BLACK ROOM REPORT We have been examining the situation in Iran from the standpoint of influencing the course of political developments These developments are likely to include one of the following -- a hostile Islamic state or hostile leftist state -- either supported by the USSR disintegration of Iran with possible Soviet intervention in the north To influence events there are several approaches which could be followed Each involves an increasing level of U S commit- ment l Contingency Planning Let nature take its course and be prepared to weigh in at the appropriate moment by virtue of indirect contact with dissidents 2 Destabilization Propaganda and black operations intended to discredit Khomeini and breed dissent among him and his followers 3 Contact Opposition Direct U S contact with potential alternative lea ers indicating support for their efforts Expanded contacts with tribal elements initially aimed at better intelli- gence collection 4 Encourage Organize Alternative On political side aim at a government-1n-ex11e or creation of a political cadre which could move in quickly On the tribal side provide arms support and coordinating mechamism for regional movements Several basic policy questions must be answered in considering our approach 1 Are we prepared to accept a commitment to destabilize the situation in Iran and try to replace the present leadership -- It could be a protracted effort and success is by no measure assured -- The commitment will tend to grow over time and to become increasingly visible -- This could weld the left and religious extremists together on a common anti-American theme DECLASSIFIED WT Classified and Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski Reason for Extension NSC 1 13 Review November 20 1999 - wean M s m fa'r - 2 - But -- Friendly Opposition forces are unlikely to act effectively without a clear signal from us Continuation of Khomeini's rule is likely to destroy the moderate elements in the political spectrum leaving the left as the only credible alternative to religious fanatacism when Khomeini inevitably falls or passes from the scene 2 If we make such a decision what is our strategy Should we our efforts on the regime in Tehran and attempt to replace the central government -- Tends to preserve territorial integrity and unity -- Minimizes risks of Soviet or Iraqi dismemberment But -- Khomeini is strongest in Tehran controls the streets -- Our assets are very limited there 3 Alternatively should we focus our efforts on the periphery to build up an alternative government -- Tribal opposition is real and could undermine Khomeini's authority The oilfields are the possible prize We would maxi mize our chances of holding the oil in the event of complete collapse or Soviet intervention -- The risk of civil war and complete disintegration is serious -- The danger of Soviet intervention in the north is increased This is likely to be a partition Option What assets do we have -- Egypt should be willing to cooperate with us for broadcasts and possibly other operational assistance Iraq may be willing to work with us in certain areas Saudis and Gulf states possible allies I -- Some key figures inside Iran may be willing tor ui g i Admiral Madani Governor of the oil regiOns 1i Shariat-Madari 'fhwy 14ifTOP 432cm 3 -- We have good contact with some of the tribes and this could be expanded -- Exile groups are begging for a signal from us There are some good peOple Amini Bakhtiar outside Iran that can have an impact there but they would need a lot of help to become a significant factor -- Ultimately direct overt U S intervention could be required The extent of our commitment_ hould be no greater than our willingness to play it out to the end This is particularly Important the more we involve the Saudis and Egyptians -- The Iranian military at present belongs to no one Although our capability to swing it to our support is limited neutralizing it is a realistic objective Our liabilities -- Khomeini is viewed as a saint by much-of the Iranian population and the embodiment of the national will Opposing him directly may only strengthen his appeal He is ruthless and thrives on confrontation -- Khomeini controls Tehran and the streets It is hard to visualize any leader or organization taking him on on his own turf Most have been This is particularly true -- There is no obvious alternative leader tainted by association with the Shah of the exiled military Three alternative assessments l The only way to find out how much strength Khomeini really has is to test it That means we have to take some action e g mounting a prOpaganda disinformation effort probing weak spots in the-military and political structure and increasing our level of contacts with tribal elements and exiles We are never going to be able to work with the Khomeini regime We might as well recognize that fact and begin a systematic effort to build an alternative infrastructure Letting nature take its course in fact means abandoning the field to the left as the only viable alternative The longer Khomeini remains in power the more tempting it will be for the moderates to move to the left or be crushed A center coalition will emerge only if we encourage and support it 2 Although we do not like Khomeini we lack the assets to bring him down By Opposing him directly we play into his hands and strengthen his appeal Khomeini is his own worst enemy Left TOP Hi1 - TO RET 4 to his own devices he will destroy himself We should prepare for that event and use our covert assets to urge it along But we should not get ourselves committed to his overthrow We probably not be able to bring it off and the commitment lS open-ended The Iranian revolution was a true expression of deep seated national will and the anti-Americanism we are seeing 13 a true expression of national outrage at U S actions over the past 26 years To support the overthrow of Khomeini will be seen in Iran as an attempted replay of 1953 and the return of the Shah Such a move opposes the fundamental trend of events and will foreclose any future cooperation 3 We are not in control of events and we must prepare for the worst The oil fields are what count in the final analysis We should focus our attention on the south and prepare to hold it no matter what That is where our best assets are located and we should play from strength Our Choices Actions Destabilize the current situation -- this can be done without showing the American hand and could contribute to under- mining Khomeini and the emergence of more moderate leadership but equally could hasten the advent of a more radical leftist regime -- Increase contacts with dissidents To be more effective to our current contacts this would have to involve some financial support Our hand would begin to show -- Support for tribal elements Strategy -- Focus on developments in Tehran -- Focus on tribal support with emphasis on securing a ase in the oil producing region in the south 42 4071 swe 93 r 3 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu