V-30 t I I I I I I lit I I I I t l ria t' stamp Declassified 03 30 94 Top Secret Copy No 1 April 14 1977 Original No 343 Embassy of the USSR in the USA Washington From the Journal of Dobrynin A F stamp MFA USSR USA Department Secret Ent No 0265 RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION with the Secretary of State of the USA C Vance March 21 1977 I met with Vance on his invitation The Secretary of State said that in view of my forthcoming departure for Moscow on the eve of his arrival there he would like in the most general tenns to describe their approach to a new agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic weapons In this regard he underlined several times that the observations which he would make continue to be subject to review by the President that they are still not set and that they may be susceptible to certain changes This applies also to numerical data which also does not reflect the final position of the USA Vance said that in their opinion two variants of an agreement on the second stage of SALT are possible one is comprehensive which they prefer another is more limited and will be introduced in case the first one is not agreed on The first variant--the more complete agreement according to Vance--could consist of the following parts 1 The American side believes that it would be good already at this stage to agree on certain reductions from the levels of strategic arms established in Vladivostok This would reflect the intention of the sides to begin real anns reduction instead of merely adapting to the approximate actual levels of weapons which the sides have or plan to have In this context in their opinion the limitation of the levels could have the following character -- up to 2000 total strategic delivery vehicles -- up to 1200 MIRVed launchers 2 The Soviet side taking into consideration its advantage in throw weight must agree to a certain limit on launchers for heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBM which it is building or reequipping to accommodate the kind of missiles called -SS-18 in the USA He commented in this regard that it would be desirable to have say 150 missiles of this kind instead of 3 0 3 Both sides agree to a freeze in the creation and deployment of new types of ICBM with a corresponding limit on the number of atmospheric tests of missiles 4 Creation and deployment of mobile ICBMs are prohibited In this regard the United States would take an obligation to stop development and deployment of its mighty mobile ICBM M-X 5 All cruise missiles with a range of more than 2500 Ian are banned In the event that the Soviet side agrees to this proposal the American side will be ready to accept the Soviet position concerning the Backfire bomber by agreeing not to ascribe intercontinental capability to this plane The USA will be also ready to take into consideration Soviet data about the radius of operation of this bomber This said Vance is in general the structure of the possible first variant of the agreement As an alternative to this agreement if it is not achieved Vance continued President Carter's already well-known proposal--to conclude alimited- Vladivostok agreement including into it all items on which the sides had reached agreement but deferring unresolved questions Le frrst of all the cruise missiles and Backfire to the next third stage of SALT negotiations--could serve After I heard what Vance had to say I told him that if I may speak frankly none of these American proposals give a real basis for achieving a mutually acceptable agreement in Moscow I said further that upon fIrst consideration the comprehensive variant actually looks even worse than the limited variant the shortcoming of which was convincingly shown in L I Brezhnev's last letter to the President The fact that American side is striving judging by the expressed considerations toward a one-sided advantage is completely obvious I asked Vance what in the opinion of the administration the Soviet Union would get in exchange for all that If I may summarize in the subsequent discussion Vance justified the American position witli the following i I t I I I 1 I I I oI I I I i I -Ii ' i' rV-32 1 A decrease in the overall level of delivery vehicles from 2400 to OOO would impact in his words not only the Soviet Union but also the USA which currently has 2150 strategic delivery vehicles Although he had to recognize that the reduction would have a stronger impact on the Soviet side he added that a reduction in MIRVed launchers would have more of an impact on the USA than on the USSR since the USA had moved far ahead in the MIRVing of rockets I The inclusion of their suggested limits on our heavy rockets--as a reflection of the problem of the Soviet advantage in throw-weight which has long worried them--Vance argued that the USA in its turn will be prepared not to develop and not to manufacture MX its own new heavy mobile ICBM with increased accuracy This in his opinion would be from the point of view of the future sufficient compensation -for the Soviet side in the context of a compromise decision on the problem of throw-weight Speaking about the elimination of cruise missiles with a range of more than 2500 Ian Vance asserted that the remaining missiles Le those with a range of less than 2 5 thousand Ian are medium range rather than intercontinental In this regard he tried to make an analogy with our Backfire which has a range of 2200 km and is therefore characterized by the Soviet side as a tactical rather than strategic type of weapon I J f I made points consistent with our proposed agreement on the second stage of SALT using arguments contained in the communications of LJ Brezhnev and our position in previous negotiations with the ericans 1 Ii - r ' r In reply to my observation that the preparation of an agreement cannot be accelerated if we set aside issues which had already been jointly worked out and begin to consider some new questions which hinder the achievement of an agreement Vance characteristically retorted that the new administration does not consider itself completely committed to the approach of the former administration and that the Carter government strives toward a real and not just a superficial reduction in strategic weapons I noted in this regard in conducting such important negotiations we start from the fact that we are dealing with the government of the USA and that the reevaluation by every new administration of agreements reached by its predecessor does not strengthen the basis for international agreements Overall I said in my personal opinion both of the proposed variants are not only not directed toward achieving a mutually advantageous SALT agreement but to the contrary significantly weaken the chances for a quick conclusion of the second stage of negotiations I appealed to Vance to take into account everything that had already been said by the Soviet side especially the points made in the letters from the General Secretary of the CC CPsu about the possible paths to resolution of the problems of strategic arms limitation during the final review of their positions Vance said that the position he had expressed is not final but that the their position also must be understood -- the USA cannot consider accept in full a Soviet approach according I l 1 V-33h to which in his words the American side should accept in full the Soviet position on remaining questions instead of a search for mutual compromise I repeated to Vance that in my view the considerations he had expressed in no way can serve as a basis for the compromise he had mentioned ' Vance said that most probably the President will convene two more sessions of the National Security Council to work out the final American position for the negotiations in Moscow In conclusion Vance requested that I convey to the Soviet leadership that he is coming to Moscow with a serious task from President Carter to try and come to' an agreement on the central issue of his trips and that if necessary he will be prepared to stay over for a day or two to finish a detailed consideration of possibilities for the quickest conclusion of a new agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons Ambassador of the USSR in the USA t I If I signature A Dobryninl MB 395 II III II o D 11 I I 11 II' This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu