xix THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 4% WASHINGTON D C 20301 JUN 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT False Missile Alert U INTRODUCTION During the last two weeks we have had three false missile warning incidents each of which has been isolated to the same component a dual channel multiplexer within the NORAD computer system The first incident on May 28th lasted only 6_seconds and was immediately recognized as an anomaly No actions were taken The second incident on June 3rd lasted for about 30 minutes This is described in detail below After this incident a modification to the computer program was installed in order to recognize a repeat of this error and to alert the system Unfortunately when a similar error occurred on June 6th the corrective modification did not immediately identify the error As a result SAC did respond to the June 6th incident by alerting air crews and starting engines However as in the June 3rd incident no SAC aircraft were taxied or launched We have now instituted further corrective actions described below These incidents differ from the false alert of November 9 1979 They cannot be traced to improper test procedures but are the result of a failure in the computer hardware or software These incidents therefore weaken further my confidence in the computer system and I consider the situation to be very serious I have instituted a number of actions designed to reinforce immediately the human safeguards which have worked well to review critically the computer system and then to repair the deficiencies I remain confident that our system has sufficient safeguards to prevent irreversible actions being taken as a result of inconclusive data My highest priority is to insure that remains the case But I am also determined to assure that the experience of repeated false alarms does not cause a real alarm to be ignored WHAT May 28 A false BMEWS output of 2020 missiles appeared on the warning display at SAC for 6 seconds At nearly the same time the warning display at the ANMCC showed 9000 missiles for a similarly brief duration Classified by SecDef J rj acpmject Review on 7 June 2000 Extended by SecDef m_ a Reason 5 Wynn meomnwi tg'qgvg ww m1 33 9mm min see SENSETIVE Because of the brevity of the display no alert actions were initiated but NORAD began a technical investigation of the anomaly 3 June A false indication of 2 threat appeared on the warning display at SAC The count quickly jumped to 200 No other command centers displayed any missile warning In less than 2 minutes SAC alerted its crews to move to their aircraft and start engines Note SAC begins these actions even when the data is known to be ambiguous as a precautionary measure to ensure survivability Six minutes after the first false display SAC began displaying 2020 from BMENS Twelve minutes after the appearance of the first false display at SAC the NMCC display began to show 200 The senior duty officer at the NMCC initiated a missile display conference and shortly thereafter 220 ICBMs were displayed indicating all had already impacted The conference was then upgraded to a Threat Assessment Conference and a NORAD assessment was requested Pacific Command initiated a launch of its airborne command post because a Threat Assessment Conference had been convened NORAD issued an assessment that we were not under attack since there were no outputs from the warning sensors radars and satellites to produce such displays These sensor indications are present on the same boards that display the computer outputs the absence of any sensor indications in these incidents has caused the duty officers in each case to be aware from the beginning that the situation was probably a false alarm Thirty-two minutes after the first false display appeared at SAC the Threat Assessment Conference was terminated and one minute later the SAC alert was terminated 6 June A false BMEWS output of 2000 ICBMs appeared on the warning display at SAC This was followed in a few seconds by false displays of 6 missiles at the NMCC and 2020 missiles at the ANMCC SAC again alerted its crews to move to their aircraft and start engines 493 SECR SENSITIVE WHAT 49W SENSITIVE 3 A Missile Display Conference was convened 2 minutes after the first false display appeared at SAC NORAD immediately assessed no confidence in the displays and no further alert actions were initiated The SAC alert was terminated 17 minutes after the first false display appeared at SAC CAUSED WHAT All of the false missile warning displays were caused by a malfunction in a minicomputer at NORAD Such a minicomputer is used with each channel of the NORAD computer system to transform the missile warning data from the NORAD computers into a form suitable for transmission to the NMCC SAC and the ANMCC where it is automatically displayed The information reaches the display at NORAD via another route so no false data ever appeared on the NORAD missile warning display screen When no missile warning data are present the output of the minicomputer for the operational channel of the NORAD computer should be a string of zeroes However in each of the preceding events the minicomputer associated with channel B which was then operating spuriously began intro ducing randdm 2's into the output message The result was a display of false missile warning data at the command centers other than NORAD Although after the June 3rd incident an automatic interrupt was installed in an attempt to prevent transmission of spurious data it did not prevent the June 6th recurrence consequently NORAD is now using its backmup computer system to avoid the use of the minicomputer altogether This is an appropriate temporary expedient but we need to take much more extensive actions than that CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE BEING A team including members of my staff and the OJCS Spent June 5th at SAC and NORAD reviewing the incident The source of the technical problems was verified and the conduct of operations during the incident was reviewed NORAD has been instructed to use a different computer the Mission Essential Backup Computer as their primary computer This computer uses completely different hardware and software from the system which caused the problem All of the command centers will receive the same information in this mode of operation NORAD will have the key displays necessary for its mission however some of the displays that they use to assist them in detailed attack assessment will not be available SENSITIVE M 7 All command centers involved in missile attack warning now have special voice circuits continuously operating over which we quickly identify false displays A special task force has been organized to review in detail the computer and communications systems at NORAD This team consists of national experts in large scale computer systems Their objective will be to identify the problems with the present system and recommend corrections-and improve ments The task force will have its first meeting next Wednesday and Thursday at NORAD The JCS is conducting a review of missile warning Operational procedures and the CINCNORAD is conducting an internal investigation In parallel I will have my staff conduct a comprehensive review of the entire surveillance and warning system to determine if any basic changes are needed in order to fulfill its mission SUMMARY In summary I feel that we have a serious problem with the computer system at NORAD I intend to devote adequate senior staff attention manpower and resources to correction of this problem as soon as possible However in spite of this deficiency I have confidence both that the overall system is designed so that you will get accurate warning information in a timely manner and that there are enough safe guards in the system that the United States would not take any offensive action based on false information The command and control of our strategic forces is an essential part of our nuclear deterrent We must avoid repetition of incidents which weaken our confidence or the Soviets perceptions Therefore while we will be brutally honest internally we must pursue our fixes with a minimum of publicity grams SENSITIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu