TEL CON General Haig Amb Dobrynin 8 04 p m October 26 1973 H Mr Ambassador General Haig D Oh llello General H How are you D Now I think we are coming to the real crust of the problem laughs H Yeah D Yes what's the matter H Listen I just carne back from the President and I told him that his remarks tonight were I thought very much overdrawn and would be interpreted improperly D Yeah H And I wanted you to know that he did not in any way have the intention of drawing the situation as sharply as 'he did What he was trying to do -- and I don't think it came across -- he thought he was doing it but as being a member of the audience I didn't think he did it was trying to emphasize his strong personal relationship with Mr Brezhnev and it did not corne across that way to me at all D Yeah it didn't corne to me either H No And he's quite upset about it because he did not intend it to be that way D You see General I would like to say only one private observation It is my own but maybe it's good for you to understand and for the President H Sure D What is really in Moscow they ve 'y rnuch upset and if I m ay use a word -- I am speaking on my own you should be very clear on this H I understand D Because I didn't know that you would phone rne H Right laughs I hope you don't think that General HaigjAmb Dobrynin 2 D But I think understanding between us on this is very import nt But they are very angry because they consider that you created all these things by reasons we donlt know -- we donlt want to discuss it but artificial cxisis why And when you compare it with the even human crisis it is really -- excuse me -- but it is going beyond any comparison Because why It f s only one detail I would like to m ention we are constantly in touch with Henry on all the matter 3 big and slnaH H Yes D Every hour on the hour But what happened in the night When I give this letter it was as the President said I determ ined he answered firm Itf s quite all right The usual procedure is through the confidential channel But until we received letter Henry didn1t mention a single word that you are going to put this on an alert Itls the easiest way oo oo just to call and say to Ambassador Look here the President feels very strongly so if you really going to persist sorry -- well you may use any language you 1ike tough or no tough or diplomatic -- but we will be forced to do it Then I will be in touch with MoscoVV Brezhnev will answer and then it's natural H Yeah D But you were holding for 5 hours -- Henry and Scowcroft calling me and they say a reply wait a reply then I will receive a reply Reply was well firlTI rigI-4 President said But he didn't even mention about this alert We find out on the radio by the way H Yeah D But for me it looks really it was not real Because if you really were concerned I am sure you will first be in touch with Brezhnev to find out what's going on if it's real But you were not really concerned so it was -the easiest way to make up an air raid without telling us So I am little bit -quite frankly Pm telling you without anger Without - specific emotions but I'm really feel sorry about this episode because it damaged very much of what was done by what reason we don It know really It was so good trip of Henry to Moscow Brezhnev spend with h iln so lTI any hours that the President never spends with Gro myko by fue way And it looked so it was quite all right But then he created this crisis that you are real and we are just weaker partners standing looking against braver United States Really we have our people too al'ound Moscow Of course he looks differently General Haig Am b Dobrynin 3 H Yeah W-eH Mr o A rnbassador what worries me I donlt think it l s a reflection of the attitudes here at all D Yeah H For xample what was done on the alerts r am sure you know that l s been done on countIes s occasions and Ior some reason none of the fanfare D Yes without fanfare Why you make it without even telling us why If it was really war I am sur'e you will try to prevent the war H No no -- D And you will tell us if so But if it was not the war why to play the game publicly about it because you put us in a very difficult position dOT Q estically really Well we are just thinking what to do - to make a public staternent denying all these things really because after all one irnpression in the letter couldn't justify or just to be quiet but rememl er this thing This is not the thing to be done I have spent too many years and 1 1m telling you rather frankly -- that is not necessary to do but it is better for us mutually to understand what is going on H Well obviously I wouldn1t call if I was at all corrifortable with what was said tonight D Yeah No I g o appreciate your call and I do appreciate fue thoughtfulness of fue President about it because it is very important to keep the pe l 'sonal relationship as strong as it was before H Well that's what he feels about it'and he feels that way very strongly And what he was trying to convey was just that -- the strong personal relationship D Yeah H Well Pm afraid that it just did not corne across well ton ight at all D No it did not H And he wanted you to know it He is very con Zerned about it He is up there -- I replayed the thing for him because I wanted him to see __ you know sometimes when you speak you donlt know D No I understand This is the point 7 ' 1 General HaigjAmb Dobrynin H 4 There was a degree l'Ilore tension in that room tonight than I think he's accustomed to you understand dl D Yes H I did want you to know that D Yes thank you verymuch I do appreciate it really Because it is very important now to keep really everything as much as possible intact H Right D Tharu you very m uch Bye bye I understand There is certain kind of things which happen here This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu