it A refusal of the Western Powers'to agree to a Soviet pro- posal to outlaw the bomb would give the So'- viet Union a telling point in its peace' cam- paign and would tend to con rm the USSR in the belief that the USactually planned o en- sive atomic warfare 3 Probable Effect upon Soviet Policy under 0 Condition of Cold War a The announcement that the USSR pos- sessed the atomic bomb has not yet produced any apparent change in Soviet policy or tac- tics The USSR has merely integrated the fact of its possession of the bomb into its gen- eral propaganda and its peace offensive Soviet propaganda has emphasized that So- viet possession of the bomb is an important factor in the preservation of peace It ends the period of US atomic diplomacy and spoils the plans of the Western aggressors to launch an atomic war The point is also stressed that the USSR will concentrate on the development of atomic energy for peace- ful purposes I It is estimated that the USSR will not signi cantly alter its policy or tactics as a result of its acquisition of the atomic bomb before the end of 1950 at the earliest How- ever assuming that there is no agreement either to outlaw or eliminate the bomb Soviet capabilities for the cold war will be enhanced - offensive 131 The USSR can use its possession of the bomb to develop a number of threatening propa- ganda lines within the context of its peace Peace Congresses and Commu- nist-front organizations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions the World Feder- ation of Democratic Youth and the various Soviet friendship societies as well as direct Soviet propaganda can now play on the fol- lowing promising themes in an effort to de- tach non-Communist countries from their al liance to the US to bring pressure on the Western powers to accept Soviet proposals for the control of atomic energy or to neutralize the US bomb by creating mass pressures against its use in the event of war 1 The USSR is now capable of retaliating in kind against Western atomic aggressors Therefore those 'who lend themselves to the aggressive plans of-the US are dragging their people to atomic destruction 2 The horrors of atomic war require that all peoples support the Soviet proposals to abolish the atomic bomb and destroy all exist- ing stockpiles 3 Soviet possession of the atomic bomb has greatly strengthened the peace front in relation to the Western aggressors 4 US support of Western Europe has now lost its value Soviet possession of the atomic bomb and the proximity of Western European countries to the USSR suggest the advisability of more friendly relations with the USSR 5 US plans to use the UK and other British territories as bases for atomic war- fare will force the USSR to consider the British Isles a primary target in the event the Western aggressors start a war mean that the UK would be quickly wiped out 6 The US no longer has an A bomb monopoly Therefore its war-mongering leaders must change their foreign policy which has been based on this monOpoly When the USSR acquires what it con- siders an operational stockpile of bombs its capabilities for employing threats and intimi dation through diplomatic channels in an ef- fort to detach individual states from the West- TOP This would i 25 em bloc wiJl be considerably increased With the exception of the UK the US and possibly Japan however this increased capability will not result from apprehension on the part of these states that they will be directly attacked by atomic bombs but rather from the in- creased Soviet military capabilities vis-a-vis the US and from general apprehension con- cerning the effects of an atomic war The USSR could not expect that the threat of direct atomic attack would carry particular weight against those stabs which estimated that a Soviet attack would bring the US into a war and that under those circumstances their territories would not be of su lcient stra- tegic importance to justify the use against them of the limited Soviet supply of atomic bombs 7 you m 4 ln mm-v um M - TOP RET ENCLOSURE OUTSIDE THEIJSSR OF SOVIET ATOMIC CAPABILITIES I General Except with respect to the US the UK and possibly Japan the signi cance'of the atomic bomb as a factor in - determining the align- ment of nations in the East-West struggle and the will to resist Soviet aggression lies pri- marily in its potential enhancement of Soviet military power vis-a-vis the US rather than in serious apprehension on the part of these nations that it will be used against them The USSR would not use the bomb it is be- lieved in any localized war and in the event of war with the US it would reserve the bomb for the main strategic targets in the UK the US and possibly Japan 2 Effects through I950 a The reaction of the outside world to So- viet possession of the atomic bomb has been generally calm It appears unlikely that this new Soviet military capability will of itself bring about changes in the international policies or attitudes of any principal nation at least through 1950 b The current US programs to counter So- viet aggression will continue to receive local support I - c The loss of the US atomic monopoly- which had been regarded as in itself a deter- rent to any Soviet military move will accele- rate the e orts of the North Atlantic Treaty countries to build up the -Westem European defense system Increasing realization of the importance of building up the conventional military strength of Western Europe will prob- ably lead to demands for larger amounts of US equipment and for further US commit ments for the active defense of Western Eu- rope It may also lead either within this pe- riod or subsequently to an agreement for at least limited restoration of German military power and the inclusion of Western Germany along with Spain in the NAT d IntheUKtherewillbeno signi cant pressure during this period for a reorientation of British foreign policy and no weakening of - support for continued reliance on a close US- UK strategic and economic relationship However re ective British opinion is showing increasing concern with the implications of the Soviet possession of the bomb and the greater vulnerability will become a more important consideration in British military and civilian thinking This may lead to a more persistent demand than elsewhere for a compromise solution on atomic control ac- ceptable to the USSR and to a reluctance to accept any US proposal which the UK may think could provoke the USSR into using armed force against the Western Powers e In the other areas of the world only the Japanese feel themselves directly threatened by the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb They have a peculiarly strong desire for the achievement of some effective international control of atomic weapons If a peace treaty is negotiated during this period the absence of- an international atomic agreement will probably make the Japanese more insistent in their demands for permission to rearm and for rm assurances of US military and eco- nomic support Similarly if the Japanese fail to obtain these assurances or lack con - dence in their effectiveness the resultant tendency toward neutrality or alignment with Communist Asia and the USSR would be in- creased Elsewhere the atomic bomb will be effective primarily as a factor of over-all So viet power and as an element in increasing somewhat the effectiveness of Soviet propa- ganda f There will be increasing pressure for es tablishment of effective atomic control from both within and without the UN but except for the outside operations of Communist front organizations and some intellectuals the Tquns'r 27 CV 2 7 bin M63 USSR will be under greater pressure to modify its position than will the g The non-Communist majority through- out the satellite states of Eastern Europe w l be discouraged because they will probably as- sume that the loss of the US atomic monopoly and the corresponding increase in the Soviet military potential reduce the chances of a Western'attack upon the USSR in which they have placed their prirnary hope of liberation Moscow s control over its satellites will be somewhat strengthened but it will secure no real advantage'in its campaign to regain domination over Yugoslavia World Commu- nists will be encouraged and will be more stri-' dent in their propaganda They will not however obtain an appreciable increase in their popular support 1 In areas where there is already a lean- ing toward neutrality there will be an in- crease in this tendency 3 Period 1950-56 05 the USSR Approaches an Operational Sfockpile The longer range effects of the addition of the atomic bomb to Soviet military capabili- ties will depend in large measure upon the extent and soundness of European economic and military recovery and upon the policy and strength of the US If present efforts to restore the economic and military strength of Western Europe fall short of their goals there will develop a strong though not necessarily decisive move- ment for accommodation or neutrality If at the same time there are indications of a seri- ous weakening in US strength or in its com- mitments to resist Soviet aggression the movement for accommodation or neutrality would probably become decisive Assuming that US support of its NAT allies and Japan remains rm and that the eco- nomic and military recovery of Europe is ac- complished on a rm and stable basis there will be a strong probability that the non-So- - 28 TOP CRET viet states including the UK and Japan will remain rm in their alignments with the US if the Soviet Union should threaten atomic warfare when it has attained an operational stockpile of bombs or if a deterioration in re- lations between the USSR and the Westem Powers suggested that an atomic war was im- minent In the latter circumstances the UK would be strongly in uenced by its appraisal of the issues at stake it would not be inclined to follow the US unless it considered these is sues vital to its security In the nal analysis however the future public appraisal of the signi cance of the atomic bomb will probably be the determining factor in the will to re- sist It is impossible at this time to predict with any assurance what this appraisal will be In general three alternative trends ap- pear possible of development in the interim a Increasing fear of the effects of an atomic struggle may have produced in all countries but particularly in the UK US and Japan an irresistible organized popular demand for re- newed efforts to bring about an agreement be- tween the US and the USSR for at least the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons If under these circumstances this objective were not attained it must be considered possible that the UK and Japan because of their ex- treme vulnerability could be detached from the US camp and that the US public might force an accommodation with the USSR 13 The concept may become generally ac- cepted that the threat of mutual retaliation will preclude the use of the bomb by either side Under these circumstances the effects of Soviet atomic capabilities would be neg- ligible c The present public attitude of indiffer- ence or relative unconcern may continue or a strong determination to resist regardless of consequences may develop Under either of these circumstances the countries concerned would probably stand rm in their alignment with the US APPENDIX A DISSENT BY THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENT OF STATE The Intelligence Organization of the De- partment of State dissents from the subject paper - The subject paper indicates that except under extreme and apparently unlikely circumstances the USSR will 'not deliber- ately employ military force in its struggle against the US We do not possess evidence which suggests that the now planning to launch a military attack on the US Neither do we possess evidence or have reason to believe that at any given date the USSR will with certainty decide to launch a military assault on the We do not consider however that lack of evidence of a Soviet intention to use military force on the US can be taken as evidence of the absence of such a Soviet intention The subject paper states that the burden of proof of a Soviet intention to resort to world military conquest lies on those who would assert that this is the Soviet intention We believe that this statement reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the prob- lem which faces us at the present time It is accepted by all intelligence agencies of' the government that the Soviet Union s basic ob- jective is to establish a Communist world - under Soviet domination It is also accepted that Soviet leaders will employ any methods and tactics which in their mind offer promise of success Prior to the Soviet development of an atomic weapon it was generally agreed that an early Soviet military attack on the West was unlikely if not precluded because of the preponderance of strength which its economic potential and its atomic monopoly gave the West With Soviet possession of an atomic weapon this particular assumption obviously is subject to reconsideration In the interest 'of thenational security therefore we are faced with the necessity of answering the question Is there evidence on the basis of which it can be assumed that Soviet leaders will not resort to military ac- tion against the US now that they possess an atomic weapon The subject paper recognizes many aspects of the crucially important potential of the A-bomb in expanding Soviet capabilities but it fails to bring into focus the problem of whether or not this development will have a decisive effect on Soviet policy and intentions While it recognizes numerous conditioning factors it takes the position that the USSR is still unlikely to employ military force in its struggle with the West This position is based upon arguments to the effect that a Communist ideology rigidly prescribes re- liance upon the international Communist ap- paratus rather than upon employment of So viet armed forces for the attainment of a Communist world dominated by the USSR and b Russian imperial history reveals that Russian expansionism has traditionally been cautious and has not been pursued at the risk of a military clash with a major power Considering the import to US defense and foreign policy of an assurance that the USSR is not likely to resort to military action we consider these arguments undependable The rst argument is in direct contradiction to earlier assertion in the CIA paper that the USSR in pursuit of its objective will wage a relentless unceasing struggle against the in which any weapon or tactic is admis sible which promises success in terms of over- all Soviet objectives and that nothing in the paper should be interpreted to imply that Soviet leaders would not resort to military action at any time they considered it ad- vantageous to do so Furthermore this emphasis upon revolutionary policy not only rests upon a doubtful interpretation of the extremely complex question of the role of the USSR as the rst socialist state in effecting TOVRET 29 30 world revolution but also assumes a rigidity in tactics in the means to be employed in reaching a xed objective comparable to the rmness with which that objective itself is held an assumption which is demonstrably false The second argument that a resort to mili- tary action by the USSR is precluded by the fact that Russia since time immemorial has been cautious in its foreign policy is based upon a misreading or the actual historical facts Russian history is characterized by neither recklessness nor caution in foreign affairs but a mixture of recklessness and caution depending upon the circumstances existing at a given time and on the make up of the rulers in power Russian rulers can no more be generally dubbed cau- tious than can the rulers of Prussia Moreover it is questionable that the pattern of Russian history under the Tsars is in itself a safe guide by which to predict the actions of Soviet leaders The danger of accepting these arguments as a basis for assuming the line of action which Soviet leaders will follow is illustrated by the subject paper itself At a time when all evidence indicates increasingly militant activity on the part of the USSR in virtually all areas of the world the paper asserts that the existing situation is one in which both Russian tradition and Communist doctrine counsel patience and restraint and it appears that the USSR is prepared to accept the status quo for the time being The USSR can af ford to be patient being rmly convinced that time is on its side that the con icting inter- ests of the capitalist powers will prevent any truly dangerous development and that the eventual economic collapse of the capitalist world will present new revolutionary oppor tunities The Intelligence Organization of the De partment of State has reached the following ECRET conclusions as to Soviet intentions regarding the deliberate use of military force in the So viet struggle against the non-Communist world 1 There is at present no evidence which in- dicates a Soviet determination at any given time to employ military force against the non- Communist world 2 The Soviet Union is however engaged in what is considers to be a life-and-death struggle with the non-Communist world In this struggle Soviet leaders can be expected to employ any weapon or tactic which prom- ises success - 3 The only sound test by which to judge Soviet intentions to resort to military action is therefore the pragmatic test of whether or not such action would at a given moment ap- pear advantageous to the Soviet Union 4 Prior to Soviet development of an atomic weapon all evidence indicated that the pre- ponderance of strength enjoyed by the US in consequence of its over-all economic superior- ity and its atomic monopoly made unlikely a Soviet estimate that it would be to the ad- vantage of the USSR to resort to military action 5 Soviet development of an atomic weapon may have decisively changed this situation particularly if surprise employment of the weapon could sharply reduce retaliatory ac- tion or make it impossible The subject report does not effectively deal with this possibility of a change We feel that the report confuses the issues on Soviet motives and leaves unclear the new balance of factors which will probably determine the Soviet estimate of the advantage the USSR could gain through a deliberate employment of military forces TOP CRET APPENDIX DISSENT BY THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF 6-2 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 1 The Assistant Chief of Staff 6 2 dis- sents with the subject paper It is recom- mended that this paper- be withdrawn and JIC 502 be substituted therefor as a basis for - resolving di erences in attitude and opinion The differences of opinion are considered to be so divergent that it is impractical to con- sider resolving them on the basis of the pres- ent paper 2 This dissent is based on the following a The threat of Soviet aggression is mini- mized to the point where dissemination of the paper and its use for planning purposes could seriously a ect the security of the United States A major portion of the paper is de- voted to developing the thesis that it is un- justi able to assume that the USSR de - nitely intends to resort to military aggression involving the United States This portion of the paper is unrealistic and not germane to the problem The conclusions as they apply to the prob- abilities of war are developed apart from any consideration of the atomic bomb 3 2 last sentence in spite of the fact that the statement of the problem 3 I requires such consideration b The second major difference of opinion is the manner in which the subject matter contained in the enclosure is presented Re- nements of logic and multiplicity of alterna- tives make the paper extremely dif cult to understand As a study it fails to reach clear cut conclusions TOP 31 V 51 low To nr APPENDIX DISSENT BY THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE l The Of ce of Naval Intelligence dissents from ORE 91-49 2 The discussion enclosures A through D is generally in accordance with ONI's views but it is not considered that the Summary and Conclusions are properly drawn from the en- closures The following comments are there- fore directed primarily toward the Summary and Conclusions There is no integrated analysis of what the effects of Soviet possession of atomic WeaPons will be Instead there is an exami- nation based on several mutually exclusive hypotheses From these hypotheses one may choose estimates which range from no change in Soviet policy to basic and alarming changes in that policy It is noted that one argument in ORE 91-49 rests on extremely hypothetical specu- lations as to what might happen if the Soviet leaders abandoned their Marxist view of the eventual collapse of Capitalism and imperialism There is at present no indica- tion that the So'viets are losing con dence in their Marxist philosophy and furthermore there is no basis on which to predict what their pelicies might he should they abandon that philosophy The hypothesis that a major war may result from miscalculation is considered in the light of recent events to be unrealistic If either the US or the USSR should let an incident or diplomatic imPasse develop into a war it is considered that such a war as well as the incident or the impasse would re- sult from a plan not from a blunder In many instancesORE 91-49 exceeds the bounds of intelligence and draws infer- ences and conclusions of an operational and planning nature 33 TOP RET APPENDIX DISSENT BY THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES FORCE 1 The following comment concentrates on the-one point which the USAF considers of such overriding importance as to make the CIA estimate ORE 91-49 dangerous as an in- telligence basis for national policy 2 The Director of Intelligence USAF be- lieves the primary reason why the Kremlin has not resorted to military action against the United States to date is the fact that the Kremlin has believed and still continues to believe it is operating from an inferior power position ORE 91 49 therefore failed to point out the full and true character of the Soviet threat Unless the full and true char- acter of this threat is pointed out Soviet total relative power may be permitted to grow to the point where the U S can no longer cope with it successfully 3 Subject paper states that the USSR regards the U S as its main opponent it will wage against the U S a relentless un ceasing struggle in which any weapon or tac- tie is admissible and that nothing in the paper should be construed as implying that the Soviet leaders would not resort to mili tary action at any time they considered it advantageous to do so While these state ments in the opinion of the are correct as far as they go the rest of the subject paper actually weakens and contradicts this original position 4 The paper completely misses the inter- relationship between war and revolution It does not realize as the Soviets do that a great power such as the U S cannot be overthrown by revolution alone but that revolution can be the result only of a preceding war It therefore overlooks the fact that Soviet policy aims above all at preparing for the show down war against the United States Therefore the rst line of U S defense is not as the paper suggests - the restoration of international stability and the maintenance of a sound in- ternal structure but is to recognize that we 3% b d h j are at war right now and that an all-out na- tional effort designed to maintain permanent military and political superiority over the So- viet Union is required 5 The paper begs the issue under discus- sion when it states that there appears to be no rm basis for an assumption that the USSR presently intends deliberately to use military force if this involves war with a potenti- ally stronger Actually there is a very rm basis for the assumption that they would do no such thing simply because an aggres- sor has never resorted to war if he were sure that he would lose The problem at issue is whether the acquisition of an atomic capability has provided the Soviet Union for the rst time in history with a clear-cut capa- bility that would enable them to win the war against the and whether under con- ditions of atomic warfare the lack of instantly available American military power vitiates the importance of the great American war potential Another no less important prob lem would be to determine how the Soviets will integrate the atomic bomb into their tra- ditional strategy and tactics To this prob- lem ORE 91-49 does not address itself 6 The USAF sets forth the following for the record a Communist thinking from Marx to Stalin clearly recognizes the inter-relation- ship between war and revolution and speci - cally the fact that no major revolution is feasible without war b The Soviets are clearly on record that 1 they consider the Soviet Union as an opera tional base and 2 they consider the Red Army as the main weapon of the proletariat The Soviets know that they have never ex-' panded beyond their frontiers without the use of military means all the territories taken by them were taken by the Red Army or a satellite force Tito Mao 35 36 c In Problems of Leninism Stalin stated clearly that capitalism can be overthrown only by violence and ultimately only by war Actually the theory that capitalism will fall of its own weight has never been Stalin's idea 'and there is much evidence that he has op- posed this concept as ideological deviation- ism d The Soviets made a major contribution to the outbreak of World War II They did nothing to prevent that war and everything to make it a reality e There are numerous recent statements by Soviet authorities to the effect that World War I produced Communism in Russia that World War 11 produced Communism'in East- ern Europe and China and that World War will see theyictory of Comnlunism throughout the world f There is ample reason to believe that the Kremlin regards its growing atomic capability to be the major force which will eventually place them in position to liquidate the center of hard-core opposition the United States- utilizing all means at their disposal including military action TOP ECRET H- Afr lg EL 1 Uni Ema G LC This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu