NATIONAL INIELLIGENCE NUMBER Supersndes NIE 11 6 54 and HS Supplement NIE ESTIMATE SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM Sit-mined by the RELEASE IN FULL DIRECTOR 05 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The joh owing mrclis'gw'Ir-e manna-Fan H this 553 rctr The C-Jnrru Inrn'ftg-srac-J swarm and the or he Departmeu 'i 0 3mm mt Hm 91 FIJI-I The sum and INTELLIGENI IE ADVISORY CO on March 135 Intelligencc InreIIigcnce InfcIIrgn-m Director Jar Inre igc-n-c the Io Energy Cc scarred by he The 5mg - and Energy In rm MIT an Diracmr Fed-3m Bureau u ILI enEr yuurm the subject hem outside his riff 54 I hc ASSUMHI Dcpurrnsur a State Hm Chm 11 Stuff the Army the a Nauui the Duh-r 3hr Deputy the Th - r1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMNATIDN NOTICE 1 This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency This copy is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per- sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments 21 Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence for the Department of State Assistant Chief of Staff for the Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence for the Department of the Navy Director of Intelligence USAF for the Department of the Air Force Deputy Director for Intelligence Joint Staff for the Joint Staff Director of Intelligence AEC for the Atomic Energy Commission Assistant to the Director FBI for the Federal Bureau of Investigation Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination CIA for any other De- partment or Agency 2 This copy may be retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli- cable security regulations or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arranger ment with the Of ce of Collection and Dissemination CIA 3- When an estimate is disseminated overseas the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year At the end of this period the estimate should either be destroyed returned to the forwarding agency or permission should he re- quested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with 22 June 1953 is material contains information aff-- -ng the coal Defense of the States Within the espionage laws Title 18 U50 T94 the trans W on of Willa v manner unauthorised person is prohibitc White llouse National Security Council Department of State Department of Defense Operations Coordlnating Board atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation TABLE OF CONTENTS 01 th Page THEPROBLEM 1 CONCLUSIONS - 2 DISCUSSION 4 I SOVIET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR GUIDED Strategic and Tactical Considerations Soviet Requirements for Defensive Missile Systems Soviet Requirements for Offensive Missile Systems Soviet Evaluation of Missiles versus other Weapons Systems 6 Priorities within the Soviet Guided Missile Program 3 II FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET GUIDED MSSIIE CAPABILITIES Scienti c and Technical Capabilities Missile Guidance and Control - 9 Missile Propulsion 10 Aerodynamios and Structure 10 Warhearls and FusesGeodesy and CarloyraphySoviet Industrial Capability to Produce Guided 12 SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 12 Warhead Selection l3 Surfacehto-Air Missile Systems 14 Air-to Air Missile Systems 15 Air-to-Suriace Missile Systems Surface to Surface Missile Systems 17 Ballistic Missiles Cruise-type Missiles 19 Earth Satellite - 20 SpeoializedMissiles TABLE OF CONTENTS Cont Page ANNEXES A A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSIIE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION 25 I Possible Program'25 II Warhead Consigerations Affecting Possible Program 32 Economic Implications of Possible Program 33 n SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES FOR THE OF GUIDED MISSILES 42 I Basic Scienti c Capabilities 42 II Availability of Technical Knowledge from ForeignSouroesOrganization and Control or the Soviet Guided C SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE TESTING ACTIVITIES Limited Distribution under Separate Cave-r D SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEAD CAPABILITIES Limited Distribution under Separate Cover Ai l il tl l Hill sans-r QM SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD THE PROBLEM To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs in the eld of guided mis- siles including earth satellites through 1966 1 FOREWORD This estimate supersedes NIE 11 6 54 Soviet Capabilities and Probable Pro grams in the Guided Missile Field 5 October 1954 and its supplement NIE 11 12 55 Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Programs 20 December 1955 Al though some new intelligence has strengthened our previous estimate that the USSR has an extensive guided missile program intelligence on speci c guided missile sys- tems continues to be de cient In making this estimate in a eld where positive intelligence is minimal we have employed three interdependent approaches mili- tary requirements scienti c and technical capabilities and economic capabilities Throughout the entire estimative process the fullest consideration has been taken of the available evidence of Soviet missile activity US guided missile experience and known and estimated Soviet capabilitiesin related elds This estimate is based on previous judgments that the USSR does not now in tend to initiate general war deliberately and is not now preparing for general war as of any particular future date Except Where noted otherwise the operational capability dates given in this estimate are the earliest probable years during which one or more missiles could have been serially produced and placed in the hands of trained personnel of one operational unit thus constituting a limited capability for operational employment These dates are based on our estimate that a concerted and continuous native So- viet research and development program began in 1948 Although considerable e ort has been devoted to estimating a Soviet produc- tion and operational program for guided missile systems through 1966 the production quantities and time phasing presented in Annex A represent only a possible Soviet program but one which is considered both feasible and reasonable Unguldcd rockets are not included in this estimate See the Director of Intelligence USAF Iootnotc to Annex a paragraph I 1 ee seesaw 2 CONCLUSIONS GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 1 We estimate that the Soviet guided missile program is extensive and enjoys a very high priority Paras 29 30 50 2 We believe that the USSR has the na tive scienti c resources and capabilities to develop during this period advanced types of guided missile systems in all categories for which it has military re- quirements Paras 29 38 3 We estimate that the USSR has the industrial base and related industrial ex- perience to series produce the missile sys- tems it will develop during this peri od However in view of competing dc mands the limited availabliity of elec- tronic equipment will seriously restrict the extent and variety of Soviet guid- ed missile productiOn until about 1958 Thereafter expanding electronics pro- duction will probably make this restric- tion much less severe Pores 45 48 4 We estimate that the USSR has re quirements for various sizes of nuclear high explosive HE and chemical CW warheads and has the capability to de- velop them on time scales coosistent with the missiles in which they would be enr- ployed In view of competing demands the availability of ssionable materials will impose limitations on the extent of Soviet nuclear warhead production dur- SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROGRAMS Surface-fo-Air Missiles 5 We estimate that surface-to-air mis- sile systems have one of the highest pri- orities among current Soviet military programs At Moscow an extensive sys- tem of surface-to-air missile sites has been constructed and all sites are prob- ably now operational 'This system can probably direct a very high rate of re against multiple targets at maximum alt titudes of about 50 000 feet and maxi- mum horizontal ranges of about 25 n m Paras 27 23 32 5640 6 During the period 1953 1961 surface to air systems with increased range and altitude capabilities for static defense of critical areas and with low and high al titude capabilities for defense of stat- ic targets eld forces and naval ves- sels could probably become available for operational employment Sometime be- tween 1963 and 1966 the USSR could probably have in operation a surface to air system of some capability against the ICBM Paras 61 6 7 We estimate that series production of Surface-towair guided missiles is now un- der way in the USSR and that it will probably produce such missiles in large quantities Nuclear warheads could now be incorporated into a limited number of ing the period of this estimate Pores surface-to-air missiles We estimate that A some percentage of surface-to-air mis- 3 siles will be so equipped during the pe riod of this estimate Paras 19 59 60 Annex A Air-io-Air Missiles 8 Despite a lack of signi cant intelli gence we estimate that the USSR has pursued the development of air-to-air missiles and that it could now have in operational use a 2 3 n m range missile capable of tail-cone attacks in good weather- It is probable that the USSR could have a 5 n m all-weather missile operational in 1958 and a 15 20 n m all- weather missile capable of employing a nuclear warhead in 1960 Paras Ainfo-Surface Missiles 9 In 1955 the USSR could probably have had a 20 n m subsonic air to-surface mis- sile available for Operational use In 1956 1957 a 55 n m subsonic missile could probably be available and there is some evidence that such a missile has reached at least nal ight test stage a 55 n m supersonic missile could probe ably be available in 1958 These missiles designed primarily as antiship weapons could also be employed against isolated and well-de ned radar targets on land In 1961 a 100 n m supersonic nussile could probably be available for employ- ment by heavy bombers Each of these missile types could employ nuclear war- heads Surface-io-Surface Ballistic Missiles up to 350 n m range 10 There is considerable evidence of So- viet development of short range surface- to-surface missiles and we estimate that the USSR could probably have had avai1 able for operational use in 1954 ballistic missiles with the following maximum ranges 75 175 200 and 350 n m These types could be equipped with nuclear warheads However the USSR would probably consider CW warheads desirable for certain speci c purposes and might employ BE in the two shorter- range types Paras 5-79 31 Annex A Surface-io 5urface Ballistic Missiles 700 n m and 1 600 n m ranges ' 11 Evidence on Soviet development pro grams leads us to estimate that the USSR could probably have had a 700 n m maxi- mum range ballistic missile available for operational use in 1956 We have rm evidence that in 1949 the USSR was in terested in a 1 600 n m intermediate range ballistic missile IRBM and we believe it is a logical step in the Soviet development program We estimate that the USSR is developing an IRBM and that it could probably have such a mis- sile in operation in 1959 Both these mis- sile types would require nuclear war heads although we do not exclude the possibility of CW use with the '700 n m missile for occasional special missions We believe the USSR would rapidly ac quire a considerable number of both the 700 n m and the 1 600 n m missiles Paras 80 82 Annex A Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 5 500 n m range 12 We have no direct evidence that the USSR is developing an ICBM but we believe its development has probably been a high priority goal of the Soviet ballistic missile program We estimate that the USSR could probably have a 5 500 n m ICBM ready for operational use in 1960 4951 We believe that the 'Date predicated on first operational unit being equipped with prototype n ssiles 4 USSR will seek to acquire a considerable number of with nuclear war- heads as rapidly as possible Porn 34 Annex A Submarine-Launched Surfece-io-Surfoce Missiles 13 We believe the USSR would probably have developed cruise-type missiles ini- tially and there is some evidence pointing to the existence of Soviet submarines equipped to carry such missiles The USSR could probably have had in opera- tion in 1955 a subsonic turbojet missile capable of a maximum range of SOD and a supersonic missile capable of this range could probably be in operation in 1957 A supersonic cruise type missile capable of ranges up to 1 000 mm could probably be operational in 1962 These missile types would require nuclear war- heads With a vigorous program the USSR might achieve an operational sub- marine-launched IRBM system sometime during the period 1964 1966 Pores 83 35 89 Annex A Eor rh Satellite 14 The USSR will probably make a major effort to be the rst country to orbit an earth satellite We believe that the USSR has the capability of orbiting in 1957 a satellite vehicle which could acquire sci- enti c information and data of limited military value A satellite vehicle posses sing substantial reconnaissance capabili- ties of military value could probably be orbited in the period 19534965 Pores 90 91 DISCUSSION 1 SOVIET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR GUIDED MISSILES 15 The Soviet guided missile program neces- sarily operates within the framework of cur- rent and future military requirements laid down by Soviet defense planners While we have no direct evidence on the elements of this framework as it applies to missiles we believe it would logically have been based on an appreciation of the USSR's present and probable future strategic and tactical situa- tions an estimate of the types of attack that could be launched against the USSR in the foreseeable future cl operational re- quirements for which missile systems could be employed to replace or augment other weap- ons systems and nally an evaluation of the probable effectiveness of missiles versus other weapons systems to perform required missions 15 The USSR has almost certainly been as- sisted in determining the scope and priorities of its missile programs by information on Western including US military programs This information is probably complete enough to enable the USSR to judge approximately the time phases in the develomcnt effective- ness size and composition of US and Allied offensive and defensive forces Speci cally the Soviet leaders can probably judge such factors as the general size of nuclear stocks piles the weapons systems into which nuclear warheads have been incorporated the general progress of air defense programs and the gen eral characteristics and availability dates of offensive and defensive missiles Slruiegic and Tactical Considerolions 17 Certain considerations which have played a role in Soviet military thinking in recent years make it plausible that the USSR should have given a high priority to the development of missiles The Soviet leaders have heavily emphasized the development of their nuclear capability and probably also believe that mis- WW 5 siles will ultimately become the primary means of delivery for nuclear weapons So- viet concern over US and Allied capabilities for strategic air attack has compelled the USSR to place high priority on development of a modern air defense system in which mis- siles are now an essential ingredient and will ultimately become the primary weapon Fi nally the relative geographic disadvantages faced by the USSR for purposes of strategic attack due to US possession of a forward base structure on the Soviet periphery could be offset to some degree by development of long- range missiles for delivery of nuclear weapons All these factors probably gured in a Soviet decision taken early in the postwar period to make a major effort in the development of guided missiles Soviet Requirements for Defensive Missile Systems 18 In preparing their requirements for air defense guided missile systems Soviet mili- tary planners would probably have construct- ed a picture of the time-phased threat from existing and foreseeable Western offensive weapons systems about as follows In 1956 high and low altitude bomb- ing attack by aircraft flying at subsonic speeds and at altitudes up to 55 000 feet in peripheral areas attack by short and medium range cmise-type missiles where ground forces would be in contact at- tack by short range ballistic missiles By 1961 attack by aircraft employing air-to-surface missiles bombing attack by aircraft capable of supersonic dash and altitudes up to 65 000 feet attack by long range cruise type missiles capable of high subsonic speeds and altitudes up to 50 000 feet attack by long range bal- listic missiles -By 1966 attack by supersonic aircraft and cmise type missiles capable of a1- titudes on the order of 80 000 feet at- tack by long range ballistic missiles 19 The USSR would have proceeded on the assumption that high-yield nuclear weapons or warheads could be incorporated into any of the Western weapons systems described above This assumption would dictate a re- quirement for air defense missile systems with a high kill probability and therefore the in clusion of a percentage of nuclear warheads in Soviet air defense missile systems at an early date 20 Soviet defense planners would probably- have formulated generalized operational re- quirements for both surface-to-air and air-to air systems capable of countering the threat outlined above Surface-to-air requirements would probably have included static and mobile systems for the defense of critical governmental and industrial centers impor- tant military centers and bases major naval forces a oat and major units of the Soviet Army Operational requirements for air-t0 air missile systems would probably have been based on the need to increase the kill capabili- ties of existing and projected Soviet inter- captors 21 Our intelligence on Soviet development of surface-to-air missiles to date indicates that time-phased Soviet operational requirements probably began with a point-defense system capable of mterdicting bomber aircraft at a1 titudes up to about 50 000 feet Our estimate of the Soviet analysis of the foreseeable threat indicates that Soviet requirements for air de- fense missiles over the next few years would become much more exacting including longer ranges higher speeds and more technical - ly advanced guidance systems Later in the period a high-priority requirement would emerge for a system capable of a high kill probability against ballistic missiles Soviet Requirements for OFFensive Missile Systems 22 In preparing their requirements for of fensive missile systems Soviet military plan- ners probably would have developed general- ized operational requirements for systems in both the surface-to-surface and air-to-sur- face categories Available intelligence 511p- ports our belief that the USSR has had con- siderable interest in both these categories especially in a family of surface-to-surfacc ballistic missiles 6 23 Soviet requirements for shorter range sur- face-to-surface missiles would probably have been derived from the military missions of at- tacking targets in direct tactical support of eld forces and of attacking other targets of importance in a military campaign Such requirements would probably have been de- rived as follows a Soviet requirements for surface-to sur- face missiles for tactical support of field forces would have been derived in general from the missions of various echelons of the Soviet Army From current Soviet tactical doctrine we deduce that operational requirements would probably have been developed for bal- listic missiles of up to 75 n m range for sup- port of division and corps operations up to 200 n m range for support of eld armies and up to 350 n m range for support of army fronts b Similarly Soviet requirements far these shorter range surface-to surface missiles for the support of other operations and for the neutralization of certain additional targets of broad strategic signi cance would have stemmed from target systems including a va- riety of key installations of both tactical and strategic signi cance A family of 16 200 and 350 n m missiles would probably have been developed to provide coverage for these targets systems c In addition a requirement might have been developed for a ballistic or cruise-type missile capable of a longer range both for support of certain army front operations and for the neutralization of certain addition- al targets 24 Considering the ranges from possible launching sites within the Bloc to targets on or near the Eurasian land mass Soviet plan- ners would probably have developed require- ments for longer range surface tasurface mis- siles ballistic missiles of 600 900 n m maximum range and of longer ranges up to 1 500 n m for peripheral attack missions in- cluding the neutralization of US and Allied bases and attack on strategic targets in non Soviet army front is roughly comparable to a US army group Bloc nations on the Eurasian periphery and a ballistic missile capable of up to 5 500 n m range for intercontinental attack The possibility exists that interim Soviet surface- to surface missile requirements might have included cruise-type missiles in one or more of the foregoing range categories Require- ments for specialized naval versions of both cruise-type and ballistic missiles suitable for launching by submarines or surface vessels would probably also have been developed 25 It is reasonable to infer that the USSR would have developed requirements for air- to-surface missiles to overcome foreseeable improvements in the capabilities of land and shipborne air defense against bombard ment aircraft Generalized operational re- quirements would probably have included a missile of at least 100 n m range to augment the capabilities of long-range bombers against heavily-defended land targets and large naval concentrations as well as shorter range mis- siles for employment against single ships or other isolated and well-de ned radar targets 26 Soviet military planners may also have considered that a requirement existed to de velop certain missiles for speci c functions in the eld of countermeasures against Western air defense systems Such a requirement could include surface-to-surface cruise-type missiles and air to-surface missiles equipped with ECM gear to be employed as decoys to satu- rate air defense radar and control systems In addition it could include air-to-surface mis siles capable of homing on and destroying ground radar installations Soviet Evoluo rion of Missiles Versus Other Weapons Systems 21' Soviet military planners having estab- lished generalized operational requirements for which guided missile systems could be employed would probably then have evaluated the effectiveness of missiles versus other weap- ons systems to perform the missions of air defense tactical support peripheral attack and intercontinental attack Based in part on the limited intelligence available on cur- rent Soviet military programs including the 7 missile program we believe that the Soviet evaluation was as follows a Air defense The most immediate and greatest Soviet military concern is the safe- guarding of key Soviet and cen- ters of control In the face of the grave threat from Western especially US air-nu- clear forces in being and programmed Soviet air defense kill probabilities must be brought to a much higher level at a very early date Conventional antiaircraft artillery is a weap- ons system of negligible value against high performance high altitude bombardment air- craft although this system will continue ef- fective for at least a few years against attack by aircraft at lower altitudes Fighter air- craft with conventional armament will con tinue to be effective for a few years against many of the likely forms of air attack on the USSR but can achieve maximum effective- ness against high-performance high altitude attack only if tted with air-to air guided missiles As the period advances improving capabilities of both defending and attacking aircraft and of attacking cruise-type missiles will dictate more exacting operational require- ments for air-to-air missiles When super- sonic cruise-type or ballistic missiles consti- tute the major threat the operational require- ment for air-to-air missiles will tend to phase out Guided missile systems offer the best promise of raising the effectiveness of Soviet air defenses to an acceptable level b Tactical support The Soviet Army ground forces have been reorganized and mod- ernized since the end of World War II and for the past three years their unit organiza- tion has been undergoing further changes to meet the requirements of modern warfare nuclear or non-nuclear Current Soviet tac- tical doctrine emphasizes allocation of nuclear weapons for use against enemy defensive posi- tions air facilities reserves nuclear capabili- ties and encircled enemy units This same doctrine envisages the use of artillery guided missiles and tactical aircraft as nuclear de- livery means Most Soviet requirements for direct support of line divisions can now be met satisfactorily with eld artillery un- guided rocket artillery and aircraft How- ever guided missiles offer certain advantages over tactical aircraft and should be pro- grammed to augment and to some exteut replace the letter C Peripheral attack Among the essential elements in Soviet strategy for the initial phase of a general war are the destruction or neutralization of Western nuclear capabili ties wherever deployed destruction of ready NATO forces prevention of NATO's full mobil- ization and isolation of the European the- ater by interdicting US reinforcement of over seas forces Soviet tactical and naval avia- tion augmented by units of long-range avia- tion will be suitable for some time for carry- ing out attacks on the Eurasian periphery A submarine-launched guided missile could be an important weapon system for this mis- sion Although conventional air attack will remain effective for some time a substantially improved capability could be attained with air-to-surfacc missiles For peripheral attack generally and base neutralization in particu- lar ballistic missiles carrying nuclear war- heads by imposing maximum surprise and dif culty of interception could ultimately present a greater threat to Western targets than any other Soviet weapons system d Intercontinental attack To deter the US from initiating general war against the Bloc and to ght such a war successfully should it occur the USSR requires a power ful intercontinental nuclear striking force This force should be capable of neutralizing US nuclear delivery capabilities at the outset and of in icting damage of a decisive nature on other continental US targets There will be a period of years during which the USSR probably will rely principally on the manned bomber for adequate coverage of targets in the continental US although the Soviet geo graphic disadvantage as well as existing US air defenses and foreseeable improvements will continue to handicap manned aircraft in the execution of the intercontinental at- tack mission A decrease in the vulnerability of attacking aircraft can be effected by equip- ping them with air-to surface missiles Sub marine launched missiles could be an impor- tant weapon system for attacks against appro- priate targets in the US- Nevertheless in the long run improving US early warning and i O P-wer' 3 defense capabilities could render even these attack capabilities insuf cient The intercon- tinental ballistic missile ICBM however could enable the USSR to present an entirely new type of threat against which adequate defense while scienti cally possible would be most dif cult Priorities within the Soviet Guided Missile Program 28 In determining priorities for its program of missile development and production the USSR would have taken into account the fol- lowing main factors priority of missions to be carried out rst priority to air defense second to peripheral and intercon- tinental attack third to tactical support comparative value of missiles versus other weapons systems and of' one missile type versus another in carrying out these missions feasibility of developing a particular mis- sile or missile system in time to meet-require- ments availability of resources to develop and produce various types of missiles includ- ing associated equipment and warheads Talc- ing these factors into consideration we esti- mate that at some time in the past Soviet military planners established priorities with- in their guided missile program generally as indicated below While we believe that such a system of priorities is probably governing the Soviet guided missile program at the pres- ent time we recognize that it will be subject to continuing revision as Soviet programs for the development of missiles and other weap- ons systems advance and as the USSR re- appraises its military requirements High Priority Missiles which can be developed in a short time 1 Surface to air BE 2 b Missiles which can be developed in a longer time 1 Suriace-to-suriace tack nuclear 2 Surface-toair improved nuclear-f HE 3 Air to surface land targets nuclear peripheral at- c Mssiles which can be developed in a very long time 1 Surface tosurtace intercontinental attack nuclear 2 Surface-to air antimissile missile nuclear Lower Priority Missiles which can be developed in a short time 1 Surface-to surfacc tactical support nuclear HEIGHT 2 Surface-to suriace submarine launched nuclear 3 Air-to surf ace ship targets nuclearf HE E Missiles which can be developed in a longer tune l Air-to-air improved nuelear 2 Airwto surface improved ship tar- gets nuclear in addition an earth satellite with limited instrumentation for scienti c purposes has probably been assigned a high priority for development in a short time A satellite vehi cle possessing reconnaissance capabilities of military value has probably been assigned a lower priority for development in a very long time ll FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE CAPABILITIES Scienti c oncl Technicol Capabilities 29 On the basis of considerable evidence we are con dent that the Soviet missile research and development program is extensive and enjoys a very high priority Although the USSR had no known guided missile develop ment program during World War Ii it ini- tiated such a program at the close of the war with a thorough and systematic exploitation oi German miSSile experience A native So- viet program has advanced rapidly since about 1948 and at present it embraces high quality research institutes design bureaus and plants including some of the best facili- ties and equipment available in the USSR These resources are adequate to continue and to expand the missile program We believe -- 9 that the USSR need not in the future depend to any major extent upon Satellite support except possibly in certain narrow elds such as precision optics and electronic instruments 30 The large number of Soviet activities asso- ciated with missile development as well as results known to have been achieved to date provide clear evidence of the intensity of the program but there is relatively little informa- tion on its details Our assessment of Soviet scienti c and technical capabilities to develop missile components presented in this section and to develop complete missile systems pre- sented in Section is based wherever pos- sible on the limited intelligence available in- cluding information obtained from returning German missile specialists However we have also relied in large measure on know or esti- mated Soviet capabilities in relevant techni- cal elds and on US guided missile experience Missile Guidance and Control 31 The foundation for current Soviet capa- bilities in missile guidance is largely postwar exploitation of German personnel facilities equipment and documents The reconstruc- tion design improvement and in some cases testing of German equipment by German spe- cialists in the USSR covered almost the entire spectrum of guidance concepts in the surface- tdsurface missile category including radar tracking-radio control beam riding inertial and celestial guidance systems In the sur- face-toair category the USSR acquired enough German knowledge and equipment to reconstruct the Rheintochter Schmetterling and Wesserjell missiles each of which in- cluded an optical track-radio command sys- tem An air-tosir guidance system for the Select missile utilizing the same principles was advocated by the Germans in the USSR The electronic analogue computer of the Wes- serfeli system was subjected to further de- tailed studies and design improvements The Germans also designed a surface-to-air missile system designated the 11-113 The guidance 'Detailed information on Soviet scienti c and technical resources for guided missile develop- ment including the availability of technical in- formation from foreign sources is presented in Annex E proposed for this system was a two-radar ground based command control type capable of 350 coverage in azimuth One radar was to acquire and track the target and informa- tion from this radar was to be fed through a computer to the second radar which was used to track and position the missile A semi active radar homing head also worked on by German scientists appears to have been de signed for use in a or R ll3 type missile The USSR exploited German World War II infrared developments including a missile homing head called June In the air- to-surface category the Germans worked on a guidance system designated Hornet which was a combination beam rider and semiactive homing system Beginning in about 1948 the USSR apparently reached the point where it could largely dispense with German assist- ance except in the missile guidance eld We have no information on German activities in the USSR subsequent to 1954- 32 Firm evidence has not been obtained to indicate which of the many guidance systems are being utilized in Soviet missiles In the surface-to air and air-to-surface categories however there are some fragmentary data a The air defense launching sites around Moscow employ a unique guidance system of native Soviet design This system apparently has the ability to track multiple targets while scanning for new targets It also apparently has an ability simultaneously to control muln tiple missiles against multiple targets Recent information indicates that a command guid- ance system may be employed However the possibility of a combination command-seeker system has not been ruled out Several years work on a semiactive surface-to air homing system performed by a German group might have been intended to complement the ground guidance system associated with the Moscow sites b In the air to-surface category there is some evidence that the USSR continued de- Velopment of an antishipping guidance sys- 'For purposes of identi cation in US intelligence the designation Hornet refers not only to this guidance system but also to the complete mis- sile system employing it WW -P-- SE 1 tem closely resembling the German Komet Electronic signals emanating from the Black Sea region were intercepted on many occa- sions in 1555 and again in late 1956 These signals were quite similar in many technical characteristics to the signals a Hornet system might have radiated 33 In addition to the fragmentary informa- tion presented above a strong inferential measure of Soviet success in the guidance and control area is the large-scale ballistic mis- sile test program which has been under way at Kapustin Yar T Considering the above evi- dence in conjunction with demonstrated So- viet capabilities in other electronics applica- tions we conclude that the USSR possesses the necessary scienti c knowledge and tech- nical skills to develop advanced guidance and control systems for all categories of guided_ missiles Missile Propulsion 34 As in the missile guidance area the USSR took energetic measures after World War II to improve its knowledge of propulsion sys terns for guided missiles Only in the eld of solid propellants where the USSR had achieved a position of World leadership during World War II was its interest in German work limited The USSR acquired large quantities of pulsejet and rocket engine parts assem- blies and production tooling from Germany Both standard and improved versions of V-1 and engines were produced under Ger man sUpervision Some reports indicate that as many as 100 to 300 motors of 25 tons thrusts were completed during the period lees so The Germans also developed an improved engine with a thrust of 35 tons This motor was placed in production in late 1948 and 100 to 250 had reportedly been pro- duced by 1950 At Soviet direction two groups 0f Germans also worked on designs for two different lilo-ton thrust motors one of which was to be gimballed for missile directional control Other evidence indicates that a 100 For details of Soviet ballistic missile test ring activities see Annex Limited distribution under separate cover 'Merrz'c ions are used throughout this estimate ton thrust motor could have been ready for static test in 1952 this would represent an outstanding achievement in advanced tech nology In the surface-to-air category de sign improvements were made on the Wesser- fell motor to increase its thrust from H 000 pounds to approximately 20 000 pounds We have some evidence of Soviet work in ramjet engines but we know of no Soviet application of such engines to guided missiles 35 Known Soviet achievements in turbojets and in both solid and liquid rocket motors in- dicate that the USSR is well advanced in propulsion systems applicable to guided mis- siles Evidence indicating the application of turbojets to missile propulsion is lacking Aerodynamics and Structure 36 We have no information on aerodynamic developments in the USSR which can be asso- ciated directly with the missile program since 1950 Most of the German work dealt with ballistic missiles Many structural design modi cations of the we were made including light weight structure and pressurized inte- gral fuel tanks One structural design the ballistic missile differed radically from the It had a long cone shaped body with no aerodynamic control surfaces control was provided by a gimballed motor New body designs were also provided by the Ger- mans in the surface-to-air category includ- ing the missile which was longer and slimmer than the Wesserfall and had two wings and three tail surfaces instead of a cruciform configuration We do not know that any German de- signs have been developed fully by the USSR Native Soviet activity in the design eld is indicated by a single German report of a Soviet design for a subsonic air to surface Home missile 38 The USSR is known to have a number of the world's outstanding aerodynamieists par- ticularly in the eld of theoretical areody- namics supported by extensive research facil- ities Despite the dearth of information on native Soviet missile air frame design we esti- mate that the USSR has the knowledge of 11 basic aerodynamics as well as the personnel and facilities to support a program for devel opment of guided missiles of transonic and supersonic speeds Warheads and li'ases I 39 The USSR did not intensively exploit Ger- man World War II explosives experience prob ably because a high level of native compe- tence in explosive and fuse technology had already been achieved To a limited extent however the USSR did acquire information on German fusing techniques equipment and data exhibiting interest in the fusing system and in electromagnetic fuses for mis- sile warhead application We have extremely limited knowledge concerning the native So viet program of warheads and fuses Impact time-delay or proximity fusing techniques would not present any insurmountable tech- nical problems to the USSR 4o Although we have some evidence on the details of the Soviet chemical warfare CW program there is no evidence of the applica- tion of CW materials to guided missiles We estimate however that the USSR is currently capable of providing CW warheads for any missile intended for antipersonnel attacks Our estimate of Soviet capabili- ties to develop and produce nerve agents and an examination of the problems involved in the dissemination of agents in missile war- heads leads us to believe that the USSR could have had tabun GA warheads in 1954 and sarin warheads in 1956 We estimate that the USSR could probably develop and em- ploy agents more toxic than the series in guided missiles by 1960 This date is predicated on Soviet solution of the prob lem of generating a proper aerosol for dis- persal of the agent 41 As in the case of CW we have some evi- dence of a Soviet biological warfare 13W capability but no evidence of Soviet applica- tion of BW materials to guided missiles We estimate however that the USSR is capable 'Detailed estimates on Soviet capabilities and requirements for warheads are presented in Annexes A and the latter in limited distribu- tion under separate cover of providing BW agents for antipersonnel anticrop or antilivestock use as soon as appro priate missiles are available 42 We estimate that the USSR could now have nuclear warheads for incorporation into several types of guided missiles Geodesy and Cartography 43 The accuracies of Soviet long-range guided missiles will depend in part upon the USSR's capabilities in geodesy and cartogra- phy The large modern geodetic and carto- graphic organisation created by the USSR since the days of Lenin is already notable for its achievements It has computed a new ellipsoid resurveyed and greatly extended the rst-order triangulation net and completely readjusted the Soviet survey system to a single datum Such achievement is possible only by maintenance of very high standards of accu- racy Most of the USSR is now covered by maps at the scale of and maps of larger scales 1 25 000 or larger are now be- ing emphasized The new Soviet geodesy speci cations emphasise the pursuit of still greater re nement and accuracy 44 We estimate that the USSR can achieve geodetic location of targets in the US relative to launching sites in the USSR with errors of feet provided as we believe a tie has already been made covertly between So viet and North American triangulation across the Bering Strait If this connection has not been made the probable error in target loca- tion would be about Lorie feet The location' error for European targets is estimated at 200 300 feet We estimate that by 1965 these errors can be reduced by about ball through extension of the Soviet geodetic and mapping system into Satellite areas and through the use of improved intercontinental ties with Europe and North America The USSR is also working energetically in the study of geo- detic gravimetry wherein gravity measures are used to reduce the error in calculating the relationship of two points on the earth s sur face The high competence of Soviet gravim- etrists and their energetic data collection program especially in the Arctic may also enable the USSR to malts early advances in 12 the study of the extent to which surface gravity variations influence a ballistic mis- sile during flight There is evidence that the USSR is engaged in the study of the vertical gradient but information is not available on the details and extent of such work Soviet Industrial Capability to Produce Guided Missiles 45 We estimate that the USSR has the in- dustrial base and related industrial experience to adapt and series produce developed proto type missile systems of all types However we believe that in view of competing demands the limited availability of electronic equip- ment will seriously restrict the extent and variety of Soviet guided missile production until about 1958 Thereafter expanding electronics production will probably make this restriction much less severe as We estimate that approximately two- thirds of the current output of Soviet elec- tronics production in value terms is allo- cated to military programs and that the remainder is shared approximately equally by essential domestic telecommunication applica- tion and civilian consumer goods Both the announced plans for the Soviet economy and our estimate of over-ail Soviet military re- quirements indicate an increasing demand for electronics productiOn during the next ve years The Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan 1956 60 calls for expansion of electronics production by 1960 to three times the value of 1955 production This increase is one of the largest planned for a major industrial sector but we estimate that the USSR is capable of realizing this ambitious goal Other military demands upon electronics output as well as essential de- mands will probably restrict the rapid build- up of missile production until new investment in the electronics industry scheduled under the Sixth Five-Year Plan makes additional output available We estimate that signii n cant portions of the additional electronics plant capacity will not be available until about See also HIE 11 4 56 Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1931 2 $11- gust 1953 Sections 1958 In the interim the USSR could divert electronics output to missiles from the size- able residual of nonmilitary electronics pro duction or from other military electronics pro- grams but it probably would not be willing to accept the adverse consequences of such a reallocation However we estirnate that the Soviet program for expanding electronics production will create by the later years of the Sixth Five Year Plan an industrial capa- bility to support an extensive and varied guided missile production program as part of a balanced over-all military program 48 Another potential bottleneck in the pro- duction of guided missiles is the amount of time necessary to train production personnel and to adapt prototype mechanisms to series production This problem is particularly acute in the production of precision mecha- nisms for missile system components such as gyros stable platforms mechanical comput ers and certain valves However we estimate that the USSR has the engineering ability to overcome this potential bottleneck and that it should be able to produce precision mecha- nisms in suf cient quantity to support an ex- tensive missile production program ill SOVIET GUIDED DEVELOPMENT 49 Current intelligence on the speci c guided missiles actually under development in the USSR is almost nonexistent except in a very few histances In the succeeding paragraphs therefore we assess Soviet technical capabili- ties to develop speci c missiles types which among the vast number of types the USSR could develop seem to us most likely to satisfy the general requirements outlined in Section I above There is intelligence to indicate that certain missiles are under development While we consider the development program as a whole to be probable the detailed character istics represent a logical growth or developmental pattern within a particular family of missile systems We have high con dence in our esti- mates on certain missiles currently In various stages of development test or operational cm' ployment However in the light of inadequate evidence pertaining to other missile systems our estimates o1 detailed characteristics for such systems are less certain A- - 13 or in operation In most instances however and especially for those types estimated for late in the period our chief guide is our esti- mate of Soviet requirements and development priorities Within each broad category of mis- siles we have presented what we believe is a logical step-by-step de- velopment program toward the more advanced types 50 This assessment of Soviet capabilities to develop speci c missile types is predicated up- on our estimate that concerted and continu ing native Soviet research and development in the guided missile eld began in 1943 The date given as the estimated Soviet opera- tional capability for each missile type is the earliest probable time at which one or more series produced missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel 1 in one operational unit thus constituting a limited capability for operational employment We estimate that the time interval between the Soviet decision to produce in series and the attairunent of rst operational capability is probably between six and 13 months under average conditions For convenience in the succeeding paragraphs we assume that in general a Soviet decision to produce a par- ticular missile in series has preceded the esti- mated operational date by an average time of one year However in instances of very high priority the USSR could probably reduce this time interval to zero if the rst operational unit were equipped with prototype weapons and it personnel training were begun early enough These instances are speci cally noted in the case of the surface to air missile para 50 and the ICBM para 84 51 Based on our current knowledge of the state of the guided missile art and our esti mate of Soviet capabilities in parallel elds we estimate that when a particular missile system rst becomes operational its system reliability will be 40 50 percent '3 52 Despite the obvious dif culties of estimat- ing individual weapons types to be developed over a period reaching 10 years into the future we have sufficient con dence in the estimates made in this section of the paper to characterize the development program in the aggregate as probable There are sev eral factors which contribute to this con d- dence including suf cient intelligence to indicate at least the general nature of some current Soviet missile programs notably the surface-to-surface and surface-to-air pro- grams foreseeable developments in US offensive and defensive capabilities which the USSR can ascertain and must attempt to counter the probability that the ultimate goal of the Soviet development program in the surface-to-suriace category is an ICBM and in the surface to air category an anti- and the probability that any de- velopment program will be limited by foresee- able states oi the art and will advance through logical steps In addition suf cient technical di erences exist between the speci c missiles in this development program so that cancel- lation of one or several of the projects prob- ably would not appreciably advance the opera- tional dates of others 53 Nevertheless we recognize that Soviet re- quirements and priorities could change the development program signi cantly as the peri- od advances and new goals either more am- bitious or more restricted may be set This would be particularly likely in the event of an unforeseen technological breakthrough Warhead Selection 1 54 As a critical portion of our estimate of the Soviet guided missile development pro- gram we have considered Soviet capabilities to develop warheads or specific missile types- We estimate that the USSR has requirements for various sizes of nuclear HE and CW war- heads and has the capability to develop them on time scales consistent with the missiles in which they would be employed Our selec- tion of appropriate warheads for various mis lviilltary personnel or civilian scientists and technicians System reliability in this context means the percentage or missiles which function according to speci cations from missile takeoff to detona- tion in the target area Malfunctions prior to launching are not included in this dednitlon of system reliability For details see Annexes A and the latter in limited distribution under separate cover clerks nearer 14 sile types presented in Table I following Sec- tion 111 is based on estimated Soviet warhead design technology and on consideration of the CEP's payload weights and probable employ- ment of the various missiles In general we believe nuclear warheads would be preferable in most missile types and mandatory in some The USSR would probably consider CW war- heads desirable in some missiles for certain speci c missions I-IE warheads would be set isfactory in some missiles with relatively small CEP's We do not believe the USSR would develop and produce BW warheads for guided missiles since BW could be disseminated more effectively by a wide variety of other means including clandestine delivery 5 urioce-i o-Air Missile Systems 55 In 19'45 46 the USSR exploited in Ger- many all the important German surface to air missiles under development including Wesserj oll Schmetterling and Rheiatochter and caused a new design Fluse to be under- taken After their transfer to the USSR the Germans continued work on these missiles with the exception of the Fluse Some work was probably done into 1951 to design a semi- active homing head for the Wesserfoll and four models are believed to have been con- structed and taken over by the USSR in late 1950 Considerable interest was also evi- denced by the USSR in improving the capabil- ity of the Wesserfoll computer In 1950 a group of Germans were ordered to prepare a study on an advanced surface to-air missile designated the lit-113 Some of the Wesson foil features such as the propulsion system were to be retained and improved while other components notably the airframe were to be redesigned Operationally the was to be effective at altitudes of from 15 900 to 100 - 090 feet with a 32 n m slant range and a burn- out velocity of more than Mach 3 The So- viet speci cations for the R413 were rigorous and more closely supervised than were those of other German design projects The Ger- man design study for this missile was aub- mitted to the Russians in 1951 but its dis- position is not known 56 The most signi cant current intelligence in the surface-to-air category deals with guided missile installations around Moscow Sightings of these installations have been made since mid-1953 there have also been a few reports of similar sites being constructed around Leningrad in 1955 and 1956- 5T In the Moscow area 24 sites have been located with suf cient accuracy to indicate their arrangement in two concentric rings with radii of approximately 25 and 45 nm from the center of the city The circurn ferential distance between the sites is about 8 nan on the outer ring and about n m on the inner ring Observation in all sec- tors around Moscow has not been possible but we calculate that the inner ring contains 23 sites and the outer ring sites for a total of 57 sites A typical site measures ap- proximately one mile by one-hali mile with three longitudinal and about 11 transverse concrete roads and approximately 50 launch ing positions Associated building complexes are of su icient size to house from 200 to 409 personnel at each site The dimensions con- guration disposition and quality of con- struction of these installations indicate that they comprise a static guided missile air de- fense system 15 58 Certain unique equipment designated in US intelligence as is located approxi- mately one mile from each operational site on the Moscow side and is generally aligned with the center longitudinal road YOYO is a radar for use in the surface-toen- missile guidance system A recent report indicates that in tests in 1952 this radar was employed to track 5 6 targets simultaneously and that it may be intended to track as many as 25 targets simultaneously Based on this intel- ligence and on the fact that provision has apparently been made for the simultaneous launching of an undetermined number of missiles from each site we estimate that this system has a high traf c-handling capability 59 Missile-er objects were observed in sub- stantial numbers at one Moscow site in 1955 They are estimated to be about 21 2 to 3 feet in diameter and 25 to 35 feet in length See map and diagrams on following pages WW Atop Taldum 0 I Mlullb alle con rmed MtaeIle launching site location tentative Mantle launcl mtq lite predicted I Missile assembly plant con rmed a Missile memny plant tentative Pl lcipul mod Principal '9 1 0 3 0 NAUTICAL 'i a- 1r Malnyarnsfavm an 1' I hhthelkwu Hazinsk a r '11 b Tagorrevsk Kalamna Ea Serputhnv Earaysh 6 Kama 3' Iypicai Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Site Moscow Area gap-55cm i I -- a I m-Tn El n aura Fauibil Irlnlinrrn Slnrul m Doe-5' Jinn-Ilium an glint II urilln'O-I Artist s Conception of a Typical Layout of a Ya-Ya Radar Area Hnuiinl and I'll 51W in MOSCOW llunlh pad final tumult Llunthi pull-may Cunmll raid 'E'Jn'i NOTE In qgjlui-Ih ill-J It'll-Id n I Site Laynut Schematic T0 Launrh Pad and Bunker Arrangement 1 5 60 We believe that some sites in the surface- to-air missile defense system around Moscow have been operational since mid 1955 and that all sites are probably now operational Based on the size and con guration of the nussile-lilre objects observed and on technical assessment of the capabilities of the YOYO we estimate that at present this system prob ably employs missiles capable of carrying a 600 00 pound payload 1 to a maximum al- titude of 60 000 feet and a maximum horizon- tal range of 25 n m Its guidance system is probably of the command type with a CEP at maximum range of about 190 feet or possibly a command and semiactive seeker with a CEP of about 50 feet We believe that in this in- stance the high priority requirement for im- proved air defense capabilities probably dic- tated the equipping of the rst operational unit with prototype missiles simultaneously with the decision to begin series production 61 The USSR has an excellent capability for the development of more advanced surface- to air systems and a high priority will almost certainly continue to be given to this program It is probable that the currently operational surface-to-air missile system can and will be improved We estimate that in 105' a com- mand type guidance system capable of 360 traverse could be available for employment with Moscow type missiles but that such a system would have a lower traf c-handling capability than the current Moscow system 62 The current Moscow system will probably continue to have only limited effectiveness at very low altitudes To overcome this defi- ciency it is probable that the USSR will de- velop and could have in operation in 1956 a surface-to-air system for low altitude cover- age effective to a maidmum of 40 000 feet al- titude and 15 n m range This system could a Payload includes the explosive device and its associated luzing and firing mechanism For the estimated yields of nuclear payloads which could be employed in these and other missiles see An- nex Limited distribution under separate cover This range represents our estimate of Soviet capabilities to extend the maximum horizontal range of the system It probably had a maximum horizontal range of 20 n m when it first became operational in 1955 probably employ missiles carrying 150 pound payloads and achieve a of about 50 feet with semiactive homing guidance 3 63 It is also probable that the USSR will de- velop and could have in operation in 1059 a surface-to-air system capable of carrying a 500 600 pound payload to a maximum of 80 000 feet altitude and 50 n m range Its guidance would probably be of the command type or a command-seeker combination The former could probably achieve a CEP of about 500 feet the letter about 100 feet 64 Although we have no rm evidence of So- viet interest in surface to-air missiles for ship- borne defensepwe believe a requirement for such missiles exists We estimate that the USSR could probably have a 40 000 ft l n m missile system in operation in 1058 and an 30 000 lit 50 n m missile system in operation in 1960 We also estimate that the USSR could modify either or both of these missiles so as to make them suitable for dual purpose use as surface-to-surface missiles in appro- priate naval roles Recognizing that a high degree of accuracy would be dependent upon the ability of the launching ship to acquire targets by radar we estimate that the maxi- mum effective range of the 80 000 ftf50 n m system against surface targets would be roughly 30 50 n m 65- For improved range capabilities in defense of critical areas it is probable that the USSR will develop and could have in operation in 1061 one of two missile systems a ram- jet propelled missile capable of carrying a 500-pound payload to a maximum altitude of feet and a maximum of 100 n m Such a missile would have a speed of about Mach 2 5 and a CEP of 100 feet with terminal homing or 500 feet with command guidance a rocket-propelled missile capable of the 1' It is the view of the Director of Intelligence USAF that the USSR would be unlikely to have an effective all-weather land based low altitude surface-to-air missile system in operational use prior to 1960 61 There is no evidence of So viet interest in or development programs for such a system Further the advanced radar techniques required for an operational guidance and homing system for such a missile are prob- ably beyond the capability of Soviet electronic technology prior to 1960 61- 16 same payload capacity accuracy and range but with an altitude up to 90 000 feet and a speed of about Mach 4 We estimate that the latter would probably be the selection although the development of such a system would present more complex problems than the development of a ramjet missile system 60 The required performance characteristics of a surface-to-air missile system which could effectively engage both supersonic cruise-type missiles and ICBMs are not fully known He- quired engagement characteristics are esti- mated as 75 n m horizontal range and 300 000 feet altitude to oppose the ICEM and 300 um horizontal range and 90 000 feet altitude to oppose cruise-type missiles We do not be- lieve a single system effective against both these targets at maximum range and maxi- mum altitudes could be developed by' the USSR during the period of this estimate 6 7 We estimate that anti-ICBM defense would receive the higher priority and that the USSR could probably develop a missile system of some capability against the ICBM for rst operational use during the period 1963 66 We are unable to estiinate with con dence the characteristics of such a system It might carry a 1 000-pound payload to a horizontal distance of about 40 n m and an altitude of about 200 000 feet An extension of these range and altitude capabilities would require advances in radar design which we believe are not within Soviet capabilities during this period Such an anti-ICBM system might be modi ed for use against aircraft and cruise- type missiles up to altitudes of about 100 000 feet and to ranges of about 150 um Devel- opment of antimissile defense systems will un- doubtedly be continued beyond the period of this estimate Air-io-Air Missile Systems 58 In late 1945 and 1946 the USSR acquired several German air-to-air missiles and designs Although during this period German scientists in the USSR successfully applied Soviet solid Propellants to German unguided rockets we Ungul ded rockets are not included in this esti mate know of only one instance in which the Ger- mans worked on a guided missile employing these propellants This design was the Ger man Fallce later given the Soviet designation Solcof The School was designed to have a solid-propellant rocket motor of 2 800 pounds thrust an optical track-radio command guid- ance system and an HE warhead of 106 pounds to be detonated by either radio or acoustic proximity fusing The design study excluding guidance was completed by the Germans in 1948 We have no evidence that the USSR pursued any of the German work to completion but there is a small amount of evidence to indicate that the USSR now has an air-to-air missile development program 69 Despite the lack of signi cant intelligence in this eld we believe that Soviet air defense requirements would have dictated that the development of air-twair missiles be given an initial high priority This estimate is sup- ported by some indirect evidence including Soviet interest in infrared homing devices and the fact that the airborne intercept radar which has been developed for the FLASH- LIGHT ghter could be used in conjunction with air-to-air missiles We therefore believe that the USSR continued development work after 1948 and that by 1955 it could probably have had in operation a solid-propellant air- to-air missile capable of carrying a 25-pound payload to a range of 2-3 with a CEP of 30 feet However the passive infrared homing system probably employed in this mis- sile would limit its use to tailrcone attacks under conditions of good weather at the en- gagement altitude '10 The probable limitations of the above mis sile would have dictated high-priority efforts to develop an all-weather air-to-air missile and we believe that in 1958 the USSR could probably have such a missile in operational use employing a semiactive homing system and capable of carrying a 50-pound payload to a range of 5 with a of 40 feet In addition the USSR will probably develop a longer range all-weather missile and could probably have in operation in 1960 a missile capable of carrying a ISO-pound payload to a range of 15 20 if launched at 60 000 altitude This missile could probably achieve a CEP of 50 feet employing semiactive hom- ing guidance or infrared homing for tail-cone attacks Air-io-Surfoce Missile Systems ll Complete design data on all German air- to surface missiles were acquired by the USSR as were many completed German mire slice The USSR also obtained information on German air launchings of the V l One German group at Design Bureau 2 Moscow Engaged in research and development work from 194' to 1951 on a guidance system for a Soviet designed antiship missile designated Homer Details are not available on the de- sign of its warhead airframe and propulsion system although from information provided by the Germans who worked on the guidance system we have deduced general information concerning the over-all system performance The BULL was designated as the launching platform and release of the mis- sile was to be accomplished at about 19 909 feet altitude at a maximum range of 55 n m from the target The missile speed was esti- mated to be about 485 knots A radar in the launching aircraft was to provide for beam riding during the rst two-thirds of the mis- sile s ight and to illuminate the target for radar homing during the remainder of the ight We believe that a missile system of the Komet type or other air-to-surface sys- tem with similar performance characteristics has reached at least nal ight test stage m 72 We therefore estimate that a subsonic air- to surfacc missile capable of delivering a 3 000-pouncl payload to a range of 55 n m from the launching aircraft could probably be in operational use in the USSR in 1955 51 This missile possibly employing beam-riding with semiactive terminal homing guidance could achieve a of 150 feet against ships or other isolated and well-de ned radar targets A supersonic missile to ful ll this require ment could probably be operational in 1958 1'3 although we have no evidence on other Soviet activities in the air-to surface eld our estimate of Soviet military requirements See Annex Limited distribution under sepa- rate cover leads us to believe that the USSR has prob- ably also developed a shorter-range missile- for employment against ships It probably could have had in operation in 1955 a sub- sonic alpha-surface missile capable of deliver- ing a 3 900-pound payload to a range of 29 n m A guidance system using television with a radio command link could probably achieve a of 390 feet but such a system could be employed only in good weather v4 It is also probable that in order to im- prove its long range bomber attack capabiliv ties against heavily defended land targets and large naval concentrations the USSR will de- velop and could have in operation in 1961 a supersonic air-to surface missile capable of carrying a 3 090-pound payload to a range of 190 n m The CEP of such a missile would vary with thetype of guidance employed ranging from about 0 5 n m with homing on a clandestine beacon to 1 2 n m with inertial guidance assuming in the latter case that the launching aircraft could determine its own position within 0 25 Surfaceulo-Surfoce Missile Systems Ballistic Missiles T5 After World War II the USSR acquired from Germany a number of complete lit-2 ballistic missiles as well as component parts and production facilities were test- rcd at Kapustin Yar as early as the fall of 19-17 During the period up until about 1950 several different groups of German missile specialists and engineers in the USSR devoted considerable effort to improve the 11 2 sys- tem increasing the thrust of its motor from 25 to 35 tons and improving its accuracy At the same time a Soviet team attempted to increase its maximum range of about 209 n m to about 359 n m 76 German experts under Soviet direction also performed preliminary design studies for other ballistic missiles In December 1948 they completed a design study for a missile designated to employ a 32-ton throat motor and designed to carry a 2 159-pound payload to a range of 430 this study actually represented the consolidation of a number of proposals for further improvement 18 of the Beginning in the spring of 1949 they worked on detailed designs for a missile designated R l-ti which was to be a single- stage missile to employ a loo-ton thrust mo tor and to carry a 600-pound warhead to about 1 600 n m A series of feasibility studies was made for an 12 12 missile to be a staged missile carrying a 2 200-pound warhead to about 1 300 miles The Soviet utilisation of these studies is not known '77 We believe that exploitation of the Ger mans together with parallel and subsequent native efforts enabled the USSR to make sig- nificant progress in the development of bai- listic missiles of short and medium ranges after 1948 In addition to the 25- and 35-ton thrust rocket motors which were available at that time we believe that a 100-ton thrust mo- tor was successfully developed by 1953 As indicated in Section II we also believe the USSR has high capabilities for development of guidance terns warheads and probably air- frames for ballistic missiles These estimates are sopported by the extensive Soviet ballis- tic missile testing program which has been under way at Kapustin Yer I 78- Based on the evidence cited above and in Annex C we believe that the USSR has pur- sued the development of several surface-to- surface ballistic missile systems A missile of 175 300 n m maximum range has been developed and could probably have been oper ational in 1954 It is probable that this mis- sile employs a 25-ton thrust motor and could carry a 2 000-pound payload Using a com- bination of radar track-radio command and inertial guidance a of 1 2 n m could probably be achieved and this could probably be improved to about 2 000 feet by 1955 53 A CEP of 1-2 n m could probably be achieved For further details see Annex Limited dis- tribution under separate cover 1 The 2 000-pound payload weights given for the 175 200 and 350 n m ballistic missiles de- scribed in paragraphs T3 79 and 81 represent our basic estimates However we believe that ii the USSR incorporated certain technically feasible re nement in structural design these missiles could carry to their maximum ranges payloads Weighing 1 5 to 2 times as much as those esti- mated We have no evidence of such Soviet developments with a pure inertial guidance system by 1958 59 - 79 In addition a missile of about 350 n m maximum range has been developed and prob- ably could also have been operational in 1954 It is probable that this missile employs a 35-ton thrust motor and could carry a 2 000- pound payload 1 Using a guidance system similar to that of the 115 200 n m missile this missile could probably achieve a CEP of 1 2 which could be improved to 3 000 feet by 1955 59 A CEP of 1 2 n m could probably be achieved with a pure inertial guidance system by 1958 59 80 Development work has also been in prog- ress on a missile of about 700 n m maximum range which could probably have been oper- ational in 1956 It is probable that this mis sile employs a loo-ton thrust motor and could carry a 6 000-pound payload A guidance sys- tem similar to those of the rst two ballistic missiles described could probably achieve a of 3 improvable to 1 2 n m by 1957 59 A CEP of 1 2 n m could probably be achieved with a pure inertial system by 1953 52 81 We have no rm evidence of Soviet devel- opment of any ballistic missile of shorter range than 1T5 n m We believe that a re- quirement exists for a missile with 75 n m maximum range for tactical support of ground forces and for neutralizing certain additional targets and that its relative ease of develop- ment would probably have led Soviet plan- ners to include it in their program We esti- mate that such a missile could probably have been in operation in 1954 Employing a 10- ton thrust motor it could probably carry a 2 000-pound payload 3 and achieve a CEP of 1 200 feet using a combination of radar track radio command and inertial guidance This CEP could probably be achieved with a pure inertial system by 1953 59 32 Estimated Soviet requirements for im- proved attack capabilities against peripheral Eurasian targets and against the continental US lead us to believe that intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles are probably under high priority development 19 These missiles are the logical goals of the step-by-step Soviet ballistic missile develop- ment program which was clearly under way by 1943 The R44 studies ordered by the USSR in early 1949 as well as the stud- ies con rm an early Soviet interest in at least the IRBM The signi cance of the 13 14 studies is further increased by recent US ex- perience which indicates the feasibility of achieving ranges up to 1 600 n m with a single mil-ton thrust rocket motor In view of prob able Soviet requirements and the progress of the Soviet program to date we estimate that is probably developing and could probably have in operation in 1959 a single- stage IRBM capable of camring a 1 650- pound payload to a masdmum range of 1 600 n m a of 3 4 n m could probably be achieved with a combination of radar track- radio command and inertial guidance improv- able to 1 2 n m in an additional one to two years or in an additional three years with a pure inertial system 33 In view of the potential capabilities of an against the continental US as well as overseas targets if launched from a subma- rine we believe the USSR may attempt to develop an IREM for submarine employment However the formidable problems involved including the development of pure inertial guidance precise navigational equipment and specially con gured submarines with the nec essary handling fueling and launching equip- ment lead us to estimate that with a vigor- ous program the USSR might achieve an oper- ational submarine-launched system some time during the period 1964 56 34 There is no direct evidence that the USSR is developing an ICBM but its development has probably been a high priority goal of the Soviet ballistic missile program We estimate that the USSR now possesses or is rapidly acquiring the necessary data for attacking the aerodynamic structural and guidance problems of an ICBM The solution of many problems including the re-entry problem has already been aided to some extent by the 700 n m ballistic missile development program and should be further advanced by work on IRBM and earth satellite programs It is therefore probable that the USSR could have ready for operational use in 1950 61 a proto- type ICBM capable of carrying a 1 500- pound payload to a maximum range of 5 500 n m The high priority requirement for an operational ICBM would probably dictate the equipping of the rst operational unit with prototype ICBMs Such a missile would prob ably employ two 100-ton thrust motors for rst-stage propulsion and one 35-ton motor for second-stage propulsion With a combina- tion of radar track-radio command and iner- tial guidance a of about 5 n m could probably be achieved but an additional two years would probably be required to achieve this CEP with a pure inertial system Cruise Type Missiles 85 Many German V l component parts and considerable manufacturing equipment were shipped to the USSR after World War II Es- timates on the number of V l missiles assem- bled in the USSR range from 50 to several hundred German experts were esploited until about 1950 their work included proj- ects to improve the V l s guidance system and its pulsejet engine The Germans reported that Soviet scientists esperimented with twin pulsejet V l type missiles in 1943 and 1949 Also a German group prepared a preliminary design study for a ramjet cruise-type missile designated which was to be a 1 600 n m missile boosted to operating altitude and speed by a jettisonable However no German ramjet experts were involved and there was no evidence of any Soviet interest in this proj- ect after the completion of the design study in December 1949 86 The postwar work on pulsejet missiles while far less extensive than work in other guided missile elds could have permitted the USSR to have improved V l type missiles in operational use by 1950 However because of the apparent lack of Soviet interest and the limited speed and altitude capabilities and high fuel consumption of pulsejet motors we believe that the USSR probably did not carry development of such missiles to completion The potential military value of subma- rine launched surface-tdsurface missiles to- MD 20 gether with the dif culty of employing ballis- tic missiles with submarines would probably have led the USSR to develop cruise-type mis- siles initially There is some evidence as yet inconclusive of the existence of Soviet subma- rines equipped to carry such missiles Based on estimated Soviet requirements and capa- bilities we believe that the USSR has probably developed and probably could have had in operation in 1955 a submarine-launched tur- bojet missile capable of carrying a 3 000-pound payload at high subsonic speeds to a maxi mum range of 500 n m The accuracy of this missile would probably vary from 0 5 to lo depending upon the guidance system employed and the accuracy with which the guidance submarine could x its position 88 A supersonic missile to ful ll this require- ment could probably be in operation in 1957 Guidance could probably be improved to ob- tain a CEP of 1 2 n m at maximum missile range in 1960 using an inertial guidance sys- tem monitored by radar map-matching 89 The requirement for submarine launched missiles will probably lead the USSR to de- velop a longer range cruise-type system A supersonic missile capable of carrying a 3 000- pound payload to a maximum range of 1 000 n m could probably be operational in 1962 As with the 500 n m missile would vary considerably with the type of guidance employed Earth Satellite 90 In April 1955 the USSR announced the formation of the Permanent Interagency Carn- mission for Interplanetary Communications There is other evidence indicating the exist- ence of this commission at least as early as the fall of 1954 The public announcement was the rst official indication that the USSR was actively engaged on problems associated with the launching and orbiting of earth sat- ellite vehicles The six conu'nission members named are among the leading Soviet scien- tists their competence in such elds as astro- physics and nuclear research is internationally recognized One of the rst tasks of this com- mission was stated to be the organization of work for the creation of an automatic lab oratory for scientific research of outer space Since late 1955 numerous unoillcial state- ments have been attributed to Soviet scien- tists concerning Soviet intentions to launch satellites during the International Geophys- ical Year 1 July 195' to 31 December 1953 In September 1955 the Soviet IGY Committee announced its intention to participate in the IGY rocket and earth satellite programs No detailed program was submitted however 91 The USSR will probably make a major effort to be the rst country to orbit an earth satellite On the basis oi estimated Soviet guided missile capabilities we believe that the USSR possesses the basic technical ca- pabilities skills and other resources required to develop build and orbit an unmanned satellite vehicle The successful orbiting of a satellite vehicle requires solutions for many of the scienti c and technical problems encountered in the development of long- range ballistic missiles except for the re entry problem and with the added requirement for a small long-life power supply We believe that the USSR has the capability of orbiting in 195 a satellite vehicle which could acquire scienti c information and data of limited mili- tary value A satellite vehicle possessing sub- stantial reconnaissance capabilities of military value could probably be orbited in the period 1963-65 Specialized Missiles 92 We consider that during the period of this estimate it will be within Soviet capa bilities to develop specialized missiles for em- ployment as decoys and antiradar weapons We have not estimated specific Soviet proe grams among the wide range of possibilities in these elds- However we believe that some of the air-to surface missiles described in the preceding paragraphs could be modi ed to home on ground radars and that a portion of the air-to surface missile production estimated in Annex A might comprise these antiradar weapons TABLE I SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THROUGH 1953 MISSILE SYSTEMS First 0 era- Maid- onal Maximum mum Ga a- Maximum Horizontal Accuracy Payload Speed Designa- bi ty Altitude Range lbs and Mach Para tion Date ft in m in ft type No Guidance Refer Remarks Ground- Launched Sill 1' mid 1955 60 000 20 19551 5001' 190 600 100 2 0 Command type 190' 56 First operational ca ability 25 19521 nuclear 2 5 mid-course command with 60 simultaneous with ecision orHE terminal homing probably to series produce Charac- semiactiye 50' CEP teristics are those estimated for early 195 811-2 1950 40 000 15 50 150 HE 2 0 Semiactiye homing 62 For low altitude defense Sis-3 1059 30 000 50 Miller 500 500-300 3 0 Command train 500' 03 nuclear command wt homing 100' or HE Bill 4 1061 90 000 100 100 or 500 500 3 5 Command trifle 500 65 Altemate system also possi- nuclear command homing 100' ble See paragraph 55 or HE System Sit-5 1903 55 200 000 40 1 200 1 000 0 0 Command type 62 1 nuclear Characteristics estimated are Emd n ftmn for use against aircraft and cruise-type subject to considerable error or es i 100 000 150 500 1 000 7 0 Command with homing i nuclear Ship- borne 1950 40 000 15 50 150 HE 2 0 Beam riding andx or semi- 6-1 Could be modified for dual- active homing our use use as surface-to islle 1 - sis r 1950 some so 100or500 sue sen so Command this sea one at $212 r316 ppm nuclear command homing 100 or HE We evaluate this program as probable with varying degrees of con dence concerning detailed characteristics See footnote to title of Section Ehose missile types for which our estimates are supported by significant current intelligence are indicated by an asterisk following the missile designa- on These are arbitrary designations for convenience of reference The'same designations are used in Table II following Section I of Annex a For de nition see paragraph 50 Payload includes the exlplosive device and its associated facing and ring mechanism Warhead capabilities and requirements are discussed in Annexes A and the latter in lrnited distribution under separate cover See Director of Intelligence USAF footnote to paragraph 62 21 First 0 era- tonal CaPa- Maximum biity Range Accuracy Date' n mJ 1955 2 3 30 It 1953 5 40 ft 1960 15-201 5010 launched at 00 000 Designa- tion Alt 2 Adria First 0 era- onal CaYa- Maximum bilt Date' n m l 1955 20 Desi a- tlonEn 113-1 300 It 1958-5 55 150 It 08 3 1953 55 150 It 1901 100 0 5 2 0 11 111 A34 Payload lbs and typei 25 IE 50 HE TABLE I Cont'dl SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THROUGH 1900' MISSILE SYSTEMS Maximum 0 prox Speed rose Mach Weight No Elba 2 0 1'15 2 0 300-450 150 nuclear 2 0 800 orHE Payload Range accuracyr lbs and type 3 000 nuclear or HE nuclear or HE 3 000 nuclear or HE 3 000 nu clear Guidance Passive infrared homing Semiactive homing Semiactive homing or in frared homing AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS Cruise 08me Speed r055 Mach Weight No 1135 0541 0 5 0 Elli 3 000 0 9 3 000 10 000 1 5 3 000 - 10 000 2 5 11 000 max Guidance TV with radio command link Beam riding with semi- actlve terminal homing Beam riding with semi- active terminal homing Command type radar map- matching or homing 0n clandest ne beacon 0311's of 0 5 n m l with inertial guidance 1H2 n m CEP as suming launching aircraft can fix own position with 0 25 n m Para Refer 60 Para Refer 13 '32 1'2 1'4 Remarks Tail-cone attack in good weather All-Weather nil-weather or tail-cone attack Remarks For use in good weather For use against sings or other well- defined radar targe Ditto For use against heavily-defended land target or large naval concen- trations See footnotes on page 21- Does not include speed of launching aircraft 22 Desig- 1 nation Ballistic Missiles 53-1 85-2 53-51 55-5 First 0 era- onal Capa- Date 1 954 105-1 1954 1050 1950 1950 01 Maximum Range mini '15 1'15 200 350 r1'00 1 600 5 500 Accuracy 1 200 It 1-2 am 1954 2 one rt by 1955 571 1 2 nan 1954 3 one It by 1955 an 3 nan 1055 112 n 1n by 195 591 344 mm 1059 LE run by 1000 011 about 5 mm TABLE I Cont dl SOVIET GUIDED MISSHE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THROUGH 1900 1 MISSILE SYSTEMS Thrust of Approx Motor Gross metric Weight tonsi libs Payload IIllis and type 2 000 10 nualcar HE or CW 2 000 25 nuclear or CW possibly HE 2 000 35 nuclear or CW 12 000 cacao cacao 0 000 100 110 000 nuclear 1 650 nuclear 100 single stage 150 000 1 500 nu- clear First stage two lilo-ton motors second stage one 35- ton motor 300 000 Guidance Radar trackuradio command inertial Same CEP attain- able with pure inertial sys- tem by 1053-59 Radar track-radio command inertial CEP or 1 2 n m at- tainable with pure inertial system by 1958 50 Radar track-radio command inertial CEP or 1 2 mm at talnabie with pure inertial system by 1950 59 Radar track-radio command inertial 01' 1-2 n n1 at- tainable with pure inertial system by IQELSZ Radar track-radio command inertial of 1 2 run at- tainable with pure inertial system by 1962 Radar track-radio command inertial same CEP attain- able with pure inertial sys- tem by 1902 53 Para ReferRemarks tactical support or ground forces and for neutralizing certain other targets Ditto Ditto For peri heral attackFor peripheral attack First operational capability simul taneous with decision to series pro- duce For intercontinental attack 33 11181-1 1954-4513 a submarine-launched IRBM system with characteristics similar to those at the 1959 83 ground-launched system migh be available for operational employment some time during the period 1054-06 1 See footnotes on page 21 'These payload weights represent our basic estimatea However if the USSR incorporated certain technically feasible re nements in structural desi these missiles could carry to their maximum ranges payloads weighing 1 5 to 2 times as much as those estimated We have no evidence or such Soy lt developments W 23 TABLE I Cont'dl SOVIET GUIDED MISSJIE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THROUGH 1966 MISSILE SYSTEMS Cont dl tonal Cruise Agni-ox Ca a- Maximum Payload Speed ross Desig- hi Range Accuracy libs and Mach Weight Para nation Date mm DEF type No 1115 Guidance Refer Remarks Cruise-Time Missiles 33-3 1955 500 3 000 0 0 12 000 Radar track radio command of 0 5 rim or Designed for sub- n m nuclear with forward guidance station within 100 one of marine launching target 1 0 nm with iorward station within 200 mu of tar at hyperbolic radio oi 1-10 corn ination of inertial guidance and homing on clandestine beacon GEP of 1-2 n m l inertial system monitored by radar map- matching or La nan by room pure iner- tial of 10 n m in 1955 with 2 5 n rn at maximum range attainable by 1004 assuming submarine can x own position within 0 5 11 1313 33-9 195' 500 0 5 10 0 3 000 1 5-2 0 12 000 Same as 1955 subsonic missile BE Ditto n m nuclear 55 10 1962 1 000 1 10 3 000 1 5-2 0 25 000 Hyperbolic radio or 1 10 nmJ inertial 09 Ditto n m nuclear em monitored by radar map-matching 0 1 2 GEP of 5 ram at maximum range attainable with pure inertial system by 1964 as- Eusming submarine can fix own position within n m Sce iootnotes on page 21 25 ANNEX A A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM 1 The program outlined in this Annex can- not be taken as the most likely or the prob- able Soviet program We present it as only a possible program but one which is hot feasible and reasonable 1 l POSSIBLE PROGRAM 2 We have direct evidence of the series pro duction and operational deployment of only one of the 24 missile types discussed in See- 1It is the view or the Director of Intelligence USAF that the number of certain shorter range surface-to-surface and shorter range air-to-sur- lace missiles projected in this estimate is in ex cess of any reasonable prodUction in light of the limited availability or nuclear warheads and the limited requirement for HE and CW warheads The number or missiles in these categories as shown in Annex A has been predicated mainly on the assumption that although the Soviets recognize the desirability of having a high pro- portion or nuclear warheads le g paragraphs 35 and 37 of Annex All they would Produce far more oi these missiles than the number Ior which they could provide any signi cant percentage 0 nuclear warheads paragraph in oi Annex A and Table 11 Annex Al lb Produce and use HE or CW warheads for the bull or this large number of missiles paragraphs and till oi Annex cl Plan for and be willing to accept the high cost and relative ineffectiveness of using a missile to deliver HE or CW on many mili- tary missions for which a nuclear warhead is highly deslrable it missiles are to produce the effects desired The Director of Intelligence USAF agrees that the USSR would indeed satisfy its requirements for missiles with HF and CW warheads includ- ing reserve stocks but believes that a shortage of nuclear materials would then limit the fur- ther production of missiles In these categories to the number for which nuclear warheads could be provided tion of the DISCUSSION We have no knowledge of the actual Soviet program for production and employment of missiles during the next 10 years and we could reasonably ex- pect little direct evidence bearing on the prob- lem The range of possibilities is wide In at tempting to narrow this range and to arrive at a better de ned judgment of the dimen- sions of the Soviet missile threat which will confront the US during the decade we pro- ceeded as follows First we estimated Soviet military requirements for numbers of missiles by type making this estimate consistent with the date at which we believe each type could be available These numbers were then modi- ed in the light of the estimated avail- ability of nuclear materials for warheads the estimated limitations of the Soviet economy of the electronics and corn struetion industries and an assumed So- viet desire to plan a reasonably economical program involving ef cient production and an expenditure curve which would not move too sharply or irregularly and thus severely affect expenditures for other military programs 3 In considering the numbers of missiles to be stockpiled we have been unable to make de nitive estirnates oi the Soviet view as to the effectiveness of missiles versus other weap- ons systems We have however exercised judgment along the general lines indicated in Section I of the DISCUSSION as to the rel- ative weight Soviet planners would give to par- ticular missile types versus other available weapons to perform various missions We do not believe that Soviet planners would at pres ent be capable of realistically evaluating the effectiveness of their own as-yet undeveloped weapons systems When such evaluations can be made various aspects of any currently visualized Soviet program will be modi ed 25 4 This analysis is predicated upon our basic estimate that barring unpredictable techno- logical or political changes there will be no Speci c war readiness target-date in Soviet military programs through this period We have therefore not attempted to postulate what Soviet military planners would judge necessary to meet their full requirements for war readiness We assume that the USSR will develop a missile force in-being consistent with Soviet judgments as to the effectiveness of missiles versus other weapons systems that it will apportion its efforts according to the priorities of the various missions and that it will stress the development and maintenance of production skills experience and facilities that can be expanded rapidly if necessary We have not attempted to de ne the force in- being as optimum maximum or minimum nor have we attempted to arrive at precise percentage requirements for air defense ef- fectiveness or precise numbers of targets to be attacked by missiles 5 Clearly the following paragraphs cannot be regarded as de ning the most probable Soviet accomplishment over it years There are far too many doubtful factors entering into the calculations moreover it is certain that any 10-year program of missile produc- tion envisaged now whether by the USSR or by ourselves will be subject to Extensive change as the years go by We believe how- ever that these paragraphs set forth a pro gram which in the light of our uncertain knowledge at the present time is not only possible but is also feasible and reasonable 'Worhends 5 We have not attempted to estimate pre- cisely what proportion of the stockpiles of various missiles would be provided with nu clear HE or CW warheads where such a choice would be feasible We recognize haw- ever that the availability of nuclear materials will impose limitations on the extent of Soviet nuclear warhead production during the period of this estimate In those cases where CEP's 'See Section II of this Annex and Annex the latter in limited distribution under separate cover and payloads make HE or CW warheads feasi ble we believe the USSR would produce such warheads in suf cient quantity to meet its requirements for certain speci c missions without regard to the availability of nuclear materials However we are unable to deter- mine whether shortages of nuclear materials would in fact result in the production of fewer missiles of certain types than estimated here- in or in the production of additional HE oi- CW warheads or both Surfer ce-io-Air Program Ground-Launched We estimate that the high priority almost certainly assigned to air defenses generally together with the necessity for air defense weapons compatible with the requirements for defense against high-performance aircraft and missiles probably gives surf ace-to-air mis- sile defenses one of the highest priorities among current Soviet military programs Ob- servance of construction of the rst of an estimated launching sites around Moscow in 1953 some ve years after the initiation of a native missile program tends to con rm this estimate Construction of the Moscow launching sites represented a major effort during the years 1953 55 On the basis of an estimated 60 launchers per site and on allocation of four missiles per launcher the missile stockpile requirement for the entire Moscow system would be about 14 000 mis- siles Our estimate that large-scale produc- tion of these missiles is under way is sup- ported by observations in 1955 and 1955 of four and possibly as many as six factory type facilities near the city These unique and almost identical facilities at present in dif ferent stages of completion appear to be par- tial fabrication and nal assembly plants for surface-toair missiles at one of them more than 450 missile like objects were observed in September 1955 8 Aside from the information presented above plus some evidence that launching sites may be under construction near Leningrad we have no intelligence on Soviet programs for the operational employment or produc- tion of surface-to-air missiles We believe '1 27 however that the surface to air program will continue to enjoy high priority We believe that each surface-to-air system developed by the USSR will with relatively minor improve ments possess combat utility for some five to seven years following the introduction of the succeeding system In this manner new- er systems can either supplement older' sys- tems or permit their allocation to less criti- cal static targets or to mobile units for de tense of eld forces 9 Soviet military planners undoubtedly view the defense of Moscow as being of very high priority and of critical importance They probably recognize that the current Moscow surface-to-air system will satisfy their require- ments for only a few years Available intelli- gence indicates that although the Moscow system has the advantage of a very high rate of re it imposes limitations on the sector covered by individual sites to about 60 and a large number of sites are required to provide adequate all-around coverage Be cause of these limitations and the great ex- pense of the current installation in xed facil- ities we believe the surface to air missile de- fense as observed around Moscow to be a spe cial case dictated by the special importance of Moscow to the USSR We believe that the Moscow-type surface-to air defenses as now constituted and in terms of the level of defense effort would not be deployed in any additional Soviet areas except possibly Leningrad 10 To provide surface to air missile defenses for other critical areas several alternatives are open to Soviet planners For example a single ring of sites comparable to the inner Moscow ring of 23 sites could provide a rela tively high level of defense at most defended areas With the present YOYO guidance sys- tem we believe that 12 sites would be required to give 360 coverage with acceptable overlap On the other hand we estimate that in 195 the current system could probably be modi- ed to incorporate a guidance system capable of 360 traverse Such a system would have a lower traf c-handling capability but it would have the advantage of permitting sub- division of the large re-units of 60 launchers into smaller units each with its own guidance system 11 We have no intelligence to indicate wheth- er the USSR will elect to defend a few critical areas at a high level of defense or alternative- ly a larger number of areas at a lower level of defense In any case we estimate that a logical program for the 60 000 03 125 n m mis- sile might involve the activation of 150 units by 1959 This would require a stockpile of about 36 000 missiles to be produced in the period 1955 66 12 The low altitude capability estimated for the 40 000 itJlS n m system which could probably become available in 1958 would make it a valuable weapon for augmenting the defenses of both critical areas and eld forces This low-altitude coverage would prob- ably be required to supplement the later more advanced high-altitude systems as well as the current 60 000 ft f25 n m system The USSR might thus produce a stockpile of about 22 400 of these missiles in the period 1956-66 and activate about 350 units for their employ ment a portion would probably be assigned to critical static target areas and the remain- der employing mobile launchers to eld forc23 13 It is probable that the USSR would desire to defend a relatively large number of critical military installations and industrial areas with surface-to-air systems of the 80 000 ft 60 n m and 90 000 n m types The improved characteristics of these systems would permit a reduction in the number of units assigned to the defense of any given critical area We estimate that a total stock- pile of about 60 000 missiles of these two types might be produced between 1959 and 1963 and that a total of about 250 units might be activated 1 Beginning in about 1969 missiles of the 60 000 its 25 n m type would probably Calculation based on 60 launchers per unit four missiles per launcher See Director of Intelligence USAF footnote to paragraph 62 of the DISCUSSION 'Calculatlon based on 16 launchers per unit four missiles per launcher with an allocation of 150 units to static defense and 200 units to field iorccs Calculation based on 60 launchers per unit four missiles per launcher l W 28 be phased out of the defenses of critical areas and be redeployed to less critical areas and eld force units 14 The numbers of interim anti-ICBM mis- slice and units which the USSR might have by 1966 is conjecture The USSR might elect to stockpile several thousand as an ultimate objective the exact number depending upon 3 its estimate of the number of US to be countered its estimate as to the net effectiveness of the system against the number of nuclear warheads avail- able for use in the anti-ICBM role and its estimate of the effectiveness of this system as modi ed against high performance bomb- ers and cruise-type missiles The uncertain- ties as to when such a weapon might be brought to rst operational use 1963 66 precludes con dent numerical estimates in a tentative basis we estimate that a reason- able number of missiles produced through 1966 might be 1 000 for use in the anti ICBM role and the number of units about 15 Shipborne 15- While the defense of naval surface units would probably have a lower priority than the defense of key land targets Soviet planners would almost certainly recognize that ship- borne surface-to air missiles could provide valuable protection for the Soviet surface fleet and decrease its dependence on shore based aircraft Considering these factors together with the economic cost of such a program we believe the USSR might seek during the period of this estimate to equip about two- thirds of its cruisers and about one-sixth of its destroyer types with surface-to air missiles On the basis of estimated Soviet naval strength for 1961 and assuming a relatively constant force after that date about 24 cruis- ers and 4 6 destroyer types might thus be equipped with surface-to air missiles by 1966 A logical program might be as follows equip six cruisers and eight destroyer types with some ft 15 n m shipborne mis- 'All calculations based on four launchers per cruiser and two launchers per destroyer type with an allowance of 30 missiles per launcher and a small allowance for reserve siles producing a stockpile of 1 500 such mis- siles between 1958 and 1961 later equip 24 cruisers including the six above with 80 000 n m shipborne missiles pro- ducing a stockpile of 3 000 such missiles be- tween 1060 and 1966 equip an additional 40 destroyers with the 40 000 ft 15 n m mis- siles including those withdrawn from the original six cruisers the conversion of these destroyers and production of an additional 2 500 missiles to be accomplished by 1966 15 Warhecds Nuclear warheads could be employed in any of the surface-to air missile types estimated for the period except the 40 000 ft 15 n m types While the small CEP's of most surface-to air missile types would make HE warheads satisfactory we estimate that the USSR would include nuclear warheads in some of these missiles Such war- heads would be mandatory for anti ICBMs Cost The ground-launched surface-to- air programs involving the activation of about 750 static and mobile units and produc tion of a stockpile of some 120 000 missiles would cost an estimated 36 billion 1955 dollars in investment and operating expenditures through 1966 This represents about one-half of the dollar cost of the over-all missile pro- gram set forth in this Annex and its dollar allocation is more than three times that of any other single category of missiles The shipborne surface twan- programs would en tail investment and operating costs amount ing to seven billion dollars or about 10 per- cent of the over-all missile program Air-io-Air Program 18 We have no evidence of any Soviet pro gram for the operational employment or pro- duction of airato-air missiles but we believe that such a program has probably enjoyed a high initial priority as part of the over all Soviet air defense effort The Soviet air-to- air missiles which we estimate will probably be available during the rst half of the period have several advantages which tend to coun- teract their guidance and payload limitations 'For details of the estimated costs of the entire missile program see Section of this Annex- All done - costs presented in this estimate are in 1955 dollars 29 These include their relatively cheap unit cost the availability of large numbers of ghter aircraft as carriers and their abil- ity to improve ghter kill capabilities Con- current surface-to air and air-to air programs are justi ed during much of the period be- cause of their complementary relationships We believe however that late in the period the contribution of air-to-air missiles to the over all Soviet air defense effort will probably decrease as the nature of the threat evolves 19 We estimate that the USSR will continue to maintain about 9 300 ghter aircraft in operational units through at least 1961 As- suming an initial program to equip about one- fourth of these ghters with the currently available 2 3 n m goodaweather air-to-air missile a stockpile of about 20 000 missiles might be produced by 1953 Soviet planners would probably consider this alr-to air sys- tem as an interim measure only to be sup plemented by the 5 n m fall-weather air-to air system which we estimate could probably be available in 1955 A Soviet program for this missile might involve full equipment of the $800 Soviet all-weather ghters estimated for 1901 Thus a stockpile of about 55 000 such missiles might be produced between 1958 and 1951 1 20 Soviet production of the 15 20 n m air- to-air missile which could probably rst be available in 1960 would probably be limited by the actual or impending threat of attack by cruise-type and ballistic missiles How- ever since the 15 20 n m missile could carry a 150-pound payload three times that of the 5 nm air-to-air missile and capable of em- ploying nuclear as well as HE warheads we believe some production would probably be undertaken As a tentative gure only we estimate that some 000 such missiles might be produced between 1900 and 1963 21 Cost The air-touair programs described would entail an investment and operating cost amounting to about seven billion dollars or 10 Calculations based on four missiles per aircraft per sortie with suf cient 2 3 n m missiles avall able for two sortles per aircraft and suf cient 5 n m missiles for three sorties per aircraft percent of the total cost rl he entire air de- fense missile program including surface-to- air and air-toaair missiles of all types com- prises approximately 70 percent of the dollar cost of the over-all Soviet missile program set forth in this Armex Air-io-Surfoce Frog re re 22 While there is considerable evidence to in dicate Soviet interest in air-to surface missiles and we believe that one type has reached at least nal ight test stage there is no evi- dence of Soviet series production in this mis sile category Our belief that such a program would probably be undertaken rests primarily on two tasters Soviet planners probably estimate that they face a serious threat from US and Allied carrier task forces and that the capabilities of these task forces to defend themselves against close-in attacks 'by air- craft are already high and will continue to improve and they probably estimate that as the period advances the capabilities of their own bombers to penetrate the defenses of key Western land targets will materially decrease 23 Until 1951 the air-to surface missiles available to the USSR will probably be those designed primarily as antiship weapons A Soviet program for these missiles might be as follows on an interim basis produce by 1953 a stockpile of about 1 000 subsonic air-to-surface missiles of which the majority might be 55 n m missiles of 8 10 000 pounds gross weight and a portion might be 20 nm missiles of 6 8300 pounds gross weight replace this stockpile with the supersonic 55 11 111 missiles which could probably be available in 1958 producing a stockpile of 1 000 '1 by 1900 Such a program could pro- vide air-to surface missiles for employment by 300 or more aircraft most of which would be of medium bomber er larger types Some 55 n m missiles could be employed against The Director of Intelligence USAF believes that the numbers of shorter range air-to-surface missiles shown here are excessive See his foot- note to paragraph 1 of this Annex Calculation based on one missile per aircraft Der sortie with suf cient missiles for three sortles per aircraft 49W 30 land targets although the guidance system estimated for these missiles would limit their employment to isolated and well-de ned radar targets and the short range would also limit their utilization HIE warheads would prob ably be satisfactory for employment against single ships but nuclear warheads would be employed against land targets and ship con- centrations 24 The supersonic 100 nan missile of 11 000 pounds gross weight which could probably be available in 1961 would increase the capa- bilities of manned heavy bombers to attack well defended land targets and could decrease the vulnerability of these aircraft A Soviet program for these missiles might involve pro- duction of a stockpile of about 1 000 by 1966 Because of their payloads and prob- able employment these missiles would require nuclear warheads Su rioce-io-Suriace Prog ro rn Ground Launched 25 Information from returned German per- sonnel as well as the large-scale testing of ballistic missiles in the USSR indicate that at least experimental or pilot-line production has been under way for six to eight years and that there must be at least one major assembly facility committed to such produc- tion Other than this circumstantial evi- dence we have no knowledge of any Soviet program for the production or operational employment of ground launched surface-to- suriace missiles 26 In estimating possible Soviet stockpiles for ground launched surfaceuto-surface mis- siles we have considered the different priori ties the USSR would probably assign to mis- siles for augmenting or replacing other weap- ons systems in the tactical support peripheral attack and intercontinental attack roles and weighed these priorities against the re- quirement for economy in expenditure and in utilization of nuclear materials While we have generally equated the stockpiles of cer tain missiles to numbers of operational units See Annex Limited distribution under sepa- rate cover its set forth in Section I of the DISCUSSION and targets to be attacked the stockpiles themselves were not derived by any precise calculation of these factors The stockpiles represent a time-phased program designed to achieve a reasonable degree of readiness and an expandable production capability This we have done in the belief that Soviet plarmers must make contingent decisions when technology and doctrine are changing rapidly and comparative evaluation of com- peting weapons systems is not clear cut 2T Short-Range Ballistic Missiles up to 350 nm range 0 Because of its relatively low priority within the missile program a production pro- gram for '75 n m ballistic missiles would prob- ably be phased over a fairly long period a stockpile of about 9 000 15 such missiles might be produced between 1954 and 1980 with stress on maintaining an expandable produc- tion capability This stockpile could equip about 90 missiles units The estimated 1 200-foot CEP of this missile would permit use of nuclear HIE or CW warheads against appropriate targets 0 On the same basis a stockpile of about 3 000 1 ballistic missiles of 175 200 n m range might be produced between 1954 and 1950 This stockpile could support about 30 units A basic requirement exists for nuclear war- heads The estimated 1954 CEP of 1-2 n m would probably preclude the use of HE but not CW warheads and would limit employ- ment of these missiles to static targets With a CEP improved to 2 000 feet by 1955 57 the use of HE would be feasible for some operations c To provide an improved capability for attack against NATO or other forces the USSR might have produced a stockpile of about 700 ballistic missiles of 350 run range between 1954 and 1956 This stockpile could support about 14 units 17 The same warhead 1 The Director of intelligence USAF believes that the numbers of short range surface-to-surfacc missiles shown here are excessive See his foot- note to paragraph 1 of this Annex Calculation based on 100 missiles per unit Units assumed to have four launchers each 1' Calculation based on 50 missiles per unit Units assumed to have two launchers each 31 and target limitations would apply as in the lid- 209 n m missile except that the use of HE would not be practicable 28 Ballistic Missiles of MG and 1 600 n msRonges Ballistic missiles of 700 n m range could reach much of the Eurasian land mass Japan Alaska and a portion of the UK from launching sites within the Sinc- Soviet Bloc IRBMS of 1 609 n m range could cover these same targets from more secure launching sites and could extend the coverage to include more distant target areas While we have not fully assessed the number of tar- gets the USSR might elect to attack by this means rather than by other weapons systems we estimate that the USSR might stockpile about 966 of these missiles We have as- sumed that the advantages the USSR could gain by acquiring a missile capability in-being for attack on Western Europe would probably lead it to produce the stockpile fairly rapidly We have thus allocated the larger portion of the stockpile to the T00 n m ndssile because of its earlier availability and on this basis we have assumed a stockpile of TOD ballistic missiles of T60 n m range produced between 1956 and 1960 and a stockpile of 290 IREMs produced between 1959 and 1962 We recog- nize however that the earlier program might be cut back to allow some increased produc- tion of IRBMs The CEP's payload weights and probable employment of both the T00 n m missile and the IREM would require nuclear warheads although we do not exclude the possibility of CW use with the T00 n m _mls sile for occasional special missions I 29 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 5 506 n m range We believe that the USSR will seek to acquire a considerable number of ICBMs with nuclear warheads as rapidly as possible In reaching this conclusion we have considered the great potential military value of the ICEM as compared to competing Soviet weapons systems particularly for sur- prise attack 13 the military advantage the USSR could gain if it could acquire a substan tial ICBM capability before the US had de- Veloped adequate countermeasures or similar forces in-being the potential economy of the ICEM system as compared to compet- ing weapons systems and the probable low initial system reliability and accuracy or the ICEM On these grounds a Soviet ICBM program might include production of a stock- pile oi about 1 090 missiles between 1960 and 1965 '3 To provide security and permit rapid rates or re but at the same time to conserve investment in facilities the USSR might em- ploy about 160 widely dispersed ICBM launch- ing sites each with 10 nussiles and two launching pads although many other methods of deployment would be possible Shipborne 30 Any of the present Soviet submarine types could be equipped to carry one or two cruise- type missiles in topside stowage and conven- tional-powered or nuclear-powered boats about the size of the class could be converted or constructed to accommodate tour missiles each in internal stowage While there is no evidence to indicate how many guided missile submarines the USSR intends to convert or construct we estimate that it could now have about ll submarines equipped to carry mis- siles in topside stowage Its future program might call for the construction or conversion oi about 56 submarines with internal stowage by about 1966 31 We estimate that production of surface- to surtace cruise-type missiles is probably un- der way and that a Soviet production pro gram might be as follows to acquire an initial capability rapidly produce a stockpile of 100 missiles with 596 capa- bilities between 1955 and mid-195T pro- duce a stockpile of 159 missiles with 5le supersonic capabilities in the period 1957 60 produce a stockpile of 360 missiles with 1 000 n m supersonic capabilities in the period 1962 64 in part to replace the sub sonic missiles and in part to equip submarines converted or constructed after 1960 The CEP's payload weights and probable employ- ment of these missiles would require nuclear warheads These dates assume rst operational capability of the ICEM at the earliest Probable date il e the beginning of 1960 Within range or our estimate however a Soviet ICBM might not be operationally available until the end or 1961 32 32 The USSR might also adapt 30 000 it ll n m shipborne surface-to air missiles to per- mit their alternative use against surface tar- gets in appropriate naval roles The basic numerical requirement for such missiles is in cluded in the shipborne surface-to alr pro- gram paragraph 15 of this Arman 33 Cost The estimated investment and oper- ational cost of the entire surface to surface program is about 20 billion dollars or approid- mately 27 percent of the dollar cost of the over-all missile program The included ICBM program represents about eight percent of th over-all program - Table II summarizing Section I of this An- nex begins on page 33 II WARHEAD CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING POSSIBLE PROGRAM Nuclear Worheods 34 The production and operational program for guided missiles described in Section I of this Annex has been assessed in the light of the estimated availability of nuclear materials to the USSR during the period 1 The accu- racy of the assessment is necessarily limited by the element of uncertainty in our estimates of past and future Soviet production of ssion able materials- 1 It is further limited by our inability to determine with any validity the planned Soviet allocation oi fissionable mate- rials available for weapons 35- From the standpoint of destructive effect alone a probable Soviet objective would be to allocate nuclear warheads to a large percent- age of all those missiles for which it is tech- nically possible to design such warheads It is highly unlikely that sufficient nuclear mate See 11 2 56 The Soviet Atomic Energy Pro gram 3 June 1956 Limited distribution This estimate will be superseded by the forthcoming HIE The uncertainty in our estimate of cumulative Soviet production of 11 235 up to the present probably does not exceed plus or minus 50 per cent of the estimated value and plutonium plus or minus 25 percent The error in our estimates of future production is less predictable rials will be available during the period of this estimate to permit such anallocation 36 We have not made an estimate of the amount of ssionable material which the USSR would allocate to guided missile use Nor have we estimated the percentage alloca- tion of nuclear warheads to all the various missiles However in order to assess the lim- itation imposed by the availability of nuclear materials we have selected those missiles which because of their probable employment andfor CEP's we believe would be equipped almost entirely with nuclear warheads and have assumed that they would be 100 percent so equipped a all submarine-launched surface-to sur- face missiles total 550 b all Till n m ballistic cussiies IRBMs and ICBMs total 1 900 c all surface-Mair missiles employed as anti-ICBMs total 1 000 d- all 100 n m air-to-surface missiles total 1 000 Calculations based on Soviet weapons capa- bilities show that the USSR could equip all of these missiles with nuclear warheads by allocating to-the missile program about 55 per- cent of life H 235 and about as percent of the plutonium which has been estimated in NIE 11 2 56 to be available for weapons on a cumulative basis through 1965 11 3 37 It is clear that if during this period the USSR equipped with nuclear warheads the long-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles submarine-launched missiles and long-range air-to-surface missiles postulated in this Annex it would have to equip the large The Director of Naval Intelligence did not con- cur with the gures in NE 114-53 for the esti- mated production of 11 235 and for the estia mated production of plutonium after 1959 which were used as a basis for the calculations in this estimate The Director of Naval Intelligence behaves the gures to be too high and that for planning purposes a more practical magnitude or cumulative quantities of U435 would be in a range below that of the minus 50 percent lower limit of the estimates in NTE For further details see Annex Limited dis- tribution under separate coverl TABLE II A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM THROUGH 1960 The program outlined in this table cannot be taken as the most ill-rely or the probable Soviet program _We present it as only a possible program but one which is both feasible and reasonable First 0 area tonal Identi- Cl 5- Irlng' Stock- Status of stockpile at End of Year 0131111111111tire Deslg- bl ty Charac- lle Operational nation Date 0a 1954 1955 1956 1957 1953 1059 1950 1961 1902 1903 1904 1955 1956 Units Remarks SURFACE-T0 -AIR 50-1 mid-1955 60 000 36 000 - 1 000 10 000 23 000 20000 150 units aetl- Statlcdeiense of 25mm Yated 195549 critical areas teristiesl 50-2 1953' 40 0007 22 000 1 000 3 200 0 000 0 000 12 000 15 000 10 000 22 000 350 units acti- For low 0101100 15mm vetted 1953 50 defense 150 for static defense and 200 for defense of eld forces Sit-3 1959 30 000 fi 250 units acti- Roplaces 60 00031 513nm 60 000 -- 5 000 11 000 35 000 1 000 00000 vated 1059-03 25 nm system in 3 11 4 1901 90 0003 f 1 critical areas and 100 11 101 11 - defends addition- al such areas Earlier system transferred to less critical areas and fieldf ces Ell-5 1963 60 Interim 1 000 or antl- - 100 400 1000 15 units stockpile a ten- tatlre fl one only - Product on might begin as late as 1906 1 Eee Director of Intelligence USAF footnote to Annex A paragraph 1 These are arbitrary designations tor convenience of reference The same deslg nations were used In Table I following Section of the DISCUSSION For de nition see paragraph 50 of the DISCUSSION For further details see Section of the DISCUSSION These figures do missiles produced for testing and training stockpile goal once reached is in general maintained throughout the period Director of Intelligence USAF footnote to paragraph 02 of the DISCUSSION 33 First 0 era- tonal Ca 3 - bl lay Date' Desig- nation 11 Cont'dl A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM 1000 Identi- fying Stock- Charoe- lle reristles oa SHIPBORNE 3 1-3 11 53 1900 105 5 Ask 2 - 1950 511-3 1000 40 000 15 run 000 00 000 50 run 3 000 2 3 20 000 run good weather 5 mm 55 000 all weather 15-20 10 111 7 000 The program outlined in this table cannot be taken as the most likely or the probable Soviet program We present It as onlyr a possible program but one which is both feasible and reasonable 1954 1055 1050 500 0 000 10 000 300 T00 100 300 300 moo 4 4 000 55 000 2 400 1002 2 100 700 5 000 Status of at End or Your 1059 1900 1001 1003 2 300 1 400 T000 190-1 3 500 2 100 1005 4 000 2 000 1006 3 000 Operational Units 0 i rs equip ed by 1900 8 estrayer types a uip ed by1901 in di- tional aestroyer types equipped 1002 00 211 cruisers in- cluding 6 afoove equipped by 1050 One-fourth of Soviet ghter force 01 0 300 1055 53 4 800 ell-weath- er khters fully 1 pp by 1901 All -weather ghters Remarks Replaces 00 0002 r 15 11 101 system on 0 cruisers origi- nally nip ed and eq psi ed- dltlonal cruisers Earlier system transferred to destroyer types Interim system Supplements 2-3 11111 oodweath- ersys m stockpile a ten- tative figure only lSee Director of Intelligence USAF footnote to Annex 21 paragraph 1 Footnotes 2-5 on page 13 3-1 J TABLE Cont'di A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM THROUGH 1936 The program outlined in this table cannot be taken as the most likely or the probable Soviet program We present it as only a possible program but one which is both feasible and reasonable First 0 era- toual Identi- Ca a- lying Stock- Status of Stockplie at End at Your Cumulativel' Desig- tv Charac- tie nation' Date' teristies' 1954 1955 1955 195' AIR A34 1955-57 5511 111 1 000' 10 1 000 subsonic 5 3-3 1958 5511411 super- sonic 55-4 1961 100mm 1 000 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE GROUND-LAUNCHED 534 1954 75 n m 9 000' SUD 1 800 3 200 4 100 53-2 1954 5-200 3 000 200 80 1 100 1 690 nan Ities Director 01 lntelligenca USAF footnote to Annex A paragraph 1 Footnotes 2 5 on page 33 The Director of Intelligence USAF believes that the numbers or A34 its-3 Annex A paragraph 1 Operational Units 3 Do i um bomber or anti- recon- naissance air- trait 3-30 medium bomber or anti- recen- naissance air- craft not in addition to those above Heavy bombers 90 missile units 30 missile units Remarks Production might not begin until 1951' Portion of stockpile might he20n m missiles which could have been available in 1955 Replaces subson- ic version For strategic at- tack against well defended targets - For tactical sup- ort or ground orces and for neutraii ng cer- tain other tar- gets Ditto 3 2 and SS4 missiles shown in this table are exeessive See his footnote to 35 Desig- nation 58-3 35-5 53 5 TABLE II Cont'di A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM THROUGH 1955 The program outlined in this table cannot be taken as the most ii We present it as only a possible program but one which is First 0 era- tonal Ca a- lying Stool - ty Charac- Lie Date' teristioe' oal 195-4 350 nm 'l'ili 1955 run 1'00 1959 LEM n m 200 19-50 61 5 5019 11 111 1 000 1954 200 1955 5GB 1956 50 Status of stockpile at End of Year 195T 1953 2512' EUHFACE-TO-EUHFACE 83 8 53 9 ES ili 500 mom subsonic one new 150 supersonic 1 000 n m f supersonic 1955 190 195' 1982 5 ED 199 5 5D 1959 500 30 mo 19-50 '300 100 100 C If 1 4 i 1951 1'10 300 1952 40 316 1 120 1954 200 1955 280 Rely or the probable Soviet program both feasible and reasonable Operational Units 14 missile unite Not estimated 1966 Hot estimated me launching sites 2 launch- inz pads each 110 submarines lwith top ide iotowege Bios l20 submar es lwith internal istowa by labout 50 30 additional aub- lmarinee with linternai stow- lage by about i an Remarks Ditto For eripheral attao see paras 23 and 270 of the DiSeussion Peripheral at- tack Intercontinental attack Produc- tion might not begin until the end or 1951 To ao uire initial capah ry Roplaees subson- ic and equip additional submarines See Director of Intelligence USAF footnote to Annex A paragraph 1 Footnotes 2 5 on page 33 See Director of Intelligence USAF footnote to page 35 36 37 majority of its other missiles with non-nuclear warheads However it would be highly desir- able and most probable that some percentage of other missiles particularly surface-to air and shorter range air-to suri ace and surface- to suriace missiles would be provided with no- clear warheads We are unable to postulate valid percentage allocations and present the following only for illustration ii an addi- tional 10 percent of the ssionable material ac- cumulated through 1966 were allocated to these other missiles categories about sur- iace-to air and 500 air-to suriace and surface- to surface missile warheads could be provided The desirability of providing larger numbers of these missiles with nuclear warheads is equally apparent but their competing de- mands could not be met without reducing the amount of ssionable materials allocated to some other part of the program For example the scale of the surface-to air missile program postulated in this Annex is such that the USSR could not equip a major portion of these missiles with nuclear warheads even by utiliz- ing all the ssionable material available for weapons 38 There are certain factors however which tend to offset the stringency of nuclear mate- rials a The USSR could gain some exibility of utilization by developing interchangeable nu- clear components for certain weapons systems employing these components It Through technical advances after 1950 it will probably increase the explosive yield attainable from a given weight of nuclear materials and the economy of use of these materials in individual weapons c Some missile types could be effective with other than nuclear warheads Moreover cer tain missiles for which we have assumed 100 percent nuclear warheads might for certain speci c missions achieve acceptable e 'ects with other types of warheads or could employ nuclear warheads of lower yields than those we have assumed for the assessment in this Annex Finally the possibility cannot be ex- cluded that the USSR would deliberately plan to restrict its wartime employment of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances and in certain areas which it planned to occupy or exploit in order to cause the minimum amount of physical damage 39 Nevertheless the USSR would face many di iculties in the allocation of ssionable ma- terials to its various weapons systems during this period It could mitigate these dif cul- ties by phasing the equipping oi certain mis- siles with nuclear warheads over a longer period of time by producing smaller quanti- ties of certain missiles during the period of the estimate or by deliberately planning on the extensive use of non-nuclear warheads We cannot estimate with con dence what the USSR will do in this respect but we believe it might adopt some combination of these three courses of action 40 We have not undertaken to estimate the probable basic Soviet allocation of nuclear materials as between the guided missile pro- gram and other uses However we believe that within a plausible basic allocation as- sumed in this estimate as about 50 percent for the missile program the USSR would be able to equip with nuclear warheads a very high proportion of the postulated produc tion of missiles for which nuclear warheads would be regarded as essential those types named in paragraph 35 of this Annex and a much smaller proportion of the postu lated production of selected other missile types Chemical Worheods 41 There is no evidence of Soviet develop- ment of CW warheads for guided missiles- However our estimate of Soviet capabilities to develop and produce agents and to solve the problems of dissemination by guided mis- siles leads us to believe that the USSR could have had tabun GA warheads by 1954 and cauld have had sarin GB warheads by 1956 active Soviet military interest in CW is shown by the extent of their CW organization the widespread issue of chemical defensive equip- ment the extent of their training pro- gram ior CW defense and the statements of Soviet leaders The USSR would probably consider CW warheads desirable for certain Pe-P-e-ee-n ee- 38 speci c purposes for attack on personnel in the open for employment against personnel in areas where the USSR would wish to hold physical destruction to a minimum and pos- sibly for effect 42 On the basis of our estimates oi Soviet CW agents available missile warhead weights and Soviet capability to develop the necessary munitions we believe the USSR could achieve with GE agents a 50 percent casualty effect against unprotected personnel in the open over the following areas 3 Warhead Class Area Radius of Effects 2 000 lb 1 3 sq mi 3 300 ft 4 000 lb 3 0 sq mi 5 100 ft 6 000 lb 3 0 sq mi 8 400 It 43 We estimate that the USSR could prob ably develop and employ agents in guided missiles by 1960 This date is predicated on Soviet solution of the problem of generating a proper aerosol ior dispersal of the agent Recent intelligence indicates that the Soviets have made substantial progress in aerosol generation although no evidence is available to indicate its application to the dissemina- tion of CW agents by guided missiles Use of agents far more toxic than the series would enable the USSR to obtain area cover- ages approximately three times as great as those shown for the series Biological Worheods 44 We estimate that antipersonnele agents which could now be available to the USSR are brucella tularense anthracis and pestis The means employed for CW dispersal by guided missiles could also be used for SW as The use of antipersonnel BW agents would be pro table only in situations where delayed casualties are acceptable Other than this the advantages of using these agents in guided missile warheads would be generally similar to those of CW However greater In determining area coverage favorable con- ditions for agent dissemination are assumed Soviet Ga would be less effective than GB quantities of BW agents could be dissemi- nated over even wider areas by clandestine delivery and other means than by guided missiles 16 We estimate that the USSR could also have certain anticrop and antilivestock agents which could he used in guided missiles ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE PROGRAM Costing Methods ond Limitations 47 The problem of estimating the costs of a Soviet guided missile program for a period extending 10 years into the future has many limitations Because neither the US nor the USSR has had suf cient experience in the production of these new weapons systems costs calculated at present cannot be com sidered as accurate estimates of the actual future costs of producing and operating the guided missile systems postulated They are however adequate for distinguishing the economic differences between one missile sys- tem proposal and another They are the type of estimates used by the US in plan- ning its future missile programs and are sim- ilar in nature and reliability to those which might be used by Soviet planners in making decisions about their own future programs 43 In the absence of rm data on Soviet mis- sile characteristics production methods and cost of component parts the program has been coated in dollars using known or esti- mated production costs for the nearest US counterparts of the missile systems under con- sideration Almost all the data employed re- flect planning costs supplied by the US mili- tary services responsible for the various US counterpart nussiles These data have been applied to the stockpile levels and time sched- ules stipulated in Section I of this Annex using analytical procedures consistent with standard weapons systems cost analyses Ruble costs have been derived by applying known or estimated ruble-dollar ratios 3 For purposes of analytical convenience all dol- lar costs used in this estimate are calculated in 1955 dollars all ruble costs are in 1951 rubles 39 49 Because it is necessary to know the direc- tion of any bias in the estimated costs of the program it was decided that where there was a choice or militarily acceptable approaches with differing costs the one with the lower cost would be used This type of choice was made on economic grounds without further consideration of the relative military effective- ness or vulnerability of the coated system as opposed to others Other decisions also made the estimated costs somewhat lower than they might actually be- Certain items necessary to the operation of the various guided n ssile systems have not been included in the cost calculations because they were not consid- ered exclusively guided missile items Among these exclusions are the costs of early warn- ing and ground control intercept systems and the costs of aircraft and naval vessels which carry missiles The costs of nuclear warheads were not included Also speci callyexcluded from the estimated totals are investment in plants and industrial equipment to produce missiles and expenditures on research and development All these factors tend to give the over-all estimate of the cost of the postu- lated missile program a severe downward bias and it should be considered as a minim-rum ure Our best judgment of the degree of downward bias for the items which were in- cluded in the costs is that it is not greater than 20 percent and more likely falls between ve and 15 percent Cost of Program 50 The program for the production and op erational employment of guided missiles as described in this Annex would be a large and costly one We estimate however that such a program is within the economic capabili- ties of the USSR although it would necessi- tate an increasingly heavy economic alloca- tion through at least 1961 The program would incur an aggregate cost of about 73 billion 1955 dollars or about 400 billion 1951 rubies during the 14-year period from 1953 through 1966 The aggregate dollar out- lay for this program is apportioned among broad categories of missiles approximately as follows total air defense program including all surface-to air and air-to air systems 70 percent total ground-launched surface-tosur- face program 25 percent air-to-suri'ace pro- gram 2 percent submarine-launched surface- to surface program 3 percent The ground- launched surface toair program would incur by far the largest dollar outlay of any single category comprising about 50 percent of the total The ICBM program would comprise about eight percent of the total dollar outlay See Figure 1 - 51 For purposes of analysis the aggregate costs of the program have been broken down into broad areas termed initial investment costs and annual operating costs 5 In dol- lars investment costs through the period rep- resent about it percent of the aggregate cost of the program with operating costs repre- senting about 56 percent See Figure 2 52 The postulated program results in a fair- ly smooth but rapidly rising cost curve An nual outlays in dollars rise from 0 5 billion in 1954 to 5 2 billion in 1959 and then rise sharply to about 8 billion in 1960 with annual expenditures ranging between 7 4 and 9 4 billion for the remainder of the period Considering the entire period about 20 per- cent of the total dollar outlay would be in- curred through 1959 and about 30 percent between 1960 and 1966 The nature of the economic burden also shifts drastically from investment to operating costs as the period progresses By 1966 nearly seven billion doi- lars per year are required to operate and main- tain the missile systems which have been de- veloped and produced during the period See Figure 3 Initial investment costs are those one timc costs incurred in producing and activating a particular missile system including missiles in- stallations guidance and special equipment or- ganizational equipment initial personnel train ing and transportation Annual operating costs are those additional recurring expenses incurred in the operation and maintenance of the equipment and personnel including main tenance of installations and equipment missiles red for proficiency and tests personnel pay allowances and subsistehce and support com- mand Neither initial investment costs nor annual operating costs take into account these excluded costs factors described in paragraph 49 of this Annex '10 53 The cost or the missiles themselves is only a partial measure of the economic mag nitude of the missile program Missiles and spare parts would account for only 25430 per- cent of the dollar outlay for each missile sys- tem while the major part of the outlay would be for associated equipment facilities and personnel Therefore changes in the orgarn- zational structure and method of deployment described in Section I of this Annex would have a proportionally greater effect on the total cost of the program than would changes in the size of the missile stockpiles to be pro- duced - The ICBM program provides a strik- ing example of this phenomenon We have postulated a stockpile of 1 000 ICBMs de-' ployed on 100 sites 10 per site However if the same stockpile were deployed on the basis of one ICBM per site the presently estimated cost would be increased by a factor of about 10 54 In conjunction with earlier estinmtes of Soviet military expenditures through 1961 presented in Appendix of NE 11 4 56 the effects of the possible missile program on total Soviet defense spending can be roughly determined Assuming that the total mili tary expenditures estimated in NIE 11 5s would not change the missile program's share would rise from some two percent in 1954 to about 24 percent in 1981 and would require some reduction in the nonmissile expendi tures If however the nonmissilc expendi- tures remained as estimated the addition of this missile program would require increases in over-ail military expenditures reaching as much as percent in 1961 Impact on Electronics Industry 55 While the demands of the missile program on the Soviet electronics industry would be quite heavy we estimate that the program is within the growing capabilities or that in- dustry As indicated in the DISCUSSION the estimated capacity of the Soviet electron- ics industry will probably limit its ability to support a varied and extensive missile pro- gram and also meet the competing demands of other Soviet military and emential non- military programs until about 1953 The mis- sile program described in this Annex places its heaviest demands upon the electronics industry in the years after 1959 For ex- ample roughly 20 25 percent of the estimated dollar value of Soviet electronics output would have had to be allocated to the missile pro- gram in 1955 and in 1956 This allocation would rise to roughly 30-35 percent in 1960 These percentages take into account the large increase in the total value of electronics out- put called for in the Sixth Five-Year Plan Assuming that approximately two-thirds of the dollar value of annual electronics output continues to be allocated to military pro- grams the missile program would require somewhat over half the military electronics allocation for 1960 Reseorch and Development Costs 56 Limited data based on US experience pro- vides some measure of the research and de- velopment costs which would be incurred in a national missile program of the magnitude estimated in Section 111 of the DISCUSSION We have not included such costs in our aggre- gate gures for the period because we have no basis for determining and costs charge- able to the development of those missile sys tems which would not materialize until after 1950 As an indication of probable and costs in the early years we estimate that such costs would have climbed from about one billion dollars in 1953 to a peak of about 1 7 billion in 195T tee-Hue G-R-EJ-P- 4 1 FIGURE 1 Cast at Missile Program 1053-1000 By Category 0 Missile Billions 1311110115 1955 Per- or 1951 Per Dollars cent Rubles cent Surface-to Alr 4 Ground-launched 35 3 49 11 190 1 49 3 Surface-m-Mr Shipborne 7 4 10 2 42 3 10 0 Air-to-Air 7 3 10 1 44 2 11 1 Air-to-Surtace 2 4 3 3 14 1 3 5 Surface-to-Surtace Ground-Launched up to and includ- ing 700 mm 10 0 13 3 49 9 12 5 Surface-tu-Surface Submarine- launched 2 2 3 0 11 1 2 8 IRBM 1 3 1 3 0 9 1 7 ICE-M 0 1 8 4 33 3 8 5 T25 100 0 393 9 100 0 FIGURE 2 Total Investment and Operating Costs of Possible Mias e Program 1953 1960 By Category of Missiles Initial Invest OPE - ment 3 Lug Costs Costs Total Billions of 1955 Dollars Surface-to-Air Ground-Launched 15 5 20 3 35 3 Surface-to-Air Shipborne 3 3 3 0 3 4 Alr-ta-Alr 3 2 4 1 3 3 Air- tar Surface 1 4 1 0 2 4 Surface-to-Surrace Ground-Launched up to and Includ- 700 nm 3 2 0 8 10 0 Surface-to-Surrace Submarine Launched 1 0 1 2 2 2 11131 0 4 0 9 1 3 ICBM i 23 31 7 40 3 72 5 WE 10 0 8 0 4 0 l s961 o uouuqJ 2 0 0 0 1 Annual Costs of Possible Missile Program I Tolu unnUul c031 billions of 1955 din-Han -- com Oporming 1201' Total annual can biilions of 195 rubles13 8 2 5 1 8 15 3 3 3 L9 1 4 59 5 2 3 3 50 8 3 5 6 50 4 6 9 4 5 5 3 9 55 6 I52 8 5 3 6 4 9 46 153 3 2 5 5 46 6d 16 Li 3145 F15 1 0 6 5 36 4 56 14 6 9 35 3 GER-EEL- 4 2 ANNEX SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDED MISSILES I BASIC SCIENTIFIC CAPABILITIES Scienti c and Technical 1 The rising general level of Soviet technical ability and the rapidly increasing number of Soviet scientists and engineers provide the manpower potential necessary to staff a very extensive guided missile program Although total Soviet scienti c resources remain smaller than those of the US and assets of the Sinc Soviet Bloc far smaller than those of the West the USSR has been able to achieve near parity with the US in areas of critical military and industrial signi cance We estimate that the USSR as of mid-1956 had about 1 690 000 university graduates in scienti c and techni- cal elds of which about 0765 000 were actual- ly employed in the physical sciences and en- gineering If present trends continue by 1961 the USSR could have 1 240 000 graduates employed in the physical sciences and engi- neering While we know that in general the Soviet scienti c effort has been iocussed pre- ponderantly on the building of a strong in- dustrial base and the development of modern weapons to the relative neglect of other elds we have no rm evidence of the number of Soviet scientists and technicians working in the guided missile program 2 The quality of Soviet scienti c and tech- nical personnel can be measured in elds other than guided missiles by evidence indi cating striking progress over the past iew years in such important fields as nuclear physi ics geophysics high-speed digital computers high-temperature alloys and the theory of automation In basic research in mathe- matics and in many elds of physics and chemistry the quality of the Soviet work is judged to be about equal to that of the US Sce HIE 11-45 56 Capabilities and Trends of So- viet Science and Technology 9 October 1955 In the missile eld itself the quality of Soviet personnel is revealed not only by known Soviet successes in developing surface-tdsuriace and surface-to-air missiles but also by indications that by 1948 they were beginning to proceed with native development of_ missile compo- nents independent oi German missile experts 3 Research Equipment Although complex research instruments throughout the Soviet scienti c program are probably in shorter sup ply than in the US research and development programs of major importance such as guided missiles will probably be hampered only by shortages or nonavailability oi sci- enti c instruments and equipment Predict ed Soviet advances by 1961 in electronics which is basic to instrumentation will prob- ably permit the USSR to achieve near equality with the US in research instruments at that time 4 Maisn'als We know of no shortage of basic materials required by the missile development program described in this estimate Even- though our iniormation is practically non- existent regarding speci c application of ma- terials to the guided missile program the ability demonstrated by the USSR in develop- ing unique materials for special application in other programs of complex nature leads us to conclude that materials for missiles will al- most certainly not be unduly restrictive II OF TECHNICAL KNOWL- EDGE FROM FOREIGN SOURCES 5 Exploitation of the German Missile Pro- gram At the close of Werld War II the USSR initiated a thorough and systematic exploita- tion of German guided missile personnel fa- cilities and equipment They obtained iour general results the acquisition of opera- tional and prototype missiles research and production facilities and equipment and ap- iece-en ale Ele- me-P s-s-e-n-s r- 4 3 proximately 400 German missile specialists completed studies of German achieve- ments prior to 1946 the familiarization of Soviet personnel with German techniques of research development testing and produc- tion of missiles and components and furs ther technical studies and limited hardware development performed by German scieutists We believe that the Soviet exploitation pro- gram was an effort to acquire equipment and techniques in which the USSR had little or no experience As a result of the foregoing exploitation the Soviet personnel apparently acquired a thorough and valuable familiarity with the German program and we believe that by 1948 the USSR had raised the level of its guided missile knowledge to that which had existed in Germany at the close of World War II The repatriation of the German mis- sile specialists began in 1959 and continued through 1953 with the exception of about 100 guidance and control specialists some of whom have recently been repatriated We believe because of the deliberate separation of the Germans from the Soviet native mis sile program that the German exploitation was utilized primarily for training familiari- zation comparison and supplementary ex- ploration 6 Availability of US Data A signi cant amount of potentially valuable knowledge on guided missiles and earth satellites has been and is continuing to be made available to the USSR in the form of unclassi ed Western publications A de nitive assessment of its value to the Soviet research and development program cannot be made We do know how- ever that enough unclassified information is available to provide the USSR with a rela- tively clear and accurate picture of the nature and extent of the US guided missile program including relative priorities of systems and categories developmental status certain per- formance characteristics and time schedules While we cannot determine the degree of Son viet success in covert collection of informa- tion on foreign guided missile developments we know of numerous instances during'the past two years where the USSR has indicated thmugh covert activities an interest in ac quiring data on US missiles particularly on air-to-air missiles and missile electronics There are no known instances of Soviet tech nical collection systems being speci cally di- rected at or developed fer use against US guided missile installations or facilities al- though we believe that such surveillance is well within Soviet capabilities Soviet interest in foreign missile programs is iurther attested by the fact that in addition to their normal scienti c translation and dissemination serv- ices the USSR in 1950 began publication of the journal Problems of Rocket Techniques This journal publication of which has con- tinued at least to mid-1956 contains transla- tions of non-Soviet articles on guided missiles earth satellites and related subjects ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF THE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE Over-All Coordination and Control 7 The Soviet missile research and develop- ment program is conducted within the exist- ing framework of ministerial functions and responsibilities In 1947 over-all supervision and administration of the program was re- liably reported to have been vested in a Spe- cial Committee of the Council of Ministers which made policy and planning decisions There is insuf cient evidence to determine whether this Special Committee has been continued to the present In addition a Scienti c and Technical Council NTS was described by a returned German scientist as the highest technical authority on guided mis- siles with power to review Sovietninitiated German missile design proposals and to deter mine whether they should be continued into the development stage The membership of the NTS was composed of military personnel civilian research and development personnel and scienti c personnel from the Academy of Sciences and was chaired by the Director of N11 33 the principal known guided missile installation under the Ministry of Defense Industry Whether the NTS was set up 3012 1y to direct the German activity or whether it also had an active part in the native pro- gram is not known Information on the ac- tivities of the NTS does not exist later than 1949 ME 6 44 8 Despite the lack of current intelligence identifying a top authority for the entire So- viet missile program we believe a program of such magnitude and compler-dty would require high-level centralized control Soviet de- fectors have speculated that any high-level Soviet missile authority would include repre sentatives of the military the government and the Party Thus such an authority might include representatives of the Ministry of De- fense the Council of h r sters including its Academy of Sciences and the military direc torate of the Party s Central Committee Al though this speculation appears reasonable we have no direct evidence of the assistance of such an authority 9 We believe that within those ministries en- gaged in the missile program coordinating and control groups probably exist at various levels For example it was reliably reported that at least until about 1950 a Seventh Chief Directorate existed in the Ministry of Defense Industry with over-all responsibility for sur- face-to surface and missile de- velopment Organizations Installations and Facilities 10 The following summary includes impor- tant organisations installations and facili ties known or estimated to be involved in the Soviet guided missile research and develop- ment program together with brief discussions of their known or estimated'contributions to the program Council of Ministers 11 Special Committee for Guided Missile Ac- tivities A knowledgeable Soviet detector has reported on such a committee as it existed in 1946 A high-level German returnee has also reported the existence of such a committee No information concerning its activities be- yond 1949 is available Ministry of Defense Industry 12 Chief Directorate for Guided Missile Ac tiuities A high-level German returnee has re ported that a Chief Directorate existed which was concerned with research and development of surface-to suriace and surface-toeair mis slles No information exists beyond 1950 but the continued existence of such a Chief Di- rectorate within the Ministry of Defense In- dustry to control its missile research devel- opment and production activity is considered most likely- 13 Scienti c Technical Council NTS for Guided Missile Research and Development The existence during 1947 49 of an NTS con cerned with missile design projects worked on at Scienti c Research Institute N11 63 has been reported by German returnees The known Soviet practice of employing similar technical councils at various levels Minis- terial Directorate Plant Institute for de- velopments in other military elds strength- ens the belief that a missile HTS for the Min istry of Defense Industry probably still exists 14 The 33 Complex Kaliningrad This in- stallation comprising a plant and a research institute is believed to be a major center for surface to-surface ballistic missile research and development an activity in which it was engaged from 1946 to at least 1954 Surface- to-air missile research and development was also conducted at this installation from 1946 to at least 1950 15 Branch 1 of Scienti c Research Institute NH 83 Ostashkov This large well-equipped installation was the major center for exploi- tation of some German guided missile special- ists who were repatriated in 1952 53 Ger- man efforts were concerned with design stud- ies of surface-to-surface and suriace to ai r missiles Certain key facilities especially for liquid rocket propulsion research are believed to be still engaged in the guided missile re- search and development program 16 Plant 456 Khirnici Center for research and development of large liquid-fuel rocket engines staffed in part by Germans until 1950 Design work on a 100 metric-ton thrust engine was conducted here as well as work on 25 and 35-metric-ton thrust engines- This installation is still active in the research and development program Central Artillery Design Bureau Kalinine grad This installation is probably the lead- ing Soviet design bureau for new artillery melons-use one-w- 45 weapons In addition to its role in design- ing conventional artillery it is believed to play a central role in the design of surface-ta surface and surface-to air missiles 18 Naval Artillery Central Design Bureau Leningrad Personnel of this organization were active in the reconstruction of German surface-to-air missiles in Germany during 1945 46 We believe this bureau would be the focal point of any Soviet naval work in missile developments 19 Design Bureau KB 2 Moscow German technicians were involved in the development of an air-to-surface missile guidance system from 1946 to mid-195E Soviet continuation of this project at is indicated to at least mid-1953 Beginning in 1951 one group of German specialists worked on a high-pri- ority Soviet project to develop a new trial-rial stabilizing system probably for a surface-to- surface missile and this system was ight tested between 1952 53 By 1951 approxi mately 40 complete systems were manufac- tured In February 1951 another German group was assigned to a surface-taair missile guidance project Information on the Ger- man work on this project correlates with the characteristics of the Moscow surface-to-air missile system German work on this and all classi ed projects was terminated by the end of 1953 While working at Kid 2 the Ger- mans assisted Soviet work on an air-to-air missile project and reportedly discussed with Soviet scientists a surface-to surface shore- to ship missile project 20 Eli 3 Putilouo Research and develop- ment of an air-to-air guided missile Sokol was conducted here by German specialists from 1945 48 Unguided solid rocket air to air and surface-to air research and develop ment has also been reported This installaa tion believed still to be active in the guided missile program is closely associated with the Soirino test range which adjoins it 21 Dyatloo's Institute NH 24 Moscow This installation is reported to have conducted native Soviet development of air-to-air missile designs parallel to the German activity at Kid 3 Dyatlov s Institute is possibly identi- cal with N11 24 22 Plant 393 Krasuogorslc Research and development activities here have included work on the German infrared missile homing system Juno This installation has also in- dicated a capability for the repair of cine- theodolites essential to test range instrumen- tation 23 Konoplev s Institute Leningrad A fa- cility in Leningrad associated with a scientist named Konoplev has reportedly conducted development work on ballistic missile guid- ance systems Konoplev attended NTS meet- ings at the SS Complex Kaliningrad during 1947 43 when the design proposals were reviewed Konoplev was concerned with guidance matters 24 NH 6 Moscow Numerous awards to mem- bers of the staff of this institute indicate a capability for research and development in the eld of solid propellants for rockets andf or guided missiles A Soviet scientist from 6 was a member of a Commission of the Academy of Artillery Sciences which was es- tablished to evolve better colloidal gunpowders for rocket artillery 25 Plant 604 Moscow In 1947 Germans re- constructed fuses at this plant The equipment used was then shipped to Pishchi ik s Institute Leningrad but a capability for continued missile tuze development is behaved still to exist at Plant 604 25 Pishchilc s Institute Leningrad In 1947 fuse assembly equipment was shipped from Plant 604 to an installation in Lenin- grad associated with an engineer named Pishchik Supplementary information sug- gests that this installation may be either Plant 521 or a Branch of Central Design Bu- reau 22 possibly N11 22 Central Design Bu reau 22 and Plant 521 were active in face re - search and development during World War II 21' NH 13 Leningrad Numerous awards to and publications by members of the stall of this institute indicate a capability for research and development in metallurgy applicable to heat transfer problems in combustion cham- bers or to warhead re-entry problems This institute is speci cally concerned with metal- lurgical research notably in the elds of heat treatment of metals and nonierrous alloys woe anomaly 45 Ministry of Defense 28 Chief Artillery Directorate Moscow This organization is responsible for the over-all supervision and coordination of research de- velopment and manufacture of artillery and antiaircrait weapons systems for the Soviet armed forces In its role as point-of-contact between the industrial ministries and the Min- istry of Defense the directorate probably serves as the key organization coordinating military requirements and acceptance testing with guided missile researchand development 29 Academy of Artillery Sciences Moscow The academy was established in 1946 to im- prove and promote artillery and ordnance re- search and development Its organization is similar to that of the Academy of Sciences USSR and it has an unknown number of associated research institutes We believe the academy has an advisory role in the formula- tion of military requirements for guided mis- silos 30 Artillery Institute Bolsheuo This insti- tute possibly subordinate to the Academy of Artillery Sciences is known to have been concerned with missile guidance and control research and development in the 194961 period During that period the institute was associated with both NH 88 and NH 335 31 NH of the Air Forces Shchelkovo This institute is responsible for acceptance testing of all new aircraft a high-level detector has described a directorate of this institute which was responsible for air-to air rockets and presumably missiles In addition there are indications that the institute has conduct- ed developmental work on various airborne weapons systems 32 Aviation Technical Commitsion of the Air Forces Moscow This commission directs all scienti c matters of concern to Soviet air forces research establishments under the Chief Engineer of the air forces In its role as sci- entific adviser to the air forces it examines all new projects and indicates lines of research on outstanding aeronautical problems We believe therefore that this commission par- lJillillates in the planning of research and de- velopment for those guided missiles to be used by the air forces 33 Air Forces Engineering Academy im Zhu- kouslciy Moscow This academy is the most important center for the training of aeronau- tical engineers in the USSR Several mem- bers of the staff have been definitely associated with guided missile research and development although not necessarily in their role as pro fessors at the academy Academy of Sciences 34 Interagency Commission for lnterplane- tary Communications This commission is be- lieved to be the focal point for research and development pertinent to the Soviet earth satellite program Key members of the staff are world-recognized authorities in scienti c elds essential to such an activity 35 Institute of Automatics and Telemechan- ics Moscow This institute is the Soviet cen- ter for iundamental and applied research in the elds of automatic regulation remote con- trol telemetry and nonlinear mechanics and for the development of pneumatic hydraulic and electrical servo systems It has been directly associated with missile guidance re- search and development activity at Branch 1 of MI 88 36 Institute of Precision Mechanics and Com- puter Engineering Moscow This institute is a center for theoretical investigation and de- velopment of electronic digital and analogue computers and has performed research and development on electrical and mechanical in- tegrators and network and differential ana- lyzers- In addition the institute is responsi- ble for general theoretical problems of preci- sion mechanical and electrical systems 37 Institute of Chemical Physics Moscow This institute the center for combustion re search in the USSR has conducted much basic research directly applicable to the devel- opment of both liquid and solid rocket en- gines Other work as indicated by open lit- erature publications could have been in the theory and development of techniques of shock-tube hypersonic experimentation 38 institute of General and Inorganic Chem- istry Moscow This institute has conducted research in metallurgy speci cally in heat- resistant alloys applicable to both rocket en- 47 gine components and warhead materials Other research has been on oxidants and fuels particularly on nitrogenvcontaining com- pounds 39 Institute of Mathematics int Stekiov Mos- cow This institute is responsible for funda mental research in mathematics It has stud- ied problems in the statistical theory or tur bulent flow which is directly applicable to the development of hypersonic con gurations 40 Institute of Physics int Lebedev Moscow This institute in addition to its work in acous tics and dielectrics has given particular atten- tion to the study of the diffusion of electro- magnetic radiation Ministry of Aviation Industry 41 Central Aerohydrodynamics Ins i tu Ramensicoye This is the primary Soviet center for aerodynamic research This institute is a Mom participant in the Soviet guided missile research and development pro gram Speci cally it has conducted wind tunnel experiments for NH 83 42 NII 1 Moscow Numerous scientists and engineers who were on the staff of this insti tute in 1945 have since appeared in key post tions in guided missile research and develop- ment centers Research and development in the eld of gas dynamics is behaved to be the major activity of the institute 43 Flight Test Institute Ramenslcoye This installation is responsible for all Ministry oi Aviation Industry research and development which requires ight testing It is believed that the institute conducts tests of all air- borne guided missile weapons systems prior to their submission to the Ministry of Defense -for acceptance testing 44 Experimental Plant 1 Podbereehe This was a German exploitation center from 1946 to 1952 Research and development on V i s air-to surface and possibly surface-to-air mis- siles was conducted In addition this plant has supplied N11 88 with cigar-shaped fuse- lages wings accelerometers altimeters and other equipment 45 Special Design Bureau 3 of Plant 2 Kay- byshev Germans at this installation conduct- ed research and development on automatic pilots triaxial gyroscopes and V l steering mechanisms During 1948 about 100 stand- ard V l control systems were reportedly over- hauled 45 Central Scienti c Research Institute of Aviation Engines Moscow This in- stallation is concerned with research and de- velopment of aircraft engines Reported fa- cilities include four rocket engine test stands and sections dealing with new engine de- signs Support could be provided in the re- search and development at ramjet and pulse- jet engines Central Scientific Research Institute of Aviation Fuels and Lubricants Moscow We believe this institute would con- tribute to the development of special fuels for cruise-type missiles and also to the develop- ment of special lubricants and hydraulic flu- ids ior all types of missiles Ministry of Radio-Technical Industry 43 NH 885 Novaya At this installation Ger- mans worked on the reconstruction and de- velopment of a ground guidance system a doppler-velocity measuring system and tele metering equipment for the A special branch at Monino worked until 1959 on a radar-homing head project for a surface-to- air missile Both Soviet and German spe cialists from N11 885 were at Kapustin Yer in 1947 49 NH 20 Moscow German specialists who visited this installation in the 1946-48 period have reported that the Tonne television mis- sile guidance system was under investigation A detector report covering the period 1948 to June 1949 indicates that the installation may have been moved to Kuntsevo southwest of Moscow and transferred to the Ministry of Defense Industry 50 NH 380 Leningrad This was a German exploitation center from 1943 to 1952 The installation is the primary Soviet television development center a secret department at Lesnoy reportedly devoted considerable effort 48 to the development of the Tonne television guidance system for air-to surface missiles 51 Unidenti ed Installation Odessa Military personnel from an unidenti ed installation in Odessa frequently visited the Secret Depart- ment or NII 38 The lOdessa installation re- Portedly had received one set or the Tonne equipment Subordination of this installa- tion to the Ministry of Radio Technical In dustry is conjectural 52 Nil 103 Moscow This installation is be lieved to be the major Soviet center for the research and development of radar equip ment On this basis alone we believe it is possibly involved in the development of radar for missile guidance systems The subordi- nation of this installation has not been veri- fled 53 NH 160 Fryaeine This installation is be- lieved to be the major Soviet electron tube design center As such it is probably involved in the development of missile electronic guid- ance equipment Ministry of Chemical Industry 54 State Institute of Applied Chemistry GIPKIL Leningrad This installation has conducted research on propellants with em- phasis on amine compounds for use in hyper- golic fuels Research on ignition properties of liquid propellants has also been reported The activities of this installation have paral- leled those of the Karpov Institute 55 Physico-Chemical Institute im Karpou Moscow Germans at this installation from - 1946 to 1948 worked on hypergolic rocket fuels and hydrogen peroxide oxidizers This installation is believed to be part of a com- plea induding the State Institute of Applied Chemistry Plant 94 and the OKA Chemical Plant all of which have conducted rocket fuel research 56 ORA Chemical Plant Deerzhinsk Gen mans from the Karpov Institute were trans- ferred to this installation in 1948 to continue their propellant research- a pilot plant for hypergolic fuels developed at the Karpov In- stitute was sent to OKA- Certain specialists employed here were reportedly subordinate to Plant 94 57- Plant 94 Moscow Hypergolic fuels devel- oped at the Karpov Institute were sent here for testing In addition certain amines de- veloped at the Karpov Institute were report- edly put into pilot production here Ministry of Machine and Instrument Building 53 Korapressof Plant Moscow Germans who were at this installation in 194' have reported the development of type ground handling equipment Ministry of Heavy Machine Building 59 Pod emnilc Plant Moscow It has been reported that transporters were under de- velopment here This installation is well equipped to develop such transporters Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry 60 NH 49 Leningrad This installation has been engaged in the design and limited pro duction of control devices computers gyro scopes electronic test equipment radar and high-frequency apparatus German special ists working here developed computers for surface-to-air missiles and worked on gyro stabilized platforms for inertial guidance sys terns Wesserfall computers developed here were tested possibly at Kapustin Yar in 1949 This installation may have become one of the largest Soviet design institutes when it was enlarged in 1952 61 Kuenetsov s Gyroscope Institute Moscow This installation appears to be a central agen- cy tor gyroscope research and development The director Kuanetsov was in Germany in 1945 46 and at Kapustin Yar in 1947 There was close liaison between this installation and MI 335 Ministry of Higher Education 62 Certain installations subordinate to this ministry although properly educational insti- tutions are believed to conduct limited guided missile research at the graduate level Sev- eral important guided missile specialists iden- ti ed at key installations in the program have 49 also been identi ed with the staffs of certain of these educational institutions 53 Higher Technical School irn Badman Moscow This institution is believed to be the of the Soviet Union A turbine assem- bly for the loo-metric-ton thrust engine de- veloped at Plant 458 was reportedly sent here for testing in 1950 54 Power Engineering Institute im Molotov Moscow Another large engineering school this institution possesses several faculties for subjects pertinent to guided missile research and development At a 1950 conference pa- pers presented to the Instrument Building Section of the school were all of possible mis- sile interest Particularly the paper present- ed by L I Thachev appeared to be a classi ed version of his 1949 publication on an inertial system for missile guidance based on the 84- minute pendulum principle 55 State University im Lornonosov Moscow Although there is no direct evidence of guided missile activity at this institution several key scientists and engineers of the guided missile program have been identi ed on the faculty Known Test Facilities2 I 56 Kepnstin Yer Guided Missile Test Range Established in 1947 as a missile tost range Kapustin Yar is the only identi ed surface- to suriace missile test range in the USSR It is now known to be actively engaged in the testing of surface-to suriace ballistic missiles The scale of effort involved indicates that Ka- pustin Yar is a most important facility in the Soviet program Suspect Test Facilities 1 57 Sofrino Test Range SHIP This range located adjacent to Design Bureau 3 is known to have actively supported the bureau in the past 0n the basis of 1m limited size and general location we believe the range may be concerned with the developmental testing of surface-to air guided missiles only 63 Barents Sea There is some inconclusive evidence to indicate missile rings in this area The location of a range in this area would be suitable for the shipboard testing of all types of guided missiles assigned to the Soviet Navy and for both environmental and operational testing of other missile types 69 Riga A facility at Riga is known to have received specimens of German naval air-to- surface missiles following World War II Oth- er than 1955 reports of a restricted coastal area in the Riga vicinity there is no indication of present missile testing 10 Zogorslc German engineers at MI 83 de- signed a static test facility for large liquid rocket engines and surveyed a site in this area for its construction No con rmation of its existence is available- '71 Crimea Black See Signals intercepted from the Crimea Black Sea area between May 1955 and September 1955 and in October 1956 are similar to guidance signals of an air- to suriace missile guidance system Hornet designed at Design Bureau 2 Moscow This comparison appears valid when considered with the report that Germans from Ell 2 at- tended tests of this system in the Crimea at the end of 1951 Testing oi surface-to-air missiles in the Crimea has also been indicated by the recent report that the surface-to air missile project worked on at Kill 2 was taken to the Crimea for tests begiiming in November 1952- 'For Iurther information see Annex Linnted distribution under separate cover This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu