SE C R E T TH E W H ITE HO USE WASH IN G T O N S ep tem b er 1 1961 M EMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDEN T The Cuban Task F o r c e m et at the White H ouse on T h u rsday A ugust 31 P r e s e n t w e re Under S e c r e ta r y B a ll A ss ista n t S e c r e t a r y W oodw ard two m e m b e r s o f the A R A B ureau D ick B is s e ll T ra cy B a rn es and m y s e lf The follow in g d e c is io n s w e re m ade 1 W e w ould p r o c e e d im m e d ia te ly to d is c u s s with oth er C a r r ib e a n g o v e rn m en ts the p o s s ib ility o f org a n isin g a C a rrib e a n S e cu rity F o r c e This cou ld be o rg a n iz e d on the b a s is o f in fo rm a l understan din gs w ithin the fra m e w o rk o f existin g treaty a rra n g em en ts as a s e r ie s o f new b ila te r a l tr e a tie s o r a fo r m a l m u ltila te ra l tre a ty It w as thought that the b a s is o f org a n iza tion w ou ld depend on the ju dgm en t o f oth er C a rrib e a n c o u n tr ie s as to how they c o u ld a c c o m p lis h the o b je c tiv e o f esta b lish in g the f o r c e w ithout running s e r io u s internal p o litic a l r is k s The United S tates fo r its p a rt w ould p r e fe r the fo rm a l m u lti-la te r a l arra n gem en t Such a C a r r ib e a n S e cu rity F o r c e w ou ld have at le a s t fo u r m a jo r a s p e c ts 1 A dvance com m ittm en t to co m e to the aid o f oth er s ig n a to rie s threatened by C a stro revolu tion s and p erh a p s the design ation o f s p e c ific units fo r p a rticip a tio n in n e c e s s a r y m u lti-la te r a l a ction s 2 The esta b lish m en t o f a p o o l o f in te llig e n ce in fo rm a tio n c o n cern in g s u b v e rs iv e a ctiv itie s with p r o v is io n fo r exchange of such in form a tion 3 The establish m en t o f a C a rrib e a n a ir and s e a p a tro l to watch fo r su sp ected in filtra tion o f C a stro a rm s o r agen ts 4 A training p r o g r a m in com batting s u b v e r siv e ta c tic s p o lic e organ ization and p r o ce d u r e e tc It was con ced ed that the substantive a sp ects o f this arran gem en t cou ld if n e c e s s a r y be a ch ieved in fo rm a lly H ow ever the d e c is io n to seek a m ore fo r m a l arrangem ent w as p r im a r ily a rriv e d at on the b a s is of internal p o litica l con sid era tion s in the United States DECLASSIFIED J fk jl h o J K P ' - M S F M 4 4 F iA k 5 S CjJatK i GBP e n J L c U l o g r -p - PUBLISHED IN FftUS v o i_ X _____ occ o a 3 # -- By J U S L -- NAfiA J Q 25- SBCRET- - 2 - 2 It was decided that our public posture toward Cuba should be as quiet as p o ssib le - - trying to ignore Castro and his island 3 Our co v e rt activities would now be directed toward the destruction of targets important to the econom y e g refin eries plants using U S equip m ent etc This would be done within the general fram ew ork of covert opera tions - - which is based on the principle that p ara-m ilitary activities ought to be ca r r ie d out through Cuban revolutionary groups which have a potential for establishing an effective political opposition to C astro within Cuba Within that p rin cip le we w ill do all we can to identify and suggest targets whose des truction w ill have the maximum econom ic impact 4 We w ill intensify our surveillance o f Cuban trade with other countries and e sp e cia lly U S subsidiaries in other countries and then employ informal methods to attempt to divert this trade - - depriving Cuba o f markets and so u rce s o f supply I understand that we have already had a few successes in this effort 5 We w ill establish next week - - in the State Department - - a psychological w arfare group This w ill be a full-tim e group of three or four people charged with the responsibility of assembling all available inform ation on the Sovietization of Cuba rep ression o f human rights failure o f the Cuban econom y etc - - much of which has been hitherto cla ssified - - putting this information into readable popularized form and developing methods o f disseminating it through Latin A m erica Such dissemination wouJc Se p rim a rily through USIA channels but would include feeding it to Latin papers for Mexclu siven stories helping to prepare scripts fo r Latin Am erican broadcasts perhaps a direct mailing list o f intellectuals and government officials to be handled by a front group etc The b a sic idea is to get this stuff into channels of Latin A m erican communica tion instead of treating it as official U S p'ropaganda We have selected som eone to head this effort - - Jim OfDonnell of G eorge B all s office who was a fre e -la n ce magazine w riter including work for the Saturday Evening Post for many years and who Ball highly recom m ends 6 The CIA was asked to com e up within the week - - with a p recise covert procedure for continuing the below-ground dialogue with the Cuban government The object of this dialogue - - to explore the possibility of a split within the governmental hierarchy of Cuba and to encourage such a split - - was fully de tailed in my last memorandum to you This is an effort to fin an operational technique Richard N Goodwin SECREtT 1 ___________ 3 3 ' M e m o r a n d u m i om the Pr e s i d e n t ' s A s s i s t a n t Special Counsel Goodwin to President o 1 O Q j y W a s h ington September 1 1961 The Cuban Task F o r c e m et at the White H ouse on T hursday August 31 P resen t w ere Under S e cre ta ry B all A ssista n t S e c r e ta r y W oodward two m em b ers o f the A R A Bureau D ick B is s e ll T ra cy B arn es and m yself jj T h e follow ing d e cisio n s w ere m ade A l lj 1 We would p r o c e e d im m ed iately to d is c u s s w ith oth er C arribean g ov e rn ments the p o s s ib ility o f organisin g a C a rrib e a n S ecu rity F o r c e This could be organ ized on the b a sis o f in fo rm a l understandings within the fram ew ork o f existing treaty arran gem en ts as a s e r ie s o f new b ila te ra l tre a tie sf o r a form a l m u ltila tera l treaty It was thought that the b a sis o f organisation would depend on the judgm ent o f other C a rrib e a n cou n tries as to how they could a cco m p lish the o b je ctiv e o f estab lish in g the f o r c e without running seriou s internal p o litic a l risk s The United S tates fo r its part would p r e fe r the fo rm a l m u lti-la te r a l arrangem ent Such a C a rrib ea n Security F o r c e would have at le a s t fou r m a jo r a sp e cts J f 1 A dvance com m ittm en t to co m e to the aid o f other sign atories threatened by O c ft r o rev olu tion s and perh aps the designation o f s p e c ific units f o r p a rticip a tion in n e c e s s a r y m u lti-la te ra l actions 2 The establish m en t o f a p o o l o f in te llig e n ce in form ation con cern in g su b v e rsiv e a ctiv itie s with p r o v is io n fo r exchange o f such inform ation J fp 3 The establish m en t o f a C a rrib e a n a ir and sea p a trol to w atch fo r su sp ected in filtra tion o f C a stro a rm s o r agents J 4 A training p r o g ra m in com batting su b v e rsiv e ta c tic s p o lic e organ isation and p r o c e d u r e etc 4 i F 9Q 7 J f l I t was con ced ed that the substantive a sp ects o f this arrangem ent cou ld if n e ce ss a r y be a ch ieved in form ally H ow ever the d e c is io n to seek a m o re fo rm a l arrangem ent was p r im a r ily a r r iv e d at on the b a sis o f internal p o litica l con sid eration s in the United States Source Kennedy Library N a t i o n a l Security Piles Countries Series Cuba General 6 6lil2 61 Secret 3 a o h 2 It was decided that our public posture toward Cuba should be as quiet as possible -- trying to ignore C astro and his island 3 Our covert activities would now be directed toward the destruction of targets important to the econom y e g refin eries plants using U S equipmenti etc This would be done within tliB general fram ew ork of covert opera tions which is based on the principle that p a ra -m ilita ry activities ought to be carried out through Cuban revolutionary groups which have a potential for establishing an effective p olitica l opposition to C astro within Cuba Within that principle we w ill do all we can to identify and suggest targets whose des truction w ill have the m axim um econom ic impact % J 4 We will intensify our surveillance o f Cuban trade with other countries and especially U 5 subsidiaries in other countries and then employ informal methods to attempt to -divert this trade depriving Cuba o f markets sources of supply I understand that we have already had a few su ccesses in this effort r s T ' UIJ 5 We w ill establish next w eek 'i in the State Department a psychological w arfare group This w ill be a roll-tim e group o f three o r four people charged with the responsibility of assem bling all available inform ation on the S o v ie tin tion of Cuba rep ression o f human rights failure o f the Cuban economy etc n -- much o f which has been hith ertojclassified putting this information into readable popularised form and developing methods o f disseminating it through Latin Am erica ' Such dissem ination wouIt jTe p rim a rily through USLA channels but would include feeding it to Latin papers for e x clu s iv e 11 stories helping to prepare scripts for Latin A m erican broadcasts perhaps a direct mailing list o f intellectuals and governm ent officials to be handled by a front group etc The basic idea is to get this stuff into channels of Latin A m erican communica tion instead of treating it as o fficia l U S propaganda We have selected someone to head this effort Jim OtDonnell of G eorge B a ll's office who was a free-la n ce magasine w riter including work for the Saturday Evening Post for many years and who Ball highly recommends i l 6 The CIA was asked to com e up within the week - - with a p re cise covert procedure for continuing the below -ground dialogue with the Cuban government The object o f this dialogue to explore the possibility o f a split within the governmental hierarchy of Cuba and to encourage such a split -GBPo was fully d etailed in my last memorandum to you This is an effortt to fixw an operational ' technique d H Goodwin In i n p i r a n f c - r n f r a n -- 111emu I i om Ceodwl n -n r nm nn_ t U W V H s t ii Kennedy - a telephone c o n v e r s a t i o n with Ball on September 7 G o o d w i n said that he had gone over the results of the C u b a n task force meeting with the President The Pre s i d e n t had reviewed the m e m o r a n d u m u h t c h Goodwin had p r e p a r e d c o n c e r n i n g the meeting and had agreed with all of the things that we are d o i n g Goodwin said that the Pre s i d e n t w a n t e d to pl a y it very q uiet w i t h Castro b e c a u s e he didn't want to give Ca s t r o the o p p o r t u n i t y to blame the U h i U S h 4 ' for his troubles P r e s i d e n t K e n n e d y a s k e d for a study of the c u r r e n t e c o n o m i c s i t u a t i o n in Cuba and a pr o g n o s i s of future developments Ball i n d i c a t e d that he w o u l d get Rils m a n and I NR s t a r t e d on such a study Kennedy Library Ball Papers Subject Series Cuba 1 2 4 6 1 1 2 3 0 6 2 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu