25m Approved For Release 2095I08I24 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY mum enema Imam-Immune ne- enel Dene-e er the United nee-e Imam theme-n- I l a INFORMATION REPORT by let The reproduction at thi- ll BMW-ted 25x1 COUNTRY USSR new no 2 5X1 SUIJECT Contribution at German Seiemtiete to the DATE mm 18 August 1953 Soviet Guided Missile Program - NO or noes 5 25 DATE OF INFO REGUIREHENT ND FLACE ACQUIRED REFERENCES 25x1 25x1 25m 25m 25x1 25m omen Ithe Soviet nieeile development end the unit of inference end are not bend en firet Maegan-L I 1 I the Soviet nieeile program In initieted 1ete --e e 19% upon the anal utilitiee 1t thet tile the pram at but unable to the Ger-en develepnent etue or 1 938 then were little lore then pet theeriee er I tee eelleae pron-earl 2 Hpen mini in Gem the ed-tn literal took everything the nd in remen teeming thi- neH unpon They preeured dame eeleeletienl and equipment in ehert everything which Herr-eluted tn the Gems n'liuile propel-h The eei'entiete tea the heel hue edge o ex-men eeile development were by the Batiste 3 The ievietl lede ne ihhediete ettenpt to mtmtieelly study end euluete the nteriel ebteined Ineteed they lent thie' indieerininetely uelleeted we to the UIBB dl'u'l the er ear-ting and causing me to take place SECRET 25m ' lihm Inc I I IJ I I Approved For Hefeasie ihosmem cm-noeeo-ooemnom romances-3 mm _es2-e 25 is wrong to believe that erman specialists vere brought to the Soviet Union only when the Soviets encountered difficulties in re-construoting the German var- 25X1 time aiseilee eoiontiete as sell as the missile reference me or a were regarded as spoils of var TIO SEPARATE GUIDED HIBSIEE PEUGEAIB 25x1' 4 Some Soviet supervised studies of the German missiles had already been aade in the-years 1945 and 1946 in such places as Hordhausen and Upon arrival in the USSR the Soviet missile develop- ment program vas divided into two distinct branches The Germans for exanple thoee in were given research programs vhioh constituted modifications refinements or advancee on the German var models in regard to range and load capacity The second or Soviet branch pursued a course which vas not undo kncun to the Genmsn 25x1 ecientistsh lthey spent the first period studying the Boreas approach and that at a given tine the Soviet specialists pushed beyond the latest German development point In that year hovever the Soviets attained the German stage of 1945 is not known to me IOEITT ABSIG TU 551 09 5 There is no question that the cviata pursued this work vith great intensity and that a priority vae assigned to this research vorh a clue to the actual priority rating of the missile program may be obtained from the salaries given the German specialists ecrking in the USSR The missile personnel received salaries vhich sore ccn ' siderahly higher than those received by personnel engaged in the airplane industry while they received somewhat less than electronic specialists 6 The Soviets vculd have little difficulty in shifting the necessary manpbver to a priority project This can be done in several vays ror instance a certain percentage of engineering graduates can be ordered to a desired institute or plant or engineers from other plants can be attracted by means of allurements in the torn of higher wages special bonuses etc it is also possible that 25X1 ideological arguments may be use stay young graduate engineers -into critical fields arguments prove ineffective other methods till he graduates are given their choice of several lcoa one or ants for vork upon graduation Generally some slight is given to the student's own preference but it is equally possible to insure the needed skilled aanpcesr for priority projects by or eliminating altogether the choice factor one to rice he or or so screws to some see 11mm 25x1 7 25X1 the Soviets profited relatively little -Ehia ne primarily because of the Sotiet method of opsrating -and also the lack of facilities particularly experimental facilities on the vorh Iith the same number of personnel if per crne crush and under normal circumstances vould have been performed in perhaps one-third Approved For Release EDUSIOBIZII 25x1 25m 25x1 25m 25x1 25x1 25x1 25x1 Approved For Refeage icosroerzd monsoon-0031commonsense sooner l 25X1 -5- the time 25x1 It may appear paradoxical that some items of considerable interest were nevertheless developed under the given circumstances It Isaalr sell he thatZthese technical no'u'eltfmelf such as the mo hle high pressure motor of the Reid the thermodynamic formulae for the determination of metal heating at extreme altitudes and epesde or the war head ee ration principle of the and 3-14 prodeoteaas a direct result ofbrimi tive working Conditions Ihe ideal of engineering to crea something out of relatively little may have been reached in some isolated problems just because of the primitive circums tenses I EVEREE IDHEIHG BOEILITIDHS OUTPUT 25m The emotions of the var yeare and the post-war occurrences in the gvigt Zone of Goran had left their indelible marks I 25x1 25x1 '10 Ia general depression prevailed amcn the German specialie ts at arising from the poverty of I 25x1 surroundingsl I 25 This mood sas reflected in work output I I 25 It was during this period that the 3-115 the final major proaect was executed by the Germans at mhe luv ebb vas reached in January 1952 shes the first group of German scientists from returned to the Soviet Zone of Germany 11 The most elemental equipment required was lacking and vorking facilities were no better 1 ing facilities 588 oh were very primitive The power supp 3 ten failed it tines there vae insufficient drawing equipment and even pencils vere lacking Host important of course was the complete absence of experimental equipment 25x1 25x1 25 12 Another factor that prevented a more effective exploitation of the German scientists hr the Soviets was the absence of necessary technical literature I I 25m Approved For Release ZDDSIDBIZ4 25x1 25x1 25x1 25x1 13c 14 15 16d '17e Approved For Release 2005I08124 519 BRET -4- from the most direree technical fields were areils'bl there see not a single periodical on rocket develop- ment I many of the sacri ce received were always censored and often shole articles or sen- tences ssro deleted I gment Dr memo attained the element of a ferrule on the effect of heat on steel at extreme speeds hnical literature available at Gstaahkcf BREEDING EFFECT 01' SOVIET GPWIOH NETBODS The greatest deterrent to progress eas caused by Soviet operating methods with the emphasis on planning This method invaded even the scientific fielde Iver development asei set to be completed by a certain' time It was further re- qnired to give a periodical eoconnt of the degree of completion the project had achieved expressed in tens of percent 111 this see time consoling end Furtherv more it 111 11 er 1 41 to LEW Additional time was wasted when at the end of a given report period the Soviets found that the prospective development etege had not been reached many days would then he lest eon- Tinoing often by fraudulent means the Soviets that the ex- pected stage had been reachedI or to explain shy the stage could not he reached In short a reariecme tattle oi eorde ensued ehich resulted in the loss of nsny manhonrs of later fine was also lest as a result of impossible demands node by the Soviets I I lo tins see lest as a result of placing ideologically scceptehle Boviste of inferior technical capacity in positions of leader- ship Then again this problen was not experienced at Getaehhor since the Seviet personnel employed there had essentially only administratiire functione 5 GOULD EEG 35 KOBE not eohnicel efficacy the Soviets would have to correct 13' cited chore I SECRET Approved For Release 2005 3 24 25X1A 25x1 25x1 25x1 25x1 25x1 25x1 25x1 25X1 25x1 25x1 25x1 Approved For Release ZUDSIUBIH occasi- 25x1 25x1 MEIER PRGJEQTES Ht 19 Approximtely twenty five German scientists and their families remined in Gstash kov after the depar tort of the Germans in JLLUB 1 952 I I 25x1 25m REASON Fi 017' 20 The selection of these particular twenty-five scientists was not governed by the degree of importance of their work or their capacity as engineers or scientists to the contrary among the twenty-five are some 1who possess relatively inferior tech- 25x1 nical ability the deciding factor in their re- tention was pure po ea the So lets probably regardea them as politically unreliable Perhaps they had nude a comment which came to the attention of a political security office or their sympathy with the West was all too apparent GALIEEH OF SWEET EMLTEJIJQ 25X1 21 Soviet training methods pf'EVent the rise of creative researchers I ISoviet engineering 25x1 personnel received excellent theoretical sensations comparable with the training received in European universities Although possessing the theoretical knowledge they are unable to effect- ively apply this knowledge is solving practical problems They appear to lack the creative talent necessary for original 25X1 research Ithis is due to two factors 25x1 national hair-wartime 1 Icomment 'eferred 25x1 to a national biological inferiorif anti the environment of 25x1 an authoritarian state d inquiry and speculation is strictly repressed even in the as oral 'sciences for fear that this attitice may not be confines to the field of scicrce bu may in time lead to criticism and heresy in the political arena as well 25m SECRET Approved For Release 2005F03I24 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu