I I I- a Egg aneds TOP sacaET - as GUEWEREATIDN MW 4 1 Time 1a December 1962 Place Turkish Delegaticn Ministerial Meeting cf 0 the Earth Atlantic Cnhneil Paris France Participants Hebert S McNamara U S Secretary cf Defense Paul H Hitse Assistant Secretary ef Defense Ilhami Sanear Minister cf Defense Turkey Mr Sancar began the discussien with an espressicn cf Turkey's ccncern sheet the military assistance being given the Iraqis by the Ecviets He was particularly ccncerned abcut the which he claimed were being supplied Hr McNamara stated he did net believe they were receiving MIG-21s In any case Iraq did net have the capacity camparable te Turkey cf eperating and maintaining an Air Fares Mr Sancar said it was net a matter cf Turkey being afraid cf Iraq but it was impertant te make it clear tn the Iraqis that they shculdn't even think cf being able to challenge Turkey and that IXKFM Turkish public cpinien shculd be sure cf US suppert in this matter Mr McNamara said it was quite clear that Turkish public cpinien sheuldn't dcubt the purpcse cf the US tc assist them He did hewever wish tc raise cne questinn this was the matter cf JUPITERE in Turkey THE SECRET - i Hr r'TtDl mcto L41 - - -- Macaw a will mm mm THE SECRET - 2 - When the Russians had raised the question of the comparability of their missiles in Cuba to JUPITERs in Turkey we had firmly refused to discuss the matter with them This is our position today and will continue to he our position But there was another aspect of the matter when we considered plans for striking the Soviet missiles in Cuba we thought the Russians would almost certainly respond by striking the JUPITERs in Turkey This consideration acted as a strong restraint on our action we had no desire to draw on one of our Allies a Soviet reaction to an action of ours In any case we consider the JUPITERs obsolete even though they have a certain residual value we think it essential in the interests of our Turkey that they should be removed would presently describe an alternative should be removed was that Berlin might come to a crisis again in three months or so we would not want to see Turkey under the danger that might flow from such a crisis At the same time we saw merit in having more modern missiles available targeted against the same targets that the JUPITERs are now targeted against missiles with a faster reaction time and greater protection Therefore we believe it would be advisable if prior to April the JUPITERs in Turkey were to be dismantled and as a substitute PDLARIS suhmarine based missiles be assigned to SAEEUR and that Turkey participate with SACEUR in the targeting of those missiles Dnly in this way do we believe Turkey could be relieved of serious danger Ally Mk McNamara said he The reason we thought they Mr Sancar said he would submit and expose Hr McNamara's views to his government He said they had thought that a more secure weapons system could be substituted for the JUPITERs but that this should be done taking into account all the political and military factors Their place should be covered by efficient weapons covering the same targets Turkey was not prepared to have the JUPITERs re- moved in a manner which would leave a vacuum which would attract an attack upon them Mr McNamara said he agreed should be done until POLARIS missiles under SAEEUR with Turkish participation in targeting were on station we did think that this could and should be done by approximately the first of April it was not our thought that this THE SECRET 11 Li I ll H1 l'h'l'I THL 1 15 1 I d l hlICI H L - I Unwashed 1 we seem TDP SECRET - 3 Hr Sancar said that the enre cf the was Turkey's confidence in its Ally there must he nn mnral depressinn either in the penple nr the Army ne shnuldn't create the impressinn that the best nf Allies was leaving Turkey tn a cnnditinn nf alnneness They cnuldn't agree tn anything which wnuld suggest the US was leaving Turkey tn its fate Hr McNamara said that he cnuld believe that the assign- ment nf PDLAHIS missiles clearly a mere efficient system than the JUPITERs shnuld prnduce mnral depressinn in either the penple er the Army He did hnwever think the best way tn prnceed was tn limit nf this discussinn tn the smallest number nf penple absnlutely necessary Under nn circumstances shnuld the Snviets he allnwed tn what we were discussing He suggested that Mr Sancar discuss the matter with his gnvernment He wnuld send them a nnte putting nur ideas in writing Hr Sancar said that the matter wnuld be dealt with in the highest secrecy Hr Sancar then reverted tn the questinn nf aircraft He said they had very serinus They had expected the F l dG at an earlier date they were delivery had been tn December This was having an adverse effect en the mnrale nf Turkish fnrces It restrains their capacity training He asked Mr McNamara tn use his influence tn have the delivery date acceler ated Hr McNamara indicated we wnuld have in accelerating delivery but we can tn resnlve this He said it wnuld be tn link an nf an earlier delivery date with the replacement cf the JUPITERs He indicated that time was nf the essence He suggested that Mr Sancar send him a persnnal cable after he had cnnsulted with his gnvernment In the meantime he wnuld the Mr McNamara referred tn General Sunay s request rifles Hr McNamara said we were gning tn send rifles a beginning he thnught in spril and we wnuld cnntinue tn dn sn up tn a tntal nf rifles The meeting adjnurned This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu