455151 5415 Wei-warm mfg-3 OgDecemlbc-rsv1643 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTEIMIATE NUMBER 74-3511 Supplement NIE 11435 GUIDED MISSILE-CAPABILITIES AND cm HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL mum-rm 05' can HAL INTELLIGHNI F Launwmg irltc fgmL-c rgaralz-ttiuus inrff 1p r 1U aggruisr-n of this cannula - Coma- 3 tr cm of the Dupe-1115 4 I Shrr the Army the Navy 1 c Au- Fur-1' 01d T u- 0523 r 1 '41 by the INTELLIGENCE an 0 Dvcumbcr 1955 Can Lt-gr Sp 5- muf g h Department Stirtr' 132 1 5 m'r Stag Departmen n Anny Hu- Dr'r-ct- Intelligcnvu the Dfrcettnr 1 USA in f DirL'cfor _I'or J'ntch fm'rwa T n Jot-L 4 Energy C mnminfou Reprrs ninth-c r'aa New In 3h crr- 3 an Duccrur Frdt'ru Bum a was subject being outside Fir UL- II 1 11 - f5 irll iirnff 1 ank GOPY op I I COPY PH Wan CENTRAL INTELIJGENCE AGENCY DISSEMATION NOTICE 1 This estimate was by the Central Intelligence Agency This copy is for the Information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per- sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following of cials'within their respective departments a Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence for the Department of State Assistant Chief of Sta Intelligence for the Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence for the Department of the Navy Director oi Intelligence USAF for the Department of the Air Force Deputy Director for Intelligence Joint Staff for the Joint Staff Director of Intelligence AEC for the Atomic Energy Commission Assistant Director FBI for the Federal Bureau oi Investigation Assistant Director for Central Reference CIA for any other Departmont or Agency 2 This copy may be retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli- cable security regulations or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange- ment with the O ice of Central Reference it for a period not in excess of one year lit the end of this period the estimate should either be destroyed returned to the forwarding agency or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with lac Dasha 22 June 1953 - material contains interma on an Defense or the within the - espionage Title is use 2 an mission 1 elation of which in' any n - a authorized person is prohibited by law 45 DISTRIBUTION White House National Security Council Departinent oi State Department oi Defense Operations Coordinating Board Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS THE PROBLEM To re-estimate wherever new evidence is available Soviet capabilities and prob- able programs in the guided missile eld FOREWORD This estimate brings up to date and supplements wherever new evidence was available our previous estimate on Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field NIE ab 5a dated 5 October 1954 At that time we had no rm intelligence on speci c Soviet missile capabilities Therefore we were forced to base our speci c capabilities estimates entirely on the available evidence of general Soviet missile activity including exploitation of German missile ex perience extrapolation from our own guided missile experience and esti- mated Soviet capabilities lin related elds Similarly our estimates of Soviet inten- tions had to be based on probable Soviet military requirements Since publication of NIE 11 6 54 new intelligence has con rmed our previous estimate that the USSR has an extensive guided missile program The new intel- ligence has also changed and in some particulars strengthened our estimates of Soviet surface-to-surfaee and surface-to-air missile capabilities It is emphasized that we have no new intelligence concerning Soviet air-to-air or submarinedaunched missiles and very little new information concerning air-to surface missiles Our estimates in these elds therefore remain based on the anal- ysis in NIE ll Ge tl which was necessarily speculative and in many cases based pri marily on estimated Soviet requirements and US missile experience The corre- sponding conclusions of NIE 1143 54 have been carried forward into this estimate for convenience of reference only The dates given in this estimate are the probable years during which small quan- tities of missiles could have been produced and placed in the hands of trained per- sonnel of one operational unit thus constituting a limited capability for opera tional employment These dates are based on the assumption that a concerted and continuous effort began in 1948 and are those around which the missile could have been operationally tested and be ready for series production However an addi tional period which would vary according to missile type would be required before missiles could be produced in quantity and the necessary units trained and deployed jur Inks-ts 1 2 We' estimate that at least an additional six months would normally be required for shift or conversion from pilot plant to series production and an additional pe_ riod to reach the planned production rate Some 18 months to two years would prob- ably be required for individual and unit training of each operational unit although this period could to a considerable extent overlap the production period CONCLUSIONS 1 The USSR is engaged in an extensive guided missile program We estimate that the Western Powers face a growing Soviet guided missile threat over the next several years A threat to Western of- fensive capabilities is already beginning to appear in the form of increased Soviet air defense strength This threat will probably soon be followed by improved Soviet offensive capabilities against US and Allied coastal areas and sea lines of communication and in tactical opera- tions Later the threat will probably ex- tend to all Allied base areas in Eurasia and its periphery and ultimately to the entire US Paras 9 10 2 With the passage of time the increas- ing size of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the larger yields estimated to be available from nuclear warheads will make missiles an increasingly effective means of nuclear attack However we believe that for the next several years the USSR would rely primarily on high per- formance aircraft for the delivery of nu clear weapons Nevertheless the advan- tage of surprise and other considerations might warrant earlier use of missiles with nuclear warheads fer certain purposes SPECIFIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES 3 Surface-to-Air Missiles The USSR is probably devoting very high priority to See Annex A Restricted Data or estimates of timemliaseil warhead yields producing such missiles to overcome its air defense de ciencies We believe that it now has deployed at least in the Mos- cow area operational surface-to air mis- siles Their performance characteristics are unknown but might be superior to those previously estimated see NIE 11 The low yield nuclear warhead which could be available after 1958 would greatly increase their kill probability Paras 11 1 4 Surface-to-Surfece Ballistic Missiles Although the USSR could employ non- ballistic guided missiles from ground launchers we believe that it would favor ballistic missiles because of their relative immunity to presently known counter- measures and their greater capability for achieving surprise In view of growing The Assistant Chiei of Staff Department of the Army the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Deputy Director or Intelligence The Joint Staff believe that although the performance characteristics are now unknown they would very probably exceed those previously estimated isce NIE 11 6 51 It appears highly unlikely that the USSR would produce and employ missiles on the scale apparent from observation of the Moscow complexes without achieving in their Opinion a substantial measure of de- icnsc against attacking aircraft This belief is reinforced by evidence oi the advanced state oi Soviet developments In other missile iicirls and the Importance which the Soviets must attach to the devel- opment of 1 rcaily effective air defense which would so greatly increase their stru- exibility 3 Allied tactical nuclear capabilities in Europe the USSR will probably give high priority to producing ballistic missiles for support of its eld forces However aside from these missiles the USSR will probably concentrate over the next few years more on ballistic missile develop- ment than on quantity production We estimate that Paras 13-20 a Short Range The USSR in addi- tion to shorter range ballistic missiles could have had since 1954 an Operational 350 mile ballistic missile with a CEP of two miles We believe that the USSR has not developed a 500 mile missile Paras 1 Medium Range The USSR could have ready for series production in 1955 1956 a single stage ballistic missile of 850 900 miles range with a CEP of three to four miles However only a low yield nuclear warhead probably would be avail- able for the next few years Paras 24 25 c Intermediate Range Ballistic Mis- sile IRBM In 1958 1959 the USSR could have ready for series production a dual stage ballistic missile of about 1 600 miles range with a CEP of three to four miles Large yield nuclear warheads would probably be available in 1959 1960 If the USSR were willing to accept a re- duced range of 1 400 miles this missile could be made ready for series production as early as 1957 but in this case only a low yield nuclear warhead would be avail able 26 227 d Intercontinental Ballistic Missile lCBl ii We now estimate that as soon Circular Probable Error means 50 percent within the stated radlus All CEPs and ranges are given in nautical miles as 1960 1961 the USSR-could have ready for series production an intercontinental ballistic missile of 5 500 miles range with a large yield nuclear warhead and a CEP of roughly five miles Advent of such an ICBM would create an entirely new type of threat to the US Porn 23 5 Earth Satellite We estimate that the Soviets are attempting to develop such a vehicle at the earliest practicable date and could have a relatively uninstru- mented vehicle by 1958 A vehicle which could gather and transmit upper atmos phere scienti c data could be available by 1963 Paras 29 30 6 Air-to Air Missiles We have no new intelligence which either strengthens 0r changes our estimate in NIE 11-6 54 that because of its air defense weak- nesses the USSR is probably also assign- ing a very high priority to air-to-air mis siles We estimate that it could develop in 1955 a guided rocket with infrared homing and in 1955 1953 an improved version with greater range However their guidance system would permit only tail cone attacks under generally fair weather conditions at the engagement altitude In 19584960 the USSR could probably have a new all-weather missile Pure 31 Air-to Snrfuce Missiles New intelli- gence partially supports estimates in NIE 11 6 54 but does not warrant a change therein NIE 11 0 54 stated that the USSR also would almost certainly seek to produce in quantity any precision weapon available for effective HE antiship at- tacks For this purpose it could now have available and would probably pro- duce a rockct prope113d glide bomb although limited to good visibility condi II I 11 1' 1 more-1 4 tions In view of its extensive bomber capabilities we do not believe that the USSR would produce a long range air to- surface missile for attacks on Allied ports and bases over the next several years In 1960 on the other hand when we esti- mate that an all weather air to-surfaoe missile with nuclear warhead could be ready for series production there will probably be a high priority Soviet require- ment for a weapon of this type because of the increased effectiveness of Allied air defenses around key target areas Par- 1 32 8 Submarine-Launched Missiles We have no credible new intelligence which either changes or strengthens our esti- mate in NIE 1146 54 that the USSR will almost certainly have a requirement for submarine-launched missiles for nuclear attacks on US and Allied coastal areas It could already have available improved types with nuclear warheads In 1955 the USSR could have ready for series production a turbo-jet pilotless aircraft nonballistic guided missile with im- proved range speed and accuracy and by 1958 its nuclear warhead yield could approach compatibility with its estimated accuracy and greatly increase its effec tiveness Peru 33 DISCUSSION 9 In NIE 11 6-54 dated 5 October 1954 we estimated that the strategic requirements of the USSR would dictate a major effort in the eld of guided missiles and that the USSR has the basic scienti c and technical capabili- ties to support a comprehensive research and development program We also estimated that the USSR has an adequate economic base for a sizeable production program however because of the limited capabilities of the Soviet electronics and precision mechanisms industries and other competing demands for their output it would almost certainly be un able to produce in the desired quantities all of the missiles for which it has an estimated military requirement except over an extended period of years Finally we estimated on the basis of the large number of personalities and activities believed to be involved in the Soviet missile program and our knowledge of the extensive Soviet exploitation ol German mis- sile experience that the Soviet program was an extensive one However we had no rm intelligence on what speci c missiles the USSR was actually developing or might al- ready have in operational use 10 The intelligence which has become avai1 able subsequent to ME 11 6-54 generally substantiates the above conclusions and rein- forces our estimate that an extensive Soviet missile program is underway In the category of surface-tosurface ballistic missiles we now believe that Soviet progress has been some what more rapid than previously estimated and that such missiles up to and including an ICBM will become available at somewhat earlier dates Moreover new evidence indi cates that the USSR has already embarked on series production or surface-to-air missiles SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES 11 The most significant development in this field is the extensive reporting on what appear to be air defense missile sites around Moscow Allowing for probable duplication in report- ing we estimate that approximately 40 com- plexes actually have been observed The earliest observation of one of these sites was in mid-1953 with the majority being observed in late 1954 and 1955 Of these 40 sites about 12 have been located with suf cient accuracy mmcx limited distribution contains addi- tlonal background information 5 to indicate that they are eight to nine nautical miles apart and are located on two circles approximately 25 and 45 nautical miles from the center of Moscow Observation in all sectors surrounding Moscow has not been possible but by calculation based on the above information the defenses might consist of 55 to 60 sites We estimate that about 25 sites are now operational with the others in various stages of construction At the present rate of progress this entire Moscow guided missile defense system could be operational in late 1956 A few sightings of similar installa- tionsin the initial stage of construction were also reported in the Leningrad area in the summer of 1955 12 Each site measures approximately one mile by one-half mile with three longitudinal and about 11 transverse concrete roads and has approximately 60 launching positions Each apparently has an associated building complex of suf cient size to house some 400 personnel From available evidence it is readily apparent that these sites including associated installations and roads are well constructed permanent type installations such as would form a part of a xed air defense system The dimensions con gura- tion disposition and quality of construction of these installations appear compatible with their use as guided missile launching sites 13 Certain equipment commonly known as has been reported as a part of 25 of the sites and probably exists at every site In each case the is located approxi- mately one mile from the site on the Moscow side and is generally aligned with the center longitudinal road Available information sug- gests that the could be a radar for use in a surface-to-air missile guidance system Its antenna con guration and the fact that so many missiles are deployed in each associated site suggest that such a radar would have a high traf c handling capability 14 Recent observations indicate that missile- like objects about three feet in diameter and 20 to 35 feet in length were present at some of the Moscow sites at one site about if missile-like objects were seen standing one in each of the recesses along the transverse phn c- r roads The observations also indicate the existence of an extensive newly-constructed facility believed to be a partial fabricator and nal assembler of surface-to-air guided mis- siles for the missile defense system ringing Moscow Its identi cation as a missile sup plier is based on the presence of more than 450 missile-like objects which are similar in size to missiles reported at air defense missile launching sites being constructed around Moscow The facility is located approximately three to four miles south of Istra some 25 nautical miles west-northwest of the center of Moscow 15 We conclude that the Moscow installs tions are surface loan guided missile launch- ing sites in support of the defense of Moscow and that the USSR now has an air defense missile system in at least limited operational use 16 We still have no rm evidence as to the specific characteristics of the missile-like ob- jects observed a type of command guidance system probably would be employed possibly augmented by terminal homing Alterna- tively a guidance system involving trackv illumination type radars a computer system and a semiactive homing head might possibly be employed The missile could have a pay- load of 600 pounds if terminal homing were not employed This weight might be reduced by about 100 pounds to make room for the homing head but this would be compensated for by the increase in accuracy Because of its air defense de ciencies the USSR is almost certainly continuing to give very high priority to developing improved surface-to-air missiles Ely 1957-1958 we estimate that a new missile could be ready for series production incorporating terminal homing By 1958 at the earliest the USSR could develop low yield nuclear warheads suit- able for this missile which would greatly in crease its kill probability Beyond this we believe that the Soviets will endeavor to de- velop improved missiles with ranges on the order of 100 nautical miles However owing to the many technical dif culties involved it is highly unlikely that the USSR could develop such missiles until some time after 1950 l't l'i'I 6 ll SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES 13 Information on Soviet activities at the Kapustin Yar guided missile test range has improved since the publication of NIE 11-63 54 A detailed sketch of the launching area was prepared in October 1954 by ve Germans who had visited the range in the fall of 1947 During early 1955 the British prepared a mosaic of the area utilizing 1942 German aerial photographs and maps By comparing the sketch with the mosaic locations of the rocket engine static test stand assembly area launching platform and railroad lines have been determined as they existed in 1941' Study of Soviet activi- ties at Kapustin Yar also indicates an increase in missile testing in 1955 over 1954 Our in formation indicates that considerable num- bers of ballistic missiles are being tested Although the information so far available does not permit accurate assessments of the actual ranges involved it indicates the scale of the program and strengthens some aspects of our ballistic missile estimates 19 Recent Soviet technical articles indicate that the Soviets have an excellent under standing of inertial guidance systems and associated problems Soviet interest in iner- tial guidance systems is also apparent from projects assigned the Germans in 10481 1950 and from various Soviet inquiries into such systems Inertial guidance systems are se- cure from detection and jamming and are ideally suited to maximize the surprise factor and offensive potential of ballistic missiles We believe the USSR has considered the utili- zation of inertial guidance in its ballistic missile program 20 Aside from tactical missiles for support of its eld forces we continue to behave that for the next few years the Soviet surface to surface ballistic missile eflort will probably be concentrated more upon development of im- proved missiles than upon quantity production of interim types By 1058 1900 the estimated growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the larger warhead yields probably available weiuld have reduced the significance of any limltations which the accuracy or reliability of such missiles systems might have placed upon their earlier production 21 Short Range The following new infor- mation strengthens our short range ballistic missile estimates in NIE 11-6 54 German engineers in the USSR worked on the plans for a large rocket-engine test stand facility during the period 1046 1950 This test fa cility was being designed for the Zagorsk area 38 nautical miles north-northeast of Mes- cow and one German actually went to survey the site in the fall of 194 Plans for this project indicated that several rocket-engine test stands would be constructed and that two of them would be capable of testing rocket engines with thrust ratings up to 50 tons Complete measuring equipment fuel prepara tion facilities and a liquid oxygen installation were planned Although no positive identi - cation of this facility has been made to date we believe a rocket engine static test facility possibly exists in the Zagorsk area This lo- cation is conveniently accessible to a major Soviet missile propulsion development center at Khirnki 11 nautical miles north-northwest from Moscow where 25 35 and 100 ton thrust engine developments have taken place 22 New intelligence strengthens our estimate that the USSR is interested in developing a 350 mile missile but does not substantiate a program for development of a 500 mile missile We have no evidence of any ballistic missiles available for operational use but we continue to estimate as in NIE 11 5 54 that the USSR could now have operational a 350 mile missile with a nose cone weight of 3 000 pounds in- cluding a 2 000 pound payload and a of two miles However for the next few years only low yield atomic warheads would be available Alternatively the USSR could now have available a shorter range missile capable of carrying larger warheads Such a missile could have a somewhat smaller CEP than the one above 23 'l o counter growing Allied all weather nuclear capabilities in Europe the USSR will probably give high priority to a missile system for support of its eld forces The short- range missiles estimated to be now available might satisfy this requirement WT 24 Medium Range The chief designer at Plant #456 Khimki was reportedly elected a corresponding member of the Department of Technical Sciences of the Academy of Sci- ences in October 1953 His selection to this position a high honor in the USSR may indi- cate the successful development of the 100-ton thrust engine with which he was associated at plant #450 Earlier reports containing in formation dating back to 1943 indicated that this person would be awarded some honor it the development of the 100-ton thrust engine was successful 25 Based on new information and reassess- ment of Soviet capabilities in the light of US missile experience we estimate that a single stage missile using the 100-ton thrust engineI with a range of approximately 850 900 miles a nose cone weight of 3 000 pounds including a 2 000 pound payload and a CEP of three to four miles could be ready for series production sometime during 1955 1955 How- ever only low yield nuclear warheads would be available for a few years after these dates 26 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Reanalysis of a Soviet demand on a group of German engineers in the spring of 1949 to design a missile capable of carrying a warhead of 6 600 pounds to a range of 1 600 miles leads us to the conclusion that the Soviets have probably established a require- ment for an intermediate range ballistic mis siie with this range rather than the 1 300 miles estimated in NIE 11 5 54 In the light of more recent nuclear warhead developments we believe that the warhead weight require- ment would be reduced without change in range requirements Ballistic missiles with ranges of 1 500 miles would be capable of reaching all vital targets in Europe North Africa Japan and Alaska from launching areas within the USSR itself 27 By utilizing the 100-ton engine as the booster together with the 35 ton thrust engine the USSR could develop a two stage missile with a range on the order of 1 600 miles a 3 000 pound nose cone weight including a 1 650 pound payload and -a CEP of three to four miles Assuming development was ini tiated in 1948 the earliest probable date at which this missile could be ready for series production would be 1959-1959 We estimate that a large yield nuclear warhead could be available for it in 1959 1960 Such a missile could also provide a research vehicle for ob- taining data pertinent to an intercontinental ballistic missile We also estimate that the above missile with the same payload but with the range reduced to 1 400 miles could be ready for series production as early as 1957 28 interCOntinental Ballistic Missile We believe an intereon tinental ballistic missile would be within Soviet capabilities and is probably being undertaken on a very high priority Much of the data and experience gained by the USSR in its mid range missile program is applicable and necessary to logical step by-step progression to an ICBM Such missile could have an estimated range on the order of 5 500 miles a 3 000 pound nose cone weight including a 1 500 pound payload and a of roughly ve nules Based on infor- mation acquired on the Soviet missile pro- gram since publication of NIE 11 6 54 we now estimate that the rst operational model could be ready for series production by 1950 1951 and that large yield nuclear warheads would be available by this time 29 Earth Satellite Vehicles Some time prior to November 1954 a Permanent Interdepart- mental Commission ior Interplanetary Com- munications was established in the Soviet Academy of Sciences The stated purpose or this Commission is to coordinate work on the solution of the problems of mastering cosmic space One of its rst tasks reportedly will be organizing work for the creation of an automatic laboratory which could re- volve around the earth over a long period of time as a satellite Formation of this Commission is the rst known o lclal in- dication of a coordinated survey of the theo- retical problems involved In establishing a Space satellite or in space travel although many individual Soviet scientists have shown considerable interest in these elds In addi- tion recent statements by Soviet of cials and scientists indicate a high degree of interest in earth satellites and a Soviet intention to launch one or more such vehicles at the earliest practicable date We believe that the USSR would place considerable emphasis on such a vehicle primarily to achieve logical effect 30 We estimate that the USSR possesses the basic scienti c capabilities technical skills and other resources required to build and launch an unmanned earth satellite vehicle A relatively uninstrumented vehicle could probably be orbited by 1958 A satellite vehi- cle which could be used to gather and transmit upper atmosphere scienti c data would prob- ably be within Soviet capabilities by 1963 We believe that the majority of the work of cle- signing fabricating testing and launching an unmanned satellite could be accomplished without signi cant interference with high priority Soviet guided missile work ill AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES 31 No signi cant intelligence on air-to-air missiles has beeome available since the pub- lication of NIE 11 6 54 However we know that Soviet ghter aircraft now carry airborne intercept radar which could be used in con- junction with air-to air missiles IV MISSILES 32 In addition to the evidence presented in NIE 1143-54 Design Bureau 2 Mas- cow is known to have engaged in research and development work from 194' to 1951 on a guidance system for a Soviet designed air- to-ship missile system designated KOMET There are some indications that this missile system would have a maximum guidance range of approximately 55 nautical miles The Keband guidance system was designed to use mid-course beam-riding and semiactive radar terminal homing Prior to 1951 approximately six sets of guidance equipment suitable for flight testing were fabricated by the German group involved The guidance system under development could be applicable to higher performance air-to- suriace and surface-to-air missiles This evi dence however is not considered suf cient to cause us to change our estimate in NIE 11 6 54 V SUBMARENE-LAUNCHED NONBALLISTIC GUIDED MISSILES 33 We have received some additional infor- mation concerning Soviet activities in sub- marine launched missiles however the information is of such doubtful credibility as to preclude its use in either supporting or changing the estimate in NIE 11 6 54 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu