TESTIMONY OF DR ORIANA SKYLAR MASTRO ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF SECURITY STUDIES EDMUND A WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY JEANE KIRKPATRICK VISITING SCHOLAR AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on “A New Approach for An Era of U S -China Competition” Wednesday March 13 2019 The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author alone and do not represent those of any of the institutions with which she is affiliated Chairman Risch Ranking Member Menendez and distinguished members of the committee thank you for the opportunity to discuss some of the ways China is challenging US primacy in the region and in the international system more broadly Before I begin describing the tactics China has been employing to accumulate power and influence at times at the United States’ expense I want to be upfront about the strategic framework that colors my thinking First I do not believe China is inherently a threat to the United States But China has defined its interests and goals in such a way that they conflict with those of the United States Specifically China believes that dominance of the Indo-Pacific is central to its security and interests meaning that Beijing cannot feel secure with the US forward presence in the region And the United States cannot protect its own interests and national security without the ability to operate there Thus we have a serious conflict of interest Second China prefers to use political and economic tools to achieve its security goals but as its military becomes more proficient it will not shy away from using this tool as well if the issue at hand is important and the other tools do not suffice In other words I believe Chinese leaders are being truthful when they say they would prefer to achieve China’s goals peacefully But this just means that they hope the United States and others will fully accommodate their position without a fight Lastly I believe China’s territorial aims are limited It wants control over the South China Sea the East China Sea and Taiwan and nothing more Thus if the United States conceded to China the sphere of influence of Northeast Southeast Central and South Asia our points of contention would be greatly lessened However I also believe these demands are too much and that the US cannot concede to them without seriously jeopardizing its own security and that of its allies and partners in the region In other words it is easy to avoid conflict if you give the other side everything it wants The Strategy Behind China’s Rise China’s rise has been meteoric in pace and astounding in scale Since Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms in 1979 that shifted China to a more market-based economy Chinese gross domestic product growth has “averaged nearly 10 percent a year and has lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty ”1 Today China is the second-largest economy and the largest single contributor to world growth since the 2008 financial crisis 2 Between 2005 and 2018 China invested around $1 941 53 billion USD worldwide 3 In the same time frame nominal Chinese military spending increased from $76 6 billion USD to $228 2 billion 4 China has managed to translate its economic growth into vast economic political and military power on the world stage On the most basic level power is the ability to get other countries to do what you want China’s system and values are generally less attractive than those of the United States China also does not have allies or even the long-standing relationships that the United States has around the world its military is still greatly inferior to that of the United States in power projection capabilities its economy has been smaller and it entered an international order in which the United States wielded a disproportionate degree of influence But even with all these disadvantages Chinese relative power has grown to the point that we now find ourselves in a great power competition This situation highlights the theme of my testimony today how China has managed to make relative power gains from its weaker position over the past 20 years My bottom-line argument is that China has consistently chosen a position in the international system from which it can best limit the degree to which other states’ policies affect it and from which it can influence the nature and terms of competition For example China spent much of the 1990s and 2000s finding places and issues where the competition among states was the weakest—military operations other than war such as peacekeeping and infrastructure development as a key component of economic aid and engagement with specific countries in Africa Latin America and Asia that had a weak US presence China then leveraged its strengths and took entrepreneurial actions to outmaneuver the United States tipping the balance of power in its favor Admittedly China is not always successful in its endeavors But its share of world power has increased suggesting that it succeeds often enough I argue that this is not because the United States is insufficiently competitive on the world stage as a political economic or military partner but because Washington has simply not been competing China’s Approach to Building Political Power The United States set up international institutions after WWII as means of promoting cooperation and constraining states in ways that encouraged responsible stabilizing foreign policy choices on the part of the participants This experiment has largely been successful States are more cooperative than ever before and the rate of interstate conflict is at a historical low And the interstate wars that do erupt are shorter and less violent These institutions also facilitate the promotion of structures norms principles and values that support US power and reduce the transaction costs of diplomacy making it easier for the United States to exercise its power For these reasons China avoided international institutions during the Cold War and criticized them as tools of US hegemonic power In the 1990s however Chinese leaders decided it would be to their benefit to become less isolated economically and politically so China joined almost all of the existing institutions The United States supported this change as American strategists believed that the more China participated the more it would be socialized into the then-current norms and rules of behavior The logic behind the US support has proved flawed This does not imply however that the inclusive approach is incorrect That others benefit from US leadership is one of the greatest competitive advantages the United States wields over China And there is little evidence that China wants to overturn the current order as Beijing benefits greatly from aspects of it As a member of the permanent five with veto power China has gained significant power over international security from its participation in the United Nations Security Council As of April 2018 the World Bank had lent China more than $60 495 trillion for 416 projects on domestic growth in transportation urban development rural development water resources management energy and the environment China’s accession to the World Trade Organization WTO expanded China’s access to foreign markets leading to a surge in exports that fueled its impressive economic growth The biggest issue is not China’s participation in international institutions The central problems are not only that these institutions have not adapted to ensure that China is accommodated when its aims are legitimate and constrained when they are not but also that the United States has not attempted to build new institutions to address contemporary issues As a result China has been able to build up its political power in three ways by exploiting blind spots in the international order by building alternative institutions and by shaping roles and norms in its favor The result of this strategy is twofold First China is more inured from international pressure making it more difficult to shape Chinese behavior Second states are dependent on Beijing economically and politically which allows China to compel others to accommodate its will States’ desire to avoid Beijing’s wrath to not become targets of its political warfare or economic coercion makes many including allies and partners of the United States unwilling to support US policies that push back against China or condemn some of its irresponsible behavior Exploiting Strategic Blind Spots First the US-led world order has weaknesses and gaps that China has successfully exploited When China began to enter international institutions some parts of the world were largely outside the US-led world order and consequently were not benefiting from it Thus China initially chose to focus on increasing its influence in parts of the world where the US presence was weak or nonexistent These areas included unsavory regimes that the US had abandoned such as North Korea Myanmar and Zimbabwe China’s relationships with these regimes increase its political power without threatening the United States They also included parts of the world that the United States had neglected China did not supplant the United States in Central Asia or in many African countries the US was simply not there US companies in particular have been conspicuously absent For example in Ecuador Chinese companies invested $1 8 billion USD in 2005 while US companies invested less than $50 000 5 Second Beijing actively builds defenses against aspects of the order that are unfavorable to its interests It has done so for example by infiltrating groups to render them ineffective as in the case of the UN Human Rights Council UNHRC 6 Within the UNHRC China has used its position to shield itself from criticism about its domestic human rights violations and change norms surrounding transparency and accountability in dealing with human rights violations in other countries 7 For instance China has blocked the accreditation of certain nongovernmental organizations that criticize or investigate human rights violations It has also emphasized principles such as “sovereignty” to shield states from having to disclose certain information about domestic human rights violations 8 The United States instead of strengthening its role in the UNHRC to ensure that the institution performs as originally intended has conceded ground by withdrawing from it When it does not infiltrate international organizations to render them ineffective Beijing repurposes institutions for its own strategic purposes For example it uses INTERPOL’s “red notice” system to track down dissidents Since Meng Hongwei 9 a former Chinese vice minister of public security was elected the leader of INTERPOL in 2016 INTERPOL has released nearly 100 red notices for Chinese dissidents abroad 10 Building Alternative Institutions In some cases China has worked to change the rules of institutions to gain a greater official say in their activities and decisions It has sought to rewrite the rules in institutions like the WTO the International Monetary Fund IMF and the World Bank to increase its voting power to be commensurate with its economic stature For example during the 2001–09 WTO Doha development rounds China led a group of developing countries in pushing back against the developed nations to demand better trade deals for developing nations worldwide 11 At the IMF voting power and governance are based on special drawing rights SDR or an international reserve asset 12 In 2015 China fought to make the renminbi part of the SDR and its quota share increased from 4 percent to 6 41 percent 13 Yet when China believes it cannot achieve a level of influence commensurate with its economic status it is often prepared to create its own institutions For example the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank AIIB shows China’s willingness to found organizations that further its interests but that are still tied to the international trade system After years of arguing for better infrastructure investment in Asia at the World Bank and the IMF China launched the AIIB in 2016 to invest in projects that were “high quality low cost” in infrastructure and connectivity 14 In the most recently available Annual Report 2017 the AIIB claims to have 84 approved members and over $4 22 billion USD worth of investments in projects and funds 15 The United States has no influence in this institution because Washington refused to participate The most significant initiative for building and exercising Chinese power globally is the Belt and Road Initiative BRI Since 2013 over 70 countries have signed contracts for projects under the BRI and it is reported that between 2013 and 2018 China spent a total of $614 billion USD on BRI projects 16 In Africa the BRI has built airports railways manufacturing hubs and infrastructure improvements with significant investments in Nigeria Ethiopia and Kenya In Europe the BRI has made inroads in central and eastern Europe and has recently been in dialogue with Portugal and Greece with a specific interest in port access In Asia the BRI has made significant investments in railway and port construction with proposals in Indonesia Laos and Malaysia 17 But the initiative is not just about building infrastructure Through the BRI China is attempting to leverage its economic power for political and security purposes which include making the world a safe place for authoritarian governments Nadège Rolland in her definitive book on the BRI writes that “BRI is intended to enable China to better use its growing economic clout to achieve its ultimate political aims without provoking a countervailing response or a military conflict” to achieve its ultimate goal “of establishing itself as the preponderant power in Eurasia and a global power second to none ”18 Many of these countries take Chinese funding because they have few other options—and the Trump administration’s initiative to dedicate $113 million to new technology energy and infrastructure initiatives in emerging Asia is far from sufficient to change this calculus Shaping Rules and Norms in China’s Favor Third China has sought to establish new standards rules norms and processes to give it a competitive advantage where the established order is weak ambiguous or nonexistent For example China is trying to shape governance and policy in artificial intelligence in ways that give its companies an edge legitimize its internal social uses of technologies such as face recognition software and weaken the voices of independent civil society actors who inform the debate in North America and Europe In the cyber realm China has been pushing an idea of “cyber sovereignty” that considers cyberspace to be primarily governed by states and recognizes the legitimacy of every state’s efforts to govern content within its borders rather than just ensuring the functioning of the internet This idea stands in contrast to the United States’ desired model which is multilateral and guarantees a role for nonstate civilian actors To shift the norm in its preferred direction China has put the brakes on US-led norm building in the UN Group of Governmental Experts the main norm-setting body for Western governments in cyberspace and has held its own annual World Internet Conference in Wuzhen since 2014 China has been watching the 2016 US election hacking with keen interest to see if Western countries will start to follow China’s lead in favoring content controls over the internet and will walk back from the ideas set out in the UNHRC’s “internet freedom” speech In the maritime realm the United States insists that freedom of navigation of military vessels is a universally established and accepted practice enshrined in international law but not all countries accept this interpretation Argentina Brazil China India Indonesia Iran Malaysia the Maldives Oman and Vietnam argue that warships have no automatic right of innocent passage in their territorial seas Twenty other developing countries including Brazil India Malaysia and Vietnam insist that military activities such as close-in surveillance and reconnaissance by a country in another country’s exclusive economic zone EEZ infringe on coastal states’ security interests and therefore are not protected under freedom of navigation China is exploiting this lack of consensus and that the United States has not even ratified UN Convention on the Law of the Seas to its advantage It is seeking to establish a code of conduct with Association of Southwest Asian Nations ASEAN countries that could legitimize Chinese expansionist activities in the South China Sea China’s Approach to Building Military Power Chinese leaders and strategists have long understood that to rise to great power status they must avoid a strong negative response from the US In the late 1990s China adopted a strategy of reassurance that emphasized “regional economic integration and multilateral confidence building in an effort to assuage the fears of China’s neighbors during its ascendance to great-power status ”19 Chinese military modernization came last and is therefore a relatively new phenomenon Ten years ago Chinese defense spending was a third of what it is today By all standard measures the Chinese military was backward Its navy was a glorified coast guard that could not sail beyond visual range of the coastline Its pilots poorly trained and with few flight hours did not fly at night or over water Its nuclear forces still relied on liquid fuel and storage in silos both of which greatly reduced its survivability And none of the services had modern mechanized equipment Indeed the mechanization of the Chinese military is only scheduled to be completed two years from now Once China did begin modernizing it focused on defensive military capabilities first China’s desire to engage in “military operations other than war” such as peacekeeping humanitarian assistance and disaster relief under Hu Jintao’s New Historic Missions reassured many that China planned to use its military for the global good China has been the number one contributor of peacekeeping troops among the permanent five since 2012 20 This is all to say that China’s overwhelming economic power and military capabilities are relatively new phenomena and that there is a clear connection between China’s increasing clout and its shift from reassurance to a growing reliance on coercion to achieve its goals In its defense policy China made a conscious shift to prioritize the military as a key tool of national power and to leverage it for national security purposes especially the aim of protecting its territorial integrity and sovereignty as defined by China Xi Jinping has put the military at the forefront of China’s efforts to achieve national rejuvenation A strong military is one of the key components of the China Dream and Xi has called on China’s armed forces to be prepared to fight and win wars This assertiveness is no longer new it began in 2009 with coercive diplomacy in the South China Sea This fact suggests that China’s reliance on coercion will only increase It is also telling that Chinese leaders and strategists perceive coercion as an effective strategy Two reasons explain why Deng’s approach of keeping a low profile was jettisoned for a more assertive confident and proactive foreign policy First the previous policy of taoguangyouhui was seen as insufficient to protect national interests because it did not persuade others to respect China’s interests in the region Second while some admit that the United States and China’s neighboring countries are uncomfortable with the new approach they argue that it is more practical and effective than letting China suffer disgraces and insults for the sake of “biding its time ” Many Chinese thinkers complain that the potential benefits of keeping a low profile—a positive international image or greater support and friendship from neighboring countries—have not materialized 21 Neighboring powers were suspicious of China’s rise long before the foreign policy shift and the behavior of other South China Sea claimants during that period suggests that an “unprincipled” strategy like “biding time” does not command respect or prevent countries from harming China’s core interests 22 Perhaps nowhere is the challenge of China’s entrepreneurial strategies more evident than in military competition First China’s anti-access area denial A2AD strategy in which it developed relatively low-cost asymmetric capabilities to erode US military supremacy significantly complicates any US plans to come to the aid of Japan Taiwan or the Philippines in the event of a conflict with China China is also building economic and political power that it can leverage during a time of conflict to convince countries not to host or support US military operations This strategy includes using all the tools at its disposal to create wedges between the US and its allies so that countries such as Japan or Australia will chose to stay neutral in a conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan or the South China Sea for example Second instead of directly confronting the United States to push it out of the Asia-Pacific with military force China has engaged in gray-zone activities Specifically China has increased the risk to the US of operating in the South China Sea by harassing US vessels and aircraft with nonmilitary platforms In this way it maintains a degree of deniability that discourages a US response With these tactics China has made significant political and territorial gains without crossing the threshold into open conflict with the United States or rival claimants especially in the South China Sea These strategies help China build relative power vis-à-vis the United States Beijing also strives to reduce US credibility as a security partner and ally to erode the US-led security order in Asia China’s Strategy to Control the South China Sea China’s strategy of focusing on areas where competitive forces are weakest and then leveraging its comparative advantages is strikingly evident in its strategy to control the South China Sea—an end China is actively pursuing On the military side Beijing is positioning itself in a way that weakens the conventional US deterrent against China China wants the ability to deny foreign military vessels and aircrafts access to the sea and airspace over the South China Sea It has been making progress toward this goal by building bases in the South China Sea specifically on Fiery Cross Subi and Mischief Reefs in the Spratlys known as the Big 3 All these bases will have approximately 10 000 foot runways and the airfield support facilities including reinforced hangars to accommodate fighters bombers tankers large transport patrol airborne early warning and aircraft refueling 23 China’s largest island in the Paracels Woody Island is also China’s largest military outpost in the South China Sea China has developed airstrips and port facilities and placed permanently stationed military personnel and temporarily deployed fighters surface-to-air missiles and antiship cruise missiles on the island 24 These bases will eventually house systems that will expand the reach and increase the layers of China’s A2AD capabilities and the range of China’s own power projection capabilities For example if China were to deploy H6-K bombers to the Big 3 it could then hold US defense facilities in northern Australia and Guam at risk If they were stationed at Woody Island almost all of the Philippines including the five sites selected for US base development would fall within range 25 If China put HQ-9s and anti-ship on Woody Island and Fiery Cross Reef Subi Reef or Mischief Reef it could hold any US assets that dared to operate in most of the South China Sea at severe risk I could spend pages laying out the possible combinations and what they mean for US operations But the bottom line is that while China is building facilities to house military systems they are still in the initial stages In May 2018 the Chinese landed a H6-K bomber on Woody for the first time HQ-9 anti-aircraft missiles were first reported on Woody Island an island disputed by China Taiwan and Vietnam in 2016 though they were removed in 2018 and then redeployed 26 Since April 2016 China has deployed at various times Y-8 military transport planes YJ-12B cruise missiles and HQ-9B surface-to-air missile systems on each of the Big 3 27 In February 2019 after the People’s Liberation Army Navy conducted a monthlong series of drills in the South China Sea an anonymous source mentioned that the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Rocket Force was looking to deploy its HQ-9 anti-air missiles and YJ anti-ship missiles on Woody Island on a permanent basis 28 We should thus expect the pace and scale of future deployments to increase With these deployments China will be in a position to enforce an overly expansive air defense identification zone or eventually even a maritime exclusion zone in the region which will put the burden of escalation on the United States if it chooses not to recognize the zones This means that the present moment is a crucial time for US policy If Washington hopes to deter or prevent the militarization of the South China Sea Islands it has to take a tougher stance now Yet China’s preferred strategy is to sidestep rather than confront the United States and to cajole other countries into agreeing to resolve their claims on terms favorable to Beijing China calls this the “dual-track” 双轨思路 principle according to which regional neighbors negotiate to resolve disputes and cooperate to maintain peace and stability 29 This doctrine implies exclusion of the US and other non-regional powers as well as international institutions For example after the Permanent Court of Arbitration PCA ruled in favor of the Philippines in its case against China in 2016 China deemed the PCA illegitimate because the Philippines had violated the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea by taking the case beyond the concerned parties 30 China also uses influence operations and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to its advantage 31 For example after the PCA ruling the Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte said he would “set aside” the ruling “in the play of politics” to avoid “impos ing anything on China ”32 This position was widely attributed to Duterte’s view of China as an “essential ally” that he hoped would fund his infrastructure plans in the Philippines 33 At the July 2016 ASEAN meeting Cambodia—a close political ally of China’s—blocked any mention of the PCA ruling effectively shielding China from any ASEAN-led multilateral approaches to dealing with Chinese actions in the South China Sea 34 Laos which heavily relies on Chinese investments supported Cambodia’s block demonstrating China’s ability to leverage its economic and political clout over small regional neighbors 35 China has tried to insert language that would prevent countries from engaging in military exercises with countries from outside the region read the United States unless the parties concerned such as China do not object The Implications of Chinese Control If China controlled the South China Sea the restrictions it would impose there would likely depend on the activity On the more permissive side China has not shown interest in disrupting commercial transit through the South China Sea In 2016 global trade transiting through the South China Sea reached $3 37 trillion USD with most exports coming from China or about 39 5 percent of the total Chinese trade goods passing through these waters 36 These commercial activities benefit China and there is little incentive to disrupt them wholesale However China has shown a great willingness to engage in economic coercion to signal its displeasure with other countries’ foreign policies and if it controlled the South China Sea it might disrupt selectively and periodically to the same end In 2010 after a territorial dispute with Japan in the East China Sea China implemented a rare earth minerals embargo against Japan This ban was later extended to include the United States and Europe after the Obama administration called for investigations into whether this ban violated international trade law 37 In 2017 after South Korea confirmed its purchase of the US Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense battery China retaliated against South Korean companies in China and significantly reduced Chinese tourism to South Korea A year later the Bank of Korea estimated that this backlash had reduced South Korea’s economic growth rate by 0 4 percent 38 In other words while China will not seek to deny commercial access to the South China Sea as it will deny military access it may periodically hold commercial interests at risk as part of a campaign to coerce a country to concede on something In the middle of the spectrum would be China’s approach to the exploited natural resources in the waters that fall within the nine-dash line These resources include oil and gas deposits and fisheries An estimated 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of oil reserves lie within the South China Sea and access to these energy resources is crucial for all of the claimants involved 39 On the fisheries side the South China Sea is in the top five “most productive fishing zones ” with half of the fishing vessels in the world operating in these waters and accounting for over 10 percent of the global fish catch 40 China has proposed a number of joint cooperative ventures with other claimants Since 2007 China and Vietnam have conducted regular joint Gulf of Tonkin exploration ventures 41 and China and Brunei embarked on joint oil and gas development ventures last year 42 In 2017 China supported the idea of a joint energy venture with the Philippines that would develop oil fields and exploration and exploitation in the South China Sea 43 This is the aspect of their strategy that Chinese leaders highlight to present their position as fair legitimate and peaceful An analysis of the statements made on the South China Sea by members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee for example show these leaders use terms such as “cooperation” and “political solution” six times more frequently than competitive themes such as “sovereignty ” “military ” “tension ” “freedom of navigation ” or other US themes 44 On the other end of the spectrum China would be the most restrictive about military activities which is why the issue is central to US national security Chinese domestic law attempts to extend more state power over China’s EEZ than international law allows including jurisdiction over hydrographic surveys military surveys and intelligence gathering 45 China believes the EEZ does not constitute the high seas and therefore the US does not have the right to conduct intel gathering activities or other military activities there 46 China also claims the Paracels and Spratlys including the artificial islands Each is surrounded by a 200-mile EEZ and China argues that the islands should be treated as archipelagos which means the waters between them would be territorial waters according to international law 47 It is through this manipulation of international law that China deems the South China Sea within its EEZ and claims that the US military is not allowed to operate there Much more is at stake for the United States if it concedes to China in the South China Sea First China currently claims nearly the entire East and South China Seas as its historic waters and EEZ 48 If China proves successful at changing the interpretation of maritime law so that the EEZ is equivalent to territorial waters then 1 the United States will be unable to conduct operations vital to US national security in much of the world’s oceans and 2 “freedom of navigation near the shore will be diminished impairing naval and air operations and diminishing powerprojection and forced-entry capabilities of amphibious forces ”49 Politically US acquiescence to Chinese coercive diplomacy could increase anxiety among US allies and strategic partners leading to Asian policy changes that could undermine regional stability 50 Moreover US deterrence against China would be severely weakened Without the ability to operate militarily in the South China Sea given the tyranny of distance the United States’ ability to hold China at risk would be greatly reduced This is the whole point of China’s South China Sea strategy—to push the US military out so that China can do whatever it wants without having to answer to the United States For deterrence purposes the United States needs to be able to threaten China with unacceptable costs It cannot do so if the US military does not maintain a presence in Asia and the ability to operate freely around China And the United States cannot protect and defend South Korea Japan Taiwan or the Philippines without the ability to operate in the waters surrounding China This is simply the reality of current technology To sum up China is not outcompeting the United States the US is not competing China is gaining power and influence at the expense of the United States by focusing on areas where the US ability and willingness to compete have been weakest and then leveraging its strengths in entrepreneurial ways to build power in those areas Washington needs to get back in the game but without lowering its standards to China’s level While perhaps imperfect in implementation the values and principles behind US global power and leadership ensure others benefit China’s Achilles’ heel is that its leaders have failed to articulate a vision of Chinese dominance that is beneficial for anyone but China In its pursuit of economic political and military power the protection of liberal values needs to be a guidepost and a priority The South China Sea lies at the center of this geopolitical competition The United States has to move beyond symbolic displays of force such as the freedom of navigation operations to include actions that improve the United States’ ability to operate in those waters This could include building a new institution or coalition of like-minded states that patrol the waters and protect all countries’ rights of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea Or the US could make peace in the South China Sea a real diplomatic priority getting all parties to the negotiating table and if China is unwilling to participate the US could bring the other claimants together without Beijing to establish a consensus at least among them that supports US interpretation of freedom of navigation And if the United States wants to deter the militarization of these islands which threaten US sovereignty it has to threaten unacceptable costs on China for example by communicating to Beijing that the United States will build its own bases in the area in response Beyond the South China Sea Washington needs to embark on a program of institution building that will shape norms in our favor and fill the gaps in the order that China has been able to exploit The United States needs to leverage its own strengths against Chinese weaknesses one of which is the ability to build coalitions This should not be a great power competition between China and the United States but between China and the United States along with its allies and partners China cannot outspend the United States and the European Union together For example it cannot prevail in a regional conflict against the United States Japan and Australia So if China uses economic coercion against a country US allies and partners should ban together and sanction China We should be patrolling the South China Sea together to ensure that every country even those that are not treaty allies of the United States has the ability to sail and fish there And the US needs to lead by example If Washington is unwilling to stand up to China as the most powerful nation in the world it cannot expect anyone else to do so It will take immense political capital to facilitate such cooperation among nations but it is the only way to ensure the United States in conjunction with its allies and partners maintains the vast share of power and influence in the international system 1 World Bank “China—Overview ” September 26 2018 https www worldbank org en country china overview World Bank “The World Bank Group in China—Facts and Figures ” July 2018 http pubdocs worldbank org en 657111542261998957 F-Fen-2018 pdf 3 Derek Scissors “Worldwide Chinese Investments and Construction 2005–2018 ” American Enterprise Institute accessed March 4 2019 https www aei org china-global-investment-tracker ncid txtlnkusaolp00000618 4 CSIS China Power “What Does China Really Spend on its Military ” March 4 2019 https chinapower csis org military-spending 5 Derek Scissors “China Global Investment Tracker ” American Enterprise Institute accessed March 7 2019 http www aei org china-globalinvestment-tracker and CEIC “Ecuador Foreign Direct Investment America ” March 7 2019 https www ceicdata com en ecuador eco02foreign-direct-investment-by-country foreign-direct-investment-america-united-states 6 Human Rights Watch “The Costs of International Advocacy China’s Interference in United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms ” September 5 2017 7 Ted Piccone “China’s Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations ” Brookings Institution September 2018 https www brookings edu research chinas-long-game-on-human-rights-at-the-united-nations 8 Ted Piccone “China’s Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations ” 9 Note Meng Hongwei is now detained in China for alleged corruption 10 Sunny Chao “Interpol Headed by China’s Police Vice-Minister Abuses Red Notices to Track Down Dissidents Overseas ” Epoch Times May 17 2018 https www theepochtimes com interpol-headed-by-chinas-police-vice-minister-abuses-red-notices-to-track-down-dissidentsoverseas_2526995 html 11 North-South Institute “The BRICS at the WTO Doha Development Round ” September 28 2009 http www nsi-ins ca the-brics-at-the-wtodoha-development 12 International Monetary Fund “IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power ” March 5 2019 https www imf org external np sec memdir eds aspx 13 International Monetary Fund “IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power ” 14 Sue-Lin Wong “China Launches New AIIB as Power Balance Shifts ” Reuters January 15 2016 https www reuters com article us-asia-aiibinvestment china-launches-new-aiib-development-bank-as-power-balance-shifts-idUSKCN0UU03Y 15 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank “Financing Asia’s Future 2017 AIIB Annual Report and Financials ” 2018 https www aiib org en news-events news 2017 annual-report common pdf AIIB-Annual-Report-2017 pdf 16 Derek Scissors “China Global Investment Tracker ” American Enterprise Institute accessed March 5 2019 http www aei org china-globalinvestment-tracker 17 Jonathan E Hillman “How Big Is China’s Belt and Road ” Center for Strategic and International Studies April 3 2018 https www csis org analysis how-big-chinas-belt-and-road 18 Nadege Rolland China’s Eurasian Century Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative National Bureau of Asian Research May 23 2017 19 Thomas J Christensen “The Advantages of an Assertive China Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy ” Brookings Institution March 25 2011 https www brookings edu articles the-advantages-of-an-assertive-china-responding-to-beijings-abrasive-diplomacy 20 Providing for Peacekeeping “IPI Peacekeeping Database ” March 4 2019 http www providingforpeacekeeping org contributions 21 Yan Xuetong “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement ” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 no 2 Summer 2014 161 22 Zhang Liwei “Zhongguo waijiao fengge zhuanxing xu jinshen ” Prudence must be practiced when changing China’s diplomatic style ” Financial Times December 17 2013 http www ftchinese com story 001053962 and Yan “From Keeping a Low Profile ” 23 “China Lands First Bomber on South China Sea Island ” Center for Strategic and International Studies May 18 2018 https amti csis org china-lands-first-bomber-south-china-sea-island and Thomas Shugart “China’s Artificial Islands Are Bigger and a Bigger Deal Than You Think ” War on the Rocks September 21 2016 https warontherocks com 2016 09 chinas-artificial-islands-are-bigger-and-abigger-deal-than-you-think 24 Ankit Panda “South China Sea What China’s First Strategic Bomber Landing on Woody Island Means ” Diplomat May 22 2018 https thediplomat com 2018 05 south-china-sea-what-chinas-first-strategic-bomber-landing-on-woody-island-means and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative “Woody Island ” Center for Strategic and International Studies March 4 2019 https amti csis org woodyisland #AnalysisofOutpost-heading 25 Center for Strategic and International Studies “China Lands First Bomber on South China Sea Island ” 26 Gordon Lubold and Chun Han Wong “China Positions Missiles on Disputed South China Sea Island ” Wall Street Journal February 17 2016 https www wsj com articles china-deploys-missiles-on-disputed-island-in-south-china-sea-1455684150 27 Center for Strategic and International Studies “China Lands First Bomber on South China Sea Island ” 28 Liu Zhen “China Just Finished a Month of Unannounced Drills in the South China Sea to Test Its Wartime Command System ” Business Insider February 21 2019 https www businessinsider com au china-drills-in-the-south-china-sea-to-test-wartime-command-system-2019-2 29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Wang Yi “Wang Yi shuanggui silu shi jiejue nanhai wenti zuiwei xianshi kexing de banfa” Wang Yi ‘Twotrack thinking’ is the most realistic and practical way to solve the South China Sea problem ” April 21 2016 https www fmprc gov cn web zyxw t1357479 shtml 30 Xinhua “Zhongguo waizhang wang yi jiu suowei nanhai zhongcai ting caijue jieguo fabiao tanhua ” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi makes statement about the results of the so-called South China Sea Arbitration Tribunal ” July 12 2016 http www xinhuanet com world 201607 12 c_1119207875 htm 31 Department of Defense “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy ” 2018 https www defense gov Portals 1 Documents pubs 2018National-Defense-Strategy-Summary pdf 32 Guardian “Philippines to ‘Set Aside’ South China Sea Tribunal Ruling to Avoid Imposing on Beijing ” December 17 2016 https www theguardian com world 2016 dec 17 philippines-to-set-aside-south-china-sea-tribunal-ruling-to-avoid-imposing-on-beijing 33 Eijas Ariffin “The Philippines and China Two Years Since the PCA ” ASEAN Post July 13 2018 https theaseanpost com article philippines-and-china-two-years-pca 2 34 Manuel Mogato Michael Martina and Ben Blanchard “ASEAN Deadlocked on South China Sea Cambodia Blocks Statement ” Reuters July 25 2016 https www reuters com article us-southchinasea-ruling-asean asean-deadlocked-on-south-china-sea-cambodia-blocks-statementidUSKCN1050F6 35 Economist “Laos Ushers Through ASEAN Statement ” July 29 2016 http country eiu com F 1Kn3-n_lVkl_JDGmN_HE_-d4Fk85Vi6ZPkugpgUsG5yCP9Fwg4FE5zPkwvhdhard8Pzh4lW9bVQLfj4BnNbpu9PlyfRO7MuaJtOa5zaf9k1 article aspx articleid 26445761 0 Country Laos topic Politics subtopic Forecast subsubtopic International relations 36 ChinaPower “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea ” March 4 2019 https chinapower csis org much-trade-transits-south-chinasea 37 Jongryn Mo “China’s Changing Economic Leverage ” Wall Street Journal December 14 2010 https www wsj com articles SB10001424052748703677604576018521123215078 38 South China Morning Post “Chinese Tourists Returning to South Korea After Missile Tensions Cool ” May 2 2018 https www scmp com news china diplomacy-defence article 2144327 chinese-tourists-returning-south-korea-after-missile 39 South China Sea Working Group “A Blueprint for Cooperation on Oil and Gas Production in the South China Sea ” Center for Strategic and International Studies Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative July 25 2018 https amti csis org a-blueprint-for-cooperation-on-oil-and-gasproduction-in-the-south-china-sea 40 South China Sea Working Group “A Blueprint for Fisheries Management and Environmental Cooperation in the South China Sea ” Center for Strategic and International Studies Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative September 13 2017 https amti csis org coc-blueprint-fisheriesenvironment 41 Ralph Jennings “China and Vietnam Explored Almost a Decade Together for Oil What Went Wrong ” Forbes April l9 2018 https www forbes com sites ralphjennings 2018 04 09 china-and-vietnam-explored-almost-a-decade-together-for-oil-what-wentwrong #533e55db13b5 42 Liu Zhen “China and Brunei to Step Up Oil and Gas Development in Disputed South China Sea ” South China Morning Post November 19 2018 https www scmp com news china diplomacy article 2173959 china-and-brunei-step-oil-and-gas-development-disputed-south 43 Manuel Mogato “China Backs Joint Energy Development with Philippines in Disputed Sea ” Reuters July 25 2017 https www reuters com article us-philippines-china-idUSKBN1AA10L 44 This analysis is based on the full content regarding the SCS from 2013 to 2018 under the “Leadership Activities” “领导人活动报道” category in the People Data data people com cn “人民搜索” The database collects data from official media and websites 45 For the details of the legal positions see Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf June 26 1998 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea http www un org Depts los convention_agreements texts unclos closindx htm and China’s Statement upon Ratification http www un org Depts los convention_agreements convention_declarations htm#China%20Upon%20ratification For a thorough analysis see Peter A Dutton “Maritime Disputes and Sovereignty Issues in East Asia ” Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations July 15 2009 46 Ying Yang “Zhuanshu Jingji Qu Zhidu Yu Junshi Huodong de Falv Poxi” An analysis of laws and military activities regarding the Exclusive Economic Zone Social Science Journal no 5 2017 118–24 Zirong Yang and Feng Xiao “Hangxing Ziyou Jue Bushi ‘Junshi Huodong Ziyou’” Freedom of navigation is not freedom of military activities Jiefangjun Bao May 12 2016 http www 81 cn jfjbmap content 201605 12 content_144321 htm and Cheng Zhao “Meishi ‘Hangxing Ziyou’ Chongji Guoji Haiyang Zhixu” American ‘freedom of navigation’ disrupts international maritime orders Renmin Ribao July 27 2016 http world people com cn n1 2016 0727 c1002-28587086 html 47 Lei Hong “2016 Nian 7 Yue 8 Ri Waijiaobu Fayanren Hong Lei Zhuchi Lixing Jizhehui” July 8th 2016 the Spokesman of the Foreign Affairs Ministry Hong Lei hosted regular press conference Foreign Affairs Ministry July 8 2016 http www chinaembassy org chn fyrth t1378698 htm and Ziwen Zhang Song Qu and Yang Bai “Nansha Diaojiao Jianshe Shu Zhongguo Hefa Quanli” To construct on the Spratlys is China’s legal right Renmin Ribao July 25 2016 http world people com cn n1 2016 0725 c1002-28580367 html 48 James Kraska “Sovereignty at Sea ” Journal of the International Institute of Strategic Studies 51 June July 2009 13–18 49 Kraska “Sovereignty at Sea ” 50 Even if the US regional maritime presence is not reduced but rather shifted to different zones US concessions in the face of Chinese coercive diplomacy would still cause anxiety among US allies about the United States’ willingness to absorb costs to stay active in the region and protect its allies’ interests