nri'a ui w u gs w 1uataf'iC mammw w STUDY 3467 THE EVOLUTION OF US STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL AND WARNING 1945-4972 L Wainstein Project Leader C D Cremeans I Moriarty nit-2 f H I Ponturo fj ijf 'T i The work reported in this document we conducted under Confmd DAHCIS 73C 3200 for that Department of Defense The pubiica on dfhis Study does not indicm'e endorsement by the D at cf Defense not should the confetti be f fpf uugi I reflecting the of c t al position of lhc 39 me if a rCh Ve '4 ar' f Tiff-r if 30 PM 3 mmwd 5 53'fa INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES INTERNATIONAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES DIVISION 400 Army-Navy Drive Arlington Virginia 22202 Contract DAHCIS 73C 0200 Task T4 11 Canada One salient feature of the SCC was that any center could perform the direction center function for any or all of the other sectors within the SCC if necessary In short each of the nine hardened SCCs could conduct the detailed air battle anywhere in the country 5 hardened SAGE concept was approved by Headquarters USAF on 5 February 1959 Because of problems involving feasim bility of occupancy by the desired dates however and lack of agreement on the desired degree of hardness for the centers a revised OEP was issued on 19 June 1959 This deployment sched ule called for the first SCC the first of 10 to be Operational by August 1963 But on 19 June the Department of Defense also published its Master Air Defense Plan which was considerably less ambitious The DOD plan reduced the total program from 10 to 7 hardened sites After a vigorous ADC and NORAD reclama placed a hold order on the purchase of all SCC equipment pending an evaluation of the total program 26 81 hhen the DOD study was completed about 1 February 1960 recommended that SAGE assume an all soft configuration because of the cost of hardening Once again there was a vigorous rebuttal but the DOD concept prevailed On 30 March 1960 USAF canceled all Super Combat Centers Meanwhile the basic SAGE system was completed in December 1961 when the Sioux City Direction Center became operational McMullen states It was perhaps ironic that SAGE was completed at about the time plans for operating the ground environment following the destruction of SAGE became solid 27 D WARNING 0F MISSILE ATTACK 1 Ballistic Missile Early Warning System U With the growing threat in the last years of the decade from Soviet ICBMs the problem of attaining warning of a mis sile attack was given high priority While much of the actual 216 accomplishment in the missile warning program falls in the next period Part most of the planning and a considerable amount of construction took place in the last years of this one On 14 January 1958 the Secretary of Defense gave initial approval for the construction of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning system amass being developed by the Air Force It was directed that the Thule site be operational in 1959 as a first priority a site in Alaska as the second priority and a site in Scotland as the third priority Interim computer and display facilities at NORAD were to be activated for the Thule station and later expanded to provide capability for the fall system Scanning radars were designated for initial site capa bility pending development of tracking radars which would later be installed to supplement the target verification and prediction capability 28 Cg Lei On 9 May 1958 after extensive reviews of costs and system designs the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to proceed with the radar stations at Thule and Alaska and a computer and display facility at NORAD The total cost for this portion of the system was estimated at over $800 million Authorization to proceed with the station in Scotland was deferred pending negotiations with the United Kingdom for a joint venture 29 U On 13 October 1958 Headquarters USAF approved the BMEWS final operational plan The total system would consist of three radar installations associated rearward communications and the computation and display facilities in NORAD headquarters Operational target dates of September 1960 for Thule and Septem ber 1961 for Clear Alaska were now established 9 iCT The program remained in an unsettled state throughout 1958u59 however largely because of funding difficulties It became necessary for the Air Force to aim at only a limited Operational capability in order to remain reasonably close to the projected target dates The time of construction of the 217 - planned third site to be located at Fylingdales Moor in the United Kingdom was also thrown into doubt By June 1959 after much discussion confirmed the USAF proposal for an interim BMEWS program to include all three sites and to be carried out in two phases An interim display facility was approved for installation at the existing NORAD combat center to be operational in September 1960 and used until the hardened NORAD combat center was completed possibly in 1963 3 33 On 30 September 1960 the Thule spews site did reach 100 as scheduled This constituted a major step toward a warning capability against missiles since the Thule location covered four sections with a total azimuth scan of 160 degrees Also in September 1960 work began on installation of a SAC display warning system with three display consoles to he eventually installed at SAC headquarters Plans for sending ICBM raid information directly to SAC from the BMEWS site were disapproved by Headquarters USAF however instead SAC would receive data from NORAD 31 U the meantime experience was being gained with the system On 5 October 1960 moon echoes appeared in one of the Thule fans and were misuidentified as a potential missile threat However impact points were not predicted and both NORAD and SAC treated the alarm as false Subsequent investi gation showed that it was indeed radar echoes from the moon that had caused the false alarm Improved gating procedures means of filtering out interference or aurora from a radarscope or systemnmwere later instituted in order to prevent I another false moon alarm 32 2 Bomb Alarm System Ky 81 The Bomb Alarm System BAS was designed to detect detonations locate precise blast locations and indicate the intensity and pattern of attack The complete system leased from the Western Union Company depended upon three optical 218 3W XXVI WARNING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT 0 DQT Ehe contribution of attack warning systems to the overall I US strategic posture underwent important changes in nature and significance during the 1960s primarily in response to the changing warning environment The traditional priority func tion of attack warningw to alert launch and control active defense forces went into decline as the primary threat shifted from manned aircraft to missiles and as antiwmissile defenses remained at best a conjectural proposition The forward bomber warning lines primarily the elaborate DEW Line constructed at great expense during the 1950s lost much of their original value when measured against the mixed threats of the 19603 and the likelihood of'a shift in enemy bombers to a secondary followwon attack rele In the absence of strategic defensive systems the rationale for ballistic missile warning was re cast mainly in terms of its contribution to the strategic offensive postureu the posture of deterrence through assured retaliation by strategic offensive forces Even in this stra tegic offensive context the role of warning was further modi fied by changes that reduced the dependence of retaliatory forces on warning for their survival and enabled them to make more effective use of shorter warning times In the world of missile threats and missile responses warning became far more critical for the decision time and flexibility that it might afford to the national command and control structure 1 A THE DEN LINE 5 546 The bulk of the DEW Line developed primarily to detect aircraft in surprise attacks was beginning to close down 1963 many of its radars were counted as superfluous and the remainder were maintained as a tactical holdback line to de ter enemy bomber penetrations until after missiles were detect- able to delay enemy bombers in a mixed missilewbomher attack for three or four hours The early warning function itself was assumed by BMEWS and the remnants of the DEW Line became more tactically oriented toward the antiaircraft sur- veillance and defense functions of the SAGE system the Backup Interceptor Control 3010 stations and the projected Airborne Warning and Control System B BHENS in L97 %he basic ICEM warning system throughout the 19605 was snews UYHL the system of long-range ground-based radars covering the northern approaches to the continental United States Sensors were located in Greenland Thule Alaska Clear and the United Kingdom Fylingdales Moor with Thule first operational in September 1960 Clear in June 1961 and Fylingdales in January 196 Capable of detecting ICBMs out to a range of some 3 000 miles BMEWS could provide close to 15 minutes minimum warning together with a rough count of the number of warheads and their approximate impact time and area directly to NORAD headquarters and immediately thence to warn ing displays at the NMCC ANMCC and SAC as prime users Q from BMEWS was critical to the survival of the bomber force which depended on airborne escape rather than concealment mobility hardening or other forms of protection and the 15 minute BMEWS warning time became the standard for ground alert aircraft at SAC In the early 1960s when SAC kept half the force on so called lSwminute ground alert it could launch as many as 1 percent of the alert aircraft nithin 8 minutes from a normal for sac DEFCON 1 posture and as many as #3 percent from a higher DEFCON 2 posture It could also launch the entire alert force in as little as 11 t 3130 3m me A 9 minutes with a single minute in the peak phase allowing as many as 200 aircraft to become airborne 3 During the years when manned aircraft were by far the predominant element in the retaliatory force this potential warning contribution was in valuable it could promise a second-strike capability even by this otherwise relatively soft and vulnerable weapons system Warning from BMEWS also enabled SAC to exploit the gunique capability of bombers to launch under positive control even in ambiguous or equivocal circumstances without prem Ecommitment to strike a launch on warning and recall Option that was not available in the case of missiles Warning could provide useful time in which to count down missiles to minimum holds and shorten their reaction times but it did not add the option of a contingent launch Warning enhanced the capabili ties of manned bombers therefOre and the continued utility iof bombers in the strategic force was directly linked to the Lcontinued effectiveness of warning support a short period in the early 19603 there was some inclination to Judge the criticality of BMEWS and the worth of other early warning systems primarily in terms of bomber sur vival The lSuminute ground alert posture for bombers was apparently considered at first as a stopgap measure until the retaliatory forces could be restructured around missiles like Polaris and Minuteman that did not depend so heavily on warn ing and quick reaction and could therefore ride out an attack 5 In the same way and for the same reason as the relative pro- portion of bombers in the strike force declined it was ex pected that the relative value of warning systems might also decline 6 Bombers remained a very substantial portion of the strike forces throughout the 19605 however as the JCS coun seled from the beginning Although the JCS did not use the word triad at the time they consistently defended the con tinued need for manned bombers in the strategic mix 7 In 1968 manned bombers mostly B 52s except for a small number _3u1 I m A w r - of still constituted some 9H5 of the 2 650 major stra ll tegic offensive delivery systems in the operational forces more than one third of the strategic triad for which even El short warning times were of vital importance 8 LET'Moreover as the JCS also argued on many occasions warning was a requirement not only for the protection of strike ll forces but also to provide maximum Opportunity to formulate an appropriate national reaction that is for decisions 9 The 3 utility of warning to support the command and control process was increasingly emphasized during the 1960s even after its contributions to the protection of population and industry - were virtually dismissed and those to retaliatory force sur vival were considerably downgraded U 97'As a comprehensive warning system against missile attack BMEWS had serious shortcomings primarily in geographic coverage and in the amount quality and timeliness of the inw formation that it provided It could be deliberately spoofed blacked out or attacked of course but such events could be treated as potential indicators of attack and could easily interfere with surprise It could be bypassed at less poten tial cost and risk by extended-range or low angle ICBMs for example by or even as the Soviets showed when they began testing the capability in the late 1960s by orbital systems Minor improvements in BMEWS coverage and effective-- ness were made during the 19605 naturally but more was re quired It proved necessary to augment BMEWS with additional warning systems and to adopt a multiple approach to the missile warning problem None of the other systems became a full fledged alternate or successor to BMEWS and in fact none of them even came into operation until the late 19603 and early 19705 but they were largely developed during the 1960s to gether with BMEWS into the interlinked warning network of the subsequent 19703C SLBM WARNING LET blearly BMEWS required augmentation against which could be launched from positions off US coasts and on trajectories that BMEWS was not designed to detect Soviet in the early 1960s were relatively shortmrange 350 mile systems three per submarine that had to be fired from the surface but the Soviets were actively developing newer classes of longer range submerged-launch systems like Polaris that could pose an even greater threat by the late 19605 and l9705 11 In a surprise attack context the Navy's underwater sound sur 7 veillance SOSUS and other ASW systems could presumably deter a sudden large buildup of SLBM submarines in potential launch areas prior to attack because of the risk of premature detec tion but it would not be difficult for limited numbers of prudently operated enemy submarines to penetrate such defenses and to launch missiles without warning 12 The therefore constituted a dangerous threat of no-warning attack against such critical early targets as fixed command and control centers communications facilities and SAC bases- much like the Cuba-based MRBM-IRBM weapons that also would have avoided the BMEWS system specialized system developed to counter the missile reat during the 19608 was the SLBM Detection and Warning System HYHN a complex of eight modified long range SAGE radars deployed along the east and west coasts Built as an interim system it was capable of monitoring coastal approaches out to about 750 n m and providing three-to seven minutes warning of SLBM strikes depending on the location of launchw ing submarines together with limited trajectory measurements As with other warning systems data were analyzed by computer and forwarded to the NMCC ANMCC SAC NORAD and other direct users The system was partially operational in the last half of the 19605 but it did not achieve full operational status until 197l at which time newer systems were under development 3M3 to provide even more reliable warning against even longer range Soviet submarines 13 D RADAR 81 Another ground based missile detection system that re mained under development during the 19603 but emerged as a successful backup and extension of BMEWS in the late 19608 until retired in 1974 was the Over the Horizon Forwardu Scatter Radar UHO-L Not really a radar the HHOWL system consisted of a series of high frequency radio transmitters and receivers at various locations in the Far East and Europe on either side of the Soviet Chinese landmass Continuous signals from the transmitters were bounced off the ionosphere and then repeatedly back and forth between the ionosphere and the sur face of the earth until they reached the receiving stations There the receivers detected perturbations or disturbances of the transmissions caused by missiles penetrating the ionosphere under active boost propulsion The system provided nearly real- time five to-seven minutes from launch detection of missiles launched from the USSR and China also satellite launches and nuclear detonations with timewof-launch and rough estimates of the launch location and type and number of missiles Data from the receivers were correlated in Europe transmitted to NORAD for processing and sent to the NMCC ANMCC and ue L system had the advantage over BMEWS of being an omnidirectional system that was able to detect missiles such as FOBS intended to end-run BMEWS In 1966 and 1967 it demonstrated a highworder capability by successfully detect ing and reporting 9 percent of all Soviet ICBM test launches 198 of 210 including all 10 F088 tested in 1967 and plans were accelerated to introduce it as a working system It became operational in 1968 15 i 1313' pr E DEFENSE SUPPORT PROGRAM 9 d The newest and most sophisticated addition to the misw sile warning network was the satellite-based infraredwdetectm ing surveillance and warning system presently known as the Defense Support Program DSP It was an outgrowth of over a decade of experimental first with the Missile Defense Alarm System MIDAS of the late 1950s and early 1960s and then with the highly sensitive and controversial follow on Programs 61 949 and more recently 647L-a series of techno logically difficult expensive and for many years operationally uncertain efforts to develop an orbital infrared detection sys tem that could detect missiles in the powered-launch phase It remained a developmental and demonstration effort until 1971 when the first operational satellite was orbited 16 Q9 LS% Although it was many years in reaching fruition satel- liteubased infrared detection promised the earliest possible warning of missile attacks within minutes of launch extending potential warning time for north polar ICBMs from the 15 min utes of BMEWS to perhaps 27 minutes providing improved and more flexible coverage than BMEWS including coverage of FOBS or other circumventing systems increasing the credibility of other warning sensors by adding correlative evidence confirma- tory or not from an alternative system and adding to the accuracy and reliability of information as to the source magnitude and with tracking the nature of an attack Al- though the program was beset with serious reliability and cost problems and pushed hard at the limits of infraredudescrimina- tion and other technologies it continued to attract strong support throughout the 19605 17 LSi bne of the strong underlying themes in the arguments supporting the various precursors of the DSP and one that illuminates an important strategic command and control issue of the 1960s concerned its utility not merely for attack warning but also for attack assessment The system was 355 important perhaps even more than other systems for providing time for decisionmakers to take measures for survival includ- ing possibly relocation to the NEACP or elsewhere it could provide extra time for them to perform essential retaliatory command functions including more opportunity to ascertain the situation and consider desirable alternatives By providing usable warning time the system was also important for enabling the strike forces to undertake precautionary or other actions that might be vital to the effectiveness of any response J alone even minutes was considered of crucial significance for such purposes 18 But the DSP-type systems held out hopes for even more They promised more information better information more accurate and reliable information and timelier information as to the source magnitude and ob- Jectives of an attack as to whether one or a few weapons imm pacts were accidental or the first of a salvo whether it was a controlled or indiscriminate attack whether it was an attack directed against military targets population centers or both whether it was an attack that included or excluded governmental control centers and so on The systems promised in short to improve the capability to assess an attack and even evaluate the likely intentions of an attackerwide margin over other warning and surveillance systems 19 0 Even with BMEWS and uhO L exercises showed national authorities were required to make retaliatory decisions in the absence of any real knowledge of the nature of an attackm at best in the knowledge only that some more or less large number of warheads was en route to the United States a rough approxi- mation of their impact times and areas and perhaps a crude estimate of the country of origin 2 This was hardly the quantity and quality of information required for a choice among the flexible response options desired by decisionmakers It was hardly sufficient for the decisions called for in the SIOP Decision Handbook prepared by the JCS for the President Vice President the Secretary of Befense the CINCs and them selves Whether to execute and if so to execute strikes against nuclear threat targets only against nuclear threat plus other military targets or against nuclear threat plus other military plus urban industrial targets of a country To execute or withhold strikes against the Soviet Union China or other individual Communist countries To execute or with- hold strikes against military and government controls in the Moscow area To execute or withhold strikes against nuclear delivery and storage sites in China To execute or withhold strikes against military-government control targets in the Peking area 21 DSP type systems promised for the first time nearly a decade after programs were initiated to develop suf ficiently flexible strategic forces and sufficiently flexible command and control systems and a sufficiently flexible SIOP war planueto make flexible response options more than a remote possibility This was their chief attraction during the 19605 far more than the extra minutes of warning time alone and it continued to be their chief attraction as they came into oper ation during the 19703 Not warning alone but warning time and attack assessment became the keys to strategic flexibility 347 THE COMMAND POST PROBLEM The idea of hardening command posts including those from which the National Command Authorities would operate in war- time had been greatly stimulated by the advent of nuclear warfare In time the capabilities of the new weapons made the hardening process only marginally effective but it proved difficult for those responsible for the command centers to acknowledge this Despite what was known about the power of nuclear weapons it continued to seem prudent to provide a certain amount of protective hardening for national command posts U For a time at least the high CEPs of nuclear weapons did make a hardened command post seem sensible It became increasingly controversial however as to whether a hardened command post at the seat of government could possibly be large enough to accommodate the men records machines and so on that made the capital a desirable place from which to conduct business in the first place The use of alternate sites was devised to give the National Command Authorities options and to introduce uncertainty into the calculations of an enemy Alternate command posts inherently provided a certain element of redundancy and this advantage was extended by the conscious development of different communications systems not only so that there would be alternates in the event one or more were destroyed but also to take advantage of the prospect that one might function under circumstances in which others would not U The ANMCC at Fort Ritchie had the advantage of a de gree of hardness and a great deal more space and more exten sive facilities than the command posts IL than the No one could bring himself to abandon the facility though in 1969 the beputy Secretary of Defense ordered that it go on standbyumfor reasons of economy 2 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs found this recommendation diffi cult to accept and argued against it 3 Fort Ritchie remained however only an alternate- and not a very likely one Q o Another choice offered the NCA as an alternate com mand post in the sixties was the NECPA The command post afloat had the advantage of space aless than that of the ANMCC but greater than the of endurance -again less than the ANMCC but much greater than that of the ABNCP Even in the Navy however it was generally felt that the location of the ships in Chesapeake Bay so as to be easily available from Washington and their slow speed made it very unlikely that they could avoid surveillance and destruction by a vigilant opponent One of the two ships was taken out of commission in 1969 and the other shortly after U The airborne command post offered the most appealing alternative to the NMCC in the view of the-majority Because of its maneuverability it had a relatively high chance of survival while airborne and it could be-brought to a place quite near the NCA in time of emergency even follow the President on Journeys away from Washington Its capabilities were of course limited by its relatively small size but with technological improvements its capabilities increased U In the late sixties a proposal had been made for substantially expanding the capabilities of the airborne com mand post by using one of the large airframes that were then coming into commercial and military use The Boeing 74 soon became the most likely candidate and there followed long dis cussions of the arrangement and of the facilities to be pro sided for what was to be designated the AABNCP Differences of vies were not quickly resolved for they centered on ques tions as to cost mission what facilities should be included N21 I I than the No one could bring himself to abandon the facility though in 1969 the Deputy Secretary of Defense ordered that it go on standbyamfor reasons of economy 2 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs found this recommendation diffi- cult to accept and argued against it 3 Fort Ritchie remained however only an alternate- and not a very likely one Ly g 'dnother choice offered the NCA as an alternate com mand post in the sixties was the NECPA The command post afloat had the advantage of spacem-less than that of the ANMCC but greater than the of endurance again less than the ANMCC but much greater than that of the ABNCP Even in the Navy however it was generally felt that the location of the ships in Chesapeake Bay so as to be easily available from Washington and their slow speed made it very unlikely that they could avoid surveillance and destruction by a vigilant opponent One of the two ships was taken out of commission in 1969 and the other shortly after U The airborne command post offered the most appealing alternative to the NMCC in the view of the majority Because of its maneuverability it had a relatively high chance of survival while airborne and it could be brought to a place quite near the NCA in time of emergency even follow the President on journeys away from Washington Its capabilities were of course limited by its relatively small size but with technological improvements its capabilities increased U In the late sixties a proposal had been made for substantially expanding the capabilities of the airborne com mand post by using one of the large airframes that were than coming into commercial and military use The Boeing 7H7 soon became the most likely candidate and there followed long dis cussions of the arrangement and of the facilities to be pro vided for what was to be designated the AABNCP Differences of view were not quickly resolved for they centered on ques tions as to cost mission what facilities should be included #21 a to and the familiar question raised about every command post other than the normal seat of government whether limitations on its capabilities endurance and survivability made it a reasonable choice for the NCA over their normal place of busine An example of basic differences that persisted or were thought to persist was a charge made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs against the in a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense The Chairman said There is some indication that the lack of prog rose by may be attributable in part to confusion over the role of the ABNCP The issue is whether the current ABNCP system should be maintained simply to provide a capability for inflexible execution of a single SIOP task or whether an AABNCP should be created to provide a capability for assessing the attack situation and for flexible execution of 810 tasks The Chairman said that the former capability was already pro vided by the current system of EC-135s and that the latter capability could only be provided by the AABNCP In fact it turned out that there was no difference between the JCS and on this matter despite suspicions It was however indeed this new and complex idea of a completely new function for the command post that made the decision on the AABNCP so difficult Many people continued to wonder if even the AABNCP was big enough survivable enough and had enough enduranceu- after all it could stay in the air only for a matter of hours and depended on supporting bases to get into the air again On 17 December 1971 the new Council chose the faster of two options which would put seven 7 7 in the air in 1975 5 Secre Throughout consideration of this issue it was Deputy tary Packard's position that there should be a strong and wellwequipped NEACP operating out of Washington He felt that the NCA should have a capability comparable to that of SAC and N22 should not have to depend on the SAC airborne command post LOOKING GLASS question of the survivability of had not een resolved however On 26 April 1972 WSEG Report 179 appeared It identified the following vulnerabilities in the 1 Under current conditions are vulnerable to SLBM attack They are under 15 minute ground alert but all bases are within 13 8 minutes flight time of potential SS-N-G launch locations 2 The unique electromagnetic transmission of could be used for terminal homing of enemy aircraft 3 Lack of air defense coverage in southucentral CONUS could permit an enemy aircraft to get through undetected 4 The relatively small emergency wartime orbit of LOOKING GLASS might appear attractive for a barrage missile attack 5 Present procedures for TACAMO aircraft make them highly vulnerable to tracking 6 Current radio communications linking within overseas are not' reliable in a nuclear environment 6 The on order were expected to correct some but by no me no a of the vulnerabilities listed in the WSEG report Q3 Even if the provision of alternate command posts and of redundant communications had provided a more hopeful out look for survivability there would have remained the more basic problem of getting the President to one of them and getting his decisions to the strategic forces after he was there The communications problem is highlighted by the con- clusion reached by about the value of a Deep Underground Command Center DUCC one so deep underground that it could survive hits by the USSR's largest weapons The conclusion was the utility of a DUCC is limited by the possibilities for eaually survivable communications and these are simply not realistically available The problem had been #23 UNCLASSIFIED problem of the vulnerability of the command and control system particularly the capability 9f the system to function in the trans and postwattack periods 1425 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED problem of the vulnerability of the command and control system particularly the capability of the system to function in the trans and post-attack perieds 1425 UNCLASSIFIED This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu