QEPDETI Approved For Release 2005 02 18 NLC-8-4-7-18-3 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON C 20301 - #roT 9 MAR 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SUBJECT Questions Brought up at the Preside tiai Visit to the National Command Center At the session in the National requested more information regarding U munications to the National Emergency cations checks with the Presidential mmand Center in January you missiie warning systems com- irborne Command Post and communi- arty The attached is a response to that equest Attachment and OSD review s completed 555 P ii i @010 SECRET MML $0 army 0F 4 COPIES 'Iu exam we 2 sz - 0 '7 0 8 impo s b1e to_ determine sac Def Cont Approved For Release 2005e 02 18 8- - proved For Release 2005 02 18 8 4- 7- 18 3 20D I VULNERABILITY 0F DSP SATELLITES T0 LASERS Questions - Can the Soviets blind ours with lasers If not what is their projected capability for doing so - How can we protect ours against Soviet laser blinding or what- ever other action they may be capable of taking - Suppose the Soviets do blind one some of our DSP satellites what can we do on short notice to protect ours quick fix - What are we doing to develop a capability to blind Soviet warning satellites Include discussion of their current ICBM warning capability both present and projected Background The Defense Support Program DSP consists of three satellites stationed at altitude 19 323 nm each equipped with an Infrared IR sensor for detecting and tracking missiles in powered flight One satellite in the Eastern Hemisphere with a dedicated ground station in Australia provides coverage of Soviet and Chinese ballistic missile com- plexes Two satellites with a dedicated ground station in CONUS -provide coverage of SLBM launch Vulnerability to Lasers The Soviet Union is not believed to possess lasers sufficiently powerful and accurate to physically damag _the DSP satellite gr permanently blind the IR sensors on the DSP satel lites 'wo $0 OMINT - P3 CONTROL svsrems Jaw I 2 Approved For Release 2000 0318 NLC 0-4 7 18 3 -I01I - 0 OP SECRET $0 T0 pproved For Release 2005 02 18 I I 2 Soviet exploitation of the vulnerability of the DSP system to laser jamming would also require a surveillance system capable of detecting and tracking satellites at altitudes The existing Soviet space surveillance system copsists principally of ground-based radars and optical trackers It is not known whether the radars are capable of de tecting and tracking satellites at altitudes The optical systems however are believed to have the capability to search for detect and track the large stationary DSP satellites This capability is limited to cloud fref nighttime when the satellite is i a un $0 $0 @550 EThe satellites are launched into orbit wi a itan boost vehicle from Cape Kennedy which has only one active launch pad Presently four spare Titan boost vehicles are available With current procedures however a minimum of 45 days is required to put a replacement satellite into orbit This assumes that there is no other satellite and booster on the launch pad If the launch pad were occupied it is estimated that it could take up to 61 days to put a replacement DSP satellite into orbit Soviet Missile Surveillance Capability The Soviet missile surveillance system is believed to consist of ground based radars and IR satellites The radars include 8 conventional phased-array radars 6 VHF Henhouse UHF Dog House and UHF Checkhov also called Cat House and 2 over the horizon 0TH radars The Soviets are believed to have launched 4 IR surveillance satellites into inclined elliptical 12 hour orbits with the last satellite launched into orbit in June 1977 Only two_are currently operational As a result coverage is restricted_to-about l3 hours per day on the U S ICBM'fields and the North Atlantic SLBM operating areas The 4 satellite system would have provided continuous coverage - - I S agea ia TOP QEPDETI 311355 HANDLE VIA Approved For Release 2005 02 18 SYSTEMS JOINTLY Approved For Release 2005 021'18 Ptaor PAVE PAWS SLBM WARNING SYSTEM Question Please provide a report on the status of our phased array radars fer SLBM warning Discuss current capabilities and weaknesses the role to be played by the phased array radars already programmed and projected for the latter Background The PAVE PAWS system consists of two modern phased array radars for SLBM warning one on the East Coa_st at Otis Air Force Base Massachusetts and one on the West Coast at Beale Air Force Base California The expected operational dates are April 1979 for the East Coast site and April 1980 for the West Coast site The currently opera- tional FPS-85 SPACETRACK radar at Eglin Air Force Base has been modified to also detect SLBM launches and will be integrated into the PAVE PAWS system Present Status The PAVE PAWS program is on schedule bility is expected to be achieved by April 1980 Full system capa- Contribution of PAVE PAWS The PAVE PAWS radars will provide significant improvements over the 474N radars in terms of coverage reliability and attack assessment The radars cannot be overflown by ei SWEET 0 gt m ther the 6 or Approved For Release 2005 02 18 Approved For Release 2005 02 18 5 the SSN-8 The expected system availability is about 95 percent They are designed to handle SLBM raid densities of up to missiles per minute and predict their impact points with an accuracy of 25 am When they are operational radar coverage of most potential SLBM launch areas will be provided The 474N radars would then be phased out A four site PAVE FANS phased array radar system is also under consideration This would provide essentially complete coverage of SLBM launches against CONUS Summer The two PAVE PANS phased array radars will be operational in April i979 and April 1980 They will provide a significant improvement over the present 4741i system in terms of reliability coverage capacity and attack assessment with the DSP system dual radar IR coverage of most potential SLBM launch areas will be providedsea-a Approved For Release 2005 02 18 Approved For Release 2005 0211 8 #220 5mm MISSILE WARNING SYSTEMS FALSE ALARMS Question How many false alarms have we experienced within the NMCS since the inception of our-early warning capabilities Background Threat reports from the missile warning systems are auto- matically processed and displayed in the command centers of the National Military Command System NMCS Alarms for each system are generated at North American Air Defense NORAD Headquarters CINCNORAD assigns a confidence of or Hi to an alarm There are three alarm levels which are defined as follows Alarm Level Three This is the lowest state of alarm and is generated when the number of threat reports has reached a level that would rarely be reached unless a missile attack were in progress The average false alarm rate is calculated to be less than one per year Alarm Level Two This represents a greater likelihood that a missile attack is in progress The false alarm rate is calculated to be less than one per 10 years - Alarm Level One This is the highest state of alarm and is almost certainly caused by a missile attack The false alarm rate is cal culated to be less than one per 25 years Operational Experience The false alarm history of the five operational 'missile warning systems is as follows a Defense Support Program - IOC 1971 A Date Cause Alarm Level 28 August 1976 US Polaris Launch 3 13 December 1976 Computer Hardware 1 The CINCNORAD assessed Confidence was No in both cases The system deficiencies which caused these false alarms have been corrected by hardware and software changes at the DSP ground stations b Ballistic Missile Early Warning System BMENS - IOC 1960 Date Cause Alarm Level 5 October 1960 Moon 3 3 November 1964 Computer Software 3 30 March 1966 Multiple Satellites 3 18 March 1975 Personnel Error 1 The CINCNORAD assessed confidence was No in all cases The system deficiencies which ceased these false alarms have been corrected by hardware and software changes at-the BMENS radar sites mm Approved For Release 2005 02 18 I Approved For Release 2005f02f18 NLC-B-4-7-18-3 3 9 Ia- c Coastal SLBM Radars 474M - IOC 1970 The 474N system has generated no false alarms over the past five years It is scheduled to be replaced by the PAVE PAWS system i 1980 d FPS-85 SLBM Radar at 33m AFB Florida - IOC 1975 Since the FPS-85 radar has been Converted to detect SLBM launches in 1975 no false alarms have been generated by this system e Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization'System - I00 1977 The PARCS has generated no false alarms Summary Since the activation of the first missile warning system BMEHS in 1960 seven false alarms have been experienced within the NMCS There have been no false alarms since December 1976 Approved For Release 2005 02 18 NLC-8-4-7-18-3 a 5 I NRO Approved For Release 2005 02 18 1111 2 bttl tl IMPROVED SECURE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE NEACP Question Nhat are the plans fer overcoming the narrow band to wide band secure voice conferencing problem with the In a recent exercise it was imposSible to bring the NEACP into a conference with the CINCs Back round During the 28 January 1978 exercise the President at the NMCCI was unable to get a secure voice link with NEACP The cause was failure of the HY-Z narrow band secure voice equipment The has not been noted as having an unusual non-availability record It just broke down at the wrong time Present Status At present the NMCC has a secure wide band KY- 3 link with the NEACP alert facility However when the NEACP is airborne a narrow band link 2 is employed Future Status Actions are underway to assure direct wide band secure voice between the NEACP and the ground-based AUTUSEVOCOM Network a KY-3 wide band secure voice equipment will be installed on all three E-4A NEACP aircraft This has no serious space weight power etc repercussions Aircraft modification cost is about $200 000 Installation is scheduled to begin not later than 1 June 1978 and will require approxi- mately three weeks including Operational Test and Evaluation However an- FOC of 9 June 1978 may be possible with an expedited implementation b To supplement the present ground entry points at Hillsboro Missouri and Offutt AFB Nebraska ground entry points at the Alternate National Military Command Center near Fort Ritchie Maryland and at Norfolk Virginia will be configured by May 1978 to provide AUTOSEVOCOM access from and to the NEACP This improved capability requires leasing of several 50 telephone lines plus a radio modification at Norfolk c Therefore by late June 1978 all E-4A aircraft will have both narrow band KY-2 and wide band secure voice capability The E-4B aircraft will also have both narrow band and wide band secure voice capa- bility d The wide band secure voice links will provide voice- -recognition- quality secure communications and are a major improvement over narrow band secure voice Summer The narrow band wide band secure voice conferencing problem will be solved by late June 1978 The solution will be the installation of wide band secure voice equipment aboard NEACP Approved For Release 2005 0218 Approved For Release 2005 02 18 NLC-8-4-7-18-3 Ettiiti COMMUNICATIONS CHECKS WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL PARTY WASHINGTON Question What procedures have been established for the Secretary of Defense to conduct communications checks in the clear with the Presidential Party away from Washington Some checks should be made with the President himself Checks with the Presidential Party Communications checks with the Presi- dential Fart can be accompiished through the white House Communications Agency NHCA Trip Officer Within 24 hours of the arrival of the Presi- dent at a trip location the WHCA Trip Officer offers the National Military Command Center NMCC the opportunity to initiate a communications check to the HHCA Trip Officer Checks with the President NMCC-NHCA procedures can accommodate direct calls from the Secretary of Defense to the President Since the Secretary of Defense is on the direct access list to the President prior clearance is unnecessary In order to avoid interference with the Presidential schedule however it is recommended that communications tests with the President be cleared in advance with the duty military aide who can deter- mine the availability of the President Summary NMCC-NHCA procedures have been established for the Secretary of Defense to conduct communications checks with the Presidential party or the President through the White House Communications Agency NRO annD'l 7 at - - sen Approved For Release 2005x0318 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu