1'RANSlA71ONPAGE 1 DOBRYNINSCONVERSA'lIONW17HROBERTF KENNEDY DobIynin's Cable to the Soviet Foreign Minishy Zl October 1962 TOP SECRET Making Copies Prohibited Copy No I CIPHERED TELEGRAM Late tonight R Kennedy invited me to come see him We talked alone The Cuban crisis R KennE1dY began continues to quickly worsen We have just received a report that an unanned American plane was shot down while canying out a reconnaissance flight over Cuba The military is demanding that the President ann such planes and respond to fire with fire The USA government will have to do this I interrupted R Kennedy and asked him what right American planes had to fly over Cuba at all cmdely violatingits sovereigntyand accepted international norms Howwould the USA have reacted if foreign planes appeared over its territory 'We have a resolution of the OIganization of American states that gives us the right to such overflights R Kennedy quickly replied I told him that the Soviet Union like all peace-loving countries resolutely rejects such a ''righf' OJ to be more exact this kind of true lawlessness when people who don like the social-political situation in a country try to impose their will on it-a small state where the people themselves established and maintained their system 'The OAS resolution is a direct violation of the UN Charter I added and you as the Attomey General of the USA the highest American legal entity should certainly mow that R Kennedy said that he realized that we had different approaches to these problems and it was not likely that we could convince each otheL But now the rnatter is not in these differences since time is of the essence ' want R Kennedy stressed ' O layout the current alanning situation the way the president sees it He wants N S Khrushchev to mow this This is the thrust of the situation now ''Because of the plane that was shot down there is now strong preSSlUe on the president to give an order to respond with fire if fired upon when American reconnaissance planes are flying over Cuba The USA can stop these flights because this is the only way we can quickly get information about the state of construction of the missile bases in Cuba which we believe pose a very serious threat to OlU national security But if we start to fire in response-a chain reaction will quickly start that will be very hard to stop The same thing in regard to the essence of the issue of the missile bases in Cuba The USA government is determined to get rid of those bases-up to in the extreme case of bombing them since I repeat they pose a great threat to the security of the USA But in response to the bombing of these bases in the COlUse of which Soviet specialists might suffer the Soviet government will undoubtedly respond with the same against us somewhere in ElUOpe A real war will begin in which millions of Americans and Russians will die We want to avoid that anyway we can I'm SlUe that the government of the USSR has the same wish However taking time to find a way out of the situation is very risky here R Kennedy mentioned as if in 60 TRANSIA71ONPAGE2 OOBRYN NS CONVERSATIONWlI'HROBERlF KENNEDY passing that there are many umeasonable heads among the generals and not only among the generals who are 'itching for a fighf The situation might get out of control with irreversible consequences In this regard R Kennedy said the president considers that a suitable basis for regulating the entire Cuban con f1i ct might be the letter N S Khrushchev sent on October 26 and the letter in response from the President which was sent off today to N S Khrushchev through the US Embassy in Moscow The most important thing for us R Kennedy stressed is to get as soon as possible the agreement of the Soviet government to halt further work on the construction of the missile bases in Cuba and take measures under international control that would make it impossible to use these weapons In exchange the government of the USA is ready in addition to repealing all measures on the quarantine to give the assurances that there will not be any invasion of Cuba and that other coun1ries of the Westem Hemisphere are ready to give the same assurances-the US government is certain of this And what about Turkey I asked R Kennedy ''If that is the only obstacle to achieving the regulation I mentioned earlie t then the president doesn see any unsurmountable difficulties in resolving this issue replied R Kennedy The greatest difficulty for the president is the public discussion of the issue of Turkey Formally the deployment of missile bases in Turkey was done by a special decision of the NATO Council To announce now a unilateral decision by the president of the USA to withdraw missile bases from Turkey-this would damage the entire structure of NATO and the US position as the leader of NATO where as the Soviet government mows very well there are many arguments In short if such a decision were announced now it would seriously tear apart NATO 'However President Kennedy is ready to come to agree on that question with N S Khrushchev too I think that in order to withdraw these bases from Turkey R Kennedy said we need 4-5 months This is the minimal amount of time necessary for the US government to do this taking into account the procedures that exist within the NATO framework On the whole Turkey issue R Kennedy added if Premier N S Khrushchev agrees with what IVe said we can continue to exchange opinions between him and the president using him R Kennedy and the Soviet ambassador 'However the president can say anything public in this regard about Turkey R Kennedy said again R Kennedy then wamed that his cornments about Turkey are extremely confidential besides him and his brother only 2-3 people mow about it in Washington ''That's all that he asked me to pass on to N S Khrushchev R Kennedy said in conclusion The president also asked N S Khrushchev to give him an answer through the Soviet ambassador and R Kennedy if possible within the next day Sunday on these thoughts in order to have a business-like clear answer in principle He asked him not to get into a wordy discussion which might drag things out The current serious situation unfortunately is such that there is very little time to resolve this whole issue Unfortunately events are developing too quickly The request for a reply tomorrow stressed R Kennedy is just that-a request and not an ultirnahun The president hopes that the head of the Soviet government will understand him correctly I noted that it went without saying that the Soviet government would -not accept any ultimatums and it was good that the American government realized that I also reminded him of N S Khrushchev's appeal in his last letter to the president to demonstrate state wisdom in resolving this question Then I told R Kennedy that the president's thoughts would be brought to the attention of the head of the Soviet government I also 61 I ' t I L ' I l TRANSlA110NPAGE 3 OOBRYN NS CONVERSA71ONW17HROBEHI'F KENNEDY said that I would contact him as soon as there was a reply In this regard R Kennedy gave me a number of a direct telephone line to the White House In the course of the conversation R Kennedy noted that he knew about the conversation that television commentator Scali had yesterday with an Embassy adviser on possible ways to regulate the Cuban conflict one-and-a-half lines whited out I should say that during our meeting R Kennedy was very upset in any case rve never seen him like this before True about twice he tried to return to the topic of deception that he talked about so persistently during our previous meeting but he did so in passing and without any edge to it He didn1 even try to get into fights on varioUs subjects as he usually does and only persistently returned to one topic time is of the essence and we shouldn1 miss the chance After meetingwith me he immediatelywent to see the president with whom as R Kennedy said he spends almost all his time novv Zl X-62 A DOBRYNlN Source Russian Foreign Ministry archives translation from copy provided by NHK in Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein We All Lost the Cold War Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 1994 appendix pp 523-526 with minor revisions 62 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu