stamp 48 stamp MFA USSR USA Subm No 1978 No 2 11 July 1978 No stamp CC CPSU 78 2 1 Subject to return to tbe General Department CC handwritten THE USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS GROMYKO A A basic eleinentts of Attachment tbe letter mentioned above on 8 to tbe addressee and to tbe file USSR AMBASSADOR IN THE USA signature A DOBRYNIN A DOBRYNIN 5I USSR EMBASSY in Washington USA SECRET Copy No 2 11 July 1978 Attachment to Issue No 667 SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA Political Letter Almost eighteen months ago--January 20 new 39th of the USA J Carter stepped across the threshold of the White House Since that time a definite policy has been conducted by the basic elements of which are the subject of the review in the present political I As has already been noted by the Soviet-American relations during the Administration have been characterized by instability major which to a internal and external extent are due to its calculations of the state of affairs in both dimensions In the middle of April of this year Carter as is well known conducted in his country residence Camp David a meeting of the members of his cabinet and closest advisors at which was taken a decision to carry out a regular reevaluation of Soviet-American relations The initiative for this affair came from Brzezinski and several Presidential advisors on domestic affairs who convinced Carter that he would succeed in stopping the process of worsening of his position in the country he would openly initiate a harsher course vis a vis the Soviet Union Africa events on the Horn of Africa and then in the Shaba Province of Zaire was chosen as the pretext around which the Administration would begin earnestly to create tension in Soviet-American relations In fact in connection to these African events it was decided to attempt a review of the entire concept of the policy of detente subordinating it to the needs of the Administration not stopping even publicly putting under the concluding a new on the limitation of by it with In 2 adjustments in position particularly in light the speech of Brezhnev and also our in Annapolis which he had found to he unexpectedly answer in Pravda to Carter's firm The having Vance go out front decided to a bit Vance usually stresses the positive accomplishments in Soviet-American relations without leaving out however the which are associated with himself for example the notorious policy of defense of human rights or Consequently in so as it is possible to on basis the Embassy has at its disposal the Carter Administration has come to own of a half-hearted conception of of which himself first aceused us Detente in its current concrete application by the White House as being partitioned It is seen as important and support of national interests of the United States itself and the corresponding formation of public opinion--regarding problems associated with uuo o u weapons issues of war and peace limitation of strategic weapons a total ban on nuclear tests certain other disarmament-related As far as the majority of other questions is concerned as in the past it is applied subject to the behavior of the Soviet Union in Africa in the Middle East in relation to human rights and so on The reaction of the Administration to the recently-begun Shcharansky process is in this regard sufficiently instructive The Carter Administration variously denies that it is supporting a return to the Cold War It seems that it fears a decline of relations with the Soviet Union to a level when the threat of a serious to say nothing of a military conflict with us would be interpreted by the American people and also in other countries of the world as something reaL Carter evidently has come to realize that this would cause deep alarm among the population of the country and would for him be a political loss and maybe would represent a catastrophe in the 1980 presidential elections In this regard the choice-- cooperation or confrontation --which he tried to pose for us in his speech in Annapolis seemed in its essence directed in the USA itself to him personally the heartland is expecting from Carter himself an answer to that adherence to principal in our position--has turned out to have not choice and he--thanks to as tO nrFo lPlr f having moved to an with the Soviet 3 It would be however to speak some sort of hopelessness or irreconcilability in our relations with the USA and particular with current Administration personally with although this issue is extremely complex In the USA other things are on which together with the noted-above general attitudes in the country require Carter and the Administration to maintain relations level regardless of all the vacillation of the current with the Soviet Union at a President The folJowing are included among these things -A recognition in the USA of the primacy of Soviet-American relations in its early days the Administration--this was Brzezinski's doing--tried to reduce their significance but had to stop doing this when it collided with the realities of the international situation - The firm and principled line of the Soviet leadership on relations with the USA which finding here a growing response -In the ruling circles of the USA there is not by any means a united negative approach to relations with Soviet political and continue to support areas understanding from experience that the paths a search for agreement with us in of confrontation with us are hopeless -The Administration cannot but take into account the fact that the main Western partners of the USA--to say nothing of the majority of developing countries--speak more or less consistently in support of a policy of detente - Carter has to realize the vulnerability of his position in the 1980 Presidential elections if he goes into those elections as a President who caused a strategic arms agreement with the Soviet Union to fail and who led Soviet-American relations to the edge of Cold War Under conditions of an erosion of Carter's mass base in comparison to his standing in 1976 the issue of relations with the Soviet Union really could be decisive for Carter in the next Presidential elections - Under conditions of the serious economic difficulties facing the USA the possibility of decreasing military spending by limiting the arms race is proving more and more impressive to average American taxpayers For the population of the USA and for Carter inflation has L 4 of the Soviet Union Hall named Brzezinski who in of this significant Our firm reacttcm nt t Rasputin to play a anti-Soviet by the Carter its tone We have to assert that this future too However it would not be in our to by ' ''t'' ' positive Carter's to relations with the Soviet Union--in the place his personal in a meeting with L I Brezhnev his support in principle for a positive reactions from our side apart from treaty on SALT and anything else would strengthen the positions of those individuals and circles which are trying to influence the President from the perspective of the need for the development of SovietAmerican relations over the long term A A Gromyko's meetings with Vance and Carter and also L L Brezhnev's reception have this regard X X X We consider the following approach to be expedient along the most important lines of our relations with the Carter Administration Continue to energetically pursue the working out of agreements on SALT and a total ban on nuclear having in mind to create by these steps the political perquisites for a Soviet-American summit meeting which could have decisive for normalization and then for improvement of our relations Taking into account the importance of the European path for the deepening of the policy of detente and from the point of view of counteracting the opponents of that policy in the USA it is important to even more actively work towards making progress on the forces and armaments in Central Europe Vienna negotiations on the limitation on basis proposals It is to maximally activate this line which was in Minsk It would 5 investment Saudi Arabia etc and Israeli-Zionist interests open territorial expansion at the Arabs' expense - On the Chinese we should continue to actively publicly advance to the USA our that the Carter Administration's formation of a bloc with Beijing on an anti-Soviet basis would preclude to it opportunities for cooperation with the Soviet Union in the matter of a 11 ' ' ' in the threat of nuclear war and of arms limitation particularly as SALT We should support the growing among Americans of anxiety regarding the possible consequences the current course of the Administration a China This became according to our observations especially noticeable Com I Brezhnev's warning in Minsk it has begun to occur to many Americans that the Administration's playing of the Chinese card with it potentially dangerous elements of confrontation with the Soviet Union which which are detrimental to the USA but in China's interests Without the constant support and nurturing among Americans of these feelings of anxiety and preoccupation as is now taking place in the USA in relation to SALT the Administration's current covert move toward a deal with China may assume an even more open and dangerous The immediate future in any case the next month or month and a half will be an extremely complex period in Soviet-American relations and it will be difficult to count on any sort of noticeable positive shifts More possibly we can expect regular anti-Soviet outbursts about Shcharansky Ginsburg and others Later however with the achievement of a SALT agreement which in itself will be a significant event and when the Administration will have to more actively try to justify that agreement in Congress and before the public it is possible to expect an improvement in the political climate in our relations About that time an election campaign will be going on here with its usual outburst of chauvinistic demagoguery and anti-Soviet propaganda On this issue it is indicative that our expression of firmness in relation to the prosecution of renegades like Shcharansky played its own role The Carter Administration despite all its rhetoric was forced to retreat and to announce its intention to continue the Soviet-American negotiations on SALT aimed at the achievement of concrete results and to declare that that agreement meets the interests not only of the Soviet Union but also the national interests of the USA The Russians won local Finally a Soviet-American summit with This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu