I ECLASSIFI EO SANITIZED COpy THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON January 30 1969 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject The State of European Thinking about the NATO Tactical Nuclear Weapons Issue At your request we have prepared the enclosed information - memorandum on The State 'of European Thinking about the NATO Tactical Nuclear Weapons Issue This assessment of European thinking apout the NATO tactical nuclear weapons issue is based not on general public statements or editorial comment but rather upon the three 'years of discussions at the Defense Minister level on a highly classified basis in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and its immediate predecessor the Special Committee This group consists of four permanent members the US the UK ' Federal Republic of Germany nd Italy plus three rotating memberships currently held by Greece Be gium and Denmark The memorandum deals wi th various aspects' 'o f the problem under the followi g general headi gs I Differences between European and US outlook on role ' of tactical nuclear wea pons i n over-all st'rat gy II Dilemmas relati g to tactical use' of nuclear weapons III Eleme ts of consensus and of difference 'd efined by NPG IV Status 'of European effort to draft guidelines on use 'of nuclear weapons V European thinking on consultation about use of tactical nuclear weapons William P I R gers I i L Enclosure - J ECLASSIFIED RO l l S8 a5amcndcd 3 5 LfT Ap ' 0 d-cocr AlL'i0 2-leqhfi 4ts 3 b X' lo By Ai tf NARA Date 5 - 1d- DC _ _ _ o _ _ _ _ T ' _ _ BOREa ANITIZED c --_ -- __-_ ------------------- ____ o o ___ COpy The State of European Thinking about the NATO Tactical Nuclear Weapons Issue SUMMARY I Differences between European and US outlook on role of tactical nuclear weapons in over-all strategy Prior to 1967 official NATO strategy was based on the concept of assive retaliation In May 1967 NATO under US leadership accepted a strategy based on the doctrine of flexible response This recognizes the need for at least limited conventional and possibly nuclear response prior to a strategic nuclear exchange However formal agreement to a new strategy has not removed all of the issues with respect to the role' of tactical nuclear weapons The very definition of tactical nuclear weapons II poses the fundamental difference in US and Allied views on such weapons Nuclear weapons for use' on European battlefields are tactical to us strategic to the Europeans Discussions in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group NPG have h ghl ghted to the Europeans the devastati g damage to Europe of what we call a tactical nuclear engagement Nevertheless the Europeans perceive credible deterrence in terms of an early use of tactical nuclear weapons designed to pose the risk to the attacker of the use of US strategic forces - The US while vitally concerned with deterrence is also concerned with the problems of limiting escalation should deterrence fail ' j I The French continue to ppose NATO's strategy of flexible response with a octrine calling for immediate strat gic response to any aggression The Force de Frappe is a function of that doctrine' although France shows some interest in battlefield nuclear weapons to support French conventional forces II Dilemmas relating to tactical use of nuclear weapons Discussions in the NPG have not yet produced any agreed policies on how nuclear weapons should be used but they have produced an increased awareness of some of the dilemmas posed by any proposed use of tactical nuclear weapons SBC T --- --- --- Ci lLNO ' _ -- _ - - - -' P do ---- _ - - - - - --------- - ' ---- ----- --'-' DECL SSIFIEIl uthority By SANITIZED COpy F D l9$13 Ql1 ' -I ate _ iz iFt -2- III Elements of consensus and of difference 'defined by NPG - NPG members ar stockpile in Europe is adequate in SANITIZED Pe ' l'g CsJ size The NPG continues to find difficulty in devising a doctrine for first use and even more for use of more than a few nuclear weapons I I - The US has tended to emphasize the risks of crossing the nuclear threshold at all our European Allies stress the importance of posing the risk of nuclear use at an early st ge 'of conflict as a deterrent to gression SANI T'ZI O c c O' J -- Some 'NATO countries in particular have pressed for r atomic demolitions that will pe'r rnit early use on NATO territory o The US has resisted any pre-delegation of authority to military commanders 'for use of nuclear weapons IV Status of European effort to draft guidelines on use of nuclear weapons The European members 'o f the NPG have 'pushed for the ' early establish ent of policy guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons The US has urged careful study before any policies are' adopted The May' NPG meeting will see the' 'first effort to reach agreement on policy guidelines' This effort is likely to bring into sharper focus some of the underlying differences between the US and the Europeans 'o n the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence and defense However initial reports 'o n the guidelines now being drafted by the UK and the FRG s 9gest that our differences will not be too great t - ' i- ' t j I1 I V European thinking on conSUltation about use' of tactical nuclear wea ns SANITIZED P-'2 S C 3 C2 b The Europeans have 'urged development of detailed procedures w decisions to use nuclear weapons will be made The US has been reluctant to adopt inflexible procedures that might limit the President's options However continued reluctance by us to adopt some 'procedures may be interpreted by our Allies as unwilli gness o share adequately in vital decisions respecti g nuclear use I END SUMMARY SCRB'f - -- - _ _ _- - _ _ _ __ _- ---------- - -- --- ' - ---- -- - ----rr --' SANITIZED COpy DECLASSIFI ED F CJ l_ 513 6'2 I PI Authority By oL NAltA Date SEEURRi 'i' The State of European Thinking about the NATO Tactical Nuclear Weapons Issue I Differences in European and US outlook on role of tactical nuclear weapons in over-all strategy The principal difference between the us and our NATO Allies in strategic discussions over the last several years has been in the relative emphaSis' given to deterrence and battlefield defense The Allies generally place greater emphasis on maintaining a credible deterrent by posing the threat of nuclear retaliation to any aggression The US thqugh vitally concerned with deterrence is also more concerned with the question of how if deterrence should fail a war might be fought in the European theater in such a way as to minimize damage and the risk of escalation to a strategic exchange it i I I ' 1 Prior to 1967 the 1ssue was' debated in the context of the NATO ' Strategy Document Me 16 3 which many Alli s interpreted in terms of an essentially massive retaliation response to Soviet aggression in E ope o This difference based as it is ' on a fundamentally differing outlook geographic location and national interest can understandably never be completely bridged The destruction wrought by tactical nuclear weapons would occur primarily in Europe the destruction wrough t by a s rategic nuclear exchange would involve primarily targets in the US and USSR i In May 1967 NATO under US leadership accepted a strategy paper based on the so-called flexible response which recognizes the need for at least limited conventional and possibly nuclear response prior to a strat ic nuclear exchange j I I f' r r _ f ' __ DF CLASSI FI ED I lIt hontv - 1-3 P D 129sc3 - N' It D ull 61 11cp As a result the issue is no longer so clearly drawn The question is no longer massive retaliation vs flexible response but rather a matter of degree -- how uch of a response should be given with conventional or tactical nuclear weapons in the European theater before escalating to a strategic nuclear exchange The NATO Strategic Concept document tends to paper over the fact that the US has tenaed to favor a generally higher though undefined nuclear threshold and thus larger conventional forces than most of our Allies are willing to accept j ' I - ' In concrete terms this has been reflected in differences on the following issues '-- How long how far forward and against how large a non-nuclear threat should NATO forces plan to defend before using nuclear weapons -- Should ATO plan on using tactical nuclear weapons to counter superior Warsaw Pact forces or only to signal the threat of escalation to a strategic exchange Despite differing emphasis a Eur o peans have wan ted and continue to wan t the US strategic nuclear guarantee even though some like the French have raised doubts about the firmness of that guarantee '1 o ' J j I I I h At the same time though there is as yet little clarity in European thought as to the purpose of these weapons Europeans have also wanted the physical pr sence of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe They remain very sensitive to any suggestion of possible withdrawal or even reduction in the stockpile of US nuclear weapons in Europe 5 DECI ASSIFI ED ulhol lly ED l258 By t NARA Datt if _ 6f '11rPf T -3France has a different view on the use of nuclear weapons The French view of Alliance strategy calls for immediate strategic action in the event of an aggression against NATO territory The French do not accept the current NATO doctrine of flexible response but would launch a strategic nuclear bombardment of the enemy rear areas at the outset They consider that this would cause the aggressor to stop the invasion rapidly and would make a battlef ie1d defense possible without the abandonment of territory The French make no distinction between limited and major aggression and consider a radical response is necessary to a y aggression Therefore the French consider that an adequate defense is not possible if only conventional forces or even tactical nuclear weapons are employed against aggressor forces Nonetheless the French Army continues to be interested in tactical nuclear weapons systems This interest reflects a realization that notwithstand ng the present French view of NATO doctrine contingency planning must proceed for the defense of NATO territory and for the possibility of French cooperation in that defen s e within the framework of established NATO concepts The French consider that any decision to employ nuclea resources must be very prompt and that a forward defense line should be installed in order to measure and define a marked aggression before unleashing a defensive nuclear strategy Nonetheless it has been a consistent French view that their own forces would not be stationed on such a forward line Ins tead their forces would apparently be used primarily to defend an advance on French territory The UK as the first European nuclear power largely shares the views attributed above to the NATO Allies in I ECLASSI FI EO Authority F D 29s-B BY NA 'e _6 Z'1lfPt EGRET -4- I - 1 'j general The UK for reasons of budget and European policy has been somewhat more outspoken than the others in pressing the European point of view II I j I 'j I ' j I '1 j I Dilemmas relating to tactical use of nuclear weapons The chief political forum within NATO for nuclear discussions has been ' the Nuclear Planning Group a seven nation group co sisting of Defense Ministers These discussions have not yet produced any clear'er policies on how 'nuclear weapons should be used They have however indicated various national views and have produced an increased awareness of some of the dilemmas posed and choices to be made in any proposed use of tactical nuclear weapons Examples of these dilemmas are 1 If nuclear weapons are used early use is desirable to limit the loss of territory and to avoid resort to larger scale use at a later stage in the conflict which will result in greater destruction but considerable time for decision is required since the-first use of a nuclear weapon has immense political and military consequences 2 If nuclear weapons have to be used their use in small numbe s is less likely to be escalatory but use in small numbers leaves one open to large scale retaliation from the full nuclear capability of the enemy 3 U e of nuclear weapo s on one's own territory may be less escalatory but it also produces more collateral damage on one's own territory ' - - 1 i I j 1- 4 Prede1egation of authority to m litary commanders will assure prompt response but it takes vital decisions out of the hands of the political leadership where they belong I F CI ASS I FI EI utho ri ly E o l9rB ARA B D utl W4tTIZeDCOPY 6 ilIPf -5 5 Strict political control of nuclear strikes is desirable to limit escalation but detailed centralized political control of a rapidly changing battlefield situation is not practicable 6 If deterrence is to continue to work the members of the Alliance must continue to manifest their determination to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend NATO territory but i t is becomin increasingly clear that the use of nuclear weapons in large numbers could have disastrous effects and that even limited use involves significant risks of escalation - III Elements of consensus and of differences defined by the NPG 1 l ' ' 1 r ' '$ 0 ' pt Sufficiency of the nuclear stockpile in Europe There has been formal agreement in the NPG that the stockpile of nuclear princ ally tactical in Europe is sufficient ' that the main s ranges and means of delivery etc This in turn- depends on what doctrine should govern the use of tactical nuclear weapons None of'the studies done to date in the NPG have demonstrated how NATO could use more than a small fraction of these without destroyi g mos of Europe Neverss NATO and US military commanders continue to support a requirement for more of certain types of weapons e g atomic demolition weapons Even though we could undoubtedly get general agreement among the NATO countries that the present stockpile is excessive from a strictly military standpoint we would en ounter serious political difficulties if we were to suggest a reduction in the stockpile There would be concern in Europe that this would weaken deterrence and that once we started to reduce there would be no en to the process Ii I I Hi Od 1 0 - P i 06 J ' _ - _ - SANITIZED COpy l - e t ' - - - - r_ - _ I ' r- ECLASSI FlED Alllhorily f -P l_ S 3 n Ql NARA Datt 6 ff1 I 1 i iOPFT I -62 Uncertainties of first use by NATO Last year the NPG did a series of studies on first use of nuclear weapons by NATO The NPG concluded that first use is not necessarily in NATO's interest However this doe s no t mean our Allies are prepared to abandon the option for first use or to publicly foreswear first use because of the belief that such a policy would weaken deterrence 3 1 J I 1 I j One of the factors which lead to the conclusion that fir st use was not necessarily in NATO's interest was the recognition that initial use by NATO could be followed by retaliation and by a process of escalation which would bring massive destruction to Europe The US has stressed in the NPG the need to look beyond first use to confront the real problems of escalation Many of our Allies have been reluctant to do so because this poses an unsolvable dilemma On the one hand first use by NATO crosses the nuclear threshold and risks retaliation and widespread destruction in Europe On the other hand if NATO appears too reluctant to use nuclear weapons the deterrent is weakened The studies to date in the NPG have focused on very limited USe by both sides but studies now underway are examining wider use 4 11 J Implications of further use Vi ws on specific categories of use a ABM's - In the fall of 1967 following the US decision to deploy SENTINEL the NPG members agreed that an ABM deployment in Europe was not in NATO's interest Under present circumstances At the time the British made an effort to obtain NPG endorsement of a statement that an ABM in Europe would never be in NATO's interest Others notably the Germans and the Ita1ians declined to 1 JiiCPiJ DECI ASSIFIED Authority F D l9sl3 Byot N I ' Dall 61z' __'il f f I GPiT -7endorse such a sweeping statement The question of an ABM for Europe is quiescent at present but would almost surely become active were the US ever to decide on deployment of an ABM system more extensive than SENTINEL to protect US cities against a Soviet attack b ADM's - The ADM is a small-yield nuclear weapon used for demolition and to create barriers particularly in mountainous terrain The utility of ADM's has been studied quite extensive in the NPG been single ae reIlLsive character Many US and A-llied military comihanders and some Allied governments believe that ADM s co ld be used ith less risk of escalation because they are to be used only on NATO territory nd thus their def nsive character would be clear MOst targets fa ADM's are in forward sition Some NATO countries _ also contend that because ac istics and the need for early use of'ADM's to gain maximum effectiveness that soma form of predelegation is necessary and might be feasible with respect to ADM's and perhaps also air defense weapons However the US has made quite clear that we were ot prepared to predelegate authority to military commanders either to emplace or use ADM's The have sought ways of assuring prompt re se of ADM's without actual l y resorting to predelegation The NPG has undertaken a study of the time factors nvolved in release of ADM's with a view to reducing reaction times This study is still in progress However it is clear that a major uncerta nty that cannot be quantified i the time it takes to make a decision to release a nuclear weapon 1I I N ITIZED Copy ' - - - - - - - - - - _ ------ DECLASS IFIEO Auth rity _ D IB By NARA Date SANITIZED COpy ___ _ J z_'1 LfE1 1 i The fundamental p roblem remains that the US has not ed to edelegate authority for use in any event would like to 1 assure prompt use in case of invasion The British have generally supported the US position The Germans in recent years have noticeably cooled on the utility of ADM's o ce they had examined the potential destruction in Germany that would result from their use If there is any consensus on this issue it is that NATO cannot count on early reIease of ADM's by the US and thus plans must be developeq where required that do not rely on the early use of ADM's 5 Demonstrative use The US authored a paper on demonstrative use of nuclear weapons i e a shot i the air or into an unpopulated area which was discussed at the NPG meeting in October 1968 It stressed that demonstrative use was not necessarily risk-free because the attacker might retaliate even against very limited use Furthermore the more clearly we signaled that it was a demonstration the less likely it would have a deterrent effect While this fact was acknowledged by the other NPG members there is still propensity to believe that use of a few w apons is safer than the use of many It is generally agreed that NATO should have an option for demonstration use and that demonstrations should be against real targets rather than in remote areas 6 War at sea ' Members of the NPG generally recognize that use of nuclear ' weapons at sea may be less escalatory than use on the land but that it also may be less necessary given NATO's presumed superiority at sea There is also recognition that targets at sea generally 'are fleeting and that remote command and control of the naval battle is probably impractical j i 1 i t SANITIZED COPY ' HECL SSIFIEI uthurity E D l9S 8 Hy a NAR I ' I at z'1l Pf N'TIZED COpy SF -97 Tactical aircraft For some years the US has pressed our NATO Allies to devote more of their tactical air forces to conventional rather than nuclear missions or at least to make them dual-capable i e capable of using nuclear or non-nuclear weapons Recently there has been some recognition of the principle that tactical aircraft should be dual-capable although there remains a reluctance to spend the funds needed for training and munitions About a year ago SACEUR appeared 'to be moving in the direction of removing some of his tactical aircraft from the nuclear strike mission However in a December 1968 meeting with the NPG General Le itzer argued that he could not reduce the number of aircraft assigned to the nuclear strike mission because less of the external forces i e US strategic weapons were being assigned to targets threatening Europe This is likely to raise a major new issue for the NPG to examine The problem for the US will be to continue to move our Allies toward a more adequate non-nuclear capability without raising the fear of denuclearization of Europe er l l e in NATO particu arlY the International Staff for development of very small-yield in nuclear weapons Behind Ihis pressure is the assumption that smaller weapons may make nuclear conflict safer or less destructive The US has discouraged these p essures ' for two reasons First we have felt that there ar adequate numbers of small-yield weapons less than in the NATO stockpile Smaller-yield weapons than we now have would not ne essarily reduce collateral damage' as more would be needed to accomPlish a given task Secondly the US has not wanted to encourage pressure from other countries which might lead to a costly new deve opment program SANITIZED COpy I 1 ' - -- -- - - -- - _ _ _ --- '-- - - --- - ' - - - - - - 4 - - ' - -- _c - ____ T_ - - _ DECLASSIFIED Authority _f 9 _ si3 ____ _ By Ol1NA' A DatI _ LZ'1I Pf SEGPM -10- IV Status of European effort to draft guidelines on use of nuclear weapons After two years of preparatory studies and discussions 'of various tactical uses of nuclear weapons the NATO Nuclear Planning Group of Defense Ministers meeting at Bonn on October 11 1968 invited the United Kingdom and Germany jointly to start work designed to develop tent tive political guidelines for the NATO military authorities in respect of the possible initial tactical use of nuclear weapons by NATO The UK and FRG have begun their joint work in November with an informal target date of March for submission of drafts to members for discussion at the next meeting of NP in London on May 29-30 The US has asked that the two governments keep in touch with us as their work proceeds The problems posed for the US in consultations regarding these prospective guidelines are generally 1 I I - -j 1 1 To avoid the emergence of potentially sharp and divisive differences between the US and European members over basic strategy 2 To encourage the greatest possible degree of realism in the drafts about the risks inherent in using nuclear weap ns without undermining confidence in the deterrent For the formulation of guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons like the formulation of the NATO strategy documents which preceded them will bring with it dangers of ' unhelpful debates that could tend to undermine European confidence in our commitment and credibility of the deterrent Conversely however just as the formulation of the new NATO strategy paper in 1967 served to broaden areas of agreement rather than to underline disagreements the forthcoming effort if well managed offers similar opportunities r ' ' r DECL SSIFIEO F P 129s13 B QL ' J A Dak 61 'f1CPf AUlhof'lly i8M'f -11- I Until drafts of the guidelines are available to us specific points at issue cannot be defined The fact that much study and discussion has preceded the effort to begin drafting guidelines plus the fact that the Germans as non-nuclear Europeans and the UK as nuclear and nonContinental Europeans have somewhat differing points of view will tend to move their compromise formulations toward a middle ground The points with which we may want to take issue are likely to be largely matters of degree and emphasis Information available on the UK-FRG talks to date indicates that the only current issues between them relate to whether or not to include in draft guidelines the subjects of a predelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons and b constraints on yield and consequent fall-out from tactical nuclear weapons according to the areas where they are to be employed v European thinking on consultation about use of tactical nuclear weapons In 1962 NATO except France agreed to the so-calle4 Athens Guidelines on consultation o They state that as regards the possible recourse by NATO to nuclear weapons in its self defense if time permits the decision to use nuclear weapons would'be ' subject to prior consultation in the Council When the US sought to replace the so-called Ithardware fl MLF approach to NATO nuclear sharing with a consultative approach the Nuclear Planning Group was established Its charter lists as pertinent subjects for consideration procedures for the use of nuclear weapons and improvements in the machinery for carrying out agreed methods of consultation o ' - ---- - --- - - --- _-- - -- o - - ' --- - --- - - '-- - - _ ------- - -_ _---_ _- - -- _ - - - - - DECLASSI FI ED Authority _ D 2 5l3 BY NAR Dale 61Z'il Pf 4iH8ft8i -12After inconclusive discussions over the past two years there is increasing pressure from most NPG members to elaborate and reach agreement on more detailed consultation procedures to flesh out the Athens Guidelines They hope by so doing to gain greater certainty that all especially small countries will have a voice in decisions that affect them They want new and more concrete evidences of this certainty to demonstrate progress in this matter to their parliaments and publics In addition there are institutional interests within NATO which would be served by definition of some defined and assured role for the Permanent Representatives the Secretary General the Mi itary Committee Major NATO Commanders etc I The US up to this time has taken the position that while it is willing to explore possibilities objectively in the NPG it may not be wise to seek much further definition of procedural detail in adv a nce I It would seem unwise for example to suggest that we would limit ourselves to consult ation in the North Atlantic Council We would not wish to discover that this body had been paralyzed in a real crisis by a communications failure or other set of circumstances which made it impossible to consult - or to consult on time - in the Council rather than conducting governmental consultations by other means I I 1 i We have tended to consider that the Guidelines should balance in a realistic manner the legitimate desire of all NATO nations for participation in determining the circumstances of the USe of nuclear weapons and the need for close political control on the one hand with the need for flexibility and timely political decisions to support required military actions on the other J Finally we have considered it essential that this balance be maint ined if the s rength and credibility of I- - ---''''-'' _ -- - - - - - - -_ _ - _ - - - - - -- - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ o _ oo o __ H __ _ _ _ o o o _ _ - I ECLASS'F' EO Authority F O l9s-8 B NAIU DatI 61Z'11CPf QR iI' -13- j I I I l I -1 j the Alliance's nuclear deterrent are to be maintained In order for nuclear weapons to continue to contribute to the deterrence of Soviet aggression in Europe the Soviets must be certain that we have the will and capability to respond to aggression in timely fashion Accordingly we have been concerned that in our quest for procedures we avoid any tendency toward any rigid unrealistic or burdensome arrangements that would be inconsistent with our fundamental interests It would appear to be very much in our interest on the other hand to seek diligently within the NPG discussions ways of showing good faith and forward movement in the effort to improve NATO consulting procedures short of impairing the freedom of action essential to deterrence and defense Ambassador Cleveland has stated the options when he reported that dragging our feet could cause this to become a fairly major political issue by the time of the May 29 Ministerial Meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group On the other hand a more forthcoming US attitude or perhaps acceptance of some general principles can defuse the issue for some time to come If iI 1 I I I I I I j iiiRiZE I I ----- -- r _ This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu