ha 1 a 'L fll Lana-nun Gum link cw THE CHIEF mini mam-nus 1 an - J I all i a interva 3 11D FF 3 H- 1 4 - FLEET BALLISTIC MISSILE -2 Fair GF 53m3 3 SERVICE THE will Ekngd-L 43f uF 1A HAMA ITEHJAL Fz HA 1% THL 3 HLPAEAT EHV a J- L11 1-- I i lE l-TfluL 1T dT ncTEtEt aa ah UH DEPARTMENT OF THE CIF THE CHIEF er NAVAL DPEHATIDHS waeHmeTnH n- c Ser SECRET UNCLASSIFIED WHEN EHCL RESCUE Frem Chief Havel Cperatiene Te Dietributien Liet Suhj Study en the Intreauetien ef the Fleet Sallietie Hieeile inte Service forwarding ei Enel Haawaa Study Se 1 Intreduetien of Fleet Ballistic Hieeile inte Service 1 The eubjeet etudy eendaeted by the Havel Warfare Anal 513 Creep in the er the Chief a Naval Cperqti ne ie ferwarded fer infermatien 2 Extraete frem an internal CPHAV implementing memerandun are appended herete mr-l-IJ 1 I lu 1h 1 m334 HF Jr Inn L I I a Dam Lrirl Irll UH HG UH 1 11 ED 91 mm LE 1 _Um_m ILA r 1 111 I r1 DEM Hmu -m mmH m Hun I II I IJ 11' L1 3 me-ltit d irf mw mew WAHFPL RE ENALYEIS STUDY ND 1 DF THE FLEET EELLISTEC MISSILE SERVICE This material eentains inFermetien aHeeting the natienal e'eiense e the United Stltes within the meaning ei the Eseienage Laws Title '13 USC Seetiens T93 and Jn additien it enntiins RESTRICTED within the meaning en the temie Energy r Fact eF its trensmissien er the revelatien eF its centents in any mmner net authorized by the appreprilte act is prehibited by Ii-e Prepared by the NAVEL WARFARE GROUP Office at the Chief at Naval Gperetiens Op 93 HEW m- - stsesevs sees ese esseesseue Sedret serial eellees or 15 January 1957 Subj Intr duttihn of the Fleet Ballistic Missile into Service 1 Reference is sivtse Study he 1 is study or the intreduttien hf the FEE inte the Havel family hf strike systems sehtaihs the fellewing ghlieht peints e The is the optimum launching vehicle in terms er survival and ef terse b The missien ef the FEM system sheuld he expressed as a deterrent espehilitp The initisl ferns requirements fer sheuld he medest with 1965 ehjettive sf s11 ush suhmhn rises in inventerv ees ptdhee ef this pregrsm will require hedifieetieh ef the current five-peer shipbuilding pregrsh 2 The sensept sf FEE utilisation as expressed in paragraph 1 sheve is eppreved end es the basis ef Hsvy plen hing fer the intredustieh ef the FEM ihth sertl'ilee I This is specifically appliedhle tn the rafting e the uperhtiehnl requirement develepmeht ehereeteristies and ship ehsrseter- isties and shell he used as guideline by the Etshdihg Geh- mitten eh Shipbuilding and Cenversieh 5 Studies are currently under esp te determine that type surface eemhstEht ship is best suited fer task feree empley heat er the he many such ships shhuld he planned and in which Shipbuilding and tenversieh Fregrsm veers sueh ship er ships sheuld he iheluded Deeisiehe in these matters will he fertheemihg subsequent te the eempletieh er the studies Ill fa settles evess fl HI 1 l- TRGDUCTICIH This study examines those matters which require prompt decisionsr for the Havy to achieve a rapid and orderly development of a deterrent capability using the fleet ballistic missile among the subjects included are a study of the opti- mum launch vehicle for the first operational introduction a concept for employ- ment and an estimate of force requirements Ln preparing this analysis the fol- lowing assumptions have been used a The problems of operating early increments of an FEM force contribute as much to determining first generation requirements as do consderations of the ultimate composition of tlte force Adequate test and evaluation facilities will be provided by Mariners I and 11 so that only the early operational vehicles need be considered c- Only the most elementary force requirements can he intelligently con- sidered at present tince the eventual requirement will probably involve decisions by higher authority as to composition of the national deterrent capability and considerations of different weapons systems which can diversify our effort and make more difficult the enemy problem of countermeasures ll CDECLLEIDNS END RECUMMEHDATIDHS LAUNCHING l The nuclear powered missile submarine is the only missile- launching vehicle capable of providing assurance of survival when deployed in small numbers 2 Since considerable growth potential is anticipated for both the vehicle and the missile quantitative speci cations are not deemed sufficiently important within rather broad limits to warrant delay in introducing the earliest types 3 Characteristics other than submerged endurance quiet operation and rapidity of launch require only routine emphasis since submarines can operate near friend- ly or neutral shores Submarine size should he that which is most economical per missile it should carry at least 3 but not over if missiles Surface launch is acceptable but submerged launch is preferable and should be developed If Later should emphasize reduced cost through the use of smaller Submarines possibly with external missile stowage Development of a subsurface- to-air weapon system would mafte a larger submarine acceptable in the more distant future 5 Initial force requirements for submarines should be fairly modest a capability to maintain two or diree on station will contribute significantly to tees as require- ments will furnish valuable operational experience and will demonstrate unique hiavai capabilities fi L'l l' afifi'fj SSGi hll forces should be contingent upon the availability of increased funds so as not to interfere with other vital hiaval missions I- r - are a if pressures to attain an earlier capability than the EEG-Polaris combination should enforce adoption of an interim surface vessel configuration it is recom- mended that conversions of combatant hulls be made unless new construction can be available sooner or would be cheaper in absolute cost 3 Other launching vehicles such as Q-ships and combatant surface vessels should be considered for development only for later phases of the program when longer range missiles become available they would be of value in forcing the enemy to divert his initial attach to many targets THE MISSILE l a range of llS miles is adequate for the initial missiles Later versions should be capable of 1513 miles with rate miles as the ultimate goal lnitial specifications ofminimum range are notcritical i3 miles would be acceptable ultimately a range band of about iil -il miles is desired 2 Accuracy and yield should he the best available in a small warhead For the first generation a yield of the MT and an over-all system accuracy of-i-mile CEP would be acceptable Subsequent generations should increase yield and accuracy Ultimately yield requirements might even be decreased as accuracy increases to a minimum of about one-third MT depending on target damage criteria 3 High launch rates submerged launch and longer range should be programmed for development to enhance submarine safety and permit penetration to more dis- tant targets Cine ultimate goal which may not be technologically feasible is a delayed-launch to be planted by a submerged about an hour in advance Longer ranges are necessary to permit the missile to be used on surface vessels without restrictions on location of operating areas 4 Conventional two-stage warheads are adequate a separate study soon to be completed demonstrates no dramatic increase in radiological warfare effective- uses by using salted weapons although there is a minor decrease in strontium- world-wide contamination AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS I a small FEM capability will permit penetration of the limited number of targets such as lvloscow whose defenses will be difficult to penetrate with other weapons Missile characteristics desirable for other targets should be deferred beyond this initial stage END should emphasize only the desired early operational capability and desired trends in missile design and should only specify minimum acceptable missile performance 2 1iiery highly defended population or industrial targets should be specified by END as the target for the initial FBlvi capability at large fraction of targets of naval interest are more suitably attached by aircraft or air-breathing missiles of the Triton type This part of the study contains the supporting discussion for the conclusions and recommendations and is_di_v_ide$n_to_four sections considerations of the launching vehicle for til-Te missile the missile itself including range accuracy and yield considerations related to programming operational requirements and military characteristicstand finally the relationship of the weapon system to the missions of the ether services La LJNC HING VEHIC LE The basic problem to be resolved by the Navy with regard to the missile- launching vehicle is to choose among the several vehicles which might possibly be used oil submarine as slow auxiliary defended during its run-in to launch on fast_au tiliary operating with task forces o ombatant-ship new construction or-ooriversions operating with taslt forces ten auxiliary disguised as a merchantman or sthip An airborne vehicle probably a seaplane The primary factor to be considered in arriving at a choice of vehicle or combination of vehicles from among these for our earliest operational units is the probability of survival since the enemyr can potentially concentrate large forces against our limited numbers However the technical state of the art re- strictions on the mobility of conventional taslt forces and budgetary restrictions on the building or conversion program must also be weighed Table lsummarires these considerations among alternative vehicles Soviet force requirements to contain the missile submarine threat are derived in appendix a each of the possible launching vehicles is discussed qualitatively in the subsections below The Figure 1 illustrates the areas from which the could on an ll mile missile against Moscow Even after 19155 the areas shown as feasible for launching are not expected to be defended by enemy underwater detection barriers Nor is it liltely as evident from appendix a that the Soviets can maintain sufficiently intense aircraft patrols to deny surfaced submarine launching if the launch time is kept short in view of the Soviet s probable inability to defend adequately the submarines missile launching areas they might attempt to shadow the EEG from its port of departure as a matter of routine However holding contact for long would be very difficult and self-generated countermeasures and tactical deception byother submarine types could defeat this enemy tactic once contact is lost on the 55-3 the Soviets are unlikely to have the ASW capability to regain contact Qefended Surface Vessels Several considerations militate against the use of taslt forces containing the missile-launching ship at least in the initial program In the first place no matter how well defended the force may be some level of enemy attack will always saturate it so that complete or even high assurance of a -- I Unfit-'1' survival is denied SECUREL altii ugh reetrieted ranges ei first gunnratturi this siles weuid Still be adequate fer sen-1e vehicles the P would demand task force eperatiens in reLatii-rei r untenable areas it seems highly desirable to ai-uid such estriettuns en Leek feree mehilit y Lin the ether hand it is desiratie te have u ugi retaliatery capability in a tasi inree to require the Enemy td alienate scene ei his effort in the tas fereu at pa rt en his initial attack thus diverting part ei his difensive Capabilities t'ren' TABLE i SF ilernatiire I 'l'eehnieai State I n-a Enet- BJHd-up Hate Me45ure I ui' the lir't in Fercel SP states Stine eacent pensinle 3 llitielttusre' eece-pt can easily meet u-i denluying permits 2-3 tn Paint-is schedule i at decays evade tracking by i enemy - I i Slew auaiJLaz-gt piuu Talus SatieiaCtery Heine i inadequate Enemy step-e at defended iast i eeuiti saturate tie- auxiliary i tenses etany unneei- Linearity build up I terees i Feat at new inadequate r1531 Cenaitterahie at pte- Adequate Ceeiti eenstruetten ten free mi teteea sent eute- et art Sia- achieve stunner than ant uperatittg with item geegraphieal tit Fleet wuuiti hetied existing astt Int-net Iimitatinns tn limited area CA er abuse As Faster hilld pthi EVA-9 auxiliary Etna-r ser vice 111 tie detect if adapted fet- quiet Liquid jupiter use since this system urn-laid he untt tended quietly tendeqUatedu-ngee 5 None Purely adequate mate r nae mieeile re I mere duel 3 Q-nitlpti I i m d P511111 required in inhibit een- blah den- tintieua traeitteg by air airy shipping et- 55 areas 1 i hail-m hide-quite Hun-r Must a'nrlit Later getter i atiene nt' guidance and navigatinnal gear Lita-'1' LE IDE- h'lli' - 1 MN I - ether targets Alse it is generally desirable te eur et'leiisit-i terees and thus te present the Enemy with a series ef which require a ri times el lerte and ee-iiriliriatee planning in 1 launch rates were rapid permit the missiles te he launched free a task ieree the time a mass rate were first ileteetetl and the time the missile ship were seek the leree retaiiate despite sateratien raids lat this weelt require a peiiey enabling the task ietee eemrearitler Le launch eiissiles ' hea he eeasitlereel a seriees attaelt te h-e underway since these missiles Cathiet he recalled any such pellet appears tetaily unrealistic In view ef these arguments it is reaseriahle te that task ieree use ei the fleet ballistic missile he assigned a rele se'asitha r3 te ether ef the feree This e ees net exclude the pessihle use ships with mesh ' erees as the Sixth Flt- 1 if the need fer a shert terre measure were sufficiently great Bet 1t lees argue against either il'liILJ' builder e1 leag term prime reliance en tas feree FEM 'I ee pessihle use efFBh- lin tasl-t ferees shetilti await tie i'elepthent ef a missile witii miles range and which is small and light eaeugh te permit it te he acid- etl te the task ieree arsenal witheiit interfering with the hasie missieas ef the fares Fit 1 OPERATING AREAS FDR ATTACK UN MUECDW Lauaeh Areas Fer A 11543 Mile Missile SheWr In Black ml nest- 1 63 a w n anew It the demand inr missiles hecemes shauld he cens der- ed as a pussihic clement hf an ultimate program since they have several advan- tages liun'ei'e r they must meet two essential requirements they must he cani- eutl ged ta prevent enemy identi cation and they must he anletti defeat attempts ta tracit then rum parts where tl an identity may have taken campremised The star-traelting equipment and launchers which characterize the Mariner missile ships cauid prahahly be submerged helen- decks permitting the sliip ta simulate seme cemmen merchant type But Q-sliips will have in eperate in rt - ginns ei' teasenahly high shipping density te ayeid the enemy eduntetmcasu re at simply sialting ry ship 1n areas where the Q ships are suspectee at aperating Han-ever a missile range at anly 15ml miles as less restricts present passihle aperating eteas tel teg tens such as the Sea where Submarine and share based surveillance might permit a Q-slnp id be tracited Figure shews shipping densities in areas of pessinle Q'h llip ape-ration These denslderatidns militate against Q-sh 1p dperatiens until the greater missile ranges new anticipated are realised at that time the large fetce re- quirements and the unique type at needed int against Q-ships may make them a premising vehicle sire-area Vehicles Lang-range air-launched hallistic missiles may he tech- nelegieally feasible but nat in time ta justify CDnii- ltlet ti tt here FIG 2 SHIPS OVER HIGH SEAS Numb-tars Shew Ships In Each l'El Square Except in Mediterranean 't i'here Natural Divisinns are Used AW-den MISSILE Cl RISTICE liantc Figure 1 shows that with a missile range of liEE miles launches against mill ow could be accomplished by an from relatively safe waters- This range thus seems adequate for the initial missiles- Ranges from to miles should be sought in subsequent lots in order to permit the missile to reach those targets which the Soviets will increasingly defend in such strength as to preclude aircraft or cruise missile attack Longer range will also permit task force use and reduce the EEG operating problem if the USSR were to occupy Heirs-Jay and Greece or to extend its ttE i'v' capabilities Accuracy and Yield- Requirements for yield and accuracy should be subordinated to early a'u'atiahil yp of the Weapon The first generatipn of Polaris will prnbably be limited to Moscow and a few other major targets calling for only a few weapon bursts so that the trade-off between the number of bursts required to achieve a given level ofdestraction and missile accuracy and yield is secondary at this time Appendix discusses considerations of yield and accuracy further and indi- cates some of the types of decisions which must he made at a later date END DPERATIDNAL REQUIREMENTS Froggamming The development of ballistic missiles is advancing rapidly as evidenced by the recent displacement of Jupiter by Folaris Consequently it would be wasteful to risk obsolescence by committing more forces ata time than are necessary to meet operational requirements For this reason a limited operational requirement for the FElvi has been emphasized as has the ability of other weapons to compete with it except against exceptionally heavy defenses Programming the FEM beyond a modest force should also be contingent upon acquiring additional funds at the expense of competing mermonuclear delivery systems Otherwise the deterrent role of the EM would be provided at the ex- pense of other Naval missions which cannot be adequately substimted for Appendix presents a possible program for purchase construction and deployment of 555's The appendix also discusses the possibility ofosing external stowage for missiles in later developmerit stages with consequent savings in EEG size and cost The suggested program involves construction of 5 555's at an inir tial cost of about $1 4 billion the first EEG would be on station during 19 53 and 2 or 3 could be maintained on station in late 1954 a proposed augmented pro- gram the beginning of a buildnup of 4 EEG's per year is also presented in the appendix it is not believed such a program should be proposed at the present time but cost and program data are given as a matter of interest Operational Requirements Since the FEM is a specialised weapon for use pri marily against very heavily defended targets the Navy should be permitted to plan for its use against the most obvious target hioscow and against other simi- lar targets This is mandatory ifa plausible concept of employment is to be followed Operations analysis should eventually be able to determine the manner in which targets of different and characteristics should be divided among the various attach weapons i-iowever aidiough solutions to such problems are not difficult to arrive at the arbitrary assumptions presently necessary can easily lead to misleading and trivial results This will continue to be the case a up Hm Can-j until basic policy decisions are furnished which recognize Naval interest indeter targets and define the mission so that target Systems can he analysed TCI FDRCEE Assurance Diversification and Political Factors The FEM offers unique capa- bilities important to our milita osmre which are not shared by other attach weapons To recognize its capabilities we must develop a concept of the enemy's planning and deployment in initiating thermonuclear war The enemy's first concern willbe the surprise forestalling of Li S retaliation To accomplish this he most tonsiderthe reactiontime we require to decide to retal iate our ability to survive beyond this period and the ability of his own defenses to deal with our surviving retaliatory forces We have several present or potential types of retaliatory systems consider- ed below The first of these SAC can be recalled after launch Consequently elements can he made airborne when early warning is received and recalled if the warning is spurious Eat SAC cannot now with certainty launch a large percentage of its forces even with present and anticipated warning although such a development is rumored to be underway Even at present this capability is expensive and it could be made prohibitively so if warning were drastically reduced by enemy use of Moreover enemy local defense can be made sufficiently strong against manned aircraft ultimately to reduce SAC etfectiveness drastically Local dc feme can be partially met by greater stand-offs through use of air-tohsorfaee missiles but for launching from beyond good radar range this deprives aircraft of their principal advantage target recognition in this point cruise missiles become competitive Missile systems including the ICBM and cruise missiles based in the 1 123 cannot be recalled once launched Consequently the decision to launch or with- hold is onerous if the enemy iorestalls by attacking missile sites Since the enemy's attack is limited only by his fear of self-in icted strontium 9i contam- ination he can plan a devastating attack on the U S The countermeasure would be to have U E missile sites built to withstand this attack But enemy judgment of our remaining ability to retaliate whatever the true iacts of the case deter- mines whether he will aceept this risk any of our weapons systems which depend on overseas bases ashore are vul- nerable to political pressures on our allies a subject which needs no elaboration Compared to the above weapons systems one which is a oat has several advantages in providing assurance against forestalling by the enemy Ballistic missiles will not be effective againstforces at sea ior some time if ever Thus manned aircraft will be needed for reconnaissance and attack with some time between detection and saturation attack Naval task in rces have the disadvantage however that some forms of attach on them may not in some circumstances be considered grounds for retaliation as would attack on the L125 Consequently the enemy may be able to allot a formid- able effort against future task forces in advance of a major attack on the L15 Submarines are uniquely free from all of the disadvantages noted for the other weapons systems Although the enemy could develop a highly competent sit-5 35 i 1 If drill-AI ASW force and loss of submarines would be inevitable effective is largely dependent on passive measures and is slow to accomplish Either antitransit bar- riers mustbe used or extremely large forces mustsearch the oceans appendist a With esoo mile Fillvl s ultimately possible no conceivable asw capability is likely to forestall an EEG within the time necessary In the face of maximum ASW effort the great threat to the missile submarine will be from forces Which detect the submarine at launch Submerged launch is only a partial countermeasure to this since recent studies estimate that the as- cending missile itself can be detected from over miles by means in high-altitude aircraft Smaller 555 s with few missiles andfor rapid rates of fire must be an ultimate requirement since airborne systems such as explosive coho-ranging can locate a submarine after arrival at datum as much as one hour late Consequently safety against having subsequent launches forestalled depends on completing the launch before an aircraft can be vectored on the basis of earlier launches Submarine safety thus demands that complete launching be accomplish- cd before enemy aircraft can arrive within an hour s flight of the launch point Economic Comparisons This section presents cost estimates as a basis for comparison oily gince cost prediction is admittedly inaccurate Reference al estin'iates that fill ICBM sites which could launch EDD missiles in 11 days would cost $1 to billion excluding missiles it would cost $3150 to ll million a year to operate these sites depending on whethertbey were under- ground surface or mobile Although costs of the EEG missile system are uncertain they lie between the Bu rd SP estimate of 59D million follow-ship cost for an il-missile configuration to the NEE-lice estimate of EEG million for a 3-missile type i e from to 11 million per missile External stowage may reduce these costs considerably CINE estimates that Polaris will cost all a million each in quantity Thus a con- servative 5 million of capital per missile will buy a hill-FEM launch or 2 5513 s of missiles each for a total ot $2 billion Dperating costs will beabout $1ilil million a year exclusive of tnissiles The ill of these 2 SSG's which could be on station would have an immediate launch capability the same as thefirst day of re via so missiles However it would be several days before the re-- mainder reached the ring line and replenishment of the original missile sub- marine had been accomplished Rand estimates that an immediate launch of all Elli missiles would cost $12 to 14 billion which would buy about 13m FEM on submarines of which Still might be kept on station Procurement cost comparisons alone thus layer the lCBivi over the SEG- missile system Operating cost comparisons are even more difficult to malte than capital cost estimates particularly since the major annual cost is missile replacement and missile shelf-life is difficult to predict Rand's figure of a 5-year shelf life and 2 million per missile gives a replacement cost of 5 24 million per missile or about million per year for sou missiles in FEM with the same shelf life 'References for this study appear at end of appendix C MN Em would cost about half as much- The results of amortizting initial costs over 3i years for both systems and combining operating and replacement costs are shown in table II TABLE lI FEE-M iCEh- i Cost Per Missile Initial cost Annual cost smartiaed EL-ise Weapon I Jperating Total I Icnsi sites 1 2 ha 1 i Missiles LE -24 I 5 ii I -FEM snhmarines i E1 45 I Missiles I as i 12 - 5 Lil The cost sen-wee s- a million for IEEM and sin million for missiles is too small to be significant in 1new oi the rough data available show- ing that real costs may not be far apart despite high 55G procurement cost These cost comparisons do nat re ect the diiferences in military capabilities between the two systems Questions of vulnerability to surprise attack reliahility accuracy yield and political enigency are more important Dcterrent Force Levels The U 5 has the power capability to damage a poten- tial aggressor The payoff of this power capability is its e ect on the plans and policy at a potential enemy that is to he e cctiye our ability to attack must in- hibit enemy plans for all- out attach However the problem of just how much ability to damage an aggressar we need and against what kinds at targets is more political and than military Since the FEM will originally comprise only a small part of our total deterrent forces these considerations need not enter this early phase 5n hmit'totl by LP Coyle I iayal Warfare Analysis Group App royed by hi L Ernst Director of Research hiayal Warfarc analysis Group 1i lj I MN if Led APPENDIX ENEMY FDRCE REQUIREMENTS THE FIRST MISSILE it is assumed that the stresses by lass-as will not permit r USSR to cup-crate systems based in florivay Denmark the Faeroes the UK Greece or the Aegean islands It is further assumed that maintenance of extensive surface or active sonar surveillance ofany large part of the area outlined in figure I would not be fens ilale to an extent that would permit peaceti is tracking of missile submarines It is of interest then to compute the Air Force requirements to maintain an adequate air surveilLince to forestall the launch of missiles from a mis ilc submarine that surfaced to launch Suppose the submarine must remain on the surface for Ill minutes before launching the ballistic missile and that the defender uses patrol aircraft with an endurance of IS hours at ITS knots and with a limited ETD Idiot dash capability The area that must be defended the shaded area in figure I totals approximately I square miles according to reference most effective operation will result from the use of separate aircraft for the surveillance and attach func- tions Force requirements for complete coverage are about 1T5 searchg attacl teams on station per 1 fI-flil flflil square miles Assuming that bases averaging about Sflfi miles from the launching areas can he found and that the high aircraft utilisation rate of lot ying hours per aircraft per month can be sustained the defense would require 230i aircraft in operational squadrons for this task a smaller number of aircraft could somewhat inhibit mlssilerlaunchiog operations but the order of magnitude of forces could not be reduced without great loss of HSW effectiveness Since the assumed air ASW capability is probably as good as can be eanECted during the 19455 era and the resulting force requiremErrts are excessive it is concluded that serrated launch is acceptable in the first generation of FEM sub- marines In considering ultimate enemy capabilities however it appears that the most significant hazard will be from aircraft called on to investigate fines which were obtained from missile trajectories specifically infra-red observation of the ascending missile It is necessary here to distinguish between the opportunity thus afforded to forestall further launches and die capability to destroy the submarine If we assume successful development ofesplosive echo ranging which may be able to locate a submarine after a time-rate of as much as one hour it is conceivable that comparatively modest force levels could ensure destruction of the submarine unless the area searched could be extended considerably Ultimate development of a rapid rate of fire permitting all missiles to be launched within minutes would malte forestalling of missile fire by this means virtually impossible It is for this reason that smaller more numerous missile submarines with higher rates of fire appear to deserve greater emphasis then submerged launch as a security featurere ne Hg I ans- - eh - - HI 1 i increased missile range has the principal effect nf significantly increasing the area m'cr which any enemy must he applied tn he success ful nf missile range capahility thus centrihate significantly to the survival at the submarine even When ASW capabilities are develnp- ed by the enemy There is ad limit tn the ultimate range desired except that increased weight and space requirements will make range an expensive cammc-d- ity Diminishing returns may encur at ah-dut 25GB miles Centinuing evaluatidn til dp-eratienal implicatieas cf the state of the art will he required in ensure that specificatinns are written fer each sue-cessiye generatinn Ari ultin'ate capability Winch appear tn make the submarine practically secure against any cnuntermeaaure d5 tetal disarmament is a missile that delays its actual launch until the submarine has retired heyend the trapping capa- bility pf an enemy aircraft El MISSILE l lEl AND ACCURACY Figures E-l and 3-2 adapted irnm reference illustrate the trade-eff between number at weapens delivered it achieve a given leyei af destructien and the accuracy and yield Decisinns must he made as tn criterina cf damage in nrder to cheese an apprepriate curve Assuming 5i percent of industrial capital tn he the criteridn it can be seen that ahnet 2f 1 MT missiles are re- quired with a 4 mile CEP while 3 wtiuld dn if the CEP were 2 miles Similarly a decrease in 5 MT wnuid require ever 3f missiles with a mile CEP and 15 far a 2 mile CEP This is a tnugh criteric-n cempareti with casualties as is indicated in figure where many fewer weapnns are required and the sen- sitivity tn CEP and yield in mach less significant 4 ICIMT EMT Number at hernias reduu'ed FIG hatchet Bf Bendas Te 5i Percent Df industrial Capital 2 Lest it be assurm-Weriuu relieves weapuns in the mcgatun class frum a need accuracy nuts figure 3-3 which tlucs fur Daytcn thu what a figure 3-2 dues fur Muscc w l-i'cre cm can interpclate tu cuncluuc that a SUD Wespcu with a CEP cf 5 miles Will accomplish the same expected carnage as a 5 NIT weapcn with 4 mile CEP- Where exist tin the rural yiulti strciitium 9f cuutaminatitm act sitcul j r as a rcattcr cf eccnumy this is an excellent argas icut fur accuracy and cruise missiles against smaller targets than Museum Magnitugurslt a dry cf the size uf Batten Dhiu is only 40th in rank cf pupulatiuu size Ceascquestly an attack cf such magnitude as tu include 4f USSR cities 1 tculi'l be ft invulve such accuracy-yield trade-tiff cucsiueraticns as figure 3-3 illustrates t MT GMT I 35 fr r IlESl 1 4 Number cf humus tecuired FIG ll E Numb-er Elf Bumhs Tu Cause Ell Percent Murtalities Excluding Fallout 5 single 1 MT weapuu wuultl be sufficient if falluut in absence cf civil defense shelters were tn ll I IGMT JMT Number cf humus FIG 13 3 DEF-YIELD Ds i'f l u' POPULATION Hutch-er Elf Bumhs Tc Cause EU Percent Muttslities 1 3 - ind-mf- I - mun- - m 1 Eh MAI Lt-rt'l 5513 PRUGRAMMING 1 regraniming and Empleyment Figure C-l graphically illustrates a pussihle pregram in meney expenditures and submarine eenstruetien and the resulting arrival ef units available fer depleyment The selld lines represent the prugrnin in this repert the detted elt'tensiens are a feasible centinuatien as- suming establishment ef a requirement and eentinued availability ef funds The preg'ram shewn is a entry el' ene prepesed by Dp l eateept that a surfaee-teui hatant ship is deIeted frern the 59 preg-ram and missile submarines in yariuus numbers are added during yarieus years This representsasehedule rensiderahly ever reutine praetiee fer intreduetien ef new types and is heth risky and expensiVei hlaztitnum prierities will be required if sueh a schedule is te he meti Fertunately the requirements are sufficiently leese that the risk that uri- eharaeteristies will result seems small Figure 2-2 illustrates a prepesetl phasing-in empleynient schedule a limited but still signifieant capability fer the first year Maximum deterrent eapahiliry weuld result if the single missile submarine en statien fer the first it menths were te be permitted te enter pert witheut prier scheduling and with 0N lens eh Twe rm statiew I tu tses FORT Fee eentiuuaLtr - centimeter I less I Isse I965 1F Wish ifs-est l 12 1 se-isi ales i LII GP APEL In In Pest eeustautt 11 EHIHE eewu i r s C- 2 DFERATIDNEL SCHEDULE 5 nu r 53C 430 IC-G ISEE- I I JEDHTIHUEB FPS EEF BJILD SHAxEcowu HIE-IT PFC-SHAH - -Ii Prat-nun BEAT CUHLATWE EU-LU PUSSIELE SHIFBHILDIHE Oil 1 I Lax-- MAJ Hyatt-1 Eff TEAHEFISCAL FUR EXPENDITURES CALENDAR FDR 'u'ull LIELE Ian -- I - - - es- 1' M- Lin EL-nf randei'n ef stay Whether arrangements In permit this ceuid be made is net new lmewn By the middle 151964 the availability ef beats sheuld permit twe ei chem te be maintained en statien tetally submerged threugiieut the parcel Future Pre rrams A develepmentthat cac be anticipated ultimateiy with seme eeafidence is the capability te a weeden that weuid be launched submerged in a capsule carried externally en submarines Islet ehly weuld this have the nbvieus advantages ef increased freedern frem detec tien and ferestailing but weuld significantly affect the eptimum sine ef the missile submarine The internally stewed Pnlaris required fer the early generatiens te aveid de lays in develepment militates teward a large submarine since missile capacity must be beught fer valuable internal space after a price ef admissien fer pre pulsiea 5133 etc has been paid Since the decit area ef a submarine er ship is prepertienal tn the pewer at its tennage the decic area per ten will increase with decreasing sine Cease quently if missiles are stewed externally the eptimum sire missile submarine will be appresimateiy the smallest that can centain the necessary prepulsien navigatien and crew quarters etc Such a smaller submarine weuid greatly enhance the security and decrease the cest ef an FEM ferce by permitting much wider dispersal within a given tetal budgetary limit REFERENCES RAND RhilsiSl Cests ef Fessible Alternative Metheds fer Dperating the WSIDT A System Secret Apr 1955 DEG Study hie tee Defense ef lBeastal Metrepelitan Areas Against Sab marines Launching er Attempting te Launch Guided Missiles Secret ES Oct 1949 RAND RETE A Study ef C mplt t Targets Mescew Dayten and Geneva Steel Secret Restr Data IS Nev 1954 lb This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu