UNCLASSIFIED SUPER SENSITIVE 8013629 SET 5 1 7 DEPARTMEW OF STATE RELEASED IN FULL we rig Memorandum of Conversation e o Neweom MS e o Shulman Veet 1 uATa June 16 1980 a 1' 'f i suemm USwSoviet Relations USSR Anetoliy Dobrynin Soviet Ambassador gg Secretary of State Muskie Marshall Shulman Special hdviser to the Secretary Ambassador obrynie had eriginally requeste the meeting before - the Vienna meeting with Gromyko but because of the press of business it had been deferred until today Introductory Exchanges Dobrynin presented the Secretary a plaque from the Diplomatic Corps He presented regards from Gremyko who had found the meeting with the Secretary at Vienna useful necessary and a needed opening of a channel of communications He then asked when the Secretary might be going to New York fer the UNGA and whether another meeting might be sehe uled then The Secretary said that he was not yet definite about his schedule but that the matter could he discussed later Dobrynin sai he would be leaving for vacation in the Soviet Union around July Sew he thought Gromyke would also be taking his vacation thenwwand would be returning around September 5 Afghanistan The Secretary said he had been disappointed with the reply Gremyko had given Watson to his Muskie'e letter The reply had not been responsive perhaye because it had been given off the cuff on fixet reading The Secretary expressed the hope that Geomyko would digeet the letter more thoroughly and might then be in a position t0 give a more detailed response to some of the elements in the letter S MS MDShulman eag Drafting 05ft 055cc 95-1254 6 16 00 SHULMAN Marshall 0 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY THEODORE SELLIN ID 23 DEC 2902 399804489 2'65 UNCLASSIFIED 4 Mi UNCLAS SIFIED The Secretary want on to mention two points in particular which concerned him in the report of Gromyko's reply 1 We i continue to disagree with the Soviet View that the principal aggreasion comes ftom Pakistan It remains our View that the aggraasion is that created by the Soviet invasion In any case we would lika to sea the Soviat aggression brought to an and 2 Gromyko emphasized at his objection to what he apparently understood the latter to suggest that a government should be established in Afghanistan acceptable to the neighbors of that country This waa a misunderstanoing what the letter said was that a government should be set up in Kabul which was acceptable to the peOple of A ghanistan He a ded that this could be done with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan emphasizing that the woro with had boon carafully ohoaen Dobrynin asked how the word with was to be understood and whothar it could be a significant departure from the word prior which he had un arstood to tepresent the Us position -Tha Secretary replied that this could be a matter for discussion In View of the problem of tranalating with which had arisen at the Gromyko Wataon conversation Dobrynio was asked what Russian wor had been mood in the_copy of the letter sent to him by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs He replied nariadu which conveys the proper sense of simultanoity The Secretary emphasized forcefully that so long as Soviet troops continued to occupy Afghanistan it would also be a barrio to the establishment of an indopondont and nonwaligned Afghanistan His letter he said had been worked out carefully with the President in the hope that it would open the way to remove this unfortunate and dangerous problem Dobrynin said ho thought a solution could be found which would meet both Soviet and American security interests Dobrynin said that Gromyko had asked him to obtain any further clarification possible on what the American side had in mind in referring to some transitional arrangement The Secretary replied that he had reference to the point in this regard which the President had made at his press conference on February 13 he did not propose at this stage to aasign too dotailed a meaning to the term but to raise a general point which if accepted could be worked out in tho UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED couree of further negotiations What we were seeking t0 d0 he saia was to fine the outside limits within which negatiations might be possible Debrynin made a further effort in behalf of the Afghan plan Why he asked could not Zia and Babrak sit dawn together to werk things out as a way of getting things started The Secretary reviewed the objections nrevionsly expressed to the plan emphaw sizing that under it Soviet-troops could remain in Afghanistan forever and this was our objection Nuclear Alerts Debrynin asked whether the Secretary had anything tn say in response t0 Gremyko's inquiry te Watson about the two recent nuclear alerts in the US The Secretary explained that while the alerts had resulted frem erroneous signals from a computer these signals could not create a danger of war without the interposition 0f human judgement and that in bath cases the matter was quickly caught and corrected Ratification The Secretary emphasized that the Presi ent was determined net to abandon the ratification of SALT II nor the objectives of arms control although the votes needed for the ratification of SALT II were not presently available given eurrent conditions Dobrynin asked whether this meant that SALT II was not likely to be ratified before next year The Secretary said he thought that was a realistic View Debrynin said that if the ratification came after the spring of 1981 there woul be obvious problems with the timing of the protocol The Secretary emphasized the importance 0f mutual restraint in the interim Dobrynin asked whether this meant restraint in regara to SALTurelated matters or general restraint to which the Secretary replied he had meant in the first instance the farmer Other Subjects Debrynin said he hOped future_negotietions with Gromyke could cover a broader range of eubjects than Afghanistan He asked as - UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED an example whether the US ooul not find a way of working together with the Soviet Union on Middle East problems adding that Soviet and American interesto were not as far apart in that area as some people seemed to think He also suggested on a purely personal basis that a oompromise solution could be found for the TNF issue In this context he repeated his regret that no formal answer had heen given to Brezhnev's proposal other than the decision to proceed with the deployment The Secretary probed to see whether Dobrynin was implying that the Soviet Union' was prepared to postpone its theater deployments but Dobrynin xepeated that this wao his personal View and no more Both agreed howevox that the Afghanistan issue was an unfortunate barrier to the rosolution of_many issues between the two countrieo UNCLASSIFIED This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu