Li - Guam-1r nal mon'n 65' ms - a 592cm om ms anon 'b n 1' my 1930 FORWARDING STATEMENT It is essential that the purpose of this report be clearly understoodi It is a professional critique of the Iranian hos- tage rescue operation addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff It is not and should not be read as an after-action summary or as a white paper examining the Iranian hostage crisis at the national level It is much too narrow and technical a report for this latter application Except for some dis- cussions with the Central Intelligence Agency the review was confined to activities and persons within the Department of Defense There was no attempt in this report to assess the events leading up to the seizure of the Embassy the By its nature therefore this report will appear to be highly critical more so probably than a wider review from a national perspective would deserve But to be use- ful a critique such as this must not allow any potential area of p0551ble future improvement to go unquestioned For this reason a number of the issues analyzed that were evaluated as having no bearing on the success or failure of the actual mission are included in this report The reason is that they might very well have an application for some future special operation conducted under different circumstances Further it must be realized that much of the critical character of the discussions contained in the analysis is the product of hindsight For example the statistical evidence available to the planners of the operation may have been persnasive that eight helicopters were the best compromise between operations security and equipment redundancy but an after-the-fact investigation is virtually obligated to assemble fresh data which will reveal why eight was too low a number The members of the review group are unanimous in the view that the issues treated in the analyses were valid concerns and we believe that a full discussion of these issues was necessary to provide the rationale for our conclusions and support for the recommendations executed this operation We encountered not a shred of evidence of sulpable neglect or incompetence 2 flu Ira-a i rah- 3 I uirhe facts are that in the conduct of this review we have seen infinitely more to be proud of than to complain about The American servicemen who participated in this mission- p1anner crewman _or trooper--deserved to have a successful outcome It was the ability dedication and enthusiasm of those people who made what everyone thought was an impossibility into what should have been a success on Finally we were often reminded that only the United States militaryJ alone in the world had the ability to accomplish what the United States planned to do It was risky and we knew it but it had a good chance of success and America had the courage to try 15 J L Admiral US Navy Ret Chairman Special Operations Review Group ff qu gamut- Di du-augxf Special Operations Review GrOup washington D C 20301 23 July 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Subject Letter of Transmittal I The attached report of the Special Operations Review Group is forwarded in accordance with the Terms of Refer ence received on 28 May 1980 I The report made use of all source materials It is sub- mitted with a recommended TOP SECRET security classification subject to further review for confirmation by the appropriate Joint Staff authorities Without attachment this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED '55 HOLLOWAY Admiral USN Ret Chairman Special Oper tions Review Group Ia edvh d cams Page a a I i 0 iv CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION U 1 U Special Operations Review Group 2 U Investigative Procedures 3 CHAPTER II twosome U Initial Training in th Desert ll U Christmas Break 721 a a I mamas - - - 1 I U Execution and Abort l7 tidy CHAPTER ISSUE ANALYSIS Issue 1 U OPSEC 24 Issue 2 U Organization Command and Contro 26 Issue 3 U Intelligence 31 Issue 4 U Plan Review 35 Issue-5 U Readiness EvaluationIssue 6 U Joint Training 39 Issue 7 U Alterations in JTF Composition 41 Issue a U Risk Assessment of Hostile SIGINTIssue 10 U Other Helicopters 50 Issue 11 U Helicopter Force Size a 52 Issue 12 U Helicopter Pilots _56 i Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue U U U U U U U U U U U Helicopter Unit Dust Phenomenon Weather Reconnaissance 0 HelicoPter Aborts Radar Threat Helicopter Communications Desert One Siting Command and Control at Desert One Classified Material Destruct Devices on Helicopters Pa I Safeguard U Summary of Major Issues CHAPTER IV U U Specific Conclusions D General Conclusions CHAPTER ANNEXES a B U Biographies of the Special U RECOMMENDAIIONS U U Terms of Reference Operations Review Group Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab U U U U U Admiral James L Holloway United States Navy Ret Lieutenant General Samuel V Wilson I I I 0 United States Army Ret Lieutenant General Leroy J Manor United States Air Force Ret Major General James c Smith Unites States Army Major General John L Piotrowski United States Air Force 3 Major General Alfred M Gray Jr United States Marine Corps 3-1 3-2 3-5 3-7 8-10 3-12 3-15 Special Operations Review Group Washington D C 20301 23 July 1930 MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Subject i Letter of Transmittal The attached report of the Special Operations Review Group is forwarded in accordance with the Terms of Refer- ence received on 28 May 1980 The report made use of all source materials It is sub- mitted with a recommended TOP SECRET security classification subject to further review for confirmation by the appropriate Joint Staff authorities Without attachment this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED HOLLOWAY Admiral USN Ret it Chairman Special Ope ions Review Group I U Executive Summary CHAPTER I CHAPTER II R 1- 2 r 90 INTRODUCTION U U Special Operations Review Group U Investigative Procedures canonomcz U U Background U Initial Planning U Initial Training in th Desert U Christmas Break CESJ Th CBS The Four int Training Exercise eser U The Countdown U Execution and Abort CHAPTER ISSUE ANALYSIS Issue 1 U OPSEC Issue 2 U Organization Command and Control Issue 3 U Intelligence Issue 4 U Plan Review Issue 5 U Readiness EvaluationIssue 6 U Joint Training Issue 7 U Alterations in JTF Composition Issue 8 U Risk Assessment of Hostile SIGIHT Issue 9 U Abort Criteria Issue 10 U Other Helicopters Issue ll U Bolicopter Force Size Issue 12 U Helicopter Pilots Page iv ll ls 1003 4 1 l7 Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue Issue U U U U U U U U U U U Helicopter Unit Dust Phenomenon Weather Reconnaissance Pathfinders HelicoPter Hborts Radar Threat Helicopter Communications Desert One Siting Command and Control Classified Material Destruct Devices on HelicoptersDesert One Safeguard U Summary of Major Issues CHAPTER IV CONCLUSIONS U U Specific Conclusions U General Conclusions CHAPTER ANNEXES A B U Biographies of the Special RECOMMENDAEIONS U U U Terms of Reference Operations Review Group Tab A Tab 3 Tab Tab Tab Tab U U U U U U Admiral James L Holloway United States Navy Ret Lieutenant General Samuel V Wilson United States Army Ret Lieutenant General Leroy J Manor United States Air Force Ret Major General Jane C Smith Unites States Army Major General John L Piotrowski United States Air Force 3 Major General Alfred M Gray Jr United States Marine Corps 3-10 3-12 3-15 c U Sources of Information Tab U Demonstrations and On-Scene Visits E U elioopter Force Size Tab A - U Analysis at Helicopter Requirements Tab 3 - U Helicopter Reliabili y-Pigures Air Force Studies and Analysis Tab - U JTP Helicopter Special Mission Training Plan Page C-1 C-2 C-7 C-9 E-l 2-13 3720 E-z SPECIAL OPERATIONS REVIEW GROUP- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Purpose U The purpose of this review is to improve US counter- terrorist CT capability through an independent appraisal of the hostage rescue mission including a broad examination of its-planning organization coordination direction and control The scope of the study addresses the broader aspects of conceptual validity and operational feasibility the planning environment including operations security OPSEC policy guidance and options available adequacy of planning resources preparation and support and overall conduct of the executed portion of the mission Background OTSJ The use of terrorism as a means of achieving inter- national political goals expanded significantly during the 19705 In response to this growing thr- became involved in CT activities_ bx MIMI 1721 the time US Embassy in Tehran was- theunit or jOint orce had the full capability to undertake a hostage rescue mission in the environment that existed in Tehran Mission T64 Rescue mission planning was an ongoing process from 4 November 1979 through 23 April 1980 The planners were faced with a continually changing set of circumstances influenced mainly by the uncertain intentions of the hostages' captors and the vacillating positions of the evolving Iranian leadership The remoteness of Tehran from available bases and the hostile nature of the country further complicated the develOpment of a feasible operational concept and resulted in a relatively slow generation of force readiness - Analxsis Pr d In analyzing the planning training and execution of the hostage rescue mission the review group identified 23 discrete issues that were investigated in depth Eleven were considered to be major issues ones that had an identifiable influence on the outcome of the hostage rescue effort or that should receive the most careful consideration at all levels in planning for any future special operation ISSUES U The major issues which underlie the subsequent conclusions are listed below In OPSEC U Independent review of plans CBJ Organization command and control and the applica- bility of Mama - U Comprehensive readiness evaluation -- U Size of the helicopter force U Overall coordination of joint training U Command and control at Desert One U Centralized and integrated intelligence support external to the Joint Task Force JTF U Alternatives to the Desert One site U Handling the dust phenomenon U C-130 pathfinders Specific Conclusions U The major issues provide the basis for the following specific conclusions CTSJ The concept of a small clandestine Operation was valid and consistent with national policy objectives It offered the best chance of getting the hostages out alive and the least danger of starting a war with Iran 9 The operation was feasible It probably represented' the plan with the best chance of success under the circumstances and the decision to execute was justified The rescue mission was a high-risk Operation Peeple and equipment were called on to perform at the upper limits of human capacity and equipment capability - C18 The first realistic capability to successfully accomplish the rescue of the hostages was reached at the end of March Delay was due to lack of reliable intelli- gence on the location of the hostages the fluctuating political circumstances and the time required to organize plan equip and train for the rescue attempt Fi OPSEC was an overriding requirement for a successful 0 eration Success was totall dependent upon maintaining @0ch Command and control was excellent at the upper echelons but became more tenuous and fragile at inter mediate levels Command relationships below the Commander JTF were not clearly emphasized in some cases and were susceptible to misunderstandings under pressure External resources adequately supported the JTF and were not a limiting factor - C16 Planning was adequate except for the number of backup helicopters and provisions for weather contingencies A larger helicopter force and better provisions for weather penetration would have increased the probability of mission success Ore Preparation for the mission was adequate except for the lack of a comprehensive full-scale training exercise Operational readiness of the force would have benefited from a full dress rehearsal and command and control weaknesses probably would have surfaced and been ironed out FIR Two factors combined to directly cause the mission abort Unexpected helicopter failure rate and low visibility flight conditions en route to Desert One vi tea The siting of Desert One near a road Probably represented a higher risk than ind cated by the JTF assessment General Conclusions CTEJ Although the specific conclusions cover a broad range of issues relating to the Terms of Reference two fundamental concerns emerge in the review group's consensus which are related to most of the major issues CTSJ The ad hoc nature of the organization and Elanning By not ut liz ng existing JTF organ zat on the Jo nt Chiefs of Staff had to start literally from the beginning to establish a JTF create an organization provide a staff develop a plan select the units and train the force before the first mission capability could be attained An existing JTF organization even with a small staff and cadre units would have provided an organization framework of professional expertise around which a larger tailored force organization could quickly coalesce TGJ Many things that in the opinion of the review group could have been done to enhance mission success were not done because of OPSEC considerations The review group considers that most of these alternatives could have been incorporated without an adverse OPSEC impact had there been a more precise OPSEC plan selectively exercised and more closely integrated with an existing JTF organization Recommendations U These conclusions lead the group to recommend that w A Counterterrorist Joint Task Force be established as a field a en of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with permanently assigned staff personnel and certain assigned forces OTSJ The Joint Chiefs of Staff give careful consideration to the establishment of a Special Operations AdVisory Panel com rised of a rou of carefull selected high-ranking officers Eactive andzor retired who have career backgrounds in speCial ogerat ons or who have served at the CINC or JCS levels and who have maintained a current interest in special operations or defense policy matters vii I INTRODUCTION r l The Special Operations Review Group was established by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS at the initiative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff JCS for the purpose of providing an independent review of the Iranian hostage rescue operation The Joint Chiefs of'Staff directed the review group to examine the operation in its broadest aspects including conceptual validity planning environment to include policy considerations and actual mission planning training and execution The Terms of Reference contained in Annex A set forth the overall objective of developing recommendations for procedures and organization to be employed by the US Armed Forces in future special operations 1E3 In order to assure an independent perspective the membership of the group was constituted from persons not associated with the concept planning training or execution phases of the Iranian rescue operation Because the group's recommendations were required for development'of an improved special operations capability in the immediate future the group was formed with only experienced military officers This avoided a long period of technical familiarization as would be required in the case of civilian members Additionally the group's charter--to recommend military organization and procedures to the Joint Chiefs of Staff-- made all-military membership particularly appropriate CSSJ The membership of the group represented all four Services and the combination of three recently retired and three active duty officers proved a desirable balance The diverse background of the military officers reflected broad experience in planning and implementation of military operations throughout all echelons including interactions with the National Command Authorities NCA The participation -of retired officers should serve to deflect any allegations of the group's being influenced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff The active duty pfficers brought to the group an in-depth operational experience and state-of-the-art technical familiarity with special operations and also contributed essential insights into current Service policies and programs U The members of the Special Operations Review Group are listed below complete biographies are contained in Annex B Ty mars- U Admiral James L Hollowa US Nav Chairman of tHe Special Operations Review Group U Admiral Holloway a Naval Aviator retired as the Chief of Naval Operations in 1978 after 36 years of commissioned service that included combat duty in World War II Korea and Vietnam His service as Chief of Naval Operations and Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff provided familiarity with all levels of command and control including National Security Council deliberations and Presidential decision making U Lieutenant General Samuel V Wilson US Army Ret U Lieutenant General Wilson an airborne infantry - officer with Special Forces and Ranger background had combat experience with the World War II Office of Strategic Services and special operations in the China-Burma-India theater Lieutenant General Wilson's unique intelligence background stems from his assignments as the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence DCI from 1974 to 1976 and the Director Defense Intelligence Agency DIA from 1976 to 1977 U Lieutenant General Leroy J Manor US Air Force Ret U Lieutenant General Manor retired in 1978 after 36 years active service that included several command and staff assignments related to special operations and combat experience in World War II and Vietnam He was Commander US Air Force Special Operations Forces responsible for unit and joint training of all USAF Special Operations Forces During this assignment he commanded the joint task force tasked to rescue prisoners of war from the Son Tay prisoner- of-war camp near Hanoi in North Vietnam on 29-21 November 1976 In his final active duty post as Chief of Staff Pacific Command he actively developed the command's plans a for counterterrorism'and supervised the staff role in counterterrorist CT exercises U Major General James C Smith US Army U Major General Smith has served over 37 commissioned years in three wars with special emphasis on command opera- tions and training of armor air cavalry and aviation units As a Master Aviator he commanded 1976-1978 the Army Aviation Center at Fort nucker Alabama where aviation doctrine and concept are developed Major General Smith- currently servescas the Army's Director of Training Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Department of the Army nut-cu IN-ya 5- sb l mana- U Major General John L Piotrowski US Air Force U A pilot and electronic warfare KW officer with combat experience in special air warfare and tactical fighter operations Major General Piotrowski served in the initial cadre of 'Jungle Jim l the Air Force's counterinsurgency unit that was activated in April 1961 and that subsequently became the lat Air Commando Wing A graduate of the USAF Fighter Weapons School he participated in tactics develop- ment and weapons testing that included introduction of guided weapons into Southeast Asia His present assignment is Deputy Commander for Air Defense Tactical Air Command Peterson AFB Colorado U Major General Alfred M Gray Jr US Marine Corps - U Major General Gray a ground officer with command combat experience in infantry artillery communications signals intelligence reconnaissance and special operations units served in both Korea and and Vietnam He served concurrently as Commanding Officer 33d Marine Amphibious Unit Commanding Officer Regimental Landing Team 4 Deputy Commander 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade during the Southeast Asia evacuation operations and was the ground combat element commander during the Saigon extraction Major General Gray's present assignment is Deputy for Development Director Development Center for the Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico Virginia U The group's approach to the review involved the following steps during the investigative phase U The group reviewed all pertinent written documenta- tion including planning documents training reports mission debriefs Congressional testimony media clips press releases technical analyses and the after-action report A detailed listing of the documents reviewed is contained in Tab A to Annex C T6 The group then interviewed all principals involved in the planning and conduct of the operation The group did not attempt to talk to every individual who participated but did consult with everyone considered to have been in a position to contribute substantive testimony Every person that any member of the group wished to interview was made available for that purpose All of the individuals contacted and their relationship with the operation are listed in Tab 8 to Annex C for the group 1ndiv1dual members made e irs outside the Pentagon- - 179499 - meta g of investigation with matters internal to m 1-3 1 owed CMM TS The group traveled to - and selected DOD CIA 3 building U received command presentati and inspected unit equi men and aircraft ht soecial onerati mp swan weapons During the field command visits the Central Intelligence field or-anizations ons and technica imu1ate the recovery of 'ed aircraft and a terrorist-held oriefings aroup observed ve demonstrations and extensive round- table discussions with mission personnel of all grades from commanders to sergeants useful insights as td personne motivation and proficiency we T5 The grou intelligence TS Because the group was chartered of Staff to whom its concl specifically addressed with military personnel examined were within the and the main part of the T5 In addition to those sessions -to pursue their own avenues were held as a group and backgrounp skill re attained I a number of was authorized access to all levels of by the Joint Chiefs the majority of discussions were the organizations and procedures National military Command System analyses and recommendations deal SEEM the Department of Defense - oroup such as the RH-SJD CH-SJD hich were conducted I usions and recommendations would be E3 192 06- 0303 I J $61 The actual methodology employed by the group in the analytical phase was simple and straightforward After the group had reviewed the written material conducted interviews and witnessed the capabilities of the forces each member -compiled a list of all items that troubled him These points were consolidated into areas of concern and then isolated into specific issues As the issues were identified each was in turn analyzed are First the issue was described in a non-qualitative sense and then supported by the facts as the group was able to determine them To present a balanced picture the rationale of the JTF planners--as perceived by the group-- was carefully explained - CTGL The group then postulated an alternative solution and developed it in sufficient detail to establish its validity and feasibility Those alternatives that turned out to be patently impractical or clearly inferior were eliminated from the list of issues The issues were evaluated to determine net impact and to judge the degree to which the issue affected the outcome of the operation and whether the proposed solution would have enhanced the probability of mission success 1TH Using this deliberative process the group attempted to reach unanimous positions or a group consensus However where unanimity was not achieved separate views were accepted to be noted either in the text of the analysis or through footnoting the review process proceeded the group identified the valid issues prioritized them as to their importance and categorized them in areas related to the tasking of the Terms of Reference to form the group's conclusions In the final analysis it was found that those specific conclusions which should generate corrective action fell into two broad general areas which in turn determined the group's recommendations 3 meas- II CHRONOLOGY U U A review of the effort to recover US hostages from Iran first requires a look into the past to determine from a military point of View the proper context within which to evaluate the overall operation U The use of terrorism as a means of waging international political warfare reached new levels during the latter part of the 19705 Prior to this development such activities were limited to relatively small isolated incidents such as air- craft hijacking or-kidnapping of individuals actions that in most instances were handled by various types_of police forces I Cb herv1ce forts were general limited to uncohJEn- tiona warfare UH activities as defined in JCS Pub broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held enemy controlled or politically sensitive territory Unconventional warfare includes but is not limited to the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare evasion and escape subversion sabotage direct action missions and other operations of a low visibility covert or clandestine nature 3G4 These interrelated aSpects of UW warfare may be performed by diverse individuals or groups during peace or war US forces having such capabilities consist of Army Special Forces Air Force Special Air Warfare units and certain-Navy units The term special operations defined as secondary or supporting operations which may be adjuncts to various other operations and for which no one Service is assigned primary responsibility is often used in conjunction with the term UW but may well be a part of an overall conventional effort Various forms of UW activity have been performed to varying degrees by the Armed Forces during and since World war II Further all the Services based on their mission and responsibilities maintain appropriate capabilities for conducting special operations with general purpose forces Military raids mountain desert warfare cold weather operations amphibious raids and demonstrations emergency evacuation and disaster relief are some examples of special operations that our conventional forces must be prepared to execute newness of counterterrorism as a military Operation can be exemplified by its absence from any joint publication such as JCS Pubs 1 and 2 The ongoing application of military forces to CT operations establishes a clear requirement for doctrinal and literature developmentoas well as standardiza- - tion of terms Initial Planning 4 November to 30 November 1979 ffs Planning was a continuous process from 4 November 1979 through 23 April 1986 Factors that prompted continued updating included but were not limited to toe following Intelligence Concepts of operation Training special mission capabilities Equipment availability Communications procedures a Base availability Environmental factors Political factors single overriding consideration during the planning phase was the need for operations security OPSEC The most stringent requirement was that the ground rescue force reach the Embassy compound undetected Certainly the next most influential characteristic of this operation was the dynamic evolutionary aspect of the planning process 46 A fundamental requirement for success of this mission was the attainment of a capability to employ and integrate helicopters fixed wing aircraft grnun' servicingfrefauiinq operations and ground combat troop in a Cu pldx long-range mission scenario conducted under cover of darkness without lights This capability did not exist on 4 November 1979 Equally important is that such a capability had to be developed under the stringent requirements of OPSEC Throughout the period 4 November 1979 through 23 April 1986 the CJCS was kept informed of progress and frequently provided guidance to COMJTF after his designation Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also received individual progress reports and on three occasions were briefed as a group in order to review aspects of the preparatory phase The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the JTF all resources requested throughout the entire planning and preparatory period except for occasional periods 'when there were modest limitations on availability of C-130 resources tied Training exercises and changes in concept that tended to drive subsequent activities are listed in chronological order to increase understanding of the overalL scenario FEEJ On 4 November 1979 the Embassy in Tehran was taken by a group of Iranians and 63 Americans became hostage $81 During the next few days a planning cell was formed by the CJCS to formulate concepts for the conduct of a rescue mission the ground rescue force and uroceede to es a 150 ted training camp iu i hxdau On 12 November 1979 Major General Vaught US Army reported to the CJCS and was directed to organize and command a JTF with the assigned mission of rescuing the hostages Note It is important to emphasize that at this point there was great concern that the hostages might soon be tried and jailed or killed A great sense of urgency existed to develop a capability for rescue as soon as possible 1E0 Two major challenges affected the planners--the distant location and large size of Iran and the fact that to meet OPSEC requirements early contact hit other countries was precluded - On 16 November a select weather team from US Air Force Air Weather Service ANS began to form and provide continuous support to the JTF I to its training EXOM c $64 On 17 November and be an to train rv On 18 November secure communications had been estab- j3 l q lishe among selected agencies involved in planning the rescue effort into Iran were selected and began rescue mission trainin a ternatives to air process of examination After review on 19 November COMJTF recommended that a he developed CJCS approved the development of a concept using helicopters and directed early refinement of the plan to support a near-term rescue attempt if required CEGJ On or about 19 November the was selected as the best available helicopter for several pertinent reasons On 20 November CJCS directed the formation of a helicopter detachm - the RH-53 a Also on 20 November CJCS directed that RH-53 deploy to the Indian Ocean 21 November the helicopter detachment began special mission capability training with emphasis on extended night navigation using night vision goggles NVGs and refueling activities Note All crews at this point were operating outside the mission areas for which they were previously trained and were in fact attempting to develOp an entirely new Operational capability CBEJ During the period 20-29 November there transpired a whole host of actions development of intelligence procedures research of additional en route refueling sites selection of landing sites and resolution of factors related to available hours of darkness 10 - 5 0360 mom- 0 I 5 uwj - FEED By 29 November torce commanders began to gain confidence Wm in their developing ope CJCS a roved a we of helicopters LL so that training co co not in re is 'chth environment OPSEC was observed and the move was completed on 30 November without apparent detection On 30 November the can training estimate was as follows helicopter aircrew capability was judged to be fair with considerable work rmaining C-130 aircrew status was judged to be mission ca ired in blacked-out landin no ogistic es surfaced from any units weather intelligence capabil- ities were improving but 70 I a Unhf b- 36 BY the end of November the CEMJTF overall assessment was that a force capability was beginning to emerge but that ng major deficiencies in planning intelligence communica- fty tions and training were evident Initial Training In the Desert 30 November to 24 December 1 PM On 1 December the training missions were flown using the replacement helicopters Note Those helicopters used for training in the earlier phase had been returned to owning units During the eriod 9 December throu 21 December 3 l l'f hours were flownIr r Navigation and fo Hui d night landings under total blackout conditions 1 1 - ism 0n 18-19 December the first integrated training was - conducted The exercises went poorly with problems in night navi ation encount 190 000- 1 5w no W3 is MJTF and planning staff recognized at pilots with increased experience in the type of mission profiles to be flown would be required A major change in personnel took lace nine pilots were replaced The Palletized Inertial Navigation System PINS was provided to improve helicopter navigati ca abilit and pilots beoan trai w By 2 7 December refueling of helicopters from on aced an altern ve to airdroocino wax blivits had been se ecteo as a poem a ground refueling site partitipa 2 By 18 December communications arrangements and procedures to support the conce had be ev 1 sad except for those of airborne elements Representatives of USCINCEUR and CINCPAC arrived _in December to'participate in planning and coordination Hi 51' traininc mid-December plans were set for an 'oint eriod using representative forces other Except for the he icopter b_jEqu eoep ack to their home stations 4 3 Tea On 22 December two additional RH-SJDs were airlifted and embarked aboard NIMITZ for transit to the Indian Ocean 'During this period OMEGA navigation systems had been acquired and preparations were made to install them on the eight mission RH-SSDs 0 stem was installed in a training aircraft b10600 as of 24'Decemoer the intelligence data base hao continued to grow 3_ - Cb 1 0000 7 3 w Christmas Break wi 24 December 1979 to 4 January_1983 TS Those units and individuals involved in training had been committed without break since early November In order to sustain force effectiveness as well as maintain OPSEC training units were authorized Christmas leave Key commanders and planning staffs continued to work on all pertinent issues during the period 4 January o yebruary 1980 On 4-5 Januar 1986 conducted a planning and review conference - - navigation procedures and techniques using the 1e and usin OMEGA and PINS 3'33 flah a ready been established 9 that prior a forecast for visual meteorological conditions KVMC on the mission track was required in order to execute the mission $64 During the 4-5 January conference weather was highlighted as a crucial factor so additional requirements for weather support were specified H am By early January - - fng n z -47 the probable staging base 1 - -- alas ne 8 3 was directed Subsequently extensive planning led to base support plan a ri-Hfh 4 k'j a 13 consi ered to be a possible new solution to the helico ter refuel mission 1 - 5 HOMO-X4 I On 12 January the fourth arrived to provide sufficient air-refuelable forward-looking infrared FLIR equipped aircraft is In mid-January the required number of helicopters to arrive at the hideout was confirmed_to be five six at the refueling site and seven for launch for a total of eight aboard the carrier Note As mentioned earlier two addi- tional RH-S3Ds were to be put aboard NIMITZ At this time the operational readiness of the helicopters aboard KITTY HAWK came under closer scrutiny To assure required flying time rates and appropriate supply levels a JTF three-man team visited the carrier to conduct a review and engage in necessary discussions with key carrier personnel and EE-lq members u- The JTF conducted another nt training exercise in mid January in a new area with long-range navigation ig ts Simi ar to those planned for the mission This event was productive but it also identified many problems that required additional planning and training 1 Problems were highlighted in the areas of OPSEC weather helicopter reliability communications refueling procedures airfield security and control and intelligence me By this time the JTF found only one in-count area-that-wes su icientl iso ated te named Desert One was FPS On 21 January because of additional airlift canability required 5 er of ersonnel increased two aircrews egan to train wi C- 6 crews These wo a were considered mission capable in two weeks ge '14 Home I I 'ftb I I L1 ma Joint Trainin 'Exercise 980- - igy CQEQ the first in February the joint training exercise was conducted to evaluate progress made during as two weeks in January In spite of bad weather task force elements in general showed improvement but more work was also indicated in the areas of helicopter naviga- tion and combat control Needed now was more intelligence additional training and a plan to refuel the helicopters at Desert One 36 'By 8 February following the postexercise conference the commanders and planners for the first time had confidence that a capability existed for the rescue e eiruary to l lpmr 1989 it 1GQ On 26-27 February another exercise was conducted for the purpose of sustaining mission capabilities incorporating Combat Control Team expertise and refining JTF communications JTF confidence was further increased 11D At this time increased attention by the planners was being placed on two uncontrollable and pressing environmental factors that could cause major revision of the rescue plan Available hours of darkness and ambient temperatures By 15 mm- 1 May the number of hours between evening and morning - nautical twilight would drop to nine hours and 16 minutes Bight hours were required for the helicopter mission with a one-hour contingency factor By 19 May prevailing temperatures of 360 would increase density altitude and limit helicopter per ormance with these conditions additional helico ters a would be re uired CDUJCKX so concluded that not less than six mission-capable helicopters had to reach Desert One to I insure mission continuation Lurk-41 16 On 25-27 March the last major training exercise was conducted and was considered a success wi nized 16 By 28 March mission - a t'ional 'E Zeploym was a stopped 1 en additional loads commenced In late March a second visit of three JTF personnel representing communications operations and maintenance -hgstag egre ru visited NIMITZ to verify the readiness of the eight helicopters 190 600 I416 The JTF continued to waxaxz copters mow CODC at 33631 no UltaD or helicopter refueling operation K As refueling requirements increased over time was made to transfer the refuelin ission bxmoc l waxed L2 HQ The Countdown 12 to 54 April 1953 lanai x- 4 1 m ch l g y pri as on many con 1 era- lg yEq tions a primary one being moon illumination 3 A series of interrelated but separate actions were initi-cwx xp 1 ated one of the more significant bei a tr exercise to 3agcg practice helicopter refueling on the desert as'a final verif catio fa can On 15-16 April c0MJTF conducted a two-day meeting in the Pentagon to review the plan-with commanders affirm command and_contro1 matters evaluate force readiness review contingencies and make an overall assessment of mission success should it be executed on 24 April FEE On 16 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan That evening the President approved the plan after he was briefed by COMJTF Deputy COMJTF and the commander of the ground rescue force The President stated that deployment flow should proceed with 24 April as the planning date for execution The RCA would direct COMJTF to execute delay or cancel the mission based on conditions existing at the time of decision - 31H Through the period 19-23 April the forces deployed By mid-afternoon on 24 April the forces were in place and ready for execution Tia Execution and Abort 24 an Apri On the evening of 24 April after 5-1 2 months of planning and training under very tight OPSEC eight RH-53 P 5- I9 nau 1ca miles at night and low altitude to a F helicopters took off from the aircraft carrier NIMITZ and began a journey of preselected refueling site Desert One in the desert waxaxz was also in the execution phase on a di erent trac and time schedule Approximately two hours after takeoff the crew of Helicopter #6 received cockpit indications of an impending rotor blade failure landed verified the malfunction an automatic abort situation and abandoned their aircraft taking all classified material with them The crew was picked up by another helicopter which then continued the mission individually Approximately one hour thereafter the helicopter formation unexpectedly encountered a dust cloud of unknown size and density Fig The helicopters broke out of the first area of suspended dust but within an hour entered a second larger and denser area While attempting to navigate through this second area with severely degraded visibility a second helicopter experienced a failure of several critical navigation and flight instruments Due to progressively deteriorating flight conditions that made safe flight extremely questionable the helicopter pilot determined that it would be unwise to continue He aborted the mission reversed course and recovered on NIMITZ Eventually six of the original eight helicopters arrived at the refueling site in intervals between approximately 50 minutes and 85 minutes later than planned While en route a third helicopter experienced a partial hydraulic failure but the crew elected to continue to the refueling site believing repairs could be accomplished there Upon landing however the crew and the helicopter unit commander determined that the helicopter could not be repaired A hydraulic pump had failed due to a fluid leak and no replacement pump was available Even if a pump had been immediately available there was insufficient time to change it repair the cause of the leak service the system and complete the next leg prior to daylight The helicopter was unsafe to continue the mission unrepaired ESQ Earlier it had been determined that a minimum of six operational helicopters would be required at the refueling site to continue the mission Since at this point there were only five operational the on-scene commander advised COMJTF by radio of the situation and he in turn communicated to Washington the statws of the force and his intention to abort the operation and return to launch base The President concurred in the decision that the mission could not continue and preparations began for withdrawal of the five operational helicopters the C-l30s and the rescue force rye While repositioning one helicopter to permit another to top off his fuel tanks for the return flight the first helicopter collided with one of the refueling Both aircraft were immediately engulfed in flames in which eight crew members died and five other members of the team were injured Since the C-l30 was loaded with members of the rescue force awaiting extraction even greater injury and loss of life were avoided only by swift and disciplined evacuation of the burning aircraft Shortly afterwards ammunition aboard both aircraft began to explode Several helicopters were struck by shrapnel from the explosion and or the burning ammunition and at least one and possibly more were rendered nonflyable At this point with time and fuel running out for the the decision was made to transfer all helicopter crews to the remaining'C-IBBS and to depart the area Follow on portions of the mission beyond Desert One will not be discussed since various elements of the plan-are of such classified nature that their inclusion might impact unfavorably on possible future actions 19 L 3 1 7 1 0 43 Fifi 0 U- ANALYSIS OF ISSUES U The findings of this chapter are central to the entire work of the Special Operations Review Group The process of identifying defining and evaluating the key issues is the basis of analysis from which the conclusions and recommendations flow C181 The group's'charter was not to find fault or to place blame it was as stated in the Terms of Reference to make evaluations and specific recommendations on the key aspects of planning and execution insuring that the broader aspects of operation were addressed Yet a broader perSpective can be derived only from a full understanding of the mission a mission that did not achieve its defined objective By defini- tion the issues raised in this chapter are those decisions or actions that may be questioned because in the opinion of the review group alternatives available might have increased the probability that the mission could continue or decreased the risks to mission success C15 While the review group has attempted to maintain a constructive outlook it has been critical where and when its collective judgment dictated While the group believes these criticisms valid and necessary to the conclusions reached and recommendations made no judgment of the able men who nlanned this mission or the brave professionals who executed it is intended nor should be inferred The men charged with planning the rescue operation in November 1979 faced certain basic factors in the overall situation that must be appreciated in order that the analyses which follow are kept in proper perSpective A forcible rescue was very much a contingency plan only to be implemented if all other alternatives failed PFEJ 0n the other hand a sense of urgency was impressed on COMJTF and his staff at the very outset that an immediate operation could be required if the hostages were to be tried or executed FEE All planning and preparation required maximum OPSEC because the sine qua non of the concept was to place with total surprise waxc goj Fi Nowhere in the US Armed Forces was there a standing capability to perform the stated mission 21 3 Those overriding and at times conflicting realities were central to some of the early decisions retarding the hxo o o selection of a JTF staff holding JCS abeyance and the compartmentalization of various preparatory functions 03 064 0 $64 Training for the Iran hostage rescue operation was a many- faceted and complex task that was necessarily accomplished concurrently with mission planning It was controlled by the dictates of a constantly evolving plan The training program was affected by the development of new intelligence during the entire period from inception to execution of the mission It was essential that the training-program remain sensitive and responsive to changing requirements The task of mission execution required extraordinary command orchestration of widely separated actions by various force elements Components of the force launched from different locations each coping with unique local departure situations that demanded exact adherence to a time schedule to assure effective force integration For example aircraft carrier positioning for helicopter launch and C l30 parking taxiing and takeoff sequence at the staging air base were significant factors Timely decisions had to be made to compensate for unplanned contingencies The great emphasis on although vital to mission success severely limited the communications necessary to coordinate the operation particularly in handling unforeseen contingencies $64 The review group determined that there were 23 issues which deserved full analysis In this report these issues are arranged-in an order beginning with the most general and conceptual to the most specific and operational The order implies no prioritization as to importance nor was there any attempt to list the issues in chronological order While key areas such as planning criteria organization adequacy of forces training support and command and control were dealt with in this approach many of the issues transcend one particular area 'The analytical method employed by the review group attempted to correlate its analysis with its charter--to provide positive alternatives and to draw from them lessons of principle that may be used in the future Each analysis raises the issue recapitulates the actual occurrence as determined by the group and outlines the group's understanding of the JTF rationale for its choice The review group then explains its alternative in more detail and assesses the implications of the alternative both positive and negative Each analysis concludes with a review group evaluation including the group's judgment of the issue's importance u-Was the issue of paramount importance to managing missiontrisk Was it of some importance in increasing the probability of success Was it of marginal value in terms of lessons learned and 55- an art Ea One final note of caution is appropriate The Special a Operations Review Group unanimously concluded that no one action or lack of action caused the'operation to fail and that no one alternative or all the alternatives could have guaranteed its success It was by its nature a high-risk mission that involved the possibility of failure The object of the ollowing issue analysis was with the benefit of hindsight to identify areas in which risk might have been better managed ISSUE 1 U OPSEC Event Critical concern for OPSEC at all levels tended to dominate every aspect of mission planning training and execution ' From the outset task force members were imbued with the absolute need for total secrecy Planning was strictly compartmentalized plans review was performed largely-by those involved in the planning process individuals were generally restricted to that information the actuall required to play their - pressures ear elt by a anO the force small in order to decrease the risk of detection In some instances personnel on the periphery of the JTF's activities deduced what was afoot but to the credit of such individuals they appear to have kept their conjectures to themselves In short strictest adherence to OPSEC guidelines seems to have been maintained from the very outset of mission inception up to the accident following the mission abort at Desert One JTF Rationale The underlying reasons for such heavy emphasis on OPSEC were well understood throughout the JTF Surprise was the sine 323 33 for mission success and complete security was essential to attain surprise Alternative This was perhaps the group's most difficult judgment Did a seemingly nondiscriminating overemphasis on OPSEC exclude certain activities and provisions that could have materially enhanced_the probability of mission success On balance and in retrospect the group concluded that greater selectivity and flexibility in the OPSEC arena particularly within the JTF could have been beneficial in operational terms without necessarily sacrificing security In planning a separate plans review element would have provided a useful testing mechanism before going forward for policy level approvals in'joint training and evaluation units from different Service components Could have been integrated with greater frequency and for longer periods especially when such activities were handled in the context of thoughtfully conceived cover stories in execution easing several OPSEC restrictions to air-operations as to shared insertion routes communications channels and procedures and general mutual support would'have permitted the C-l3 s to play an important weather reconnaisance role en route to and at Deseft One pathfinder duties and code word transmission of terminal weather conditions These examples are illustrative and do not exclude several other possible excursions from what the JTF actually did or refrained from doing because of OPSEC considerations Implications Basically the group's alternative would have reduced OPSEC restrictions in selected areas implying incrementally improved force posture and enhanced potential effectiveness at the cost of some increased probability of operational compromise Admittedly it cannot be predicted at what point in easing security restrictions secrecy could have been breached which in turn might have resulted in canceling the mission What is known and therefore should be underscored is the fact that the level of security practiced by the JTF did preserve secrecy 63$ Evaluation The question of too much or too little OPSEC was easily the most controversial issue and the group's differences with actual JTF OPSEC practices epitomize the advantage of hindsight General conclusions regarding the areas in which information flow could have been improved without compromise to OPSEC are discussed in Chapter Organization command and control and the applicability of Event When the hostage seizure incide Iran on 4 November 1979 a small planning cell EON-X military options-as irected by the CJCS earl eriod the organizations mework of JCS #was not adopted although some of its provisions ere incorporated Thes- included utilization of intelli-ence assetsoeavor suc as as orianization anning integration of concurrent planning-by subordinate units and determination of support requirements were com artmentalized 1979 the staff CINCRE Joint tab istri ion was the basis for JTF headquarters manpower re i u A USAF general officer was appointed special consultant to COMJTF because of experience and knowledge gained during a recent tour of duty in Iran - During the 10-day period 16 to 25 November 1979 the following forces and elements were assigned to the JTF USAF ANS team helicopter detachment in T 6 up r-uu y W is Training began immediately Concurrently Conceptual plans were develo ed the JTE staff and reviewed the CJCS a helicopter option as having the greatest potential for success The helicopter detachment pilots and aircrewmen was Marine resource in operational requirements increa a iona pi ots an crewmen were provided from other locations Special missibn training was moved to the western United States for a more realistic desert environment On 9 December 1979 a new helicopter detachment commander was assigned and a vigorous training program was instituted to attain the special mission capabilities required No overall naval component commander or provisional squadron command staff capability was provided The senior Marine officer involved in the operation was assigned to the Office of the CJCS and while not officially_ designated a member of the JTF staff became involved in mission planning and execution At the direction of the Director for Operations Joint Staff he reviewed the early I November helicopter planning examined the aircrew selection against special mission requirements arranged for the assignment of more experienced pilots assessed the helicopter force training effort and planned the movement of the unit to the western US desert training site During this period it was implied that this officer was in charge of the helicopter force during the preparation phase and he believed this to be so However COMJTP may have thought differently and it was evident throughout the first two months of training that much ' if not all of the COMJTF direction of effort concerning helicopter pteparation and special mission capability training was done through the general officer who was thought to be the consultant on Iran In mid-January 1986 the role of the senior Marine had evolved into that of overall helicopter force leader since no other designation had been made and at his COMJTF lannino meetings request he began to '27 Early in the lanning a senior USAF officer with special operation xperience was assigned as p mT Deputy Component Commander His role evolved a h u into the task of supervising and coordinating the C-l30 training Just prior to mission execution he was assigned as on scene commander at Desert One responsible for - supervising the refueling operations on decision process during planning and the command and control organization during execution of the Iran hostage rescue mission afforded clear lines of authority from the President to the appropriate echelon There was a straight line from the President thrOugh the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to COHJTF during the actual execution CJCS acted cha on behalf of the Joint an in thi 1 5451-_v _kf of commanq COMJT irF' ar- command channels were less well defined in some areas and only implied in others - 4484 During the training phase command channels provided for dissemination of guidance to individual elements of the force from COMJTF Each element was provided only those portions of the plan considered essential for its particular purpose Because of the stringent OPSEC requirements compartmentalization was considered necessary The rigid compartmentalization during the early stages is considered to have been a deterrent to training and readiness progress Clearly during the final stages of preparation all element leaders should have been thoroughly familiar with the overall plan This could have enhanced greater integration of all elements of the force lnformally the senior Marine was adviser to COHJTF regarding helicopter operations Additionally he supervised helicopter training although not formally in the chain of command The helicopter flight leader detachment commander was made reSponsible for unit flight proficiency to achieve a special mission capability requiring flight regimes never achieved by any helicopter force in the world and to do it as soon as possible Further as detachment commander he was responsible for the total performance and welfare of his men but not provided adequate staff or administrative support 96% Early-on the designated Deputy Force Component Commander role involved the task of supervising and coordinating the C-130 training The C-130 elements were directly under individual squadron c0mmanders Just 28 - l- 0 - in every aspect of mission planning training deployment prior to execution he was designated on scene commander Desert One implying a command control and communications C3 capability to exercises command This capability was not fully provided A general officer served primarily as a consul- tant on Iran from late Nbvember 1979 to mid-February 1980 He spent considerable time during this period at the western US training site monitoring helicopter and other air training On 12 April 1980 he was designated the Deputy CTSJ The ground force chain lified in 1 that the Army elements reported Q J 0 directly to COMJTT who so nent Commander Chi JTP Rationale OPSBC was the overriding consideration and execution because of the absolute requirement to reach the Embassy compound undetected OPSEC coupled with the dynamic planning process and development of special mission capabilities drove COMJTF to the techniques _adopted for this organization planning and preparation by the JTF CBS Alternative The requirements for stringent OPSEC are clearly recognized Nevertheless it is considered essential that there be a balance between rigid compart- mentalization to include secrecy through informal or ad hoc arrangements on the one hand and sound organization planning and preparation efforts on the other CTGQ The JCS Crisis Action System CA5 provides guidance for the conduct of planning for the use of military forces during emergency or time-sensitive situations When the hostage seizure occurred in Iran 'the group would have implemented existing JCS procedures intended to provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff Services commanders of unified and specified commands and other agenciesuinformation with which to develop recommendations to the RCA pertaining to military courses of action JCS Cowprovides the NCA with a wide range of options for uti izing military forces for rapid emergency actions to counter terrorism directed against US interests citizens and or property in other nations The plan does not abrogate those responsibilities found in lens or tasking currently in effect but rather provides the conceptuhl basis or an additio capability Supporting planschave been repared by the commanders of an ad 29 11m WV 18 The group's alternative for organization command and control_wo ve used the stable existing frameworh to organize plan train and execute the miss on as we as to provide the mandatory OPSEC Prolonged arrangements often result in tasking from different sources and can cause confusion at the operating level These situational arrangements may hinder preparation and can impact adversely on overall cohesion of effort The review groupfs alternative would strive for a better balance between more appropriate disclosure policy particularly at the level to enhance the organizing equipping and training of forces HQ Further basic JCS COEE Pmethodologies and or existing unified specified d mman procedures make full provisions for compartmentalization OPSEC can be and has been preserved when appropriate steps are taken Thus the entire preparation phase could have been accelerated and overall readiness enhanced Im lications On the positive side the group's alternat ve wou ave led to a 'quicker start' in the preparation phase Additionally task organization and force planning would have been enhanced and command relation ships clarified These in turn would have led to more effective command and control at all levels On the negative side _the group alternative would have increased the number of people involved and therefore increased the OPSEC risk i I I 16 Evaluation The potential for increased capability and readiness must be weighed against possible OPSEC risk Al- though it is not possible to measure the outcome of the proposed 1 alternative in terms of mi success _it is believed that I application of JCS and JCS Service doctrinal precepts could have improved the organ ration planning and preparation - q of the force through unity of command and cohesion of effort That in turn would have led to more effective command and control and enhanced overall JTF readiness ISSUE 3 U Centralized and integrated intelligence support external to the JTF Event COMJTF his staff and subordinate commanders were fully aware that successful mission accomplishment would critically depend on precise and timely intelligence and moreover that intelligence would tend to drive the operation from conception to execution The JTF fortunately had a professionally capable intelligence officer to assume the role of J-Z from the beginning In addition each of the Service force components--with the exception of the helicopter contingent--already had staff intelligence officers heading up small intelligence staff sections The helicopter contingent was provided intelligence support from the JTF J-2 section In the JTF headquarters itself the intelligence section remained small throughout the period beginning with one officer on 4 November and increasing to four in the course of planning Nonetheless for an operation of the scope and complexity of the Iranian mission a significant augmenta- tion of existing intelligence capabilities was mandatory This augmentation tended to evolve over time and in somewhat piecemeal fashion'as planning got under way and as intelligence needs grew were attached a directly to COMJTF's staff in the early days and working arrangements were set up by the JTF J-2 with ints of 'jw aob contact withi y ese p01nts of contact or in er aces wi ou side staffs and agencies were widened from one to several individuals and the number of personnel beyond the interface requirements officers photo interpreters and other specialists involved in providing specific intelligence increased accordingly as the volume of work reached higher levels In some ways however certain elements of the Intelligence Community seemed slow' in harnessing themselves initially for the tasks at hand As a result intelligence gaps and deficiencies existed especially in the early planning phases when the focus was on developing an immediate rescue capability should the - hostages appear in imminent danger of execution ESJ_Strict adherence to OPSEC criteria was maintained throughout - - - -- most of in 1gence agenc1es outside the JTE were not fully briefed and cleared for the operation at the outset of planning although those individuals working JTF-related intelligence requirements on 31 a continuing basis eventually were able to deduce for i- themselves in essence what was being planned Some of these officers felt that their initial effectiveness may have been impaired somewhat by not being told more about the true nature of the operation from the beginning - Hi Most intelligence requirements were formulated 'by the 3-2 in anticipation needs Service component requirements came in from the field by message or- rd Il-zl co cou ier deliv Collection requirements wire usually handled on fa o- ace basis w is son representatives occasionally by secure phone or classified message Responses were normally by message or other hard copy form and on occasion by secure phone - - sq originating agency--in Service component forces The heavy emphasis placed on ovi ing responses to requirements as quickly as possible at times resulted in raw or only partially evaluated reports going directly to planners When this occurred intelligence working a specific subject covered by an incoming raw report might become aware of the report's existence only some days after it had been in the - hands of JTF planners ame directly into the JTF from the cases di q w a by the me the operat Io' rial Alternative Ihe group believes that Intelligence Community assets and resources could have been pulled together more quitkly and effectively than was actually the 32 AW C5 C5 case A preferred encroach would have been to task the 12-31% i711 ll-f I i - f air-F13 vii-H- 22 32 51 wo Igi ng in 1370 9 concert with Del 0 estac- sn a smei- an select in direct su-port interagency Intelligence Tesn Force ITF of the from the mocent Fiat - I L-Iiwl ui - I or 1 1- I- 4 n rliJI-Inr his small intelligence sa ninn a COMJTF would an internal element of the JTF the would have been located externally and would have worked closely and continu- ously with the Jr J-z Che latter would be close-in intelligence Staff officer the chairman would be his external senior intelligence adviser ITF members would have been cleared and security briefed at the outset regarding the details of the contemplated operation in ave reta advantage arnessing selected elements of the US Intelligence Community and bringing them together as an integrated intelligence supporting mechanism on extremely short notice Fragmentation of responsibility for intelligence support would be avoided as the Director Din in his role as 3-2 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be clearly charged with overall supervision and given the necessary authority Coordination of intelligence activities would be simplified by the designation of a single focal point for intelligence matters--the chairman of the 17 This individual and or the BIA Director exercising his direct access to the CJCS would be in a position to relieve COHJTF of intelligence - management concerns freeing him to concentrate his attention in other areas I i 1' TS Implications The proposed arrangement would have the I i TS Evaluation Initial difficulties in the intelligence support arena had been laroelv overcome by the time the L a -- - the alternative approach to intelligence support for operations of this nature in the future could greatly facilitate achievement of acceptable readiness and forward deployment of forces in situations where time is a critical factor - pL-r 33 Hi0 This brief summary of intelligence support for the hostage rescue mission could'serve as a possib1e departure point for a more detailed and comprehensive in-house review by the Intelligence Community designed to discern and document procedures and arrangements to more effectively support future operations I ISSUE 4 U Independent review of plans Event Early in the process of planning for the hostage rescue mission consideration was given to establishing a small group of individuals with credible experience in special operations to act as consultants and review the plan as it developed Overriding OPSEC concerns and the perceived need to limit as sharply as possible the number of personnel privy to the contemplated operation led to a conscious decision not to form such an element As a consequence planners- in effect--reviewed and critiqued their own product for feasibility and soundness as they went along It is clear that COMJTF was fully aware of the potential disadvantages inherent in this approach and that he took steps to offset and compensate for this organizational defect For example each component part of the plan that could be checked and tested on the ground was painstakingly reviewed through training exercises to the extent possible In this connection it must be noted that on the three occasions when the Joint Chiefs of Staff were briefed on the status and content of the plan there had been no intervening 'scruh-down' or 'murder board' of the planning product Further for the same OPSEC reasons the Joint Chiefs of Staff were acting in essence as their own action officers and were denying themselves the staffing support they normally enjoy when reviewing plans of a less sensitive nature In sum this meant that the hostage rescue plan was never subjected to rigorous testing and evaluation by qualified independent observers and monitors short of the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves U JTF Rationale As indicated above the driving concern to preserve complete OPSEC led to a conscious judgment that avoiding a possible security compromise of a sensitive operation was--on balance-more_important than effecting a conceivably minor improvement in the planning effort r96 Alternative The Special Operations Review Group on the other hand inclines to the view that the inclusion of several additional individuals properly qualified to handle the plans review function on a continuing basis would have facilitated the planning process without necessarily degrading security The key would have been the careful selection of individuals for this role They could have come from the active or retired rolls and might well have included'individuals with a nonmilitary background a retired senior CIA professional with extensive special operations experience This small subordinate cell would have been closeted separately from the JTF planners and used as required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to subject components of the plan to critical review to include periodic 'worst case analyses U Im lications The implications of the group's alterna- tive in planning area can be simply stated On the positive side it would probably have contributed to a more thoroughly tested and carefully evaluated final plan--indeed some of the issues now being addressed by the review group might have arisen in sharper focus during the actual planning phase For instance to the best of the review group's knowledge no final plan for the rescue operations was ever published prior to_mission execution A written plan to supplement oral briefings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff would-have provided them a document to study and review in the privacy of their own offices which might have sharpened their understanding of details and led to more incisive guestions in subsequent discussions A properly constituted review group might well have suggested publication of the completed plan with tight controls and later changes added as necessary to facilitate an effective review U On the negative side of the group's alternative exposure of additional individuals to the plan might have increased the risk of security leaks inadvertent or otherwise U Evaluation Finally is the issue of existence or nonexistence of a plans review element vital Could such a unit have contributed materially to the success of the mission In the review group's judgment there is little doubt regarding its potential value A comprehensive and continuing review capability impacts directly on almost all other issues Sash a plans review'element could have played an important balancing role in the dynamic planning process that evolved conceivably making a critical contribution to ultimate mission accomplishment - 36 nu r simulated conditions expected in Iran r ISSUE U Comprehensive readiness evaluation Event Training was planned and conducted on a highly decentralized basis within an informal component command st ucture that does not appear to have been clearly established Individual and unit training was conducted and evaluated throughout the period at widely separated locations training of JTF elements was conducted at various desert sites in western CONUS that Thoroughly integrated training exercises of the entire JTF for the final plan were not conducted although joint training of all plan segments was conducted by portions of the component forces in conjunction with their respective roles and tasks Readiness evaluation was based upon observation of the training and exercises and overall assessment of the situation COMJTF decentralized command supervision of training and evaluation in part through the use of various advisers individually- observing segments of the continuously evolving concept and plans - U JTF Rationale Several considerations militated against thorougE integrated rehearsals and a more direct command role for COMJTF The dynamic situation required some mission capability from mid December 1979 to 24 April 1983 The overall situation including intelligence and JTF assessment of various unit readiness progress continuously changed demanding modifications of concept and subsequent plans including the roles played by various components Finally the primacy of OPSEC considerations led COHJTF to decide that regular _integration of training and readiness evaluations was undesireable U Altarnative The review group would have integrated 'air ground and naval elements throughout the preparation phase to conduct combined training as early and as often as possible moreover integrated training and readiness evalua- tion for the entire'JTF would include specialists and supporting forces where practical Individuals task-oriented groups and the force itself would drill until every aSpect of the raid became an automatic process U Implications Thorough integrated rehearsals would have deve oped precision and speed in execution increased interunit coordination suggested necessary changes and resolved problem areas Such integration would have made a major contribution in assessing the impact of plan modifica- tions and evolving roles for individual components The group's alternative would have facilitated a more searching 37 1' Q assessment of the concept of operations and scheme of maneuver and of course a more comprehensive assessment of JTF readiness to execute The negative implications of the alternative are implicit in the rationale--that such an integrative effort would have endangered OPSEC Moreover the dynamic situation and compressed tineframes made such a system extremely difficult to establish However the difficulty of integrating training while preserving OPSEC must be measured against the contribution of that effort to mission success U Evaluation The criticality of this issue was difficult to assess as only a portion of the plan was executed prior to abort Nevertheless the review group concluded that integrated training and rehearsals reduce risk and enhance the probability of success in this or any_other special operation 38 Issue-6 Overall coordination of joint training 0333 Event The overall joint training supervision function was retained at JTP level in the Pentagon At the western us site coordination and supervision were performed in part by two officers who were advisers to COHJTF yet retained responsibilities related to their primary office of assignment outside the JTE neither was responsible for the overall management of joint training activities Tanking for joint training was accomplished by messages issued by the 3-3 from the JTr headquarters in the Pentagon Principals from the JTP staff proceeded to the western US training site to observe and supervise the directed events Onsits support was handled individually'by force elements in many instances or arranged by the staff It was related by force participants that c-l30 and 33-539 crews did not brief or critique jointly prior to and after every joint training exercise Briefings and critiques were generally conducted at the respective locations of force elements Critique results were proyided to JTP headquarters by secure telephone by teletype or in some instances by personal contact An example is the participation where in some cases a the crews did not land at the west Us trainin sit oint fan 1- 1a th new 6 0 tted their cr tique i ems ere opportunity for face-to-face exchange of views and problem solving that would have enhanced accomplishment of training objectives more training on communications equipment and procedures to assure effective force integration conducted postexercise conferences for the commander and staff a few days following training exercises -These proved eery beneficial in determining procedural and equipment problems and areas emphasis _ The dynamic nature of the mission concept resulting from new intelligence inputs availability of support bases for the actual mission testing of various helicopter refuel procedures and assessment of unit readiness militated against shifting joint training responsi- bility to the field Training exercises were observed personally by COMJTF or his representative Creating an additional staff element was not considered necessary CTGJ Alternative Recognizing that COMJTF had the overall responsibility-for training the myriad other important activities related to concept development planning and extensive coordination would indicate the need for assignment of an officer and small staff to be in charge of the very important function of_joint training at the western US training site The group would have designated the 39 I1 LI F Deputy Commander of the-JTF and made him responsible for coordinating joint training activities including but not limited to-training schedules -operational and-administrative support and outside support He would have made arrangements for joint mission briefings and critiques He would have submitted progress reports to COMJTF periodically as appropriate He could have taken prompt actions to correct deficiencies to the extent possible as they arose Coordina- tion of training site support would have assured equitable allocation of available assets and contributed positively to morale and overall training progress Participant interviews indicated a need for better supply and administrative support and more responsive tactical and intelligence briefings The review group recognizes that joint doctrine assigns the Service component commanders unit training and support responsibilities however for this mission forces were so interdependent that complete force integration was essential In lications The group would have relieved COMJTF ur en of day-to day supervision of training It would have provided a central point of contact at the training site for each element of the force as well as for COHJTF and members of the staff It'is believed that the achievement of the training objectives would have been enhanced by an individual responsible for early identification of deficiencies followed by prompt cor- rective actions Additional personnel would have been required but perhaps not more than three or four U Evaluation It cannot be stated categorically that adoption review group's alternative would have made the difference between mission success or failure However centralization of overall joint training responsibility and coordination would have enhanced force-readiness and is recommended for future JTP operations involving joint training at a site geographically separated from the headquarters 45 unw- '5 - ISSUE 7 U Alterations in JTF composition U Event From interviews with key JTF personnel and from detailed review of after-action reports and documents it has become clear that significant planning and training problems were created by the continuing changes in the overall political situation surrounding the plight of the hostages The immediate objective in November was to field a capability quickly for an emergency rescue attempt should the hostages seem in imminent danger of being tried and or executed Shortly after the first of the year as a credible rescue capability began to emerge the emphasis shifted to contemplation of a more deliberate operation at a time and under conditions more conducive to the exercise of US initiative _In November u-assy Tehran was -e ng se zed I dv question 0 ow to from a hostile environment arose imme-iate became most vexing difficult COMJTF would face In this context the initial airlift requirement for hand early training num er 0 aircra needed to meet that require ment Over time however the size of gradually increased to contributing to a correspo ease in the number of helicopters from four to six to seven and ultimately to eight including spares Positioning the helicopters forward on NIMITZ well in advance of the actual operation was a delicate and time-consuming move and the failu - to fix the size and composition of the assault forceh or at a minimum establish a troop ing 0 late juggling in the numbers of helicopters This appeared to have exacerbated a problem that even in early planning stages was considered the most critical link in the entire operation P l JTF Rationale The obvious JTF rationale for such incre- mental changes in force structure was to provide as finely tailored a capability as possible at the point of attack Minor corrections and additions as planning progressed and further experience was gained from training'and rehearsals 1-11 -119 1-48 3414 a were considered necessary improvements and appropriate responses to the dynamics of the situation Further to a large extent intelligence drove the operation from the outset and intelligence developments caused in the operational conce t walla 01' Alternative _ Nonetheless as can be inferred from the discussion above it would have been desirable to fix the airlift requirement at a certain ceiling well in advance of launch date and to hold that ceiling for planning purposes unless a compelling case could have been made that a given increase was indeed vital to insure mission accomplishment For example ceiling of say 00 personne in early January to ave remained constant for planning urposes from that int on If the flexibility provided by necessary it would have been pre era a sue a imit be established in January vice the ongoing fluctuations that occurred 0563 Implications Adoption of the group's course of action would have facilitated greater precision in rehearsals a more finely tuned final plan with fewer last-minute changes and a clearer and more carefully computed airlift requirement further in advance of launch date than_was the case in the actual operation In this particular case it was virtually impossible for COMJTF to fix a firm date because the rescue effort was essentially a response not an initiative The rescue operation was a last reso 2e used onl after - di lomatic efforts failedan orce strut I e may ave -een desirable it may not have been possible to adhere to such planning especially when the terminal situation is dictated by the enemy PIG Further too rigid planning could have had the effect of reducing the flexibility to respond to last-minute changes in the situation be the di lomatic operational or enemy initiated bx U Evaluation A commander is always tempted to make any adjustments possible to improve his posture up to the point when the battle is joined The review group would simply counsel that particularly in undertakings of a special opera- tions nature-in the future such late changes be made with some trepidation and extraordinary care Whether the issue of late changes and increases in force structure impacted unfavorably on the operation as far as it went is problematical 42 7 17 I ct-4 3% 11 east such as the suspended dust zero visibility problem and the search and rescue 5 recover of Helicopter the C-136 force and Helicopter did transmit at various 1 - v 9 was ISSUE 8 U Risk assessment of hostile SIGINT capabilities Event Analysis of operational communications planning training and execution coupled with detailed interviews with key personnel underscored JTP understanding of the need for COHSEC particularly transmission security The principles of signals security SIGSEC were vital well understood by the JTF and provided for in the JTF Communications- Blectronics Operating Instruction CEOI extract utilized by the force However it was clear that threat understanding and resultant radio procedures varied among units and probably resulted from a combination_p knowledge training experience and mind-set For example the helicopter force attempted to execute the NIMITz-to-Desert One phase under strict radio silence even when faced with contingencies exec- 30 ammo gamma CL U0 I 4N The helicopter unit commander and his'plane commanders 1 maintained strict radio silence during extreme operational difficulties in maintaining integrity and control addi tionally the commander of #5 was not told- nor did he c ask-about the weather at Desert One The receipt of this -- information by the commander of Helicopter #5 could have caused him to proceed on the mission 19 JTF Rationale The JTF rationale concerning COMSEC policy was driven by the requirement for total initiation of planning to assaul dand- by the assessment of the 5 65 Tia Alternative The group's alternative would insure a comprehensive assessment and detailed understanding of threat capabilities by eve member ofrthe force to include impacts and consequences on by l-ihl a Eat-l 9-1- 3 Lune-3 2 ODCI bXs- 45 gig 1 - mom 2 1E0 1m lications - The group's alternative would have insured nso ar as possible 'that all personnel thoroughly understood the CONSEC requirements and consequences Further it appeared that command and control through pJ selected use of radio communications could well have resulted g - in a more favorable execution of the movement to Desert One 0n the other hand total radio silence or the strictest of procedures always enhances OPSEC 1Q Evaluation It is difficult to determine if the overall posture at Desert One at abort decision point would have been enhanced by additional command and control communications at critical points Commanders and key personnel have many things to consider in times of stress and uncertainty Nevertheless the group would urge comprehensive analysis assessment and trainincr in matte of SIGSBC operations- and planning ISSUE 9 Abort criteria 0361 Event During the flight from the carrier to Desert One a distance of nearly 600 nm the helicopter force unexpectedly encountered visibility conditions that precluded VMC flight The condition was caused by two separate areas of suspended dust of unknown magnitude This condition occurred approximately three hours after takeoff Flight integrity was lost The helicopters broke out of the first area but soon entered the second area which was of even greater density The helicopter flight flew in instrument meteorological conditions IMO for approximately two hours The restricted visibility ended at a point approximately 50 nm from destination The plan had been to conduct the entire mission under VMC a procedure adopted during the training phase 5_ - 1 6X06309 1-23 -- waxes - - - The minimum Visi i ity con ag kfor the operational requirements of this mission were not defined or testedTwo helicOpters including the leading helicopter turned F k to exit the first area of dust and landed The leader using a special radio that afforded minimum chance of intercept called COMJTF and told him what the flight had encountered The radio call could not be heard by other members of the flight In response to query by COMJTF the leader indicated he thought that it was possible to cOntinue the mission despite the dust He_was directed to continue One aircraft Helicopter at the time not in visual contact with other aircraft aborted short of destination and returned to few minutes before he would have exited the dust condition He based his abort decision on the instrument malfunctions exacerbated by the visibility conditions The crew commander indicated later that he would have continued had he known that restricted visibility conditions did not prevail at destination His failure to arrive_at Desert One proved critical in that one additional mission-capable aircraft would have permitted the entire mission to continue The flight leader was not infOrmed of #5's decision to abort Strict radio silence inhibited exchange of essential information within the helic0pter flight when unexpected contingencies arose visibility conditions caused the helicopters to be as much as 85 minutEs late at Desert One This in itself could have been a cause for mission abort based on total hours of darkness remaining for the next phase 0' as Ora JTF Rationale There was a tendency to feel that an abort decision could best be made by the element leader based on his experience and professional knowledge Moreover the helicopter flight leader believed that no more precise abort criteria were necessary for his individual flight members The absence of positive communications procedures reflected the primacy of OPSEC in all mission planning The helicopter crews demonstrated a strong dedication toward mission accomplishment by their reluctance to abort under unusually difficult conditions Alternative Considering the helicOpter's limited IMC capab es based primarily on equipment limitations and in the absence of comprehensive weather penetration procedures the group would have established firm weather criteria for mission abort wake lad -y use of elicopter flight leader cot ve retained control 33Q dwisual signals to the extent possible and by use of radio when pecessary OPSEC notwithstanding F mydecisions based on established criteria and circumstances and He would have made abort would have aborted the entire flight if helicopter assets fell below minimum requirements to proceed to the next phase of the mission In addition to the weather criteria others based on an acceptable degree of punctuality were necessary to assure timely arrival of a minimum number of helicopters at Desert One An absolute minimum of six were required for the next phase and prudence would dictate arrival of at least seven Obi Directly related to sound abort criteria is a procedure to assure that communications equipment is functional In 1 strict radio silence an aircrew could be completely unaware i that a radio had ceased functioning A procedure for periodic I blind radio transmissions would have served as an equipment check for all net members o why The negative implications of the TSJ Implications group's alternative include the'possibility that severely restrictive abort criteria could have limited individual initiative and the success orientation necessary to mission success 0n the positive side the review grOup's method would have provided positive management of mission assets I 48 Err 1 Evaluation Positive abort procedures could have enhanc capability of the helicopter flight leader to maintain flight integrity and control Likewise could have been better informed regarding the status of the helicopter force as the mission progressed toward Desert One His ability to make a well-informed decision could have been enhanced However it cannot be stated categorically that adoption of the group's alternative would have assured success beyond Desert One Even though six helicopters-and seven crews arrived at the intended destination under the difficult conditions that prevailed they proved insufficient to proceed further If all six helicopters had been'mission capable the delayed takeoff for the next phase could well have jeopardized success and resulted in a more serious situation The national significance of this operation - demanded adoption of and adherence to extraordinary pro- cedures designed to deal with relatively remote contingencies 49 ISSUE 10 U The use of other heme-eager - 0361 Event Initial study of the Iranian situation and orces available quickly led to the belief that a rescue'attempt would require heavy-lift long-range helicopters On 19 smasher 1979 the ones a raved lan using Window The 33-539 was selected after an in-depth review 0 available helicopter resources and their inherent 6 a capabilities 3 FEED Rationale Primary criteria for selection included range pay ability to be positioned rapidly airlirtable Other major considerations were suitability Jot candidate helicopters to carrier operations and OPSEC Primary candidates for the rescue mission were the 23-46 CH-47 CE-SB 55-53 military helicopters All 3 were c 5 airlirtable but range and payload considerations favored the -53 series or the latter the RE-S3D provided load and shi board the best combination of ran a com tibilit 9364 Alternative Selection of RH-S3D for all the res a correct However helicopters should have been favorabl I - 25 consider as im ico ers were Just coming 0 the production a andful of pilots were proficient in flying them and operating their sophisticated systems and they carry less payload than the 23-530 In addition reliability and maintainability or such a sophisticated tam was doubtrul at earl st e'of its introduction I 50 ui- Implications On the 4 a lt onsi ering that H5 247 ne time there were no prac ice a ernatives to launching the helicopter force from a carrier the negative implicat iroup s alternative are the deciding tactor elicopter will not it into a carrier elevator or -ow ec without removal of its rotor blades--a procedure ommended for daily operations on deck is virtually infeasible oeca corr051ve atmosphere difficulty of maintenance impact on carrier operations and above allr OPSEC Logistic support at a relatively new and exotic weapon system would be further complicated by the additional-delays in shipboard resupply not Evaluation During the planning process the RH-SBD emerged as only helicopter with the full combination of operational capabilities upon which a feasible rescue plan could be structured in 51 L- @475 my ZL y mad already been correctly anticipated lz l 5 5mm um ISSUE 11 U Helicopter force size Approximately two weeks after US Embassy personnel Event in Iran were taken hostage six RH-53D SEA STALLION helicopters to the Indian Ocean re lecting the axoaxy fact that their use in the event of a possible rescue attempt The helicopters were the carrier KITTY HANK and eventually transferred to the carrier- IMITZ when she arrived on station These six augmented by two more brought in on NIMITZ launched on 24 April in support of the rescue operation The mission was aborted on the morning of 25 April because the number of RH-53D helicopters available to proceed was less than required HEQ JTF Rationale As planning for the rescue progressed the number of helicopters perceived necessary to execute the mission grew from four to six to seven and eventually to eight These incremental increases were the result of unforeseen growth in the force believed necessary to achieve an acceptable probability of success in assaulting the Embassy and freeing the hostages In addition more heli- copters were required to compensate for the lift capability lost because of seasonal temperature increases in the objective areas Moreover as intelligence on the situation in Iran planners were driven to a concept embodying an in-country rendezvous for helicopter refueling and unloading of the assault force $51 The JTF decision on helicopter requirements was based on the collective professional judgment of highly experienced helicopter pilots participating in rescue mission planning A risk analysis based on fleet-wide RH-S3D statistical data for an 18-month period from 1 July_l978 to 31 December 1979 seemed to support the planners' conclusion that eight RH-53D helicopters aboard NIMITZ provided an acceptable degree of risk Moreover the always-primary OPSEC concern apparently influenced the planners' rationale driving them to seek minimum practical force levels In hindsight it is clear that the eight helicopters put aboard NIMITZ provided ad -uate redund- ancy to airlift the initial assault force a perhaps 103 personnel four to five However as personnel and equipment grew in response to evolving intelligence the minimum airlift requirement at Desert One increased 5% I yy ginex E and the conclusions reached therein are summarized Alternative helico ters and crews would have reduced the risk of abort due to mechanical failure were operationally feasible and could have been made available if requeste A detailed analysis of the helicopter ocu31ng on maintenance reliability is provided in re As indicated in Figure 1 an unconstrained planner ould more than likely'have initially required at least 13 helicopters under JTF combat rules 11 under the most likely case and up to 12 using peacetime historical data These figures do not deal with accidents combat losses etc which depending on the mission profile could drive initial requirements higher The threat posed to OPSEC by additional helicopters and support aircraft was a principal concern however other possible constraints did not prohibit such an increase NIMITZ was capable of onloading helicopters with little or no impact on other missions last-two mission pilots were trained and certified in a March indicating that aircrew availability di no force By reducing the contingency margin fuel available at Desert One was sufficient'to accommodate at least 10 helicopters The sum aside from OPSEC no operational or logistic factor prohibited launching 11 from NIMITZ and continuing beyond the halfwa -- _Ine with 16 helico ter lull CTSJ Implications The negative implications of this alternative includes abandoning more helicopters in Iran an increased threat to OPSEC generated by additional aircraft and a reduction in contingency fuel at Desert One However an increase in the helicopter force coupled with a reduction of contingency fuel levels would not have required additional forces in other areas and would not have significantly altered the footprint of the mission 0n the positive side the group's alternative would have decreased the probability that the number of mission capable helicopters would fall below the required minimum u i'LJf fry arm- The review group concluded that additional me 03 1 We 27 $55 33 mums- r Ha 0 HQ Evaluation The number of mission-capable helicopters availabIe at Desert One was critical to allowing the mission to proceed It is too simplistic to suggest that adding more helicopters would have reduced the likelihood of the mission aborting due to mechanical failure The problematic advantages of an increased helicopter force must be balanced against the increased threat posed to OPSEC throughout the continuum of training -deployment and execution and the reduced contingency fuel reserve at Desert One In retrospect it appears that on balance an increase in the helicopter force was warranted however such an increase could not itself guarantee success 55 Ti proficient_in the basic weapons system U Alternate helicopter pilots - 1Q Event ISSUE 12 At the outset with the fate of the hostages unknown 53 unpredictable an immediate capability to mount a possible rescue attempt was mandatory Although a residue of similar capability from the Vietnam-conflict existed it was not in ct efore it was expedient to select an integral unit ofic nt in the 33-539 an carrier operations To night assault capability Navy pilots were wi Marine Corps pilots versed in assault missions In this crew configuration training progress was viewed as unsatisfactory by As a result pilots progressing slowly were released in late December 1979 and pilots known to have demonstrated capabilities more akin to the mission were recruited Training in preparation for the rescue progressed more' rapidly with the revised crews and no further wholesale aircrew changes were made or contemplated CTGJ JTF Rationale ' The need to be ready at any moment preclud a smooth program'designed to achieve a specific capability by 24 April l980 The requirement to be ready when windows of opportunity opened resulted not in one five month training program but several discrete two- or programs- shingled one overlapping the other TEA Alternative During this period USAF Pilut resources included 114 qualified 3-53 pilots instructors and flight examinhrs Of these 96 were current in long- range flight and aerial refueling In addition there were another 86 former 3-53 qualified pilots identified most of whom had fairly recent Special Operations Forces or rescue experience These USAF pilots more experienced in the mission profiles envisioned for the rescue operation would have probably progressed more rapidly than pilots but trained in a markedly different role USAF pilots as well as those from other Services with training and operational experience closely related to the rescue mission profile could have been identified and made available The real question to be addressed is is transition to a new and highly complex mission in the same aircraft more or less difficult for an experienced pilot to master than transition to an aircraft variant in the same mission Mastering a new difficult and complex mission requires a pilot to acquire and hone new skills and more importantly a new mind-set a 56 f Transitioning from sn-HH- or to_an RH-SJ requires only learning a few new flight parameters and altering already established procedures something every experienced pilot has done several times This point is not new Experience gained in Project Jungle Jim circa 1961 illustrated that learning new and vastly different complex mission skills is far more difficult than transitioning to an aircraft of similar design and performance characteristics In lications Teaming carefully selected pilots of all Services with a Heavy weight on USAF assault experience would most likely have produced the most competent crews at an earlier date However introduction of large numbers of USAF pilots would have complicated the OPSBC problem in training and aboard the carrier Evaluation Should a rescue mission have been attempted in the early days after the Embassy seizure it is probable that a complement of selected pilots with extensive or current assault and rescue experience would have been more effective However there is nothing to suggest that any'other combination of aircrews could or would have performed the mission better than those who flew it on 24 April 1986 While this issue was not crucial to the mission it does indicate the importance of designating an operational helicopter unit responsible for maintaining mission capability in this area 57 ISSUE 13 U Established helicopter unit $81 Event Selection of the helico ter for the rescue wiselon naturally led to selection of an RH-53D squadron as the unit to perform the mission r 8 Ci at 0151 JTF Rationale The JTF was driven to prepare for imminent launch of a rescue mission if the hostages' lives were threatened Accordingly they selected a minesweeping helicopter squadron as the most expedient solution when it became evident the RH-53D was the helicopter to use 3 1 alternative The group would marry up the appropriate helicopters and their maintenance capability with an opera- tional unit compatible with mission requirements When it was clear that helicopters were required selection of a USMC assault squadron would have facilitated training and in constructing a credible OPSEC cover story If necessary highly qualified pilots from other Services could have augmented the Marine squadron to bolster its capability The main point is that the squadron's institutional structure would be preserved training tactics and standardization Personnel performing and experienced in these functions would'greatly enhance the unit's ability to smoothly transi- tion into its new role Perhaps one of the key squadron staff functions referenced above would have perceived the Blade Inspection Method BIM -associated abort experienced during training as a major potential cause of abort during the mission and pursued the facts as the review group did See Issue 17 Armed with knowledge of the circumstances surrounding BIM failures the pilots of Helicopter #6 could have reached a more informed decision on the risk associated with continuing I Ora Implications The negative aspect of the group's- alternative is the additional personnel required'to preserve vital elements of the selected squadron's structure Perhaps as many as five or six additional personnel would have been required The positive aspect is the benefits gained in preserving unit integrity vital to flying training and operations Evaluation It is believed that the preservation of an established squadron's inherent unit cohesion could have facilitated training enhanced information flow and increased aircrew knowledge all of which could lead to a more integrated unit operation It cannot be demonstrated nor is it suggested that these factors would have altered the outcome However they would have enhanced training and more than likely increased the chance of success For the future appropriate units with the requisite equipment should be identified to develop and maintain the necessary skills at a high level of proficiency 59 ISSUE 14 U Handling the dust phenomenon CTSJ Event There was serious and justifiable concern with the ability to accurately forecast weather along planned low level routes to Desert One HelicoPters planned to ingress and navigate visually over a sparsely populated desert with few weather stations None of these reporting stations were located along their route Therefore the JTF had to develop a catalog of weather phenomena that could likely occur in Iran and the ability to accurately and reliably forecast their occurrence Difficulty of accurate weather prediction was compounded by the need to accurately forecast Iranian weather that could meet required minimums for a 40-hour period to accommodate the planned'two-night Operation Diplomatic initiative moon phase and other windows exacerbated the problem The JTF weather team researched and identified hazardous weather that aircrews could encounter in Iran Among these was the phenomenon of suspended dust actually encountered along a 200-nm stretch of the helicopter route Information extracted from the National Intelligence Survey N18 33 34 - Iran and Afghanistan July 1970 was eventually included in the OPLAN weather annex A table in the annex indicated by location and month the frequency of suspended-dust occurrences HelicOpter pilots however were surprised when they encountered the dust were unprepared to accurately assess its impact on their flight and stated that they were not advised of the phenomenon pilots were also unaware of the possibility of encountering suspended dust $25 JTF Rationale The ANS team-was assigned to the JTF J-2 section and did not have direct contact with the helicoPter and C-l30 aircrews Weather information was passed through an intelligence officer to the pilots on regular visits to the training sites However pilots with extensive C-130 and 3-53 experience on the JTF J-5 section had direct access to ANS personnel Information flow to the mission pilots was filtered as a result of organizational structure The traditional relationship between pilots and weather forecasters was severed This was done to enhance OPSEC Casi Alternative The question to be addressed is not where the fault lay for the lack of aircrew knowledge but more importantly what should be done in future situations where there exists aspaucity of weather information and the 60 price of failure is high Air Weather Service meteorologists can be denied information in several ways 1 a closed-society does not release information 2 the phenomenon is so infrequent that it had never before been observed in recorded history Mount St Helen's ash or 3 the area of interest is so sparsely populated that although the phenomenon occurs frequently and perhaps predictably it is not observed by_'civilized' inhabitants and therefore not recorded The suspended dust encountered along the helicopter route falls more appropriately into the third category If they were fully aware of the high degree of uncertainty associated with limited data and the attendant risk mission planners should have more aggressively pursued options that reduced this uncertainty to a- manageable and acceptable degree One cannot build a data base overnight it takes years of observations to accurately and reliably predict weather atterns Therefore active measures a K - C E IN C LI 0 equa impor ance ay of metero ogist operator is the process that most often surfaces the questions that need to be answered-the uncertainties that size risk In this regard the AWS had little or no direct interface with the mission pilots- they were both exclusively compartmented By and large an intelligence officer passed weather information to the pilots Operators were placed in a receive only mode--forecasters and weather researchers received no direct feedback The group would have required direct interface between mission pilots and their supporting weather team W In lications The negative'aspects of the review group's a ternative impact on OPSEC and administrative procedures The AWS officer would have had to make frequent trips to the training sites for direct interface or a seco weather officer could have been_ is unlikely that either of ese a ternatives wou have compromised OPSEC 0n the other hand there is no assurance that face-to-face interaction would have surfaced the dust phenomenon or made pilots more aware However the group believes that direct interface between mission pilots and air weather officers would have increased the likelihood of foreknowledge of the suspended dust phenomenon that informed planners would have more aggressively pursued alternative approaches to reduce and manage this uncertainty and'that pilots encountering the suspended dust would have been better prepared 31 61 wen-em THPE Evaluation The potential for increased awareness of weather phenomenon through better interface with the th team on the planning staff must be weighed against the possible OPSEC risk HWhile it is unlikely that direct interface between ANS personnel and mission pilots could have altered the outcome on the night of 24 April it is possible that helicopter pilots would have gained insight into the dust phenomenon and might well have made a better informed decision when they encountered it For example a decision to abort would have preserved the 0 on to launch the mission at 3 an opportune point The g geiarger issue for future con31 eration is the need for planners to be more sensitive to areas of great uncertainty that could impact significantly on the planned operation and where' possible to reduce these uncertainties For this mission all planning envisioned flight conditions permitting visual naviga- tion Yet weather was an uncertain factor which would lead to the conclusion that the chances for successful helicopter ingress would have been enhanced by any and all means that would have improved the helicopters' and their crews' capabilities to penetrate adverse weather r ISSUE 15 U Weather reconnaissance Event There was serious and justifiable concern about the a ility to accurately forecast weather along planned' low-level routes to Desert One and the extraction site and less concern about forecast accuracy for Tehran because of the availability of weather predictions for major international airports Moreover weather stations of which there are several near Tehran report their observations in the clear On the other hand the helicopters would ingress over sparsely populated desert with few stations reporting and none along their specific route Forecasting difficulty was compounded by the need to predict acceptable weather for a two-day period Accordingly an ANS team was formed to gather data on Iran It was tasked to forecast Iranian weather on a regular basis and its predictions were checked for accuracy and reliability by-comparing them with actual reports and weather photos of the forecasted period Over time the team's ability to forecast with accuracy and reliability was validated by the JTF Primary interest was focused on visibility hazards to flight such as storms ambient light and winds for navigation and timing Satellite imagery was extremely useful but incapable of revealing the presence of low-level clouds or other restrictions to visibility hidden beneath an overcast and was of limited value at night Nevertheless there was evidently sufficient confidence in the forecaster's ability to predict VMC and the frequency of VMC that alternative means to VFR flight procedures were not pursued The weather forecast for the night of 24 April did not predict reduced visibility over extended distances of the helicopter route Uninformed and unprepared to cope with the extremely low visibilities encountered the leader paused the flight became separated Helicopter #5 aborted and all helicopters reaching Desert One were appreciably late Til JTF Rationale The JTF believed that the probability of VMC for the helicopter ingress was reasonably high and that the ANS team could accurately forecast the en route weather Therefore the helicopter ingress would be accomplished by visual navigation using night vision goggles If the heli- copters encountered weather that could not safely be penetrated using visual navigation with night vision goggles the flight - and mission--would be aborted The use of a weather reconnais- sance aircraft had the disadvantage of being one more sortie over the helicopter route that could arouse attention This risk to OPSEC was considered to override any advantage to be gained in view of what appeared to a simple and straightforward approach to handling weather contingencies 63 was Alternative COMJTF and his air component staff had the means to obtain more timely and accurate weather data Weather reconnaissance is a proven and often used means of accurately determining weather along flight routes with a 'paucity of weather reporting stations and high risk of incomplete knowledge Transoceanic fighter deployments are a classic example It was feasible for the first TALON aircraft penetrating Iranian air space to fly the helicopter route in advance If deemed necessary a weather forecaster and or a helicopter pilot could have gone along to assess - and report the impact of weather encountered In hindsight a weather reconnaissance MC-la would have encountered the dust phenomenon approximately one hour in advance of the helicopters and assessed its magnitude and impact before the helicopters would have to penetrate the area of reduced visibility It is purely conjecture at this point but full knowledge of what the helicopters would encounter balanced against their planning and training for VMC flight may have caused COMJTF to order an abort Although useful in a macro sense satellite weather imagery often has proven to be neither accurate nor timely enough to meet operational requirements on a high-risk mission It is therefore believed that information provided by an weather reconnaissance of the RH-SBD route could have reduced the risk margin PFEL Implications 0n the negative side the C-l3 would have been one more sortie overflying the helicopter route and could have alerted ground watchers so that the helicopter flight would have been visually detected 0n the positive side weather reconnaissance could have provided COMJTF with more accurate and timely information on which to base a deci- sion on whether or not to abort that night and try again within the available Evaluation A TALON weather reconnaissance along the exact helicopter route would have provided COMJTF with precise information on the prevailing weather and influenced a decision to continue at that juncture or to wait for more favorable conditions The group considered that provisions for handling weather contingencies could and should have been enhanced The weather reconnaissance was one option that cost nothing in additional aircraft fuel or crew requirements although there were OPSEC implications Wu 17- 36 16 U pathfinders 1mg Event During flight from respective launch points' to Desert One the MC- and made landfall in the same general vicinit and at approximately the same time as the MOM I helicopters Cb 0 Ca -2 orce was much more austerely prepared for long-range low-level night navigation Their crews did not include navigators and the aircraft were not iv J elrcopter Uf eguipped with TFR or FLI The re equip with the PINS t4 OMEGA system 4 3 pv The crews had receive on 1m J agr low confidence in the ui ment and their ability to employ it primary method of navigation or the helicopters was dead reckoning using NVGs to terrain follow There was serious and justifiable concern about the ability to accurately forecast weather along planned low- level routes to Desert One and the extraction site There was understandably somewhat less concern about forecast accuracy for Tehran because weather predictions for major international airports were readily available Moreover weather stations of which there were several near Tehran report their observations in the clear The route from the coastal penetration to Desert One was over sparsely populated desert with few stations reporting and none along the route Forecasting difficulty was compounded by the need to predict the weather for a two-day period Accordingly a weather team was formed to gather data on Iran It was tasked to forecast Iranian weather on a regular basis The predictions were checked for accuracy and reliability by comparing them with actual reports and weather photos of the forecast period Over time the team's ability to forecast with accuracy and_reliability was validated to the JTF's satisfac- tion Primary interest was focused on visibility and hazards to flight such as storms ambient light and winds for navigation and timing Satellite imagery was useful but incapable of revealing the presence of low-level clouds hidden beneath a higher level and was of limited value at night There was evidently sufficient confidence in the forecaster's ability to predict VMC and the frequency I of VMC that alternative means to VFR flight were not pursued The weather forecast for the night of 24 April did not predict I reduced visibility over extended distances of the helicopter route Uninformed and therefore not well prepared to cope with the extremely low visibilities encountered the leader paused the flight became separated Helicopter #5 aborted and all helicopters reaching Desert One were appreciably late JTF Rationale With limitations of the navigation equip ent available in the RH-SBD the JTF gained confidence in the ability of helicopter crews to navigate over long distance at night under VMC using NVGs during the training phase in the western United States The JTF was comfortable that weather would not be a limiting factor for miSsion success because of the predicted high frequency of VMC along the helicopter route Use of an pathfinder for the heli copters was not considered because of the confidence in the high probability of VMC weather and because of the feeling that the use of a C-13B pathfinder would be therefore unnecesarily complicating eSpecially with the wide difference in operating airspeeds Alternative The alternative plan would provide for an helicopter rendezvous at or 'ust after landfall 9 0000 is I exs b fssi TALON aircraft are capable of flying at speeds compa ible with RH- 3 helic - as -athfinders for them - --iK 1 35 66 35 1 Implications Using TALONs as pathfinders from the L -oint of entrv into Iran to Desert Qne__ 36 Aftoa m a- m_ oHsumption would be somewhat 1 uh pensated for by a greater assurance that the helicopters arrive and arrive on time thus requiri shorter w-I ground times for C-l3 s and Lb 01% Evaluation pathfinders for the RH-SJDS would 4 have increased the probability of all flyable helicopters arriving at Desert One on time regardless of unforeseen weather alctr the route short of a major storm-dgouan - 5 - pathfinders would most its have enabled elicopter #5 to reach Desert One and the mission to proceed Moreover pathfinders might have averted the fuel situation that arose -w1 due to late arriving helicopters In addition if existing L- weather along the route had been of such severity to make it prudent to discontinue the mission pathfinders could have contributed to a better informed early decision preserving the option to delay by one or more days r-pw-rgx o-ur n va - Ham - ISSUE 17 U Helicopter aborts 10 Event Eight mission-capable RB-SBD helicopters departed NIMITZ on the evening of 24 April 1980 Of these eight only five arrived at Desert One capable of proceeding One helicopter aborted in the Iranian desert short of Desert One another turned back for loss of instruments due to electrical power failure and a third RH-S3D aborted at Desert One as the result of a hydraulic leak that in turn failed a primary hydraulic pump Decause only five helicopters were available to proceed against a firm minimum requirement of six the rescue mission was aborted Accordingly a post-mission analysis of the aborts was warranted 5 1 JTP Rationale Helicopter the first abort experienced a SIM indication approximately two hours into the flight RH-53 rotor blade spars are pressurized with nitrogen and the spar's ability to retain the nitrogen under pressure is an indication of spar integrity A BIM warning indicates possible loss of nitrogen pressure in the blade but does not necessarily indicate that the pressure loss is the result of a crack in the spar Nitrogen pressure loss can result from a leaky filler valve a defective seal on the spar extrusion or a crack in the spar that can ultimately result in rotor blade failure The crew of #6 made a precautionary landing in the desert to investigate verified the cockpit indication with the BIN indicator on the rotor blade and based on normal operating procedures elected to abandon the helicopter With regard to spar failures the helicopter family has experienced 31 spar cracks three of which have resulted in crashes However the RH-53D equipped with an improved cockpit detection system has not experienced a spar crack To date 210 RH-53 blades have been returned to Naval Air Rework Facility RARE for various inspections and repairs-- 43 of these were for BIM indications All 210 RH-53D rotor blades inspected demonstrated spar integrity Why this is 'true is unknown but the fact remains that in 38 216 RH-SBD flying hours 229 296 blade hours logged through December 1979 not one crack has been found in an RH-SBD rotor blade spar Moreover an 3-53 blade fatigue failure analysis conducted by Sikorsky in 1974 revealed that rotor blades with cracked spars would retain structural integrity for up to 79 flight hours from crack initiation The time from crack initiation to spar failure-is a function of airspeed as indicated below - - 68 FORWARD TIME FROM CRACK INITIATION SPEED T0 SPAR SEPARATION 166 KTS 79 27 HRS NOTE Based upon an air- craft maximum gross 129 KTS 27 47 HRS weight o e42 60@ 1b 133 KTS 15 13 HRS 14B KTS 8 73 HRS 150 KTS 5 63 HRS 160 KTS 3 33 HRS 2 43 HRS In 1974 as a result of the Sikorsky data the US Air Force directed that the H-53 not be flown in excess of five hours beyond BIM indication at or below 136 KTS nor more than two hours above 136 KTS FEE Helicopter #5 aborted four hours into the mission and returned to NIMITZ because of failures to essential flight instruments that the pilots believed were critical to safely continuing the flight At the abort point #5 was within 25 minutes of exiting the dust cloud and about 55 minutes 116 nm from Desert One When the pilot was asked if he would have proceeded had he been fully aware that the dust cloud dissipated in 56 nm and the weather at Desert One was VMC he said he probably would have PSSJ The lead crew possessed essential information on Desert One weather and the dust cloud that was not passed to Helicopter Based on the helicopter pilot's testimor these data had they been passed could have altered his abort decision Once at Desert One Helicopter #5 could have continued in the VMC conditions existing and moreover would have had the opportunity to exchange equipment with the non-mission capable helicopter - 'Crsi H IicoptefT 2 abofted at Desert'One because of a hydraulic pump failure resulting from fluid depletion through a cracked nut Failures of this type usually result in metal contamination throughout the hydraulic system -Correcting the ma1function required replacing pump and filters and thorough flushing of the system The extensive maintenance required to repair a hydraulic pump malfunction justified the decision to not take a spare hydraulic pump along 69 more and had been experienced in training ff I 4 Wwould have compromised OPSEC 3 3 Alternative In light of the circumstances surrounding helicopter aborts that led ultimately to the overall mission abort it is apparent that the pilot of helicopter #5 lacked certain knowledge vital to reaching an informed decision to proceed or abort Uncertainty regarding Iranian radar coverage and the dust phenomenon see Issues 14 and la played important roles-in Helicopter #S s decision to return to the carrier However the major factor in his abort decision was lack of readily available information on weather conditions further en route and at Desert One Information on the-number of mission-capable helicopters at Desert One or still en route also could have influenced his decision and should have made known a' ure to al information back Wars-J vi estrictive communica- tions doctrine related to the overriding concern for OPSEC However there were ways to pass the information to C-la s and helicopters en route that would have small likelihood of compromising the mission A HIM indication was a likely occurrence on the mission HIM indications and other likely malfunctions should have been identified and 'researched in detail and information provided aircrews as part of their mission preparation can In lications The negative aspects of the proposed alternative are reIativel insi nificant 'retransmissio alternat ve wou have provided for a covered and secure flow of vital info the rescue force while en route to Desert One 05G Evaluation When considering the conflict that often arises between OPSEC and operational requirements a prudent planner of a clandestine high-risk venture should always be conservative However in the-narrow scope of this issue the group concludes that restricted communications flow within the task force denied information essential to reach informed decisions The additional information might have prompted Helicopter #5 to continue on to Desert One One more flyable helicopter would have enabled the mission to proceed 7B D 'm ISSUE 18 U The enemx radar threat $81 Event This issue while stated in generalize fashio a ve's from asi le hi hi 11 Maw 1 1-3 In lications There exists the possibility-r that some he Loopter pi ot judgeme arding altitude selection were affected by the infer-nub HIS Evaluation It would be inappropriate to fault COMJTE a 5 staff in' this ance as he learned of the informal after the mission had been concluded obv1ousy muc oo ate to take corrective action Furthermh t e six helicopters did arrive at Desert One and the abort at that int cannot be related to any alleged enemy capahility along the penetration 71 route What is illu trated by this event deserveS'reemphasis however all concerned should refer a ion appropriate intelligence staff representative for confirmation denial or other qualification be ore accepting the report as factual nth-5 April ISSUE 19 U Helic0pter communications Event The helicopter force was inculcated with the view hat any communications from or between them would seriousl threaten OPSEC 1 um55_ Accordingly the helicoPter force planned and trained to operate in complete radio silence Intraflight communication where possible was to done with light signals The absence of radio communica- tions indicated to the helicopte oilots that all was well and to continue the mission -- when helicopter flight became separated in the dust cloud each separate element lacked this and other vital information The lead helicopter did not know that #8 had successfully recovered the crew from #6 and continued nor that #6 had been abandoned in the desert More importantly after he reversed course in the dust and landed the lead could not logically deduce either that the other helicopters had' continued or that they had turned back to return to the carrier He did not know when'the flight had disintegrated He could have assumed that they had become separated before 1 he reversed course and unknow1ngly proceeded 'Alternatively they could have lost sight of him after turning and mistaking his intentions continued back to the carrier Lastly #5 might have elected to continue had he known that his arrival at Desert One would have allowed the mission to continue and that VMC existed at the rendezvous $64 JTF Rationale In concert with the view at OPSEC was critical to with surprisemissions to the absolute minimum 01 s We helicopter crews vital information that would have enabl Capabilities existed to pass to the ed them to make more informed judgments II 0n the night of 24 all information deemed vital to the helico_ters could have been transmitted by NIMITZ w r 73 153mm sz 42 hm - 43 we ex 1-44 Implications Negative implications of the proposed 2 alte at ve are re ailtivel min 5 - tlined 910 c 1 communicat ons 41 w no 1 ave compromised -43 C- - - 1-44 v --tl helicopter crews to be better informed while'en route ' I I if a pos time do the proposed my Evaluation A system providing secure Er-f intel igence to the helicopter crews would he tly I 19 enhanced the probability of the mission proceeding beyond y at Desert One By his own statement If the helicopter commander aboard #5 had been aware that' the weather at Desert One was J1 VMC he would have continued ISSUE 23 U Alternatives to the Desert One sited-fins in th h 8t399 rescue plannin clear hat desertgal- 533 hag - 1-hl'an aa- - ve necessary 0 15 1 5 c'1335 and-9193 33-5338 and to 33 13 ghag ologi hliesiihith b satisfactory-bearing surface 'JrF'RatiGEale 75 womc J fuel equipment and assault force 1cop ers to Eff go I - believed necessary to successfully execute the plan The window where 11 these environmental factors overlapped closed the basis of the the JTF ant cipated that the force at esert vehicles They had a Alternative The Desert One plan was feasible but the risks of compromise along the road were high When it was learned that Helicopter #2 had aborted at the site for hydraulic failure COMJTF asked his on-scene commanders to reaffirm that they could not proceed with five helicopters They advised that five were not enough and the force was ordered to withdraw However had Helicopter #5 arrived on the scene in lieu of returning to the carrier it is ass ed the rescue mission would have continued as planned mom i 5 The vehicles and helicopter akandoned a ong road would more than likely draw attention to the scene and ultimately to the C-136 wheel ruts As a result COMJTF was on the horns of a dilemma the risk of compromise was increased if the mission proceeded and was certain if the force withdrew Clearly r another site away from roads would have markedly - I reduced the risk of compromising the rescue mission in its early phases before the assault force - tr- I a Past ImplicatiOns The group's alternative depended on the photographic identification of other suitable site s clear of roads and inhabited areas Intelligence planners for the JTF had concluded none existed and the group has no basis for believing that the search for alternative sites was anything less than thorough A perfunctory review of the available photography by the group did not confirm the availability of an alternate potential sites CUCIJQJCI less traffic on the roa a isected Deser erations was almost certain and there was the probability of abandoning a helicopter or other equipment Tia Evaluation Hostage rescue in a hostile environment carries great risk for the hostages and their liberators Accordingly the planners should take every precaution to reduce risk A refueling site in the desert was an integral part of the only feasible rescue plan and the siting of Desert One apparently had no suitable alternative in a remote location Therefore the JTF's solution appears to be the only reasonable one but the group concludes that it probably carried more risk than the JTF had assessed with -l3 s more than had been exercised it took on new and larger dimension 1 bp i w l ISSUE 21 U Command and control at Desert One Event The first aircraft to arrive at Desert one carrying the on-scene commander Combat Control Team and Road Watch Team executed a missed approach to avoid a vehicle traVeling along the highway adjacent to the desert _strip As the aircraft landed on its third approach the Road Watch Team disembarked to take up blocking positions on the roadway approaches to Desert One They each encountered traffic one a bus with a driver and 43 passengers the other a small fuel truck followed closely by a pickup truck All three vehicles showed no signs of stopping when signaled Shots were fired which resulted in the bus stopping and the fuel truck set on fire The fuel truck driver jumped out raced back to the pickup and escaped--44 Iranians on the bus were detained This had all taken place-rather rapidly - the operation was becoming more complex but these contingencies had been foreseen and planned for As the site filled uo b20000 an ac been rienced but was unfolding as planned Then it became apparent the helicopters were late but for reasons unknown at Desert One As the helicopters started arriving in separate elements concern increased that there would not be enough helicopters fuel or time remaining to continue beyond Desert One The setting in which all this took place was at best a difficult but manageable one The noise generated by 16 C-130 and 12 RH-53D engines made voice or radio communications difficult Personnel moving about Desert One were shadow omewhat fuzzy figures barely recognizeable i hen came the unfortunate accident when Helicopte crasne into a while repositioning to allow another helicopter to take on more fuel for the return flight to NIMITZ - As complex and difficult as the Desert One scenario 1 had no een fully rehearsed A training exercise conducted on 13 l4 April with two nd four 3-535 was used to validate the esert One concept Perhaps because the scope and complexity of Desert One was not replicated in a full-dress rehearsal the plan for this desert rendezvous was soft There was no identifiable command post for the on-scene commander runners were not anticipated backup 5ch audios were not available until the third C- arrive and 'lastly key personnel and those with critical functions were not identified for ease of recognition 78 0- For example when the Desert One on-scene commander's name surfaced during post-mission interviews with heli- copter pilots they stated that in some cases that they did not know or recognize the authority of those giving orders at Desert One In this regard instructions to evacuate helicopters and board the C-lB s had to be questioned to determine the identity of those giving the orders to establish their proper authority JTF Rationale The overriding concern for OPSEC played heavily in the JTF's decision not to fully rehearse the Desert One scenario Moreover the JTF apparently believed that desert operations had been practiced sufficiently and that although there were technical differences in the refueling a full rehearsal was not justified With regard to identification members of the JTF by their own testimony were confident that personal recognition between the key players was adequate to facilitate command and control at Desert One SEQ Alternative The review group concluded that the uncertainties conducting a clandestine operation in a hostile environment argued for the striCtest adherence to doctrinal command and control procedures The on scene and functional commanders their alternates and personnel of every key function should have been des with readily identifiable markings visible 1 artificial or natural light This would as ea everyone on the scene to easily identify and quickly seek out responsible authorities for guidance when contingencies arose and to immediately recognize the authority of those giving orders or direction The lack of effective command and control became evident when the helicopter flight leader did not arrive first as scheduled at Desert One There was no way to quickly find out or locate who was in charge when the on-scene commander happened to be away from his radio to consult with others his radio operator broadcast that the RH-SB and the C-136 had collided Unfortunately the transmission was incomplete and no call si L Thi res 1ted in several blind radio calls n an attempt to find out what he ne and ere hese unnecessary transmissions blocked out other radio calls 79 The on-scene commander's principal location should have been fixed and easily recognized An alternate or second in command and runners to carry orders should have been available and identifiable Armbands or some other easily recognizable device would have had to have been fabricated for the identification of key personnel and their agents In addition backup communications should have been carried on both the first and-second to insure reliable and secure communications from Desert One as soon as possible Lastly although not central to the command and control issue a full-dress training exercise at a comparable desert training site could'well have surfaced some of these problems see Issue 5 Im lications The review group's alternative - woul have re uce confusion and accelerated information flow at Desert One Equally important it would have virtually eliminated the disconnects that surfaced when principals such as the helicopter flight commander arrived last and the Deputy Commander for Helicopter Forces aborted Evaluation Although the proposed alternative would have smoothed Desert One operations it would not have influenced the outcome Nevertheless it is a significant lesson learned for application to future operations II I ISSUE 22 U Classified material safeguard JTF guidance called for pilots crews an operators to return their helicopters and wwa NIMITZ taking appropriate action to protect classified pd material The plan proved infeasible when one helicopter crashed into a C-l36 resulting in fire casualties and an overall hazardous situation The on-scene commander decided to withdraw the entire force by the remaining C-l3 aircraft as soon as possible leaving the five ma ed helicopters at Desert One Two of the helicopters located in the southern refuel zone were properly sani ized of classified material by the dividuals responsible The other three helicopters were located in the northern refuel zone in close prox1m1 within 166-150 feet to the crash and fire Personnel responsible for the classified material and radio equipment in those heli ters attempted to return to them to remove documents# but were told to immediately board or cases reboard the C-13 s to expedite withdrawal Failure to sanitize the helic 055 and com romise of classifieThere is no ev1 - commander was aware that classified material was being left behind Event In the event of mission abort at Desert One FEQ JTF Rationale JTF guidance coupled with military SOP and training appeared sufficient to provide for adequate protection of classified The decision by the Desert One on-scene comm expe withdrawal of personnel by the remaining C-136 aircraft was made in the interest of troop safety to protect remaining assets and to minimize risk of detection Alternative The review group's alternative would have been to refine command and control procedures at Desert One to assure adherence to provisions of the JTF plan for handling of classified material see Issue 21 Emu Im lications An attempt to return to the helicopters and to sanitize them could have cost additional lives and increased the risk of discovery and of damage to the escape aircraft However the helicopters were not destroyed there remained a requirement to protect classified material and a period in excess of 23 minutes was available to sanitize the helicopters I - a El a i Evaluation The loss of classified ad no direct impact on the success 0 this mission However such loss reflects unfavorably on the performance of the personnel involved Their actions resulted in ossible enemy exploitation of sensitive including its use for propaganda ends 82 ISSUE 23 U Destruct devices on rescue mission helicopters 36% Event Helic0pter #6 developed mechanical problems an to te to Desert One and land in the desert short I of destination new I I helicopter destruction were no accident and ensuing conflagration at Desert One pre- vented the on scene commander from implementing the heli- copter destruction plan because he perceived it to be too risk As a result five RH-53Ds were abandoned intact CTS JTF Rationale In planning the rescue mission I it was envisioned that helicopters abandoned in Iran would be sanitized and left intact Planners believed that destroying the helicopters presented a greater risk of I mission compromise if executed prior to withdrawal and an - unnecessary complication and delay during evacuation at the extraction site As planning proceeded an cption to I destroy the helicoPters in Iran should a contingency situation warrant was considered This contingency called for 0 place thermite grenades in the helicOpters destruction was called_for and then to detonate - them This option was never implemented at Desert One because of the perceived danger of exploding helicopters and ammunition to personnel and aircraft evacuating the site and to Iranians aboard a nearby bus Alternative The review group believes it prudent to have etailed plans for contingency destruction of equipment in missions similar to the Iranian rescue Providing the option for contingency destruction is most important when the equipment is to be abandoned in a hostile country There is good reason to believe such explosives when prOperly installed are no more dangerous to crew and passengers than the onboard fhel supply Moreover explosives for use in destroying the helicopters and breaching the Embassy had to be carried aboard several if not all helicopters to insure availability Therefore it is a moot point as to what explosives were carried onboard and where they were placed On at least one previous rescue mission Son Tay explosives for heliCOpter self-destruction were placed onboard at the outset The helicopter to be abandoned was fitted with explosives and detonators Electrical initiators were placed apart from the explosives and the electrical leads left disconnected Aircrew members destroyed the helicopter when necessary by simply connecting the initiator to the explosives and activating a built-in timing device With regard to aircrew reluctance to have 83 -3 3e 'point in the mission similar devices to the ones used in the Son Tay raid aboard their helicopters Iranian-mission aircrews interviewed stated that this procedure was acceptable to them Moreover they admitted that most explosives were less of a danger than other hazardous material carried on-board mission helicopters e fuel 9 I PEG Equipping rescue mission helicopters with easily removable separated and disconnected explosive devices and initiators should not have jeopardized safety and would have enhanced the ability to destroy helicopters at any FTSJ Implications negative implications of the group s proposal are nil Aircrews would have had to have been trained to connect and operate the destruct devices planned for use cooters There was ample thme available at to accomplish this training Fli sa ave been compromised On the positive side the pr could have hated - the requirement to have explosives reduced res u r an ime option to destroy helicopters at any point in the mission Thus the group's alternative would have enabled Helicopter #6'5 crew to destroy their aircraft in the desert if called for and could have provided greater opportunity to destroy all helicopters-abandoned at Desert One CEGQ Evaluation Equipping helicopters with destruct devices would not have altered the circumstances that ultimately led to aborting the rescue mission however the lack of destruct capability severely limited the Desert One on-scene commander's ability to execute destruction when an unforeseen contin en 54 U Summer of Major Issues U Of the 23 issues analyzed ll were considered to be major issues ones that had a identifiable influence on the outcome of the hostage rescue effort or that should receive the most careful consideration at all levels in planning for any future special operation While the other 12 issues are not accorded the same priority they do reflect valuable lessons learned To provide a reference for the subsequent conclusions the ll major issues are listed below U 0932 U Independent review of plans Or anization command an control and the applicability of U Comprehensive readiness evaluation U Size of the helicOpter force U Overall coordination of joint training U Command and control at Desert One U Centralized and integrated intelligence support external to the JTF U Alternatives to the Desert One site U Handling the dust phenomenon U C-l30 pathfinders 85 IV CONCLUSIONS U The conclusions drawn in this chapter derive from the determination of fact presented in Chapter II and the analysis - of issues discussed in Chapter SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS U The conce of a small clandestine Operation was valid and consistent with national ob'ectives U The review group concludes that the concept of a small clandestine operation was sound A larger overt attempt would probably have resulted in the deaths of the hostages before they could be reached It offered the best chance of getting the hostages out alive and the least danger of starting a war with Iran Further the large-scale military thrust required by an overt operation would have triggered early hostile reaction possibly resulting in widespread Iranian casualties and giving strong credence to probable Iranian allegations that the rescue attempt was an act of war Conversely a small operation with Iranian casualties essentially limited to the act of freeing the hostages WOuld have better supported the contention that it - was a rescue not a punitive raid U The Operation was feasible and probably represented the clan with the best chance of success at the time the mission' was launched U Despite all the complexities the inherent difficulties and the human and equipment performance required the review-group unanimously concludes that the risks were manageable the overall probability of success good and the operation feasible Under these conditions decision to execute was justified Ohio The plan for the unexecuted portion of the mission was soundly conceived and capable of successful execution It appeared to be better than other alternatives--a realistic option with the best chance success at the time of mission execution Based upon b 0 31-53 and a comparison I wi a ces 0 er nations it_ low appears that selection training and equipment of 86 the ground rescue forces were excellent U The group believes it virtually impossible to precisely appraise the remaining part of the operation and to measure probability of success During that portion of the mission the inevitability of hostile reaction would have become a major factor The dynamics inherent in a recovery of the type envisioned would have produced a level of complexity that makes the study of probabilities essentially a matter of conjecture U The rescue mission was a high-risk eration U The mission had to be considered high risk because people and equipment were being called upon - to perform at the upper limits of human capacity and equip- ment capability There was little margin to compensate for mistakes or plain bad luck furthermore possible measures to reduce the high risk factor could conceivably introduce new elements of risk For example the arr considered that adding more helicopters and crews to improve the chances of having more mega-oh i helicopters available en route would result in an unnecessary an 1 increase in the OPSEC risk A delay in ex add trainin b 5 18-53 1-54 -55 i U The first realistic capability to- successfully accomplish the rescue of the hostages was reached at e the end of March 3' w ck 137 Confidence in the probability of mission success grew after the final training exercise in the western United States With the possible exception of several items L of cmunications equipment essentially all mechanical means used in the rescue operation- helicopters aircraft and ecial equipment-were available on 4 November 1979 6 7- 8'7 wax 2 we C4 U OPSEC was an overriding requirement for a successful operation U Rescue depended upon surprising the captors in the Embassy compound before the hostages could be harmed If this surprise could not be achieved the mission would fail--either canceled or aborted with high probability of the hostages being removed or executed Further recognizing the importance of the element of surprise the group is reluctant to criticize even constructively the OPSEC standards for being too strict as secrecy was successfully preserved until after the withdrawal of the aircraft from Iran U Nevertheless throughout the planning and execution phases decisions were made and actions taken or not taken because of OPSEC that the group believed could have been done differently Furthermore most if not all of the suggested alternatives could have been implemented without an adverse OPSEC impact had there been a more precise OPSEC plan developed early after the formation-of the JTF organization and with specific responsibilities assigned U Command and control was excellent at the upper echelons but became more tenuous and fragile at the intermediate levels U The command and control arrangements at the higher echelons from the NCA through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to COMJTF were ideal Further down the operational chain command relationships were less well defined and not as well understood V g Several examples of shortcomings in the organization are ident during both preparatory and execution phases No one person except for COMJTP had overall responsi- existed for the helicOpters and pilots during their very on - difficult training period Some Service component commanders were only vaguely identified Finally while Operational commanders were designated there appear to have been inadequate provisionS to make them clearly identifiable under the foreseeable conditions of darkness noise and dust at Desert One The on-scene commander had no designated staff to assist in maintaining command and control nor was a command post planned and clearly defined to other members of the force I - i Cy I i - helic ers being available at each stage RH-S3Ds with crews could have been deployed to wi out crowding or impacting other mission I fr - my U External resources adequately supported the JTF and were not a limiting factor U The effectiveness of the special supply system for the helicopters was commendable especially considering the problems imposed by OPSEC U Plannin was ad ate exceot for the number of backu helico ers and the rovisIons for weather contingencie g helicopters aboard NIMITZ would have increased the chances of the required number of Up bk 6iz a requirements of the carrier and without a reduction in PSEC The use of C-130 aircraft to lead the REP53D flight to Desert One would have decreased the probability of a mission abort due to the weather c-13o pathfinder RH-SBDs could have been-added to the mission wit equiring additional fuel at Desert One U Preparation for the mission was adequate except for the lack of comprehensive full-scale training - U OPSEC considerations militated against such a rehearsal and while the review group recognized the inherent risk in bringing all of the forces together in the western Us training site the possible security disadvantages of such a rehearsal seem to be outweighed by the advantages to be gained Increasing familiarity of element leaders with one another both during the operation and in the ensuing debriefing critique U Exposing the command and control relationships to the pressures of a full-scale combination of airplanes helicopters troOps and vehicles maneuvering in the crowded parking area under the confusing conditions of noise dust and darkness U Two factors combined to directl cause the mission abort Unex ected helico ter failure rate and low visibilit flight conditions en route to Desert One If the dust phenomenon had not occurred Helicopter' #5 would have arrived'at Desert One or if one more heli- copter had remained up six would have arrived at Desert One despite the dust U There were alternatives available that would have reduced the probability of an abort due to these factors and they have been discussed in detail in terms of planning In John-J Following promotion to Vice Admiral and duty as Deputy Commander in Chief Atlantic and 0 3 Atlantic Fleet he returned to command at sea in May 1972 as Commander U S Seventh Fleet For directing Seventh Fleet operations in the Vietnam War and particularly the highly successful Navy air operations from May 1972 to August 1973 and the strategically important mine warfare operations in North Vietnam Vice Admiral Holloway was awarded his third Distinguished Service Medal On'l September 1973 he was promoted to Admiral and became Vice Chief of Naval Operations the post he held until assuming the Navy's top uniformed position on 1 July 1974 Admiral Holloway was born in Charleston South Carolina on February 23 'l922 the son of Admiral James L Holloway Jr U S navy Retired and the late Jean Hagood Holloway He is married to the former Dabney Bawlings the daughter of Rear Admiral Horhorne L Rawlings Retired and Mrs Rawlings of washington D C The Holloways have two daughters Lucy Holloway Lyon and Jane Meredith Holloway 5-4 LIEUTENANT GENERAL SAMUEL v WILSON UNITED STATES ARMY BET Lieutenant General Samuel V Wilson served as the Director Defense Intelligence Agency from May 1976 until his retirement from the Army on 1 September 1977 General Wilson has had extensive experience in uncon- ventional warfare and special Operations planning and execution and has a broad background in both the intelligence field and in international affairs He enlisted in the Army in June 1940 and served as a platoon sergeant with the 116th Infantry 29th Division Following OCS graduation he was commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant in the United States Army on-17 August 1942 and assigned to the Infantry School as an instructor in small unit and guerrilla tactics Sub- sequently he joined the para-military ranks of the 088 and then participated in extensive behind-the-lines combat in the China-Burma-India Theater as an intelligence and recon- naissance officer and later rifle_company commander in the 5307th Composite Unit Provisional Merrill's Marauders Following world War II Captain Wilson taught military leadership at the Infantry School for two yearsIr and from there entered the Army's four-year Foreign Area Specialist Training Program Russian graduating in the summer of 1951 He has lived studied and traveled extensively throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Throughout the period from 1951 to 1958 Major Wilson served in a variety of special operations and intelligence assignments including a three-year operational tour with the Central Intelligence Agency In 1959 Lieutenant Colonel Wilson became Director of Instruction of the Army's Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg North Carolina He commanded a unit of 7th Special until Forces Group Airborne at Fort Bragg in 1961 before being called later in that year to appointment as Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations a capacity in which he served until 1963 Extensive staff and command duties in the counterinsurgency area followed and he served as Army component commander in a number of joint airborne exercises He was accorded the personal rank of Minister in the US Foreign Service in 1966 while serving as the U S Mission Coordinator in Vietnam He commanded the 6th Special Forces Group Airborne from 1967 to 1968 and was Special Assistant to the Commanding General 0 8 Army JFK Center for Special warfare at Fort Bragg North Carolina between 1968 and 1969 He served subsequently as Director Military Assistance School and as the Assistant Commandant of the Army Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg In 1970 General Wilson became Assistant Division Commander 82nd Airborne Division where he served until February 1971 He was then assigned as the US Defense Attache US Army Attache Moscow USSR where he served until March 1973 Thereafter followed duty with the Defense Intelligence Agency first as Deputy Director for Estimates and then as Deputy Director for Attache Affairs In September 1974 he was appointed to the post of Deputy Director Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community washington D C where he served until his assignment in May 1976 as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency General Wilson's military decorations and awards include the Distinguished Service Cross Defense Distinguished Service Medal Army Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal CIA Distinguished Intelligence Medal Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster Bronze Star Medal for Valor with Oak Leaf Cluster Meritorious Service Medal Joint Services Commendation Medal Army Commendation Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster Combat Badge and Master Parachutist Badge He is a graduate of the Army's Infantry School Advanced Course the Army's Command and General Staff College and the Air War College and was awarded an honorary Doctor of Laws degree in 1979 from Hampden Sydney College in Virginia General Wilson was born in Prince Edward County Virginia on September 23 1923 He is married to the former Frances Brenda Downing of Lee County Alabama The Wilson's have four children Samuel V Jr a US Army Major Susan V Jackson B and David J M He was promoted to the grade of Lieutenant General on 4 October 1974 3-6 - r 'fTAB LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEROY J MANOR UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RET Lieutenant General LeRoy J Manor served as the Chief of Staff US Pacific Command from 12 October 1976 until his retirement from the Air Force on 1 July 1978 Following retire- ment he represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPAC as senior military negotiator and advisor to the US Ambassador to the Philippines for the Military Bases Agreement MBA Amendments to the MBA were agreed upon and signed subsequently by both Govern- ments Born in Morrisonville N Y on February 21 1921 General Manor graduated in 1937 from Cadyville High School Cadyville N Y and then received his Teacher's Certificate from New York State Normal School in 1940 General Manor entered aviation cadet training in November 1942 and received his pilot wings and commission upon graduation in August 1943 During werld War II he flew 72 combat missions as a P-47 pilot with the 358th Fighter Group in Europe and was later assigned to the 100th Fighter Wing also in EuroPe In September 1945 General Manor was assigned as a pilot at the Air Proving Grounds Fla He attended New York University during 1946 47 and received a bachelor of science degree in education For the next six years General Manor was an instructor first at Tactical Air School Tyndall Air Force Base next at the newly formed Squadron Officer School Maxwell Air Force Base and last at the Air-Ground Operations School southern Pines N c From September l953 to June 1955 General Manor was a staff officer with the 6th Allied Tactical Air Force NATO at Izmir Turkey He returned in July 1955 to assume command of the 2242d Air Reserve Flying Center at Selfridge Air Force Base Mich 3-7 General Manor entered the Armed Forces Staff College in July 1958 Upon graduation he was assigned to the 27th Tactical Fighter Wing Cannon Air Force Base New Mexico and commanded the 4313 Tactical Fighter Squadron In July 1960 General Manor transferred to Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe where he was Chief Tactical Evaluation Division until July 1963 when he entered the Industrial College of the Armed Forces In June 1964 General Manor was assigned to Headquarters US Air Force in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Operations where he served successively in the Directorate of Operations as Chief Plans and Capabilities Branch Chief Analysis of Southeast Asia Operations Study Group and as Chief Operations Review Group 'In May 1968 he assumed command of the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing in the Republic of Vietnam where he completed' 275 combat missions in North and South Vietnam In June 1969 he was named Commander of the 835th Air Division at McDonnell Air Force Base Kansas General Manor became Commander of the US Air Force Special Operations Force in February 1970 From August 8 1970 to November 1970 he additionally served as Commander of a joint task force whose mission was to search for and rescue United States military personnel held as prisoners of war at Son Tay North Vietnam In February 1971 General Manor became Deputy Director for Operations Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities Joint Staff at washington D C He was transferred to the Philippines in February 1973 to become Vice Commander 13th Air Force Pacific Air Forces at Clark Air Base He was 13th Air Force Commander from October 1973 until October 1976 when assigned duty as Chief of Staff Pacific Command General Manor is a command pilot with more than 6 500 flying hours His military decorations and awards include the Distinguished Service Medal with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster Distinguished Flying Cross with one Oak Leaf Cluster Air Medal with 25 Oak Leaf Clusters Air Force Commendation Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster Purple Heart Air Force Outstanding Unit Award Ribbon Republic of Vietnam Distinguished Service Order 2d Class Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Monor Medal Republic of Korea Order of Military Merit Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with palm Republic of Philippines Legion of Honor and Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal General Manor and his wife the former Dolores H Brookes of Schenectady N Y have three children Alan Mary and Dean He was promoted to the grade of lieutenant general on November 1 1976 with same date of rank l3 - Bitch TAB MAJOR GENERAL JAMES C SMITH UNITED STATES ARMY Major General James C Smith is the Director of Training Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans US Army General Smith was born in the 6th US Cavalry Regiment Fort Oglethorpe Catoosa County Georgia on 5 September 1923 and graduated from Chattanooga City High School Chatanooga Tennessee in 1941 He attended North Georgia College Dahlonega Georgia for six months and then withdrew to-enlist in the Army on 30 June 1942 General'Smith has'had broad combat experience encompassing infan- try armor air cavalry and airmobile units Be enlisted in the Army on 30 June 1942 and rose to the rank of sergeant before attending Officer Candidate School at the Cavalry School Fort Riley Kansas Commissioned a 2nd lieutenant on 14 January 1943 he saw combat with Third Army in Europe as a platoon leader in the 28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron As a result of serious wounds he was evacuated to England in 1945 He qualified as a liaison pilot in November 1946 and then returned to Europe as an Air Observation Pilot in his former combat unit He completed helicopter flight training in 1952 and was subsequently assigned to the Light Aviation Section Corps in Korea He has been at the forefront in the development of Army air mobility and served several tours in Vietnam with air cavalry and airmobile units General Smith's command experience is equally impressive Beginning in October 1945 he commanded an assault gun tank unit at the Cavalry School Fort Riley Kansas in 1949 command of Company 1 3rd Battalion 14th Armored Cavalry in 1950 command of company D Medium Tank Battalion Fort Hood Texas in 1955 command of the 3rd Combat Avia- tion Company Fort Benning Georgia in 1962 command of the 2nd Reconnaissance Squadron 11th Armored Cavalry in 1966 command of the Support Command Air Cavalry Divi- sion Airmobile command of the Squadron 9th Cavalry 1st Air Cavalry Division Airmobile and command of the Brigade Cavalry Division Airmobile in 1970 Commanding 3-10 gq-r - I Eucharist General US Army Flight Training Center Fort Stewart Georgia in 1971 Commanding General Cavalry Division TRICAP in 1973 Commanding General US Army Readiness Region V Fort Sheridan Illinois and in 1976 Commander US Army Aviation Center and Fort Rucker Alabama General Smith has attended the U S Army_Command and General Staff College the U S Army war College and the University of Omaha where he earned the Bachelor of General Education Degree in 1961 General Smith is a Master Army Aviator whose military decorations and awards include the Distinguished Service Medal Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster _Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster Distinguished Flying Cross with three Oak Leaf Clusters Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster Air Medal with 63 Oak Leaf Clusters Army Commendation Medal with Device Purple Heart with two Oak Leaf Clusters Viet- namese Cross of Gallantry with Palm Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Silver Star Presidential Unit Citation Korea Presidential Unit Citation Vietnam four Overseas Bars National Defense Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster European African Middle Eastern Campaign Medal WOrld a War II Victory Medal Army of Occupation Germany Medal Korean Service Medal with two Stars United Nations Service Medal American Campaign Medal Vietnamese Service Medal Vietnamese Campaign Medal Combat Badge Master Army Aviator Badge and Parachutist Badge General Smith is married to the former Doris June Lewis of Homestead Florida and has seven children Major General Smith was promoted to his present'grade on 10 March 1971 and assumed his current military assignment in December 1978 8-11 amsexgp - 5 I EST Link-rt TAB a MAJOR GENERAL JOHN L PIOTROWSKI UNITED STATES AIR FORCE Major General John L Piotrowski is deputy' commander for air defense Tactical Air Command Peterson Air Force Base Colo General Piotrowski was born February 17 1934 in Detroit and graduated from Henry Ford Trade School Dearborn Mich in l951 He attended Arizona State University and Florida State University and graduated from the University of Nebraska at Omaha in 1965 with a bachelor of science degree He_did postgraduate work at the University of Southern California and Auburn University and attended the program for management develop- ment at Harvard University He completed Air Command and Staff College Maxwell Air Force Base Ala in 1965 Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk r Va in August 1968 and Royal Air Force College of Air Warfare at Royal Air Force Station Manby England in July 1971 General Piotrowski enlisted in the US Air Force in September 1952 After basic training at Lacnland Air Force Base Texas he was assigned to Keesler Air Force Base Miss as a student in basic electronics and ground radar 'In July 1953 General Piotrowski transferred to Harlingen Air Force Base Texas for navigator training in the aviation cadet program After graduating with honors he was commis- sioned a 2nd lieutenant in August 1954 and returned to Keesler Air Force Base for advanced training in electronic countermeasures In January 1955 he received the electronic warfare rating and was assigned to the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing in Korea and Japan as an electronic warfare officer and RB-26 navigator 3-12 351 r'tz-g eiuorf' etsj'QJ He returned in May 1957 for pilot training at Marana Air Base Ariz Bainbridge Air Base Ga and Bryan Air Force Base Texas He then attended F-86F aircraft advanced gunnery training at Williams Air Force Base Ariz Following graduation he was assigned as armament and electronics maintenance officer at Williams and later at Luke Air Force Base Ariz In May 1961 he moved to Eglin Air Force Auxiliary Field 9 Fla and joined the initial cadre of Project Jungle Jim which became the let Air Commando Wing He was assigned in Southeast Asia from 1961 to 1963 as a munitions maintenance officer and combat aircrew member In August 1965 General Piotrowski transferred to the US Air Force Fighter Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base Nev and served as an F-4 instructor pilot chief of academics and project officer for the US Air Force operational test and evaluation of the WALLEYE missile program Following graduation from the Armed Forces Staff College in August 1968 he was assigned to Headquarters US Air Force Washington D C as an action officer under the deputy director of plans for force development From December 1970 to July 1971 he attended the Royal Air Force College of Air Warfare He was then assigned to Bitburg Air Base Germanyr as Deputy Commander for Operations 36th Tactical Fighter Wing In January 1972 he assumed command of the 40th Tactical Group Aviano Air Base Italy In April 1974 General Piotrowski became chief of the US Air Force Six-Man Group directly responsible to the Chief of Staff He became Vice Commander of the Keesler Technical Training Center Keesler Air Force Base in March 1975 In July 1976 General Piotrowski assumed command of the 552nd Airborne warning and Control Wing Tinker Air Force Base where he introduced the E-3A Sentry Airborne warning and Control System aircraft as an operational Air Force weapon system He assumed his present duties in September 1979 General Piotrowski is a command pilot with more than 100 combat missions and 210 combat flying hours His military decorations and awards include the Distinguished Service Medal Legion of Merit Meritorious Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters Air Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters Air Force Commendation Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster Presidential Unit Citation emblem and the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award ribbon with three Oak Leaf Clusters He received the Eugene M Zuckert Management Award for 1979 in December 1979 3-13 r-qgg ic' He was promoted to major general November 1Ir 1978 with date of rank July 1 1975 General Piotrowski is married to the former Sheila Dee Fredriokson of Racine Wis They have one daughter Denise Lynn and two sons Scott Lee and Jon Dee 8-14 rm MAJOR GENERAL ALFRED M GRAY JR UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS Major General Alfred M Gray is the Deputy for Development Director Development Center Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico Va is responsibilities include the development of new doctrine tactics techniques and equipment for landing forces in amphibious operations General Gray was born June 22 1928 and hails from Point Pleasant Beach N J He enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1950 and served overseas with the Amphibious Reconnaissance Platoon Fleet Marine Force Pacific attaining the rank of sergeant He was commissioned a 2nd lieutenant on April 9 1952 After joining the let Marine Division in Korea he served a tour as an artillery officer with the 2d Battalion Marines and a subsequent tour as an infantry officer with the let Battalion Seventh Marines Returning to the United States in December 1954 General Gray was assigned to the Eighth Marines 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune N C until August 1955 when he attended the Communications Officer School at Quantioo He was promoted to captain in July 1955 From April 1956 until May 1961 General Gray served overseas in special operations command billets in the Pacific and the Far East In May 1961 General Gray was assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps washington for duty as special Operations and plans officer Ge2-Division During this tour he saw service in Guantanamo Bay Cuba and in Vietnam where he commanded a compdsite force which became the first Marine ground unit to conduct independent operations in Vietnam He was promoted to major in February 1963 3-15 -- - Ling General Gray joined the 12th Marines 3d Marine Division in Vietnam in October 1965 serving concurrently as Regimental Communications Officer Regimental 8-3 Officer and Artillery Aerial Observer In April 1967 he was assigned command of the Composite Artillery Battalion and the US Free world Forces at Gio Linh In September 1967 he was reassigned to the Marine Amphibious Force in DaNang where he come manded Marine elements throughout I Corps He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in October 1967 In February 1968 he returned to Washington D C for duty with the Defense Special Projects Group as Chief Intelligence and Operations Division During the period June through Sept- ember 1969 General Gray returned to Vietnam in conjunction with surveillance and reconnaissance matters in the I Corps Area Returning to Ouantico in October 1969 he was assigned duty as Chief Intelligence and Reconnaissance Division at the De velopment Center until August 1970 He attended the Command and Staff College and then joined the 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune in June 1971 where he assumed command of the 1st Battalion Second Marines and Battalion Landing Team BLT 1 2 The BLT was deployed to the Mediterranean in September 1971 as part of the 34th Marine Amphibious Unit and returned to the US in March 1972 General Gray commanded the Second Marines from April through December 1972 when he was reassigned as Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 2nd Marine Division He was promoted to colonel in August 1972 General Gray attended the Army War College Carlisle Barracks from August 1973 to June 1974 and upon graduation was assigned to the 3rd Marine Division on' Okinawa as Commanding Officer Fourth Marines and Camp Commander Camp Hansen He later served as CO 33rd 9th MAB during the Southeast Asia evacv_tion operations Reassigned to HOMC in August 1975 he was assigned duty as Deputy Director Training and Education Division Manpower Depart- ment He was advanced to brigadier general on March 24 1976 and presided over a special study group on the Marine Corps Reserve until June 11 1976 when he was assigned duties as Commanding General Landing Force Training Command Atlantic and Commanding General 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade In this later capacity he commanded four major Marine air ground task force operations conducted on both flanks of NATO As CTF 403 his command responsibilities included units from seven NATO nations Under CJTF 122 at CINCLANT he was CTF 125 and COMMARPOR for CINCLANT contingency plans and joint exercises General Gray was advanced to his present grade with a date of rank of 1 April 1976 and assumed his current assignment at Ouantico in October 1973 3-16 MC SOURCES OF INFORMATION U 233 A U Documents U Primary Source Material U Official Government Statements Reports U Congressional Testimony U Office of Secretary of Defense Memorandum 0 Joint Staff Memorandums U Press Releases TAB 11 Interviews TAB U Demonstrations and On-Soene Visits U U U 1-81 -62 ozP TAB A DOCUMENTS Primary Source Material 1 U Special Operations Review Group Terms of Reference provided by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 28 May 1980 2 U Hostage Rescue OPLAN 3 U The Joint Chiefs of Staff After-Action Report Volumes I 4 U President Jimmy Carter Letter to Speaker of The U S House of Representatives Report in Accordance with the warpowers Resolution of 1973 Public Law 93-148 26 April 1980 Official Government Statements Reports S U Presidential Statement 0100 25 April 1980 6 U Presidential Statement 0700 25 April 1980 7 U Statement by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 25 April 1980 Congressional Testimony 8 Ed Notes of Testimony before the Senate Armed Services 1 00 I 9 BJ notes of TestimOn before the Senate Armed Services 10 U Notes of Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee by Colonel James H Kyle USAF 2 May 1980 ll U Notes of Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee by Colonel Charles D Beckwith USA 5 May 1980 12 Ed Notes of ommittee by 5 May 1980 Testimon before the Senate Armed Services 13- U Notes of Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee by Lieutenant General Philip C Gast USAF and Major General James B Vaught USA 5 May 1980 l bl -612 I 14 U Notes Committee and Major of Testimony before the House Armed Services by Lieutenant General Philip C Gast USAF General James B Vaught USA 6 May 1980 15 U Notes Committee of Testimony before the Senate Armed Services by Major General James B Vaught USA 7 May 1980 16 UK Notes of Testimony before the Senate Armed Services ommittee by Lieutenant General Philip C Gast USAF Major General James B Vaught USA Colonel J- as H Kyle USAF Colonel Charles D Beckwith USA bk 02X L Char es H Pitman USMC Lieutenant Colonel Edward R Seiffert USMC as a group 7 May 1980 and testifying NJ Notes of Testimony before the House Armed Services plonel James H le on 23 May 1980 May 1980 U Office of the Secretary of Defense Memorandums 19 U Assistant Secretary of Defense Public Affairs Memorandum Iranian Aircraft Incidents 29 April 1980 20 U Assistant Secretary of Defense Comptroller Cost Estimates for Hostage Rescue Operations 21 May 1980 U Joint Staff Memorandums 21 U Rescue Force Personnel to Visit Washington 3 May 1980 22 U Response to Senate Armed Services Committee Request Organizational Chart of the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission and information on the eight helicopters used in the hostage rescue mission 5 May 1980 23 U In Response to Congressional Queries 6 May 1980 24 U Comments on New York Times Story by Richard Burt 6 May 1980 25 U JCS Public Affairs Guidance 6 May 1980 Iran Rescue MiSSion rt 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 U Response to'Congressional Query on Hostage Rescue Mission 7 May 1980 U Helicopter Navigational Equipment 8 May 1980 U Awards for-Personnel Who Participated in the Hostage Rescue Attempt 8 May 1980 U Helicopter Performance During Training and Rehearsals for the Hostage Rescue Attempt in Iran 8 May 1980 U Request for Cost Estimate of Iranian Rescue Effort from Senator Ernest P Hollings 8 May 1980 a U Helicopter Maintenance Records 12 May 1980 U Response to Query'on Hostage Rescue Mission from House Appropriations Committee 12 May 1980 U Questions of SECDHF curing Appearance before Senate Armed Services Committee on 8 May 1980 13 May 1980 U Map Chart Classification 13 May 1980 U Questions of CJCS and SECDEF during Appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee 13 May 1980 U Questions of SECDEF during Appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee 14 May 1980 U OSD Questions Concerning Rescue Attempt in Iran 15 May 1980 U Request for Information on the Hostage Rescue Attempt in Iran 16 May 1980 U The New York Times Query concerning a map related to the Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt 16 May 1980 U Response to Query on Hostage Rescue Mission House Appropriations Committee 16 May 1980 U The Washington Star Query Concerning the Iran Hostage Rescue ATtempt 17 May 1980 U Talker and Backgrounder on Intelligence Support to the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requests 17 May 1980 61 1 040 11 L 43 U Comments on Army Times article of 19 May 1980 undated - rhi la'ii 44 3KUJ Notes Taken During Interv1ews by Senator Warner and Senate Armed Services Committee Staff Personnel 19 May 1980 45 Notes Taken During Interviews Senate Armed Services Committee Staff Personnel ay 1980 46 U Request for Cost Senator Hollings' 1980 21 May 1980 letter of 6 May 47 U Cost Associated With Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt 21 May 1980 48 U Inserts for the Record for Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 7 May 1980 21 May 1980 49 U Congressional Request for Information Concerning Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt 22 May 1980 50 U Inserts for the Record for Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee 22 May 1980 51 U Possible Compromise of Classified Information Regarding the Hostage Rescue Attempt 23 May 1980 52 U Senate Armed Services Committee Request for Information Concerning Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt 23 May 1980 53 U Response to Query on Hostage Rescue Mission House Appropriations Committee 23 May 1980 54 U Helicopter Comparability 23 May 1980 55 U Possible Compromise of Classified Information Regarding the Hostage Rescue Attempt 27 May 1980 56 U Query from Congressman Wright's Office 27 May 1980 57 0 Query from Lisa Myers of The Washington Star 28 May 1980 U Query from Congressman Levitas's Office 4 June 1980 U Questions on Rescue 9 June 1980 I U Press Releases 60 61 62 63 64 67 68 69 70 U News Conference by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and General David C Chairman JCS 25 April 1980 U Transcript of Backgrounder Brief by Lieutenant General John S Pustay USAF 26 April 1980 U Transcript of Face The Nation CBS Television Guest Harold Brown Secretary Defense 27 April 1980 U Press Release Casualties from Rescue Operations in Iran 28 April 1980 U News Conference by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and General David C Jones USAF Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 29 April 1980 U News Conference by Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas 8 Ross 1 May 1980 U Address by Admiral Thomas a Hayward USN Chief of Naval Operations 1 Hay 1980 - U News Conference by Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas 8 Ross 6 May 1980' U Department of Defense Executive Summary of Hostage Rescue Attempt transmitted by Secretary of Defense letter 6 May 1980 U ress Interview Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 8 May 1980 U Backgrounder on Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission by Major General James B Vaught USA 12 May 1980 InI'l 10 11 12 13 14 yearns TAB INTERVIEWS BY DATE U U General David C Jones USAF Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 30 May 1980 U Major General Charles W Dyke USA Vice Director for Operations Joint Staff 30 May 1980 U Lieutenant General Philip C Gast USAF Deputy Commander Joint Task Force 30 May 1980 - U Major General James B Vaught USA Commander Joint Task Force 30 May 1980 U Admiral James D Watkins USN Vice Chief of Naval Operations 2 June 1980 U General Robert H Barrow USMC Commandant of the Marine Corps 2 June 1980 U General Lew Allen Jr USAF Chief of Staff US Air Force 2 June 1980 U General Edward C Myer USA Chief of Staff US Army 2 June 1980 U Colonel Charles D Beckwith USA Commander Delta Force 3 June 1980 U Colonel James M Perryman USMC Project Menage for 5-46 FHA-261 naval Air Systems Command 3 June 1980 U Commander Arne 8 Bruflat USN Deputy Projett Menage for 3-53 Pun-261 Naval Air Systems Command 3 June 1980 U Captain Wayne Purser USAF Airlift and Special Operations Division XOOTA Directorate of Operations and Readiness Headquarters USAF 3 June 1980 U Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Varnon USA Combat DlViSlon Requirements Directorate Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Readiness USA 3 June 1980 U Lieutenant Colonel Charles Densford USA Aviation Systems Division DAMA-WSA Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Research Development and Acquisition Usa 3 June 1980 C Colonel James H Kyle USAF Operations Joint Task Force Deputy Commander for at 4 June 1980 Mia 0 Lieutenant General Leroy Manor Son ray Rescue Operation USAF aet 1 Commander Briefing on Son Tay 6 June 196 0 Lieutenant General Philip D Shutler csnc DireCtor Operations Joint Stair 9 June 1980 U- U Admiral Stanstielo warmer USN iRet Director Central Intelligence 10 June 1960 01 Joint meeting with all task force and subordinate Commanders 16 June 1980 U Admiral Thomas B Hayward 16 June 1980 USN Chic of Naval Operatizzs We H 1 I - UL'vii TAB DEMONSTRATIONS AND ou scm VISITS BY DATE U l U Tapes cf Comand N61 recorded abcard the USS NIMITZ 2 June 1980 wb a h u u at lost 43 @253 63aux- DI- 1- 0-3 J IF- I 0-2 6 99 - d' - #64 321 0 I - 0 OJ - fl 3 a l L an Q m ll 1 - 34 I r - 1 SE1 1 5 L 35335 r Tab A Tab Tab ANNEX HELICOPTER FORCE SIZE U U JTF Analysis of Helicopter_Requirements U Helicopter Reliability Figures U JTP HelicOpter Special Miasion Training Elan 21 November 1979 - 15 April 1980 0 rE Pgwt' nu ANNEX HELICOPTER FORCE SIZE U The basis for the numbers of helicopters used on the rescue mission has received special emphasis inasmuch as the mission was aborted on the morning of 25 April 1980 because the number'of 93-5313 helicopters available to proceed was less than required I 1- Q5 um a 1 44 duo was '2 i' l- a 1'11-3 1-- - -- 5-3 I - - - - Maw 00in Argt p 1 'a-ul' I 5' 3H L 100% 80 1 60 40' 20- 0 FLIGHT TIME IUI FIGURE E-1 TYPICAL HISTOGRAM 0F MALFUNCTIONS AS A FUNCTION OF FLIGHT TIME V333 I al It um-nu rt - 1 ab lxail '11 11nut-r- I 1-4 - i Ina Ii 1 1 Mgry- - - a ww d - - auw wa I -- I - - - th MO 341n -131 1 11 - Ijhin - 3 lm-lai-I The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that eight helicopters aboard NIMITZ represented greater risk than perceived by mission planners and reviewers However the JTF planners and Joint Chiefs of Staff were led to believe the risks of mechanical failure were lower than actual This coupled with their concern for OPQEC appeared to have influenced their decisions to rely on eight helicoPters Whether or not additional RH-S3Ds would have compromised OPSEC and thus prematurely aborted the rescue attempt is conjecture and cannot be quantified fliJ On balance it appears that the certainty of higher- risk resulting from too few helicopters might have outweighed the uncertainty of compromise that a larger helicopter force was feasible and that if provided the larger force could most likely have allowed the mission to continue to its final phases f k l sue TAB A JTF ANALYSIS OF HELICOPTER REQUIREMENTS U I U JTF Pre Mission Analysis of Helicoyter Requirements II U JTF Post-Mission Assessment of HelicoPter Force Adequacy 1-0 I I 1 ASALYS HELICOPTER I U Purpose To discus and maintainability RAE 3i 33 ai Daza availability 61 0 10 000 Dr n-l nah-UH - -l4 E- nu-i I - ru J 1I IUI II JTF POST-MISSION ASSESSMENT OF HELICOPTER ACEQUACY a I U Puroose To access the adequacy of the number of helicopters positioned for the mission II U Background l-1S 121 U Main Poi ts Ill-tall ah 93 - in 4 emailit gig'1 sz Egan-l W 1109 1 12 5 U1 Heliconter Assessment Summary of RH-SJD helzcopters pLanned for the that 1-71 HI I H- Anon- 9 - i I 'b'tiu Figure Figure -Figure Figure Figure 2-5 0 3-6 a E-B 4m TAB HELICOPTER RELIABILITY FIGURES Expected Number of RH-SJD To Arrive Extraction Site Given Eight RH-053D Are Programmed To Launch From NIMITZ Probability of At Least Five RE-53D Reaching Extraction Site Given Six Seven Eight or Nine Are Programmed To Launch From NIMITZ Probability of At Least Five RH-SBD Arrive At Destination as a Fraction of Time Given Eight RB-SSD Take Off Probability of At Least Five RH-53D Arrive At Destination as a Fraction of Time Given Seven RH-53D Take Off Probability of Having At Least Five RH-SBD Arrive Extraction Site Given Six or Five Depart Desert One E-ZO hula-IR dais all-Haunts 1 FF I J fwd In 1 22%- L - 11 kli I i f FIGURE 5-5 5-21 LUHL um 2 a 11 @117 khfal 1i -H 2111- min- - - - Jig 41 - 4r 41 1 -1- H - -- - th 1 ''31 a pm-n- Lil an Ir tu hlxwi 35hm qu bow it Imcwm mm ll Hum Waumw mmom mm manur as 40 1 wwcaxz AV rJ i I in if 42 4 I - If a U Training objectives for JTF helo det were determined to be 1 0 Mission planning execution 2 U Update of intelligence data 3 U Augmented navigation systems 1 PINS 2 Omega 4 U HaXimize proficiency on NVG utilization _ 5 U Maximize proficiency on low leVel night navigation 3-30 5 1 000 b H Aircrews were trained to a satisfactory minimum standard - when all crews met that standard then the standard was raised This training period was designed to raise the standard c U The specific objectives were devouted to the following areas E-3 2 Bili- U Section landings at remote sites 2 U Augmented nav system refresher 3 U Extended flight prefile 4 U Hep interpretation and terrain analysis Ma r z 3133 19M 4X 1 a b 4flUT' Emphasis upon training objectives focused toward a wider area of tactical training to include the following areas U Terrain flight TERF techniques Day VFR 2 U TERF Navigation Day VFR 4 U Qualify all aircrews in inflight air refueling 5 U Remain proficient in NVG night navigation techniques E-34 pilots' a-dngT Training emphasis was focused upon improving tactical skills encompassing all possible problems situation which might arise Training was conducted during daylight hours and involved the following areas of instruction 1 U Day TERF trng 2 U In-flight aerial refueling day night all ewe 3-3 5 FA Hut-I a b l Ma she i i i Au nun - Training objectives were designed to increase Ground training was conducted to enhance already established proficiency levels and skills no mission potential for the helb det E-36 va- 5w - has 4 1 I 1M7 - d U training 1 2 3 b Maggi The following items were fit objectives for final U Night navigation 8V5 utilizatien U Augment nav system utilization U NVG foxnation review remote landings 3-37 i ANNEX GLOSSARY b l du t lfl yo aircraft 6 AFB Air Force Base l'f J 3 Air Force Studies and Analysis Division AGL above ground level i amplitude modulation AM Forces in being which have been placed under the operational command or oper- ational control of a commander Assigned Forces Air Weather Service US Air Force BZM Blade Inspection Method I command control -and communications C3 Lockheed HERCULES cargo transport aircraft C-l30 Crisis Action System GAS Icombat Control Team CEOI Communications-Electronics Operating Instruction CH-4S Boei g-Verto1 SEA KNIGHT assault helicopter P-l CH-47 cu sa CIA cxuc CINCAD CINCLANT CINCMAC CINCPAC CINCSAC CJCS COMBAT TALON COMJTF COMNAVAIRLANT COMSEC CONPLAN CONUS CT IA DNA DOD Boeing-Vertol CHINOOK passenger cargo helicOpter US Army H-SJ assault helicopter equipped primarily for movement of cargo personnel US Marine Corps Central Intelligence Agency commander of unified or specified command Commander in Chief AerOSpace Defense Command' Commander in Chief Atlantic Commander in Chief Military Airlift Command Commander in Chief Pacific Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Commander Counterterrorist Joint Task Force aircraft Commander Joint Task Force Commander Naval Air-Forces Atlantic Fleet communications security operation plan in concept format continental United States counterterrorist Counterterrorist Joint Task Force Director of Central Intelligence Defense Intelligence Agency direct maintenance man-hours flight-hour Defense Nuclear Agency Department of Defense DR dead reckoning electronic warfare Federal Aviation Agency 1 FL '3 FAA 13 FM H-3 3-53 IMC INS IR ITF forward- looking infrared frequency modulation Sikorsky SEA KING helicopter Sikorsky SEA STALLION heavy-lift helicopter HLZ helicopter landing zone high frequency 3-3 search and rescue helicopter 3-53 search and rescue helicopter US Air Force instrument meteorological conditions Inertial Navigation System 'infrared Intelligence Task Force Intelligence Directorate wk m o WONG 67 evasive maneuvering - an J-3 Operations Directorate JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Task Force A force composed of assigned or attached elements of two or more Services which is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan JTF Joint Task Force knot s MC mission capable MC-130 C-130 aircraft modified for Special Operations Forces missions COMBAT TALON MCAS Marine Corps Air Station MHZ megahertz NARF Naval Air Rework Facility NAS Naval Air Station NCA Iational Command Authorities nm nautical miles NMCC National Military Command Center NMCM not mission capable--maintenance NMCS not mission capable- supply NVG night-vision goggle OJC Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - Operation and Maintenance Operational Those functions of command involving the Command composition of subordinate forces the assignment of tasks the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission Operational command should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through their responsible commanders or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational command It does not include such matters as administration discipline internal organization and unit training except when a subordinate commander requests assistance The term is synonymous with operational control and is uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by the commanders of unified and specified commands over assigned forces in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 as amended and revised lo u s c 124 OPSEC operations security Mm KG ait Palletized Inertial Navigation System if RAM reliability availability and maintainability RH-53 5-53 airborne mine countermeasures helicopter US Navy F-S 1SEA STALLION sin v15 1 US Navy 3-53 helicopter sea air land unit US Navy signals intelligence T SIGSEC signals security 50F Special Operations Forces SOP standing operating procedure s Support The action of a force which aids protects complements or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action TAC Tactical Air Command TACAN tactical air navigation system TALON COMBAT TALON Task Force 1 A temporary grouping of units under one commander formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission 2 a semipermanent organization of units under one commander for the pur- pose of carrying out a continuing specific task TERF terrain flight TFR terrain-following radar takeoff This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu