DECLASSIFICATION w Chapman Senior Reviewer 3 19 2019 NOTE TO THE SECRETARY Chris I represented you is morning at a meeting of the President's foreign poli entirely on the Moscow summit in reporting on my trip for the Summit with the issue become the centerpiece to the President were the VP Tony the two LeonsIED us Department of State Case No Doc No 006698878 Date 06 25 2019 RELEASE DIN FutLt United States Department of State The Deputy Secretary of State Washington DC 20520 April 13 1995 t AWN yl A Wit 46% 1 We 42 Mafb w' My we We met for nearly an hourfc ur 7 Tony asked me to take the lead making a presentation on the prospects team and laying out recommendations on how to deal since that has for better or worse Those present in the Oval in addition Sandy Chip Blacker and I began a 10-minute presentation by saying that May 10 is a moment of truth for the Administration's ability to keep on track two strategies that of post Cold War Europe developing a parallel sec and Russia may have to settle for g The best outcome in allaying Yeltsin's cor are crucial to the President's vision admitting new members to NATO and urity relationship between the Alliance There are two possible outcomes at the Summit one that we must try as hard as we can to get and another we would be for the President to succeed cerns about the pace of NATO expansion and securing Russia' 5 eng agement in PFP The necessary assurances are a not a ma ter of compromising or retreating on our policy rather they his mistaken fears about happen during the next tw years re a matter of disabusing Yeltsin of hat is happening -- and what will If he can convince Yeltsin that it is in Russia's in erest to participate fully and in the Partnersh for Peace himself to a date-certain for signing the PFP documents making Russia a full Part able to initiate the ussia dialogue yield by the end of this relations the Central European aspi own country both by most and if Yeltsin commits thus the two President will then be That dialogue should framework for NATO Russia nr ear a Such an agreem nt will be welcomed by our Allies by ra ts for NATO membership and in our a Ivocates of NATO expansion and by many critics of our policy who fear that NATO expansion jeopardizes Russian refor Dye af x rv B UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No C06698878 Date 06 25 2019 IED US Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No 006698878 Date 06 25 2019 $1 The distant second-best outcome in Moscow would be for the two leaders to have a tough serious inconclusive but not acrimonious exchange on an extremely difficult subject In short no breakthrough -- but no repetition of Budapest either I reported that both Chernomyrdin and Yeltsin's national security adviser Ryurikov asked me to assure our President that even if he and Yeltsin can't solve the issue Yeltsin will not be a bad host Based on my talks in Moscow I reported that virtually all major players in Russia all across the political spectrum are either deeply opposed to or at least deeply worried about NATO expansion Therefore we cannot realistically expect a Russian blessing or endorsement of expansion now or probably any time soonHowever almost as much as wit erars expanSion many in Moscow fear Russia' 5 own isolation Moreover the RuSSian military very much wants to cooperate as much as possible- with NATO Grachev made this quite clear to Bill Perry 3Therefore v Russia wants a relationship with NATO an agreement along the' lines of what we' re prepared to negot iate espec1ally if that relationship agreement can for now at least be' defined in a way that finesses the question of how large a NATO we're talking about-l fw- m As for Yeltsin personally much as he diS-lik s NATO he wants a good Summit and he wants to keep open as many doors as possible for Russia s 1ntegrationeintq the Therefore he has a strong personal motive for trying'to square ij 5 3 the CitCle -- and for dOing so atr'the Sum1t txliJ 1715 1 1Ai 17 513 13 qu -wu 7-3 if i' v All the major players in WesternvEurope and'Central Europe i e NATO members and would- be members alike -- want to see a Russia relationship Whether they re ambivalent about expansion the West Europeans orienthusfastic about 1t 1the 51'3727 Central EurOpeans they don' wanf the processwt provoke v spasms of paranoia and countermeasufes by the Russ1ans They 7 know from experience that thereZs noth1ng more offen51veJthan Russian on the defenSive in S i Nflrii 13 incifi EZWB i ldgam w vm aha- 5' viz-Ina - 'Therefore our goal for the Summit 0 Yeltsin' agreement to s1gn the outstand1ng PFP if possible before May lor'fa111ng that at the Summit or at least at an announcedadateZ -certain soon 33 3 Jpn arr 4 1 0 A joint commitment to negotiate by the end of this Trgzar a framework on the NATO Russian relationship that answers concerns on both sides UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No 006698878 Date 06 25 2019 IED US Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No 006698878 Date 06 25 2019 -3- A joint statement released at the Summit laying out the parameters of a new European security order and Russia s role in it Knowing from Tom Donilon among others that there had been quite a bit of debate in the White House over whether the President should give a major pre Summit foreignvpolicy speech I argued that he should It would help I suggested if before the Summit the President made a definitive statement on his vision of European security and integration One purpose of such a speech would be for him to put on record yet again and in the clearest possible fashion our objectives and an authoritative sense of the pace of the process This message will be in fundamental ways reassuring to the Cen_tral Europeans for it will reaffirm the seriousness bf our approach we are moving forward At the same time it will be reassuring to the Russians and the West Europeans who are also nervous about rush since it would signal a time frame for actual expansion that is in keeping both with realities of the situation n9 way is NATO actually going to expand next year and with the_ assurances you gave Yeltsin in September our forward movement does not put us on a collision course with the RuSSian presidential elections I said I thought it was important for him to deliver this message in advance say well in advance -- of the Summit so that what he says in Moscow and what Yeltsin says his said does not appear to be a concession to him on that OccaEion rather it will be and will be understood t9 fully m consistent with long- -standing policy 'A pre w09 d n v3 be a way to innoculate ourselves against ew Yalta type headlines out of the Summit - I then suggested how to use the rema1n1ng i333 _Ss expecting any moment a Yeltsin reply _t9 PQTUS 0 0 I '7 ur n r- mun O mnop European security It will ask for some familiar as that an expanded NATO won' threaten Ru551a securi commercial interests Knowing the questions 1 313 121 2 1 with our answers We don't know whether Yelts1n 195 0 another American presidential letter 6r whether pr1vate assurances delivered via our ambassador Or by you t6 Kozyrev will do the trickanswering Yeltsin' letter will depend on the format of the 'Signed by the President cannot go as far as nonpapers 9r oral notes 33 2 a 3213 an 1 wish- - UN on 40110111535 1'5- H- We should work this issue over the next several _days so that the President can include reference to his letter when he talks to Yeltsin by phone The Russians have asked for a presidential phone conversation Monday or Tuesday In addition to previewing his answer to the new letter the President might stress the importance of resolving these issues as much as UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06698878 Date 06 25 2019 Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06698878 Date 06 25 2019 8 5 possible before the Summit so that in their face to-face talks in Mos to hag cow they can concentrate on the future rather than having gle over the unfinished business of PEP We'll have the following opportunities to do that Jim Collins and Mamedov are meeting in London at the end of next week You and Kozyrev are meeting at the end of the month I mentioned that if the Russian response to our initiative is sufficiently forthcoming by the time Kozyrev gets here it might be helpful if the President had a brief meeting with himadd that it might be a good idea if I were prepared to make another trip to Moscow either just before or jUst after the next Chris- -Kozyrev session _depending on how the_ Collins Mamedov talks next week go -- - - The President first called onhBill Perry who said agreed that we should do everything we Can to achieve progress on PFP both because it was important also becaus He not for th there was so little progress likely on any other issue ed that the press was already establishing a litmus test success of the Summit on the He also 1 - agreed that we should find some way to f1nesse whether Russia should dialog it we indivi -- mil Gore C would schedu Force Nunn images and Bi ns were endorsing NATO expansion per sezixAs he putTit we define success in terms of PFP and Russia - ue not Russia' 5 acceptance of our argument on expansidn- - Til Bill also urged that both 1n-advance'of the summit and 3E 5 3 2 a stress that the relationship is more than the sumaof the dual issues we'll be discussing The key is engagement itary-to-military and economic hernomyrdin 3 ws 1 Eng-1 117 31 wit If ht 1 int 01 He pressed for addition to the schedule oE-annevent dramatize denuclearization W1thsapologiesEto'WH Ean1u 1 1 - lers he said the President should v15rt the Base where Soviet era bombers are bernguchopped up with ieil f' 0 ugar help I said we' have to make- sure -there were of available of U S bombers Suffering a similar fate 11 agreed saying we could arrangevfor the-RUSSian media to have access to Davis-Mantham AFB that kind of wor very Summit to the I d ca is done vs t-u at It was at that point that very very profoUndIy worfied ab66t the _ being a bust and about its being extremely deterimental He said we should do everything we can to get what lled Outcome Number 1 a arrangement -especially because he believes that I was too sanguine in presenting Outcome Number 2 He believes that if Yeltsin a 1 w v 1 414 run UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06698878 Date 06 25 2019 6 6 9 8 8 L7 US Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 DOC No C06698878 Date 06 25 2019 stiffs us on PFP and NATO he wins politically at home -- and that President Clinton himself loses politically at home - there' 5 positive political benefit to him and nothing good for me if it looks as though yet again he' put the brakes on NATO Even if Yeltsin cooperates in trying to put a good face on non progress on NATO etc it will still be another Budapest -- actually worse than Budapest That was just comic relief I flew 18 hours to spend six hours getting the shit kicked out of An inconclusive meeting in Moscow will be a bad meeting including bad for me politically Such an outcome would turn up the heat on expansion and I hope the Russians understand that At the same time the President has deep misgivings about the West Europeans believing that they are indeed playing off m against us with the Russians not sure it realist1c to say that the Russians will be isolating themselves rather_than isolating us if they continue to play hard to- -get 6n NATO The Europeans are vulnerable to being split from us On this They' re probably sympathetic to some of the arguments they re git kn g hearing from the Russians They' re madde2r than hell at us over Bosnia and on NATO expansion they wLorry that be1ng by the Polish American vote in '96 1-The Republ1cans justm aggravate this calculus a - - Luz He then went to Bill PerrY' po1nt anLd agreed that w_eL_1- definitely need for this trip to_ be a_bout someth1ng otherLthan -1 just NATO Iran Chechnya and START II especially sinc it looks like Yeltsin is going to stiff uLsi _on those tog' anar i The Vice President then spoke He said Moscow was indeedL 1n d vk a high- -risk venture that the press he ment1oned Safir in -ushie particular is setting a very high bar But he then went on g- 4 1 to say that even minus progress on PFP the Summit could 3 4 -- been taking three steps forward two steps back He mentioned economic reform the IMF stand by privatizatianFBaltic troop qguisg withdrawals Russian restraint ovegnthe Crimeaj Ye1ts1n 5 been aqjt looking the other way as Kuchma reestabl1$hes control over 21 ljlcit 1P r1 alu91li Crimea Moscow's deal with Shevardnagze gye wAbkhagia and kirk a parliamentary opposition to Russ1an m111tarY presence in a -- Tajikistan He believes that their disaster in ChechnyaLhas made the Russian more dovish on their periphery - 3 t The VP acknowledged that there was also plenty Lof Lbad news He cited the threat to liberty and democracy from the growing security apparatus and recent evidence- of- cont1nu1ng ominous behavior by the Ministry of Atomic Energy The VP concluded by saying that we should gear our Summit plans toward a no-disaster scenario while trying to get progress on any issues we can particularly NATO etc We UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No F-2017-13804 Doc No C06698878 Date 06 25 2019 should also make the most of the World War II commemoration remembering that the Russians lost 100 times as many people as we did Picking up on that the President said that any speech he gives whether before the Summit or during it should do something that explains the connection between World War II and the post-Cold War phase we're in now -- we were together before we can be together again He also wants us to find a way to establish a subtext to the Summit along these lines the more integrated Russia is into the West the less likely Russia is to be aggressive in other contexts He agreed with the VP that we should not let ourselvesube A stampeded into the general pessimism about that when he was in Russia in January4194 reformist- h ministers of the Chernomyrdin cabinet were on_theinqway out 1 - everyone thought the whole deal was that the Russian economy was going into the tank We' ve got to push back against those who want to declare the whole thing over there a disaster - Tony emphasized the need to couch all our- arguments a r - whether they were in defense of agreement with the Russians -or s in explanation of disagreements --in terms of U S national interest As we were breaking the President came back to the problem I'd mentioned over the West European Allies-not-backing us up on NATO He said we should concentrate-particularly -Jon closing ranks with Kohl who of course will be going to Moscow and who has a lot of influence on lzixgelre Lag 1211 His parting words as some very distnaught schedulers if hi 3 finally succeeded in shooing us out of the Oval was an 3 y instruction to bust your ass forsa Russia deal if ate zn-i all possible along the lines of what J lai d ouL - 4 3a Sandy Bill Perry Chip Blacker and I huddled in_ Tony agst office afterward We agreed that while the regular interagency n process would deal with all other aspectslofz ummitaplanning r Eh nxug we d set up a small off line group to hand1es Ku the NATO-Russia issue with Sandy JoexNyer Bill Owens and Fln myself in the lead It will meet asfsoon as letter The latest word on that from a Collins conversation with the Russian charge is that the letter is still- on 11- Lac - Yeltsin' desk or wherever in Sochi- - I apologize for the length of this report but- I believe- this was an important enough co tion that you would be interested in the full conten Strobe UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No Doc No 306698878 Date 06 25 2019 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu