13-0000April 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE SUBJECT Meeting with the President - 5 30 - 15 Apr 1963 In Palm Beach Florida 1 Lundahl gave a complete briefing on the latest satellite photography of the Soviet Union and both satellite and U-- 2 photography of Communist ChinaJ wart- A -4- -- 9 4g Eieviewed with the President the details of the Helms Angleton papers covering their counter intelligence work in the French effort to 1 3 penetrate certain U S scientific areas I recommended to the President that we initiate a program of misinformation which the President approved - and Helms and Angleton were instructed to proceed The justification for the HelmS AngletOn activities were based upon intelligence received from which was confirmed by the of a plan on the part of the SDECE to penetrate certain US scientific and nuclear installationj 3 Discus sedin some detail the Donovan negotiations in Cuba Gave the President a copy of Miskovsky' summary of the Donovan discussions and a copy of my memorandum of April 15th on Cuba President raised the question of Miro Cardona stated that Cardona had misrepresented the facts I urged that the President not involve himself personally in a public argu- ment with Miro Cardona I raised the question of the possibility of working on Castro with the objective of disenchanting him with his Soviet relations causing him to break relations with Khrushchev to effect the removal of Soviet tr00ps from reorient his policieswith respect to Latin America and establish Cuba government satisfactory to the rest of the Hemisphere Ii explained to the President that the Cuban problem must be solved in one of two ways either the manner outlined above or alternatively by bringing consistent pressure of every possible nature on Khrushchev to force his withdrawal from Cuba and then to bring about the downfall of Castro by means which could be develoPed after the removal of the Soviets troops but not before and thereafter establish a satisfactory government in Cuba 1 stated to the President that we were studying both Courses of action and I had not made up my mind concerning the feasibility Of either plan The President thought both approaches should be carefully examined and Suggested the possibility of pursuing both courses at the same time in any event it was decided that we should 1 30000 0 I 13 q- l7 77 objections to the Killian Board report and that I felt the report should keep the Donovan channel open I advised the President that Donovan has to return to Havana at the end of the week and that I will see him privately prior to his departure 4 The President and Italked at some length concerning sabotage in Cuba I expressed gravedoubts and pointed out the hazards from his standpoint in view of the stand down of the hit andnrun exile operations the danger of attribution etc The President seemed to question whether active sabotage was good unless it was of a type that could come from within Cuba I said this was very difficult and that the initial operations conceived were from the sea I said I thought a program should be engaged in only if it was an essential building block in an agreed program to remove the Soviets from Cuba and to take care of Castro - 5 dvisied the President of my plans for a brief trip to Europe Also advised him that I had delayed my departure for a few days in order to meet with the Killian Board on April 23rd I repeated my very strong either be withdrawn from the Board or amended The President urged f1 that I not engage in a controversy over this report he had decided not to circulate it that only one copy was in existence and as far as he was concerned hehad dismissed the entire matter I told the President 5 I had not discussed the Board's report with the Board but if they brought it up I intended to urge its amendment but would not engage in a - controversy with the Board I 6 C91scussed briefly the problems of Soviet leadership in the 1 7 USSR and gave the President a copy of the paper on this subject 3 225 1 1 a f e n the President of the study of future satellite photography i lwhich I7 had initiated It was obvious from our brief discussion on this subject that the use of the OXCART over Soviet territory was of great 4 concern to him and he was most hopeful of improving satellite photography II 7 to a point where it would suffice our intelligence needs eff 7' Briefly discussed the Views of Mr Kelly Johnsou on the TFX l Hand the Navy' 3 plans to install a submarine research center on Andros Er EIsiand in the Bahamas _Htf JAM nifb 13-00090 - - CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25 D C gh MEMORANDUM FOR The President SUBJECT Donovan Negotiations With Castro 1 James Donovan returned from Cuba yesterday after a four day'visit As aresult of talks with Castro the Americans imprisoned on the Isle of Pines are to be released 01122 April During the intervening period Castro will observe Closely American policy toward Cuba and make sure that the Red are being concluded in goodfaith 2 The main thrust of Donovan s discussion however was political and can best be evaluated bya very Confidential statement made to Donovan by Doctor Vallejo a close personal adviser of Castro who was present at the Imeetings Vallejo said Castro knew that relations with the United States are neCessary and Castro wanted these developed However there are certainlCuban Government officials cOmmunists who are strongly opposed even more than certain people in the United States These officials are under close surveillance They have no great folloWing in Cuba but if they rebelled at this time Cuba would be in chaos He believed that Donovan and Castro could work out a plan for a reasonable relationship betWeen the two countries 3 Donovan had two sessions with Castro one for five hours the other for fourteen hours A variety of subjects were covered including the role of Red China in world politics the Cuban economy and Cuba's role in Latin America In discussing any subject Castro came around to relating it to Castro 3 plan for developing Cuba Castro finds the Soviet Union useful but Cuba under Castro he claims will never'become a Soviet satellite - He emphasized that the Cuban 'rolefin Latin America depended upon Cuba's viability rather than the export of subversion 4 Donovanhas the confidence of Castro who believes that Donovan is sincere and direct with no official ties to the United States Government Our debriefing of Donc ava l is continuing JO A 1 ng Director 13700000 17 CENTRAL AGENCY WASHINGTON 25 MEMORANDUM mm The President SUBJECT Donavon Negotiations with Castro 1 James Donovan returned from Cuba Vorterday after a four- day visit As a result if tniks with Castro the Americans imprisoned on the Isle of Firmware to be released on 22 April During the intervening period Castro will observe clearly American policy toward Cuba and mako sure that the Red Cross deliveries are being concluded in goon faith 2 The main thrust of MMan' a discussion however was political and can best be evaluat d by a very confidential statement made to Donovan by Doctor Vallejo a close personal advioor of Castro who was present at the meetings Vallejo raid Castro know that relations With the United States are necessary and Castro wantod these developod However there are certain Cuban Government officials communists who aro strongly opposed even more than cortain people in the United - States These o ciala are under anrwi anco They have no great following in Coot but if they rebelled at this time Cuba would be Ratio Moved that Moran me Ghetto could work out a plant for a reasonable relationship between the two countries 3 Donovan eo-o-aiona with Castro one for five hours the other for fourteen hours A varitty of subjects were covered including the role of Red China in world politios the Guban economy and Cuba s role in Latin America in discussing any subject Castro canto around to rela ng it to Gasuo'a plan for developing Cuba Castro finds tho Soviet Union useful but Cuba under Castro he claims will never bocorno a Soviet satellite He emphasized that the Cuban role in Latin AmH-ica depended upon Cuba s viability rather than the export of subversion 4 Donovan has the confidence of Castro who believes that Donovan is sincere and directwith no of cial ties to the United States I Govermnent Our debriefing of Donovanis oonunuing E Eiit MCCONE JOHN A MCCONE Director A I 35 pg 4 5 51 it - Omar-man To 4 5 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu