Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Directorate of Secret Intelligence 25X1 The Soviet Nuclear Power Program After the Chernobyl Accident 25 A Research Paper Secret SOV 87-10032X June 1987 464 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 25x12 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 0 2 90 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 7 Directorate of Secret Intelligence 25X1 The Soviet Nuclear Power Program After the Chernobyl Accident 25 A Research Paper This paper was prepared by the 25X l Of ce of Soviet Analysis Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief Economic Performance Division SOVAJ 25x1 2 5X1 Reverse Blank Secret SO 87-1 0032X June 1987 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 25X1 The Soviet Nuclear Power Program After the Chernobyl AccidentS 25X1 Key Judgments The disruptions to the Soviet nuclear power industry through 1990 caused Information available by the Chernobyl accident will be minor when measured in broad as May I987 economic terms and will not derail Soviet intentions to increase reliance on was used this report this energy source The Soviets remain strongly committed to reducing dependence on oil and gas antinuclear elements of public opinion will have only a weak effect and the large investment and substantial infrastructure in the commercial nuclear program will ensure continued growth Beyond 1990 however some modi cation of the nuclear power program is likely a few changes could set back the timetable by several years These would probably involve the design and location of future nuclear plants and a shift in emphasis resulting from the competition of coal and oil interests for 1 investment resources 25X1 The to some extent its CEMA partners will bear a variety of energy-related costs because of the Chernobyl accident The loss of electricity generated by the Chernobyl reactors and the increased use of fossil fuels in thermal power plants to partially offset the loss are key short- term consequences Eastern Europe already had to bear some of the burden of electricity cuts during the 1986-87 winter period of peak power demand During 1987 enough power plant capacity probably will be restored at Chernobyl or brought on line elsewhere to alleviate this problem Longer term consequences for the Soviet civilian nuclear industry include the investment writeolfs of at least three reactors at Chernobyl and the costs of improvements to the safety of other Chernobyl -type reactors A rough total of these capital costs shows them to be the equivalent of two or three years investment in the industry Since the accident Moscow has also spent about $80 million on Western equipment for use in the entombment of the destroyed reactor and in other aspects of the recovery 25X1 Despite increased costs we expect the Soviets will strive to minimize the impact of the accident on their long-term plans for nuclear power and will continue broadening the role of this energy source We believe they will be largely successful in this damage-limitation effort The xes proposed for implementation over the next several years for Chernobyl -type reactors are not likely to take them out of service for long and the costs are manageable Moreover power plants with Chernobyl -type reactors have long been slated to play a diminishing role in the Soviet nuclear program of the 19805 and 19905 as the emphasis shifts to other reactor types These other types represent 80 percent of the nuclear energy capacity currently under construction or planned 25X1 Secret SOV 87-10032X June 1987 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 UCLI cl Longstanding problems in manufacturing components for nuclear power plants and delays in plant construction will account for the majority of the shortfalls in bringing new capacity on stream between now and 1990 overshadowing the impact of Chernobyl on the growth of the commercial nuclear program The cumulative effect of the Chernobyl accident both the direct effects and the turmoil caused by the recovery ef- fort will probably mean that only three or four fewer new nuclear reactors out of 35 planned will be completed during the 1986-90 plan period The loss of these reactors and delays in the construction of others will mean that roughly 10 percent less electricity will be produced from nuclear power We believe the USSR will have about 48 000 megawatts of commercial nuclear capacity by yearend 1990 compared with 28 300 megawatts in 1985 and will produce some 260 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity at nuclear power plants in 1990 compared with 167 billion kilowatt-hours in The Soviets are likely to encounter only a minor domestic backlash against nuclear power The blow of Chernobyl may be enough to catalyze some Soviet groups with reservations about nuclear energy and the supporters of other energy sources into challenging plans for some nuclear facilities Advocates of other reactor types and other energy sources will use the accident to bolster their arguments The plans most vulnerable to pressure for nonnuclear alternatives are those for eight Chernobyl -type reactors where little construction has taken place and those for 20 units of a new type of nuclear plant designed to be sited near cities to provide a dedicated source of heat beginning in the 19905 The Soviets have sought a high-pro le involvement of the West in the postaccident events Moscow chose the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA as the forum in which to defuse Western concerns about radioactive contamination and safety in the nuclear program The Soviets will probably continue to use the IAEA to certify that the proposed modi cations to Chernobyl -type reactors are adequate and that all Soviet reactors are safe particularly types they hope to export Given the long-term need to monitor the environment and the leadership s intent to keep expanding its nuclear energy program Moscow is likely to look to the West for radiation monitoring and decontamination equipment and possibly nuclear power plant components and services A role for the West as supplier of plant components is more likely if Moscow chooses to Secret iv 25X l 25X l 25X l 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 25X1 accelerate construction of pressurized-water reactors to replace Cherno- byl -type reactors that may be canceled Soviet equipment suppliers have not been able to meet the demand at the current pace of construction 25X1 Any market in the USSR for Western nuclear vendors is likely to be highly competitive Firms from the United States France Finland West Germany Sweden Great Britain and Japan can offer many comparable components and services The US vendors will probably have little advantage over their competitors in sales of components and only a modest edge in services experience US rms are likely to trail the others in terms of nancing packages and ease of technology licensingg 25X1 Reverse Blank Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 vv- 25X1 Contents Page Key Judgments Sc0pe Note - 7 ix Short-Term Consequences of the Accident 1 The Accident Prescription for Disaster 1 Electricity Losses and Increased Fuel Use 2 Returning the Chernobyl Plant to Service 2 Short Term Economic Costs 3 Managing the Nuclear Power Capacity 7 Background 7 Choice of Reactor Types 9 Maintaining the RBMK Reactor Option 10 Outlook for Achievement of Nuclear Industry Goals for 1990 12 Assuring the Future VVER and AST Reactors 14 Impact on Soviet Nuclear Energy Policy 16 An Underlying Commitment to Nuclear Power 17 The In uence of Nuclear-Industry Infrastructure 20 Antinuclear Voices in the USSR 20 Impact on Resource Allocation and Trade 21 Soviet Purchases From the West 22 Soviet Nuclear Sales Abroad 22 Reverse Blank Vii Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Scope Note Reverse Blank Secret 25X1 For several decades the Soviets have viewed nuclear energy as the key to growth in the electricity supply and recently in the heat supply in the European USSR The Chernobyl accident on 26 April 1986 however has robbed the commercial nuclear power program of some momentum and challenged many Soviet concepts regarding its safety reliability and low costs The special August 1986 meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency showed that the Soviets were beginning to make changes based on their analysis of the accident This meeting also revealed that the Soviets expect to study their nuclear program a good deal more which means we are now getting only a rst look at the possible changes 25X1 This report explores how the Chernobyl disaster will probably in uence the plans for nuclear power and heat supply and evaluates the implications for total primary energy production 25x1 25X l 1x Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 The Soviet Nuclear Power Program After the Chernobyl Accident Short-Term Consequences of the Accident The accident that destroyed reactor unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in late April 1986 had many and varied consequences from the tragic hu- man costs see inset to marginally greater fossil-fuel consumption safety upgrades on Chernobyl type re- actors and some reexamination of the commercial nuclear program in the USSR The Accident Prescription for Disaster The Soviet accident report led with the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA indicates that the errors that doomed unit 4 began on 25 April when technicians started a poorly executed experiment to test the emergency electricity supply to the reactor Major violations of the procedures for reactor Opera- tions were committed such as switching 011' the emergency shutdown system and operating the reac- tor with too many control rods withdrawn These human errors coupled with a design aw that allowed reactor power to surge when uncontrolled steam generation began in the core set up the conditions for the accident The nal moments of the accident occurred in a period of about 40 seconds at 0123 local time on Saturday 26 April Operator errors had put the reactor in an unstable condition so reactor power increased rapidly when the experiment began Subse- quent analysis of the Soviet data by US experts suggests the power surge may have accelerated when the operators tried an emergency shutdown of the reactorDAccording to Soviet data the energy re- leased was for a fraction of a second 350 times the rated capacity of the reactor This burst of energy resulted in an instantaneous and violent surge of heat and pressure rupturing fuel channels and releasing Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret 25X1 25X1 The Human Costs of the Chernobyl Accident The 31 initial casualties resultingfrom the explosion that destroyed unit 4 will ultimately accountfor only a minor part of the human toll of the Chernobyl disaster Two power plant workers were killed imme diately and burns and high radiation exposures eventually claimed the lives of another 29 people 25x1 most of them remen and site emergency personnel Soviet doctors reported that nearly 300 people re- ceived enough radiation to require hospitalization These individuals will experience substantial addi- tional risk of conceng 25X1 Longer term health consequences in the USSR will result from radioactive contamination spread by the accident over an area of about 1 000 square kilome- ters Many thousands of persons were exposed to this radiation or will be exposed to residual amounts of radiation as daily routines are reestablished in creasing their long-term risk of cancer This cancer threat poses unique medical and prob- lems even though the overall statistical increase in 25x1 cancer rates is likely to be minimal E 25x1 Soviet reactions to the accident included a massive evacuation and a cleanup effort that will probably be a long-term battle An area with a 30-kilometer radius around the reactor was evacuated and Mos cow reported that about 135 000 people were moved In addition to these o icial evacuees perhaps as many as 270 000 mostly women and children left cities such as Kiev in the region around the reactor 25x1 site but outside the evacuation zone The o icial evacuation started about 36 hours after the explosion and took about 10 days to complete Most evacuees will never be able to return to their homes Nearly all of the 135 000 evacuees have been resettled about half in new homes 25x1 25X l Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret steam that disrupted large portions of the core Some of the shattered core material was pr0pelled through the roof of the reactor building The hot core material that was released started about 30 separate res in the unit 4 reactor hall and turbine building as well as on the roof of the adjoining unit 3 All but the main re in the graphite moderator material still inside unit 4 were extinguished in a few hours by the heroic efforts of re ghters The graph- ite re continued to burn for nearly two weeks carrying radioactivity high into the atmosphere until it was smothered by sand lead dolomite and boron dropped from helicopters Unit 3 was shut down four hours after the destruction of unit 4 Units 1 and 2 located several hundred meters from unit 4 continued producing electricity for 24 hours after the accident The Soviets reported considerable radioactive contamination of units 1 2 and 3 Electricity Losses and Increased Fuel Use For ve months following the destruction of the Chernobyl 4 reactor the plant s three surviving reac- tors were idled This loss of generating capacity roughly 10 percent of the total in the Ukraine would have led if uncompensated to an average de cit in electricity production of 2 4 billion kilowatt- hours kWh But during the summer lull in electric- ity demand the Soviets were in a favorable position to o set much of this potential de cit by stepping up electricity production from power plants burning fos- sil fuels Beginning in September however the sea- sonal upsurge in demand for electricity probably eliminated most of the painless adjustment mecha- nisms The Ukraine experienced electricity problems even during the summer lull in demand Ukrainian party chief Vladimir Shcherbitskiy in a July Speech called for additional energy conservation measures and Ukrainian Council of Ministers chairman Aleksandr Lyashko noted that some enterprises needed to Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 change to night shift work to reduce daytime electric- ity demand These steps were a likely preparation for coping with the prOSpective shortage of electricity since the Soviets were only able to restore two reactors at Chernobyl to partial service by the onset of winter The effect on total fuel demand of the effort to offset Chernobyl -induced electricity losses appears to have been minor Given the fuel-use capability of the replacement plants the Soviets were probably using an extra 45 000 barrels per day of oil 220 million cubic meters per month of natural gas and 400 000 tons per month of coal 3 During the ve- month period when the Chernobyl plant produced no electricity the nationwide demand for fuel oil in- creased 1 to 2 percent natural gas use gr percent and coal use rose by 0 3 percent In addition to the power losses at Chernobyl the Soviets are expecting cuts in output during 1987 at the four other nuclear power plants operating RBMK Chernobyl -type reactors xes to improve safety will reduce power output at these plants by about 10 percent or nearly 10 billion kWh in 1987 ave not indicated whether this is a one time loss in power generation due to temporary downtime or a derating of the capacity of these reactors Returning the Chernobyl Plant to Service As soon as the Chernobyl accident was under control Moscow began promoting a rapid recovery of power- generating capability at the idle plant evincing con- cern for longer term considerations affecting the nuclear power program as well as for the immediate exigencies - Moscow desired to spare the economy the degree of electricity shortfall that would come in winter unless much of the Chernobyl capacity was returned to service 3 The total fuel bill was nearly 800 000 tons of standard fuel A unit of standard fuel contains the energy equivalent of 7 000 kilocalories per kilogram or 12 600 Btus per pound Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 225x1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 - With roughly half the Soviet nuclear power plant capacity in Chernobyl -type reactors restoration of con dence in these units was imperative 0 The leadership probably viewed the recovery of the Chernobyl plant as an implicit test for the manage- ment of the nuclear industry proof that nuclear power is reliable and that Soviet management is competent The Soviets restarted Chernobyl unit 1 in late Sep- tember and unit 2 in November thereby missing their early optimistic goal Adequately decontaminating the site to resume operations tested Soviet ingenuity and resources see inset on page 6 A major realloca- tion of managers and technicians was needed to solve problems such as the entombment of the destroyed reactor and decontamination of the highly radioactive turbogenerator hall which houses the turbines of all four of the plant s units see gure 1 Part of the price for this success was a slowdown in the construction of at least three reactors at other power plants due for startup in 1986 Intermittent Operation of Chernobyl units 1 and 2 through mid-December suggested that problems remained The fate of Chernobyl unit 3 is still uncertain Although entombment of unit 4 is now complete the recovery of unit 3 will drag on for some time especially if critical electrical and ventilation assem- blies were damaged in the res following the accident or if radiation contamination is too extensive for rapid cleanup If the reactor of unit 3 is not fully recovered Moscow will have to reassess the shared facilities design at RBMK reactors Three nuclear power plants now use this type of design and one other such plant is at an early stage of construction l Shortly after the April accident plans were announced to restart Chernobyl units 1 and 2 in June During August the deadline for restart was shifted to October as the Soviets became more con- cerned about radiation exposures of operations staff 5 In order to save on plant investment and simplify designs the Soviets construct RBMK plants to share facilities for functions such as reactor hall ventilation or water treatment Although designs for Western nuclear power plants use similar logic a much greater effort and investment are made to assure that the integrity of functions is maintained in the event of disruption at any one reactor Secret Meanwhile the Soviets appear to have abandoned efforts to recover the partially constructed units 5 and 6 This was announced without elaboration by the chairman of the State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy Andronik Petrosyants on 25 April 1987 Factors in stopping construction probably in- 25X1 elude high radiation at the site rising construction costs and possibly difficulties in recruiting skilled labor to nish the project s 25X1 Short-Term Economic Costs The immediate economic costs of the accident include - The Opportunity costs of using additional fuel oil in plants replacing electricity from Chernobyl instead of selling the fuel oil for hard currency 0 Increased purchases of Western equipment to facili- tate the cleanup after the accident - The diversion of construction labor equipment and materials to the tasks of decontaminating the Cher- nobyl plant and surrounding area entombing the destroyed reactor of unit 4 and building new hous 25X1 ing for the evacueesl 25X1 The forgone hard currency earnings from reduced sales of heavy fuel oil at prevailing world-market prices during 1986 potentially amounted to roughly $100 million This opportunity cost was halved when two Chernobyl units were brought back on line in December 1986 Continued losses of potential sales of fuel oil at the reduced level will nevertheless equal nearly $10 million per month until another 2 000 megawatts MW of power plant capacity is brou ht into the power network probably late this year 25x1 Unit 5 is 85 percent complete and unit 6 is 15 percent complete In addition to decontamination and construction work on the power plants themselves housing and basic amenities would need to be organized for the 10 000 to 13 000 workers needed to nish 25x1 construction These pe0ple and their families were dis laced from the heavily contaminated town of Pripyat l 25x1 25X1 Secret eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 25x12 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 0 0 2 90 25X l Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 2H 7 ll 4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret Figure 1 cont 25X1 2 December 1986 25X1 312993A 6-87 25x1 5 Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret A Chronology of the Recovery E ort at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Reactor unit 4 explodes causing res in that unit and some damage to adjoining unit 3 Radioactive con- tamination forces shutdown of un- damaged units 1 and 2 and suspen sion of construction on units 5 and 6 Soviets publicly acknowledge the Gorbachev appears on TV describ- ing the accident and announcing Tunnel for access to the area under the unit 4 reactor started construc- tion on entombment for unit 4 First recovery timetable announced proposing to complete entombment and prepare units 1 2 and 3 for Restart of units 1 and 2 scheduled for October restart of unit 3 put on Tunnel to unit 4 completed Special CPSU Politburo meeting discusses Chernobyl investigation results announces reorganization of nuclear power industry IAEA special meeting on Chernobyl 29 September 10 October 13 October- 8 November I 5 November 5 December 1987 1 1-16 Janu- ary 13 March 25 April Unit I restarted unit 2 restart promised in two weeks Plans for units 3 5 and 6 an- nounced unit 3 restart scheduled for mid-I 987 construction on units 5 and 6 to resume after unit 3 brought on line Unit I shut downfor adjustments Unit 2 reactor restarted trial opera- tion at low power Pravda reports entombment of unit 4 complete imits I and 2 are on line and ready for normal service IAEA director Hans Blix inspects entombment and veri es its integrity decontamination or construction work beginning on units 5 and 6 Soviet press reports that units 1 and 2 are operating at full power The chairman of the USSR 5 State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy Andronik Petrosyants an nounces that units 5 and 6 will not be completed 1986 26 April 28 April accident I 3 May unit 4 extinguished 14 May goals for recovery 15 May began 22 May operation by 15 June 2 June hold 4 July 19 July 25 29 August held in Vienna Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret Table 1 The Nuclear Program in an International Perspective Country Capacity Reactors Output Percent Share of Yearend 1986 3 Yearend 1986 a 1986 Total 3 Total Power Output megawatts billion kilowatt hours United States 87 241 98 433 5 16 France 47 170 49 254 2 70 Soviet Union 29 312 42 161 0 10 Japan 24 686 32 164 8 29 West Germany 18 295 17 117 4 33 Britain 12 940 37 59 1 19 Canada 11 813 17 74 5 16 1 Preliminary data Does not include Chernobyl units 3 and 4 Announced changes in fuel enrichment at existing reactors will initially cost about 115 million rubles There will also be hard currency costs by September 1986 some $80 million had been spent on imported goods to aid the recovery Much of the cost of these imports could be charged to the nuclear program because they were used in the entombment of the Chernobyl unit 4 reactor The eventual costs to the nuclear industry are likely to be much higherFS The Soviets have made relatively small purchases from the West to facilitate cleanup after the accident speedily return Chernobyl units to use and construct new housing for workers displaced from their apart- ments and homes by radioactive contamination The Soviets bought a wide variety of products remote- controlled robots and tunneling equipment for decon- tamination work and entombment of the unit 4 reactor radiation monitoring equipment radiation 7 Uncon rmed Soviet estimates of the cost of the Chernobyl accident range from 2 billion to 25 billion rubles The minimum estimate was quoted in the Soviet press during the summer of 1986 and probably accounts for only direct damage to the plant immediate site cleanup and possibly population relocation expendi- tures The higher estimate was provided uno icially by a Soviet engineer who claimed to be assigned to the Chernobyl Investigat- ing Commission The upper estimate would probably cover a total accounting of the costs of cleanup and recovery and probably represents a projection of expenses through 1990 protection items for personnel and prefabricated housing units In addition the USSR received from international contributors several million dollars worth of donations in the form of cash medical supplies and household items Managing the Nuclear Power Capacity Background The USSR ranks among the leaders worldwide in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy see table 1 After a quick start as the rst country to operate a nuclear power plant the USSR fell behind the United States and later France Soviet industry has not been able to meet in timely fashion the technological and logistic challenges of nuclear power plant construction so plant startups are lagging three to ve years behind original plans The USSR never- theless has managed ambitious nuclear power re- search that has yielded the world s largest capacity reactors used for commercial applications one of the most advanced breeder-reactor programs and numer- ous designs that Soviet energy planners hope to implement in future uses of nuclear energy in urban 25X1 25X1 25X1 municipal and industrial projects see gure 21E 25X1 25X1 Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret Figure 2 Soviet Nuclear Power Plants 1 344 53 9 596 Power Plants capacity in megawatts 3 000 and above 3 0 1 50010 3 000 Less than 1 500 0 Under construction Note Figures indicate number of operations 1 it reactors as of January 1987 500 Kilometers I I I 500 Miles 313 3 i 3 19 oKostroma sf Beloyarskiyo3 7 Kalinin 2 r 4 Bail C Sea i Awe-5 Bi ibino l yyl' I northeastern Siberia I 7 1 NJ x Bashkir mpy 1 I jerl Gar kry AS kg Tatar oMinsk 13 Smolensk i E 1 a 2 Ba Iakovo Rovno 1 3 Kursk ge Chernobyl 4 Eglloronezh A ST 1 1 5 Novovoronezhskiy g Jhar kov km i KL Don $331 ki ivn 3i South f1 - 2 Ukraine 9 - a jg Za orozh' pf fyy r Rostov B ack Sea Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 710319 541360 687 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret USSR Commercial Nuclear Reactor and Plant Types RBMK A graphite-moderated boiling-water reactor currently used at the Chernobyl Leningrad Kursk Smolensk and Ignalina nuclear power stations It is produced in two standardized capacities 1 000 MW and 1 500 electrical rating Although boiling- water reactors are used outside the USSR there is no close Western counterpart to the RBMK which is operated only in the USSRE VVER A pressurized water reactor in which the water is used as both a moderator and a coolant It is produced in two standardized capacities 440 MW and 1 000 MW electrical rating This reactor is similar to many Western designs VVERs are operat- ed in the USSR at the Armenian Balakovo Kola Novovoronezhskiy Rovno South Ukraine and Za- porozh 'ye plants VVER reactors are also operated in Eastern Europe and Finlandi BN A fast-breeder reactor that as its name implies will produce or breed nuclear fuel for other reac- tors as it operates This reactor is cooled by liquid sodium The Soviets are running two prototypes 350 MW and 600 MW electrical rating Plans call for the design construction and operation of 800-M and versions Only a few other countries have mastered this technology on a similar scale 25X1 AST AT ET s These two types of nuclear plants are designed to supply heated waterfor centralized heat ing The AS will use a specially modi ed reactor of 25x1 500 W thermal rating that the Soviets plan to dedicate solely for centralized heat supply to cities Production has just started on this reactor Current plans call for its use at Gor kiy and Voronezh by 1990 and eventually at many other cities The ATE Ts plant will supply both electricity and heated water to cities The ATE Ts will use a reactor to power a steam turbine generator modi ed to permit release of heated water to the central heat network in cities Although the ATE Ts design incor 25X1 porates a standard VVER reactor model the loss of energy to the heat network lowers the electrical rating of the reactor to 900 MW Current plans call for startup of ATE Ts plants at Odessa Minsk and Khar kov by 1990 and extensive use in the European USSR in later yearsi 25X1 An important difference in viewpoint exists between the Soviets and the West on the economics of com- mercial nuclear power In the West the focus on the bottom line of nancial projections means that the cost and revenue projections for an individual utility play the leading role in decisions on how much nuclear power capacity to build or as more recently in decisions to cancel nuclear projects The Soviets on the other hand are less guided by the costs of individual projects than by the cost-bene t ratio of a proposed power plant with reSpect to Soviet fuel- supply logistics and the reliability and quality of electricity supplied to end users B In the USSR Inadequacies in electricity supply including low voltage AC frequency below established limits and intermittent brownouts or cutoffs are chronic in the USSR nuclear power plants are highly valued because they substantially reduce the burden of fossil-fuel produc- tion and transportation and until Chernobyl nucle- ar plants were more reliable electricity producers than either fossil-fueled or hydroelectric plants Although nuclear power plants are likely to become more costly as Chernobyl -inspired design modi cations are im- plemented they will retain their attractiveness in the Soviets broader economic evaluationg 25x1 Choice of Reactor Types After making a commitment to nuclear power Mos cow turned to the RBMK graphite-moderated boiling-water reactor in the 19605 and 19705 see inset This enabled the USSR to get substantial 25X1 Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret Figure 3 Construction of Soviet Commercial Nuclear Reactors 1981 85 Number of reactors 25 - Planned for startup - Finished during period All types RBMK-1500 RBMK- 1000 VVER- 1000 Type of reactor nuclear power capacity on line during the protracted period of tooling up to produce other types of reactors The RBMK was less technically demanding to build than other large-capacity reactor types Consequently the RBMK-1000 and RBMK-1500 are the backbone of the current program The Soviet pressurized-water model has two standardized capacities VVER-440 and The larger version is scheduled to become the workhorse of the 19905 Moscow hopes the prototype fast breeder reactor BN-600 will be- come the model for expansion in the 19905 and beyond to increase ef ciencies in the nuclear fuel cycle and to lower costs Within the next year or so the Soviets will probably begin operating a new reactor which will replace some fossil- fueled plants in supplying hot water to centralized heating systems 9 The numeric part of a power-reactor designation refers to the capacity of the reactor For the VVER RBMK and EN reactors this capacity is expressed in megawatts of electricity generation capability For the AST reactor this capacity is expressed in megawatts of thermal heating capability Secret 312994 687 Maintaining the RBMK Option The seriousness of the Chernobyl accident has over- shadowed the history of more than 80 reactor-years of operating reliably and without serious inci- dent number of positive characteristics of RBMK reactors de- scribed in Soviet technical handbooks are probably still valid and will contribute to a Soviet willingness to keep these reactors operating The RBMK-1000 reac- tor in recent years has had a better record for on-time assembly than other large power reactors see gure 3 Plants with this reactor can generate more electric- ity on an annual basis than either fossil-fueled or VVER-equipped power plants of equivalent capacity because the RBMK is subject to fewer unplanned outages l0 Online refueling capability helps RBMK reactors to maintain high utilization rates In 1985 for example the 14 RBMK-1000 reactors averaged 72- percent utilization of capacity while the six online reactors averaged 64 percent and a representative sample of fossil- fueled generating capacity averaged 70-percent utilization 10 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 25X1 25X1 25X l 25xi 25x1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Because the 14 existing RBMK reactors compose 53 percent of the nuclear power plant capacity and provide 6 percent of all the electricity generated in the USSR 60 percent of nuclear-generated power a prolonged safety related equipment re tting of exist- ing reactors could seriously disrupt the Soviet electric- ity supply We believe Moscow is not planning exten- sive modi cation of although Soviet inquiries to Western companies suggest Moscow is considering a retro t of additional equipment besides that mentioned in their accident report to the The Soviets appear to have rejected wholesale upgrad- ing of RBMK containment on the grounds of techni- cal di iculty and costs E The technical shortcomings of the RBMK reactor that contributed to the accident include a complex nuclear core that requires moderately sophisticated monitoring with computer-assisted control and the potential instability of the nuclear reactions in the core during low-power Operating conditions or if coolant is rapidly lost These were known to Soviet specialists well before the Chernobyl events Report- ing in the Soviet nuclear industry s technical journals showed that design engineers were working on these problems so xes may not require extraordinaril long downtimes or construction delays E Another concern surfaced by the catastrophe is the possible vulnerability of Soviet nuclear power stations to multiple reactor failure All ve of the existing plants using RBMK reactors are built around pairs of Western suppliers have been contacted about equipment for hydrogen monitoring and ignition to detect and prevent the forma- tion of an explosive mixture that could result in the Chernobyl -type destruction of a nuclear reactor Other possibilities for retro ts may involve adding backup emergency core cooling and improving the automated reactor-control systems 2 The Soviets have already set a precedent on refusal to retro t for containment Soviet planners had decided by the mid-19705 to add containment to designs for pressurized-water reactors VVERs The containment function was incorporated in phases with later model VVER-440 reactors receiving containment or localization of certain critical components In 1980 the Soviets built their rst reactor with full containment equivalent to that used in the West They did not however retro t any of the eight earlier model VVER-4405 with containments The decision not to enforce the same safety standards at all VVERs was probably influenced by the technical dif culty of such extensive reconstruction and by costs estimated by some Western experts to equal the original investment in the reactors ll Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 reactors The explosion at Chernobyl unit 4 damaged components of unit 3 calling attention to the risk that other events such as major res or large pipe ruptures in one reactor could endanger the other member of a pair Modi cations to reduce this risk of multiple reactor failure in future plants would require time- consuming redesign work which would increase con- struction costs Modifying the Of the 29 RBMK reactors built or planned the projects most vulnerable to cancellation if basic design aws cannot be easily remedied are the eight reactors at the earliest stages of construction These are located at the existing Kursk and Smolensk plants and at the proposed Kostroma plant In an April 1987 announcement of the remaining RBMK projects the Soviets implied by omission that the four reactors at Kostroma had been dropped The Kostroma plant is in the earliest stages of design and site preparation work and could be canceled with the least disruption The plans cited in the Soviet press call for construction of four 1 500- MW RBMK reactors at Kostroma due to come on line at two-year intervals from 1992 to 1999 A power station operated on natural gas could be proposed as an e ective alternative to the Kostroma nuclear plant since large gas- red power plants are already in existence in the region A gas- red replacement for Kostroma could be built with only minor delays to the plan for expanding power-generating capacity 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Replacement of Smolensk units 5 and 6 RBMK- 15005 and Kursk units 5 and 6 RBMK-10005 would pose greater problems Although assembly has just begun on some of these reactors abandoning them would mean a costly writeo of the construction infrastructure that is already being used to complete four other reactors at each location Replacement electricity-generating capacity could be either conven- tional gas- red or even nuclear using VVER reac- tors It is unlikely that the Power Ministry could complete the process of site selection design and construction of this replacement capacity in time to avoid a tightening of power supplies to the central region because the units at Smolensk and Kursk were expected on line in the early 19905 S 25X1 25X1 25X1 Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 DUCI CI CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Figure 4 Soviet Nuclear Power Performance Versus Plan Generating capacity on linea Plan Electricity output Plan Actual Billion kilowatt-hours Million kilowatts Actual 80 I 60 CIA estimates for 19901 Pre-Chernobyl Post Chernobyl 40 iv I 20 0 1970 75 80 85 90 a Total capacity on line at end of ve-year plan 1990 capacity includes nuclear heating plants Midpoints of established ranges 400 CIA estimates 300 for 1990b Pre-Chernobyl I Post Chernobyl l 200 1 100 0 1970 75 80 85 90 Seven RBMK reactors are in later stages of construc- tion with four at an advanced stage including the reportedly canceled Chernobyl units 5 and 6 Modi - cations already proposed by the Soviets could proba- bly be done on the remaining ve without major extensions to completion times If the Soviets decide to curtail the RBMK construction program sharply following through on Petrosyants announcement about the two Chernobyl units they still might be able to salvage some prestige Moscow would be able to claim with some justi cation that they are only accelerating a long-planned shift to VVER reactors The emphasis in construction of nuclear power plants has moved from RBMK reactors to VVER reactors over the last three ve year planning cycles In the Secret 312995 637 1976-80 plan period six of the 11 completed reactors were and in 1981-85 the share declined to eight of 17 The plan for 1986-90 shows only seven among the 35 reactors due for completion Outlook for Achievement of Nuclear Industry Goals for 1990 Soviet targets for nuclear power plant capacity and output were out of reach even before the Chernobyl accident shocked the nuclear industry see gure 4 The targets call for starting electricity output or heat 12 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 25x1 25X1 Table 2 USSR Plan for Additions to Nuclear Power Plant Capacity Scheduled Startups 1986-90 a 1986 1989 Kalinin 2 VVER-1000 Zaporozh ye 6 Zaporozh ye 3 Tatar 1 VVER-1000 Chernobyl 5 Smolensk 4 Ignalina 2 South Ukraine 3 Rovo 3 VVER-1000 Minsk ATETs 1 Balakovo 2 Khmel nitskiy 2 Khmel nitskiy 1 Ignalina 3 RBMK-ISOO Gor kiy 1 AST-SOO Gor kiy 2 AST-SOO 1987 1990 Zaporozh ye 4 Rovno 5 Smolensk 3 Crimean 2 Balakovo 3 Rostov 2 1988 Odessa ATETs 2 Kalinin 3 Khar kov ATETs 1 Zaporozh ye 5 Kursk 5 Chernobyl' 6 Voronezh 2 AST-SOO Rovno 4 Totals Balakovo 4 New capacity New reactors Crimean 1 32 000 MW electrical 24 Rostov 2 000 MW thermal in ASTs 5 Odessa ATETs 1 2 Voronezh 1 AST-SOO 4 AST-SOOs 35 All types 1 Original plan subject to annual revisions during 1986-90 generation at as many as nine new reactors in a single year 1988 see table 2 3 The 1990 electricity output goal for nuclear power is even more ambitious than the capacity goal 390 billion kWh compared with the 167 billion produced in 1985 '3 Soviet near-term plans for nuclear power were summarized in the 12th Five-Year Plan 1986-90 Full details of the plan have not been published but the general goal is clear a doubling of operational nuclear power plant capacity from 28 300 MW in 1985 to about 60 000 MW in 1990 An alternative plan for 41 000 MW of new capacity which would bring total nuclear capacity in 1990 to about 70 000 MW has also been cited by Soviets in the nuclear industry This total is not con rmed however in the literature on construction at individual plants The target probably represents both the capacity they hop on line and the capacity in late stages of construction l3 25X1 Before the Chernobyl accident we estimated that the Soviets would achieve good growth in both capacity and output but still fall short of plans for 1990 We projected that capacity would increase to about 50 000 MW and that electricity production would 25x1 grow to about 285 billion kWh Such an outcome would have been consistent with Soviet performance which continues to fall short in component manufac- ture and plant construction 25x1 As a result of the Chernobyl accident both the direct effects and the turmoil caused by the recovery effort we estimate that by yearend 1990 nuclear capacity 25X1 Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 cl Figure 5 New Capacity at Soviet Nuclear Facilities Planned and Projected 1986-90 Thousands of megawatts 25 Projection range 5 I'llnw High Plan Projected Plan Projected Plan Projected RBMK VVER Type of reactor estimates AST will reach only 48 000 MW and electricity output only 260 billion kWh We expect that three or four fewer new reactors will be completed because labor and materials have been drawn from other nuclear plant construction sites to speed the Chernobyl recov- ery see gure 5 Indeed Chernobyl -induced delays are likely to affect much if not all of the construction of nuclear power plants Such delays on unit 1 at the Odessa nuclear heat-and-power plant unit 2 at the Voronezh AST and possibly unit 5 at the Kursk plant could postpone startup of these units until the early In making these projections we assume that the Soviets will succeed in limiting the disruptions caused by retro tting and will not have to disrupt construction of the VVER-1000 reactors including Secret 312996 6-87 25X1 almost all of those due on line by 1990 for safety upgrades see table 3 These assumptions are based on our observation that only a few individuals in the Soviet nuclear-power decisionmaking hierarchy the CPSU the scienti c community and involved minis- tries have expressed reservations about the basic form of the nuclear Assuring the Future VVER and AST Reactors The VVER and AST reactors representing 80 per- cent of the capacity under construction or planned are the future of the Soviet nuclear program to the year 2000 The Soviets want to use these reactor types in power plants in plants supplying heat to central- ized municipal distribution networks and in plants 25X l 25X1 14 eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 Table 3 USSR Actual and Projected Additions to Nuclear Power Plant Capacity 1986-90 1986 1990 Kalinin 2 VVER-1000 Rovno 4 VVER-1000 Zaporozh ye 3 VVER-1000 Zaporozh ye 5 VVER-1000 Rovno 3 VVER-1000 Rostov 2 VVER-1000 1987 Kalinin 3 VVER-1000 Balakovo 2 VVER-1000 Odessa ATETs 1 a Ignalina 2 RBMK-1500 Kursk 5 RBMK-1000 a Gor kiy 1 AST-500 Totals 1988 New capacity Zaporozh ye 4 VVER-1000 18 000 to 20 000 MW electrical Crimean VVER-1000 1 500 MW thermal in ASTs Rostov VVER-1000 New reactors Khmel nitskiy 1 VVER-1000 14 to 15 VVER-1000s Voronezh 1 AST-500 to 2 RBMK-10005 Gor kiy 2 AST-500 2 RBMK-15003 1989 3 AST-5003 Ignalina 3 RBMK-1500 20 to 22 All types Balakovo 3 VVER-1000 South Ukraine 3 VVER-1000 Smolensk 3 RBMK-1000 8 Delay to 1991 possible that will provide both electricity and heat to munici- pal and industrial customers Because these reactors are central to the expansion of the nuclear program their involvement in a Chernobyl -inspired safety review that resulted in major changes in equip- ment and procedures would have a larger impact on growth prospects for the nuclear industry than would changes to RBMK reactors alone Such a safety review has already been suggested as a possibility by several leading scientists in the nuclear estab- lishment The nuclear power plants under construction that will use VVER and AST reactors are already caught up indirectly in the post-Chernobyl activity Construc- tion of a VVER-1000 reactor at Rovno in the Ukraine was accelerated so that the loss of Chernobyl to that region could be reduced Despite some delays this 15 25X1 reactor started generating electricity in 1986 instead of in 1987 as we had projected earlier Construction at several other plants however slowed as resources were drawn off to complete the entombment of the destroyed reactor at Chernobyl or to accelerate the installation of safety modi cations 25x1 Another set of postaccident concerns that could affect VVER and AST reactors relates to the number of reactors colocated at any one plant Some Soviet specialists may challenge the wisdom of colocating 2 5x1 multiple reactors that can be rendered inOperable for months or years by an accident in one unit Plans made before the Chernobyl accident call for most plants to colocate four to seven reactors Reducing the number of reactors at plants would substantially slow the growth and increase the cost of the nuclear power Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 program The larger number of smaller plants would also reduce economies of scale in operation and maintenance In addition the widespread radioactive contamination around Chernobyl and the increased risks of cancer to people exposed to this radioactivity are likely to motivate Soviet specialists to reconsider the decision to locate nuclear heating plants in heavily populated areas At present in order to operate economically plants supplying both electricity and heated water for central heating are located 25 kilometers or less from the heat-distribution network of a city Plants that produce only heated water for heating are sited even closer within 15 kilometers of the centers of major cities-l Before the Chernobyl accident Soviet nuclear spe cialists had convinced critics in the USSR that the nuclear heating plants were equipped with safety backups adequate to ensure that their proximity to cities posed acceptable risks Construction is under way on nuclear heating plants at Gor kiy Voronezh Odessa Minsk and Khar kov that are scheduled to come on line before 1990 Canceling or modifying these plants probably would be prohibitively expen- sive according to Soviet calculations The post- Chernobyl safety reviews are likely however to reopen the discussion of site locations for the roughly 20 nuclear heating plants that exist only on paper in long-term plans Until the mid 19703 Soviet experts believed that the probability of a major accident in a nuclear power plant was so small that massive and expensive con- tainment structures were unnecessary All later model reactors both RBMK and VVER however have some form of containment The earlier uncontained reactor models may now come under closer scrutiny since Chernobyl has shown the potential impact of Existing Soviet standards for nuclear plant locations minimum distances of 3 kilometers km from any populated area 25 km from cities with populations of at least 300 000 or 40 km from cities with pepulations of 1 million or more were amended for nuclear heating plants ASTs following a review in the late 19703 Secret Declas sii eg in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 what had been considered a low-probability event If the Soviets decide to improve safety the eight uncon- tained VVER reactors may be reviewed rst because of the potential risks if the integrity of components is breached Impact on Soviet Nuclear Energy Policy At the time of the Chernobyl accident a distinctive Gorbachev imprint on the nuclear goals was not yet apparent Gorbachev s new assignments at energy ministries were too recent to have had a visible effect on the nuclear program the new Minister of Power and Electri cation was appointed in March 1985 The new leadership in the various major energy ministries oil natural gas coal and power apparent- ly did not alter the long-term energy goals when the Opportunity presented itself in late 1985 At that time the plan for 1986-90 pushing natural gas production and calling for sustained growth in oil output and the existing Long-Term Energy Program setting goals for expanded roles for coal and nuclear energy in the 19903 and beyond were publicly endorsed without wisest Early in 1986 however there were signs that the Gorbachev energy team was considering some shift away from coal with a corresponding greater empha- sis on nuclear power in the longer term A key element in the program for a coal resurgence direct- current ultra-high-voltage UHV electricity transmis- sion was challenged on the grounds of high develop- ment costs and lack of progress in achieving new technical capabilities The critics of coal argued that nuclear power plants are better suited to supplying electricity to the Urals than would be UHV transmis- sion lines linked to distant coal- red power stations 15 l6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 25X l 25X l 25X1 25x1 25X1 25X1 25X l 25x1 Since the accident a number of Soviet viewpoints relating to the effects of Chernobyl on the nuclear program have been set forth in the Soviet media and expressed by Soviet of cials in conversa- tions with Western counterparts There appears to be broad agreement on several judgments - The need for nuclear energy as the main alternative to fossil fuels was not changed by the Chernobyl disaster 0 Operator error in performing tests at unit 4 was the chief although not the sole cause of the disaster 0 Soviet targets for completing nuclear power plants and for generatin electricity in 1990 should not be changedj Some disagreement among Soviet authorities is evi- dent however on The extent to which the basic design aws in the RBMK reactor that contributed to the destruction of Chernobyl unit 4 and damage to the adjoining unit 3 can be xed 16 0 The amount of work needed to restore reliable operation of Chernobyl units 1 and 2 and provide housing- and services to workers 0 The feasibility of returning Chernobyl unit 3 to operation and whether construction could be re- sumed on Chernobyl units 5 and 6 a decision not to recover units 5 and 6 was apparently made in March April 1987 The functions and authority of the several organiza- tions that deal with nuclear energy For example the rst o icial statements on the cause of the accident singled out operator error and poor management in the Power Ministry and State Committee for Safety in the Nuclear Industry By 19 July the Politburo had extended its public criticism to include the ring of a key designer of the RBMK reactor an official in the semisecret Ministry of Medium Machine Building By implicating design shortcomings as at least a contributing cause of the accident the Politburo had called into question not only the design integrity of existing and planned but also possibly the design philosophy underlying the entire nuclear program It was not until the August IAEA special meeting that the Soviets directly acknowledged that design faults were partly responsible for the seriousness of the accident - 17 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 Given the complexity of these issues the contradic- tory viewpoints on some matters and the number of bureaucracies involved in making the necessary deci- sions Soviet policies on the nuclear program could remain unsettled for another year or more The immediate attention of decisionmakers was directed at Chernobyl cleanup activities the effort to entomb unit 4 and the recovery of units 1 2 and 3 Mean- while the nuclear industry has been rocked by reorga- nization and uncertainty about the authority of key players such as the Power Ministry the State mittee for Nuclear Safety and the new Ministry of Atomic Energy see insemg An Underlying Commitment to Nuclear Power Nevertheless Soviet spokesmen continue to af rm a strong commitment to the growth of nuclear energy This commitment is bolstered by the large infrastruc- ture dedicated to the nuclear industry a factor that will carry considerable weight with policymakers as they review long-term plans for nuclear energy Long- range goals for Soviet nuclear power to the year 2000 were de ned in terms of their ro'ected impact on economywide fuel Speci cally Moscow had set goals for the develop- ment of nuclear energy during the 1986-2000 period that were designed to mesh with other energy pro- grams so that - Consumption of oil and gas could be reduced - Retirements of obsolete power plants could be speeded - The quality of electricity supply could be improved - Fossil fuels could be conserved in increasing quanti- ties by using nuclear energy in more applications Growth in the demand for electricity in the Europe- an USSR could be met nuclear power stations are concentrated in the area west of the Ural Moun- tains S Our conversion of these targets to actual reactor construction goals implies that over 120 000 MW of power plants and about 20 nuclear heating plants would have to be added during the 1986-2000 period 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 DCLI CI ReorganiZation of the Soviet Nuclear Program After studying the results of the Chernobyl investiga tion in July the CPSU Politburo began a reorganiza- tion of the Soviet nuclear industry It red the head of the All-Union State Committee for Nuclear Safety and the main designer for as well as key personnel in the Ministry of Power and Electrifica tion and in the Ministry of Medium Machine Build- ing probably for its role as overseer of RBMK design 3 In addition the Politburo set up a new Ministry of Atomic Energy and increased the party s in uence on the operation of nuclear plants by assign ing people from the central CPSU apparatus instead of local party representatives to each nuclear power station Major questions remain on which organizations and people will wield authority for such functions as operation of nuclear power plants preparation and disposal of nuclear fuel enforcement of safety rules construction of nuclear plants and fabrication of componentsl many areas of au- thority have yet to be clearly de ned The Ministry of Atomic Energy for example will assume responsibil ity for operating all nuclear power plants taking over from the Ministry of Power and lectri cation and the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy staged with nuclear experts from the Minis try of Medium Machine Building Whether even more authority will be transferred from other key ministries to the new Atomic Energy Ministry is not now evident a The responsibilities of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building include functions in both military and civilian nuclear programs The civilian nuclear industry depends on this ministry for nuclear fuel for design and construction work on the RBMK reactor and for expertise in nuclear materials transportation storage and reprocessing The Soviets appear to have begun work ranging from preliminary paperwork on the plant designs to actual plant construction on about three-quarters of the projects needed to meet the long-term goals see table 4 More than half of these nuclear projects are Secret in the earliest stages of development however and some 30 000 to 40 000 MW of the nuclear capacity needed to achieve the objectives for the year 2000 has not yet been approved at even the drawing-board stage-E Disagreement moreover is evident in the Soviet media on several aspects of nuclear energy develop- ment over the longer term Among the points at issue are - The adequacy of Soviet nuclear safety standards and standards of enforcement - Whether reactor types other than the RBMK VVER or AST should receive thorough safety reviews - The need for a reevaluation of quality control in component manufacture for nuclear plants - The criteria for site locations of future nuclear plants 0 The feasibility of pushing ahead with more and larger breeder reactors - The need for development of an inherently safe reactor Before Chernobyl the Soviet safety philosophy was based on a perception of the probability of certain types of accidents rather than on an evaluation of the consequences of both probable and unlikely occur- rences The Soviets believed that their nuclear plant designs Operating parameters and rules for plant operations assured that any failures would be small events that could be contained safely If the Soviet nuclear industry is instructed to give greater weight to ensuring safety for even low- probability events with major consequences this new philosophy will impact on plant site selection designs component manufacture and plant operation 18 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89TOO296R000200260002-8 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X l 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25x1 25x1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret Table 4 The Soviet Nuclear Program to the Year 2000 Outlook Before Chernobyl Capacity MW Plants Reactors Total planned 170 000 to 180 000 a 60 to 70 230 to 250 Operating generating power as of 24 April 1986 28 312 15 41 Of which RBMK 15 500 5 15 Capacity at some phase of construction or planning 111 300 a 39 162 Of which RBMK 19 500 6 1 15 Construction at main facilities 35 000 a 16 8 36 Of which RBMK 7 000 3 0 6 Site preparation 19 300 a 11 3 18 Of which RBMK 4 500 3 0 3 Planning and design 31 000 a 12 5 29 Of which RMBK 8 000 3 0 6 Site proposals 26 000 a 18 38 Of which RBMK None None None Capacity awaiting go-ahead on site selection and design 30 000 to 40 000 which RBMK Unknown Unknown Unknown 3 Includes capacity partially or wholly dedicated to supplying heat for Space heating and industrial-process applications Number at left of diagonal shows total of plants with activity in the category number on right shows plants exclusively in the category We believe the Soviets will try to accommodate both old and new safety philos0phies to minimize costs and delays Existing plants and plants at advanced stages of construction would continue to be judged according to the current safety standards The new safety philosophy would be phased in at plants on the drawing board and possibly at selected plants now in the earliest stages of construction This approach to a more comprehensive safety philosophy would leave plans for new nuclear power plant capacity untouched in the 1986-90 period but could lead to delays in the 19903 Support for this theory of Soviet reactions was evident in discussions during British Energy Secretary Peter Walker s visit to the USSR in December 1986 Mr Walker s host Nikolay Lukonin head of the new Ministry of Atomic Energy informed him that con- struction of would cease after the last two Chernobyl reactors were completed units 5 and 6 scheduled for the early 19903 We believe the Soviet 19 25X1 reference to a construction halt on would still allow for completion of many of the remaining 15 reactors now at some phase of assembly 7E 25X1 The plans for power plants based on VVER reactors will probably survive the post-Chernobyl scrutiny although some additional safety requirements could be mandated However the slowing of the Soviet 1 If new safety measures that go beyond what has already been proposed make new RBMK reactors prohibitively expensive the Soviets could drop as many as six RBMK reactors that are now in very early stages of planning Such an action could be taken without a major impact on electricity supply if Moscow is willing to rapidly replace these reactors with conventional thermal power plants fueled by natural gas Secret 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret The Manufacturing Infrastructure for the Nuclear Power Industry The manufacturing infrastructure for the Soviet nu clear power industry is divided into two more or less distinct subsets One group composed of over 500 major enterprises makes components for RBMK reactors The logistic nightmare of the RBMK sup- port industry is a main reason this reactor has been scheduled for gradual phaseout The otheruand much smaller group of support enterprises manu factures components for VVER reactors and is sched uled to produce for the breeder reactor program In the latter group of enterprises are the Izhorsk Heavy Equipment plant near Leningrad and the Atommash plant outside Volgodonsk two of the largest nuclear- component-fabrication facilities in the world But the Atommash plant has shown a disappointing perform- ance since production of VVER pressure vessels began in 1978 Far from being a showcase nuclear assembly plant Atommash has been plagued with problems poor management production of substan- dard components and plant damage from ground subsidence Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 with the notable exception of nuclear fuel assemblies Moreover VVER and RBMK nuclear power plants built in the USSR contain many key components manufactured in Eastern EurOpe Because it appears likely to Western observers that the failure of or an inadequate operational range of certain components could have contributed to the Chernobyl accident the absence of repercussions in the Ministry of Power Machine Building or the Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry is surprising The IAEA special meeting on Chernobyl provided insight on this matterl nuclear program as well as safety reviews will proba- bly mean that the economic rationale for a large-scale breeder-reactor program currently targeted to start in the late 19905 will be eroded The In uence of Nuclear-Industry Infrastructure The large investment the Soviets have made in manu- facturing plants that supply the nuclear industry will bolster their commitment to a growing and little- changed program see inset Plants manufacturing components for Soviet-designed reactors are located not only in the USSR but also throughout Eastern Europe The Soviets have invested tens of billions of rubles and millions of dollars of hard currency im- ports in building and equipping their facilities They have accomplished many of their goals for centraliz- ing component production and for integrating the capabilities of the CEMA The East European coun- tries for example can produce nearly all the compo- nents for power plants using VVER-440 reactors Secret 1n a perverse way the Chernobyl accident is good news for the equipment manufacturing ministries because they were implicitly certi ed as competent Indeed it is possible that more resources will be assigned to them so that equipment for modi cations can be produced quickly Antinuclear Voices in the USSR Antinuclear movements as they exist in the West are not possible in the USSR Moscow s control organs probably would effectively prohibit the organization of an antinuclear group of substantial size and almost certainly would prevent public demonstrations or cir- culation of publications containing views opposed to of cial policies on nuclear energy The Soviets have also minimized the opportunities for an antinuclear lobby by mounting an effective pronuclear campaign that advertises the advantages of nuclear power fuel savings less environmental impact than coal and lower overall costs Nevertheless antinuclear sentiments exist in the USSR and they receive some degree of o icial acknowledgment Three groups that have questioned 3 In the nuclear industry as in other Soviet industries responsibil- ities for designs of equipment and plants are handled by institutes and bureaus that operate nearly independently of the manufactur- ing and construction organizations that use the designs 20 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25x'1 the nuclear program are likely to respond to the Chernobyl accident with increased activity 1 Spe- cialists on ecology 2 those regional Communist Party authorities who have shown reluctance to back nuclear projects and 3 scattered individuals who reveal a grassroots expression of doubt and concern about the locations and Operations of nuclear plants Although Soviet ecologists have generally supported the nuclear program as providing an energy source much less disruptive to the environment than fossil fuels particularly coal a few scientists have criticized the impact of nuclear energy The most prominent of these critics has been Nikolai Dollezhal original designer of the Chernobyl -type reactors In an article published in a leading Soviet journal in 1979 Dollez- hal argued that a large nuclear program in the European USSR could eventually require withdrawal of lands from agricultural production make excessive demands on water resources and release ecologically threatening quantities of heat into the atmOSphere Dollezhal s solution to consolidate nuclear power plants in large remote complexes could now gain more backing from ecologists whose opinions recently have had increasing though still minor in uence on policy formulation '9E Since the Soviets are unlikely to allow direct question- ing of the safety of nuclear plants the ecology issue could provide an acceptable surrogate for use by groups whose real concerns are safety and public health A harder look at the ecological impact of nuclear power could jeopardize the extensive use of this energy source for central heating because the reactors used for this purpose must be located close to populated areas Moreover ensuring that nuclear facilities are more ecologically benign probably would drive up the capital costs of most nuclear plants Many regional party and government organizations saw real advantages to nuclear power and supported nuclear power plant projects A few regions the 1 The view that ecologists or arguments couched in ecological language have had in uence on Soviet policymaking is supported by their role in recent events the decision not to divert Siberian rivers the followup to the Dnester River chemical spill and the nuclear winter line in nuclear weapons debates 21 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret Ukraine for example gambled heavily on the suc- cessful operation of nuclear power plants nearly all new power plant construction there since the late 1970s has been nuclear The leadership of the Geor- gian republic however opposed building nuclear plants until early 1986 when the construction of a power station was announced The basis for opposition to nuclear plants in Georgia was not fully discussed in 25X1 the Soviet press but concern about radiological conse- quences on Georgian agriculture was evident The Chernobyl catastrophe is likely to revive the Geor- gian antinuclear lobby which may now be more successful in arguing that untapped hydro resources and local coal deposits can meet future Georgian electricity needs 25X1 Impact on Resource Allocation and Trade The assorted production and research bureaucracies of the energy ministries that compete for resources with nuclear power oil gas and coal will use the Chernobyl accident and its associated capital costs as an opportunity to promote their claims for investment resources at the expense of the nuclear industry see inset In the short term the oil and natural gas industries may be the quickest to take advantage of the Soviet nuclear industry s setback Oil and gas provided 70 percent of the energy production in 1986 and will remain the most important Soviet energy sources well into the 19905 Spokesmen for oil and gas industry interests will be able to make the case that over the next several years these fuels will be even more necessary for the Soviet economy because the nuclear industry will fall short of plans while it is reorganizing and regrouping in reaction to Cherno byl The oil and gas interests will probably link this argument to a bid for increases in their already escalating requirements for investment and skilled labor promising that they can meet the energy needs of the economy 25X l 25X l 25X1 Coal is nuclear power s main long-term competitor Coal-based energy strategies have backers in the State Planning Committee Gosplan in the Power 25X1 Secret Deelassifiecl in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret Capital Costs of the Chernobyl Accident At a minimum the nuclear industry will need to write of the 400 million-ruble reactor destroyed at Chernobyl the Soviets must abandon Chernobyl' unit 3 and the work done on units 5 and 6 because they are too contaminated to recover another 800 million rubles of investment would be lost Addition al outlays of hundreds of millions of rubles would be necessary if new rapid shutdown equipment for reac tors is installed at all The VVER reactors particularly the eight early uncontained ones may also need safety upgrades that if extensive could cost several hundred million rubles During 1981 85 yearly spending on equipment and construction for nuclear plants averaged nearly 2 billion rubles almost 35 percent of all power industry investment Additional sums perhaps several hun dred million rubles are annually invested in infra structure for the nuclear industry A rough total of the capital costs of the accident rangingfrom actual to possible to be borne by the nuclear industry shows these to be the equivalent of two or three years' current investment Ministry in the Coal Ministry and in many research institutes Expanded coal use is supported in the Soviet Long-Term Energy Program planners are counting on coal in conjunction with nuclear power to supply nearly all new energy output once natural gas production levels off in the mid 19905 However the Soviets have not been devoting the resources needed to get the coal industry moving toward its ambitious goals The industry s leadership is now in a strong position to bid for a larger resource share using the argument that coal- red plants will be able to deliver electricity more cheaply and safely than nuclear plants Soviet Purchases From the West The Soviets are likely to continue to need Western equipment for monitoring radiation and health amounting to several million dollars per year for at least a decade Moscow probably h0pes to meet these Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 specialized needs through IAEA-sponsored donations but will import what is necessary Other products and services that the Soviets may want to purchase from the West are reactor simulators and teaching aids for training reactor operators and equipment for nonde- structive testing of nuclear power plant components A more important role for Western imports is possible in the next few years if the Soviets want to accelerate their VVER program or decide to implement rapidly safety features used in reactors operated in the West For example the Soviets would probably need service contracts with Western machine-tool specialists to boost construction of VVER reactors because effec- tive utilization of machine tools that have been pur- chased in the West is essential to the production of the major components used in these reactors Many com- ponents of a generic nature such as pipes valves and pumps could also be purchased from the West since these would require little modi cation to operate in Soviet plants Any market in the USSR for Western nuclear ven- dors is likely to be highly competitive Firms from the United States France Finland West Germany Swe den Great Britain and Japan can offer many compa- rable components and services The US vendors will probably have little advantage over the competition in sales of components and only a modest edge in services experience and US rms are likely to trail the others in terms of nancing packages and ease of technology licensing Soviet Nuclear Sales Abroad Before the Chernobyl accident the USSR was step ping up its campaign to sell nuclear power plants in the West The accident has dampened the prospects of all suppliers of nuclear power plants but may have a more lasting impact on Western suppliers than on the Soviets see inset The Soviets have tried to sell nuclear power plants with VVER reactors to new customers in 12 countries in the past two years The Soviets agreed several months before Chernobyl to supply a nuclear power station to North Korea hosted 22 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 25x1 25X l 25X l 25X l 25X1 25X l Impact of Chernobyl on Nuclear-Support Industries Are the Soviets in Better Shape for a Comeback Than the West With the likely exceptions of France and Japan most developed Western countries including the United States could su er greater setbacks to their nuclear support industries during the next decade than will the USSR as a result of reactions to Chernobyl While the nuclear industry in the developed West and several other countries South Korea Taiwan the Philippines and India was in recession before Cher- nobyl before the fall in oil prices and even before the Three Mile Island accident there were several immediate backward steps in the months after the Chernobyl accident Austria and the Philippines nally chose to give up their previously troubled nuclear programs A number of planned orders for new stations in Finland the Netherlands and Italy were put on hold permanently in some cases Further postponing of orders for nuclear power plants is most likely to occur in the West as doubts about nuclear power increase As a result shakeouts and retrenchment in the developed West s nuclear-support industries are now more the rule than the exception possibilities for new business are dwindling at home and reactor-export possibilities are shrinking In an- other five years or so industrial capacity in the West devoted to supplying nuclear power plants could be greatly reduced In contrast new orders for nuclear plants in the USSR continue Because the state-operated nuclear power equipment industry of the USSR can weather this period of slack international demand for nuclear plants the Soviet Union could nd itself in a better position than most suppliers in the West to take advantage of a rebound in nuclear plant orders in the 1990s Such a rebound currently seems remote Nev ertheless selling nuclear power plants and equipment could again become lucrative if con dence in nuclear power is restored and conventional energy costs rise sharply 23 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret a Chinese visit to Soviet nuclear plants sought Ku- waiti assistance as a broker for possible sales in the Middle East and offered to sell nuclear plants to India Egypt Morocco and Indonesia Before Cher- nobyl they also discussed constructing reactors in Syria Iraq and Libya and planned to bid on plants for Finland and Yugoslavia In the wake of the Chernobyl disaster the Soviets probably have lost some nuclear plant sales Finland with two Operating Soviet reactors and Yugoslavia immediately put their nuclear orders on hold while other potential Soviet customers indicated that nuclear plans were being reviewed 25X1 Before the Chernobyl accident Soviet nuclear plant marketers hOped to get several commitments for purchases of VVER reactors Potential buyers in Finland and Yugoslavia seemed close to placing or- ders cumulatively worth roughly several billion dollars over the next ve to seven years Given the trade arrangements between each of these countries and the USSR however these transactions probably would have been largely barter agreements with very little hard currency transferred to the Soviets Although the Soviets were actively discussing contracts for commercial nuclear plants with a number of other non-Bloc potential buyers this segment of business was at a preliminary stage 25X1 The Soviets are jointly engaged with the East Europe- an countries Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Germa- 25X1 ny Hungary Poland and Romania in marketing Soviet-designed nuclear plants to power industries inside and outside the CEMA area These plants use the VVER pressurized-water reactor in either of two capacities 440 MW or 1 000 MW Reactors of the Chernobyl type have never been offered for export With the exception of nuclear fuel all of the compo- nents for the VVER-equipped plants can be manufac- tured in Eastern Europe largely in Czechoslovakia East Germany and Hungary The VVER reactors currently being marketed have full contain- ment and other safety features functionally compara- ble to those used in the West The Soviets are also jointly marketing a VVER-440 nuclear power reactor with a Finnish company that operates a plant of this model in Loviisa Finland 25X1 25X1 Secret Declassifiedrin Part- Saniti _ed Copy Approvedjor Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret In public testimonials a number of East European of cials have reaf rmed their con dence in the safety and reliability of Soviet-designed reactors Privately however East European energy experts concede that the Chernobyl accident has increased concern about the safety systems engineered into Soviet designs eSpecially the older VVER-440s without even Soviet- type containment but they expect that Soviet- designed reactors will continue to be operated built and ordered 25X l The East Europeans have a large stake in the success of Soviet-designed VVER models 19 reactors with a combined capacity of about 8 000 MW are now operating in these countries and 50 others some 36 000 MW are under construction or on order Although we believe that the East Europeans will follow through on plans for nuclear energy their nuclear programs could experience delays while pub- lic con dence is restored with safety reviews and increased costs 25X1 Secret 24 Declassified in Part - Sanitized CopyrAprproved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 Secret Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012 04 09 CIA-RDP89T00296R000200260002-8 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu