COPY NO I Iii SPECIAL NATHJNAL INTEHJGENCE ESTHMATE SOVIET CAPABILITIES OR ATTACK ON THE US THROUGH 1957 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL a Lll' 9 SNIE Supersedes 16 February I954 PubIIshecI 24 February I954 The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 16 February i954 The following member organizations of the Aduiaury Committee participated with the CentmI trite-t tigenee Agencu in the preparation a this estimate The nteftigencc Organization of the Departments at State the Army the N ilyt the Air Force and The Joint Stat CENTRAL INTEHJGENCE AGENCY NOTICE 1 This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the re- cipient's of ce who require the information for the performance of their official duties Further dissemination elsewhere in the department to other of ces which require the information for the performance of of cial duties may be authorized by the following a Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence for the Department of State b Assistant Chief of Staff 3-2 for the Department of the Army c Director of Naval Intelligence for the Department of the Navy d Director of Intelligence USAF for the Department of the Air Force e Deputy Director for Intelligence JointStafi for the Joint Staff f Director of Intelligence AEC for the atomic Energy Commission g Assistant to the Director FBI for the Federal Bureau of Investigation 11 Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination CIA for any other Department or Agency 2 This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by a1 rangement with the Of ce of Collection and Dissemination CIA 3 The overseas dissemination of this intelligence will be limited to a period of one year or less at the end of which time it will be destmyed returned to the forward- ing agency or permission requested of that agency to retain it in accordance with June 1953 matcrial contains information slice-i th - I within the me Title 13 U50 - trans- mission - -- -tion of which mauthoriaed person is prohibited by law onage laws SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US THROUGH 1957 THE PROBLEM To estimate the capabilities of the USSR to attack the continental US by open or clandestine means through 1957 SCOPE Thislestimate is concerned solely with Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the - continental US during the period through- 195-7 does not att m pt to assess whether the USSR intends to attack the US during that period or what courses of action the USSR would adopt before along with or after such an attack Further- more the paper estimates Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the US without refer- ences to any commitments of military forces which the USSR might make elsewhere and without reference to any advantages which the USSR might gain for an attack on the US by previously occupying territory that is not now within the Soviet Bloc PARTI I SOVIET Mass DESTRUCTION weapons Nuclear Weapons 1 General The Soviet nuclear energy pro- gram will continue through 1957 to have one of the highest priorities in the allocation of Soviet resources The program which is con- tinuing to expand emphasizes weapon devel- opment and aims at reducing the relative advantage of the Us both in weapon develop ment and production By the end of 1953 the USSR had established a substantial plu- tonium production capacity and achieved the production of weapon grade uranium- 35 On the basis of data obtained from the 7 Soviet explosions detected to date we con- clude that by the end of 1953 the Soviets had reached a point in weapons technology at 'soweT Gaoss CAPABILITIES which they were capable of producing'weapon types with energy yields ranging from the equivalent of a few thousand tons of TNT up to the equivalent of one million tons of TNT The numbers of these weapons would be limited by the supply of nuclear materials available rather than by technical o-u ZEWeepons stockpiles While there is no clear evidence as to the speci c types and the numbers of each type or nuclear weapon that the Soviets will actually stockpile we believe the weapons stockpiied will probably have the general characteristics and explosive powers of the models already tested There are many courses of action which the USSR adopt in establishing its stockpile of nuclear weap- ons The tables which follow are based upon four alternative hypothetical examples mass i STOCKPIIE mamas ONE Based on the assumption that the USSR continues stockpiling composite and pure plutonium ssion weapons as tested in 1951 and yielding approxi- mately the equivalent of 40 000 tons of TNT each End Mid Mid Mid Mid 1953 1951 1955 1955 1957 Unboosted composite plutonium weapons 40 000 tons each 240 390 5 15 500 Total Yield bullion tons 1 2 9 5 15 0 23 32 5T0 EWLE TWO Based on the assumption that the USSR uses all its sslonable material with thermonuclear boosting as tested in 1953 to build a stockpile oi plutonium com- ponent weapons of medium yield 60 000 tons of TNT 'and- small yield oi mi and uranium-235 weapons yielding one million tons of TNT each End Mid Mid Mid Mid 1953 1954 1955 1955 1957 Boosted uranium 235 ll million tons each 12 13 34 54 80 Boosted plutonium weapons 60 000 tons each 00 35 125 175 235 Boosted plutonium weapons 5 000 t'ons each 190 250 3'15 525 700 Total Number of - Weapons 252 353 534 75 1 015 Total Yield Million - tons of 15 5 24 3 43 4 65 5 97 5 mm THREE Based on the assumption that the USSR uses all its ssionable material to build a stockpile of large yield boosted weapons uranium 235 Weapons Fielding the equivalent of one million tons oi TNT each and pure plutonium weapons yielding the Equivalent of 50 000 tons of TNT each End Md Md Mid Md 1953 1954 1955 1955 1951' Boosted uranium 235 weapons 1 million BTOCI-EPJLE mm FOUR Based on the assumption that the USSR uses all its sslonable material to build a stockpile oi small yield boosted weapons composite and pure plu- tonium weapons yielding the equivalent or 5 500 tons of TNT each End Mid Mid Mid Mid 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 Boosted composite pure plutonium weapons 5 000 tons each 550 1 25 1 115 1 125 2 400 Total Yield 2 3 as 5 9 as 12 3 'Morgin of Error in Estimate While the gures given in the tables above represent the most probable estimates for the examples pre- sented the actual gures for weapons stock- piled at the end of 1953 may be as much as one-third lower or higher than those given The uncertainty as to amounts of ssionable material produced increases proportionately as estimates are projected into the future Thus the actual gures for 1957 may be as low as one-hall or as high as twice the gures given in the tables above o'ruture Developments The USSR will probably continue work on small-yield and small-dimension weapons and further devel- opments of this type of weapon could be tested during- 1954 The-possibility cannot be ex eluded that the USSR will develop nuclear warheads for weapons other than bombs dur- ing the period of this estimate The USSR will probably also continue work on develop- ing weapons with energy yields in excess of a million tons of TNT This program possibly could result in a prototype weapon by 1957 If this research is successful and as a conse- quence the USSR develops weapons in which thermonuclear reactions contribute directly a major portion of the energy yield the energy yield of a portion of the Soviet weapon stoch- pile could be multiplied by a factor of approxi- 3 23 3 12 nium 3 13 3 5 3 mately ve without any increase in ssionable Weapons 60 000 material production or in numbers of weapons Totpsneua r or 120 250 350 all - It is improbable however that conversion of Weapons 2 133 234 404 550 weapons in stockpile in this way will take Tum yield mun place on a substantial scale during the period loos TNTthis estimate 3 fl an Radiological Weapons 5 It is most unlikely for technological rea- sons that the USSR will have the capability to produce militarily signi cant quantities of radiological warfare agents during the period of this estimate However the USSR will have available small quantities of gross or separated-fission products which might be employedyas ij agents Biological Wo riore 6 The Soviet Union is in possession of all the necessary basic knowledge for the production of most BW agents If they chose to do so they would be able to construct or operate plants for BW production and weapons for dissemination could be available in adequate- - numbers However there is no evidence at present that such weapons are being devel- oped Since it is not feasible to stockpile large quantities of most BW agents in pro- longed storage operational requirements would have to be supplied largely from cur- rent production Chemical Warfare The USSR can probably engage in chemical - warfare on a large scale We assume that the stockpile of standard agents and munitions accumulated during World War II has been maintained and will be available for use dur- ing the period of this estimate The USSR has the facilities and scienti c knowledge necessary to produce at least one of the nerve gases and could employ nerve gases during the period of this estimate DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL AND MASS WEAPONS BY AIRCRAFT Long-Rondo Aviation 8 The Til 4 Soviet Long-Range Aviation constitutes the long-range striking force of the uses It consists of 3 Air Armies 1 1n the Far East and 2 in the western USSR plus I 01135 of undetermined subordination in the 1stiern USSR The medium bomber Which was copied from the American 3 29 is the only Soviet bomber known to be in opera- tional' use and capable of carrying nuclear weapons to distant targets As of 1 January 1954 a total of about 1 000 TU i's was esti mated to be available in operational units Table of Equipment strength of Soviet air regiments known to be equipped with or in process of being equipped with Til 4 aircraft totals 1 220 aircraft but the Til 4 regiments are currently estimated to he at only about 35 percent of TE strength As of 1 January 1954 approximately 180 six regiments with an aggregate strength of 220 were located in the Far East It is ti licved that deliveries of TU a's to operational units are continuing 9 Tarboprop Heavy Bomber We have very little information on Soviet development work on new types of'medium or 'heavy bombers No medium or heavy bomber other than the Til 4 is known to be in series production in the Soviet Union At the Moscow Air Show in 1951 a single four engine aircraft considerably larger than the Til-4 was observed in ight and was designated by Allied intelligence as the Type 31 In mid-1953 'l distinctive air- craft with tails reported as being approxi mately 5 feet higher than the TU-ll were seen on the ground by competent observers This and other information including- the sighting 'at Kazan Aircraft Factory of 5 aircraft re- ported larger- than the Til 4 suggest that a bomber larger than the Tile-4 may have an- tered series production in 1953 This aircraft could be a heavy bomber similar to the 31 and it could be powered by turboprop en- gines The status of Soviet production of turboprop engines is unknown but the USSR has developed and tested a prototype turbo- prop engine based on the design of the Ger- man 10 Jet Heavy Bomber Part of the con g- uration of a single new large aircraft with a swept-back vertical tail was observed at a So viet experimental establishment in mid-1953 and designated by Allied intelligence as the TypH'f The aircraft appeared to be larger than the US B47 medium jet bomber and could fall within the heavy or near-heavy bomber category T-o-a sso-n-s-Ia 4 11 Jet Medium Bomber Based on known development work stemming from German projects in the medium jet bomber eld it is estimated that a few Soviet bombers oi this class will appear in operational units by mid- 1955 There is no indication that it is at present in production 12 Summary Table The following table of estimated strength and composition of the bomber force of Soviet Hang-Range Aviation is based on the assumptions a that series production of a heavy bomber with turboprop engines began in April 1953 b that series production of a medium jet bomber will begin in 1954 and c that series production of a heavy jet bomber will begin in 1950 ESTEIATED STRENGTH IN OPERATIONAL UNITS January 1054 End 1951' Medium Bomber Piston 1 000 4'15 Jet 325 Heavy Bomber Turboprop possibly a 'fewl 500 about 200 of these might have im- proved 7 000 - engines Jet a few TOTAL q-l 1 000 1 300 AircrEH Characteristics 13 The Til-4 The Til 4 under normal op- erating conditions is estimmed to have a combat radius of 1 700 nautical miles and a combat range of 3 100 nautical miles with a 10 000 pound bomb load Under cruise con- trol conditions necessary to reach distant tar- get areas its speed would be apprommately 175 knots at an altitude of about 10 000 feet- However it is capable of attaining a maximum speed of 350 knots at about 30 000 feet for short intervals Although there is 'Should the USSR be able to shorten the period necessary to produce a long-range jet bomber the USSR might not produce a turboprop long- range aircrait in this quantity no intelligence to indicate that it has done so the USSR is considered capable of mOdifye ing the Til 4 to increase its range in the same manner that the American was stripped to produce the 3 203 This mod - fication involves removal of defensive arma- ment except for the tall turret and increase in the fuel capacity with a net weight reduc- tion of 2 600 pounds in take-oi weight So modi ed a Til 4 would have markedly re- duced defense capabilities against interceptor attack but its combat radius would be in- creased to 2 150 nautical miles and its combat range to 4 000 miles carrying a 10 000 pound bomb load - 14 Turboprop Heavy Bomber Assuming in- stallation cat a engine a hears - bomber of the Type 31 class could have a combat radius of 2 500 nautical miles and a combat range of 4 800 miles with combat speeds up to 325 knots at an altitude of 35 000 feet By the end of 1957 technical modi ca- tions and improvements particularly in the engines on such a heavy bomber might per- mit a combat radius of 3 000 nautical miles and a combat range of 5 000 nautical miles with combat speeds up to 350 knots at an alti- tude of 35 000 feet - - - 15 Jet Heavy Bomber Available information on the Soviet jet engine program is not ade- quate to determine when a Soviet engine suit- able for use in a jet heavy bomber may be available Based on an assumption of instal- lation of a 10 000 pound thrust power plant believed to be under development a jet heavy bomber could have a maximum speed of 450 knots at 40 000 feet a combat ceiling of 44 000 feet a combat radius of 2 500 nautical miles and a combat range of 4 300 nautical miles with a 10 000 pound load 16 Jet Medium Bomber It is estimated that the jet medium bomber which the USSR could have operational by mid-1955 could have a combat radius of 1 500 and a combat range of 2 900 nautical miles carrying a 10 000 pound bomb load A Soviet jet medium bomber hav- ing these characteristics could reach targets in the United States only from the Chukoiskl base area On a oneway mission it could - 5 reach targets north of an are drawn through Los Angeles Denver and Minneapolis On a two-way mission with in ight refueling it could just reach Seattle 17 in ight Refueling No intelligence is available concerning Soviet in ight refueling capabilities However in ight refueling tech- niques do not impose serious technical prob- lems and the USSR has had access to the techniques and equipment employed by the US in this eld It is therefore necessary to consider the effect of in ight refueling in ext tending the range of Soviet bomber aircraft A eet of tanker aircraft and appreciable training in their operational use would be - necessary before two-way missions 'on 'a large scale could be conducted The establishment of tanker units would require the conversion of or production of new tanker air- craft With one refueling the combat radius of the long-range aircraft with a 10 000 pound load could be increased as shown in the following table 18 Summary Table The estimated 1957 maidmum performance characteristics of So - viet long-range aircraft are summarized in the 1' allowing table Combat IKE Catalan-rig 8 Ceiling ELMO lb load i li tl feet Medium Bombers i1 Til 4 moo 3 100 350I30 000 36 500 Modi ed 2 150 i 000 seafoopoo 37 500 - Modi ed with one refueling 3 0o0 5 600 21 Jet Med Bomber 1 5002'2300 43 000 iw h one refueling 2 100 radius Heavy Bombers ill hips-31 class with 5 601 ESHP turbo- propsl 2 500H il 325 35 000 36 000 with one reiuelingl 3 500 radius Type 31 class with 7 000 ESHP turbo- props 3 000 5 60 aeoxashoo 33 000 t bii di smile as lb ioa gift ifeetlg with one refueling 4 200 radius 2 Jet Heavy Bomber 2 5OOJ4 BDD 450140 000 000 with one reiuellngi 3 500 radius It should be noted that the performance char- acteristics given for all aircraft are based on calculations which in turn depend on assump- tions A - Boseaireos for Direct Air Attack on the US 19 - General Three base areas the Chukot- ski area in northeast Siberia the Kola area in northwest USSR and Soviet and Sovlebcon- trolled territory along the Baltic and in East- ern Germany are the closest to the United States I The Chukotski and Kola areas are particularly advantageous as bases for sur- prise attacks since great circle routes would avoid initial overnight of nations friendly to the us Theextensionoi bomber ranges by the end of 195' will not be great enough to allow the-enemy to dispense with these areas if important'targets in the 'whole of the United States are to be reached on Other than one- way missions It is therefore reasonable to suppose that at least until the end of the period of this estimate any large-scale attacks would involve the use of these areas From any of these base areas the stripped-down with one in ight refueling and the 'l ype al class and the jet heavy bomber on one-way missions could reach any target in the -US having the 5 60 nautical mile range and the Type 31 class could also operate from bases in the biterior of the So- viet Union on one-way missions against the US 20 Ehuicotslci Area Of the three base areas mentioned the Chukotski area is nearest to the United States The standard on a two-way mission with no in ight refueling could not reach the United States On a one- FSee Appendix A ior maps depicting Soviet long- range bomber capabilities for attack on the con- tinental United States from these bases way mission it could reach targets within an are drawn from San Diego to Lake Superior The stripped-down Til 4 on a two-way mission could reach Seattle without in ight refueling With outbound in ight refueling on a two- way mission this type of aircraft could reach targets within an are drawn from San Diego through Lake Superior A one-way mission without in ight refueling would permit the stripped-down Til 4 to reach targets in all parts of the United States except Florida from the Chukotski base area By 1956 the im- proved Soviet Type 31 class turboprop heavy bomber operating from the Chulsotslri area on a two-way basis with in ight refueling could reach targets anywhere in the US and with- out refueling could reach targets north and west of an are drawn from San Diego through Lake Superior The jet heavy bomber operat- ing from the Chukotski area on a two-way mission with indight refueling could reach targets north and west of an are drawn through Dallas Cincinnati and Pittsburgh and without refueling could reach targets north of an are drawn through San Francisco Ogden and Bismarck 21 Operational Conditions in the Chukotski Area Long range air operations from the Chulrotski area would encounter many dith- 'culties because of basic logistic limitations and adverse climatic conditions logistically the area is served principally by sea-lift limited to the ice-free months of the year Moreover there are no known air elds which could be used for sustained operations from the Chukotski area although it is estimated that the area contains four air elds capable of supporting limited medium bomber staging operations There are additional air elds which could be improved to support long- range bomber operations It is also possible that frozen surfaces might be employed dur- ing the Arctic winter to provide staging air strips or assembly parking areas 22 Kola and Baltic-East German Areas 1 aircraft sortied from the Kola and Baltic- East German areas could not reach the United States except the northern tip of Maine and return to their bases even with one outbound refueling From the Kola area a stripped- dowa on a one-way mission range 4 000 -- 23 Operational Conditions in Kola 6 nautlcal miles could reach targets roughly north and east of a line from Charleston South Carolina through southern Oregon From the Baltic area such a range would enable to attack targets north and east of an are drawn from Charleston South Car olina through Montana All of the north- eastern industrial centers of the United States could be reached from either area The Type- 31 class heavy Dumber on two-way missions without refueling from eitherihe Kola or the Baltic area could only reach the northern tip of Maine On two-way missions with one in ight refueling the Type 31 class operat- ing from the Kola or Baltic areas could reach targets in ailof the US north of an are drawn from Charleston South Carolina _ through Mnneapolis a Jet large bomber operating from these areas could not reach the United States on two-way missions without refueling but with one in ight refueling could reach the New England area 1 and Baltic-East German Areas There are 2 air- elds estimated to be capable of supporting medium and heavy bomber operations for at least a limited period from this area In addi tion there are air elds of 4 000 feet or 'more in length some'of which- could probably be -improved and extended to support long range bomber operations Both Makurtti and Mur- mansk-Vayenga are favorably situated logisti- cally and great circle routes from this area would avoid initial over ight of nations friendly to the United States The Baltic East German area has adequate bases to sup- port large numbers of medium and heavy bombers The Leningrad area contains at least 4 airfields which are presently suitable' for long-range operations Improvements of other airfields in the area could provide addi- tional facilities during the period The area including Poland and the Soviet Zone of Ger- many has at least so air elds that could be used for long-range bomber operations These bases are favorably situated with respect to communications and weather and are ade- quately served by existing transportation facilities A major disadvantage is that great circle routes to the United States from these I A I 51o - 7 bases pass over portions of Western Europe off Scandinavia and any attempted air strike might be detected early enough to provide warning or n_ 24 Targeting and Bombing Accuracy Soviet long-range aviation has available through open sources virtually complete target and navigation data on North America and ap- proach routes It' is even probable that in the event of a surprise attack certain Western electronic navigational aids would be avail- able at least during part or the ight Slrn- ilarly meteorological reports including pro le data at all altitudes are regularly broadcast in the United States and Canada in simple cipher We esthnate the Soviet blind-bomb- ing and navigational radar equipment is capa- ble of at least equal or better performance than the US World War II equipment which the USSR acquired It is also possible that clandestinely placed navigational beacons may be used for aircraft homing The cur rent Soviet training program points to contin- uing improvement in air crew proficiency In view of these factors and Soviet ability to select a time of attack with respect to favor- able route and target weather conditions there can be little doubt that Soviet air crews would have the ability to navigate with suf - cient accuracy to reach the major'populaticn and industrial centers of the United States- and to achieve bombing accuracy by either visual or radar means generally within the eilective radius of the weapons available al- though the effectiveness of attack delivered by radar alone could be materially reduced by deiensiwelectronic countermeasures 2e Availability Abort Rate Replacement Foc tor Maintenance of Soviet aircraft although below US standards has improved since World War II and is considered adequate By the end of 195' the Soviets should be capable of achieving in the forward staging areas a serv- iceability rate of 35 percent for an initial de- liberately prepared surprise attack against North America The sustained sendceabliity rate for bombers is estimated at about 40 per- cent ior normal operations- Cold weather Operations might cause some reduction in the foregoing gures In addition we estimate that up to 20 to 25 percent of the aircraft tamig off would fail to reach target areas for reasons other than our air defense activity In view or the fact that most US target areas could be reached only by one-way missions or on two-way ights employing range extension techniques aircraft losses would be high No appreciable reserves oi Til 4's are believed to exist at the present time II a tanker eet is created or Til-4's are converted ior other spe- cial purposes appreciable nunhbers of TU d's phased out of operational bomber units dur- ing the period of this estimate would probably not be available as a reserve There will be no appreciable reserves oi any new types of air- crait introduced during the period -of this- EStlInate 26 Wrangler The USSR has consistently dc voted considerable emphasis to both short and long period meteorological iorecasting Spe cial techniques for upper air research and improved synoptic methods are being devel- oped ior use in weather forecasting for periods longer than one month although we cannot estimate the degree of success which will be achieved during the period of this estirnate By 1955 it is believed that the USSR will have achieved a short period prediction capability 'in at least the European USSR of 85 percent reliability as compared with the present reli- ability oi 60 percent This prediction capa- bility plus extensive experience in meteorolog ical research in the extreme northern lati- tudes good weather reporting facilities in Siberia availability of records of weather con- ditions which have prevailed throughout North America for many years and constant access to current North American weather conditions and forecasts should enable the USSR to predict both route and target weather with re enable accuracy 4 1 1 5 1 1 Electronic Eounternlsasures The USSR has had access to a wide variety of US deten- sive radar and to some US janmung equip ment The USSR is apparently well aware of the tactical advantage to be gained by jam- ming defensive radar and other communica- tions We believe that the USSR is now tech- nically capable of producing limited quantities 4 of ground based and airborne jamming equip- ment to cover frequencies through 10 000 megaoycles and that the USSR can seriously disrupt long-range radio communications be tween the continental US and its overseas fa- cilities We further believe that the USSR will increase the effectiveness of its jamming equipment as well as the pro ciency and num- ber of its trained personnel throughout the period of this estiinate Airborne counter - measures are likely to be available for use against defensive radars and ground air fight- er control communications in use at the pres- ent time for the defense of North America The effectiveness of the future countermeas- ures will depend on the degree of success ob- tained from Soviet analysis of signal radia tions and from other means of obtaining technical data on the defense radar that will - then be in use It is believed probable that the USSR has produced sufficient electronic countermeasures devices to equip some TU-4 aircraft It is not known whether Soviet Til 4's have in fact been equipped with such jamming equipment or how effective those devices would be against US defensive radar Use of effective jamming equipment probably would require the employment of extra air- cra'ft equipped specially for this purpose 23 reoriented Scale of Air Attack in 1954 1- Soviet gross capabilities for air attack on tar-_' gets in the continental United States are pres- entiy limited by dependence on the bomber by the apparent lack of a developed infiight refueling capability and by the rela- tively undeveloped character of the Chukotski and Kola base areas Nevertheless it is esti- mated that the USSR by a maidmum effort could launch approidmately 300 aircraft from the Chukotski and Kola areas in a surprise attack against the United States If the bulk of these aircraft were committed to one-way unrefueled missions approximately 250 might reach target areas not considering combat losses If however approximately 50 aircraft were refueled in ight requiring the use as tankers of 65 of the aircraft launched the number reaching target areas might be ap- proximately 200 not considering combat losses Some of these aircraft reaching the target probably would not be bomb carriers WW since a number would be used for electronic countermeasures escort or diversionary tasks 29 Estimated Scale of Air Attack in 1957 The Soviets could by a major effort have suffi clent facilities to launch a madman of ap- proximately 1 IJDO aircraft in an initial air operation against the US by the end of 1957 if their entire heavy and medium bomber force were employed The number of mission aircraft in this total would vary considerably depending on the types of missions employed If a combination of missions designed to achieve optimum weight of attackyith recov- ery of a sizable part of the attacking force were employed approximately 550 aircraft could be mission aircraft with appraidmately 450 used as tankers This is a maximum capability under the stated conditions Its exercise would involve very dif cult opera- - tional and logistical problems particularly those pertaining to the creation of a tanker The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Assist- ant Chief of Staff 6-2 Department of the Army feel that available intelligence on over-all Soviet capabilities for long-range air attack is insuffi- cient to warrant a nite estimate of the number of aircraft which might arrive over target areas in the in 1954 They therefore believe that paragraph 23 should read as follows 1 Soviet gross capabilities for air attack on'tar- gets in the continental United States are pres- ently limited by dependence on the Til 4 bomber by the apparent lack of in ight re- fueling capability and by the relatively unde veloped character of the Chukotsld and Kola base areas The Soviets have suf cient TUA's to attempt the delivery of all or a substantial part of their atomic stockpile the number depending upon types of weapons stockpiledl against the United States from bases in Soviet-controlled territory This capability is dependent upon their willingness to accept the loss on onevway missions of a substantial portion of their long- range aircraft and to rile the loss of surprise foi- a portion of the attacking force by launching an attack from Baltic-East German bases and upon their employment of range extehsion techniques Such an attack might be launched without de- tection although aircraft launched from Euro- pean bases would in all probability be detected while transiting non-Soviet territory Some of the aircraft reselling target areas probably would not be bomb carriers since a number would be used for electronic countermeasures escort or diversionary tasks fleet and the training of both tanker and mis- sion aircrews Of these 550 mission aircraft apprordmately 450 could arrive over target areas not considering combat losses If the USSR should decide not to create a tanker eet and to commit the built of its forces to one-way unrefueled missions it is estimated that the magnitude of the attack might be on the order of 700 aircraft reaching target areas not considering opposition or combat losses Some of these aircraft reaching the target areas probablyr would not be bomb carriers since a number would be used as in 1954 for electronic countermeasures escort or diver- sionary tasks DELIVERY OF AND MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS BY OTHER MEANS r 7 Guided Missiles 30 General There is no positive information that the USSR now has any guided missiles in series production It is known that the USSR has been conducting an intensive research and development program and has made certain developmental improvements on the V l and type weapons whioh'were used operation- ally by the Germans during World War II 31 V41 Characteristics The con- tinued development on the V l missile A single pulse-jet version'could carry a 2 000 pound warhead to a range of 210 nautical miles at a speed of 370 knots A twin pulse- lEt version has been developed which could carry a warhead up to 4 500 pounds for shorter distances There is no positive evidence of Soviet experimentation in the field of sub- marine-launched guided missiles however it is estimated that the Soviet Union could equip a number of submarines for the launching of V-l type missiles It is probable that such missiles could be given some guidance up to a range of about 200 nautical miles although accuracy limitations would probably preclude general use against other than area targets Characteristics The USSR has car- ried forward the development of the German type ballistic missile This missile how- ever could not be a threat against the con- imentai US during the period of this estimate i CLANDESTINE DELIVERY 5Nucleor Weapons 33 General The USSR is_capable of pro- ducing nuclear weapons which could be smug- gled into the US either as complete assemblies or as component parts or subassemblies The assembled devices could range from Small- yield weapons equivalent of 5 00 0 tons of TNT or less weighing a few hundred pounds to larger-yield weapons possibly up to the equiv- alent of 1 000 000 tons of TNT weighing sev- eral thousand pounds Their size could range from that of a package small enough to fit bite the luggage compartment of an automo- bile to that of a packing case large enough to contain an automobile All of these weapons could be designed to break down into'a' mun-1 her of relatively and readily transport- able components Those designed to give a relatively low yield would not require much labor or technical training assemble Some- what more labor and training would be re- quired to assemble weapons designed to give high yields and once assembled they would be more di cult to transport It is conceiv- able that only the in small pieces need be smuggled into the US since other components couidjbe fabricated or procured in title country This scheme however would require careful advance plan- ning and coordination by supervisory person- nel with engineering skill and familiarity with the US sources of needed components and would take a longer time to carry out It would probably result in a reduced yield for a given amount of ssionable material It would incur a substantially greater security risk than the clandestine introduction of all components ad ilerhocs of nursery a variety of meth- ods of clandestine delivery suggest themselves Assembled weapons could be dropped by ap- parently friendly aircraft could be detonated in the hold of a merchant ship or could be sown as underwater mines Either compo- nents or assembled weapons could be brought in under diplomatic immunity smuggled across land or sea frontiers introduced through normal import channels or brought mam 10 in as bonded merchandise awaiting transship- ment The selection of the method of intro- duction and of transport and assembly within the US would depend on the Soviet obiectlve and the risk of detection which the USSR was willing to accept 1 35 Security Considerations Considering the known limitations of the means of physical detection it is probable that the USSR could introduce into the US and detonate in place a considerable number of nuclear weapons by clandestine means However the USSR would have to take into account not only the esti- mated chances oi detection but also the con- sequences of possible detection in forfeiting the element of surprise in any intended overt attack and in provoking US colmteraction its-the number of weapons clandestinely in- troduced was increased the risk of compromise would increase This increased risk would be less a function of US capabilities for physical detection then of the scope and complexity of the clandestine operations particularly inso far as larger numbers of Soviet agents became involved Considering the consequences of a breach of security the USSR would probably be unwilling to risk the use of even selected and trained agents in such numbers as would be inyolved in a_clandestine attack on a scale comparable to that which 'might be delivered overtly by aircraft -We conclude -therefore that although clandestine attack with atomic weapons might occur against specially se- lected targets as a supplement to overt deliv- ery by air such an attack on a scale com- parable to that which might be delivered overtly by air would probably belprecluded by security considerations 36 Lack of Evidence on Clandestine Delivery Plans We have no evidence to indicate Whether or not the USSR has actually made any plans or preparations for the clandestine delivery of nuclear weapons Biological Weapons Some BW agents are peculiarly adaptable to clandestine introduction The introduc- tion of small amounts of BW agents would be difficult to detect or identify as to source but Soviet operatives would be required for their dissemination A large number of people would be required for extensive dissemination of BW agents and Soviet security considera- tions would be a limiting factor in the scale and timing of such an attack if 3 at Chemicol Weapons 38 CW agents are not easily adaptable to clandestine use In addition to the limita- tions noted above as applicable to BW attack CW agents are easily identifiablehy their im- mediate effects and it probably would not be feasible to build up sufficient supplies or to procure the means clandestbiely for their dissemination against large population cen- ters The most practicable use would be against personnel in key installations but even this would be dif cult We have no evi- dence to indicate whether or not the USSR is developing the means for the clandestine de- livery of chemical weapons ATTACK ON THE US WITH CONVENTIONAL AND FORCES p 3'tk I Conventional Novol Attack 39 Thesubmarine force oithe USSR could at least in the initial phases of an attack in ict serious damage on US overseas communica- tions and carry out offensive mirth-1g in the shipping approaches to US harbors in addi- tion to its potential for delivery of mass de- struction weapons It is expected that during the period of this estimate the submarine forces will be enlarged and strengthened by the addition of additional numbers of im- proved ocean patrol types by the progressive moderniaation of existing types including in- stallation of snorkel and by the possible' adaptation of submarines to missile launch- ing The capabilities of surface naval forces for attack on the US are low The Soviet sur- face eet is geographically divided lacks ad- vance bases and does not possess a shipborne air arm Sporadic raider operations are pos- sible but the surface fleet in general lacking aircraft carriers and long-range amphibious types is unsuitable for transoceanic naval or amphibious attack an any signi cant scale 'Il n 11 Airborne Attack pr 40 Soviet capabilities for airborne attack upon the continental US except Alaska are also very limited Attacks would require the use of adapted for troop carrying serv- ice and operating at the same ranges and un- der the same conditions as the Til 4 bomber We have no evidence to indicate whether or not the USSR had made any plans for the dropping of airborne forces in the US but the USSR could if it chose drop small specially trained assault and sabotage cries for attack upon Important but dif cult bombing targets PART ll CERTAIN FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OF THE FOREGOING CAPABILITIES ASSUMING A SOVIET DECISION TO ATTACK THE US 41 The Soviet rulers would expect a direct attack on the-United States to precipitate gen- eral war In such a war the Soviet rulers would expect to have an initial preponderance of military power on the Eurasian continent but in their attack upon the continental US would be concerned to prevent US air attack on the Soviet Union with nuclear weap- ons mobilization of the superior war potential of the Western allies particularly that of the United States and US rein- forcement of anti-Soviet forces in Eurasia r 0 42 Trig Soviet rulers have demonstrated their sensitivity to the danger of US air attack with nuclear weapons by the high' prioritywhich they have given to the development of de fenses against such an attack Despite the substantial progress already achieved in build- ing up their defenses it is unlikely that they would regard their defensive capabilities as adequate to prevent substantial numbers of attacking aircraft from reaching strategic targets in the USSR It is likely therefore that in initiating nuclear warfare the USSR would be concerned swiftly to destroy or cripple US capabilities for retaliation in kind to deliver such an attack on industrial and targets in the United States as would prevent or at least hinder the mobilization of the US war potential and to retain the means to counter any US rein- forcement of Europe Moreover in any at- tack on the United States it is considered al- most certain that some portion'of the nuclear stockpile would be employed against other - objectives outside the continental limits of the United States or retained against iother'con- tingencies 43 as among the available forces and weap- ons for attacking the continental US the USSR's highest capability lies in open mili- tary attack with nuclear weapons delivered by long-range aircraft for the following reasons a the limited capabilities of conventional naval forces and airborne forces b the security di lculties inherent m the - delivery of comparable numbers of nuclear weapons by clandestine means - c the insufficient development of other methods of delivery of nuclear vveapons on a large scale and d the insulficient development of other mass destruction weapons or handicaps in their large-scale use 44 The Soviet rulers might however employ other methods of attacking the US concur- rently with or immediately following an open and direct nuclear attack In the cases of guided missiles airborne attack submarine bombardment chemical and biological war- fare Soviet capabilities appear to be relatively limited I 45 Clandestine attack in the form of sabo- tage or small-scale biological warfare might occur at any time and without an overt attack mam 12 ever being launched The USSR must weigh the timing and value of the sabotage in rela- tion to their complete plan of attack and its effect upon the capability of the United States to launch a retaliatory military attack Clandestine attack with nuclear weapons might occur against specially selected targets Baa supplement to overt deliver r by aircraft Subsequent to an overt attack clandestine at- tack in any form could be expected to the maximum practicable extent 46 We believe that the considerations affect- ing Soviet employment of their capabilities will remain throughout the period of this esti- mate essentially the same as those outlined above APPENDIX A Range Capabilities of Soviet long-Range Bombers Mid-1954 to End-19 I From Chukotski Area Map 1 Standard Modi ed Map 2 Type 31 class 5 600 ESHP engine Type-31 class 7 000 ESHP engine Map 3 Jet Medium Bomber Jet Heavy Bomber II From Kola Area Map 4- Til 4 Standard - Modi ed Map 5 Type 31 class 5 600 ESHP engine 'I'ype-31 class H 000 ESEZP engine Map 6 Jet Medium Bomber Jet Heavy Bomber From Baltic-East German Area - Map '1 Standard TU 4Modi ed Map a Type 31 class 5 1500 ESHP engine Type 31 'elass 7 000 ESHP engine Map 9 Jet Medium Bomber Jet Heavy Bomber a 5'31 i The estimated capabilities of airerait using in ight refueling are based on an assumed single refueling point for attacks launched rmm'eaeh area The esti- mated area coverage Is thus subject to considerable error 13 3 31 xix ai- -- Fifi If T- ix - - REFUEL 17 AREA o- -- - 21505 TWO-WAY Ina-n rf-mr RH an - I 'h-hl-uno 9 LnA-nh- ymf ONE REFUEL Map 1 STANDARD 3 AND MODIFIED From the AREA Rong org in nnrh'c and no tame-d i 5600 on In 0110 000 t bomb o gC A- ONE-WAY 1 - JEGREJS ONE REF IEL 0 REFUEL AREA REFUEL J - a m Ijlfumm Jul Ann-Ir- If Dun - - Chg-I'm AK haw-uh- Map 2 ff 3 Y - HEAVY TURBO-PROP oxg agtgo 4500 BOMBER Type 3 CIBSS From the AREA ESHP Engine TWO-WAY moo ESHP Engine ONE Ranges are in Ma a ml f and assumed an the 505 3 a IQDOO HI 50ml Incli- SE 5 JET MEDIUM AND JET HEAVY BOMBER From the CHUKOTSKI AREA Rongn u in nautical mi and are wind on the huh bumll bad ONE REFUEL Map Medium Heavy ONE REFUEL 13I5d cm 25-1 a Map 4 AND MODWED From the KOLA AREA Standard Modified Ring Hv I n muf n-F mile and an nun-Inn on H1 bush of IQDOO f5 bomb food- 55mg n' ONE-WAY ONE REFUEL lan'u - - I ONE REFUEL l3l55 HEAVY TURBO-PROP BOMBER Type 3 Class From the KOLA AREA 5600 Engine ESHP Engine Range - Ire in nautical mI'fe and assumed on In boy of 0 000 Ira-J 2 7- 4300 MapS 1 5600 ON E-WAY -- thl Ea TWO-WAY REFUEL i 13156 JET MEDIUM AND JET HEAVY BOMBER From the KOLA AREA Medium Heavy Range are In Muf n miles ind are anon-Jed an the basis of mono Eon-lb laid 1 11 Orig-mu 4300 ONE-WAY a he 3 5 315 CM 2 54 - 3'06 I - - If w-uum i 5K LBJ-gull Map 7 TU-4 STANDARD AND MODIFIED mm h I x From the BALTIC om REFUEL EAST GERMAN AREA AhStandard I Modified i Ranges he in nautical and no rumthe 515 of 01000 1 5 bomb load I 5600 - I l- ONE-WAY i' I ONE REFUEL f RAJ-54 4 Map 8 HEAVY TURBO-PROP ONEwi'm BOMBER TYPE 3 Class From the BALTIC- EAST GERMAN AREA 5600 ESHP Engine 7000 ESHP Engine Range in malice mile end we sun-Ind cm the bu In 1 000 135 at-n5 load SGGRE-T but I Otl an r nl-E lol I-I-l-ill Mw hull- Ill c- Dum- I an Exit-43 - a 4' REFUEL 5 QNE REFUEL 1 Iii- 59 cm 2 5-1 I Mop-I ll i Hunt I I Don-h I 'Ianng 1 m Ila-urn I - I Gila-Illum- hon-h naive-ear I f 'H unh h m h' Map 9 If JET MEDIUM AND HEAVY BOMBER 0'0 From the BALTIC 46 EAST GERMAN AREA 01 2 Heaw 1' Ringer are in Ma a nno are sun-led I t on In Ins-'1 m lac-CI Bomb 1 i Ell 9'14 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu