3 Date Printed CHANNEL n a HANBLING n a 1N PULL PAGE 01 STATE 30 013 ORIGIN INFO 830 09 ICAE-OG 061 DRAFTED BY APPROVED BY LAWSON 021943 2810403 20 280022Z NOV 79 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO USMISSION INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GER PRIORITY NORFOLK VA PRIORITY CINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY USOELMC BRUSSELS PRIORITY CINCSAC OFFUT NE PRIORITY CINCNORAD COLORADO SPRINGS CO PRIORITY STATE 307013 3 0 12065 GUS 11 27 85 LEDOGAR STEPHEN J TAGS FARM MPOL UR NATO SUBJECT TNF SOVIETS AND THE FALSE MISSILE ALERT SECRET SECRET PAGE 02 STATE 307013 Page 1 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY THEODORE SELLIN 06 FEB 2094 200304223 UNCLAS SIFIED Date Printed CHANNEL n a 1 19798TATE307013 n a 086 DTG 2113452 NOV 79 NOTAL l SMENTIRE TEXT 2 A NOVEMBER 9 TEST TAPE SIMULATING A MISSILE ATTACK ON THE US WAS INADVERTENTLY TRANSMITTEO OUTSIOE NORAQ HEAOQUARTERS ALE COMMANDS RAD UOSLY AND CORRECTLY IDENTIFIEO THE EATA AS FALSE IN L338 THAN SIX MINUTES FOUR DAYS LATER AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN DELIVERED TO THE SECRETARY AN ORAL NOTE FROM BREZHNEV TO PRQSIDENT CARTER WHICH BREZHNEV - NOTED WITH CONCERN THE FALSE ALERT AND NOT TOO SUBTLY IMPLIEE THAT THE PROCEDURES FOR CONTROLLIEG ITS FORCES WERE SOMEWHAT LACKING END SUMMARY I i 3 WE ARE CONSIDERING A RESPONSE TO NOTE BUT ARE CONCERNEQ THAT THE SOVIETS MAY TO MAKE USE OF THIS INCIEENT TO CAST UNWARRANTEQ DOUBT ON THE RELIABILITY OF OUR NUCLEAR CONTROL THUS INFLUENCE ALLIED ATIITUDES ON THE EVE OF TNF ARMS CONTROL MINISTERIAL MEETINGS 4- WE BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO INFORM THE ALLIES OF THE FACTS OF THE FALSE ALERT IRCIDENT AME THE COMMUNICATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN TO AVOID DAMAGING RUMORS UNNECEESARY CONCERN WE WOOLD SUGGEST THAT GSNATO USE THE TALKING POINTS IN PARA 6 AND 7 TO BRIEF THE PERMREPS AT AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY AND NATO CAPITALS DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING IN ANSWERING OFFICIAL QUERIES 5 YOU SHOULD UNDERSCORE AS YOU DO SO THE REDUNDANT AND SECRET SECRET PAGE 03 ETATE 307013 COMPLETE NATURE OF OUR CONFIRMATION AND CONTROL MECHANISMS WHICH WERE PROVEN TO BE QUICKLY AND APPROPRIATELY RESPONSIVE TO THE SITUATION AS IT DEVELOPEQ EMPHASIZE THAT NO STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES WERE ACTIVATED -ALSO EMPQASIZE THAT T33 SYSTEM WAS AGAIN saowm TO BE RESPONSIVE TO HAVE SAFEGUAROS AGAQNST HASTY ACTION AND TO RAVE A DESIGN WHICH ASSURES HUMAN JUDGMENT CAN OVERRIDE INADVERTENT MALFUNCTIONS YOU SHOULD ALSO THE FACT THAT THE SEEM TO BE TAKING ADVANTAGE 0 ANY SITUATION TO DILUTE ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR A DECEMBER DECISION TO Page 2 UNCLASSIFIED Date Printed CHANNEL n a 1979STATE307013 HANDLING n a MODERNIZE AND DEPLOY THEREFORE AS WE MOVE TOWARD AND THROUGH THE MINISTERIALS IT IS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO PRESENT A UNIFIED STROEG IMAGE TO THE EAST 6 THE NOVEMBER 9 FALSE ALERT YOU SHOULD USE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATIOH TO BRIEF TEE ALLIES ON THE NORAD INCIDENT FYI THE GIST OF THE INFORMATION IN THE FIRST TIC BELOW WAS PASSED BY DOD TO RETHERLANDS ATTACHE ON 14 HOV IN RESPONSE TO URGENT REQUEST FROM NETHERLANDS DEFENSE MINISTRY WHO EXPECTED QUERY IN PARLIAMENT ON 15 NOV END FYI A PORTION OF A RECORDED TEST SCENARIO WAS ERRONEOUSLY TRANSMITTED OBTEIDE NORAD HEADQUARTERS TO A NUMBER OF OTHER COMMANDS AND AGENCIES THE ENTIRE SYSTEM HAS A NUMBER OF BUILT-IN CHECKS AND REDUNDANCIES BECAUSE OF THESE THE TEST DATA WAS ADMOST IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED AS SPURIOUS ALL COMMAND LEVEES DEMONSTRATED ENTIRELY PROFER RESPONSIBILITY IN HANDLING THE DATA E0 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR UNITE TOOK ANY STEPS TOWARD ADVANCED ALERT ALL COMMANDS HAD UNAMBIGUOUSLY AND CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED AND CONFIRMED THE DATA AS FALSE IN LESS THAN SIX MINUTES BECAUSE OF AN ALERT PRIOR TO THAT TIME A SECRET SECRET PAGE 04 STATE 307013 SMALL NUMBER OF AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT TOOK OFF FROM THEIR BASES TO ASSUME AN ALERT POSTURE THESE WERE RECALLED IN A FEW MINUTES NONE CARRIED ANY NUCLEAR WEAPOHS w THE PROCEDURES USED TO EVALUATE THE MISSILE LAUNCH INDICATION PROVED TO BE EFFECTIVE FAST AND CORRECT 7 SOVIET DRAW ON FOLLOWING ON NOVEMBER 13 AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN DELIVERED AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM BREZHNEV TO PRESIDENT CARTER EXPRES- SING SOVIET CONCERE OVER THE INCIDENT WE ARE CONSIDERING A RESPONSE TO MESSAGE WE CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY RETURN TO THIS INCIDENT PUBLICLY AS DECEMBER 12 APPROACHES Page 3 UNCLASSIFIED g Date Printe CHANNEL n a 1 10 N0v 2003 1979STATE307013 n a EN A FURTHER EFFORT TO BERAIL DEPLOYMENT WE TO-SHARE THE FACTS OF THE EVENT WITH YGU IN ADVANCE OF AMY FOSSIBILITY 8 FOR COPENHAGEN THIS RESPONDS TO REFTEL VAECE SECRET NNH Page - 4 UNCLASSIFIED This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu