DECtASSIFIED E O 12958 S ct 3 6 e m 1 'OiL _ _ _----_ _--_ - _ ---_ -_ _ _---------_ --_ THE WHITE HOUSE rIlE p' - ' RESIDENT BAS S EEll P WASHINGTON I t If ' SECRET -NODIS June 13 1969 Y MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT k FROM Henry A Kis singe r SUBJECT Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin June 11 1969 --- Dobrynin had requested the appointment to inform me that he had bee 1 recalled to Moscow for consultations Dobrynin opened the conversation by saying that he had been impressed by the deliberateness and precision of the Administration We had moved one step at a time towards first establishing a general atmosphere then into the Middle East talks then beginning some discussion on Vietnam and only when the main outlines were set did we offer to have the SALT talks We had not been stampeded at any point He had reported accordingly to his government He said the Soviet Union preferred to deal with careful planners since they were much more predictable Dobrynin then turned to Vietnam I told him that we were following a very careful policy We had' our moves for the next few months fully worked out I reminded him of what the' President had said when we gave him an advance copy of the Vietnam speech He should not be confused by the many statements that he heard We were not interferring with much that was being said But the President reserved the final decision on essential items Dobrynin replied that he had noticed that we moved on ab ut the schedule we had given him a month ago Dobrynin then asked about our ideas for settling the war in Vietnam _ He inquired especially on our views on a coalition government I said that he and I were Doth realists He knew very well that in order to bring about a coalition government we would have to smash the present structure of the Saigon Government while the NLF remained intact This would guarantee an NLF victory sooner or later We would nevel accept that We would agree to a fair political contest -- not to what the President had called a dis guis ed defeat Dobrynin made no effort to defend Hanoils position He replied that Hanoi was very difficult He said I could be sure that the Soviet Union had transmitted our discussion of April and added a recommendation However SECRET -NODIS DECtASSIF'lED E O 12958 S ct 3 6 e m f By' ' 02 NAHA Date d-6 q '0 SECRET -NODIS -2- Hanoi believe d that they knew their own requirements better than the Soviet Union I said on the other hand the Soviet Union supplied 850 0 of the military equipment Dobrynm asked whether we wanted the Soviet Union to give Hanoi an ultimatum I said it was not for me to tell the' Soviet Union how to conduct its relations with its allies I said that we were determined to have the war ended one way or another Hanoi was attempting to break down the President1s public support It was too much to ask us to hold still for that I added that what we needed was some strategic help not just negotiating devices for settling particular problems as has been the case until no'w Dobrynin who was very subdued said I could be sure that they are looking into the question Dobrynin then asked me about US-Soviet relations in general I said th at while some gradual progress was possible even during the Vietnam war a really massive change depended on the settlement of the Vietnam war Dobrynin said we always seem to link things I replied that as a student of Marxism he must believe in the importance of objective factors It was an objective fact that Hanoi was trying to undermine the President It was an objective fact that we had taro ok to every avenue for a solution Dobrynin then said supposing the war were settled how would you go about improving relations I called his attention to the President1s offer of increased trade and I also suggested the possibility of a summit meeting I said that they could count on the same careful preparation for a summit meeting that characterized all the President1s efforts One pos Sibility would be to hcrve a meeting at which the major issues were discussed together with a pre'cise agenda' for dealing with them to be followed by periodic meetings to resolve them In this way we might reach a stage in which war between the two major nuclear countri s would become unthinkable and other countries which might be emerging could not disturb the peace of the world I added this should help the Soviets with some of their allies Dobrynin said that they had no problem with any of their allies I replied that China was ' still a Soviet ally Dobrynin emphatically said China is not an ally it is our chief security' problem He was very intrigued by the suggestion of a summit meetil' 'g and I added that there was no prospect of it without a settlement of the Vietnam war Dobrynin then turned to the Middle East He aid the Soviet Union was very interested in a settlement -- Sisco was always speaking in the abstract about secure and recognized borders The Soviet Union was perfectly willing to discuss a rectification of the borders even if it did not promise SECRET -NODIS Dr CtASSI iEO E Oo 1 958 S ct 3 6 f m By' 1 02 1Jw NAHA Dated-G'a SECRET -NODIS -3- to agree right away Gromyko was in Cairo to try to see how much give there was in the Egyptian position I said that if Vietnam were settled we could certainly give more top level attention to the Middle East Dobrynin returned to the theme of US-Soviet relations and asked what he could tell his principals when he returned I said that everything depended on the war in Vietnam If the war were ended he could say that there was no limit to what might be accomplished You would like to be remembered as a President who ensured a permanent peace and a qualitative change in international relations Dobry-nin asked whether we were expecting a change in the Moscow leadership I replied that we had no intention of playing domestic politics in the Kremlin Dobrynin said lIDon l t believe your Soviet experts they understand nothing II Dobrynin then asked whether I might be willing to come to Moscow some- time very quietly to explain your thinking to Kosygin and Brezhnev I told Dobrynin that this would have to be discussed with you but that if it were for the right issue you would almost certainly entertain the proposition SECRET -NODIS Opening the Channel February-December 1969 settlement-Sisco was always speaking in the ab- stract about secure and recognized borders The Soviet Union was perfectly willing to discuss a rec- tification of the borders even if it did not promise to agree right away Gromyko was in Cairo to try to see how much give there was in the Egyptian position I said that if Vietnam were settled we could certainly give more top level attention to the Middle East Dobrynin returned to the theme of US-Soviet relations and asked what he could tell his prin- cipals when he returned I said that everything depended on the war in Vietnam If the war were ended he could say that there was no limit to what might be accomplished You would like to be remembered as a President who ensured a permanent peace and a qualitative change in international relations Dobrynin asked whether we were expecting a change in the Moscow lead- ership I replied that we had no intention of play- ing domestic politics in the Kremlin Dobrynin said Don't believe your Soviet experts they un- derstand nothing Dobrynin then asked whether I might be willing to come to Moscow sometime very qui- etly to explain your thinking to Kosygin and Bre- zhnev I told Dobrynin that this would have to be discussed with you but that if it were for the right issue you would almost certainly entertain the proposition dor reported to his government during his stay in Moscow he the Ambassador could if necessary provide first-hand information concerning the President's views on various international issues and particularly on Soviet-U S relations Kissinger said he can state with full responsi- bility that besides resolution of the Vietnam issue which he intends to address in greater detail a little later President Nixon regards Soviet- U S relations as the other main foreign policy area for him to focus on He has established as his main objective in this area the need to avoid situations that could lead to direct confrontation between the U S and the USSR He the President believes that this objective is fully attainable In any event on instructions from the President he Kissinger can provide assurances that Nixon will not al- low third countries or events in one region of the world or another to induce him to pursue a course that threatens to cause a direct clash between our countries In this connection the President hopes and believes that the Soviet Government holds the same view However Kissinger continued this is only one side of the question During his presidency-until 1972 and perhaps until 1976 if he is re-elected- Nixon very much wants to see Soviet-U S relations enter a constructive phase that differs from the rela- tions which existed during the Cold War and which regrettably still continue to have an impact today Even though ideological differences will undoubted- ly remain and will continue to make themselves felt because they are too deep the President nonetheless believes that the aforementioned turnaround in the intergovernmental relations between our countries is quite possible and desirable although this will require time and patient efforts on both sides tak- ing into account each other's interests Kissinger continued that in all of this Presi- dent Nixon assigns an extremely important place to a meeting with Soviet leaders However he ap- proaches this very important issue with a certain degree of caution mainly owing to domestic po- litical considerations and the worldwide reaction to this The point is that such meetings are accom- panied by inevitable fanfare by various kinds of sensations by rash predictions and particularly by so-called great expectations at first and then by equally great disappointment although logically speaking it is difficult to expect a summit meet- ing lasting 2-3 days to produce major results right 24 Memorandum of Conversation USSRP Washington June 12 1969 On June 12 the day before I left for Moscow Kissinger the Assistant to the President called me and asked for a meeting before my departure I agreed and the meeting took place in Kissinger's office at the White House this meeting like all previous meetings with him was confidential Kissinger began the conversation by remark- ing that President Nixon knew I was leaving for the USSR and this meeting had been arranged with his knowledge so that when the Soviet Ambassa- 1 Source AVP RF f 0129 op 53 p 399 d 6 I 98-111 Secret The date on the memorandum is evidently in error the meeting was held onJune 11 64 Meeting Between Kissinger and Dobrynin June 11 1969 Kissinger asked what I thought about the idea of holding such meetings periodically I gave it as my personal view that in principle this idea merits attention Then turning to specific problems and regions Kissinger said that with respect to Europe Nixon agrees that there should be no attempts to change the situation that developed as a result of World War II It is common knowledge that in principle the U S is in favor of German unification but to all appearances this is realistically speaking an issue for the very very distant future The current admin- istration does not intend to stir things up or force events in that direction On the contrary it is for example interested in achieving a certain degree of stability with respect to West Berlin so that events there do not on occasion cause Soviet-U S rela- tions to heat up We are awaiting Kissinger added possible more specific proposals from the Soviet side in this regard in view of the fact that this was mentioned in the Soviet Government's first com- munication to President Nixon back in February of this year 2 When I countered with a question as to what the U S side itself could propose in this connection Kissinger responded that they would still like to re- ceive more specific Soviet ideas first However his remarks could be taken to mean that in exchange for quiet on the access routes to West Berlin they could discuss steps to neutralize the FRG ac- tions in that city that are the cause of the friction between the GDR and its allies-above all the USSR-and between the FRG and its allies includ- ing the U S At the same time it could be inferred that Washington is however not prepared to agree to free city status for West Berlin at this time During our discussion of European affairs Kissinger reiterated that President Nixon takes into account the Soviet Union's special interests in the Eastern European region and does not intend to do anything there that could be viewed in Moscow as a challenge to its status in that region That is Nixon's principled position on this issue Kissinger asserted and one should not pay a great deal of attention to certain critical remarks made by the President in public concerning one Eastern Europe- an country since that is merely a gesture to certain away especially as the most complex international problems can hardly be resolved immediately since the relevant obstacles and the accumulated baggage of many years must be dealt with one step at a time Regrettably public opinion expects miracles from such meetings but since miracles are difficult to achieve various speculations about a setback a failure begin to circulate and this does not help the process of searching for solutions it has a negative psychological impact on the meeting's par- ticipants who from the very outset subconsciously begin thinking about what they will have to tell the press at the end of the meeting That is why Kissinger continued President Nixon is convinced that holding only one such meeting with the Soviet leadership during his en- tire presidency as was the case with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson is evidently not the prop- er way to proceed It would be advisable to hold several meetings at regular intervals-say once a year That way the meetings will cause less of a sensation and will be more businesslike During these meetings we will not have to search for some outwardly non-committal formula that appears to give a certain amount of satisfaction to the public but in essence does little to bring about progress Instead we could periodically engage in a busi- nesslike discussion of the most important prob- lems and search for mutually acceptable avenues of approach without worrying that the press would subsequently label this a failure to agree or a setback for the Soviet and U S leaders because everyone would know that in a little while there would be another meeting at which discussion of the problems would continue and in the interim they would undertake appropriate efforts through diplomatic channels At such meetings Kissinger continued we should not only seek solutions to the most diffi- cult issues very often this cannot be done right away but also hold mutual consultations and an exchange of views on potentially explosive situa- tions that could involve the two sides in conflict even if their views on such situations do not coin- cide the parties will better understand each oth- er's motives and in their actions will not overstep dangerous boundaries Of course in any event there must be thorough advance preparation for summit meetings bearing in mind the need to de- rive maximum benefit from them under certain specific conditions 2 65 Printed as an attachment to Document 5 Opening the Channel February-December 1969 segments of the u s population that playa role in the U s elections 3 As Secretary of State Rogers had done earlier Kissinger raised the question of joint ratification of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as President Nixon had proposed to us several months ago Kissinger emphasized that Nix- on continues to attach great importance to the fac- tor of simultaneous ratification of that treaty by the Soviet Union and the United States for two reasons First this would be the first important joint Soviet- U S action since the beginning of his presidency and in his view its significance would go beyond the event itself Second Nixon is convinced that joint Soviet- U S ratification would increase the pressure on those countries that have not yet signed the treaty I stated our position on this issue I remind- ed him that as the U S side had already been informed the treaty is currently under consider- ation in the foreign affairs commissions of the Su- preme Soviet under Soviet law this is an integral part of the treaty ratification process Further I expressed my personal view that the U S is not currently exerting the necessary influence and pressure on the government of the FRG which is openly evading signing the treaty this could to a great extent make the treaty pointless I went on to express the hope that the Nixon Government would nonetheless take a more active role vis-a- vis Bonn in an effort to get it to sign the treaty as soon as possible In point of fact Kissinger did not deny that in this sense they are not currently putting any serious pressure on Bonn He tried to justify this by citing the delay in our response to Nixon's proposal on simultaneous ratification of the treaty by the USSR and the U S According to Kissinger the leadership in Bonn is supposedly telling them-along with ref- erences to the election campaign in the FRG-that they the West Germans do not need to hurry since the USSR has itself not ratified the treaty In general from the discussion of this topic one gains the impression that Nixon apparently sees our avoidance of his proposal on joint ratification as an unwillingness on our part at this time the Com- munist Party Congress the exacerbation of Sino- Soviet differences to demonstrate unity of action with him Nixon by taking such a step rather than as a belief in the argument that our non-ratification will exert some sort of pressure on the FRG Kiss- inger argued in many different ways that the absence of ratification by the USSR and the-U S in fact helps those forces in the FRG that oppose the treaty In general based on our observations one can evidently state with a fair degree of certainty that in the near future the U S itself will not complete ratification of the treaty or exert strong pressure of the FRG until we agree to the above-mentioned pro- posal from Nixon or until we give a more definite response than we have thus far It is the Embassy's view that consideration of this treaty by the com- missions of the Supreme Soviet should not go on too long If worse comes to worst the treaty could even be ratified with a special reservation concerning the need for accession by the FRG Speaking of other areas where Nixon feels that Soviet-U S contacts and a bilateral exchange of views should be pursued Kissinger referred to the problem of a Middle East settlement issues related to limiting strategic nuclear arms and- in the future-the gradual development of our trade relations Touching upon the Middle East Kissinger said Nixon believes that if it is at all possible to do any- thing at this time to bring us closer to a solution to that tangled and extremely complex problem this can be achieved only through a confidential bilat- eral exchange of views between the USSR and the U S which know what their clients want and to some extent share their views but which must not be unduly influenced by their clients According to Kissinger Nixon intends in the not-too-distant future-after he recently finished working out his program of action on the Vietnam issue and hopes to review and approve the directives for the upcoming Soviet-U S strategic arms limita- tion talks soon-to personally study the specific possibilities for a Middle East settlement in greater detail In addition to the meeting with the king of Jordan which has already taken place he plans to meet next month with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir in particular the U S Government intends to discuss the current situation with her especial- ly in light of the bilateral Soviet-U S exchange of views and taking into account the Soviet response 3 During his commencement address at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs On June 4 Nixon remarked if America were to turn its back on the world there would be peace that would settle over this planet but it would be the kind of peace that suffocated freedom in Czechoslovakia Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Richard Nixon 1969 pp 432-437 66 Meeting Between Kissinger and Dobrynin June 11 1969 which Washington is awaiting with great interest and which will presumably be received shortly af- ter Soviet Foreign Minister A A Gromyko returns to Moscow from his trip to Cairo the conversa- tion with Kissinger took place while that trip was in progress 4 During the subsequent discussion of the Mid- dle East Kissinger avoided discussing the specific issues that I had raised saying that he himself had not yet studied all these issues in depth because he had been so occupied with Vietnam but that if necessary he would be prepared in about a month or a month and a half to personally get involved in the Soviet-U S talks on these matters on condi- tion that he would not take over Sisco's responsibili- ties with respect to all the minutiae and details He Kissinger could meet privately with me for a com- prehensive discussion of key issues we might raise in regard to a settlement and then provide his per- sonal report and recommendations to the President According to Kissinger depending on the course of events and other circumstances that report could serve as the basis for additional instructions from the President to the State Department for a further exchange of views with the Soviet side without any reference to the conversation with the Soviet Am- bassador He added that in his view in order to achieve success it was necessary for all parties the Arabs and Israel to swallow the bitter pill of cer- tain compromises However Kissinger did not go into details He also said that the President anticipates that all these issues regarding a Middle East settlement will be the subject of a detailed discussion between A A Gromyko and Secretary of State Rogers dur- ing the UN General Assembly Following all these remarks Kissinger turned to the issue ofVietnam which from all indications is currently uppermost in the minds of the President and his principal advisors During a detailed exposition of their position on the Vietnam question Kissinger essentially re- peated all the main thoughts and arguments Nixon had presented to me during my last meeting with him at the White House in May 5 as well as every- thing that Kissinger had said earlier on instruc- tions from the President for transmission to the Soviet Government There was a somewhat new note however in that there was a more direct appeal to us to assist in overcoming the current impasse in Paris After remarking that the U S Government continues to appreciate everything positive that the Soviet Union has already done to support the Paris talks Kissinger went on to say that speak-- ing frankly they are however gaining the impres- sion that in recent months Moscow has been less actively involved in the negotiations and has evi- dently left them almost entirely to the discretion of the Hanoi leadership in any event Soviet influence on the negotiations has become noticeably less than the leverage the USSR ought to have with Hanoi and the South Vietnamese NLF including as their main source of arms and economic assistance Of course we are well aware of Moscow's principled approach that it does not negotiate for the DRV or the NLF But he noted in passing as it were that all of the above nevertheless raises a question among some of Nixon's advisors which they are asking with increasing frequency at White House meetings Doesn't Moscow currently believe that continuation of the war in Vietnam will neverthe- less ultimately be beneficial to it for a number of reasons and that therefore there should be no hur- ry in resolving the conflict According to Kissinger he himself and Presi- dent Nixon do not share this view They think Mos- cow is interested in ending the war because the war is costing it a great deal of money and because the Vietnam conflict is a major stumbling block that must be removed if one is to think about truly ma- jor improvement in Soviet-U S relations Clearly in this same context Kissinger went on to address the issue of China After recalling the thought Nixon had expressed to us earlier to the effect that they do not intend to interfere in any way in the current Sino-Soviet conflict and after reaffirming that this is a matter of principle and will not change Kissinger said that of course they are not averse to improving relations with China and are prepared to take reasonable steps to meet 4 While Dobrynin was in Moscow for consultation Soviet Charge Cherniakov met Rogers on June 17 to deliver a Soviet document of Basic Principles in response to previous American proposals on the Middle East including the preliminary document of May 6 see footnote 2 Document 18 National Archives Nixon Presidential Materials NSC Files Box 649 Country Files Middle East Middle East Negotiations June 1969 and AVP RF f 0129 op 53 p 399 d 6 I 113-124 5 67 May 14 Opening the Channel February-December 1969 openly siding with either the USSR or the PRC to be particularly careful not to give the Soviet Govern- ment reason to believe that the U S somehow sup- ports China in its anti-Soviet policy or that it is seek- ing agreement with Peking based on such a policy As a realist Nixon's logic is simple the Soviet Union is much more able to oppose the U S in various re- gions of the world than is present-day China this could create situations that pose a threat of conflicts in which the security of the U S as a nation could be at stake if a large-scale war were to break out In terms of its military and economic potential China cannot pose such a threat to the U S for a number of years yet whereas the Soviet Union can Moreover Kissinger added Mao Tse-tung's ac- tions cannot be assessed using rational logic One might expect anything from him although thus far he has clearly avoided everything that could pro- voke a direct military clash between China and the U S this does not apply to clashes in third coun- tries The Soviet Union is a different matter it is led by political figures who think realistically and who are interested in the welfare of their people and their country With them specific agreements are possible in the interests of both countries and others as well That is why at one point President Nixon already expressed to the Soviet leadership the thought that if over the next 10-15 years our countries succeed in uniting their efforts or even in at least proceeding along appropriate parallel courses on the most important and dangerous is- sues then it will be possible to keep the world from being drawn into major military conflicts until China grows up and more responsible leaders come to power in Peking However according to Kissinger this requires a prompt end to the Vietnam conflict and the Sovi- et Union must now playa more active role in reach- ing a settlement without delegating everything to Hanoi which assesses the entire international situation only from its own specific narrow view- point and objectively speaking this viewpoint of- ten serves mainly the interests of China Everything Kissinger said as he reiterated his arguments centered on this main theme One got the feeling that he was under instructions from Nix- on to layout for us precisely this line of argument although in so doing Kissinger appeared to be ex- pressing his own thoughts I again set forth for Kissinger our principled ap- proach to resolving the Vietnam conflict I empha- China halfway but this must be a two-way street However according to Kissinger a careful analysis of the decisions of the last Congress of the CPC and subsequent events has not yet given them the Americans any evidence at all that the Peking lead- ership is prepared to take a somewhat more concil- iatory line toward the u s It is true he added half ironically that the USSR has now taken our place as the main target of Chi- nese criticism and we are now in second place as it were but as for the rest Peking's attitude toward us has not noticeably changed The Chinese continue to insist that Taiwan be turned over to them The U S cannot agree to that even though it has no ob- jection to some discussion of this problem between Peking and Taiwan itself but thus far the latter has not expressed such a desire and the Nixon Admin- istration will not exert any pressure in that regard Taiwan is still an important link in the chain of bas- es to deter Peking's expansionist tendencies However that is not the main point Kissinger asserted We are realists The main power in the socialist camp both militarily and industrially is not China but the Soviet Union That will be the case not only now but throughout Nixon's presi- dency To be frank in that sense our main rival is the Soviet Union if we are talking on a global scale and especially about the possible consequences for the U S if a nuclear war is unleashed That is why Nixon believes it is above all important to main- tain good or at least more or less normal proper relations with the USSR without allowing those re- lations to reach the brink of dangerous tension We understand he continued that there are evidently people in Moscow who believe that the U S and China might somehow make a deal based on opposing the Soviet Union From an overall his- torical perspective and taking into account the past experience of various countries such an idea could sound fairly convincing However Kissinger assert- ed that if one were to speak for the U S Govern- ment in this specific situation it would above all not be in the United States' own interest to frame the question in this way Kissinger went on to say that it would of course be hypocritical to ass e you-and you would not believe us anyway-that we are greatly distressed by your growing differences with the Chinese Howev- er here there is one significant circumstance to which Nixon attaches considerable importance The Presi- dent is certain that the best course for him is without 68 Meeting Between Kissinger and Dobrynin June 11 1969 sized that we are genuinely seeking an early end to the war in Vietnam but that the legitimate rights interests and aspirations of the entire Vietnamese nation must be taken into account I also said that the unrealistic U S policy in Vietnam merely plays into the hands of Mao Tse-tung and his group and hinders the establishment of a truly independent and neutral South Vietnam as proposed in the well-known 10 Points put forward by the South Vietnamese NLF 6 The sooner Washington under- stands this the better it will be for Vietnam and for the U S itself as well as for the relations between our countries However Kissinger continued to defend the program put forward by Nixon for settling the Vietnam conflict repeatedly stressing that they are prepared to discuss any proposals and to seek com- promises if Hanoi and the NLF will finally begin serious negotiations rather than repeating only their own ultimatums After mentioning com- promises Kissinger noted that here there could be various options that could be discussed confiden- tially but he added that they cannot however abandon Thieu right now because that would be political capitulation to North Vietnam In the course of these remarks Kissinger again commented as Nixon had earlier that if Hanoi is going to endlessly obstruct the negotiations then in a few months the government will have to think about other alternatives in order to con- vince Hanoi I said firmly that there are not and cannot be any alternatives to peace talks and a peaceful set- tlement unless the current administration wants to repeat the previous administration's mistakes what those mistakes led to is quite well known as shown by the example of the previous occupant of the White House Kissinger clearly did not want the discussion to become contentious and turned the conversation to another topic However one cannot fail to note that other alternatives are a fairly persistent theme in my conversations with both Nixon and Kissinger Even though at this stage these statements are evi- dently more in the nature of an attempt to blackmail the Vietnamese and in part the USSR with hints that at some point Nixon might resume bombing of the DRV or take other military action by and large one cannot totally rule out such steps by the cur- rent administration if in Nixon's view the situation warrants them Nevertheless one should be pre- pared for such a development especially if Peking's policy of provocation against the USSR intensifies and Washington believes that in this sense the situ- ation could prove disadvantageous for Hanoi At one point Kissinger made a comment which was apparently deliberate to the effect that if they do indeed have to resort to other alternatives they hope that Soviet-U S relations will not drop below a dangerous minimum because for their part they will not do anything that could in any way be det- rimental to the Soviet Union itself or to its author- ity I told Kissinger that a U S attempt to resolve the Vietnam issue by military means is inevitably doomed to failure and that such a course of action will undoubtedly bring about an overall increase in international tension which also cannot but affect our relations with the U S In general the conversation left the definite impression that for Nixon foreign policy problem No 1 remains how to find a way out of the Vietnam War on terms that would be acceptable to him and that would ensure his re-election to the office of President of the United States To all appearances his attempts to convince the USSR to help in re- solving the conflict will continue and presumably this will to some extent also be felt during our ne- gotiations with this administration on other inter- national issues-if not directly then at least in a certain slowdown in the pace of such negotiations or the resolution of other issues Kissinger said that after my return he would again like to discuss the broad range of issues con- cerning our relations and the entire international situation I agreed A few words about Kissinger himself In ob- serving the activities of Nixon and his main foreign policy advisors and I am now acquainted with prac- tically all of them it can be stated with a good deal of confidence that at the moment Kissinger is the main-in fact the dominating-influence on the President in the area of foreign policy Kissinger is in charge of gathering and personally reporting to the President all foreign policy materials including in- telligence data received by the White House Along with his hand-picked staff of 25 experts on various issues he prepares the agenda and the materials for discussion at the National Security Council chaired by the President under Nixon this body has begun See footnote 3 Document 22 69 Opening the Channel February-December 1969 operating on a regular basis meeting at least once or twice a week Nixon himself admits as he told me during our last meeting that Kissinger pesters him i e visits him on a daily basis considerably more often than any of his other assistants Judging by my personal observations and compar- ing for example President Johnson's relations with his assistant Rostow I can say that Kissinger conducts him- self much more freely in the presence of the President than did his predecessors one feels the definite confi- dence of someone who has already gained for himself a firm position in the White House at the State De- partment they say bluntly that if Henry Kissinger's first name is against a particular proposal Nixon will almost certainly reject it Kissinger himself though he is an intelligent and erudite person is at the same time quite vain and in conversations with me we have developed a fairly good personal rapport especially during a private lunch he is not averse to boasting about his influence For example during our last conversa- tion he stated without excessive modesty that in all of Washington only two people can at any given moment provide a precise answer concerning the u S position on a particular issue those two people are President Nixon and Kissinger himself In this connection he suggested to me that if something genuinely important needs to be clarified so that Moscow correctly understands Nixon's policy on a specific issue I should unofficially get in touch with him directly It should be said that he himself willingly re- ceives the Soviet Ambassador or comes to our Em- bassy for a one-on-one conversation immediately after we suggest it He frequently initiates such meetings himself Evidently he is using all this to reinforce his own authority with Nixon as the con- fidential channel of communication with the So- viet side It should be noted in this connection that Kissinger exercises personal control over all contacts between members of his staff and personnel of our Embassy and keeps close track to ensure that these conversations are reported to him personally and if he feels it necessary he himself reports to the Presi- dent Lately he has in general noticeably tended to restrict such contacts and for the most part direct them exclusively to the channel of his personal con- tacts with the Soviet Ambassador In the future it would presumably be advis- able to develop and utilize the Kissinger channel even more actively in order to exert influence and 70 communicate our views on various important is- sues through him to President Nixon personally especially in situations of a somewhat sensitive na- ture or where publicity is undesirable something which very often cannot be achieved by working through the State Department Of course all rou- tine and official business particularly where it is necessary to go on record with our position should continue to be handled through normal diplomatic channels Secretary of State Rogers is noticeably beginning to gain power and is becoming more ac- tive in U S foreign policy relying on the extensive apparatus of the State Department and overseas institutions However judging from all our own observations and the available information one should also take into account that for the time being Kissinger's influence on the formulation of Nixon's foreign policy remains predominant --------- A Dobrynin -------- Meeting Between Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko SEPTEMBER 22 1969 25 Memorandum of Conversation U S 1 New York September 22 1969 10-11 p m U s Participants Secretary William P Rogers Ambassador Charles W Yost Mr Gerard Smith Mr Richard F Pedersen Assistant Secretary Martin J Hillenbrand Assistant Secretary Joseph J Sisco Assistant Secretary Samuel DePalma Deputy Assistant Secretary Emory C Swank Mr William D Krimer Interpreter 7 A typed note at the top of the first page of the memorandum reads Distribute to members of the Politburo of the CC CPSU and candidate members of the Politburo of the CC CPSU uly 12 1969 A Gromyko 1 Source National Archives RG 59 Central Files 1967-69 POL US-USSR Secret Exdis Drafted by Krimer and approved by Brown The meeting was held in Suite 42A of the Waldorf Towers This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu