TOP «T VF OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25 D C 20 February 1962 EYES ONLY EYES ONLY OF ADDRESSEES FROM Brig Gen Lansdale SUBJECT The Cuba Project Transmitted herewith is the projection of actions to helpCubans recapture their freedom This total plan is EYES ONLY The lives of many brave people depend on the security of thiBpaper entrusted to you Any inference that this plan exists couldplace the President of the United States in a most damaging position This is a specific plan with time phases It responds to the request of the Special Group 5412 for such a paper 1urgethat this paper not be made known in this complete form beyondyourself and those named as addressees The Attorney GeneralSpecial Group General Taylor State Secretary Rusk Alexis Johnson Richard Goodwin Defense Secretary McNamara Deputy Secretary Gilpatric Brig Gen Craig CIA John McCone Richard Helms William Harvey USIA Ed Murrow Don Wilson da“Fifiedunder theprovisionsAssassinationRcccrds Act cf 1S92 PL102-526 TOP SESREtSENSITIVE ftftyir NARA-TVatg llnl n -TO P-SECR ET ' - JP- IP-8 SENSITIVE 20 February 1962 Program Review by Brig Gen Lansdale THE CUBA PROJECT The Goal In keeping with the spirit of the Presidential memorandum of 30 November 1961 the United States will help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace The Situation We still know too little about the real situation inside Cuba although we are taking energetic steps to learn more However some salient facts are known It is known that the Communist regime is an active Sino-Soviet spearhead in our Hemisphere and that Communistcontrols inside Cuba are severe Also there is evidence that the repres sive measures of the Communists together with disappointments in Castro's economic dependency on the Communist formula have resulted in an anti-regime atmosphere among the Cuban people which makes aresistance program a distinct and present possibility Time is running against us The Cuban people feel helpless and are losing hope fast They need symbols of inside resistance and of outside interest soon They need something they can join with the hope of starting to work surely towards overthrowing the regime Since late November we have been working hard to re-orient the operational concepts within the U S government and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assetsrequired for success in our task The next National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba NIE 85-62 promises to be a useful document dealing with our practical needs and with duerecognition of the sparsity of hard facts The needs of the Cuba project as it goes into operation plus the increasing U S capability for intelligence collection should permit more frequent estimates for our guidance These will be prepared on a periodic basis Premise of Action Americans once ran a successful revolution It was run from within and succeeded because there was timely and strong political economic and military help by nations outside who supported our cause Using this same concept of revolution from within we must now help the Cuban people to stamp out tyranny and gain their liberty On 18 January the Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two tasks toDepartments and Agencies of the U S government in order to providea realistic assessment and preparation of U S capabilities The Attorney General and the Special Group were apprised of this action The answers received on 15 February provided the basis for planning a realistic courseof action The answers also revealed that the course of action must con tain continuing coordination and firm overall guidance The course of action set forth herein is realistic within present opera tional estimates and intelligence Actually it represents the maximumtarget timing which the operational people jointly considered feasible It aims for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962 It is a TOP SECRET 'lr Q IP SENSITIVE series of target actions and dates not a rigid time-table The target dates are timed as follows Phase I Action March 1962 Start moving in Phase II Build-up April-July 1962 Activating the necessary opera- tions inside Cuba for revolution and concurrently applying the vital political ' economic and military-type support from outside Cuba Phase III Readiness 1 August 1962 check for final policy decision Phase IV Resistance August-September 1962 move into guerrilla operations Phase V Revolt first two weeks of October 1962 Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime Phase VI Final during month of October 1962 Establishment of new government Plan of Action Attached is an operational plan for the overthrow of the Communist regime in Cuba by Cubans from within Cuba with outside help from the U S and elsewhere Since this is an operation to promptand support a revolt by the people in a Communist police state flexibility is a must for success Decisions on operational flexibility rest with the Chief of Operations with consultation in the Special Group when policymatters are involved Target actions and dates are detailed in the attached operational plans which cover A Basic Action Plan Inside Cuba B Political Support Plan C Economic Support Plan D Psychological Support Plan E Military Support Plan F Sabotage Support Plan G Intelligence Support Plan Early Policy Decisions The operational plan for clandestine U S support of a Cuban movement inside Cuba to overthrow the Communist regime is within policy limits already set by the President A vital decision still to be made is on the use of open U S force to aid the Cuban people in winning their liberty If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are achieved in Cuba and if U S help is required to sustain this condition will the U S respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban revolt The contingencies under which such military deployment would be needed and recommended U S responses are detailed in a memorandum being prepared by the Secretaries of State and of Defense An early decision is required prior to deep involvement of the Cubans in this program TOP SECRET 'f SENSITIVE Distribution Copy No 1 The President 2 The Attorney General 3 General Taylor 4 The Secretary of State through Deputy Under Secretary Johnson 5 The Secretary of Defense through Deputy Secretary Gilpatric 6 The Director Central Intelligence Agency 7 The Director U S Information Agency through Deputy Director Wilson 8 State Mr Goodwin 9 Defense Brig Gen Craig 10 CIA Mr Harvey 11 -12 Chief of Operations Brig Gen Lansdale - OPERATION IN CUBA MARCH a Establish three ’’pathfinder agent operations in key areas selected by CIA OPERATION IN CUBA APRIL a Establish up to five more agent operations in key areas selected by CIA TOP SECRET SENSITIVE A BASIC ACTION PLAN INSIDE CUBA PHASE I March 1962 PURPOSE Explore operational conditions and requirements Report on potential and active resistance elements and situation for exploitation by resistance teams Lay groundwork for bringing in additionalagents and teams as conditions warrant PHASE II April-July 1962 PU RPOSE Report on resistance potential and laygroundwork for additional agent operations TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS Agent operations must stay alive make useful contacts and communicate securely with CIA Risk to the personnel is sub stantial due to lack of intelligence but m ission is essential to planning andoperations CONSIDERATIONS These additional teams should provide current reporting on major Cuban areas so broad political action program can beplanned Risk to teams will continue high but m ission is essential - TOP SECRET SENSITIVE A BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE II con t OPERATION IN CUB A PURPOSE APRIL cont b ” V oice 1 of Cuban movement goes on the air Establishes vital psychological assur ance to people that a movement existsto overthrow the regim e kn U A hditX Co-v OeJX k jo ­ U-SS MAY c Re-supply agent operations necessary as D eliver supplies to satisfy needsdeveloped by agent operations if valid TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS Preferably the voice” should be from mobile transmitter inside Cuba Broadcasts can be brief ones at first identifying music slogan and short news News to include reports on resistance” acts taking credit for all sabotage As daily broadcasts are established criminals against people” should be named and promisedswift justice two names per broadcast If operational judgment dictates trans m itter can be aboard submarine for early broadcasts as a strictly tempor ary measure It is vital to take risks by having it inside Cuba a second transmitter and crew should be moved in if the first is lost The agents will have to prove to localpartisans that outside support is a reality Thus as arms ammunition and equipment etc are needed to equip resistance groups we must be able to respond effectively to these needs Maritime and as feasible air re-supply will be used This capability will haveto expand as resistance is developed OPERATION IN CUBA d By June establish 12 more agent operations in key areas selected by CIA JUNE e By June introduce three resistance teams in areas under initial path finder” surveillance if situation is favorab le f Establish bases for guerrilla operations TOP SECRET SENSITIVE A BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE II cont PURPOSE M ission is the same as for previous pathfinder operations This will test acceptance and use of the more highly trained teams thatmust guide development of the popularrevolution within Cuba This also will check emphasis and timing ofprogram from viewpoint of Cuban situation To have focal points with some viability to stockpile for defensive needs and for future attack operations TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS These will be the last agent operationsinfiltrated into key areas from the outside Further expansion by pathfindersafter these teams are in can be done from groups inside It is likely that some of these last pathfinders will bereplacing casualties Very minor resistance actions by important population elements such as labor must be tried and groundworklaid for broader anti-regime programleading toward firm uprising program Realism of political platform can be tested These b ases are to be selected after on the-ground surveys by the teams inside Cuba Some may exist already These will also be logistical bases for caches and stockpiling of arms and equipmentto be used by the resistance The p a teams w ill need not only supplies foractive resistance but also should be able to provide some welfare aid suchas to families of resistance members families affected by plants shut-down by sabotage etc JUNE cont OPERATION IN CUBA g Establish clandestine leadership headquarters with means to communicate with all resistance elements h Collection and use of psychologicalaction material JULY i By July establish up to 5 m oreresistance teams in areas prepared by pathfinder operations as operationally feasible j Basic organization of undergroundin vicinity of airfields and communication centers TOP SECRET SENSITIVE A BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE II cont PURPOSE _ Organize internal direction and con trol of the popular movement To provide documentary and photographic evidence of tyranny of regimeto awaken world opinion and fan fireof revolt inside Cuba for use by support operations and by resistance teams inside M ission is the same as for the first resistance teams A II e above To prepare the means for sabotageagainst military aircraft and keycommunication links of the regime's security forces TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS Leadership will have been emerging andthis is about the earliest date possibleto establish a clandestine headquarters It should be of a bare field type in the securest area possible This can be come the meaningful source of political-psychological actions to develop Cuban will to resist and fight The resistance teams will use this material with timeliness inside and get it back outside so that it can be exploited fully in LatinAmerica and elsewhere building officialand public opinion in support of the insideope ration Experience of first resistance teams mustbe considered in preparing these additionalteams for operations Security of personnel is very important at this point as the operation expands This requires ground surveys selection of sites for caching of sabotage supplies and recruitment of local underground in cluding members of military and communications employees Popular support mustbe prepared by resistance teams 11111' TOP SECRET SENSITIVE A BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE II cont OPERATION IN CUBA PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS JULY cont k Expand infiltration points alongTo obtain maximum security forOriginal rat-lines” need to be expanded coasts stepped-up infiltration into a functioning underground railway to pass more infiltrees into interior Means of quick alerts to danger delaying defenses multiple routes coastal watchers and receivers need to be organized and activated 1 Low-key resistance sabotage as To demonstrate public disaffectionActions under resistance team guidancea continuing and expanding program with the regime and give examplescan include which will prompt similar actions- Runs on State food and clothing storesby many others To build attitude and ransack where possible promptingand m orale of the Cuban people tosim ilar acts by those who want to get become activists for their cause enough to eat and wear against the Communist dictators -Sugar in gas tanks of public buses and local official cars and trucks - Ice-picking tires - Removing receivers from telephones - Harassing telephone calls to officials - Throwing stones with threatening notesinto homes of officials - Disrupting rail switches and sand ingear boxes of trains Swiping spark plugs and distributors from vehicles Housewives complaints on shortages offood medicine doctors etc - Public contempt campaign against Cubansin regim e's puppet organizations includ ing effigy burning _______ TOP SECRET SENSITIVE OPERATION IN CUBA OPERATION AUGUST m Final check on resistance elements in Cuba AUGUST n Symbolic work slow-down « TOP SECRET SENSITIVE BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE III 1 August 1962 PURPOSE To have a final look at the situation and at the means in place before giving the signal to initiate actionsleading to full-scale revolt PHASE IV August -September 1962 To give workers a feeling of participating in the popular movement without immediate reprisal TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS This is a last-minute pause to be cer tain that the resistance has a possible organization in key places which will act when needed that the significantportion of the Cuban people are insympathy with the aims of the movement and will join in when given the chance and that the movement will be able to gain an area of Cuba as its own against the regime’s military forces as a minimum 12 August is the anniversary of the overthrow of dictator Machado The resist ance should link the Castro-Communists with Machado and call on workers to lose one hour by slow-down methods on 12 Aug to com m em orate the overthrow of one dictator Workers should be asked to give either one-hour by slow-down orone act of sabotage The ” Voice of the movement should thank them the next day for their splendid response to shame those who didn't participate by makingthem feel alone OPERATION IN CUBA OPERATION AUGUST cont o Symbolic signs painted on walls Machado One’1 By August have actions to penetrate and subvert the regime Cuban paramilitary teams infiltratedto bases in the hills r Guerrilla bands activated in key areas TOP SECRET SENSITIVE A BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE IV cont PURPOSE To commemorate the downfall of one remembered dictator and givea symbolic pace to the resistance To weaken and frustrate organizedactions against the popular m ovement To provide a trained guerrilla cadre upon which to form guerrilla units To build a military striking force forthe popular movement inside Cuba TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS Timed with the symbolic work slowdown A IV n above Spaced a few days apart the signs should have lines added to them to read Machado One Batista Two Castro Three These are actions on officials of the regime including the military and the police Some should be defected in place Others should be defected and helped to escape to the outside worldto tell the inside story of the regime's tyranny to evoke world sympathy withthe freedom fighters The paramilitary teams must be capableof initiating minor harassment and reprisalactions as well as organizing and trainingguerrilla units Popular support is essential Recruits will be coming in after the symbolic harassment and reprisal actions They will be screened organized and trained for guerrilla action The regime's security forces can be expected to be very active Anti-tank and anti-aircraft tactics are necessary Increased popular supportis a must in this phase OPERATION IN CUBA OPERATION SEPTEMBER s Commence expanding undergroundto every locality in Cuba t Step-up of guerrilla actions u Activate larger-scale black” opera tions on bureaucracy as penetration assets permit v Start entry of volunteer freedom fighters from Latin America and elsewhere TOP SECRET SENSITIVE A BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE IV cont PURPOSE To have a truly revolutionary organization throughout Cuba To season the guerrilla forces withlarger scale raids To overburden the regime s administrative machinery by false orders increase the amount of paper workby adding new form s issue regulations to discredit superiors and sew sus picion and friction between bureaus To let the Cuban people know thatthey are not alone in their struggle against tyranny by the physicalpresence of foreign freedom fighters TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS The guerrillas are the open arm but the popular movement must have mass support which requires intelligence collec tion and clandestine activists in cities and towns throughout They will surface when the revolt needs open support Actions will be to seize police files kidnap officials as hostages capture local militia arms stores increase road ambushes and destroy fuel supplies andtransport by raid actions This will require intensive preparation including defection in place of some personnel intimate knowledge of currentprocedures within bureaus and means of producing material which can pass asofficial A Marti Battalion might be formed for foreign volunteers Recruits from Latin America from refugee groups such as Hungarians Poles etc and Americans need a controlled means of entering the good fight Some veterans of the Huk campaign could be a gesture and a practical one -­ OPERATION IN CUBA SEPTEMBER cont w Attack on the cadre of the regim e including key leaders TOP SECRET SENSITIVE A BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE IV cont PURPOSE To express popular anger against the regim e1s tyranny and to give harshreality to the listing of crim inalsagainst the people x Operations liberating politicalprisoners held by regim e if possible To liberate prisoners for impact uponpopular support of guerrillas andgeneral resistance program Start blocking assistance from the Communist Bloc To shut off B loc assistance to the island of Cuba by all possiblemeans from the inside TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS This should be a special target opera tions CIA defector operations are vital here Gangster elements might providethe best recruitment potential for actions against police-G2 officials Bloc tech nicians should be added to the list of targets CW agents should be fullyconsidered This requires a physical survey to obtainprecise information on feasibility of bribing guards breaking way open to release prisoners encourage prisoners to havehope that tyranny of regime will be overthrown etc From these hard facts decisions can be made on which prison orprisons should be targets for liberation actions Bold operations are called for the psychological impact will be very high While appealing to the free people of theworld to help shut off Communist shipments of arms being used to kill the Cubanpeople the resistance must act on its own inside Cuba -striking against ships delivei ing Bloc supplies denying harbors by mining sabotaging transport aircraft destroying B loc supplies in warehouses and acting against Bloc technicians -­ OPERATION IN CUBA SEPTEMBER cont z Commence active sabotage ofm ilitary aircraft ground transport and communications OCTOBER a General strike by the Cubanworkers TOP SECRET SENSITIVE A BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE IV cont PURPOSE To hamper the ability of the regim e'ssecurity forces to strike at the resist ance movement as it em erges into m ore open guerrilla-bands PHASE V FIRST TWO WEEKS OCTOBER 1962 To make public the popular support of the militant revolt signifying the pass ing from underground to open rebellion b Anti-regim e demonstrations Same purpose as noted above A V a for the general strike c Declaration of the revolt To initiate the hour of decision bycalling on all Cubans for open support TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS More sophisticated sabotage devices contaminants etc should be in target area by this time Strike must tie-up transportation andcommunications The resistance teams must have set the readiness of the workers for this defiance of the regime Arms must be available Military cells will be activated Funds will be needed to help the workers hold on and to baitdefections of groups The resistance teams must have set the readiness of all population elements youth farmers Church etc to openly defy the regime Arms must be available including anti-tank weapons Military cells will be activated Since the aims of the liberation will have been publicized previously this is the go signal All Cubans and the world need to hear it - OPERATION IN CUBA OCTOBER cont d Open revolt by the Cuban people e Return of Cuban refugees who arequalified and want to help liberatetheir homeland 1 Ut' £ Jjj JKJUT SENSITIVE A BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE V con t PURPOSE To overthrow the Communist regime To start a m ore open movement backto Cuba of those Cuban refugees who are able and willing to risk their livesin overthrowing the Communist regim e a Establish a new Cuban government which can be recognized by the U S PHASE VI DURING OCTOBER 1962 To give legality to the m oral right of the Cuban revolt DO TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS This is the combat phase fighting totake and hold ground Cuban refugee organizations will betested with a nput up or shut up pro position Those who have ability tocontribute to the popular movementinside Cuba should be given a chanceto go home and act Their screening and infiltration will have to be con trolled It must be a joining -in not a taking-over of the inside movement When the popular movement is holdingmeaningful territory in Cuba it should form a provisional government This should permit open Latin American and U S help if requested and necessary A military government situation willexist for the initial period and we mustinsist upon realism in this interim period preceding reasonable civilian control - - - - - _ 11 ACTIVITY Radio program s for Cuban political activation TOP SECRET SENSITIVE B POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN cont PURPOSE To inform and keep basicinterests within the Cuban population 12 By October official U S and Latin Am erican policysupport To provide a positive basis for m ore open support of the people'srevolution possibly a foundation for m ilitary assistance upon request of recognized newgovernment CONSIDERATIONS Religious programs interviews with exile workers students fishermen families to help keep Cubans in touch with the wayof life they must recapture from the Communists CIA capability for daily andspecial broadcasts exists noting Swan Island station and arrangements with private stations in Miami New Orleans and some 75 small outlets in the Caribbean area Use of printed materials for dissemination inside Cuba is possible throughmails and drops but hazard to receiver toogreat prior to clim ax CIA and USIAre sponsibility The policy line for recognition of a revolutionary government is involved directly atthis point ACTIVITY ACTIVITY Persuade QA$#NATO and countries friendly to freedom to desist from trading with the Communist dictator ship in Havana Stop trans-shipment of U S items to Cuba especially via Mexico and Canada A positive list” for Latin America subject to licensing procedures forother parts of the Free World Harassment of shipping destined foror arriving from Cuba Obtain cooperation of National Foreign Trade Council in delaying or refusing charters to vessels calling at Cuban ports by mid-March Introduce counterfeit currency into Cuba if feasible Obtain by mid-March the cooperation of U S Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers to influence U S firms having sub sidiaries abroad to adhere to the spirit of U S economic boycott of Cuban regim e TOP SECRET SENSITIVE C ECONOMIC SUPPORT PLAN PURPOSE To build anti-regim e feelings among Cuban people by economic squeeze To reduce supply of items and parts critical to the Cuban regim e's economic program To reduce supply of special interest items To delay and reduce supplies Cuban regime needs in economy To reduce supplies the Cuban regime must have to keep economy going To disrupt Cuban economy To harass Cuban economy TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS The regime may be weakened as the Cuban dollar market is depleted through loss of creditline Requires full cooperation of allies andfriends State responsibility with CIA andCommerce Target is Cuban sugar economy power petroleum communications transport State responsibility with CIA Commerce Justice Responsibility of State with Commerce and CIAparticipating Union leadership can help in this Security or administrative reasons can be used for actions if a reason is required Responsibility of CIA with State Commerce Defense Justice Labor and Treasury participating Responsibility of State with Commerce and CIAparticipating Responsibility of CIA with Treasury and Justice participating Responsibility of State with Commerce and CIA participating ' ACTIVITY ACTIVITY Create atmosphere of a ’’crusade for human liberty Ready broadcast means for Voice of inside Cuban movement to com mence broadcasting in April In March commence visits of prominent U S and Latin American personalities to Cuban refugee camps in Florida Publicity for selected defectors from Castro team TOP SECRET SENSITIVE D PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT PLAN PURPOSE To set the deeply-moving tone andmotivating force for the liberation of Cuba To ensure maximum effectiveness of broadcasts To demonstrate concern for plightof refugees particularly parent- less children To demonstrate Cuban regime's failure to live up to prom ises oforiginal 26th of July movement TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS All media This means maximum use of spiritual appeal such as the prayer for CubabY Bishop Boja Masvidal who has a genuineCuban revolutionary background recapturingthe ideal of Marti by taking use of his memoryaway from the Communists even to issue ofcommemorative U S stamp and popularizingsongs by commercial recordings USIA and CIA responsibility These broadcasts entail considerable work and risk to mount They have to pay-off every second while on the air They need identifying music by guerrilla instruments such as guitar or harmonica identifying slogan and a format worth risk to the listener inside Cuba If opera tionally required initial broadcasts can be tapedand transmitted by submarine As soon as feasible portable transmitter s must be established inside Cuba CIA responsibility with support byDefense and USIA as required M rs Kennedy would be especially effective invisiting children refugees One camp near Miami has about 1 000 children who came out withouttheir parents Her impact upon Latin Americans on the recent Presidential visit to Venezuela and Colombia suggests this USIA responsibility Feature stories documentaries etc USIA responsibility with help of CIA Justice and State 5 6 7 ACTIVITY ACTIVITY Publication of weekly reportswith human-interest stories about Cuban refugees starting in March Activate bi-partisan group to p ro vide m edical supplies to Cuba bySeptember Dramatize individual stories of Cuban refugees representative of m ajor population groups w orkers youth farm ers fisherm en women church TOP SECRET SENSITIVE D PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT PLAN cont _____ PURPOSE To illuminate intolerable conditions in Cuba and the plight of the Cubans who remain inside To dramatize plight of the Cubanpeople and the failure of the Communist regim e to care for the people To publicize that ordinary citizens not just the rich have fled tyranny 1M TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS This should include supporting reports givingstatistics on the numbers of refugees who havefled and keep fleeing to the U S Jamaica Venezuela Mexico and Spain USIA respon sibility with support of others as required Responsibility of CIA and USIA Documentaries etc of these refugees now at work in the U S not just in refugee centers awaiting the day they can return to strike a blowfor liberty USIA responsibility ACTIVITY ACTIVITY Provide logistic personnel and training support Induce actions against Cuba through bilateral and multilateral military organisations to include personal contacts Prepare to increase military activity in the Caribbean area Prepare to intrude Cuban sea or air space Prepare to harass Cuban civil aviation and surface shipping Prepare to protect elements of the resistance movement Prepare to intrude or jam Cuban communications TOP SECRET SENSITIVE E MILITARY SUPPORT PLAN PURPOSE To insure optimum implementation of the basic plan To enlist support of military elementsof the Free World for the resistance movement to encourage opposition to the Cuban regim e and actions againstthat regim e To deceive Cuban government or todivert attention to provide psycho logical support for the resistance to frustrate the Cuban regime and to demonstrate U S determination to other states To divert attention of the Cuban regime and to help impede transport of supplies the regime needs To delay confuse or deter Cuban transportation and communication To insure success of resistance at critical juncture To confuse and block Cuban com munications TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS The basic plan requires complete and efficientsupport of the military to include the use of facilities and military cover Defense responsibility Make full use of the Inter-American Defense Board the Joint Mexican-U S Defense Com mission the Joint Brazil-U S Defense Com mission and the Permanent Joint Board for the Defense Canada-U S Additionally use should be made of extra-hemispheric militaryorganizations Defense responsibility with State support Increases in flights or naval shipping moves of dependents reinforcement or increased supply will improve readiness posture in the area Defense responsibility Unattributable Defense responsibility with CIA support Unattributable Defense responsibility with CIA support Air cover or escort and sea and air rescue operations Defense responsibility with CIA support Defense responsibility --CIA and USIA support ACTIVITY ACTIVITY 1 Special Operations Room fullyactivated by 1 March 1962 2 Caribbean Admission Center Opa-Locka Florida fullyactivated by 15 M arch 1962 3 Develop additional Interrogationcenters in other areas during March 1962 4 Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence cover age as required TOP SECRET SENSITIVE G INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN PURPOSE To provide the Chief of Operations andthe project team with current intelligenceand daily developments To provide top U S officials with status briefings as useful To collect intelligence required for the operations to identify and earm arkassets as refugees arrive and to pro vide security against Communist agentoperations To collect intelligence in a Latin atm os phere at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U S to spot additional assets for the operation and to provide security against Communistagent operations To develop increased '’hard1' intelligence cO TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS A maximum security room for this projectw ill be maintained in the inner JCS securityarea of the Pentagon Defense responsi bility with support by CIA and others as required This operation in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations is moving at utmost speed to becomefully active by 15 March with a new building com pleted and occupied and with a staff of 42 at work The staff is now being increased in phases as quickly as personnel are train ed to supplement the initial staff of 9 CIA responsibility with support by Defense Justice State USIA As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated as first priority CIA must survey means and methods for activating other interrogationcenters where useful Puerto Rico Spain and Venezuela should be included in this survey The new centers should be activated as quickly as feasible CIA responsibility with support by Defense and others asnecessary Defense responsibility in collaboration with CIA ACTIVITY Develop intelligence potential of Cuban colonies” in U S Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide substantive intelligence on Cuban activities Periodic intelligence estimates as required by progress of operations TOP SEC-id T-SENSITIVE G INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT PLAN cont PURPOSE To exploit the intelligence possibilitiesof former residents of Cuba including U S citizens now in the United States To add to the increased U S intelligence coverage on Cuba and to strengthen theconcern of Latin American states for security To up-date NIE 85-62 so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels t 3 -jfOp-SBCRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS There are colonies in Washington D C and other U S cities which are little Cuba s Family Church and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents a real potential exists for collection ofintelligence not otherwise available Justice FBI responsibility with support from CIA and others as required Responsibility of Defense with support by others as required As the operations develop there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Esti mate as the U S can produce meaningfully It is likely that a more informal method ofproducing an Intelligence Estimate for useat the national level than now governing theissuance of NIEL s may have to be followed CIA responsibility with support of others as required EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25 D C 20 February 1962 EYES ONLY EYES ONLY OF ADDRESSEES FROM Brig Gen Lansdale SUBJECT The Cuba Project Transmitted herewith is the projection of actions to helpCubans recapture their freedo si This total plan is EYES ONLY The lives of many brave people depend on the security of thiBpaper entrusted to you inference that this plan exists couldplace the President of the United States in a most damaging position This is a specific plan with time phases It responds to the request of the Special Group 5412 for such a paper I urgethat this paper not be made known in this complete form beyondyourself and those named as addressees The Attorney GeneralSpecial Group General Taylor State Secretary Rusk Alexis Johnson Richard GoodwinDefense Secretary McNamara Deputy Secretary Gilpatric Brig Gen Craig H fcMrti SQr CIA John McCone Richard Helms William Harvey USIA Ed Murrow Don Wilson L 4JL a« u vU ­ D’da-fified under the provisions 01 Li- JFK Assassination Rcccrds Act cf 1S92 FL102-526 -40P-S£eRSsENSiTIVE ¦f- ff m NARA-thu 8 o m n SF lo % It- 6i-tUx - TOP SECHRIErF SENSITIVE 2Q Febru ry 19 2 Program Review by Brig Gen Lansdale H THE CUBA PROJECT m t» The Goal In keeping with the spirit of the Presidential memorandum of 30 November 1961 the United States will help the people of Cuba over­throw the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new govern-“ T3 ment with which the United States can live in peace The Situation We still know too little about the real situation inside Cuba although we are taking energetic steps to learn more However some salient facts are known It is known that the Communist regime isan active Sino-Soviet spearhead in our'Hemisphere and that Communistcontrols inside Cuba are severe Also there is evidence that the repres sive measures of the Communists together with disappointments in Castro's economic dependency on the Communist formula have resultedin an anti-regime atmosphere among the Cuban people which makes aresistance program a distinct and present possibility Time is running against us The Cuban people feel helpless and are losing hope fast They need symbols of inside resistance and of outside interest soon They need something they can join with the hope of starting to work surely towards overthrowing the regime Since late November we have been working hard to re-orient the operational concepts within the U S government and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assetsrequired for success in our task i The next National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba NIE 85-62 promisesto be a useful document dealing with our practical needs and with duerecognition of the sparsity of hard facts The needs of the Cuba project as it goes into operation plus the increasing U S capability for intelligence collection should permit more frequent estimates for our guidance These will be prepared on a periodic basis Prem ise of Action Americans once ran a successful revolution It was run from within and succeeded because there was timely and strong political economic and military help by nations outside who supported our cause Using this same concept of revolution from within we must now help the Cuban people to stamp out tyranny and gain their liberty On 18 January the Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two tasks toDepartments and Agencies of the U S government in order to providea realistic assessment and preparation of U S capabilities The Attorney General and the Special Group were apprised of this action The answers received on 15 February provided the basis for planning a realistic course of action The answers also revealed that the course of action must con tain continuing coordination and firm overall guidance The course of action set forth herein is realistic within present opera tional estimates and intelligence Actually it represents the maximumtarget timing which the operational people jointly considered feasible It aims for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962 It is a Excluded from SENSITIVE automatic regrading _______ DoD Dir 5200 10 TOP SE GiRET This document contains_____pgs does not annlv Copy No of ___copies Canitixed under the provisionso thejrK AsccrsinationRecordsColIectifH# Act of 1S92 PL102-526 A ’ v iUs beenre- NARA H I ¥ac rsu ftt fait fAVMW as a resu or tnu review - TOP SECRET SENSITIVE series of target actions and dates not a rigid time-table The target dates are timed as follows Phase I Action March 1962 Start moving in Phase II Build-up April-July 1962 Activating the necessary opera- tions inside Cuba for revolution and concurrently applying the vital political economic and military-type support from outside Cuba Phase III Readiness 1 August 1962 check for final policy decision Phase IV Resistance August-September 1962 move into guerrilla operations ii Phase V Revolt first two weeks of October 1962 Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime Phase VI Final during month of October 1962 Establishment of new gove rnment Plan of Action Attached is an operational plan for the overthrow ofthe Communist regime in Cuba by Cubans from within Cuba with outside help from the U S and elsewhere Since this is an operation to promptand support a revolt by the people in a Communist police state flexibility is a must for success Decisions on operational flexibility rest with the Chief of Operations with consultation in the Special Group when policymatters are involved Target actions and dates are detailed in the attached operational plans which cover A Basic Action Plan Inside Cuba B Political Support Plan C Economic Support Plan D Psychological Support Plan E Military Support Plan F Sabotage Support Plan G Intelligence Support Plan Early Policy Decisions The operational plan for clandestine U S support of a Cuban movement inside Cuba to overthrow the Communist regime is within policy limits already set by the President A vital decision still to be made is t n the use of open U S force to aid the Cuban people in winning their liberty If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are achieved in Cuba and if U S help is required to sustain this condition will the U S respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban revolt The contingencies under which such military deployment would be needed and recommended U S responses are detailed in a memorandum being prepared by the Secretaries of State and of Defense An early decision is required prior to deep involvement of the Cubans in this program SENSITIVE TOP SECRET 2 Distribution Copy No 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 -12 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE The President The Attorney General General Taylor The Secretary of State through Deputy Under Secretary Johnson The Secretary of Defense through Deputy Secretary Gilpatric The Director Central Intelligence Agency The Director U S Information Agency through Deputy Director Wilson State M r Goodwin Defense Brig Gen Craig CIA Mr Harvey Chief of Operations Brig Gen Lansdale 'i CJVKL 'Reds VnmiSSicv nobox Hum cr faUaoc Ar T -Kcc ” of 7 l dt» u 5 l ipt Program Review --6y- e -Ch4-e£-of-Operations Operation Mongoose fi»afvs i Xe4__ i Jy Washington February 20 1962 Jx5 THE CUBA PROJECT '  i ' The Goal In keeping with the spirit of the Presidential memorandum ot id' November 1 9 6 1 the United States will help the people of Cuba over ' throw the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new goverrv ment with which the United States can live in peace 3 The Situation We still know oo little about the real situation inside Cuba although we are taking energetic steps to learn more However some salient facts are known It is known that the Communist regime is an active Sino-Soviet spearhead in our Hemisphere and that Communistcontrols inside Cuba are severe Also there is evidence that the repres­sive measures of the Communists together with disappointments in Castro's economic dependency on the Communist formula have resulted  in an anti regime atmosphere among the Cuban people which makes aresistance program a distinct and present possibility Time is running against us The Cuban people feel helpless and are losing hope fast They need symbols of inside resistance and of outside interest soon They need something they can join with the hope of startingto work surely towards overthrowing the regime Since late November we have been working hard to re-orient the operational concepts within the U S government and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assetsrequired for success in our task % vj'- The next National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba NIE 85 62 promisesto be a useful document dealing with our practical needs and with duerecognition of the sparsity of hard facts The needs of the Cuba project as it goes into operation plus the increasing U S capability for intelligence collection should permit more frequent estimates for our guidance These will be prepared on a periodic basis  J kI Premise of Action Americans once ran a successful revolution It was run from within and succeeded because there was timely and strong political economic and military help by nations outside who supported j our cause Using this same concept of revolution from within we must _ now help the Cuban people to stamp out tyranny and gain their liberty fj On 18 January the Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two tasks toDepartments and Agencies of the U S government in order to provide _ a realistic assessment and preparation of U S capabilities The Attorney General and the Special Group were apprised of this action The answers received on 15 February provided the basis for planning a realistic course of action The answers also revealed that the course of action must con tain continuing coordination and firm overall guidance • The course of action s«t iorlh horein is realistic within present opera tional estimates and intelliaence Actually it represents the maximum target timing which the operational people jointly considered feasibleu Itaims for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962 It is a Excluded from SENSITIVE automatic regrading EtoD DVr 5200 10 ' TOPSECRET JJ doe not apply Thl document cont»i» _ CoPr No- of -Li----e0 - C'j w X pP’ SECRET SfeNSITfVE series of target action and dates not a rigid time-table The target dates are timed as follows Phase I Action 'March 1962 Start moving in Phase II Build-up April-July 1962 Activating the necessary opera- tions inside Cuba for revolution and concurrently applying the vital political i economic and military-type support from outside Cuba 7 -  Phase III Readiness i 1 August 1962 check for final policy decision C v n Phase IV Resistance' i August-September 1962 move into guerrilla operations r' Phase V Revolt first two weeks of October 1962 Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime v j Jj Phase VI Final during month of October 1962 Establishment of new government Tl ­ C w Plan of Actionrv Attached is an operational plan for the overthrow ofthe Communist regime in Cuba by Cubans from within Cuba with outside help from the U S and elsewhere Since this is an operation to promptand support a revolt by the people in a Communist police state flexibility is a must for success Decisions on operational flexibility rest with the Chief of Operations with consultation in the Special Group when policymatters are involved Target actions and dates are detailed in the attached operational plans which cover A Basic Action Plan Inside Cuba B Political Support Plan dja1 C Economic Support Plan i D Psychological Support Plan E Military Support Plan F Sabotage Support Plan 'S G Intelligence Support Plan V Early Policy DecisionsSr The operational plan for clandestine U S support of a Cuban movement inside Cuba to overthrow the Communistregime is within policy limits already set by the President A vital decision still to be made is on the use of open U S force to aid the Cuban people in winning their liberty If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are achieved in Cuba and if U S help is required to sustain this condition will the U S respond promptly with milil y force to aid the Cubin rcv t contingencies under which such military deployment would be neede an recommended U S responses are detailed in a memorandum being prepareIfcby the Secretaries of State and of Defense An early decision is required “Hprior to deep involvement of the Cubans in this program SENSITIVE ' top secret 2 I# I J DERATION IN CUBA O ER MARCH a Establish three pathfinder agent operations in key areas selected by CIA f ' X 0 I OPERATION IN CUBA ER a Establish up to five more agentoperations in key areas selected by CIA V I A BASIC ACTION PL AN INSIDE CUBA PHASE I March 1962 3 fRP PURPOSE Explore operational conditions and requirements Report on potential and active resistance elements and situation for exploitation by resistance teams Lay groundwork for bringing in additionalagents and teams as conditions warrant PHASE II April jjuly 1962 PURPOSE Report on resistance potential and laygroundwork for additional agent opera tions TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS Agent operations must stay alive make useful contacts and communicate securelywith CIA Risk to the personnel is substantial due to lack of intelligence butmission is essential to planning andoperations jjNsTi SXDERATIONS These additional teams should provide current reporting on major Cuban areas so broad political action program can beplanned Risk to teams will continue high but mission is essential OPERATION IN CURA PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS APRIL colit ' b '’Voice of Cuban movement goes Establishes vital psychological assur Preferably the voice should be ance to people that a movement exists on the air from mobile transmitter inside Cuba to overthrow the regime Broadcasts can be brief ones at first identifying music slogan and short news News to include reports on resistance acts taking credit for all sabotage A s daily broadcastsare established criminals against people should be named and promisedswift justice two names per broadcast If operational judgment dictates trans­ i ¦ mitter can be aboard submarine for Vf 'J early broadcasts as a strictly tempor- — 1 ary measure It is vital to take risks by having it inside Cuba a secondtransmitter and Crew should be moved in if the first is Agji t U m JlY c Re-supply agent operations asDeliver supplies to satisfy needsThe agents will have to prove to localnecessary developed by agent operations if partisans that outside support is a valid reality Thus as arms ammunition and equipment etc are needed to equip resistance groups we must be able to respond effectively to these needs Aiaritime and as feasible air re-supply f vill be used This capability will have 9b expand as resistance is developed M A marginal note at this point on the White House copy in McGeorg Bundy's hand reads Will be got ready and held on call ife - BASICHt6TION PJ ANPHASE II cont# OPERATION IN CUBA PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS d By June establish 12 more agent operations in key areas selected by CIA e By June introduce three resistance teams in areas under initial path finder surveillance if situation is favorable Establish bases for guerrilla operations Mission is the same as for previous pathfinder operations This will test acceptance and use ofthe more highly trained teams thatmust guide development of the popular revolution within Cuba This also will check emphasis and timing ofprogram from viewpoint of Cuban situation To have focal points with some viability to stockpile for defensive needs and forfuture attack operations fjO TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Th«»e will be the lfest agent operationsinfiltrated into key areas from the outside Further expansion by pathfinders after these teams are in can be done from groups inside It is likely thatsome of these last pathfinders will be replacing casualties Very minor resistance actions by important population elements such as labor must be tried and groundworklaid for broader anti-regime program leading toward firm uprising program Realism of political platform can be tested jj These b ses are to be selected after on- the-ground surveys by the teams inside Cuba Some may exist already These will also be logistical bases for caches and stockpiling of arms and equipment to be used by the resistance The p a teams will need not only supplies for active resistance but also should be able to provide some welfare aid such as to families of resistance members families affected by plants shut-down by sabotage etc · JUNE corit OPERATION IN CUBA Establish clandestine leadershipheadquarters with means to com -municate with all resistance elements h Collection and use of psychologicalaction material JULY By July establish up to 5 moreresistance teams in areas prepared by pathfinder operations as operationally feasible j Basic organisation of undergroundin vicinity of airfields and communication centers a —BASIC AGT-ION PLAN PHASE II cont» PURPOSE Organise internal direction and con trol of the popular movement To provide documentary and photo ­graphic evidence of tyranny of regimeto awaken world opinion and fan fireof revolt inside Cuba for use by support operations and by resistance teams inside Mission is the same as for the first resistance teams A II e above To prepare the means for sabotageagainst military aircraft and keycommunication links of the regime'ssecurity forces TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS Leadership will havq been emerging andthis is about the earliest date possibleto establish a clandestine headquarters It should be of a bare field type in the securest area possible This can be come the meaningful source of political-psychological action to develop Cuban will to resist and fight The resistance teams will use this material with timeliness insicle and get it back outside so that it can b« exploited fully in LatinAmerica and elsewhere building officialand public opinion in support of the insideoperation Experience of first resistance teams must be considered in preparing these additional teams for operationi Security of person nel is very important at this point as the operation expands This requires ground surveys selection of sites for caching of sabotage supplies and recruitment of local underground in cluding members of military and communi cations employees Popular support must be prepared by resistance teams OPERATION IN CUBA k Expand infiltration points along coasts Low -key resistance sabotage as a continuing and expanding program BASIC ACTION PLAN ' prases 4cont “ PURPOSE To obtain maximum security for stepped-up infiltration To demonstrate public disaffection with the regime and give exampleswhich will prompt similar actionsby many others To build attitude and morale of the Cuban people tobecome activists for their cause against the Communist dictators TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS Original rat-iines need to be expanded into a functioning uiderground railway to pass more infiltrees into interior Means of quick alerts to danger delaying defenses multiple zoutes coastal watchers and receivers need to be organized andactivated Actions under resistance team guidancecan include - Runs on State food and clothing storesand ransack whexe possible promptingsimilar acts by those who want to getenough to eat and wear -Sugar in gas tanks of public buses andlocal official cars and trucks - Ice-picking tires -Removing receivers from telephones -Harassing telephone calls to officials - Throwing stones with threatening notesinto homes of officials - Disrupting rail switches and sand ingear boxes of trains -Swiping spark plugs and distributorsfrom vehicles -Housewives complaints on shortages of food medicine doctors etc - Public contempt campaign against Cubansin regime's puppet organizations includ ing effigy burning r to D i E jOPER ATION IN CUBA G U ST m Final check on resistance elements in Cuba AUGUST n Symbolic work slow-down A — BASIC ACTION-PfaAN-PHASE III L August 1962 PURPOSE To have a final look at the situation and at the means in place before giving the signal to initiate actionsleading to full-scale revolt PHASE IV August - September 1962 'V To give workers a feeling of participating in the popular movement without immediate reprisal  tO  TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS This is a last-minute pause to be cer tain that the resistance has a possibleorganization in key places which willact when needed that the significantportion of the Cuban people are insympathy with the aifns of the movement and will join in when given thechance and that the movement will be able to gain an area of Cuba as its own against the regime's military forces as a minimum 12 August is the anniversary of the overthrow of dictator Matihado The resist ance should link the 3astro-Communists with Machado and call on workers to lose one hour by slow-down methods on 12 Aug to commemorate the overthrow of one dictator Workers should be asked to give either one-hour by slow-down orone act of sabotage The Voice of the movement should thank them the next day for their splendid response to shamethose who didn't participate by makingthem feel alone OPERATION IN CUBA AUOIfSr-tUcmM o Symbolic signs painted on walls Machado One p By August have actions to penetrate and subvert the regime q Cuban paramilitary teams infiltrated to bases in the hills r Guerrilla bands activated in key areas ' A BASIC AgTIQN RJLAN ' PH A SE # coot PURPOSE To commemorate the downfall of one remembered dictator and give a symbolic pace to the resistance To weaken and frustrate organisedactions against the popular movement To provide a trained guerrilla cadreupon which to form guerrilla units To build a military striking force forthe popular movement inside Cuba ' TOP SECRETrtfeNSmVE CONSIDERATIONS Timed with the symbolic work slowdown A IV n above Spaced a few days apart the signs should have lines added to them to read Machado One Batista Two Castro Thiee These are actions on officials of the regime including the military and the police Some should be defected in place Others should be defected and helped to escape to the outside worldto tell the inside stoiy of the regime'styranny to evoke world sympathy withthe freedom fighters The paramilitary teams must be capableof initiating minor harassment and reprisalactions as well as organising and trainingguerrilla units Popular support is essential Recruits will be coming in after the symbolic harassment and reprisal actions They will be screened organised and trained for guerrilla action The regime's security forces can be expected to be very active Anti-tank and anti-aircraft tactics are necessary Increased popular supportis a must in this phase OPERATION IN QUBA SEPTEMBER s Commence expanding undergroundto every locality in Cuba t Step-up of guerrilla actions u Activate larger-scale ”black opera tions on bureaucracy as penetration assets permit v Start entry of volunteer freedom fighters from Latin America and elsewhere A- BASIC ACTION PLAN PHA9B¥V fewnt PURPOSE To have a truly revolutionary organization throughout Cuba To season the guerrilla forces withlarger scale raids To overburden the regime's administrative machinery by false orders increase the amount of paper workby adding new forms issue regulations to discredit superiors and sew sus picion and friction between bureaus To let the Cuban people know thatthey are not alone in their struggleagainst tyranny by the physicalpresence of foreign freedom fighters “’r’C 3 T TOP SFrorT cpmcttivK CffNSIDERA TIONS The guerrillas are the open arm but the popular movement must have mass support which requires intelligence collection and clandestine activists in cities and towns throughout They will surface when the revolt needs open support Actions will be to seize police files kid nap officials as hostages capture local militia arms stores increase road ambushes and destroy fuel supplies andtransport by raid actions This will require intensive preparation including defection in place of some personnel intimate knowledge of currentprocedures within bureaus and means of producing material which can pass asofficial A Marti Battalion might be formed for foreign volunteers Recruits from Latin America from refugee groups such as Hungarians Poles etc and Americans need a controlled means of entering thegood fight Some veterans of the Huk campaign could be a gesture and a practicalone OPERATION IN CUBA SEPTEMBER cont w Attack on the cadre of the regime including key leaders Operations liberating political prisoners held by regime if possible y Start blocking assistance from the Communist Bloc A BASIC ACTION PLAN pKKsnrrv fcoittr PURPOSE To express popular anger against the regim e's tyranny and to give harsh reality to the listing of criminals against the people ' To liberate prisoners for impact upon popular support of guerrillas and general resistance program To shut off Bloc assistance to the island of Cuba by all possible means from the inside r ttTTVir C Sn SIDE f -A TIONS II L n » P 'A ’ D 11•“ r • rfI'•X'1 h ft j j x f j M ty I ' While appealing to the free people of the world to help shut off Communist ship­ments of arms being used to kill the Cuban people the resistance must act on its own inside Cuba -striking against ships deliver ing Bloc supplies denying harbors bymining sabotaging transport aircraft destroying joc supplies inwarehouses and acting against Bloc technicians OPERATION IN CUBA SEPTEMectr tomcfch s Commence active sabotage ofmilitary aircraft ground transport and communications OCTOBER TO General strike by the Cubanworkers b Anti-regime demonstrations c Declaration of the revolt A BASIC ACTION PL-AN T»Hjb 8 lt iFd8 ieh PURPOSE To hamper the ability of the regime'ssecurity forces to strike at the resist ance movement as it emerges intomore op»-n gii rri1l» h nH« PHASE V F RST TfiO W EKS OCTOBER 1962 To make public the popular support ofthe militant revolt signifying the pass ing from underground to open rebellion Same purpose as noted above A V a forthe general strike To initiate the hour of decision bycalling on all Cubans for open support TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS More sophisticated uabotage devices contaminants etc t should be in target area by this time Strike must tie-up transportation andcommunications The resistance teams must have set the readiness of the workers for this defiance of the regime Arms must be available Military cells will be activated Funds will be needed to help the workers hold on and to baitdefections of groups The resistance teams must have set the readiness of all population elements youth farmers Church etc to openly defy the regime Arms must be available including anti-tank weapons Military cells will be activated Since the aims of the liberation will have been publicised previously this is the go” signal All Cubans and the world need to hear it OPERATION IN CUBA OCTOBER contr J d Open revolt by the Cuban people e Return of Cuban refugees who arequalified and want to help liberatetheir homeland X Establish a new Cuban government which can be recognised by the U S A BASIC ACTION PLAN - pfayrw v mrir PURPOSE To overthrow the Communist regime To start a more open movement backto Cuba of those Cuban refugees who are able and willing to risk their livesin overthrowing the Communist regime PHASE VI DURING OCTOBER 1962 To give legality to the moral right ofthe Cuban revolt top Secret sens Ive CONSIDERATIONS This is the combat phase fighting totake and hold ground Cuban refugee organisations will betested with a put up or shut up'1 pro position Those who have ability tocontribute to the popular movementinside Cuba should be given a chanceto go home and act Their screeningand infiltration will have to be con­trolled It must be a joining-in not a taking-over of the inside movement When the popular movement is holdingmeaningful territory in Cuba it should form a provisional government This should permit open Latin American and U S help if requested and necessary A military government situation willexist for the initial period and we mustinsist upon realism in this interim period preceding reasonable civilian controL jy B POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN ACTIVITY l i tivp kPose CONSIDERATIONS 1 Uac OAS and it organs To reaffirm strong official condemna OAS members must be firm and open about vtion of Communist rule in Cuba To this being a regional concern OAS must » influence Latin American and world build support for the £ause of the Cuban 3 opinion against Communist grab ofpeople against the Communist regime by Cuba and favorablf’toward Cubans statements and reports about the police Ik recapturing their freedom state methods and foreign domination inCuba This will require official and personal diplomacy with a real sense of m ission and must be an effort by Latin American as well as U S officials State responsibility with CIA and US1A support 2 Use United Nations members and To enlist world opinion for plight ofStatements of world leaders for humanity U N organs Cuban people under domination of aand justice can come from speeches andforeign sponsored government Build comments about misery of Cubans underhostility to Communist regime and aCommunist political-economic program favorable attitude to people's revolt Plight of trade unionism religion health Develop basis for outside support of education all fall within UN interest PhoneyCuban people Communist maneuvers about persecution of Castro regime can open way for a challengeto a UN inquiry team from OAS states re the true status of popular support within Cuba A challenge to hold free elections under UN monitor could be timely and place Cuban Communists on the defensive A UN aid for Cuban poverty an l health would be sound move to highlight situation State responsibility 3 Use US officials and news releases Indicate policy and commit prestige Top officials of Executive and Legislative at Washington level of U S government to appropriatebranches can keep pressure upon Castro support of the Cuban people vs Com regime directly by timely statements This munist dictatorship also supports similar attitude by leaders of other nations and helps spirit of Cubans Development of symj athy leading to favorableopinion about outside support for Cuban people is a goal State has responsibility to lead in TOP SECRET SENSITIVE this very important Jine ACTIVITY Use U S diplomats and staffs in official and other contacts Activate Latin American leaders government and public Activate labor leadership in other countries especially Latin Ameri can area B F OLlTto €WPORT PLAN r tcont 4 ­ PURPOSE To influence attitude of politicalleaders favorably for the Cuban people and hostile to Communist dictatorship To influence keystaffers of foreign leaders alongsame line and as appropriate influence leaders in intellectual and major population groups Commit national prestige and power of Latin political intellec tual labor youth religious military leaders to cause of Cubanpeople against Communist regime For own public impact internationalsupport and morale of resistancewithin Cuba To lead major population groups in opinion formulation and in actionsimpressing upon political leadershipa demand for support of the Cubanpeople against their dictator regime To counter and steal the Communist maneuver using labor to defend theCuban grab and launch other takeovers To employ any contacts with working class in Cuba as a means to help generate the resistance and revolt TOP seckE i% ensitive CONSIDERATIONS Personal influence upon foreign officials is vitalto build sympathy and support for Cuban revolutionagainst Castro regime Can lead to independent actions by other nations to build the case for theCuban people Latin American nations are most important but NATO also important Official attitude of Spanish government can be key tooperational values in homeland ties to Spanishcolony in Cuba State responsibility with sup port by others as required Timely and strong public statements will be en couraged Maximum publicity at country of origin other key countries and into Cuba by CIA assets State responsibility with support by CIA andUS1A ACTIVITY Use exile Cuban labor leaders Use exile groups under CubanRevolutionary Council Use exiles as touring teams forpolitical action in Latin America V Special news coverage for' LatinAmerica to generate political action B POJbiTiCALlSUPPORT PLAN-3 cont PURPOSE To help develop labor assets andactions in Latin America and to assist main operation by communications and infiltration of personnelinside Cuba To maintain a significant symbol ofspecial groupings for contacts within Cuba and impact upon Latin American public opinion To give personal witness against theCommunist regime and ask supportfor the people recapturing theirfreedom To arouse public and official sym -pathy for the suppressed Cuban people and to sharpen appreciationof the Communist threat to other Latin American countries Will provide leads for popular actionssuch as public pressure throughpetitions to local political and public leaders TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS ¦ « «¦ f frjl' i sl v 11 r• Special groupings such as students youth professions women are under the CRC and must be used with care and avoid politicalimprint of CRC to maximum Teams of students lawyers ex-Castro associates can tell impressive story that is newsworthy Cl I J f » ' vjj M  f J POt ITie fcr«tfPPORT PU JCi PURPOSE ACTIVITY CONSIDERATIONS 11 Radio programs for Cubanpolitical activation 12 By October official U 6 and Latin American policy support To inform and keep basicinterests within the Cuban population To provide a positive basis formore open support of the people'srevolution possibly a foundationfor military assistance uponrequest of recognized newgovernment Religious programs interviews with exile workers students fishermen families to help keep Cubans in touch with the wayof life they must recapture from the Communists CIA capability for daily andspecial broadcasts exists noting Swan Island station and arrangements with private stations in Miami New Orleans and some 75 small outlets in the Caribbean area Use of printed materials for dissemination inside Cuba is poasible throughmails and drops but hazard to receiver toogreat prior to climax CIA and USIAresponsibility The policy line for recognition of a revolutionary government is involved directly atthis point --u C ECONOMIC SUPPORT PLAN ACTIVITY Persuade QAS NATO and countriesfriendly to freedom to desist from trading with the Communist dictator ship in Havana Stop trans-shipment of U S items to Cuba especially via Mexico and Canada A positive list for Latin America subject to licensing procedures forother parts of the Free World Harassment of shipping destined foror arriving from Cuba Obtain cooperation of National ForeignTrade Council in delaying or refusing charters to vessels calling at Cuban ports by mid-March Ifvl I' ' ' '-'I' ' ' ''1 -I lift I• J' j Obtain by mid-March the cooperation of U S Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers to influence U S firms having subsidiaries abroad to adhere to the spirit of U S economic boycott of Cuban regime PURPOSE To build anti-regime feelings amongCuban people by economic squeeze To reduce supply of items and partscritical to the Cuban regime'seconomic program To reduce supply of special interest items To delay and reduce supplies Cuban regime needs in economy To reduce supplies the Cuban regimemust have to keep economy going To disrupt Cuban economy To harass Cuban economy -- ' TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS The regime may be weakened as the Cubandollar market is depleted through loss of creditline Requires full cooperation of allies andfriends State responsibility with CIA andCommerce Target is Cuban sugar economy power petroleum communications transport State responsibility with CIA Commerce Justice Responsibility of State with Commerce and CIAparticipating tal ' ylK Jt -V-V ho I if '- j Responsibility of State with Commerce and CIA participating V I I 'I i t f jf hot wij Responsibility of State with Commerce and CIA participating 7 U ' C pl M i S fcdkT PLAN contl ” ACTIVITY PURPOSE CONSIDERA TIONS 8 By June rumor campaign againstTo discourage sales of Cuban produceTropicals tobacco and sugar could be tar Cuban items in free world market and to further deplete Cuba's dollar geted Responsibility of CIA with State andmarket USIA participating TOP SECRE'rfcBKSITTVE AW1 A A1V D PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT PLAN ACTIVITY » 0 Create atmosphere of a crusade for human liberty 1 J 7 2 Ready broadcast means for Voice of inside Cuban movement to com mence broadcasting in April 3 In March commence visits of prominent U S and Latin American personalities to Cuban refugee camps in Florida 4 Publicity for selected defectors from Castro team Its PURPOSE To set the deeply-moving tone andmotivating force for the liberationof Cuba To ensure maximum effectiveness of broadcasts To demonstrate concern for plightof refugees particularly parent-less children To demonstrate Cuban regime's failure to live up to promises oforiginal 26th of July movement — t# ­ TOP crwctTTvr CONSIDERATIONS All media This means maximum use of spiritual appeal such as the prayer for Cubaby Bishop Boja Masvidal who has a genuineCuban revolutionary background recapturingthe ideal of Marti by taking use of his memoryaway from the Communists even to issue ofcommemorative U S stamp and popularizingsongs by commercial recordings USIA and CIA responsibility These broadcasts entail considerable work and risk to mount They have to pay-off every second while on the air They need identifying music by guerrilla instruments such as guitar or harmonica identifying slogan and a format worth risk to the listener inside Cuba If opera tionally required initial broadcasts can be tapedand transmitted by submarine As soon as feasible portable transmitter s must be established insideCuba CIA responsibility with support byDefense and USIA as required Mrs Kennedy would be especially effective invisiting children refugees One camp near Miamihas about 1 000 children who came out withouttheir parents Her impact upon Latin Americans on the recent Presidential visit to Venezuela and Colombia suggests this USIA responsibility Feature stories documentaries etc USIA responsibility with help of CIA Justice and State TOP SECRET SENSITIVE ACTIVITY Publication of weekly report with human-interest stories about Cuban refugees starting in March Activate bi-partisan group to pro vide medical supplies to Cuba by September Dramatize individual stories of Cuban refugees representative of majorpopulation groups workers youth farmers fishermen women church -tokG siimtotXKmiursuPPoRT plan PURPOSE To illuminate intolerable conditions in Cuba and the plight of the Cubans who remain inside To dramatize plight of the Cubanpeople and the failure of the Com-munijst regime to care for the people To publicize that ordinary citizens not just the rich have fled tyranny CONSIDERATIONS This should include supporting reports givingstatistics on the numbers of refugees who havefled and keep fleeing to the U S Jamaica Venezuela Mexico and Spain USIA responsibility with support of others as required Responsibility of CIA and U 5IA Documentaries etc of these refugees now at work in the U S not just in refugee centers awaiting the day they can return to strike a blowfor liberty USIA responsibility JtV E MILITARY SUPPORT PLAN ACTIVITY PURPOSE n _j cJ 2 Provide logistic personneland training support Induce actions against Cubathrough bilateral and multilateral military organizations to include personal contacts To insure optimum implementation ofthe basic plan To enlist support of military elementsof the Free World for the resistance movement to encourage opposition tothe Cuban regime and actions againstthat regime I Ill 3 4 5 6 Prepare to increase militaryactivity in the Caribbean area Prepare to intrude Cuban seaor air space Prepare to harass Cuban civilaviation and surface shipping Prepare to protect elements ofthe resistance movement To deceive Cuban government or todivert attention to provide psycho logical support for the resistance to frustrate the Cuban regime and to demonstrate U S determination to other states To divert attention of the Cuban regime and to help impede transport of supplies the regime needs To delay confuse or deter Cuban transportation and communication To insure success of resistance at critical juncture 7 Prepare to intrude or jam Cuban communications To confuse and block Cuban com munications TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS The basic plan requires complete and efficientsupport of the military to include the use of facilities and military cover Defense responsibility Make full use of the Inter-American Defense Board the Joint Mexican-t S Defense Com mission the Joint Brazil-U S Defense Com mission and the Permanent Joint Board for the Defense Canada-U S Additionally use should be made of extra-hemispheric militaryorganizations Defense responsibility with State support Increases in flights or naval shipping moves of dependents reinforcement or increased supply will improve readiness posture in thearea Defense responsibility Unattributable Defense responsibility with CIA support Unattributable Defense responsibility with CIA support Air cover or escort and sea and air rescue operations Defense responsibility with CIA support Defense responsibility --CIA and USIA support I I Vi w X» ty F SABOTAGE SUPPORT PLAN ACTIVITY PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS 1 Sabotage Cuban supply of nickelTo deny supply to Soviets and to hinder to Soviets Cuba's ability to pay for Bloc imports r 4« •J 3 2 Sabotage fuel supply To cripple transportation 1 -' I I'- i ' i W » ' 3 Sabotage communications To dramatize and encourage the Prime targets for hit-and-run teams based spirit of resistance outside Cuba are CMQ TV and the Czech radio -m transmitter believed now used to jam U S broadcasts Attacks mounted only when operationally feasible The G -2 micro-wave net should be dealt with when there are suf ficient assets inside to make sabotage coincide with a critical need in August-September r 4 Sabotage power supply To increase strain on regime andThis should be a concerted attack as feasible bring daily business to a standstill in July-August on power plants at Havana by dramatic action all people willSantiago Cinfuegas Vicente Santa Clara note Cuatro Caminos Matanzas It is of a type requiring detailed planning and special equip ment and can be mounted from outside Cuba TOP-SECRET SENSITIVE 1 ft SUPPORT PLAN U ACTIVITY PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS 1 Special Operation Room fully it ' activated by 1 March 1962 2 Caribbean Admission Center Opa-Locka Florida fullyactivated by 15 March 1962 3 Develop additional Interrogationcenters in other areas during W March 1962 4 Expand special intelligence andother sensitive intelligence cover age as required To provide the Chief of Operations andthe project team with current intelligenceand daily developments To provide top U S officials with status briefings as useful To collect intelligence required for the operations to identify and earmark assets as refugees arrive and to pro vide security against Communist agentoperations To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere at different levels than now seempossible in the continental U S to spotadditional assets for the operation and to provide security against Communistagent operations To develop increased hard intelligence TOP SECRET SENSITIVE A maximum security room for this projectwill be maintained in the inner JCS securityarea of the Pentagon Defense responsibility with support by CIA and others asrequired This operation in response to early recommendation as essential oy the Chief of Operations is moving at utmost speed to becomefully active by 15 March with a new building completed and occupied and with a staff of 42 at work The staff is now being increased in phases as quickly as personnel are trained to supplement the initial staff of 9 CIA responsibility with support by Defense Justice State US1A As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated as first priority CIA must survey means and methods for activating other interrogation centers where useful a ----­ should be included in this survey The new centers should be activated as quickly as feasible CIA responsibility with support by Defense and others as necessary Defense responsibility in collaboration with CIA  r --G r 1 11 OR T PLAN ­' contr i ACTIVITY PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS bevelop intelligence potential ofCuban colonies in U S Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide substantive intelligence onCuban activities Periodic intelligence estimates as required by progress of operations To exploit the intelligence possibilitiesof former residents of Cuba includingU S citizens now in the United States To add to the increased U S intelligencecoverage on Cuba and to strengthen theconcern of Latin American states for security To up-date NIE 85-62 so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels There are colonies in Washington D C and other U S cities which are little Cuba s Family Church and business interests provoke unusual personal tiesinside Cuba for some of these residents a real potential exists for collection ofintelligence not otherwise available Justice FBI responsibility with supportfrom CIA and others as required Responsibility of Defense with support by others as required As the operations develop there will be both increased intelligence collection anda need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U S can produce meaningfully It is likely that a more informal method ofproducing an Intelligence Estimate for useat the national level than now governing theissuance of NIE 's may have to be followed CIA responsibility with support of others as required