DECLASSIFIED nw icil j Author CONTROL NUMBER DOCUMENT PROCESSING RECORD q DATE RECEIVED RETURN TO OFFICE CHAIRMAN JCS-ROOM 25865 THE PENTAGON 17 Mar 80 DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION TE ME 35080 summer Reply to U THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE CIRCULATION OF TH I8 DOCUMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO INDIVIDUALS INDICATED BELOW THE DOCUMENT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE FOR RECORD PRIOR TO DISPATCH TO ANOTHER OFFICE OR OTHER DISPOSITION HHS MM um NOTBENHOVEDW TO NAME man mamas oo 19 March 1980 execunvs ASSISTANT on OEPUWEXECUTIVEASSISTANT on ACTION RELEASE MESSAGE f gim mwm 0 2 USCINCEUR has asked for the following 4 specific information and authority re 3 EXECUIWEASSISTANT 0M th garding the 9 Nov 79 event at NORAD 7 ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT 04 7 summary of event - any changes in procedures ASSISTANT lessons learned and release of appropriate version of mums STAFF GROUP 01 a AIRPORCE MEMBER event to NATO I 5v 3 This is a mare s nest Next under I have reWritten the preferred staff 1 MMYMENIBEII 0 option- enclosure achieve a small degree of conciseness and clarity our I have ad de USDELMC Brussels General Knowlto j and USNMR SHAPE General SPECIALASSISTANT 016 Rogers' office as info addees so that the information can be shared at appropriate levels in NATO Contrary to staff advice I have not included 5 CINCAD CINCSAC and CINCPAC mmnenme 3 I have re-cleared the draft with the PROTOCOL 06 originator 4 Recommendation Release message next under '81 hr the Joint Staff IAW J51 5227 01 - Wm DECLABSIFIED edi ces-a I I pIn f lau Reply to USCINCEUR El n-mm UJq l 2 0105 SUMMARY SHEET ORIGINATING DIR see-ass ess 1 7 1 1 7 MAR 1980 DJSM NO onus suspense one DJS WW 1- TM- 1 an 7 1930 s HOR HANSON ACTION VICE ADMIRAL we assume mm mm REMARKS b CINCPAC J-5 and a 6 Option 1 Option 2 c Option 3 d U Option 4 2 L31 Four options are proposed Forward message at Enclosure 1 details NATO releasable information at SECRET level 55 Forward message at Enclosure 2 con ains same information as Option 1 but tasks General Knowlton US Rep Mil Comm NATO to brief NATO military material provided Forward message at Enclosure 3 summarizes information in Option 1 and states CJCS will brief NATO in more detail at earliest opportunity 1 U Enclosures 1 2 and 3 are presented as options for response to a request for information concerning the 9 Nov 79 false missile raid incident This message This message No written This message Forward message at Enclosure 1 to CINCAD and CINCSAC 3 This information has been coordinated with C38 J3 EUR Div 4 U CBS and J-3 recommend Option 2 4 1 6 I 3 - 5 U Request CJCS approval of Option 1 2 3 or 4 for release by J-3 0420252 Feb 80 35 0m mus mam I use m5 mansion moon USAF J- 1 sws C38 35 3 Shutler Ext 70168 m nou' JCSor gcn 1'99 1 1 CLASSIFIED 'h Aumo ty I 5 a1 RR JCS UASHINGTON USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN USDELNC BRUSSELS BE SUBJ PROCEDURES FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF TESTING REFS A JCS 15Lu352 JAN Su B BHEU C HQ BEITBSZ l REQUESTED A SUMMARY 0 INCIDENT DISCUSSED IN REF A- REF CONTAINS ALL AVAILAB INFORMATION ON 9 NOV 79 INCIDENT- I E- ANY PROCEDURAL REVISIONS AFFECTING CINCEUR STEHHING NOV 79 INCIDENT UILL BE DIRECTED BY REVISI 0F APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES- SUCH CHANGES WOULD NOT NECESSARIL REFER T0 9 NOV- 3- THE FOLLOWING INFORNATION IS RELEASABLE NATO AT THE SECRET LEVEL A- BACKGROUND OF INCIDENT EARLY ON NOVEMBER 1973s THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS MAS CONDUCTING AN INTERNAL CJCS DJS SJCS J3 CBS NAJ1 USAF EA DIV1 FSEGRETWILL 3EU5 3 Fl A t 1 Authority EMT EXERCISE FOR A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT PURPOSE TECHNICIANS MERE PREPARING TO CONDUCT ADDITIONAL TESTS LATER THAT DAY- AS PART OF THIS PREPARATION A TEST NORMALLY USED TO SIMULATE INPUTS FROM EARLY EARNING SENSOR81 AS BEING READIED FOR CONNECTION MITH AN INCOMING SENSOR COMMUNICAT ON LINE AFTER TECHNICIAN MERE UNABLE TO PROPERLY ESTABLISH A CONNECTION THEY CHANGED DATA DI TO ONE MHICH HAD BEEN USED SUCCESSFULLY IN THE PAST- AT THE ME THEY DID NOT INTEND T0 FEED SIMULATED SENSOR DATA INTO THE MAIN OMPUTER AND1 IN FACT1 THOUGHT THAT THE TEST COMPUTER MAS NOT CONNECT TO THE SENSOR COMMUNICATION LINE- UNKNONN TO THE TEC NICIANS1 THO MINUTES OF EARLY UARNING DATA FROM THE DISK MENT INTO HE MAIN NORAD COMPUTER TAGGED AS REAL DATA- THE QUOTE REAL DATA UN UOTE FORMAT HAS BEEN USED IN THE PAST TO PROVE THAT THE SYSTEM MILL OVERRIDE TESTS IN PROGRESS IN THE EVENT MISSILE LAUNCH INFORMATION IS COMING IN FROM THE SENSORS- NORMAL PROCESSING OF THIS INPUT DATA BY THE MAIN NORAD COMPUTER RESULTED IN NORADS MISSILE UARNING DISPLAY SYSTEM HIGH SPEED DATA AND TELETYPE USERS RECEIVING INDICATIONS OF AN ATTACK A lil- II n 1 wm mn 2 Aumority 03 ON THE UNITED STATES BY SOME luq SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILES- B- ACTIONS TAKEN ON 3 NOVEMBER 1973 iafdA CONFERENCE UAS INITIATED TO DISCUSS THE APPARENT ATTACK WARNING ABOUT ONEUPINUTE AFTER THE FIRST EARNING EVEN BE- FORE THE CONFERENCE UAS ESTABLISHED1 OFFICERS IN THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CEN ER BEGAN TO DETECT ANOMALIES IN THE MARNING INFORMATION UARNING INF RMATION GENERATED BY THE COMPUTER AT NORAD SIMULATED DETECTION OF A OVIET MISSILE ATTACK BY NARNING SENSORS THAT NOT ONLY FEED DATA TO ORAD BUT ALSO ARE DIRECTLY CONNECTED TO THE ANMCC1 AND SA CP- THE DIRECT DATA LINE FROM THESE SENSORS TO THE AND SAC CP SHOUED NO LAUNCH REPORTS BEING TRANSMITTED- FURTHERMORE1 OPERA ORS AT THESE SENSORS REPORTED THAT NO LAUNCH REPORTS HAD BEEN TRANSMI TED AND THAT THEIR SYSTEMS HERE OPERATING PROPERLY LAUNCH DETECTIO FROM THESE SENSORS MOULD BE CONFIRMED BY DETECTIONS MADE BY OTHER SENSORS HAVING COVERAGE OF POTENTIAL ICBM AND SLBM THREAT TRAJECTORIES- NOVEMBER THERE HAS NO CONFIRMATION OF AN ATTACK BY OTHER U-S- 'nu EARLY MARNING SYSTEMS- I THE TEST DATA INTRODUCED OTHER INACCURACIES INTO SYSTEN- ANONG THESE IS A TINE OF DAY INDICATION SEVERAL HO RS DIFFERENT FROM REAL TINE- APPROXIHA ELY SIX MINUTES AFTER THE FIRST THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR 0 ERATIONS DETERMINED CONCLUSIVELY THAT NO THREAT EXISTED- C- LESSONS LEARNED i VOICE CONNUNICAT NS PROCEDURES NUST BE CAREFULLY NORDED TO AVOID POSSIBLE NISUNDE TANDING NORAD DIRECTED ITS AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS T0 PREPARE TO LAUNCH HONEVER1 FEN BASES THE INSTRUCTION RELAYED TO THE AIRC FT MAS LAUNCH1 CAUSING A NUNBER OF INTERCEPTORS TO ACTUALLY LAUNCH- USE OF AUTONATIC DATA PR CESSING EQUIPHENT AND TELECOHHUNICATIONS CIRCUITS CAN CARRY TH EFFECTS OF TESTING TO LOCATIONS FAR REHOVED FROM THE TEST SITE CONTROL PROCEDURES SHOULD INSURE THAT ALL INVOLVED AGENCIES ARE NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE OF TESTING ACTIVITIES IN AN ON LINE INTERCONNECTED SYSTEN1 PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO NOTIFYING INDIVIDUALS AT FACILITIES m m ram 73 usiaw w- a 'nE' mam 7 US UPSTREAM AND FROM THE TEST LOCATION COMMUNICATIONS CONNECTIVITY TO SENIOR DECISIONNAKER81 E 1 COMMANDERS IN CHIEF SHOULD BE VERIFIED PERIODICALLY TO TIMELY RESPONSE DURING CRISIS H GENERAL KNONLTON IS AUTHORIZED AT HIS DISCRETION T0 BRIEF INFORMATION CONTAIN IN PARAGRAPH 3 TO PRINCIPALS 0F NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE ONL ON A CLOSE HOLD BASIS AS SOON AS PRACTICAL- THIS MUST BE A EFING ONLY AND WILL NOT INCLUDE ANY URITTEN STATEMENTS- REVN 30 FEB EBUU REAS 5 a 2 Authority ' i pi Iii RR r r ucs MASHINGTON USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN PR EDURES FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF TESTING REFS A- SLHESZ JAN ED 3 USCINCE IECJS DHEUESZ FEB BU C HQ 0517352 DEC TH l- REF REQUESTED SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL INCIDENT DISCUSSED IN REF A REF CONTAINS A AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON 3 NOV 9 INCIDENT- E- ANY PROCEDURAL REVISIONS FECTING USCINCEUR STEMMING FROM 3 NOV 79 INCIDENT MILL BE DIRECTED REVISION OF APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES- SUCH CHANGES WOULD NOT ESSARILY REFER TO 9 NOV I i 3 THE FOLLONING INFORMATION IS REL SABLE TO NATO AT THE SECRET LEVEL A BACKGROUND OF INCIDENT $94 EARLY ON 9 NOVEMBER L9791 THE NO TH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS WAS CONDUCTING AN INTERNAL cyan 53 CJCS DJS SJCS J3 CBS C H BOYDs MAJ1 USAF EA DIV NSll a EU FEB 60 fl REEL ACE lo 1 79 DECLASSIFIED Aumoriw wao c EXERCISE FOR A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT TECHNICIANS MERE PREPARING TO CONDUCT ADDITIONAL TESTS LATER THAT DAY AS PART OF THIS PREPARATION A TEST COMPUTER1 NORMALLY USED TO SIMULATE INPUTS FROM EARLY EARNING SENSOR31 UAS BEING READIED FOR CONNECTION WITH AN INCOMING SENSOR COMMUNICATION LINE- TECHNICIANS MERE UNABLE TO PROPERLY ESTABLISH A CONNECTION1 THEY CH GED DATA DISKS TO ONE UHICH HAD BEEN USED SUCCESSFULLY IN THE PAS AT THE TIME THEY DID NOT INTEND TO FEED SIMULATED SENSOR DATA INTO HE MAIN COMPUTER AND IN THOUGHT THAT THE TEST COMPUTER HAS NO CONNECTED TO THE SENSOR COMMUNICATION LINE 81 UNKNOMN TO TECHNICIANS1 TUO MINUTES OF EARLY EARNING DATA FROM THE DISK WENT TO THE MAIN NORAD COMPUTER TAGGED AS REAL DATA- NORMAL PROCESSING 0 THIS INPUT DATA BY THE MAIN NORAD COMPUTER RESULTED IN MISS LE MARNING DISPLAY SYSTEM HIGH SPEED DATA AND TELETYPE USE RECEIVING INDICATIONS OF AN ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES BY OME 11HUD SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILES DECLASSIFIED 2 I Authority seems B- OH NOVEMBER A CONFERENCE MAS INITIATED TO DISCUSS THE APPARENT ATTACK EARNING A UT ONE MINUTE AFTER THE FIRST WARNIN61 EVEN BEFORE THE CONFERENCE COMPLETELY ESTABLISHED OFFICERS IN THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND ENTER BEGAN TO DETECT ANOMALIES IN THE EARNING INFORMATION- jEj THE MARNING FORMATION GENERATED BY THE COMPUTER AT NORAD SIMULATED DETECTION OF A OVIET MISSILE ATTACK BY WARNING SENSORS THAT NOT ONLY FEED DATA TO AD BUT ALSO ARE DIRECTLY CONNECTED TO THE NMCC1 AND SAC THE DIRECT DATA LINE FROM THESE SENSORS TO THE NNCC1 ANMCC1 AND SAC CP SHOMED NO LAUNCH REPORTS BEING TRANSMITTED FURTHERMORE OPERATORS THESE SENSORS REPORTED THAT NO LAUNCH REPORTS HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED A THAT THEIR SYSTEMS MERE OPERATING PROPERLY- NORMALLY LAUNCH DETECTIONS FROM THESE SENSORS MOULD BE CONFIRMED BY DETECTIONS MADE BY OTHER SEN RS HAVING COVERAGE OF POTENTIAL ICBM AND SLBM THREAT TRAJECTOR ES- ON NOVEMBER THERE NAS N0 CONFIRMATION OF AN ATTACK BY OTHER U-S- EARLY WARNING SYSTEMSICESV so 55 5r- 130 I Authority Numb seen-5 THE TEST DATA INTRODUCED OTHER INACCURACIES INTO SYSTEN- ANONG THESE IS A TINE OF DAY INDICATION SEVERAL HOU DIFFERENT FRON REAL TIME- APPROXIMATE SIX NINUTES AFTER THE FIRST THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPER TIONS DETERMINED CONCLUSIVELY THAT NO THREAT EXISTED C- LESSONS 21 VOICE CONHUNICATIONS OCEDURES NUST BE CAREFULLY NORDED TO AVOID POSSIBLE NISUNDERSTAN NG- NORAD DIRECTED ITS AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS TO PREPARE TO LAUNC A HOWEVER1 AT A FEM BASES THE INSTRUCTION RELAYED TO THE AIRCRAFT MA LAUNCH1 CAUSING A NUMBER OF INTERCEPTORS TO ACTUALLY LAUNCH USE OF AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSIN EQUIPNENT AND TELECONHUNICATIONS CIRCUITS CAN CARRY THE EFFEC OF TESTING TO LOCATIONS FAR REMOVED THE TEST SITE CONTRO PROCEDURES SHOULD INSURE THAT ALL INVOLVED AGENCIES ARE NOTIFIED IN DVANCE OF TESTING ACTIVITIES- IN AN ON LINE INTERCONNECTED PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO NOTIFYING INDIVIDUALS AT FACILITIES Nb 1 0 mm when nusum 1n OF and us on i An Tlcn ULSS 5 31 UPSTREAN AND FROM THE TEST LOCATION 21 CONNECTIVITY TO SENIOR DECISIONHAKER81 E-Goa COHHA DERS IN CHIEF SHOULD BE VERIFIED PERIODICALLY T0 INSURE TIHELY ESPONSE DURING CRISIS- REVN an FEB aunu REAS IITECLASSIFIED punhontY - I 0 RR 8388 JCS UASHINGTON USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN USDELNC BRUSSELS BE i SUBJ PROCEDURES FOR ADVA NOTIFICATION OF TESTING REFS A- JCS JAN EU B DHEDES FEB 60 C- HQ 0517352 DEC 1- 21 REF REQUESTED A SUNNARY OF ERATIONAL INCIDENT DISCUSSED I IN REF A REF CONTAINS ALL AVAILABLE INFORNATION ON 1 NOV 73 INCIDENT A E CQF ANY PROCEDURAL REVISIONS AFFECTING INCEUR STENNING FRON NOV 79 INCIDENT MILL BE DIRECTED BY REVISIO 0F APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES SUCH CHANGES MOULD NOT NECESSARILY EFER TO 3 NOV- 3 THE FOLLOMING INFORMATION IS RELEASABLE TO NATO AT THE SECRET LEVEL A- LXI EARLY ON 9 NOVENBER 19791 THE NORTH AHERICAN AIR DEFENSE CONNAND HEADQUARTERS MAS CONDUCTING A TEST EXERCISE- TUO OF SIMULATED TEST DATA MAS INADVERTENTLY LABELED AS CJCS DJS SJCS J3 CBS '1 a - CLASSIFIED 1' If Dl RR NO JCS UASHINGTON USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN USDELHC BRUSSELS BE SUBJ PROCEDURES FOR ADVA NOTIFICATION OF TESTING REFS A- JCS JAN 60 B nuauas FEB an c Ha 0517352 a l gzi'REF REQUESTED A SUMMARY or IN REF A- REF CONTAINS ALL AVAILABLE NFORHATION ON a Nov 7R INCIDENT- a PROCEDURAL REVISIONS AFFECTING INCEUR STEHNING a Nov 7R INCIDENT MILL BE DIRECTED BY REVISIO or APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES- SUCH CHANGES UOULD NOT NECESSARILY EFER TO a NOV- 3- THE FOLLOUING LEVEL A- EARLY ON 9 NOVEHBER L375 THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COHNAND HEADQUARTERS MAS CONDUCTING A TEST EXERCISE Two HINUTES OF SINULATED TEST DATA MAS INADVERTENTLY LABELED AS CJCS DJS SJCS ERATIONAL INCIDENT DISCUSSED INFORMATION IS RELEASABLE T0 NATO AT THE SECRET liq-ill I DECLASSIFIE Labial I - DE REAL DATA RESULTING IN INDICATIONS OF AN ATTACK IN THE UNITED STATES BY INED SOVIET BALLISTIC HISSILES- i EARLY IN THE EVENT1 NATIONAL HILITARY COHHAND CENTER PERSONNEL DETECTED ANOHALIES IN THE WARNING INFORMATION AND A CONFERENCE MAS INITIATED TO DISCUSS THE APPARENT ATTACK MARNING- THERE WAS NO CONFIRHATION OF AN ATTACK BY OTHER US UARNING SYSTEMS- APPROXIHATELY SIX HINUT AFTER FIRST THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS DETE INED CONCLUSIVELY THAT NO THREAT EXISTED C- MODIFICATIONS TO SYSTEMS ND PROCEDURES ARE PRESENTLY BEING STAFFED AND IHPLEHENTED TO EVENT REOCCURRENCE OF SIMILAR INCIDENTS H- AUTHORIZE RELEASE PARA 3 TO NAT THE UILL BRIEF AND EXPAND ON THIS INCIDENT TO NATO AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY DECL HAR BE 'i 1 Il This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu