I I I I I I DOBRYNIN I think I will clarify the situation because I see the right wing and left wing views beginning to argue I think the situation was simple to understand from the American point of view We on the political side--by the political side I mean the Foreign Ministry-- really knew very little We knew very little about what was going on in our military thinking 156 -- ----------- -------------- II May 8--Morning Session 1 Did they have long-range planning in the military or not What kind of weaponry we were - II preparing Indicating Kondrashov Well he knows because he was working in the KGB and the KGB knew everything But there was no way for ordinary- l say ordinary--channels working in the Foreign Ministry to know what was going on So the situation was really a little bit like what Tarasenko said it was He speaks for the Foreign Ministry Kornienko knew a little bit more because he was in this f mous Georgy Five But even he didn't know everything because he didn't have any secrets from me and when we discussed things I felt that he was on a rather shaky ground he knew a little bit more but still in the grand scheme of things he did not know much When I came back from Washington and saw friends in the KGB and General Staff I began to learn some things But this was just piece by piece things were not well-connected in my mind So I would return to Washington a little bit enlightened but not on a great scale I was enlightened on this particular sphere or on that particular sphere ' -so that when I discussed things with you I would try to learn from you This was the situati'on There was no system It was as our Generals said It was a closed society Five six men--who knows And the whole Ministry--the Foreign Ministry I mean--knew nothing--except when we participated directly in formulating negotiation strategy We had a very good team in Geneva and in other places We l worked very closely together--military diplomats and KGB people It was a very good team But they weren't working together within their own society so to speak The military did not always tell us all the whole all the story Maybe they didn't know themselves--I mean our particip ts in the negotiations Or maybe there was some military discipline preventing it 157 II II oII II II o o j f i I I May 8--Morning Session 1 Perhaps they didn't want to go too far because after all it was only planning Military planning in Rus'Sia was top secret It's unbelievable in your country it's a loose cannon You discuss all these military things rightly or wrongly And ultimately you yourself don't know what you are talking about Laughter But it made an impression on us I should say because we tried to understand what you were talking about We still believed in l I I I t i t I I I t I I I you We had a much higher opinion of you at that time by the way than you did of yourselves Laughter So what Generals Detinov and Starodubov said was quite right At the later stages I had a chance to be a little bit more involved on the military side I had several chance to speak with the Minister But this was just because I happened to know the fellow For most of the period the military did not know me the ambassador personally They did not know how to talk with me This was the situation There is always an eagerness among the diplomats to know what we were up to but it was very difficult for us to know It was also difficult for you When I would go to the negotiations with you Cy or with Zbig I would have an instruction from Moscow Do not compromise on this issue merely inform the Americans of our position on this issue and so forth There was no indication of what we were really interested in They even asked me sometimes to find things out from you When I asked you questions they were my questions they were not Gromyko's questions I was trying to find out what was going on It was very difficult for us diplomats I repeat what Tarasenko said his is the voice of despair of the time We were not dumb diplomats but it is a difficult profession if you try very hard 158 May 8--Morning Session 1 We were trying very hard But the military people developed our positions One day they tried to explain to Mr Gromyko--in the very beginning of course--how missiles fly without I a propeller Laughter I was present when one of our fellows explained it to him Then of course he knew I graduated from Moscow Aviation Institute and I had very good connections with the Yakovlev Design Bureau when I was still ambassador so it was easy for me to understand it But most of our foreign policy people knew nothing We did not even know the names of our own weapons We used your names We have been speaking of Backfire By the way why-is it Backfire and not Fonvardfire Laughter We did not know But we used the Western name I never saw a Backfire actually Or rather I saw one photo later in an American magazine Laughter But I once tried to ask Gromyko why they couldn't take our diplomats who really involved in the negotiations to some factory or to some airfield just to see what kind of bombers existed in what form so that we would know what we were talking about It was impossible It was a top secret Why Viktor recalled how many years later on we called it the Tu-22 instead of the Backfire Tu-22M--this is what we called the modernized version But at the time we never knew what it was Everyone just called it Backfire We didn't know how to say that in Russian so always in my telegrams I only used the word Backfire I didn't lise a single Russian name for bombs or missiles or planes They were secret So this was the mentality And little by little began subconsciously to think that you really knew more than we because we used your terminology we use your designations for our missiles All of this was because there was a great gap between the military and the diplomats--a gap in communications not a disagreement What 159' I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I May 8--Moming Session 1 could lor others' tell Detinov Look here this particular missile should be prohibited Or This missile should be accepted as equivalent to that one in a ratio of one to five What kind of argument could I have against what he said The military had good intentions General Grechko also had very good intentions But he was against giving up anything because he learned his lessons from the Second World War That's why it was difficult The Commission of Five did a great service to us When I became a Secretary of the Party I participated in these kinds of discussions It was first name Sokolov at that time myself from the Party a fellow named first name Kryuchkov and somebody else An interesting discussion was going on too But the military just impressed on us that they had all the knowledge Our job was to talk about what kind of relations we wanted to have with the Carter administration I know you have a system that s much better than ours but at that time we didn't have any education in military things None at all No one attempted to educate the Foreign Ministry on military matters--except perhaps on a friendly basis one-on-one I would go to someone and he would tell me what I needed to know but he would say Please don't tell anyone that I told you This was the situation It made things very difficult That's why we now have this disagreement They are trying to convince you that they had a nice plan and Sergei said there was no planning at all Actually if you accept my explanation the truth was in between This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu