T EUR SECRET 7 August 1962 CO VERT ACTIVITIES W illia m K H a rvey CIA R ep resen tative fo r O peration M on goose states I SITUATION A The p u rp ose o f this plan is to outline the action w hich w ould b e re q u ire d by the C en tral In telligen ce A g en cy to fu lly im plem ent c o u r s e o f a ction b in G en era l L a n sd a le 's m em orandum to the S p ecial G roup Augm ented dated 25 July 1962 B The in tellig en ce estim ate fo r the p e rio d o f this plan is con ta in ed in the N ational In telligen ce E stim ate 8 5 -2 -6 2 C m ade F o r the p u rp ose o f this plan the follow ing assum ptions a re 1 C onclusion #D o f the National Intelligence E stim ate 8 5 -2 -6 2 is invalid This assum ption is not in our opinion valid but this opera tion al plan is not a valid plan fo r the ov erth row of the C a stro -C om m u n ist governm ent unless this assum ption is m a d e 2 Soviet tro o p s w ill not be p resen t in Cuba in f o r c e 3 P a s s iv e re sista n ce can be changed to active re s ista n ce through a g g r e s s iv e p rov oca tiv e propaganda plus a g g re s siv e s m a ll-s c a le open resista n ce and through fortuituous c ir c u m stances existin g at the tim e It cannot be m anipulated on a tim e ta ble b a s is H MISSION E x e r t all p o s sib le diplom atic eco n o m ic p sy ch o lo g ica l and other p r e s s u r e s to overth row the C a stro-C om m u n ist reg im e without o v e rt U S m ilita ry com m itm en t SENSITIVE F@P SECRET TASKS A P o litic a l 1 A s s is t and support State in any fea sib le action to develop a ctiv e OAS and individual Latin A m e rica n country support fo r the ov erth ro w of C a stro 2 A s s is t State in the developm ent o f p o s t-C a stro con cep ts le a d e r s and p o litica l g rou p s 3 P rov id e co v e rt support to the CRC and to such other Cuban p o litic a l groups as a p p rop ria te 4 D evelop con tacts in the p o w e r ce n te rs o f the Cuban govern m en t as a p o ssib le m eans o f splitting the re g im e 5 Induce the population to engage in m ilitant m a ss action such as dem onstrations slow -d ow n s w ork stoppages and s a b ota g e B E c o n o m ic 1 P a rticip a te in in te r -a g e n cy econ om ic action planning and execu tion 2 Conduct m axim um p o s s ib le sabotage of m a jo r Cuban in d u stries and public u tilities with p rio rity attention being given to transp ortation com m u n ication s pow er plants and u tilities No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies m ed ica l fa c ilitie s or d ire ctly against the population of Cuba as such At the p resen t tim e and fo r the p red icta b le future m a jo r sabotage at lea st in part probably would have to be conducted by ra id er type team s using hit and run t a c tic s 3 B y a g g ressiv e deception and other operation s cause the d iv e r s io n o f Cuban r e s o u rc e s fr o m produ ctive p u rp oses 4 Induce the population to conduct continuing w idespread m in or acts of sabotage C R e s ista n ce 1 Strengthen and m aintain an atm osphere of resista n ce and rev olt in the general population 2 TOP SECRETSENSITIVE T-OP SECRET2 R e cru it train and supply sm a ll clandestine re s ista n ce c e lls in the m a jo r citie s and in other se le cte d a reas o f Cuba 3 C ache a rm s am m unition and other supplies in m axim um fe a s ib le am ounts in a re a s a c c e s s ib le to the resista n ce c e lls and in potential r e s is ta n ce a r e a s 4 B e p r e p a r e d to p rov id e c o v e r t lia is o n and com m u nication s with le a d e r sh ip elem en ts to any sign ifican t internal u prising 5 Be p r e p a r e d to c o v e r tly p rov id e person n el and lo g is tic s support to any sign ifican t internal re s is ta n ce group o r u p risin g 6 H a ra ss lo c a l elem en ts o f the Cuban governm ent by hit and run ra id s against s e le cte d targets such as lo c a l G -2 o ffic e s m ilitia p o s ts telephone ce n tra ls etc 7 D If fe a s ib le and au th orized initiate an internal u p risin g P s y c h o lo g ic a l 1 Strengthen m aintain and ex p loit the w ill o f the Cuban p e o p le to r e s is t C a stro -C o m m u n is m 2 D is cre d it the C a stro reg im e in Cuba in the H em isp h ere and e ls e w h e r e E In tellig en ce 1 P ro v id e the m axim um in telligen ce cov era g e o f Cuba with p a rticu la r em ph a sis on the follow ing a C a p ab ilities and intentions o f the C a stro governm ent b A c tiv itie s of Cuban G -2 c Soviet a ctiv ities in Cuba d State o f re sista n ce including the tone and tem per of the population e M ilitia m o ra le f L o cu s o f pow er a n d o r s tr e s s and strain among the oopower centers' in the Cuban governm ent 3 SENSITIVE TOP SECRET IV IM PLEM ENTATION T o undertake the above liste d tasks CIA w ould be req u ired to d ev elop and c a r r y out the follow in g p rog ra m which con stitu tes a substantial e x p a n sion o f the cu rren t p ro g ra m p a rticu la rly in fie ld s other than in te llig e n ce A In telligen ce F I The cu rren t b u ild -u p of in telligen ce a s s e ts m ust be in ten sified and expanded No additional p o lic y a p p rov a ls a re needed The fo llo w in g types of action s w ill be m axim ized 1 S p o ttin g re cru itin g tra in in g o f le g a lly esta b lish ed Cubans in Cuba o r in Cuban governm ent p o sts a b roa d E stablishm ent and m aintenance o f r e lia b le se cu re com m u n ica tion s w ill b ecom e m o re c r it ic a l as p o lic e state con trols in c r e a s e 2 S p ottin g recru itin g tra in in g sof th ird cou n try nationals re sid e n t in Cuba 3 S p o ttin g recru itin g tra in in g o f le g a l tr a v e le r s who have potential a c c e s s to significant in form ation 4 Expansion o f com m u nication s in tellig en ce p a rticu la rly in the G -2 p o lic e and m ilitia nets T his is p r im a r ily an NSA p r o b le m B P s y ch o lo g ica l W a rfare C A The p rog ra m m ust p rim a rily con cen trate on and reach the Cuban population It w ill have to provide a g g re s siv e and p ro v o ca tiv e propaganda as w ell as the m ilder th em es C le a r authority to engage in high noise le v e l types o f propaganda op era tion s ca llin g fo r w ork sto p p a g e s slow -d ow n s sabotage and other fo r m s o f m ilitant m ass action and w id esp rea d ov ert resista n ce is re q u ire d The follow ing p sy ch o lo g ica l w a rfare a ctiv ities are con sid ered essen tia l 1 The establishm ent of a su fficien tly pow erful Radio F r e e Cuba lo ca te d in Southern F lo r id a o r other appropriate a re a When this is in operation the Swan Island operation w ill be term inated P o lic y approval to establish this is requ ired 4 ffiOP- SEC RET SENSITIVE TOP SEC'R-ET 2 A m a ritim e propagan da b a llo o n launching ca p a b ility and a p p r o p r ia te p o lic y a u th ority to con d u ct propagan da b a llo o n la u n ch in g o p e r a t io n s # 3 P o lic y approval and authorization to conduct a irc r a ft le a fle t dropping op eration s using U S and other con tract c r e w s 4 Intrusion on liv e Cuban TV channels with video and audio t r a n s m is s io n s f r o m a ir b o r n e and s e a b orn e p la t fo r m s P o l i c y a p p r o v a l i s r e q u ir e d 5 Continuation and expansion o f the V o ic e of Cuba subm arine b ro a d ca stin g op era tion s in co lla b o ra tio n with the Navy y 6 Continue and expand the p resen t propaganda opera tion s in filtra tin g m a teria l into Cuba via the open m a ils leg a l tr a v e le r s o r c o u r ie r s 7 Intensify propaganda a ctiv itie s utilizing p o litica l p ro fe ss io n a l cu ltu ra l student and other groups which have a potential fo r getting th eir m e ssa g e to their cou n terparts in side o f Cuba C P a ra m ilita ry T o date the p a ra m ilita ry p ro g ra m against Cuba has been lim ited E x p e rie n ce plus continually tightening se cu rity co n tro ls has dem on strated the d ifficu lty o f infiltrating and m aintaining b la c k te a m s in the target cou ntry fo r an indefinite p eriod n or has any m eth od yet been d ev ised by which in filtrated b la c k te a m s can be e ffe c tiv e ly le g a lize d with adequate docum entation T h e re fo re the PM p ro g ra m m ust in cre a sin g ly em phasize team in filtra tion s spotting re cru itin g and training legal resid en ts caching and ex filtra tion of the o rig in a l team s This m ust be p a ra lleled by an a g g re s siv e p sy ch olog ica l w a rfa re p rog ra m which w ill maintain the w ill to r e s is t and re v o lt and w ill p rov id e the spark o f h o p e Without this it w ill be im p ossib le to re cru it and train the n e c e s s a r y legal resid en ts To a ccom p lish the req u ired tasks the follow ing p ro g ra m and support is co n sid ered essen tia l 1 C om m an d o R a id er T eam s - Ten to fifteen such team s of ap p roxim ately twelve m en each should be available fo r unilateral cach in g operation s se le cte d m ajor sabotage op eration s and hit and run com m ando r a id s A uthority should be granted to strengthen these team s with non-Cuban con tract p erson n el U ltim ately when an internal uprising o f strength develops they could be landed either TOP SECRET-- SENSITIVE -TOP SECRET a s a d iv e r s io n a r y e f fo r t o r f o r augm entation o f s e le c t e d p o c k e t s o f r e s is t a n c e T h e s e te a m s sh ou ld be tra in ed p r im a r ily f o r h it and run c o m m a n d o r a id s It is b e lie v e d s p e c ia liz e d M a rin e C o r p s tra in in g w o u ld be e s p e c ia lly a p p ro p ria te fo r th em If th is is not p o s s ib le then A r m y R a n g e r typ e tra in in g sh ould be g iv e n It is e s tim a te d that ten to fifte e n 12 to 15 m an te a m s w ould b e the m a x im u m that c o u ld be r e c r u it e d tr a in e d and u tiliz e d du rin g the fo r e s e e a b le p e r io d T h ey sh ou ld h a v e a m in im u m o f fo u r-m o n th s tra in in g f o r w h ich D ep a rtm en t o f D e fe n se f a c ili t i e s and in s t r u c to r p e r s o n n e l a re r e q u ir e d P o l i c y a p p r o v a l i s r e q u ir e d f o r the u se o f n on -C u b a n c o n t r a c t p e r s o n n e l and DOD f a c ilit ie s and p e r s o n n e l 2 U rban R e s is t a n c e C e lls - T w o to fiv e m an te a m s e q u ip p ed w ith W T c o m m u n ic a tio n s sh ou ld b e in filtr a te d in to the m a jo r C u ban c i t ie s to r e c r u it and tra in sm a ll oolegal c o m p a r tm e n te d r e s is t a n c e c e l l s U pon the c o m p le tio n o f tra in in g the in filt r a te d te a m w ill be w ith draw n if en d a n g ered o r if it s con tin u ed p r e s e n c e je o p a r d iz e s the l e g a l r e s id e n t s In itia lly th e se c e l l s sh ou ld b e in te llig e n c e p r o d u c e r s w ith the s e c o n d a ry m is s io n o f s e le c tin g c a s in g and fo r m u la tin g p la n s f o r sabotage o f k e y t a r g e t s T h e sa b ota g e to b e done e ith e r b y o th e r in d iv id u a ls o r at the tim e o f any m a jo r u p r is in g A th ir d m is s io n w ou ld be to e s t a b lis h s m a ll c a c h e s o f a r m s and su p p lie s f o r u s e in the ev en t o f m a jo r u p r is in g It is e s tim a te d that w ithin a y e a r at le a s t tw e lv e u rba n c e l l s c o u ld b e e s ta b lis h e d A t le a s t 25% o f th ese p r o b a b ly w ill b e lo s t due t o e n e m y co u n te r a c tio n o r f r o m o th e r c a u s e s S p ottin g r e c r u it in g and tra in in g o f the te a m s to in filtra te can be a c c o m p lis h e d w ith in A g e n c y fa c ilit ie s and e x is tin g p o l ic y a p p r o v a ls 3 R u ra l R e s is t a n c e C e lls - T h ree to fiv e m an te a m s eq u ip p ed w ith W T c o m m u n ica tio n s sh ou ld be in filtra te d in to the r u r a l a r e a s to r e c r u it tra in and a r m s m a ll le g a l co m p a r tm e n te d r e s is t a n c e c e l l s The in filtr a te d t r a in e r s w ill be w ithdraw n if th ey a r e en d a n g ered o r p o s e a th rea t to the s e c u r ity o f the re s id e n t r u r a l c e l l T h e s e r e s id e n t ru ra l c e l l s w ou ld have lim ite d in te llig e n c e fu n ctio n s un til c a lle d into a ctio n in the even t o f an u p ris in g It is e s tim a te d that tw elve to fifte e n s u c h 'te a m s co u ld be in p la c e w ithin a y e a r F o r c e s lo s t due to a ttritio n a r e e s tim a te d at 25% S e le c tio n and tr a in in g o f the in filtra tio n te a m s ca n be a c c o m p lis h e d b y A g e n c y f a c i l i t i e s but th ey should b e a u g m en ted w ith DOD S p ecia l F o r c e s in s t r u c t o r s 4 G u e r r illa - F iv e to eight m an tea m s eq u ip p ed w ith W T co m m u n ica tio n s w o u ld be in filtra te d into ru ra l a r e a s to liv e b la c k 6 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE ' TOP SECRET r e c r u it train and lead or p a rticip ate in h it and run g u e rrilla bands a n d o r rem nants th ereof T h ese groups w ill req u ire both m a r itim e and a e ria l re -su p p ly A ttrition w ill be high The p s y c h o lo g ic a l w a rfa re p ro g ra m in support o f this e ffo rt m ust be a g g r e s s iv e and hard -h itting if r e c r u its are to keep flow ing to the g u e r r illa s It is estim ated that within a year twenty sm all grou p s o f g u e r r illa s can be activated It is not p o ssib le to p re d ict what the rate o f attrition w ill b e but ap p roxim ately 50% appears p ro b a b le The team s to be in filtra ted should have at le a s t fou r m onths S p ecia l F o r c e s type training at DOD sites with S pecial F o r c e s in s tr u c to r s The tra in ees co u ld be handled in groups o f fifty with two groups in training at a given tim e 5 Cuban E x ile F o r c e s - The recru itm en t and training o f Cuban e x ile s b y the U S A r m e d F o r c e s should be p r e s s e d to the m ax im u m Upon com p letion o f their training arrangem ents should e x is t to p erm it the separation o f se le cte d individuals o r groups to p e r m it the form a tion o f a C uban F r e e d o m F igh t under re sp o n sib le e x ile lea d ersh ip which can qu ick ly be u sed to augment any sign ifican t in tern a l u p risin g Non-Cuban U S and other co n tra ct p erson n el should be p erm itted within the C uban F re e d o m F ig h te r g rou p s A ddition al P o lic y approval is re q u ire d 6 Infiltration E x filtra tion - The in crea sed Cuban defen sive c a p a b ilitie s plus the above outlined a g g re s siv e re sista n ce p ro g ra m re q u ir e s fre e d o m to utilize all p o s s ib le in filtra tio n e x filtra tio n ta c tic s as requ ired including a P re se n t and planned c o m m e r c ia l p r iv a te m a ritim e ca p a b ility b Subm arines and other naval cra ft c A e ria l overfligh t with con tra ct o r USAF c re w s and a ir c r a ft A dditional p o lic y approval is requ ired 7 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE iFOP SECRET SU P P O R T REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES A F r o m D epartm ent o f D efense Q_r oun i Support T h ree separate training fa c ilitie s in clu din g a ll in stru ction and support a S te A co m m a n d o r a id e r training P ro v id e a fou r-m on th training co u rse on a rep etitive b a s is f o r a p p rox im a tely 100 m en b Site B - S pecial F o r c e s type training P r o v id e fou r-m on th co u r s e on a repetitive b a s is F ifty m en p e r c o u r s e c- Site C - Special F o r c e s type training P r o v id e fou r-m on th c o u rs e on a repetitive b a s is F ifty m en p e r co u r s e 2 N aval Support a Subm arine in filtra tio n e x filtra tio n m is s io n s E stim ate m axim um fiv e p er month f ir s t three months in crea sin g to ten p e r month b y January 1963 B y the end o f 1963 the requ irem en t cou ld be substantially h igh er b Subm arine radio b ro a d ca sts - V o ic e o f F r e e C uba c Naval su rfa ce cra ft support m ay be req u ired at a la te r date but cannot be p red icted now d Installation CIA supply base at o r in p rox im ity to B oca C h ica Naval A ir Station e U se o f Guantanamo Naval B ase fo r operation al pu rposes including in filtration and exfiltration o f agents support fo r clandestine m aritim e op era tion s operational recon n a issa n ce and holding and in terrogation o f Cuban agents and su spects 3 A ir Support a U se of USAF cre w s and sterile a ircra ft in lieu o f o r to supplement U S con tra ct c re w s provide crew s and a ircra ft SENSITIVE TOP SECRET o r a e n a r e -s u p p ly infiltration and le a fle t flig h ts In itially es im a e ive p e r month in cre a sin g to fifteen per month by anuary 1963 B y the end o f 1963 this requirem ent cou ld su b stantially in c r e a s e b 4 Support fo r CIA a ir p ro g ra m p er existing a rra n gem en ts P e rs o n n e l L im ite d n u m b ers o f qu alified p e rson n e l m ay be req u ired to p ro v id e s p e c ia liz e d in stru ction in CIA training p ro g ra m s s p e cia liz e d support in con n ection with the CIA m a ritim e prog ra m and to p rov id e com m u n ica tion s su pport B F r o m USIA and F e d e r a l C om m u n ication s C om m ission A s sis ta n ce in the esta b lish m en t o f the Radio F r e e Cuba tra n sm itte r V I P O L IC Y A P P R O V A L S REQUIRED T he follow in g p o lic y a p p rov a ls a re re q u ire d to im plem ent the fo re g o in g program A A u th ority to initiate and conduct a g g r e s s iv e p sy ch o lo g ica l w a rfa re o p e r a tio n s including ca llin g fo r w ork stoppages slow -d ow n s sabotage and oth er fo r m s o f m ilitant m ass action and w id esp rea d o v e rt r e s is ta n c e B A uthority to establish and operate a m edium wave tra n sm itte r by R a d io F r e e Cuba C A uthority to conduct propaganda balloon launching D A uthority to conduct ov erflig h ts o f Cuba fo r lea flet dropping E A u t h o r i t y to c o n d u c t m a j o r s a b o t a g e o p e r a t i o n s t a r g e t e d a g a in s t C u b a n in d u s t r y a n d p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s i e r e f i n e r i e s p o w e r p la n t s t r a n s p o r ta tio n and c o m m u n ic a tio n s F A uthority to use U S Navy subm arines fo r in filtra tion ex filtra tion G A uthority to use non-Cuban con tra ct personn el to strengthen team s b ein g infiltrated 9 TOP SECKETSENSITIVE H A uthority to train CIA re c ru ite d Cubans on DOD b a s e s using DOD in stru cto rs and support fa c ilitie s I A uthority to o v e r fly Cuba fo r r e -s u p p ly in filt r a t io n e x filt r a tion m is s io n s using U S co n tra ct a ir cr e w s o r USAF c r e w s J A u th ority to separate train ed Cuban o f f i c e r s and e n listed m en fr o m the U S A rm e d S e r v ic e s to p e rm it them to jo in an e x ile sp o n so re d grou p o f C uban F r e e d o m F ig h t e r s K A u th ority to u tiliz e Guantanamo Naval B a se fo r op eration al pu rp oses VII ESTIM ATED COST TO CIA A The total num ber o f CIA p erson n el a s sig n e d fu ll-tim e tion M on goose w ould have to be in c r e a s e d to at le a s t 600 B to O p e r a E stim ated B udget F is c a l Y e a r 1963 - $ 4 0 0 0 0 000 F is c a l Y e a r 1964 - $ 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e x c lu s iv e o f r e im b u r s e m ent f o r DOD support w hich it is fe lt should be on a n o n -r e im b u r sa b le b a s i s 10 Ta A P 'Ufa O D SENSITIVE vB T This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu