Approved for Release 2019 09 24 906796503 Tub-Secret Intelligence Memorandum O ice of Scienti c and Weapons Research 16 November 1994 The Pnl'tics of NPT Extension Countdown to the Conference - Summary - Aswe approach the April 1995 Conference on the Treaty on the Nona-Proli ration of Nuclear Weapons NPT it appears unlikely that-a consensus will emerge in favor of the US-preferred option of unconditional inde nite extension We cannot discount the possibility of a two-thirds majority which would represent a strong vote of con dence in the Treaty if the Nuclear Weapon States NW5 1 - make signi cant progress on some key arms control issues before the NPT Conference A simple majority vote for inde nite extensionw-as required by the Treaty seemsachievable particularly if the United States and its allies sustain a i substantial high-level diplomatic effort in support of that outcome The situation is uid however and momentum appears to begrowing in-favor of the 25-year - red-term extension Option This trend is partly fed by perceptions among some nonaligned states that th United totes and the West-are not rm in their support for inde nite est-tension l J3 1This assessment is based on 1 Directorate of Intelligence effort to monitor country nositions on NPT extension for US negotiators SW 94-20052C see 14$ WARNING NOTICE mm OF 3 3 INTELLIGENCE SOURCES - 0R matrices INVOLVED - A 1 I Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796503 006796503 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796503 Tap-Seem a bxs Roadblocks to Inde nite Eutension In April 1995 signatories of the NPT will have their only opportunity under current Treaty provisions to determine the term for extending the Treaty Non-nuclear Weapon States are being asked particularly by the West to sign on inde nitely to a regime that prohibits them from developing nuclear weapons while not requiring the NWSs to give up their nuclear arsenals within a set time period The debate over NPT extension sharply underscores longstanding and widespread grievances that have evolved since the Treaty entered into force in 1970 about the failure of the NWSs to live up to their disarmament obligations under NPT Article VI Moreover the question whether the NPT can provide for their future - security and point to regional disputes nuclear theft the continued nuclear threat from both the declared and nonsignatory threshol nuclear weapon states and the NPT's unsatisfactory mechanism for ensuring compliance see inset'on page 3 U The 1995 NPT Conference provides the Non-Aligned Movement NAM with an opportunity to reassert itself With 95 votes out of a total of 166 the NAM could have a substantial impact on the outcome of the NPT Conference At the Third Preparatory Committee meeting in September 1994 NAM opponents of indefinite extension crafted a document outlining their concerns which include obtaining a Comprehens ve Test Ban Treaty CTBT and legally binding negative security assurances 2 The NAM's primary NPT grievances are - The perceived poor performance by the NWSs in negotiating in good faith toward complete nuclear disarmament Article VI Signi cant progress toward the conclusion of a CTBT is arguably the single most- important measure that could be taken to widen the margin of support for inde nite extension of the NPT but chances for obtaining a CTBT before the extension conference are virtually nil see inset on page 2A negative security assurance is one in which NWSs agree not to use nuclear weapons against a NNWS with some provisos A positive security assurance obligates the signatory NWSs to Come to the aid of a NNWS should it be attacked by nuclear weapons U This memorandum was prepared pf ce of Scienti c and Weapons Research and was coordinated wimt n me Directorate of rtelligence Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to luclear Biological and Chemical Division OSWRI Information available as of 3 1 November l994 was used in this report bus Approved for Release 2019 99 24 006796503 106796503 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796503 Tap-53cm Possible Conference Outcomes The treaty allows for the NPT to be extended inde nitely or for a xed period or periods Because obtaininga slim majority vote for inde nite extension could undermine-international con dence in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and cause some signatories to withdraw or threaten to withdraw 4mm the Treaty many countries believe that they cannot support an extension option that does not garner a near consensus Several alternative extension options have'been proposed Rolling Extension Extend the NPT by additional xed periods that would be renewed automatically unless the signatories acted by majority decision to revoke the Treaty at the end of any of the additional periods This option would in practice be roughly equivalent to the inde nite extension The Venezuelan Proposal - 'Extend the Treaty for an additional 25 years at which point another extension conference would be called This essentially repeats the terms of Article X Most Western nations see this option as requiring a treaty amendment Other Limited-Term Options One-time-only xed terms of extension for as little as ve years in order to gauge Nuclear Weapons State progress on disarmament and other issues Recessingor adjourning the Extension Conference for six months or more if an extension decision cannot be reached Some nonalign ed signatories ma ursue this option to assess progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - The inability of the international community to ensure universal adherence to the NPT This criticism is partly a response to Israel s unwillingness to join the NPT I inde nite extension would be unacceptable to Arab states without some unequivocal movement by Israel to accede to the NPT Although primarily an Arab security concern this issue resonates among other developing countries The ambiguous nuclear status of Ukraine and North Korea and the existence of other nuclear-weapons-capable states such as India and Pakistan are also of concern to some states - The failure of the NPT to provide legally binding negative or positive security assurances to the in exchange for foregoing a nuclear weapons option The want legally binding or at a minimum greatly strengthened negative or positive security assurances as a deterrent against attack by declared and threshold nuclear weapons states At the Third SC-67 426 94 3 - Top-Seem Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796503 'mxo i 6 7 9 6 5 3 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796503 fen-Seem Prepcom Cairo proposed a protocol thatwould incorporate negative security assurances into the NPT Obtaining NWS support for a similar protocolin the draft Africa Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty is a key concern of some African states 3 - Discriminatory nuclear technical assistance and export control practices A vocal group of developing countries led by Iran has accused the nuclear suppliers of not living up to their Article IV NPT obligations to provide nuclear technology for peaceful purposes These states regard with suspicion efforts by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to further restrict nuclear or dual use commodity trade China which derives substantial income from nuclear- related exports also is concerned about efforts to strengthen nuclear-related export controls - Shortfallsin the NPT's inspection veri cation and compliance mechanisms Revelations that Iraq developed a covert nuclear weapons program while under IAEA safeguards and the dif culties obtaining access to nuclear-related sites in North Korea have generated complaints that the NPT in its present form is ineffective and'should be amended to strengthen its veri cation mechanisms Not many develoPingcountries have jumped on this bandwagon in part because of concerns that a strengthened safeguards regime could represent a further intrusion on their national sovereignty Regional Alliances and the NPT Vote Count The outcome of the 1995 NPT Conference will depend on a variety of factors including conference dynamics the degree of US and allied in uence possible economic concessions regional security considerations and the wei ht signatories 1 will give to the positions of their neighbors and mentor states i - - Currently approximately 60 NPT signatories rmly support inde nite extension and can be expected with few exceptions to- remain resolute on this position This group consists of Central and West European nations the former Soviet republics South Korea Japan Australia New Zealand and several of the Latin American and Caribbean states 3Some regional groupings View NWS adherence to existing and proposed Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones as a model - of a legally binding security assurance For example Protocol II of the South Paci c Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty commits the NWS not to Use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against parties to the - Treaty only Russia and China have signed this Protocol Similarly Article 3 of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco gives protection to all contracting parties form the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 1 albeit with some provisos All NWSs have signed that protocol U SC-671426I94 - 3 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796503 I 006796503 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796503 Top-Seem- - Outside of this core group 20 to 25 additional countries have indicated either publicly or diplomatically that they will support inde nite extension and another 20 are leaning in this direction Many of these 40 to 45 countries however remain susceptible to regional pressures and NAM overtures and their positions are thus highly uid This group consists primarily of the remaining Latin American countries the South Paci c Island Nations and a handful of the Arab African and East Asian countries About 25 countries either oppose or are leaning toward opposing inde nite extension Many of these place strict conditions on their particularly signi cant progress toward a CTBT or a concrete step by Israel toward NPT adherence Although regionally diverse these NAM opponents of inde nite extension are concentrated in the Arab League the ASEAN states and Latin America Iran is the only country that unconditionally opposes inde nite extension African nations constitute the largest concentration of undecided signatories with approximately 35 undecided or unknown votes So uth Asian nei hbors of India and Pakistan also remain uncommitted at this point Outlook -A substantial high-level diplomatic effort by the United States and its allies will probably be required to obtain a majority vote for inde nite extension 'To obtain a signi cant majority perhaps two-thirds or more progress probably will be required on the range of arms control and regional security issues of interest to the Some European countries may consider alternative positions such as a 25-year limited-term extension should it become evident that a substantial majority for inde nite extension is not achievable False perceptions that the United States and the West are not rm in their position could also decrease the likelihood of assembling a majority vote before the Conference 8067 1426 94 5 -'Pop-Secret Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796503 bxsi mo 5 bxs hm hm Hm u bxs Approved for Release 2019 09 24 000796503 Sensitive to this perceived backsliding opponents to inde nite extension are solidifying theirjpositions and campaigning for regional support For example several core countries such-as Colombia and Indonesia are rallying around a 25 year Backers of inde nite extension may well be faced with choosing between supporting a narrow majority for'inde nite extension or a large majority or near consensus for a xed-extension option SCI-671426194 Approved fer Release 2019 09 24 006796503 006796503 Approved for-Release 2019 09 24 006796503 Progress Toward A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT have progressed more anticipated and a treaty is unlikely to be concluded before the 1995 NPT Conference Reaching consensus on a nal text is possible by the end of 1995 and a treaty could be concluded in 1996 - China has said it will not sign a CTBT before 1996 China probably wants to conclude its current round of scheduled tests - - France wants to be able to reconsider its stand on the CTBT after its national election next May - Most NWSs have indicated that even if a CTBT text was completed before the 1995 NPT Conference the NWSs could not sign it without the secure underpinning of a long-term Although most request only signi cant progress toward conclusion of the CTBT some have demanded that the CTBT be completed before the 1995 NPT extension vote These nations fear losing negotiating leverage with the NWSs on the CTBT and such other arms control measures as a Fissile Material Cut-Off Convention if the NPT is extended inde nitely before their completion This concern has prompted calls to recess the NPT Conference until a CTBT and possibly other measures can be concluded are also becoming increasingly aware of possible loopholes in the CTBT that are being considered by the NWSs that- would allow them to _ - Conduct hydronuclear experiments all NW S - Withdraw from the CTBT without invoking supreme national interest United States - Retain the right to conduct safety reliability tests UK and France peaceful nuclear ex lesions China and tests in sealed above ground containers Russia 8067 1426 04 7 I Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796503 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu