-1J5Y -asar- SBSiM 1 CENTRAL INTELUGENCE AGENCY W ASHINGTON 28 D C 29 October 1962 G 2I ca UJ W-9 l J ci v - 5 ol o'3C 7 4 MEMORANDUM FOR B rigadier General E G Lansdale SUBJECT Operation MONGOOSE - Infiltration Teams GBP 1 Forw arded herewith or your inform ation and action is a cable in clear text received today from our Chief of Base in Miami outlining the status of the twenty 2 0 infiltration teams which are currently being held awaiting policy decision O ' 'M iam i Operations Base currently has twenty infil ops scheduled i e nineteen PM and one FL This means we have twenty teams safehoused under conditions maximum security Equipment checkout com m o briefin gs discussion infil routes and assignment tw o-fold m ission of intel c o lle c tion re m issile sites and imminence hostilities indicators plus preparations to provide support to U S m ilitary fo rce s during any m ilitary action has brought teams to highest possible pitch of motivation and state of readiness Human psychology and stamina being what they a re this high peak of proficen cy cannot be maintained indefinitely because fighters of all types go stale as is so w ell documented in pugalistic annals and all other com petitive fields where combat readiness is required This particularly true with Cubans who volatile em otional expressive people While this all w ell known Headquarters believe fluctuations in go and 8 top orders over past seven days have been such that prudent judgment dictates that you be personally apprised that we are sitting on explosive human situation which could blow at any time within next forty-eigh t hours Wish assure you that while full gamut of leadership tradecraft psychology and discipline w ill be harnessed to prevent any human explosion we cannot guarantee that it w ill not happen Believe positive or negative action is - only guarantee which will insure our retaining con trol o v e r these human resources to extent that flap w ill be avoided There is in my judgment no middle ground on this issue r GBP4 gO ro 4 GBP 2 L- to jp - 7 7 ' tinder tb e p r o v is io n s r A r r a s s in s tio n R e c o rd s A c t cC 1SS2 P L 1 0 2 -5 2 6 ULu Kl I N A R A Date sensitive J ie e u i HO- - 1 TiouTT I Ev IkM trm ntMutlcf L SQgUIVE ooPositive action would consist resumption infiltration activities This connection wish point out a ll teams currently scheduled for infil are trained assets which WAVE has been developing since March 1962 As you well know this large backlog of assets has accumulated because CIA maritime assets have been totally incapable infiltrating these teams at rate commensurate with speed at 'which teams were developed to maturity and readiness f o r an target ops assign-' ments We are therefore not advocating m ass infiltration of ill prepared and untrained people H iese teams are as good as our current systex i can produce Despite this sound preparation infiltration at this time w ill produce losses because Cuba is on general alert and this bound make our m ission extremely difficult While being fully cognizant this loss factor believe that so long as XT S reconnaissance flights are in motion over Cuba CIA should attempt supplement this collection via agent ops This judicious blending of agent reporting and aerial reconnais sance on Cuba has been significantly and tp my knowledge uniquely effective Do not believe this interlocking com obination should be broken up at this critical juncture View cessation mail flow from Cuba and in light limited number W T assets now functioning Cuba suggest there no alterna tive from philosophical or intelligence doctrinaire view point except to push for increasing our Intel collection capability by putting trained teams with W T into Cuba as soon as possible If this done quickly we should have increased intel coverage as well as capability support in meaningful manner U S forces if and when they move against Cuba ooNegative action would be disassembling of teams at that juncture when in our judgment we could no longer securely hold in safehouses any given team This would be employment safety valve technique but its use is not without pitfalls Most obvious ones being reduction our future potential get these teams back into appropriate state of readiness for future use phis fact once released teams would talk and their experience-would trweep exile community like wildfire Once in exile community their experience Secr et SENSITIVE SENSITIVE would be interpreted as TJ S backdown This bound bit press and could be detrim ental to U S pubUc image a n d o r negotiat ing position A bove com m ents have attempted to place m a jor CIA M iam i Operations Base problem into context of nuts and bolts intelligence rea lities based on clin ica l objective appraisal our situation It has obviously not con sidered politica l rea lities w hich fa ce U S# as these so fast breaking and we so consum ed with nuts and olts ops problem s that there virtually no time fo r National political reflection With all of these fa ctors in m ind w ould appreciate guidance re possible cou rses of action which Miami Operations B ase might be expected or required ca r r y out within foreseea ble future with em phasis on what w ill be expected of CIA Miami Operations Base re infil te a m s 11 2 above m essage We are waiting your guidance before responding to the -S ffiS E F SEMStTOt siour i EBkM frm ntMafic femtTsdlif u l This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu