6 7 6 4 9 3 Approved for Release 2919 09 24 C06796493 Intelligence Report O ice of Scientific and Weapons Research 10 April 1995 The NPT Extension Conference A Challenging Endgame The Western Group enters the I 995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in a relatively strong position with a national majority of some 92 NPT signatories having indicated either publicly or diplomatically that they support inde nite extension see matrix of estimated country positions Nevertheless signi cant e orts by the Non-Aligned Movement NAM and the Arab League to negotiate consensus positions behind alternative extension optionsare likely to continue during the end game and inde nite extension is by no means assured Obtaining indefinite extension will depend on I Our ability to assuage concerns about a series of contentious issues that the NAM consistently has linked to inde nite extension - 0 The West s ability to prevent NAM supporters of inde nite extension from defecting Obtaining favorable voting procedures 0 Conference dynamics Although the composition of the northern or Western-Eurasian coalition behind indefinite extension has remained relatively constant the loyalties of the' southern group will continue to be vulnerable to efforts by the NAM and the Arab League to develop alternative extension options As a result and because many undecided states will delay their extension decision until the eleventh hour we may not have an accurate count as we enter the vote WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED sw 95-40022cx TN 95-02879 Top-Secret Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796493 The Basis for a- Possible Majority Vote Since the Fourth Preparatory Committee prepcom meeting in January 1995 the bloc in faster ref inde nite extension has grown by approximately 30 votes and at 92 now roommates amazonallsmajo ty o'f Treaty parties The bulk of this support comes from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Russia the Europe and the rest of Western Europe with the exception of Switzerland Pockets of support that we assess as critical to maintaining this majority also have emerged among the NAM but these countries remain vulnerable to backsliding because of continued attempts by the NAM to develop a joint position A surge tonegotiate a common NAM position is likely during the 11-12 April NAM Senior iD ioialsiMeeting and-at the Conference itself-if Conference dvnamics ove favorable to a bandwagon emerging behind a more limited extension option Currently blocs of nonaligned support for indefinite extension come from 0 Central America The six Central American states are expected to support inde nite extension 1 Several of these had previously supported the Venezuelan 25-year fixed period option - -o The Carribean Islands In fall 1994 the Caribbean Community and Common Market CARICOM issued a statement supporting inde nite extension Only half of the member states have committed to indefinite extension independently however 2 1113 South Paci c In 1994'the South Paci c Forum SPF issued a communique supporting the unconditional inde nite extension of the NPT and historically the SPF has voted as a bloc Nevertheless since then a few South Paci c countries including Papua New Guinea have expressed reservations about supporting inde nite extension - Francophone Africa French-speaking African countries which account for roughly a dozen of the states in Central and Western Africa are inclined to follow Paris one on NPT extension and thus have indicated a preference for inde nite extension I The Central American states are Nicaragua El Salvador Honduras Guatemala Panama and Costa Rica U 2 CARICOM members of the NPT are Antigua and Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Belize Dominica Grenada Guyana Jamaica St Kitts and Nevis St Lucia St Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago U 3 NPT signatories in the SPF are Australia Fiji Kiribati Marshall Islands Nauru New Zealand Papua New Guinea Solomonsislands Ton Tuvalu and Western Samoa Additionally Vanautu and Palau may accede before the- 'Conference- n This report was prepared _bffice of Scienti c and Weapons Research with contributions from other offic 'n th D'r of Intelligence Comments and queries are welcome and ma be directed to Chief Nuclear Biological and Chemical Division oswgl Information available as of 29 March I was used in this repor W3 7 mo -Top-Seeret- 2 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796493 ic06796493 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 Nevertheless some have indicated that they would not oppose a regional or NAM - consensus should one emerge Oppositientls Concentrated In the Middle East and the NAM The East The majority of states in the Middle East continue to oppose the unconditirma l inde nite extension of the NPT and absent Israeli signature of the Treaty are notildhe ly-to change-theirpositions by April Algeria Egypt Iran Iraq Lebanon LibyaSgt wand Yemen probably will be among those voting against inde nite extension or possibly abstaining in the interests of not damaging relations with Washington This group probably will pursue a single fixed etitension or a series of limited extensions such as a rolling ve year extension as the best way of enabling them to retain leverage with the West and Israel on arms control issues Although the Arab League4 meeting in late March failed to adopt a consensus position against inde nite extension it left the issue open for further discussion The Arab League s resolution said the Arab position would take shape depending on the extent to which universal implementaion of the Treaty had been achieved The resolution also supports the efforts to link other arms control issues to the extension decision Nonetheless a few positive signs are emerging The Non Aligned Movement An ad hoc NAM NPT working group-chaired by Malaysia has been meeting since late 1994 with the goal of developing a uni ed NAM position Although the group completed a position paper for use by NAM countries during the NPT Conference we believe they failed to agree upon a common extension proposal 4 The Arab League consists of Algeria Bahrain Djibouti Egypt Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Mauritania Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Somalia Sudan Syria Tunisia UAE Yemen and the Palestine Liberation Organization U Top-Secret 3 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 306796493 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796493 - Indonesia as president of the NAM is Spearheadin NAM efforts to oppose inde nite extension Jakarta has proposed different extension options over the last six months including a xed-term extension and a series of rolling xed periods I -0 favors extending the Treaty for a xed term unless certain alleged defects in the Treaty principally so-called discriminatory export control practices are corrected - Mexico s opposition to inde nite extension appears to have remained unchanged as 9f 10 March Targets for NAM Maneuver-ing Regions Vulnerable to the Opposition Africa No Organization of African Unity OAU consensus has emerged largely because many African States are ambivalent about NPT extension States in this region probably will be more in uenced by the votes of key regional players such as South Africa-than by NAM hardliners 30671298195 I 4 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 A A 00 bl 1 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 - South Africa has consistently supported indefinite extension or extension in perpetuity In an effort'to bring along its neighbors in the region on 10 March it suggested a rolling fixed periods option as a possible compromise 1 'f-I he SADCS constiitntes a key pocket of opposition to inde nite extension but South Africa will probably influence its ultimate decision Southeast Asia Since Philippine President Ramos late January statement that Manila will vote for inde nite extension the six Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN nations appear to have given up efforts to reach a consensus position opposing inde nite extension S and Thailand appear intent on xed term extensions while Singapore remains undecided It is not clear how Brunei which may have been awaiting an ASEAN consensus against inde nite extension will proceed Other Southeast Asianstates Bur'ma Laos Vietnam and Cambodia are also divided on the issue a South Asia South Asian NPT member states-concerned about neighboring India s and Pakistan s nuclear weapon capabilities-have been consistently supportive of nuclear - nonproliferation objectives but hold mixed views on NPT extension Afghanistan the Maldives and Bangladesh support unconditional inde nite extension although Bangladesh s support may be wavering Other South Asian signatories such as Nepal either support a fixed extension period or have not decided what form extension should take Sri Lanka charged with presiding over the conference in April will go along with the consensus so as to preserve the appearance of impartiality as president Latin America Most of Latin America probably will support indefinite extension in the end but the region also includes some key NPT troublemakers Mexico Colombia Venezuela and Ecuador have all expressed interest in limited term extensions citing the 5 Members of the SADC are Angola not an NPT signatory Botswana Lesotho Namibia Malawi Mozambique South Africa swaziland Tanzania Zambia and Zimbabwe U 5 ASEAN members are Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore and Thailand Laos Papua New Guinea and Vietnam participate as observers U 7 bxs 80671298195 Pup'Secf r 1 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 zco 7964 3 6 9 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 weapons states poor disannamcnt track record Article VIM 1 Seventeen countries have publicly or privately endorsed inde nite extension the remainder 8 3 may be susceptible tc ying efforts of Mexico and other NAM opponents of 3 indefinite extension 7 aKey Variables'That Could Affect the Conference Outcome iliongstanding Linkage Issues The issues outlined in the NAM documents presented at the Third and Fourth-Preparatory Committee meetings remain central negotiating positions of NAM opponents of inde nite extension They include calls for a time- bound framework for eliminating nuclear weapons treaty universality support for nuclear weapon-free Zones a comprehensive nuclear test ban a ssile material cut-off legally libinding security assurances and the-peaceful use of nuclear energy Most conciliatory measures recently proposed by the NWSs in an effort to widen support for inde nite extension do not cut deeply enough to satisfy such hardline NAM opponents as Iran Indonesia Egypt and Nigeria see inset Maintaining majority backing for inde nite extension will depend in part on our ability-to convince NPT signatories that progress made to date on these issues is indicative of our goodfaith and is at least substantial enough to give them the political cover to support inde nite extension Procedural Issues Unsettled rules relating to voting procedures may affect the outcome in largely unpredictable ways see inset simultaneous voting is adopted a key challenge will be to prevent adoption of a rule that would result in fallback options acceptable to Washington being eliminated in early voting rounds Similarly we believe that ublic balloting will help keep countries in the pro-inde nite extension camp Delegate personalities Personalities of delegates in of cial 'or unof cial leadership positions are likely to affect conference dynamics For example the Committee chairmen may have biases which could affect the tone and content of their nal Committee reports see inset Isaac Ayewah the Nigerian who will-chair Main Committee 1 was extremely sympathetic to Iran s arguments 'when he presided over Prepcorn - - The Conference President ayantha Dhanapala from Sri Lanka has pledged neutrality however a recent speech by the Sri Lankan ambassador to the Conference on Disarmatnent may indicate that Colombo is in fact inclined against inde nite extension If Dhanapala shares his colleagues views givcn the considerable leverage afforded the conference president such inclinations could affect the process and outcome of the Conference I 3 Collapse of US-DPRK Agreed Framework Differences between the United States and North Korea over South Korea s role in providing two light-water reactors to the North Top-Seem 6 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 risks a breakdown in the Agreed Framework P yongyang has threatened to refuel its 5 megawatt electric reactor if the reactor supplier issue is not resolved by 21 April about a week into the NPT Conference The breakdown of the Agreed Framework _particularly if it is followed by a North Korean withdrawal from the NPT and or a return an the Security-Council for sanctions would underscore the international community s z niitedsoptionsiorcenforcing the NPT regime l - soutIOOk sh-oft bandwagon emerging at the Conference against inde nite extension is real The uncertainty stems primarily om the lack of an overwhelming consensus behind inde nite extension the continuing activism of the NAM and others in promoting alternative extension options and the likelihood that some supporters of inde nite extension will fail to attend the Conference abstain or settle for second-best options Our ability to achieve inde nite extension will be further challenged by I Continued activism by the Arab Loague and the NAM for a more limited extension option including attempts to sway those NAM countries inclined to support inde nite extension The NAM will use focused criticism of the weapon states performance on such long-standing linkage issues as a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT a ssile material cutoff legally binding security assurances and peaceful nubiear technology transfer to argue that the Non-Nuclear Weapons States need to retain a source of leverage on the Nuclear Weapons States Many NAM states fear'that achieving inde nite extension Will curtail further reviews of Treaty operation The likelihood that many states will delay their extension decision until the eleventh hour We may not have an accurate view of the depth and breadth of support for indefinite extension as we enter the actual vote A NAM push for the Conference to reach all decisions by a near consensus rather than a simple majority and the possibility that NAM hard-liners will try to ad'ourn the Conference rather than accept an inde nite extension by simple majority t Some supporters of inde nite extension have expressed concern over the strategy to accept a 50-percent plus 1 majority vote fearing that doing so would alienate too many other states and jeopardize the future of the NPT Most NPT signatories however appear to understand that they will be bound by whatever the majority decides at the conference and we do not foresee mass withdrawals from the Treaty even if inde nite extension is narrowa achieved 0 With the exception of North Korea no country has ever come this close to withdrawing from the NPT - There has been no indication that any country is seriously considering withdrawing from the NPT should the vote not go their way I SC-67 1298 95 rTop'Secret 7 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796493 6 7 9 54 9 3 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796493 1 0 Iran and Egypt are the only countries that previously have hinted at a possible withdrawal over the extension decision Iran now denies that it would withdraw if the Treaty is extended inde nitely presumably because it wants to assure access to technology for its nuclear program Egyptian President Mubarak said in March that Egypt will not withdraw even if its demands are not met by the time of the Treaty Conferenoe - - - 80671298195 JFBp-Seefet- 8 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796493 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 v1- - 7- - A 92 5 115% In 1 g Gdnditiehg ffor hbnfentipus a 1- ma '7 3 15129 90 4' y ls'il 9 - my I e 35 gir 5 455 - ha ha i a 35 Iliuh' n 91 11 53 I - 4 an gimme seine him-116 peep anew safe g - v Qt be Mew em melud f fr a 7 atq alcqliumm extensm sf of2the contingent-- - sew gifmr ua ng 55' 35 if ance aesf p - - I sawnan-3 a ammayzhew lmg temept si luti lil onf osi i7ir 3g i g atiizefs m rit a iiraric S-gg an iigt itim step 1 g yi ih i g 9'21 1 - 1 563 55 I 5' 51w 5 va Ln eqcumt ngpx-ghmeyge '0 Sf301n 2_- A r yea-Ta 7 u ru1 13 33Hing- peace esvo 2 a contmues toaehampiommeSg fdi at qenf ie 3' 5 391 esf rg II-fa - f tatesengi liu all ItsTrig - ancogsmeggcy m q nuclear 3 sz i c 3 u 23 Eli i2 1 Leiyin1 12Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796493 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 wk Q 5ng jl gfe- 11 9 - Commutteesa-saa - Khan 1 rwr6 14 wagwe urpc arsed-e a thr' h3- at 'u 6 - 95 - min 5 omuecHug gfgw to a 7 are -- 4 35om 66' a mgzr rswam 3 Mr V - 31 - w Maxiaux - re re m v ma r iv 3 k - 335 ma was 1 r hi 32 95 v 70 ff 1553' newv gfax I-YA 7 I a7 g xkbv 355- wing rm in H0 - 5M5 i vm 'z 75% via mama an r u w 4 weapons - z a nia 45 33 1 w 1 gs- e rr - wan M vvw u dme- v r - awe-flgaugergwa mew rogaayclc 31Ex md t 44 7 - 95 44 gsf g gav w mxw -92' 5 5w 3- am Mimi a Mw 2 Mr Wig-My - 1- ml v Qiy nun- 4 5% f'vf' hit 00 a a 1L any-Maw mag 3 w a MW d I urth a m 4 ii- 1 25 3an hi-i 2 75 4 in flag ommittee 7 - idercd - a abe th 6a353% a x J- cl ss gi uh SCI-67129805 Tap-Secret- 10 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796493 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 im gesliige 'goyemin' imam 76 - ot ig tilf'h u iieW ' afiB - r- nut-wig Idstime A a Eat atr ry es eganxorep of zqgsaimmlm $9 053 4 2 43 J 12w 2 14 2- 0nal meunga rpa u hue-agma m awe ta pm - ass - - -- -- 011$ 1 de q r 591 - sed-aamr out A faw'nr 21 1 iz ifaymmorhp teng on ah 5 9 members bcheve - f L ggeewedl 3-1 in $1493 a u a -- fti- E p 4 113 pf mde mte bx gn sgop supportersoff xq 3 113 atheisz Harv ssfully 2% p11 - - 91slyeballpt' m 3 1 3 10 - -1- ai - a - mad-beg gg a -z-543 - fs-t 1 13 mm 30671298195 Tap-Seem 11 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 CO6796493 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796493 Emmet- Approved for Release 2019 09 24 306796493 306796493 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 Sema- 'SE cre-L Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 CO6796493 6 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 Secret Secret Approved for Release 2019 09 24 006796493 Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796493 See-Fet - Approved for Release 2019 09 24 C06796493 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu