o T e f -9 E C R E T THE WHITE HOUSE WASH IN G T O N EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESID EN T N o v e m b e r 1 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESID EN T I b e lie v e that the c o n ce p t o f a ''c o m m a n d o p e r a tio n fo r Cuba as d iscu sse d with you by the A ttorn ey G e n e ra l is the only e ffe c t iv e way to handle an a llout attack on the Cuban p r o b le m S in ce I u n d erstan d you a re fa v ora b ly d is p o s e d tow ard the id e a I w ill not d is c u s s why the p r e s e n t d is o rg a n iz e d and u n coord in ated o p e ra tio n cannot do the jo b e ffe c t iv e ly p 1 The beauty o f such an o p e ra tio n o v e r the next few m onths is that we cannot l o s e If the b e s t happens we w ill unseat C a s tr o If not then at least we w ill e m e r g e with a s tro n g e r u n d ergrou n d better p rop agan d a and a fa r c le a r e r id e a o f the d im en sion s o f the p r o b le m s w hich a ffe c t u s e l l The question then is who should head this o p e ra tio n I know o f no one cu rre n t ly in Cuban a ffa irs at the State D epartm ent who can do it N or is it a very g o o d idea to get the State D epartm ent in v olv ed in depth in su ch c o v e r t a c tiv i t ie s I do not think it should be ce n te re d in the C IA E ven if the CIA can find som eon e o f s u fficie n t f o r c e and statu re one o f the m a jo r p r o b le m s w ill be to revam p CIA op e ra tio n s and thinking - - and this w ill be v e r y hard to do fro m the in sid e I b e lie v e that the A tto rn ey G en era l w ould be the m o s t e ffe c t iv e com m an d er o f such an op era tion E ith er I or som eon e e ls e sh ou ld be a s sig n e d to him as Deputy fo r this a ctiv ity sin ce he ob v iou sly w ill not be able to devote full tim e to it The one danger h e re is that he m ight b e c o m e too c lo s e ly identified with what m ight not be a s u c c e s s fu l o p e ra tio n Indeed ch a n ce s o f s u c c e s s are very sp ecu la tiv e T h ere a re a few an sw ers to this S Cuknh C 1 E veryon e kn ow led geable in these a ffa ir s - - i n and out o f g ov ern m ent - - i s aw are that the United States is a lrea d y helping the underground The p r e c is e m anner o f aid m ay be unknown but the fa ct o f aid is com m on know ledge We w ill be b la m ed fo r not winning Cuba b a ck whether or not we have a com m a n d o p e r a tio n and whether o r not the A ttorn ey G eneral heads at E Y E S O N LY F O R THE P R E S ID E N T i -- b ' 'v U'O __________ jI M l5 t EYES ONLY FOR TH E PR ESID EN T - 2 - Z His r o le should be told to only a few people at the very top with m ost oGBP the contact work in carrying out his decisions being o t to s deputy IX that deputy is someone already c lo se ly identified w t t e con uc o f Cuban affairs then it would appear as if norm al channels are e ng o owe except that decisive attention would bo given to the decisions which came through those channels There are probably three or four peop e w cou fu lfill this criterion o This still leaves a substantial danger of identifying the A t t o r n e y General as the fellow in charge Tlxis danger must be weighed against t e increase effectiveness o f an operation under his command Richard N Goodwin E Y E S O N I- Y FOR T H E P R E SID E N T get Eda drain W Hm 9w 0 95 WA nn wt gum 0 no use T Q P 'O E C R E T TH E W H IT E HOUSE WASH I N G T O N EYES ONLY FOR THE PR E SID EN T N ov em b er I 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESID EN T I b e lie v e that the co n ce p t o f a c o m m a n d o p e r a tio n fo r Cuba as d iscu ssed w ith you by the A ttorn ey G e n e ra l is the on ly e ffe c t iv e way to handle an a llout attack on the Cuban p r o b le m S in ce I u n d ersta n d you a re favorably d is p o s e d tow ard the idea I w ill not d is c u s s why the p r e s e n t d iso rg a n ized and u n coord in a ted op era tion cannot do the jo b e ffe c t iv e ly The beauty o f such an o p e ra tio n o v e r the next fe w m onths is that we cannot l o s e If the b e st happens we w ill u n seat C a s t r o If not then at least we w ill e m e r g e with a stro n g e r u n dergrou n d b ette r p rop a g a n d a and a fa r c le a r e r id e a o f the d im en sion s o f the p r o b le m s w h ich a ffe c t u s The qu estion then is who should head this o p e r a tio n I know o f no one cu rren t ly in Cuban a ffa irs at the State D epartm ent who can do it N or is it a very g o o d idea to get the State D epartm ent in v o lv e d in depth in su ch c o v e r t a ctiv i t ie s I do not think it should be ce n te re d in the C IA Even if the CIA can find so m e o n e o f su fficien t fo r c e and statu re one o f the m a jo r p ro b le m s w ill be to reva m p CIA op eration s and thinking and this w ill be v e r y hard to do from the in sid e C tlU c b - I b e lie v e that the A ttorn ey G en era l w ould be the m o s t e ffe c tiv e com m ander o f such an op era tion E ither I o r s o m e o n e e ls e sh ou ld be a ssig n e d to him as Deputy fo r this a ctiv ity sin ce he o b v io u sly w ill not be able to devote full tim e to it The one danger h ere is that he m igh t b e c o m e too c lo s e ly identified with what m ight not be a s u c c e s s fu l o p e ra tio n In deed ch a n ces o f su cce s s are very sp e cu la tiv e T here a re a few a n sw ers to this 1 1 E veryon e kn ow ledgeable in th ese a ffa ir s - - i n and out o f govern m ent - - is aw are that the United States is a lre a d y helping the underground The p r e c is e m anner o f aid m ay be unknown but the fa ct o f aid is com m on know ledge We w ill be b la m ed fo r not winning Cuba back whether or not we have a com m a n d o p e ra tio n and w hether o r not the A ttorn ey General heads it# EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT e a9' l ' Y ' - _________ J __ 1 ___ y I w i # $1 l o t o--ooaii ---- -jr ' EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDEN T - 2 - 2 His r o le should be told to on ly a few p e op le at the v e ry top with m o s t o f the con ta ct w ork in c a r r y in g out his d e c is io n s being le ft to his deputy If that deputy is som eon e a lre a d y c l o s e l y id en tified with the conduct o f Cuban a ffa ir s then it would appear as if n o rm a l channels a re being follow ed e x c e p t that d e c is iv e attention w ould be g iv e n to the d e c is io n s w hich cam e th rou gh th o se ch a n n els T here a r e p r o b a b ly th ree o r fou r p eop le who could fu lfill this c r it e r io n T his s t ill le a v e s a substantial danger o f id en tify in g the A ttorn ey G eneral as the fe llo w in c h a r g e This danger m u st b e w eigh ed again st the in crea sed e ffe c t iv e n e s s o f an o p era tion under h is co m m a n d u # $ R ich a rd N G oodw in EYES ONLY FOR TH E PRE SID EN T -- FOP S E C R E T This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu