“China’s Digital Authoritarianism Surveillance Influence   and Political Control”  May 16 2019    Hearing Before the   House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence    Prepared statement by   Peter Mattis  Research Fellow China Studies  Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation        I OVERVIEW    Chairman Schiff Ranking member Nunes distinguished members of the Committee thank you for  inviting me to appear before you The Chinese Communist Party’s influence and particularly its  political interference in the United States is an important topic as we establish a new baseline for  U S -China relations Any sustainable long-term strategy for addressing China’s challenge requires  the integrity of U S political and policymaking processes This requires grappling with the challenges  posed by the party’s efforts to shape the United States by interfering in our politics and domestic  affairs      The United States its political and business elite its thinkers and its Chinese communities have long  been targets for the Chinese Communist Party The party employs tools that go well beyond  traditional public diplomacy efforts Often these tools lead to activities that are in the words of  former Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull corrupt covert and or coercive Nevertheless   many activities are not covered by Turnbull’s three “Cs” but are still concerning and undermine the  ability of the United States to comprehend and address Beijing’s challenge     Here are a few of the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party has shaped the ways in which  Americans discuss understand and respond to the People’s Republic of China its rise and its  activities   ● We have been persuaded that the Chinese Communist Party is not ideological and has  substituted its Leninist tradition for a variation of capitalism    ● We have not responded to violence coercion and intimidation committed or instigated by  PRC officials on U S soil These are allegedly criminal acts committed by a foreign  government against our people on our soil and U S authorities did not open criminal  investigations   ● We have not responded to PRC education officials intimidating Chinese students on  university campuses despite this activity not being consistent with their diplomatic status   ● We have changed our laws at the state level to facilitate the Confucius Institute program to  help the party build beachheads inside universities   ● We often debate our policy options toward China in binary terms engagement vs  containment trade war or negotiation accommodation or war etc      Most of my statement will focus on the policies and actions of the Chinese Communist Party for  two reasons First as Americans we are still not prepared to accept the party has sought to shape  and influence U S political and business elite for decades We are still in a process of building  awareness and consensus about the nature of the problem Second it is not my place to name names  of American individuals and institutions before Congress The U S Government has the resources  and authority to investigate and analyze the party’s challenge     The central element to understanding what the Chinese Communist Party is doing and why to shape  the world outside the party is united front work Mao Zedong described the purpose of this work as  mobilizing the party’s friends to strike at the party’s enemies In a more specific definition from a  paper in the 1950s the Central Intelligence Agency defined united front work as “a technique for  controlling mobilizing and utilizing non-communist masses ” Put another way united front policy  addresses the party’s relationship with and guidance of any social group outside the party The most  important point here is that what needs to be shaped is not just the Chinese people or world outside  the People’s Republic of China but rather those outside the party      United front work also is a tool of political struggle It is not just a question of activities that we  would call propaganda or public diplomacy Nor is it limited to what we would call covert action As  Mao wrote in 1939 “Our eighteen years of experience show that the united front and armed  struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy The united front is a united front for  carrying on armed struggle And the Party is the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons the united  front and the armed struggle to storm and shatter the enemy's positions That is how the three are  related to each other ” Mao’s basic framing of united front work within the party’s toolbox remains  the core understanding within the party today Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping all have  characterized united front work as a “magic weapon” to facilitate China’s rise in the midst of an  international ideological battleground     United front activities help the party resolve several dilemmas of the post-Mao era and that became  ever more apparent after the Tiananmen Massacre and the passing of Deng Xiaoping These are  fundamental questions for the Chinese Communist Party and they speak to why the party must  spend so much effort trying to shape the world beyond the membership of the party    1 How to motivate and mobilize the Chinese population without the ideological fervor of the  Mao Zedong era   2 How to benefit from the outside world while screening out influences and ideas that might  damage the party’s positions   3 How to enlist the outside world in supporting China’s rise and keeping those doors open  even as the party continues to be repressive       II MAGIC WEAPON FOR NATIONAL REJUVENATION    Achieving the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” 中华民族伟大复兴 has two  significant components The first is making China a great power with global reach The second is  doing so with the Chinese Communist Party at the helm      The party defines the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” as having three components The  first is building “a great modern socialist country that is prosperous strong democratic culturally  advanced harmonious and beautiful ” Although many of these words are self-explanatory others  like democratic culturally advanced and harmonious mean something very different in the party’s  context than in the American context “Democratic” is consultative democracy in which the party  leads and other political inputs are provided through controlled mechanisms like the united front  policy system “Culturally advanced” and “harmonious” define the party’s relationship with society  and the ways in which Chinese people conduct themselves The second is national reunification of  all areas claimed by Beijing regardless whether they were traditionally by China The third is China’s  emergence as a global leader in terms of comprehensive national power and international influence     The following quote from Xi Jinping in 2016 explains what united front work is intended to  accomplish in bringing together a unity of effort When U S intelligence officials describe Beijing as  presenting a “whole-of-society” challenge they are describing an important element of what the  united front policy system is doing   “Attaining the ‘Two Centenary Goals’ requires that our entire society works together  in one heart and one mind It requires that people of all ethnic groups focus their  thoughts and their efforts towards the same goal A society that lacks common  ideals goals and values and that finds itself in permanent disorder will never achieve  anything China has a population of more than 1 3 billion people and neither the  people nor the country would benefit if we ended up like that To attain our goals…  we must rally all Chinese people under the leadership of the Chinese Communist  Party and motivating all parties to engage in a concerted effort to bring about the  rejuvenation of the Chinese nation ”    The United Front Work Department the executive agency for conducting and coordinating these  operations provided a similar description of its purpose and activities   “The history of China and foreign countries shows that whether a political power or  a political party is good or not its success or failure ultimately depends on the back  of the people Paying attention to the people's sentiments obeying the public's will   striving for the people's hearts maintaining proper flesh-and-blood ties with the  masses and winning the sincere support of the masses is a solid foundation for our  country's long-term stability and a fundamental guarantee for the sure victory of our  cause ”    The second important component of the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” is  maintaining the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party The most important threats to party  that must be addressed are the diaspora communities and potentially threatening great powers The  former have the cultural knowledge to introduce subversive ideas that resonate The latter have the  material power to undermine or topple the party-state     The desire to control the political landscape and protect the party’s position found clear definition in  China’s National Security Law 2015 The law describes security in broad terms that go well beyond  physical threats to the territory of the PRC Security comes from the inside out Articles Two and  Three of the law state “National security refers to the relative absence of international or domestic  threats to the state’s power to govern sovereignty unity and territorial integrity the welfare of the  people sustainable economic and social development and other major national interests and the  ability to ensure a continued state of security National security efforts shall adhere to a  comprehensive understanding of national security make the security of the People their goal   political security their basis and economic security their foundation make military cultural and social  security their safeguard…”    This definition has two notable features First security is defined by the absence of threats not by  the ability to manage them This unlimited view pushes the Chinese Communist Party toward  preempting threats and preventing their emergence Second security issues extend to the domain of  ideas—what people think is potentially dangerous The combination of these themes — preemption  in the world of ideas — creates an imperative for the party to alter the world in which it  operates—to shape how China and its current party-state are understood in the minds of foreign  elites     One way of making this more concrete is to look at party documents about security threats In April  2013 “Document No 9” — “Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere” —  identified ideas that undermine the party-state’s security Among them were the promotion of  constitutional democracy civil society and Western concepts of journalism In the circular’s final  paragraph it stated the party should “allow absolutely no opportunity or outlets for incorrect  thinking or viewpoints to spread ” Although it would be easy to dismiss this document as a one-off  or unenforced in 2015 Beijing abducted and held five Hong Kong booksellers including foreign  passport holders who sold books ostensibly banned in China Moreover Beijing issued new  regulations on counter-espionage last December that clarified the Counter-espionage Law 2014   and defined activities threatening national security apart from espionage Among these was  “fabricating or distorting facts publishing or disseminating words or information that endanger state  security ” Influencing the outside world therefore is not just a historical activity of the party but an  ongoing requirement for national security as defined by the party-state       III INTRINSIC TO THE PARTY’S DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS1    The Chinese Communist Party’s management of political influence operations — evaluated on the  basis of the united front policy system — runs to the very top of party involving senior leaders  directly The policy systems extends through the party’s hierarchy and spills over into the  government ministries of the People’s Republic of China as well as other state-owned and  -administered organizations Put simply united front work is conducted wherever the party is  present Moreover united front work is not an “influence operation” or a campaign It is the  day-to-day work of the party There are not special orders explaining what to do to achieve what  objectives or the equivalents of a presidential finding      At the leadership level four elements point to the importance of united front work and shaping the  world outside the Chinese Communist Party      1 A Politburo Standing Committee Member Oversees United Front Work​ The senior-most  united front official is the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CPPCC   chairman who is the fourth-ranking PBSC member A look at the leaders who have held the  CPPCC chairmanship suggests that Western observers have been far too quick to condemn  the CPPCC as a mostly-useless advisory body The list is a who’s who of the party including  1 Much of this section draws from a forthcoming report for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute co-authored with  Alex Joske as well as “An American Lens on China’s Interference and Influence-Building Abroad ” ​Asan Forum ​ April  30 2018 ​http www theasanforum org an-american-lens-on-chinas-interference-and-influence-building-abroad​ and  ““Russian and Chinese Political Interference Activities and Influence Operations ” in Richard J Ellings and Robert  Sutter eds ​Axis of Authoritarians Implications of China-Russia Cooperation​ Seattle WA The National Bureau of Asian  Research 2018   Mao Zedong Zhou Enlai Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian The current CPPCC chairman   Wang Yang continues a tradition of competent leadership at the top of the united front  system He exemplifies the need of united front personnel to be highly-disciplined party  cadre who are nonetheless capable of handling themselves among diverse people and  feigning ideological flexibility     2 A State Council Vice Premier Has a United Front Portfolio​ The vice premier position  serves as the bridge between the party center and the State Council ministries The vice  premier provides prestige to the united front system as well as a necessary position of  authority to direct and coordinate the ministries’ united front activities The position often  looks as though the portfolio covers education and culture because of the overlap with  united front work At meetings of the united front policy system this vice premier appears  in protocol order between the CPPCC chairman and United Front Work Department  director Currently the position is held by Sun Chunlan     3 Two Members of the Central Secretariat Have United Front Policy Roles​ The directors of  the party’s United Front Work Department UFWD and Propaganda Department serve on  both the Politburo and the Secretariat of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist  Party of China Because the Politburo does not meet regularly—its far-flung membership  includes both central party bureaucrats and provincial party secretaries—the secretariat is  empowered to make day-to-day decisions related to policy that has already been settled This  group is also responsible for moving paperwork among the central leaders and coordinating  the party’s actions Secretariat membership is not related to relationships that the current  UFWD and propaganda chiefs—respectively You Quan and Huang Kunming—have but  rather reflects the structure of post–Deng Xiaoping politics Their presence on the  Secretariat is more institutional than political     4 In 2015 Xi Jinping Established a United Front Leading Small Group​ As part of the effort  revitalize and better coordinate united front activities under Xi Jinping the party established  a leading small group It functions as platform to coordinate and raise the status of united  front work across the bureaucracy bringing together senior officials from numerous state  and party agencies for united front study tours across China Interestingly the last time the  party created a united front leading small group — in 1986 under the leadership of Xi  Jinping’s father Xi Zhongxun — it coincided with a similar description of problems to be  resolved expanding scope and responsibilities coinciding with a lack of central direction     The Chinese Communist Party bureaucracy at the central level has four key bodies for building and  exercising political influence outside the party — and especially outside China The United Front  Work and the Propaganda departments also have subordinate elements at the provincial and local  levels      1 United Front Work Department​ The UFWD is the executive and coordinating agency for  united front work It has a variety of responsibilities at home and abroad including in the  following areas Hong Kong Macao and Taiwan affairs ethnic and religious affairs   domestic and external propaganda entrepreneurs and non-party personages intellectuals   and people-to-people exchanges 17 The department also takes the lead in establishing party  committees in Chinese and now foreign businesses The UFWD operates at all levels of the  party system from the center to the grassroots and the CCP has had a united front  department dating to the 1930s     2 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CPPCC ​ The CPPCC according to the  organization’s website is “an organization in the patriotic united front of the Chinese  people an important organ for multiparty cooperation and political consultation ” The  advisory body mediates between important socials groups and the party apparatus The  CPPCC is the place where all the relevant united front actors inside and outside the party  come together party elders intelligence officers diplomats propagandists military officers  and political commissars united front workers academics and businesspeople They are  gathered to receive instruction in the proper propaganda lines and ways to characterize  Beijing’s policies to both domestic and foreign audiences Many of these individuals   particularly if they hold government positions are known for their people-handling skills and  have reputations for being smooth operators CPPCC membership offers access to political  circles political protection for business and minor perquisites like expedited immigration   The CPPCC standing committee includes twenty or so vice chairpeople who have a protocol  rank roughly equivalent to a provincial party secretary At the central level the CPPCC  includes more than 2 200 members but the provincial and local levels include another  615 000     3 International Liaison Department​ The International Department founded in 1951 is the  party’s diplomatic arm handling relationships with more than 600 political parties and  organizations as well as individual primarily political elites The department previously  handled the CCP’s relationships between fraternal Communist parties and cultivated splinter  factions of Moscow-dominated Communist parties after the Sino-Soviet split The activist  bent of the International Department disappeared as the department began re-establishing  itself in 1970–71 following the tumultuous early years of the Cultural Revolution   Interestingly the department originated as a UFWD bureau before being carved out into an  independent entity     4 Propaganda Department​ The Propaganda Department has been a core part of the CCP  since 1924 The official description of its duties includes conducting the party’s theoretical  research guiding public opinion guiding and coordinating the work of the central news  agencies including Xinhua and the People’s Daily guiding the propaganda and cultural  systems and administering the Cyberspace Administration of China and the State  Administration of Press Publication Radio Film and Television The Propaganda  Department cannot be regarded as an entirely internal organization that broadcasts outward  to the extent that it is involved in influence-building abroad For example China Radio  International developed in the 2000s a covert international network of radio stations to hide  the CCP’s direct role in broadcasting Chinese-language propaganda inside target countries   The Propaganda Department presumably also plays a role in the cooptation intimidation   and purchase of Chinese-language print media outside China     The State Council ministries and many other organizations with a party committee also conduct  united front work These organizations all offer unique platforms and capabilities that the united  front policy system can draw upon for operational purposes Below are a few of the examples of the  organizations outside the party that perform united front work or have united front work  departments attached to their party committee     1 Ministry of State Security  2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs  3 Ministry of Civil Affairs  4 Ministry of Education  5 Ministry of Culture and Tourism  6 Chinese Academy of Sciences  7 China Baowu Steel Group  8 China National Overseas Oil Corporation CNOOC   9 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission SASAC     The People’s Liberation Army PLA deserves special mention because it operates both inside and  in concert with these other influence-building actors as well as outside this system During the  Chinese Revolution the PLA served almost as the party’s expeditionary arm It duplicated all of the  party’s functions within a military organization The PLA was and remains the armed wing of the  Chinese Communist Party and not China’s national army As the party’s armed wing and as the  ultimate guarantor of the party’s power the PLA still mirrors the party structure from leadership to  leading agencies to tactical execution      1 Central Military Commission​ Headed by Xi Jinping the Central Military Commission serves  as the nexus between the party and military leadership Historically the two military vice  chairmen included an officer who risen through the PLA’s political work system however   since 2012 two experienced operations officers have held the vice chairmenships The CMC  also includes the minister of national defense and the director of the Political Work  Department The former like the vice premier for united front work serves as the link  between the PLA and the State Council The latter oversees the bureaucracy responsible for  military propaganda and political influence operations      2 Political Work Department​ This department is the successor to the General Political  Department which was dissolved in the reorganization of the PLA launched in November  2015 The department’s Liaison Bureau is the military agency that contributes most to the  party’s united front work It operates much like an intelligence service with officers using  official and non-official cover but focused on strategic targets relevant to military  operations Two of the Liaison Bureau’s most notable targets have been Taiwan and  Okinawa      3 Strategic Support Force​ The creation of the Strategic Support Force as part of the 2015  reforms integrated the PLA’s signals and electronic intelligence capabilities with its tactical  information warfare elements        IV VECTORS AND MECHANISMS    The Chinese Communist Party’s political influence operations come through five primary vectors   community organizations wealthy proxies Confucius Institutes exchanges and consulting  agreements None of these avenues for influence are bad by themselves Often only a few  individuals camouflaged by the myriad China engagements are working on behalf of the united front  system but they might be difficult to point out without implicating individuals who are guilty if  anything of nothing more than naivete      1 Overseas Chinese Community Organizations​ The Chinese communities outside the PRC  contain an alphabet soup of ethnic community organizations including chambers of  commerce hometown associations friendship societies and cultural promotion centers   These organizations exist for all the same reasons that ethnic community organizations come  together They provide useful community resources and services even as ones tainted by the  united front system bring the party’s influence along with them In most of the problematic  organizations the membership probably is unaware of the connections The leadership  sitting atop co-opted organizations become the community leaders through which politicians  engage their local Chinese communities They also can be quoted in media as being  community leaders even in cases where the organization exists in little more than name     There are several indicators for whether a community organization — or rather its leadership  — is working on the party’s behalf None of these indicators by themselves is sufficient but   taken together they are strongly suggestive The first is whether the organization’s officers  participate in united front delegations and conferences back to China Sometimes these  officers have special advisory roles with united front work units The second is contact with  the local PRC embassy or consulate and whether these officials participate in the  organization’s events The third includes changes such as a shift from using traditional  characters to simplified characters or visible changes to the amount of money used to put on  events      2 Wealthy Proxies​ Wealthy businesspeople working on the party’s behalf are one of the most  important vectors for the party’s influence abroad Although many of these individuals are  PRC citizens or emigres some businesspeople from other states are influenced coopted or  fully recruited to the party’s cause Their primary value is the ability to move money quickly  outside of China and in democratic societies the ability to spend that money legitimately  without generating the alarm that comes with more direct state activity Where the united  front system is active two or more businesspeople will provide a significant chunk of the  financial support for large united front-linked community organizations as well as other  relevant political or social causes For example in Australia Chau Chak Wing and Huang  Xiangmo appear to have been the most active financial supporters of Beijing’s efforts to  interfere in Australian politics Their money bought access to the major political parties   platforms for pro-China voices and supported community groups like the Australian  Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification      The easiest group of these proxies to identify come from Hong Kong Their wealth has been  built with the party’s assistance Although their families may have built successful businesses  in one or two industries a hallmark of these businesses is sprawl across numerous unrelated  industries These businesspeople often can be identified because they are members of the  Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the National People’s Congress  system Their Hong Kong residency gives them legitimacy and credibility that their  counterparts in China do not have For example former Hong Kong chief executive Tung  Chee-hwa has been able to reinvent himself as a philanthropist to donate money to U S   think tanks academic programs and sponsor trips for journalists students and politicians to  China Tung however became Beijing’s man in Hong Kong after the party bailed his  company out of bankruptcy in the mid 1980s and he began representing the party’s interests  to the British Tung now serves as a vice chairman of the CPPCC which gives him standing  within the party at roughly the level of a provincial party secretary     3 Confucius Institutes​ The Confucius Institute program — ostensibly under the Ministry of  Education and Hanban — creates a beachhead in university administration through which  the party’s influence can expand Although a Confucius Institute appears focused on  language training and cultural programming they sometimes provide opportunities for staff  to move into influential positions Confucius Institute directors can be found on faculty  committees and advising engagement offices on how to handle China In some cases the  institutes have given Beijing a voice in a university’s hiring decisions for China-related faculty  and affected the kind of speakers invited to the university Australia’s John Fitzgerald an  astute observer of the party’s influence operations wrote that accepting a Confucius  Institute signaled a university was “prepared to make an exception for China on questions of  academic freedom teaching curriculums and research integrity ”2 Not every Confucius  Institute has proven to be problematic but it has depended on whether the university avoids  exceptions and ensures the institute operates within the agreement     4 People-to-People Exchanges Diplomacy​ The united front policy system sponsors and  arranges hundreds of trips to China each year These trips are used in a myriad different  ways to earn good will and to influence analysts and politicians They offer opportunities for  the party to persuade them of China’s rectitude or to refute critical arguments Even if the  latter does not persuade the critic their fellow participants may be persuaded or inclined to  see the critic as needlessly provocative The trips also give party officials evaluate potential  targets personally Not only is there personal interaction but there often is substantive  discussion of ideas and policy positions      5 Consulting Agreements​ Hiring senior officials after they retire has become common  practice Beijing may have pioneered the process decades ago pressing companies that  wanted to do business in China to hire their favored former officials to close business  agreements Perhaps the most noteworthy recent example is former Australian trade minister  Andrew Robb’s $880 000 AUS salary for minimal work on behalf of the Chinese firm  Landbridge Robb resigned from this position ahead of the deadline to register under  Australia’s new transparency scheme for former officials In some cases former officials  work for Chinese or Hong Kong businesspeople through their personal consulting  companies obfuscating the sources of their income     The relationships formed through from these vectors serve to open doors into institutions and  networks for exploitation Most often there is a sequence of the relationship that goes through  periods of development testing and exploitation    John Fitzgerald “Unis Could Bide Their Time and Escape the Long Arm of Beijing ” ​The Australian​ March 2 2018   https www theaustralian com au nation inquirer unis-could-bide-their-time-and-escape-the-long-arm-of-beijing new s-story 202b5b9462af59a9f38f57aaee13b7b8​   2   1 Developing the Relationship​ From my experience and research I think there are two  beginnings to problematic relationships with the Chinese Communist Party’s united front  system The first is party-sponsored trips to China Whether the sponsorship comes from  different united front platforms or more overtly through the International Department   these delegations provide several useful services for the party Most obviously a relationship  can be established between the visitor and the party The party also gets the opportunity to  assess the visitors their views and depending on the visitors’ security awareness their  personal and professional networks The second is someone deliberately directed to seek the  position This indicates the willingness to exploit an opportunity as much as any kind of  long-term planning      A key element of developing relationships is the massive collection of data on individuals  who play influential roles or who might prove useful to the party This line of effort —  historically called “social affairs work” — draws upon the human and technical collection  capabilities of the party-state Delegations and exchanges provide opportunities to learn  more about individuals exploit their electronics and ask about who is important Retired  officials are interviewed Now computer network operations are launched at databases for  employment healthcare and travel records as well as government personnel files This data  is fed into large databases that track personal and family networks receptivity to China and  their public and online presence     2 Formal Agreement and Testing​ The formal agreement sets a baseline for what will come   Poorly negotiated agreements — such as some of the original Confucius Institute  agreements that contained secret clauses or required the university to defend publicly the  reputation of the institute — invite abuse Even well-structured agreements are meaningful  only if they are enforced and the institution stands up for itself Once a foothold has been  established the parameters of the relationship will be tested to see how an institution  responds As Vladimir Lenin reportedly observed “Probe with bayonets If you encounter  mush proceed if you encounter steel withdraw ” In the case of Confucius Institutes this  probing has involved testing the institute’s voice in university affairs holding external events  under the university’s name and using institute funds to affect hiring decisions for China  studies faculty elsewhere in the university     3 Compromise and Exploitation​ Compromise takes severals forms depending on how  attentive the institution is to the agreement and the relationship One of the most common  ways relates to the individuals running China-related programs In some cases they are  recruited directly by the party In others they are former PRC government officials or  already connected to the party’s united front system In still others the individuals’  incentives are shaped by the home institution to push simply for more engagement and to  ignore potential problems with their partners in China From there access and opportunity  are manipulated to ensure the standing of the individual and their ability to have a public or  institutional voice to further the party’s objectives The difficulty in identifying especially  from open sources how this compromise comes about is that the party is most often is  opening a door for someone to succeed Without specific evidence of how the opportunity  that made someone successful arrived who is to gainsay how that success was achieved       V WHAT IS THE HARM     The harm caused by Beijing’s political influence and united front operations takes several forms   even if we accept many of these activities as being legitimate actions of a foreign state inside the  United States or other countries     1 Western Politicians Become Symbols for the Chinese Communist Party’s Rule​ By using  party-controlled community organizations for their outreach to ethnically-Chinese  constituents Western politicians become propaganda fodder for the Chinese Communist  Party Politically-aware Chinese in the People’s Republic of China and sometimes abroad   can recognize these groups for what they are pawns of the party The reason for the  publicity surrounding these meetings and fundraisers is to broadcast back into China the  message that Western politicians care about liberalism at home but not for Chinese people   and that they stand on the side of the party They reinforce the image of the party’s strength     Vaclav Havel captured this dynamic in his essay ​The Power of the Powerless​ by describing a  greengrocer placing a slogan of regime loyalty in his shop window He does not believe in  the regime or its ideology but he does so to make his life a little bit easier Nor do people  necessarily notice or read the slogan because similar slogans can be “found in other shop  windows on lampposts bulletin boards in apartment windows and on buildings ” The  presence of these slogans becomes part of the “panorama of everyday life ” This panorama  “reminds people where they are living and what is expected of them It tells them what  everyone else is doing and indicates to them what they must do as well if they don't want to  be excluded to fall into isolation alienate themselves from society break the rules of the  game and risk the loss of their peace and tranquility and security ” By participating even  inadvertently in united front-sponsored events U S politicians and their foreign  counterparts help the Chinese Communist Party build Havel’s “panorama of everyday life”  for the Chinese people and their own ethnic Chinese citizens     2 The Chinese Communist Party Mediates Between Chinese Citizens and Their Elected  Representatives​ The network of united front “community organizations” creates a fake civil  society The community which is supposedly represented is supplanted by the Chinese  Communist Party unless politicians reach directly to membership or deal with  uncompromised organizations The party’s interests become the constituency interests that  are presented to officials     3 The Marketplace for Ideas is Distorted​ Having a pluralistic democratic society means  engaging with differences of opinion There is a natural ebb and flow As noted above the  defining feature of the party’s united front operations is the effort to control platforms  rather than just the narrative As platforms are compromised the voices and messages they  carry change They may not specifically represent the Chinese Communist Party but they  will avoid criticisms or subjects that are intrinsically damaging to the party’s image standing   and legitimacy     4 The Party Suppresses Discussion of China’s Future​ The Chinese Communist Party’s control  inside China means that any version of China’s future without the party must be discussed  and decided beyond China’s borders The extent to which the party monopolizes the social  space of Chinese people — especially those who would like to return to their home country  — is the extent to which the party can preempt the transmission of liberal political values  into China and discussion of China without reference to the party      5 Undermining the Integrity of Policymaking​ At its worst the party’s political influence and  united front operations distort policymaking and the process of gathering information to  feed into the policy process The primary targets of united front work are socially influential  individuals such as politicians prominent businesspeople intellectuals and sometimes even  celebrities      There is some reason to suspect that the united front system plays a role in feeding foreign  intelligence services information In conversations with former U S intelligence officials and  serving foreign ones they described questionable sources over the years whose information  seemed to good to be true The sourcing for their political reporting appeared sufficiently  plausible and good to encourage officers to avoid placing too much scrutiny on the policy  implications of the reporting or how it seemed to slant the party’s politics and positions      6 Facilitating Intelligence Operations and Technology Transfer​ The united front network of  organizations and relationships in overseas Chinese communities has been used to facilitate  the theft and transfer of technology from the U S companies and research institutions For  example as Alex Joske of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute explained at recent  conferences in Canberra and Melbourne last month Tesla’s problem with Chinese theft of  its intellectual property was entirely predictable Those involved were nested within and had  even established UFWD-linked organizations related to talent recruitment and technology  transfer Current and former intelligence officials inside and outside the United States believe  the Chinese intelligence services make use of the spotting and assessing opportunities  created by united front system-sponsored visits to China for education culture and  business        VI THE U S PROBLEM WITH UNITED FRONT WORK    The United States has long been a target for the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to build political  influence The risks in the United States largely stem from our dismissive attitudes about the dangers  we face and the seriousness with which the party has sought to influence U S opinions especially at  elite levels      The United States is often juxtaposed against Australia and New Zealand U S analysts are  dismissive that the kinds of problems that happened in those countries could happen in the United  States One of my former colleagues at the Central Intelligence Agency dismissed united front work  as a largely tangential issue in an interview The way in which this analyst described the problem —  or rather its absence — is symptomatic of a larger malaise within the communities with  responsibility and competence to evaluate Beijing’s attempts to build political influence and interfere  in other countries’ politics      “You know when I was working in the government we didn’t care that much about  the activities of the United Front Work Department and I think there’s still a reason  why we really shouldn’t care that much about their activities You know this is not  Australia … So the United Front Work Department is of course the group under the  Communist Party whose job it is basically to work on overseas Chinese and get them  to support the government basically In short that’s what they do And you know   look there was some serious things going on in Australia You know they were  doing this But I think it’s important for us to remember that the Chinese population  in Australia is a much larger portion of a much smaller total population There were  some interesting challenges in Australian campaign finance laws that allowed  foreigners to contribute directly to you know these elections and so on but we  don’t have these things in the United States And from my observations I do not see   for example the Chinese diplomatic presence here or even some of their you know   think tanks and so on doing anything like what they were doing down there Maybe  not yet and maybe that’s what the concern is but I find it over- overwrought ”    I want to take apart some of the problems in that statement because they highlight the mix of  arrogance and ignorance typical of American attitudes about the party’s potential to have a real  impact in the United States First it inaccurately characterizes united front work as getting overseas  Chinese to support the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Republic of China Overseas  Chinese are a focus of the party for the reasons identified above however they are not the sole  focus and they never have been For example when Beijing began planning how to handle Japan  diplomatically in the 1950s two of the party’s most senior and experienced influencers were given  the responsibility Zhou Enlai and UFWD deputy director Liao Chengzhi They made the decision  to cultivate Japanese businesspeople by helping them succeed in China even as Tokyo was frozen  out diplomatically The businesspeople would then form a natural constituency to push Japanese  leaders toward Beijing giving the latter the leverage to hold out for more generosity from Tokyo     Second the statement treats our ethnic Chinese citizens and residents as undeserving of their full  freedoms because they are not a significant enough part of the U S population They deserve to  have their rights protected and crimes against them investigated regardless of race or creed      Third the United States does have stronger campaign finance laws than Australia previously had a  problem they rectified last year but that has not meant immunity from the problem of the Chinese  Communist party trying to directly influence U S politics We might recall the Clinton campaign  finance scandal involving China in 1996 which may not have had a substantial impact on U S policy  given that the Democratic National Committee was able to return the Beijing-linked donations  without financial difficulty The legal protections and the publicity of the campaign finance scandal  forced the party’s efforts underground and to work through American proxies who could legally  donate to political campaigns      Fourth even well-informed people are mostly unaware of the scale of the Chinese Communist  Party’s operations inside the United States Below are just a few facts about what is taking place in  the United States that I consider to be relatively solid and reflect what is actually happening or  happened rather than analysis     1 The Chinese Communist Party pressures Chinese students — either directly or through their  families — to conform to the codes of speech and behavior acceptable inside China     2 In the space of a few hours my research assistant and I identified more than 250  organizations in the United States with individuals who actively and probably wittingly work  to support the party’s united front activities      3 The party’s united front system has sponsored dozens of visits by hundreds of local and  state government officials journalists and students to China Such visits are used to  influence and evaluate the participants for their future usefulness      4 Beijing pressured and incentivized MSCI to expand the share of Chinese stocks on its  emerging markets index The move will likely move more than $1 trillion into China      5 U S thinks tanks and civil society groups have conducted surveys of American attitudes  toward China and U S -China relations on behalf of the influence bureaucracies outlined  above Major Chinese multinational companies have discussed with U S lobbying and  consulting firms projects to map U S policymaking on China beyond the scope of their  business and investments in the United States     The United States also has a limited capability to respond to the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts  to build political influence We have built-in resilience because we are large country with diverse  centers of political economic cultural and intellectual power The natural churn of democratic  politics also bolsters the natural resilience of the United States However the limited capability to  generate and sustain a public conversation     1 Civil Society Capacity​ The United States as it stands today is woefully short of journalists  and researchers who can bring these issues into the public light The United States is more  than ten times more populous than Australia yet we have less than half the number of  journalists who have reported the issue The same is true of Canada relative to the United  States Most U S reporting has been done by a columnist a freelancer and a journalist who  is currently unemployed I am hopeful that this will change as experienced China  correspondents return home and report China-related stories from inside the United States      The Chinese-language media landscape in the United States also has succumbed almost  entirely to the party’s efforts to co-opt and control media outlets Wealthy proxies or  party-controlled front organizations sometimes directly purchase the outlets In other cases   Beijing organizes advertising boycotts to drive the media outlet out of business or into  compliance with the party’s wishes The only independent outlets seem to be run by the  Falungong and they have not been able to maintain a consistent quality of journalism to  make them credible sources of information      Academic research provides a disappointing picture The research skills and language  capability is present but the knowledge and output is not The last book published by an  American scholar on united front work was by a Stanford professor in 1967 The united  front system also has not featured in most of the general textbooks on Chinese  policymaking even in areas such as the party’s relationship with business where the  system’s importance is clear A growing cadre of researchers also is emerging but they are  too junior at the moment to carry the weight of public discussion They also have had to pay  the burden of building this expertise on their own      2 Government Capacity​ As a former government analyst I wish I could say with full  confidence that the U S Government has the resources and knowledge it needs across the  board I do not think that is the case despite some pockets of excellence and a few  outstanding individuals with a long period of time on target      The Intelligence Community needs to think through what it means to have an analytic and  operational career in counterintelligence and countering foreign political  influence interference Laws and principles may be country agnostic but the capabilities to  enforce will be specific to each country There are some general skillsets common to all  forms of security intelligence — including counterintelligence counterterrorism   counter-narcotics and counter-proliferation — but linguistic and regional area studies  knowledge is required to research understand and unravel the networks      At the policy level the interagency process does not seem well-geared for countering foreign  political interference Different agencies possess different elements of the response but  coordination and clear responsibilities seem to be lacking Allied security officials have  commented privately on what seems to be disarray within U S delegations on leadership   substance and protocol A new agency or bureaucratic entity devoted to the problem seems  inappropriate Such a reorganization would likely disrupt the intelligence components of the  system that are working without changing the bureaucratic dysfunction at the policy level   The best fixes may be in the White House where a deputy national security advisor or an  NSC senior director with the rank of deputy assistant to the president could be appointed to  coordinate the efforts to counter foreign interference Outside the White House there are  too many senior stakeholders who also must oversee much broader national and homeland  security portfolios      The U S Government also needs to think through how to push information into the public  realm to drive the conversation to explain its actions and build public support Open source  researchers can do quite a bit to map to the Chinese Communist Party’s united front system  and the networks of front organizations at the intersection of technology transfer   intelligence and political influence However such work requires having solid pegs into the  system from which to begin Some of the very open political influence operations are  relatively easy to track because of the individuals public affiliations with the united front  system Identifying for example the Ministry of State Security operations for political  influence is much more difficult if not frequently impossible Government identification —  either through some sort of regular public report taking cases to trial etc — allows  researchers to expand off of what the government has done providing even more context  and possibly more leads to additional activities of concern Having more of this information  available also helps justify U S government actions especially administrative responses that  can be opaque even within government in ways that lay and expert communities can  understand and debate     VII GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN RESPONDING    1 Transparency​ Sunlight is the best disinfectant Out in the open people have to make  choices about whether to continue on in their conflicts of interests or compromised  relationships This applies equally to government and law enforcement responses to political  interference Administrative responses done quietly are not as effective as public  prosecutions and explanations which help create risk and inject new information into the  public sphere for discussion     2 Conversation and Debate​ The legislature draws the line between legal and illegal Federal  government resources always will focus predominantly on the illegal side In a democracy   we would not want it any other way What is unacceptable or improper however is not  necessarily what is illegal Civil society must be able to discuss in reasonable terms what is  taking place     3 Protect Space for Critical Discussion of China​ Whether it is Chinese-language media  outside of China university spaces or any other platform where discussion of contemporary  China takes place they all are vulnerable to the party’s pressure And they all are targets of  the Chinese Communist Party They need support protection and sometimes even  cultivation      4 Consequences Create Risk​ Until the Chinese Communist Party faces consequences for its  actions they are not in danger of overstepping the mark or overestimating their ability to  influence or intimidate Without successfully taking cases to and winning at trial without  administrative penalties Americans who actively assist the Chinese Communist Party at the  expense of U S interests will have no reason to scrutinize their actions or to desist Risk is  required to deter behavior that undermines democracy      5 Civil Liberties as much as National Security​ Because the Chinese Communist Party puts  so much emphasis on overseas Chinese communities and individuals countering Beijing’s  efforts means ensuring ethnically-Chinese citizens and residents can enjoy equal protection  under the law National security and the resources brought to bear in its name are negative   defensive powers rather than positive or creative Civil liberties protections and the resources  deployed for this purpose however are the latter They serve to guarantee constitutional  freedoms creating and preserving the free space for speech and association Enabling  democratic practices is at least as important preventing the exploitation of democracy     6 Maintain the Integrity of Rules and Processes​ When relationships with Chinese  Communist Party organizations go awry or become exploitative most cases — excepting  those involving recruited or compromised agents — involve foreign partners who do not  monitor and enforce their own guidelines and procedures To protect against conflicts of  interests and outright compromise organizations that seek to do business promote  exchanges collaborate on research or otherwise have institutional relationships need to  establish and stick to rules and procedures Exceptions and exemptions need to be done in  the open with clear explanation otherwise it is too easy to slip toward compromise and  exploitation       VIII RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESS    1 Revise the Foreign Agent Registration Act FARA to include more robust reporting  requirements more robust penalties for non-compliance and a publicly-accessible  database of FARA registrants updated frequently     Others have more fully outlined the fixes that need to be made related to the Foreign Agent  Registration Act but I would like to emphasize a few points First the reporting  requirements for describing the activities are quite minimal Companies and individuals that  wish to be safe provide more however that is not the general rule Expanding the reporting  requirements to include more substance and specificity about the messages delivered or  services provided would make the reporting mechanism more transparent Separately   additional reporting could be made a part of Congressional ethics standards Second   non-compliance with FARA seems to have few if any consequences The current approach  to enforcement is largely about voluntarily self-policing Third the United States should  revise its approach to presenting FARA data modeling its public-facing database on the  Australian Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme FITS The FITS database is updated  on a regular rolling basis rather than the quarterly approach to FARA The database and  accompanying documentation is comparatively clear and accessible      2 Request a review of the Department of Justice’s decisions not to prosecute  espionage-related cases     The intelligence law enforcement and prosecutorial capabilities for responding to espionage  are the same resources that will be used to address the greyer areas of political influence and  interference A review of decisions not to prosecute should be completed to understand  what problems — whether investigative competence resources and funding political  expediency or any other factors — undermined taking the cases to trial This review should  be undertaken by Congress and the Department of Justice should be encouraged to do their  own review and report it to the appropriate committees     3 Expand the mandate of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China CECC   to include the civil liberties and human rights of ethnic Chinese living outside the  People’s Republic of China     Congress created the CECC in 2000 “to monitor China’s compliance with international  human rights standards to encourage the development of the rule of law in the PRC and to  establish and maintain a list of victims of human rights abuses in China ” The treatment of  overseas Chinese at the hands of Beijing is closely related to this mandate      The human rights of overseas Chinese would be a logical expansion given that they are  subject to two issues The first is Beijing’s willingness to surveil and apply pressure to these  communities as well as to subvert community organizations The second is the absence of a  response from their home governments to the Chinese Communist Party’s actions The  former is the infringement of the rights of overseas Chinese the latter is the absence of  often constitutionally-guaranteed protections     ​ evelop and fund educational programs to support mid-career expertise building  D and language skill maintenance     Existing programs focus almost exclusively on undergraduate and graduate students most  often at the beginning of their careers Creating space and time for experienced professionals  to brush up on language skills or pursue useful personal projects would help ensure  continued learning Government employees have some access to similar programs but there  needs to be greater recognition of the value of education and being away from the desk   Private sector employees need new programs and sources of support to be able to take the  time to study and return to work      5 Create a national training center for community workers to support language  training and understanding foreign government operations in ethnic communities  within the United States    4   Community outreach programs in the United States are decentralized owing to the federal   state and local government structure Unifying these programs would be unnecessarily  complicated and put the different levels of government at odds with one another To ensure  awareness of issues in ethnic communities Congress should create a national training center  for community workers Overseas Chinese communities are not the only ones subject to  harassment or infringement of their civil rights by a foreign government The center should  support language training either through residency programs or individual grants for local  programs      Those most affected by a coercive foreign government do not have a ready outlet for  reporting the problems they face Law enforcement works best when officers are dealing  with familiar issues and challenges Building a cadre of informed community workers outside  the justice system serves at least two purposes First it provides navigators for those  individuals willing to stand up and report the problems Community workers can help such  an individual navigate law enforcement when they may be reluctant to come forward   Second community workers can serve as an important source of information outside  traditional law enforcement and intelligence channels      6 Use Congress’s institutional powers to press the executive branch for transparency  on actions taken against China especially where the actions are administrative     American opinions are shifting about China but much of the public discussion remains  caught in limbo between the old policy paradigm and the uncertainty of today’s new era of  competition Consequently the administration needs to be more transparent than the  executive branch typically is inclined      The visa denials for Chinese scholars is a perfect example from recent news Many U S and  international scholars have been dismayed by the news and the merits of excluding those  individuals or revoking their visas is not obvious to the public The particular of case of Zhu  Feng a Nanjing-based professor having his visa revoked shows why the executive branch  needs to be more transparent publicly Although he is a well-known scholar known for his  amiable humor Zhu also has been supported by and done work for the political warfare  element of the People’s Liberation Army This is available from open sources Putting a few  simple criteria out in public for visa denials and alerting inviting institutions what criteria was  triggered would be a useful positive step for handling the visa issues going forward Without  such information many otherwise knowledgeable people about China assumed the worst  about the administration’s intentions and actions     The administration also should be encouraged to use the legal system and press charges  where appropriate The legal process forces the U S Government to commit to a course of  action and making some information public That information especially after a conviction   becomes as close to ground truth as a possible on sensitive subjects for which there is not  much clear public information