6 76 OmONAL rOCM NO 10 L UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum d a te Honorable McGeorge Bundy Special Assistant to the for National Security'SwHJIlt s30 AM 10 i 2 Mr Sherman Kent Director National Estimates CIA TO FROM subj e c t RECEIVED McGEQRGE CwNu f S 0 Fr f%r I 29 October 19 5 believe the attached Special Memorandum produced in this office will be of interest to you SHEEMAN KENT i COPY LBJ LIBRARY e ff e R Ti T C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y OFFICE OF RATIONAL ESTIMATES 29 October 1965 SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO 25-65 SUBJECT British Guiana Moves Toward Independence SUMMARY On 2 November a constitutional conference in London will once again take up the question of Independence for British Guiana This time an affirmative decision seems likely and British Guiana will probably become Independent before mid-1966 An Independent Guiana will turn Increasingly to the US for eco nomic aid and other support An independent Guiana will still be plagued by racial hos tility Althou x Cheddi Jagan the leader of the People' s Progressive Party PPP has a penchant for Marxist thinking his political strength lies in his racial appeal to his fellow East Indians Eieae will soon constitute a clear majority of the country fs population and they look to the PPP for protec tion against the Negroes Ubless Prime Minister Forbes Burnham is unexpectedly successful in reassuring the East Indians re newed comminal violence is likely Aiirhnciry Wy SANITIZED tfAC- N AR A D a c e J L i _S B 0 SOUP 1 Excluded from automatic B V-- downgrading and declassification 1 It now appears likely that the Independence of British Guiana In mid-1966 will he agreed to at the 2 November Constitutional Congress In London The governing coalition has settled on terms for a draft constitution and the Ufa ted Klngdom T vhen it could leave with a reasonably stable non-camaunist government in control While Britali vill continue to assist in the training and supervision of security forces and the proposed army it has assumed that the Uhlted States would play a larger role in the overall development of the fbrmer colony 2 Hie relative tranquillity of the past year could easily disappear with the stresses and strains of independence The fundamental fact of Guianese political life is the racial animosity between the Negroes who support Prime Minister Forbes Burnham's People's National Congress PNC and the East Indians who constitute Cheddl Jaganfs People's Progressive Party PPP o Guiana has a population of about 9 0 000 some 50 percent East Indian and kk percent Negro and part Negro The East Indiana are Hindu or Moslem they live largely in rural areas except for a shopowner class in Georgetown and work mainly in the rice and sugar fields The Negroes are Christian they live mainly in urban areas and work mainly in sugar factories bauxite mines and the civil service - 2 - -s-a-e $rqs T- Cheddi Jagan remains the champion of the rapidly growing Eadian population primarily for racial reasons rather than for any widespread adherence to his Marxist Ideology Host Bast Indians distrust and fear Burnham and his Negro party and acme are sufficiently fearful to advocate a partition of Guiana after Independence 3 Partly because of Hie Inactivity of the PPP Burnham's government has managed to prevent the violent clashes which occured frequently during Cheddi Jagan's most recent tenure of office 1961-196 o Burnham has nmda some concessions to the s i f t W 1 a d i ' Y 4 East Indians -I i -- -------------- 1 Burnham has been successful In the difficult task of holding together his coalition with the small conservative Utaited Force Party UP which le made up pri marily of wealthy white businessmen plantation owners Amer indians and other minority groups Including a few Negroes and East Eadians The PNC-UF coalition Is held together mainly by mutual apprehension of Jagan's return to power km Burnham has made substantial compromises with his coalition ally In order to obtain agreement on the conditions % for Independence However once Independence is granted and the - 3 - CO PY LBJ LIBRARY need fo r a show o f u n ity is gone basic differences between tbs 5LcWy ' 3 5 This distrust has been manifested in d'Aguiar 8 in sistence that Guiana retain some aspects of a British constitu tional monarchy system similar to Canada as opposed to a republic vhich Burnham has advocated This issue has assumed symbolic overtones far greater than its actual effect on the Guianese political system Burnham has made some concessions The Joint draft now provides that general elections be held not later than three and one-half years after independence until then British Guiana is to be a self-governing dominion with a Guianese governor general Change to a republic coold then be accompli died by an act of the assembly Bie joint draft will come under criticism fran various quarters at the conference but the coalition' s geperal desire to avoid a split that could postpone independence will probably prevail COPY LBJ LIBRARY 6 In the short run the prospects fbr stability in an independent Guiana hinge on B a rn h a a ' a ability to canprcmlse vith the fiscally conservative d'Agular as veil as his ability to appease the suspicious Indian majority Often these two goals are conflicting The Lydians vant developmental projects in their areas and subsidies for their unsold rice crops d'Agular wants a balanced budget and protection fbr his wealthy business men hackers Furthermore d Aguiar realizes how dependent Burnham is on OF votes and is determined to squeeze out every advantage he can While frictions between the participants in the coalition will become more intense after Independence we believe it will hold together at least for a while since both parties realize that the alternative would almost certainly be Jagan9s return to power 7 Jagan and his PPP are in a difficult tactical posi tion After years of pressing for independence Jagan since his election defbat has opposed independence so long as the Burnham government remained In power and the proportional Assembly Seats PPP 3T PNC 22 UF 7 - 5- rep re se n ta tio n system remained i n effect Nevertheless a more radical faction within the PPP is mnfvring fop lnaadiate Independence in Hie belief that once the British had left it could get control of the government one way or another Noses Ehagwan an East Itadlan extremist leader recently expelled from the PPP has formed his own Committee for National Reconstruction'9 and has indicated that he would be willing to go to London 8 Although Jagan has stated that he would boycott the conference unless Burnham capitulated to his demands he probably will attend after all Da the past he has taken similar firm stands only to back down later His current outburst is probably an attempt to squeeze concessions out of Burnham or merely to harass him on the eve of the conference Seme Indian groups within the PPP are anxious that their party be represented in Proportional representation was Introduced by the British in 1963 for the purpose of denying the PPP an absolute ma jority in the 196b general election Jagan has naturally opposed this and has also campaigned for the lowering of the voting age from 21 to Id Provisions retaining the proportional representation system and the present voting age have been written into the draft Jagan will continue to campaign against these provisions but has recently been concentrating on pressing Burnham to lift the current state of emergency and to release prominent PPP leaders held In detention - 6 - w e n E -rc- London and have been urging Jagan to attend The conference could serve as an excellent sounding board for Jagan to rally hla somewhat'demoralized party However if he stayed away Jagan would risk weakening his party and give Burnham the opportunity to upstage him by taking along some members of tbs PPP who are willing to participate 9 The British Colonial Office is optimistic over the prospects for a successful conference and is stepping up its efforts to train indigenous security forces It feels that the UF and the PRC will agree on a viable constitution and that Cheddi Jagan will have so choice but to attend 5 i 1 ' believe that it is largely Justified and that independence will be granted A by-product of granting early independence would be to give the UK and British Guiana some psychological advan tage in scheduled taika with Venezuela over the long standing border dispute which involves some two-thirds of Guianese territory ' - 7 - COPY LBJ LIBRARY S B Longer Range Prospects 10 While Burnham can never secure the full confidence of the East Indians he oust at least gain a measure of accep tance from them if he is to stay in power far long If he does not gain some acceptance racial hostilities are sure to flare up again Ititer-racial hostility would probably take Hie form of sporadic but serious violence rather than civil war ar sus tained insurgency bulk 3 a c ' - u of the East Indians have shown little inclination for organized violence and Jagan has always been more Ideologist than in surrectionist o Nevertheless even sporadic violence could re sult in Burnham' s having to for help from the UK or US in order to keep the peace There ml git be a flight of better educated and wealthy Guianese which would lead to a deteriora tion of economic conditions which have been steadily improving since the Inauguration of the coalition 11 Ultimately not even the artificial barrier of pro portional representation can prevent the Indians from becoming the predominant political force Their population is increasing COPY LBJ LIBRARY at a more rapid rate than the Negro population Almost all the East Indians remain thorougily tied to the EPP and in spite of a few dissident groups accept Jagan as their leader Were the U -P3C coalition to fall apart Jagan vould be 5 a V ' 12 Burnham's best hope to win the acceptance of the East Indians is to back more developmental projects in their areas - 9 - COPY LBJ LIBRARY COPY LBJ LIBRARY c and to facilitate their integration into the civil service especially into the police and the proposed defense force now the almost exclusive bailiwick of the Negro These develop ment projects vould require greater amounts of foreign aid and for it he vill Increasingly turn to the US as the main source He vill also look to the UK and possibly Canada for setae assis tance In addition to these problems Burnham must face the constant threat of renewed violence and cope with his strong willed coalition partner To handle all of these conflicting problems at the same time _ and the coalition more ooheslon than it 1 5 c 3 1 5 d 3 presently enjoys FOR THE BOARD 07 NATIONAL ESTIMATES SHERMAN KENT Chairman v# - 10 a a m m m p - COPY LBJ LIBRARY COPY LBJ LIBRARY 1 LBJL NSF Country File Latin America Box 55 Folder British Guiana Vol II 2 of This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu