MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL November 9 1979 INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI- FROM PAUL B HENZ SUBJECT Thoughts on U I have no original thoughts to offer on how we get the hostages released and our Embassy back but it is important to think beyond the current imbroglio and not let emotions generated during it undermine our longer-term interests in this part of the world If there is leftist and or Soviet input directly or indirectly into the Embassy takeover the aim can only be to make it impossible for us to have any relations with Iran over an extended period of time The fact that we were on the way to reestablishing a military relationship and American business was still able to function was inimical to leftist objectives It is in the long-term interest of the left much more than that of the religious fanatics to have us out ql of Iran entirely but it is very convenient for the left whether they are manipulating or influencing the Situation or not to have the religious fanatics doing their work for them C The Espionage Theme The charge that the American Embassy was a nest of espionage directed against the Iranian revolution is pervasive at present It is a curious theme for religious fanatics to get stress- but not at all curious for leftists Can it be entirely accidental that this theme has been prominent among a whole series of antirU S themes in Soviet clandestine broadcasts to Iran over recent weeks See the attached summary with excerpts of NVOI monitoring--TAB A all these accusations are of course part of the current anti U S rhetoric Fragmentation Along with China Ethiopia and Egypt Iran is one of the oldest polities in the world We hardly need any more demonstration than we have already had of the strength of Iranian nationalism - 0 Review 11 9 85 p 33 3min Li 1 21 121 These facts alone argue against any espousal by us of frag- - mentation separatism So does U 5 experience and basic pol We avoided supporting separatist movements in Congo Zaire 1 Nigeria Ethiopia and can be thankful in each instance that a we did The destabilization which support of separatism in Iran would cause in the whole region would be awesome In the short- and medium-term such an approach could only serve Soviet interests We do not need to support brutal Iranian ml oppression of Kurds Arabs Azeris Beluches etc either-- but we should be completely clear about support for Iranian territorial integrity Within that territorial integrity there is plenty of room for minority rights UL Intelligence It is supremely ironic that we should stand accused of so much espionage out of our Embassy in Tehran when we have done so little What modest efforts there have been in recent months will no doubt be shattered by what has just happened But we can't simply close up and forget Iran We have had so-little luck 'with the intelligence problem here that a special task-force effort to gather intelligence on Iran through all possible channels outside of Iran and through friendly governments inside of Iran needs to b e made CL Retaliation If worse comes to worst in Tehran agitation in the 0 5 for revenge and retaliation will be intense We are likely to hurt ourselves more than the Iranian fanatics by any violent actions emotionally satisfying as they may be on a temporary basis And the left will know how to exploit such actions to our discredit and loss We must still have a lot of friends in Iran Retaliation will only make it more difficult for them eventually to assert themselves UL Break Off Relations Keep the Ethiopian example in mind we came close to breaking off relations there and some leftist and proeSoviet elements clearly wanted us out We did not have to put up with anything approaching the level of destructive Provocation we now have in Tehran but it was worth holding on We are better off having regular diplomatic relations with Ethiopia than we would be if they had been severed 'Sooner or later the same mesa-seam 2 will be true of Iran If we have to take everybody who is now there out we should send at least one man over to maintain a link or set up a small interests section in an allied embassy We could even maintain relations_but not have a resident embassy- es we do in many places in the gm world C Attachment - TABA cc Sick Hunter w att Brement w att Ermarth w att Welch w att Griffith w att This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu