JlMNIY DARTER UBRARY MANDATORY RHODY CASE 4 NLC XIE IORANDUIIII DOCUMENT iiATIOiNAL 5916 4 SECURITY COUI ICIL October 11 1979 INFORMATION FOR K21ORANDUM ZBIFNIEW BRZEZINSKI FROM ROBERT PASTOPQ i SUBJECT Reaction to Chile's Decision on Letelier -- Item foz VBB C I have never been comfoztable with the way State has handled the Letelier case They have conducted virtually all their business accounts on this case through Stadis channels and that in pa to the transformation of the unable comprehend have been foz why I U S from government to prosecutor to judge which is wheze we aze Having been burned on this issue at the beginning w currently myself in the process since But I believe m I have not inserted he time to insert ourselves has arrived and so I welcome your no e on Harold Brown's memo C t LII I have just rec'eived a draft decision memo which State is work'ng on for Vance and it includes nineteen specific sanctions to Chile rom which Vance can select to convey our displeasure Harold Brown's memo ins'sting that we keep our attaches and m lgzoup represents only DOD's ox which they naturally want to protect There are 18 other oxen options include remove our - bassador remove Peace Corps raise the issue of Chilean te rorism at tne UN terminate all business by the Expozt-Import Bank support legislation to cut off all private loans etc Frankly Harold Brown's concerns pale alongside the othe- options I would much sooner pull our milgroup and attac es than cut all private loans but that's beside the point for the moment C I don't see we answer how we can move into a discussion three fundamental questions of sanctions before 'ustification can we be displeased with the Court's Chilean deciszon The Chileans clarm that their is independent and that the evidence before it was Judzczary insufficient to try the three Chileans We will need to make a very credible case that either of those t o propositions is alse That case may exist but I haven't seen it yet and I have asked repeatedly for it C 1 By what Supreme Review on 10 11 85 2 To make a really powerful case I suspect one will need of cultural to find a vehicle to transport us over the chasm arrogance -- namely b what ri ht can the U 'S' ''State De artment 'ud e another government' s laws and court My prima facie answer to that question is there is no such right but I realize these are extraordinary times and the Letelier assassination crime but we still need a vehicle to cross was an extraordinary that great divide I believe that Vance and Civiletti ought to appoint a three-person judicial advisory team -- preferably an international team 1 American 1 Latin 1 European to advise If Christophez is us on the merits of the Chilean decision right that the Chilean decision is without any justification then the team will give our case a little bit moze standing C 3 What are our' ob'ectives in the Leteliez case in U S -- I would presume that we would Chilean relations and overall address this question after the first two and before we decide Unfortunately we seem to be which sanctions to approve doing the last first C question on objectives has not been answered to shock the Chileans into trying the three terrortrying we that the final decision on a trial has or do accept ists is negative If the latter is the case then our been made and objective would presumably be to convey disrleasure or to as an international landmark for other es-aaais adeterrent g Anyway we ne'ed' a' systematic answer to this cuestion assuming that we receive satisfactory answers to the first two C Even the simplest Are we 'gp p T is going to chair a ecting I have just learned that Christopher at 9 00 a m on Friday to go over the options and I will use nat as an opoortunity to ask the three questions above I I believe it would hope you will also ask Vance them at lunch be hetter if you asked him rather than officially tasked State to answer these auestions because I am not et c rtain that we want to cet the White House into formally making the decisions on this case C With regards to Harold Brown's memo I am extremely disappointed that he signed his name to it The suggestion that if we pull out our milgroup or the attaches we will lose valuable intelligence or worse we might even lose the Southern Cone to the Soviets is absolute nonsense First of all I am not aware of any valuable intelligence we could lose by pulling them Secondly I think the best way to communicate our policy to a government like Chile is at a low and diplomatic level More often than not the Chileans use ou military to serve their interests rather than' the ether way around Finally the I FIDE vT AD I iX' suggestion that the Cone could go left is ludicrous that be the best way to provoke a coup The foundation of these governments is anti-Communism They have nowhere to That's but they continuously seek contact with us why go us and approval if possible and that's why we have a fair amount of influence over them C would the Soviets which Brown notes the Argentines have such an balance with the Soviets that the Soviets that they might be interested in buying something as well as just selling Secondly the Argentine military machine is voracious they may have spent as much as S2 billion in the last year on arms It is possible that they might seek something from the Soviets that they couldn't get elsewhere but I' don't think we ought to cater to that appetite just to prevent them from doing that Thirdly the invitation was a crude and obvious ploy to give our military an argument to use to beat up on our human rights people Our attache probably learned about it before the Soviets did Anotnez good reason why we shouldn't hesitate about pulling these guys it's not clear which government they' re invitation by Argentina to foz three purposes First extraordinarily one-sided trade occasionally they have to show The was working for C Anyway I'm not asking you to ignore Harold Brown's concerns only that you put them in a broader context and see them for what they are bureaucratically self-serving I would hope that we could get State to answer the three questions above and then if necessazy we could Suggest a ranking of sanctions C cc Henry Owen Jim Cochzane This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu