THE SECRETARY OF STATE SECRET SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT From - Cyrus vance Subject White Paper on Iran I wanted to bring you up to date on our efforts to prepare for an eventual Congressional or other inquiry into U S policy and activities in Iran and to restate 1 my belief that we ought not to prepare a simple White Paper In response to an SCC decision last December we collected and summarized in January the key documents available in each area of U S -Iranian relations since 1941 In addition we prepared a highly classi- fied Survey of U S -Iranian Relations which although clearly not a White Paper covers the broad outline of U S -Iranian relations and details certain of their more sensitive aspects This goes far beyond the initial short paper I understand you were given The NSC has a copy of the Survey and a one-volume compilation of the summaries of key documents We are holding the documents themselves and a substantial amount of useful backup material The NSC staff is reviewing certain of the important White House files to which we did not have access to ensure that our inventory of key documents is as nearly complete as possible mogether all of this material should provide us with the information we will need in responding to inquiries preparing speeches in defense of 0 5 actions or presenting our case to the Congress through testimony I believe there are a number of serious problems inherent in preparing a simple White Paper on Iran SECRET RDS-3 g3 25 00 WMHW am it magma P- SECRET -2- I -- While supporters of 0 8 policy toward Iran might at least initially welcome a White Paper it is the detractors and the critics who would most carefully scrutinize the document and make it a target of their attacks we would present a broad target for inquiry into nearly every action taken by the U S in pursuit of our objectives In short we could find ourselves decidedly on the defensive or having to adopt an unten- able we cannot go beyond what we have said posture -- To be effective a White Paper would have to be presented as an objective account of current and past policies In portraying earlier problems we could stimulate charges of having attacked previous administra- tions To the entent the Paper fell short of complete objectivity we could be open to charges here and abroad of covering up the acts of this or previous administra- tions - -Past experience with White Papers such as those on China 1949 and Vietnam 1965 is not encouraging Regardless of how well they were prepared the China White Paper for example was very well done they became more of a liability than an asset The Vietnam White Paper was clearly a minus in public attitudes towards our Vietnam policies -- A White Paper covering the entire range of our policies with Iran could arouse serious concern in other states in the region including Saudi-Arabia Egypt and Pakistan that their confidential exchanges with the U S could be brought into the open at some point -- We would have difficulty controlling the timing of its presentation once it was completed we could encounter POI and Congressional requests for its release Lastly if issued before the hostages were re- leased a spirited public defense of U S policy in the form of a White Paper wouldralmost certainly complicate our efforts to gain their freedom Depending on how it were perceived it could make still more difficult a face-saving solution for the Iranians or strengthen those elements in Iran demanding other inquiries into U S actions in that country SECREF WW Wm aI-ulv This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu