6ECRET -11 ' 1 THE JOINT CIiIEFS OF STAFF WashLilgtol 25 D C I%l JUS 26 11 19 -A SCSM-431-61 J K' f Defense dated 13 June 1961 o u h J e c t as above In which he equested answers t o queetlons posscl by Yi Achcson i n his c lnulng review of t h e Berlin roblcm 2 The t h r e e studies were prepnrod 011 a priority basis They are responsive t o Mr Achesonls qiic3tloiis on t k c above r e - quest which states Tlicsc I n part qriLotloii8 do not r c f l e c t any p o l i c y decisions but a r e posccl t o cr8eatc an a i i a l y t l c a l framework which would be helpful i n rcvlcw of t h e B r l l n problem 'I Consideration was givcii t o t h e vlows developed J o i n t l y by the J o i n t Chiefs of S t a f f w i t h Mr Wan Rchcson and Geixral Norstad durlng t h e dlscussions hold on 1 4 June 1961 3 The Joint Chiefs of Staff uonsldcr that t h c Irmnedlatc concern is t o influence Sovlet declolonc on HcrlJn before t h e y a r e taken t h i s summer o r f a l l a Berlin c r i s i s - I n t h e US be taken United S t a t e s preparations f o r i n Eui-opc and world-wide nlS1itar f both nuclear and r oLinuC1 21b Lirlar s - should concur- I i rently In t h i s connection tho roqu%cment f o r modernizlng strengthening and Improving t h e US aild Allied m i l i t a r y posture world-wide has been rccognlzed however t h c b a s i c consideration remains t h e need f o r re-establishhing t h e c r e d l b l l l t y of t h e nuclear d e t e r r e n t DISTRIBUTION Our A l l i e s must have confidence and t h e USSR a TOP SECRET' A must be made t o kelleve t h a t the United State3 has t h e w i l l and determlnatioii t o use nuclear yeapoiis I n t h e defense o f NATO B e r l i n o r t h e U3 position world-wide - --- -- submit t o Soviet abrogation a3 necesmry r a t h e r than b i - i sand - Allled i Ights or position Berlin i s t h e immediate concern and t h e vicwa of t h e Joint Chiefs of S t a f f on the questions posed by Mr Dean Acheson a r e contained herein 4 U The conclusions t o t h e t h r e e appended s t u d i e s which a r e based on t h e ascum$Lon t h a t nuclear vmapons w i l l not be em- a s follows p 4 y e d by e i t h e r s l d c an6 suro oo zcd - 4 a Military Meaew l fiWorld-Wide 1 The e a r l 3 oxccutlon by the UiiiteB S t a t e s of t h e measures enumerated i n Annex C t o Appcndlx A within the t l m e limits assumed i n 6hPo t u d y e 31 October 1961 would be e x p c t e d t o Influence t h e Sovles decision process regardlng Berlln The mil itary act ons can bc talcen only i f t h e necessary p o l i t i c a l decisions required t o Implement them have been made Implicit i n such p o l i t i c a l decisions I s t h e acceptance of t h e risk of general war 2 The measures enumerated In Annex C t o Appendix A i n most cases depend f o r full e f l e c t i v c n e s s upon complete Allied cooperation p a r t i c u l a r l y by the nations w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t I n t e r e s t I n t h e Ezrlln question - t h e United Kingdom Prance and t h c Y e i c m l Republic of Gerrnany FRQ United S t a t e s a c t i o n alone 13 fcaaible only t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e Allies w i l l permit thc use of t h e i r n a t i o n a l t e r r i t o r i e s and t h a t t h e a c t i o n contomplated does not involve t h e sovereignty of an A l l y I The mL asurc c arc dcsigned t o be a c l e a r demonstration of US determination and l e a d e r s h i p which could be expeotcd not only t o lnfluence t h e Soviet decision making process but also t o TOP SECRET r e s t o r e t h e confidence of our A l l i e s In t h e Unieed States and t o obtain t h e l r f u l l cooperation and support 3 Although a measure of Allied agreement could proba- s b l y be obtained f o r t h e e a r l y c x e o u t i o n of some of t h e measures envioagcd in Aimcx C t o A p p c n d b A c g incrcaso e t a t e of readiiiess of US forccs world-wide but p a r t i c u l a r l y nzmopj 15 18 douxfui that us A l l i e s i n t h e absence of a clear-cut Soviet-Inspired -2 Berlin inaidant would agrec t o a r a p i d and systematic build-up f o r limltcd nonnuslcar wni 111 CcnhW Ewopc t o g e t h e r with thc risk of gancral war 4 m e execution of tlic rncasurc 7 c n v i s n e c d i n Annex C t o Appendix A IC d1xir ncd e f f e c t on t h e soviets- t o p v o f i u c i l stroLx d e t c r r c n i Thcrc LO a J o o s b l l horrcver ty t h a t t h e Soviets m i g h t r e a c t by t n l c i x i d i l i t a r y counter- a c t i o n s t o pre-empt West Berlin US and or A21 2cd c f f o r t s t o p r o t c c t For t h i s reason t h e United S t a t e s must bc propwed f o r general war b TypeY and Amount of Offensive Nor nuclear Force for Certain Contingencies l j When opposed by CDR f o r c e s alone Thc J O I Chiefs of S t a f f r e a f f i r m t h e i r vicw that tho hypothesis of opposition from QDF forfirs olo ie 13 Invalid and that t h e r e is no aubstantl vc d l P i a c i i cbetween c GDR and Soviet m i l i t a r y forces Howover using present a c t i v e GDR f o r c e s as a unit of measurement 6 dlvlslons and about 225 t a c t i c a l a i r c r a r t j it i s considered that tl balanced force of aeven divisioiia supported by f o u r t a c t i c a l a b wings could reopen aacess t o B e r l l n This s i z e force is based on t h e assumption t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s -SECRET 3 ' f ' TOP'SECkET 6 r e s t r i a t m i l i t a r y operations t o t h c axis of t h e HelmstedtBerlln autobahn and t h e air forccs t o defensive o p r a t l o n s only 2 When opposed by r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e USSR and GDR f o r c e s Sn t h e a r e a of East Germmy only Under 8uch a s l t u a t l o n t h e h o s t i l i t i e s could not be l l m l t e d t o tho H e l m t c d t B e r l i n c o r r i d o r alone v Operations would have t o bc con- duotcd t o meet and d e f e a t Sovlct and GDR f o r c c s throuchoxt E a s t G e m n yw i t h the objwctlvc of c s t a b l l s k l n g a defense l i n e on t h e C3cr-h'eiaae Rfver l Snc F o x e s cjn t h e ordcr of 50 a l l i e d d i v i s i o n s and n corrc opsndlng mqgdtudc of air s t r e w t h wou2 d be r qulr d 3j t o achlcvc Lhlo ob ject ve TO a u d w t h e communists s m chanrre thel d e c i s i o n t o block acce ' m a 0pgortuV ity t o If t h e a c t i o n begins with A l l i e d f o r c e s opposcd by GDR forcca only a balanced seven d l v l s i o n a l force w i t h adcqcctc a f r support would provide durlng the first f i v e days t l m o and opportunity for t h e Communists t o changc t h c l r decfivion t o block access In t h e e v e n t ' t h a t t h e S o v k t u cntcrcd t h o opcmtion a t any I time t h e s i t u a t i o n described %I paragraph h 2j would per- tain The A l l i e d f o r c e of sevcn dlvislonn a l r e a d y co nmlttod t o t h e o p e r a t i o n could avold d c s t r u c t l o n c Adequacy of C a p a b l l i t tee 1 A f t o r a mobilization period or four months t h e Uhlted States o r t h e US and i t s Eurowan A l l i c s has TOP SECFIET 4 t h e o a p a b i l i t y of deploying s u f f i c i e n t ground and ab forces t o Europe t o r e s t o r e aoceas t o B e r l i n i f opposed only by GDR This same s i z e force could avoid destruc- t i o n f o r a period o f f i v e days or 15 days If opposed by GDR and Russian f o r c e s 2j Due t o t h e i n a b i l i t y t o dctcrininc t h c q u a l i t y of European A l l i e d f o r c e s and due t o thc I n a b i l i t y t o prcd l c t with confidence that all European A l l i c s and the United S t a t e s w i l l commence full moblllzntlon l o u r months p r i o r t o an a r i t l c i p t e d Incidciit In Ilcrlln it is cons i d e r e d t h a t t h e r e would not be sufi'lcicnt f o r c e s in Europe by 31 October 1961 t o rcotorc acccss t o l3er ii n against suocessivelg higher l c v c l a of GDii and Sovict resistance 3 Because of t h e need f o r a i r bt-wes staging amas and assembly a r e a s it is Impracticdl f o r t h e United S t a t e s t o consider u n i l a t e r a l actlori I n t h e Bcrlln area As 0 minimum full cooperation of t h e Federal Republic of Germany FRG is required and t o a lesser degree that of France and Great Britain ln a d d i t i o n the United S t a t e s cannot put sufficient Porccs I n Europe in a four-month period t o r e s t o r e accc s a g a i n s t s u c c e s s i v e l y h i g h e r l e v e l s of GDR and Soviet resdstance 4j Considering t h e r e o i c u n r antte of both s i d e s and t h e need f o r I n d u s t r i a l mobilizr tlon%I order t h a t t h e United m t e s can support its A l l i c s a s w e l l as its own forces it would not be f e n s i b l c f o r European A l l i e s or the United S t a t e s t o engagc I n nonnuclear war for any 1 extended period w i t h t h e Soviet Bloc forces which could be brought I n t o t h o a r e a by 31 October 1961 I n some oases mobilization of t h e A l l i e d countries r e q u i r e s 15 ' i it' $'t I 1' - L d SECRET ry 3 month6 and only af'ter full mobilization of A l l i e s and the United States is a t t a i n e a one year plus do t h e Allied f o r c e s appear t o exist in comparable numbers with Soviet foroes 5 The Joint Cliiefs of S t a f f recognize the d e s i r a b i l i t y of providing v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s t o general war In t h e event the measure6 enumerated In Annex C t o Appeiidix A fail t o d e t e r t h e 3 0 v i e t 6 from denying Allied access t o Bcrlln and limited ground ' f o ce a o t l o n l a msucceesful In t h i o conncctlon consldera- lj - ti n muat be given t o other I1 eQsurest'nat w i l l f o r c i b l y demontrtrate on a r l s l n g s c a l e CS dctcrmlnation t o achlove i t s object i v e o f r e s t o r i n g acceos t o Eierllii Pomible nrcaaures could Include considcration of a c t i o n s such C L thc ICQ of nuclear weapons on purely m i l i t a r y targc tc In a manner which will forcibly drive homo t o t h e Sovlcto the scrlousnesn w i t h which t h e United S t a t e s views the sLtuatkm 6 It is recommended t h a t you note t h e enclosed s t u d i e s and forward them t o t h e Special Assistant t o t h e President f o r National SecurIty'Affali 6 as requested by him for use by M r Aoheaon in his oontlnulng review of the De -lln problem For t h o Joint Chiefs of L t a P f j's ' L L UNNITZBR Chairman J o i n t Chlafs of dtaff' A t t a chmcnt TOP SECR TJ I 6 P SECRET AN ERS 2 c TO QUESTIONS RELATI 1 Queatlon TO BERLIN COIITINGENCY PLANNING I How much of t h e S o v i e t n u c l e e r s t r i k e f o r c e woild be destroyed Answer a JCS SIOP-62 p l a n s f o r t h e a t t a c k r f about 1 000 S n s t a l l a t l o n s which b e a r a r e l a t i o n s h i p t o n u c l a r clelivery c a p a b i l i t y The Alert Force i s scheduled t o a t t a c k about 75 p e r c e n t of t h e s e i n s t a l l a t i o n s and assuming timely t a c t i c a l warning o r I ' I US pre-emption so t h a t a l l US a l e r t f 0 r c e s u r v i v e through ltlal launch may he expected t o desti oy about 42 p e r c e n t t h e t o t a l i n c l u d i n g a l l 76 - which c o n a t i t u k t h e home b a s e s and primary s t a g i n g base s oL' the c n t i r c S o v i e t long-range n u c l e a r s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y and t h e known I C E 4 and IRBM sites Pro6ramn ed for a t t a c k by tho A l e r t Force are a l l a i r f i e l d s with n u c l e a r s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s a l l primary stag2ng bases and a l l iiucelar s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s Not a t t a c k e d by t h e A l e r t Force a r e 235 o u t of a t o t a l of 7 5 0 a i r f i e l d s These 235 a i r f i e l d s do n o t have m i l i t a r i y a l r c r a f t c u r r c n t l y a s s i g n e d and or a r c l n a c t 1 v e o r do n o t have support f a c i l i t i e s The F u l l Force is scheduled o a t t a c k a l l of t h e approximately -1 000 i n s t a l l a t i o n s and may'expect t o d e s t r o y about 88 p e r c e n t of them assuming no before-launch l o s s e s % Additional i n s t a l l a - t i o n s would be destroyed o r damaged but a t a l e v e l o f aseurance l e s s than 70 p e r c e n t The l c v e l of assurance f o r d e s t r u c t i o n of all known i n s t a l l a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t i n g a ' d i r e c t t h r e a t t o t h e CONUS would be high - about 35 p e r c e n t V u l n e r a b i l i t y o f SIOP f o r c e 6 to d e s t r u c t i o n before launch I s discussed i n paragraph 3 f below In g e n e r a l and assuming timely t a c t i c a l warning o f encmy m l s s l l e a t t a c k d e s t r u c t i o n b e f o r e launch would be expected t o be low for - i n each I n s t a n c e of t h e u s e of the term destroyed t h e term l a a p p l i e d t o those t a r g e t s with an assurance of 70 p e r c e n t o r g r e a t e r of r e c e i v i n g s e v e r e damage conoidering all f a c t o r s of a t t r i t i o n and r e l i a b i l i t y except pre-launch d e n t r u c t i o n of SIOP f o r c e s TOP SECRET JCSM-49-61 1 C TOP SEEmT - '0 t h e e - Force ' destruction the If t h e Sov1ct n ohould iriit l tc ' he z t t a c k before launch ur lt fOllOiv- 3 i bc r c l a t I v e l y h i c h ior f o r c e unleao t h c r s hns hdcn ctr kgIc s u f f i c i e n t for f o r c e g nei ctj o ifolluwc 1 me b VJVi7ing 'ny t ct cr l var iing above information on destruct Lon of S o v i e t n u c l e a r strike f o r c e is expressed i n terms of cle3tructloli of the' b a s e s flm which t h e f o r c e s woula be la unchec I may o r may n o t be on t h e bases nt tile base t h e y would he destro ed The r o r c e s theinselves V 'iiiIc or attack The nuiiber m S a x 2 2 11' on time o f a t t a c k would be a f u n c t i o n of 3ucli fact or% as t h e r e a d i n c s s measures t a k e n p r i o r to a t t a c k wlictlici tlic US o r USSR struclc f i r s t and t h e ntiintgGfc and t a c t i c a l warninl avallablc t o t h e Soviets c Annex A h e r e t o shows E dcCai1eA 1 ronl cibwn of t h e types o f i n s t a l l a t i o n s considered t h e number p I ac d a t rlsk by t h e Alert Force a t t a c k s and t h e nurnber oxpcctcd t o be d e s t r o y e d by t h e Alert Force and the F u l l Force w i L h a t 1ea t TO$ a s s u r a n c e The d a t a i n Annex A a3 in t h e preceding paragsaphs do n o t r e f l e c t t h o s e fosces a s s i g n e d t o u n i f i c d and s p e c i f i e d commands which are n o t c o m m i t t e dt o o r r e f l e c t e d i n S I O P 2 Question ' hat 'US WOUIII -TI the j lI I I e ' rcfi il European and S o v i e t C i v l l S o c i o t i e o Answer a USSR and Red China 1 There are lo3 govcrnment conl it l C C I L C In S and China which appear on t h e S I O P 'I'ai-gct List t h e USSR Eighty-three percent of t h e s e could be expected t o be destroyed by the i A l e r t Force and all by t h e Full Foi cc w i t h 70 percciit g r e a t e r assurance i n each case 01- A c l d I t J o m l d e s t r u c t i o n and damage would be achieved bjr t h e A1ci t Force b u t a t a l e v d l of confidence lQSS than TO$ Twen1 y-three a d d i t l o n a l govern- c e n t c o n t r o l c e n t e r s may be destroyed by t h e F u l l Force a3 bonus I n c i d e n t t o a t t a c k of o t h e r t a r g c t s -TOP -- SBCIX'T JCSM-430-61 I 1 2 TOP SECRET 2 I n t h e USSR 193 c i t i e s would be s t r u c k by t h e A l e r t _ - - -- Force and 295 by t h e u l T - % c eBY a 1959 census t h e r e I 'are 293 c i t i e s i n t h e USSR of 5O OOO 01- g r e a t e r population Assuming t h a t a t b a s t one weapon aibr ve8 ai cach programmed Desired Ground Zm o DO% t h e Alert Poice can be expected t o i n f l i c t casualties including fallout efrects f o r the f i r s t seventy-two hours w i t h a 60% fiilielding f a c t o r t o 56s of t h e w h a n p o p u l a t i o n and 37% of population the t o t a l The F u l l Force cc 'i be cdcpccted t o l n f l l c t casualties t o 72$ of t o t a l populatioIi The u r b u i popul t' lon and 54$ of t h e These f i g u r e s wou 1 d vary dcyeiidcnt on t h e nunber o t weapons ' a c t u a l l y ari'ivlng a t an emmy DGZ The expected d e s t r u c t i o n of i n d u s t r i r l f l o o r spacc i n t h e c i t i e s a t t a c k e d would be 66% f o r ttir A1er t Force and 74$ for the F u l l Force 3 I n China 49 c i t i e s would be ti ack b y the A l e r t Porce and 41% of t h e ui-ban p o p u l a t i o r and 10s of t h e t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n would be expectcd c a o u a l l i e s Scvcnty-elgtit c i t i e s would be s t r u c k by t h e 1R 111 Force and 53% of t h e urban p o p u l a t i o n and 16% of t h e t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n would be expected c a s u a l t i e s These f i g u r e s t h o i n c l u d e t h e r a l l - o u t e f f e c t s mentioned above The ex1 cctcd d c c t r u c t i o n o f I n d u s t r i a l floor space Irr W J c l t l e a t t a c k e d would be 55$ f o r t h e Alert Force mid 611 for t h e I h l lForce b Europe 1 I n t h e S a t e l l i t e c o u n t r l e o of Uuli arla Czcchoslovalcia E a s t Germany Hungary Poland and Rutuania only m i l l t a r y I n s t a l l a t i o n s a r e scheduled t o be att ackcd t h e s e c o n s i s t of 165 a i r f i e l d s Easlcally Incident t o these attacks t h e Alert Foroe would cause an expected l 378 000 c a s u a l t i e s and t h e Full Force 4 004 000 These f i g u r e s e q u a t e t o about 1% and 4% r e s p e c t i v e l y of t h e L ui opean s a t e l l i t e populations again Including t h e fall out considerations mentioned earlier __ I ' I J A u II TOP' S E C W c 2 Thc probable r e s u l t i n g d n i i q i i i the ik 11 ccl Europcal c o u n t r i e s would be dependent t o vc qLiig d e c p x iipon thc Soviet s t r a t e g i c concept which s i d c cxcrclsed the l n i t i a t l v c p' whether attaclci 'cme by surprioc 011 wciv prcccdcd by uacful warning and t h e Soviet estlntcte of whether o r not t h e damage which they could i n f l i c t prilni irlly oil thc US n l o n c would bring about a c c s i a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e o a nd pennlt them If t h e Sovlcts decided t o take over tlestorn Europe i n t a c t t o pursue t h i s course of action thc a t t a c k s on Western - Europe probably would bc reiat vely U g h t and r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e extent f e a s i b l e to m l l i t a r y t a r g c t s which could a t t a c k If a course of a c t i o n USSR BICX'C followed which r e s u l t e d i n a t t a c k s a g a i n s t t h e f u l l spcctrum of Western Europcan military urban-industrial and p o l i t i cal strengths t o t h e e x t e n t permitted by a v a i l a b i l f k y o f L'orcc t h e damage l e v e l would probably be of t h e 3rzme t cneral nature as that suffered by the US figure6 011 Annex B hcrcto jn ovidcs more d e t a i l e d d m g e t o c l v i l soc1cijic 1I n t h e USSR China and t h e European S a t e l l i t e s c United S t a t e s 1 While a number of s t u d i e s have been conducted through recent years which indicate o t i m t e sof dam to t h e US c i v i l s o c i e t y expected t o 1-eault from a g e n e r a l nuclear Yiar t h e r e 1s no s p e c i f l c study conducted r e c e n t l y and g e n e r a l l y accepted which can be drawn upon for t h e I n i o m t l o n you d e s i r e ur oful source vould be the last aniiual NESC study coilductal in 1955 The r e s u l t s of t h a t study a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e Uherc LO a u f l i c i c n t pattoiyi ill paot utudlco t c x 1 i t hcc boon that while n nuclcr c ciinngc would lunvc th US in a' ueX'lOualy d m g c QcOiidiLj ori rr l th in iny ini l l ioiis TOP SECRET JCSm-430-61 I ' 4 I - 1 of ' TOP SECRET 1 I c a s u a l t i e s and l i t t l e h n e d i a t e war supporting c a p a b i l i t y h1 t h e US would continue t o e x i o t as an organized and ' p v i a b l e nation and u l t i m a t e l y would p r e v a i l whereas the USSR would n o t a 3 Question What a r e the major unccri ailntlcz c K r e g a r d i n g t h e size and d i s p o s i t i o n of the Sovict m i s s i l e force which u n d e r l i e theso judgments 3 Answer M e major uncertsint es 1 k I n t h c a r e a s of the s i z e l o c a t i o n post-re and opcratlcnnl of I'cctl vcness of Soviet i m i s i l e effort Also lmporta t a r e thc u n o e r t a l r t i c s concerning -Sov e t e a r l y warning c a p e b i l i t y which rsLrtcs t o r e a c t i o n times of a l l S o v i e t nuclear del very vehicles and their o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y t o achieve simultaneity of attack on U S f o r c e s which a t l y t h e d e s t r u c t i o n before laur ch ol' o u r own d e l i v e r y va ef fhei cc ltessg r eThese a r e a s o f u n c e r t a i n t y a r c tliocuosed below i n greater detail a No confirmed deployed l o c a t i o n s 01' ICL't4s been i d e n t i f i e d o t h e r than the t e s t rarigc's ' havc as y e t Therc is evidence w i t h varying i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s as t o r e l 1 i b l l l t y of some a d d i t i o n a l p o s s i b l e o p e r a t i o n a l ICBM site-coinplcxcc The mos t - 'suspect l o c a t i o n s f o r o p e r a t i o n a l ICBM ltc- complexes a r c I n northwestern USSR A l l ICBM and IlU3M ol crat lonal s i t e s arc c u r r e n t l y considered t o be s o f t b u t f u t u r c hardenj ng i s cons i d e r e d probable The primary elenient of uiiccrtainty l i e s i n t h e range of d i v e r g e n t views i n c u r r e n t estimates of the number of S o v i e t ICBMs on launcher Thc f u l l range of u n c e r t a i n t y as t o t h e Soviet m i s s i l e c a p a b l l l t y i s r e f l e c t e d I n National I n t e l l i g e n c e Estimate N I E 11-11-61 b It is assumed t h a t the Soviets w i l l s t r i v e Lo achieve s i m u l t a n e i t y of a r r i v a l of ICBMs i n the I n i t i a l salvo a g a l n s t Weeteim targets Concerning t h e cusrcni r e l i a b i l i t y of the TOP SECRET JCSM-430-61 1 F 1 1 ' 5 Soviet ICBM i t is estimated t h a t oolne 40-6 5 percent of the t o t a l number of ICBM8 on launcher would g e t off Within 15-30 ' minutes of scheduled t i m e n and a r r l v e 1 n the vl cIn1ty OS assigned t a r g e t s i e threg tlmeo t h c 1ioi linal Clrculnr Error l n l t L m i s s i l e and manned a i r c r a f t peiict rationw of the c a r l y warning and m i s s i l e d e t e c t i o n n e t s are expected t o be rve ll coordinated Ho gever f u l l c l i n l t n n c i tof y inlssi2 e 1mpa c t w i l l n o t be achieved b u t %hs Sovlets v r i l l endemor t o coor dj nate c l o s e l y timewise a t t a c k s on CO pS and Europe 0 The Soviet nctlve e3 rly warning capa ll iiq 2s extcnslve e l a b o r a t e and hGirvily overlzpping but 1 i i n i t e d t o medium and high altiZude cover about the peripht yand s e n s i t i v e I n t e r i o r areas The only known gap 13 i n tilo nouthcentrzl- southeastern section- borderlpg - _on TI c% -- be closed i n the near future is l i m i t e d 'J'hio will d o u b t l e s s Tlis low a l t l t d ecapnblll'iy The development of lil@ f r cqucncy ionos1iherl c back-scatter radarn for detection of lon -range n l s s l l e 1aUnClliilgS has bean within Soviet c c p a b % l i t l e sf o r the l a s t f i v e gears The Soviets also hzvo a h l g h c a p a b i l l t y for long-range passive detection d The Sov1et a i r defense system is urldcrgolng a major t r a n s i t i o n which L$ slgnlfL i - %y Lmprovine I t s c a p a b i l i t i e s a g a i n s t medium and high a l t l t u d e 33 1- aspects of this t r a n s i t i o n are the rapid i n s t a l l a t i o n of ourfaoe - t o - a i r missile s i 'I attack The p r i n c i p a l and the w 1 dcoprcnd d e p l o p c n t of an a i r defense control system w l t l i einl-automatic features Other s i g n i f l o a n t recent developments Include the advent or I b o t t e r radars the introduction o f limltod number3 o f improved i n t e r c e p t o r s the estiinated introductlon of nuolear weapons i n t o s u r f ace - t o - a i r rnisnilcs and the probable incorporation of more advanced e l e c t r o n l c gear and armament TOP SECRET JCSM-430-61 6 TOP'SECRET i n t o interceptors The Soviets now have an extensive high-priority research program t o develop a e t a t i c a n t i b a l l i 8 t i c missile system Considering t h e i r progress t o d a t e t h e i r technical capabllitieo and the advantages t o them of early deployment l i x l t e d dcploymcnt of such a system i s expected t o begin I n 1963-1966 Notwithstanding the above the Soviet a i r defense nyotc in would s t i l l have g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y in coping with Iapce- icale w l r attack employing varied and eophisticated t a c t i c s tilrough a t 1 l e a s t 1963 e US a i r defense capability 13 currently limited t o detection and activa cttaclc of a i r bmatlilnz vehlclec and an i n l t ' l a l capabi1it j f o r detectjon of IcBTvls period under consideration the L cconr BNiS #' Later i n the 6 it c will enhance the probability of t e c t i c a l war nl ng of enemy mass ICBM attack The capability for post launch detection of submarine-launched missiles and t o r aotivc k i l l of ICEM and submarine-launched missiles 1s not cnvisioned w i t h i n the tlmo period under consideration f Planning f o r the s t r i k e s in JCS SIOP-62 r e f l e c t s consideration of and compensation for a l l factors whlch might degrade asfiurance of succesy w i t h t i c p a r t i a l exception of 2'53 consideratlon accorded destruction before launch destruction before launch is reflected I n the planned launch of s t r i k e s on specific targets froin bas05 which d i f f e r i n location and type and i n ui Llizlng a mix of delivery systems While tliis conoldeiaatlon appllcs to planning the f a c t remains that the t r i l c ee f f e c t s and I r o s u l t s described herein are baaed upon an assumption of no destruction before launch which would l i k e l y be lnaccurate i n varying degree i n gny case l e I n the cii-cwnstnnces postuleted a Berlin c r i o i s with an associated s t a t e of tension - - the a b i l i t y o f our forces t o enhanco deterrence t o enemy I i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of tho crl8is TOP SECRET JCSM-43-61 7 OP to engage survive and TOP SOCEIET t '' t # Sf GilLri Lltly m y o v e d ' p m v a l if such deterl ence f a i l s by a number of p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s r e f e r r e d 2a l t o i n a s e p a r a t e memorandum being forwarded t o you on t h a t These a c t i o n s would s u b j e c t from t h e J o i n t Chiefs o f S t a f f considerably reduce the e x t e n t of dOstl-dctJ on of a l a r g e p o r t i o n of o u r offensive f o r c e s p r i o r t o launch t h o same a c t i o n s would place - UR Moreover i n an onlicmced posture f o r execution of a p o s s i b l e n a t i o n a l dcc Lsioii t o pre-empt in Y t h e event o t h e r a c t i o n s t o reta n our i-ights regarding -r r l i n were defeated Extensive two-sided wargarnos of IOP-62 now being conducted may bo expectcd to c o n t r i b u t e more p r e c i s e datr on base and vchlclc c u r v i v a b s l i t y than irJ now a v a i l a b i e 4 CJaentLon How o m d i a l t o the outr omo w i J l d be t h e quest of whether the US o r USSR mck Answer fir I n answering tllis question c r u c i a l t o t h e o u t - come is i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean c r i t i c a l t o p r e v a i l i n g i n general war a If the US exercised pre-eniptlve inii l ative i n general w a r the weight o f a t t a c k launched ngalnst the Slno-Soviet - Bloc would be ouch t h a t although the US would be g r e a t l y damaged by the USSR r e t a l i a t o r y e f f o r t tho US c l e a r l y would s prevail b Currently e f f e c t i v e XLC Il -Ltionnl S e c u r i t y Policy k s a s a b a s i c objective p r e v a i l i n g i n event of general war p o l i c y a l o o precludes 2revcntlvc war IIovicvcr c w r c n t p l a n - ning recognizeo t h a t i n response t o Icnowler c a t t a c k a g a i n s t the US i 6 imminent or The to that a Sovict honor a s e c u r i t y t r e a t y commitment t h e US f o r a e s may be required t o take t h e i n i t i a t i v e i f s o d i r e c t e d by t h e Preoident By lmplicatlon a p r o v i s i o n of the p o l i c y is t h a t the US shall p r e v a i l i n event of e i t h e r i n i t i a t i o n 01 r e t a l i a t i o n Our general war plans which are based on t h i s policy a r e drarm up t o permlt tho US t o p m v a l l even though placcd I n a r e t a l i a t o r y role I TOP SECFIET JGSM-430-61 - 8 I ' 0 3 I' ' 2 I ' 9 j$ r J ' 'p I '' I I ' TOP SECRET c ma degree t o which we would be succeasful i n p r e v a i l i n g if placed- I n a r e t a l l a t o l y r o l c p r i n c i p a l l y would be dependent on t h e eneny c a p a b i l i t y r e l a 2 i v c t o t h c c a p a b i l i t i e s of US and a l l i e d forcesr illcluding the ir s u r v i v n b l l i t g and t i m e l i n e s s of rerponne be dependant on 'd e c i s i o n rQCOipt Timelliiesn of i er ponse 'in t u r n would of wariiilinc o f fittbc k t i n e l i n c o s of t o r e a c t and capXkLllty of tlia l'i'icndly l'orocs t o respond t o the d e c i s i o n ' t o s k i k c Cursent i n t e l l j geiice estimtes accord the enemy a high c n p a b l l l t y I n th c wzy of i 0 t h offensiva nnd defensive f o r c e o - lJS a c t i v e defensive c a p a b i l i t i e s are l h i t e d t o app1Scat ioii ago Llist air-bre2thiiig v e h i c l e s and pro-launch a c t i o n agaiiict t h e cutmariix missile t h r e a t through J SW operations Wh1 le iolnJ aosu-nnce of I C F X warning i s a v a i l a b l e we have no poat laun1 it a c t f v e defenses a g a i n s t ICBMs IRBM MRBMs miRslles AS143 aiid ubmnrine-3 au iched and t n e r e a r e dlffer1r g evaluations o f the degree t o which our A S W operations can reduce t h e slzcable S o v i e t t The survivability of our forceo i s a submarine f o r c e complox f'unctlon of many c r i t i c a l factors - Sui3vlvnbilityy I s g i e a t l y 'enhanced by increased iiiob%lity and by pl aciin a l a r g o number of f o r c e s in an a1 cr l s t a t u s Alert f o r c e s a r e those which on fixed baoQs c8n r c a c t within 15 mLnutes o f warning time and those on ' le bate wLtliIn 2 hours il Additional mcasures a v a l l e b l o t o I n c m n o o s u r v i v a b l l i t y Include a d d i t i o n a l d i s p e r s a l of forces har denlnl and pre-launch o f f o r c e s under p o s l t i v e c o n t r o l A I n surmnary t h e US c l e a r l y would prevGI 1 i f we ini i iato g e q e r a l n u c l e a r war - If- _ we a r e placed i n the p o s i t i o n o f --- s t r I l c 1 ' i nr e t a l i a t i o n the d a 3 e o t o which we a r e successf u l ' I n p r e v a i l i n g I s dependent upon tlic timeliness of cur response Our p l a n s 'and t h e nssocia cd TQP SECFET 9 JCSM 430-'61 I - -- __I_ ' I _ incasures f o r t h e i r TOP SECRET execution provide f o r an e f f e c t i v e responoe Implementation o$ those plans 13 Success in the ' dependent on r e c c i p t of adequate warning and on timelineas of decision t o execute I those plans 5 Question If present plans were d 1 k r F d s o ns t o concen- trate on d e s t r u c t l c n of the S o v i e t nuclear 3tgMn q force b r i n g i w a g r e a t e r p a r t of our f o r c e t o bear on excl uslvely ncLlltary t a r g e t s W t would br the miflwcrn t o the fLrst t h r e e guestions llfltod above 1 Ansrer_ a E f f e c t on dovlet h cltp S t r l l c l n r DorcL There are c u r r e n t l y iacludad Lc the t a r g e t l i s t attached by SIOP-62 f o r c e s all knovm elements o r t h e Sovie liuclonr s t r l k i n g f o r c e and related f a c l l l t l e s The le rel G assurance I' for a t t a c k of a l l t a r g e t s representinp the nuclear threat to the CONUS i e those h e r e t o is high 148 inst3llatLone so l J s t c a -In Aiinex - about 95s - c o n s i c l c r l n all' f a c t o r s A except doatruction bcforc ltunch which f o r kiie U e r t Borcc would be low Directing a g r e a t e r p a r t o f our force agnlnst exclusively m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s VJOUld not r o c u l t i n a slp5 f L- cant i n c r e a s e In d e s t r u c t i o n of thQ Sovict nuclear s t r i k i n g force IncroasinG the l e v e l of nttac r againsL a i r bascs md missile launch s l t e o those aircraft and US weapons WOL ' IIIiSOilCS b ' b r f c c t the survLval of ltlullchcd prf or t o arrival of' The num5er so launched of course would depend on whether the US i n i t i a t e d the attaclc o r r e t a l i a t e d Raising t h e l e v e l of US a t t a c k against Icnovm i'fxed m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s would not reduce the t h r e a t poscd by niisslles tlic l o w t l o n of which i s not known ThISj tho a l t e r a t l o n of p r e s e n t plans t o more heavily weight the attaclc of m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s would n o t reduoe Soviet c a p a b i l l t i e a t o a s i g n i f i c a n t dsgree TOP SECRET TOP SBCRET b E f f e c t on US Ecropecm and Soviet C i v i l S o c i e t i e s Inasmuch as Increasing the l e v e l of e f f o r t a g a i n s t m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s would r e s u l t I n l i t t l e ctinnge I n effect on the Soviet nuclear strllclng force t h a r c would be correspondingly l i t t l e change I n e f f e c t of Soviet n t r i on tho US aiid liestern European c i v i l noo'letleo c Dlvsrsion or us force8 fkom o t h e r t a r g e t s t o m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s would reduce by relatively m a l l percentage the e f f e c t on the Soviet c i v i l society If' the diversloil were higlfly proilounced I t could e s u l t i n f a i l u r e t o Camage t h e wnr-supportLnZ cconomies o f he USSR and China t o the extent neceosiwy t o ronder them Incapable of f u r t t o r aupport of t h e imi- c f f o r t This l a t t e r condition was found by Study No 2003 t o be a shortcoming o f a t t a c k i n g only m l l i t a r y t a r g e t o c Major Uncortalntles As lndicntod 111 a above diverting more US f o r c e s t o a t t a c k of militai-j t a r g e t s would r e s u l t I n relat-lvely i n s i g n i f i c a n t increase i n dcs t r u c t i o n o f the Soviet nuclear s t r i k i n g forco Consequently thcre would bc c o r r e s p o n d i l y l i t t l echange i n the e f f e c t of the major u n c e r t a i n t i e s I d e n t i f i e d I n paragraph 11 above on judgment - a s t o e f f e c t s o f general nuclear war on t h e Soviet nuclear s t r i k i n g f o r c e and 03 US European and Soviet c i v i l s o c i e t l o s I TO SPCAET P1 ' A mx A 42- '' ' DAMAGE TO SINO-SOVIET STRATWIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY CAPBY THE'ALERT F O Em N m L FORCE The number of i n s t a l l a t i o n s on t hc 1151 o f the nr cat Single Integrated Operational Plan 19 12 j10r-62 ls indicated below Included 13 i n d i c a t i o n of the number of i n s t a l l a t i o n s planned t o be attacked and expected t o bc destroyed by e i t h e r Y t h e Alert Force o r 'Ale P r l l Force 'J'i a riuiiibeis indicated d e troyed representu those l n s t a l l a t # i o n swhich would be destroycd - a t a l e v e l of assurance o f 70 percent o r rnolw considering all f a c t o r 8 of a t t r i t i o n cnd r e l l n b l l l t y of' wc ilmnr CXCcIJt d ti ucl L o t b e f o m launch 'ihc ac ucil number fic3LroycCI o r s i L n i i i c d i i s l y damaged would bo g r e a t e r but at a l e o s e r lcvoi 0 ' confidence than 70 percent c tar e t s At oclwd -Lv_A crt Nuolear Threat t o United S t a t e s - A i r f i e l d s w nucloar storage and primary staging bases 76 75 Nuclear storage 68 sa 4 148 - 1'18 2113 6 Misoile s i t e s and storage ICBM h lL 166 99 212 G 1 6 1 1 1 It C Nuclear Threat t o Forward AiA i r f i e l d s w o nuclear storage n u c l e a r s could be deployed Missile s i t e s MRBM Missile storage MREC3l Naval Base 1 26 193 ' S a t e l l i t e A i r Threat A i r f i e l d 8 w o nuclear storage Air-Surface Missile storage TOP SE% T' 88 56 5 93 5 83 24 5 5 7 Annex 88 29 61 - A -- TOP SECRET Attacked bY Alert _ - De otroyod bY Alert pull -- Residual A i r and Surface Capability Residual and reserve a i r f i e l d s A C and wpns could be 369 deployed 8 10 15 56 80 72 --29 -- 26 15 26 - 983 734 415 TOP SECRET JCSM-430-61 1 11 A i r Depots Total Strate IC Nuclear I 276 11 --pixTfnhions 4 91 Naval Base Surface Air Repair F a c i l i t i e s e 217 13 I I 852 TOP SECReT ANNEX B DAMAGE TO 'SINO-SOVIET BLOC CIVIL SOCIETIES Destruction of f l o o r space and personnel c a s u a l t i e s r e p r e s e n t u s e f u l Indices of e f f e c t on c i v i l s o c i e t i e s of nuclear Indicated below are anscnsmcnts o f damage g e n e r a l war expressed I n thoae terms expected t o r e s u l t from a t t a c k s -planned f o r SIOP-62 forces These est lmates are based upon -a a r r i v a l of a t l e a s t one weapon a t each DOZ -Destroyed by Alert Force F u l l Force 65 75 $ I n d u s t r i a l floor space USSR $ T o t a l f l o o r space USSR % Urban casualties ' USSR k Rural o a s u a l t i e s USSR 41 Total c a a u a l t i e s USSR 74 82 37 71 39 5Lt 53 59 55 21 $ I n d u s t r i a l floor space China $ T o t a l floor space China k Urban casualties China $ Rural c a s u a l t i e s China $ T o t a l c a s u a l t i e s China 52 53 9 16 61 41 4 10 Casuelties i n European S n t e l l l t e s 421 000 258 000 197 000 Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Germany 436 000 308 000 292 000 4 200 Hungary 214 OCO 2 636 000 58 000 49'7 000 Poland mania 1 300 Urban Industrial Complexes a t Rlsk s USSR 295 China 78 ffovernment Control Centern in USSR and China No attacked by Alert Force No destroyed by Alert Force No destroyed by F u l l Force 118 85 121 Destroyed means dwage t o building o r f a c i l l t i e s w h b h p r e c l u d e s production without e s s e n t i a l l y complete rccons t r u c t i o n o f the i n s t a l l a t i o n Connotates collapse o r severe damage t o a l l p r i n c i p a l a t r u c t u r e s A g r e a t e r number of I n s t a l l a t i o n s w i l l receive l e s a e r but a i g n l f l c a n t damage which would r e q u i r e m a t e r i a l s and e f f o a t t o r e p a i r before produotion could be restored q Caaualtles Include f a l l o u t e f f e c t s durinc the f i r s t 72 hours with a 60 peroent shielding TOP SECRET SCSM-430-61 Annex B 14 TOP SECRET ' yo ' MILITARY INEASU ESWORLD JIDE 2 1 THE PROaLTiH 1 To determine propa ation l of mount i rig 3criousness which 1 could be taken by the I h i t e b Statoo i n tlic CONUS i n Europe 2 and worldwide t o provide a basis for the t h r e a t arid use of 3 m i l i t a r y f o r c e t o z'estoru access ta l%rllri by app1icatio i of 4 a SubaLnritirl n o m - i c l e c forcc Pr succsuslve atwee 5 b General nuclear w z x G ASSUVD PPICNS 2 Aosuniptions f o i th1 o stuCy includc l iloSc s e t forth i n paragraph 2 of the baolc paper plus tlic 0 13o vlng this study a r e twofold 9 10 1 To influence Soviet deciRiciis before they a r e taken t h i o summer o r f a l l 11 12 2 Provided the prcparatlona envisagod In this 13 study f a i l t o have the dcsircd deterrent e f f e c t t o 14 c r e a t e no l a t e r than Oitobcr 1961 thc 15 Scot capablllty f o r a p p l i c a t i o n cf s u b s t a n t i a l noniiuclem force t o r e s t o r e ground access against CUR forcca alone o r 1 0 a Tho purposi of the pseparatory ntebc cnvicagcd in 1 -7 16 17 a g a i n s t t o t a l Soviet Bloc C n p d i l l t l @ G which can be 18 brought t o bear I n EsuoC Geimaiy for pcrlodo of 5 13 days t o 15 before r e s o r t is made t o tho iisc of rluclecz-r weapons 20 FACTS BEARING ON Tim PROBLEM 3 I n a memorandum for the Secrctary of Dsfonoe d a t e d 21 6 June-1961 t h e J o i n t Chiefs of Stafr s t a t e d t h a t tlic Check- 22 list h l i l l t a r y and Non-Mll ltnry mea r urcs in thc E c r l i n or 23 Crisis forwarded t o the Secretary of Defense on 12 August 1960 24 I ' TOP SECRET Appendix A I JCSM-43-61 a 1 I 0 I I TOP -k -___- mccwrr TOP SBCIiET provides a wide range of a c t i o n s r e s p o n s l v e t o the problen of 1 d e t e r r i n g the Soviet Bloc from attempts t o blockade access t o 2 Berlin I n e d d l t i o n i n t h e i r memorandum f o r the S c c r e t a r j of 3 Defense dated 13 A p r i l 1961 a3 ml 1 as i n thelr memorandun 4 f o r t h e S e c r e t a r j of Defense dated 28 A 1 i - 1 1 1361 the J o i n t 5 Chief 3 or Staff r e l t s r n t c d t h a t t ie Cl cckliril 1 wlth the preinlsc on which I t I s based 1 e L c Is ncccptiiig the 7 risk of g e n e r e l waz continues to bc n m t j sCixtory i n i t i a l 8 framewopk f o r t h e derel opnad of p cn i f o r 1JX and Free l orld 4 r p o m e t o any Soviet atteidpt t o take over B c r l i n OF 3 deny Free - world a c c e s s t h e r e t o 4 For add tlonal 11 h t s see Ai'li exA I2 DISCUSSION 13 5 For d i s c u s s i o n see Annex B 1 4 CONCLUSIONS 15 16 6 It i s concluded t h a t a The e a r l y execution by the United S t a t e s of t h e measures enumerated I n Annex C t o Appcndlx - A 17 18 within t h e time limits assumed I n t h i s study l c 31 CJctober 1361 19 would be expected t o influenca t h e Soviet d e c i s i o n process 20 regarding B e r l l n 21 The m l l i t a r j crctloi-rs can be taken only i f t h e necessary p o l i t i c a l deciolons rcqulred t o implement 22 ImL311cit i n such p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s 23 them have been made 24 I s t h e acceptance of t h e r i e k o r general war b The measures enumerated i n Annex C t o Appendix A 25 i n most c a s e s depend f o r full effectiveneoo upon complete 26 A l l l e d cooperation p a r t i c u l a r l y by t h e nations wlth t h e 27 g r e a t e e t i n t e r e s t i n t h e B e r l i n question - t h e United 2a 10 Kingdom France and t h e Federal Repub3 IC of Germany PRG 29 United S t n t e e a c t i o n alone is f e a s i b l e only t o the e x t e n t 30 t h a t t h e Allies w i l l permit t h e u s e of' t h e l r n a t i o n a l 3 t e r r i t o r i e s and t h a t t h e a c t i o n contemplated does not 3 ' ' 'TOP SECmT d involve the sovorcigntY of an A l l y 4 v ' 2 and l e a d e r s h i p which could be exltccted not o n l y t o influence 3 t h e Soviet d c c i s i o n makftlp groce u but also t o r e s t o r e the 4 confidence of our A l l i e s i n the llnltcd S t a t e $ and t o o b t a i n 5 t h e i r rUll cooperatlon-and ouppoit 6 Although a measure of A I l i r d agreenient could probably be obtained for the e a r l y execut ion 0 oomc of t h e U RSLI CS of readineos of US forces worl6w 10 but p wtLcularly I n Europe i t i s doubtful i n t h e c trcinc that US A l l i e s i n 11 t h e absence of a clear-cut Soviet -1ns1 lzcO B e r l i n i n c l d e n t 12 would agree t o a r a p i d and s y s t e m t i c build-up S o r l i m i t e d 13 nonnuclear war I n Central Europe together w i t h t h e risk of 14 general war 3 5 Appendlx A io on t h e Soviets TOP designed t o produco a otl-ons d c t e r r c n tc r f e c t There i s a p o s u l b i l i t y however t h a t the 17 18 13 pre-empt US and or Allied e f f o r t 3 t o protect West Derlin 20 For t h i s reason t h e United S t a t e s must be prepared f o r 21 g e n e r a l war 22 sEcm - Appendix A 3 I I 16 S o v i e t s might r e a c t by taking m i l i t n r y counteractions t o JCSM-431-61 ---__ 8 9 de ---- - ' 7 envisaged in Annex C t o Appeiidix b c iwic easc s t a t e d The execution o f the measur'c erivlsngcd i n Anncx C to ' 1 designed t o be a c l e a r deinoristration o f US determination c - The messures a r e TOP SJXRET ' I The fundamental d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e concept envisaged n t h i s study and t h e concept envisased I n the Chcclclist o f Mill- 2 t a r y and Non-Military Measures i n t h e B e r l i n Crisis 3 i s as follows h a I n this study s e l e c t e d meacurcj would 'ic implcir cnted p r o g r e s s i v e l y over t h e next Few 1 iontho w i t h enhancing t h e crcdlbl l-ty 5 view t o oLn t h a nuclcai- d t errcnt and 5 6 7 improving U S and A l l i e d non-nuclccr c a p n b l l i c s1n Eirope a by 31 October 1961 i n o r d e r t o d c t c r t h e S w i c t Bloc from 9 attempting a blockade of West Ber ln and a t t h e same time 10 t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e e v e n t u a l i t y of gc io -al wcr 11 b The Concept of t h e Checklist envlsngcs p r o g r e s s i v e 12 a p p l i c a t i o n of measures a f t e r a D e r l i n I n c i d e n t h a s occurrcd 13 while t h e measures l i s t e d i n Annex C t o Appendix A a r e 14 designed t o d e t e r a Berlin c r i s i s by adequate p r c p a r a t l a n 15 beforehand 16 TOP SEQRET _ - I - JOSM-431-61 I 1 4 Annex A t o Appendix A TOP SECRET I A N E X B TO AFFXNDI c ' p C # DISCUSSION 1 In accordance w i t h tho aeeumptions I n t h l s s t u d y it i s enviaaged t h a t B n b e r of a c t i o n s g n r t i c u l n r l y m i l i t a r y measures could be implemorlted imniedlntely as p o s s i b l e S o v i e t Bloc attempts t o $ y l o p the n e a r f u t u r e 2 deterrent t o 2 measures G of $he type envisaged F Annex C t o Ap cncilx A t o gnln n d e t e r r e n t ef I c t p r l 3 r t o an a i i % i c i a t eB 8 e r l i n lncicicnt w2s rccmflcndad 5 6 7 by he J o i n t Chiefs of Staff' i n t h e i r mcm% anclum t 3 the Secre- 8 t a r y of Defense c k t z d 13 i ril 1561 w b j c c t Thc S t a t u s 9 - Of B e r l l n Contingency P l m o ' I 2 Although 10 no lmmedistc a c t i o n wns taken by the US Coordimt-11 ing Group t o Implement t h e cbovo recomniendntion 3f Lhc J o i n t 12 Chiefs of S t a f f some o l t h e measures recommc-nded f o r e a r l y l m - 13 plementation have i n e f f e c t been executed 14 F o r example t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e T r i p a r t i t e United S t a t e s United Kingdcm France m i l l t a r y planning staff LIVEOAK has become known ns a 15 16 r e s u l t of some r e c e n t newspaper a r t i c l e f i 17 3 As t h e Berlin s i t u a t i o n has developed without a majoi' 1b i n c i d e n t s i n c e Premier Khruchchev Is threit i n November 1958 19 lt has become I n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r t h a t t h e Soviets remain a s 20 i n t r a n s i g e n t even with regard 21 t3 t h e i r o b j c c t l v c s of mcking permanent and i r r e v o c a b l e the d i v i s i o n of Gcrmsny and t h e com- 22 p l e t e incorporntion of West B e r l i n into t h e i r E st Gerrncn 23 satellite T h i s Soviet p o s i t i o n w n most r e c e n t l y reaff irmed 24 a t t h e r e c e n t meeting i n Vienna betwecn President Qnnedy and 25 Premier Khrushchev 26 4 Accordingly t h i s study f ocu3ca p r i m a r i l y on those mill- t a r y reinforcement measures and prepnrationa which c o u l d be TOP SECkET '- 'JCSM-431-61 I -- 3 4 a Bcrlin c r i s i s i n The concept of i n l t i n t i n S 1 5 Annex B t o Appendix A 27 29 TO SFE U33 ' '4 ' recommended t o t h e Pzesident f o r ImplemcntatSon I n o r d e r both I to r e s t o r e t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of the US nuclear d a t e r r e n t and t o 2 achieve as e a r l y as possible a military posture which would 3 permit t h e United S t a t e s and 4 I it6 A l l i e s oi- t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s u n l l a t e r a l i y t o ap3ly subatantin3 nonnual ear f o r c e a g a i n s t any 5 Soviet Bloc attenipt t o blockade ground a c c e i s t o B e r l i n and 6 concurrently t o prepare f o r tns ultlinate r ' ctk o f g e n e r a l war 7 which such actiunu iiivolve 8 5 The sequence o f mil1' arj z c t l o x i whlch are envisaged 1s f o r t h i n Annex C coga' iei wftli correri mndfnL p o l l ' c l c a l - a c t i o n s and p e r t i n e n t i-emarks wlth re 1 ai d t o Srrip5cmeiil atlon 6 An i n s g o a t t o n 03 10 21 tile sequence of' events in Annex C 12 to a 13 r e a d i l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e a o t l o n s cnvisaGed aln0uP t crash program within t h e tinre l l n i i t u cs jumcC vllthii t h i s la study l e 31 Octobcr 1961 15 Hot evei-- thi asnect docs not i n v a l i d a t e t h e o v e r - a l l d e t e r r e n t e f r o c t wh ch incy be expected 16 f r o m implenentation o f theaa meanuI'e3 17 7 While t h e o m c u t i o n 9 6f t h e measures c n v l s a g c d I n JG Annex C t o Appendix A whether on a US unll atci-a basi o r 19 A l l i e d b a s i s i s designed t o produco n ctrong d e t e r r e n t e f f e c t 20 on t h e S o v i e t s concclvably i t could have an adverse nnd 21 o p p o s i t e e f f e c t on t h e Soviet Eloc i c Instead o f deterring 22 them from a blockade oi' West F ' ' i n i t could cause them t o 23 take i n l l l t n r y counteroutlonn t o m - r q j t u riiid op A1 l icd e f f o r t s t o p r o t e c t Weat B e r l i n 2 11 25 8 For example i f t h e United S t a t e o nnd i t s Allies 26 mobilize and deploy a d d i t i o n a l nonnuclear ground f o r c e s t o 27 Europe as a m i n l m u n i tmay be expected t h a t t h e Soviet Bloc 28 w i l l respond i n kind 29 I n a d d i t i o n it may be expected that t h e Soviet Bloc w i l l accuse t h e United S t a t e s and t h e west of 30 d e l i b e r a t e l y preparing f o r nggresaivc war i n Central Europe 33 f o r t h e purpose of destroying t h e Qennan Democrat Republic GDR 5 2 Annex B t o Appendix A 6 TOP SECRET $ and r e u n l f p q Germany by force f $0 I n a d d i t i o n they a r e c e r t a i n r a i s e t h e s p e c t r e - o f a resurgent and mi itant seeking t o aggi-ss 1 fletit Germany 2 3 a g a i n s t t h e Cormnuiiist cttites undcr t h e p r e - t e x t of l i b e r a t i n g East Germany and B c r l t n Morcovcr all o f 1 t h e s e moves a r e certctln t o cause s e r l o u s r cpc cuss1oiis i n o t h e r 5 p a r t s of t h e world 6 For e ample t h e fJ xal lon of United S t a t e s grid A l l i e d a t t e n t i o n on and t h e provision o f a d d i t i o n a l resources z t o Western rope c m l d motivate i h o CIIICOMc a c i e v e t h e i r oFJec5ives of' l' oc i i l g f to sttexpt to i i l d w nd ovel-rutminz So t h e a s t Psia by o v e r t military f c r c e 9 It is a l s o coO jcratic# 1 i s not o n l d c s i r a b l e b u t essential if t h e f u l l d e t e r r e n t c f f e n t j v e n e r s oi' t h e measures envioaged 18 t o be r e a l i z e d 8 3 10 OSvlous from i n oxnminnt3 on of Aniicx C t h a t f u l l A l l i e d including N ' TO 7 Ii1 the I bsmce o f an 11 12 13 14 o v e r t Soviet-inspired B e r l i n i n c i d e n t I t Lo mo t Improbable 15 t h a t t h e United S t a t e s could count on f u l l Alliccl cooperation 16 i n Fmple entLng a s e r i e s of mensureo such a s thosc envisaged 1'1 I n Annex C 18 Forceful US i e a d e r s h i p howevcr and Us u n i l a t e r a l p r e p a r a t i o n s t o r e s o r t t o f o r c e ii necer sarj coulO have a 13 c a t a l y t i c e f f e c t on Our a l l i a s i n stlmulnt#'lnp them t o t a k e 20 a p p r o p r i a t e correspondlng a c t i o n s 10 That l a n o t t o say t h a t United lltatcc Allies Including t h e FRQ would not fight for dcr t i 3 c v J i n It I s t o say 21 22 23 however t h a t t h e people and governnorits o f lrlcstcrn Lkimge 24 m y remain l o a t h t o engage i n such deterrcbnt p r e p a r a t o r j 25 a c t i o n s without a c l e a r demonstration o f U S leadership 26 TOP aECiTJUSM-431-61' Annex B t o 7 Appendix A I $COP SECLT h I P 1 ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A POSSIBLX MZASURES TO DETER A BERLIN CRISIS Purpo o The purpose of t h i o list of a c t i o n s 1s t o demonstrate a United S t a t e s r e s o l v e t o employ m i l i t a r y f o c e t o lncludo the use o r n u c l e a r weapons if necessary t o prcvent the S o v i e t s from talc Lng a c t i o n t o deny a l l i e d r l g h t s in Berlin -' ' 2 Time Phasing 4 The a c t i o n s t o be taken a r e keyed t o Khrnshciiev Is pronounce- t o s i g n a s e p a r a t e t r e a t y with thc CDR b r the end of 1951 ment - and are phased I n t o t h r m tint grouglr gn D-5 MOS t o LJ-4 MOS D-4 MOS t o D-2 MOS 3-2 li0S t o Ii-Xn 31 U l S 1961 Altiiough this assumed tune frame would not conipletc prcparntions by 31 October 1961 it would constiti as much p r o p x s s it colild bc scalistleally dxpected in a 4-month period assuminG a n nyp-ro c inat e 1 J u l y 1961 starting d a t e 3 Implementation Although measures a r e l i s t e d %1 a gcricrally ascendbig ordei of s e v e r i t y w i t h i n t h e idsumed t ime frainc t h e Implementct ion oi' any neasude U s t e d is d e p x d e n t upon t h e c%rcu iiotaiiccs 1vh ich mc y develop r a p i d l y over t h e next few weeks AccordLngly t h e mea3u1es could b e executed In any-order required 4 Polit3 cal Measures - _-_ 0ppoo Lte c ach irk1i t t e r y - m a a u w 1G 1 I n tr d c oiirc c pond $ 1 7 p o l i t i c a l a c t i o m required f o r implenientation - Tho p o l i t i c a l measures column I s not intended t o uover all cowcuponding appropi-iatu p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n s but only the most obvious ones roqu ired f o r mll Ltary a c t i o n O f primary importance I s t h c requlrcinent f o r a l l i e d p a r t l I c u l a r l y t r l p a r t l t e agreeinont and coopomtion L'ar i hz f u l l L e f f e c t i v e n e s s of many measures I I TOb S FkT JCSM-431-61 Annex C to Appendix A D-6 to D-b MOMTBS Assume D-Day is 31 Deceni cr 1961 A i IME PERIOT - 1 Restor CrrdJbllit of Deterrent Restore credib lity of the deterrmt by a- Eone a Enhancing posture oi m c l e e r cepdole fosvord forces by nrvirlg edrEtiom 1 n u c l e u weapons f o r a r d in p r o m t j t3 forces e Z USCREEL F land-battle d i s s i l e varhezds n w aspersea in cornr c oviding nuclear zssisterice t o - Frarce c Zxecutive cc-Lion t o release n u l e a r iriormation to France required d Executive action t o mOalfy U S Policy is ricessrrry d None I 2 lncreese Xediness - - c bqleaen z ioz by unified a-id specified ccxmaAers on a p x i o d i c basis of selected alert measures containee in their respec- tive alert plans r 7 d L tensified treining of force US o r tripartite selected to execute Eerlin probe end ground access opra' lon Coasider ploym n t of this force ta the Helmsted area with replacement of this force with units fran CXXJS e Increase readiness to execute 4 I rl '0 _ V -- I a F r e o i d s r t i a l decleyztion of e l h i t e d n z t i o s a l ecorgencj- oSoifed by i g o r t Cwgressionsl resolxtion of a k l n z t i c c a l ezzrgency I I m b i i i z e d -f o r a sufficiosL - r i d to accomplish t k e o3jecti re Forces roc 3 generated in ec-ordance with zurrent co ilizatior glans b Alterus ive w 0 I 3 declar c Request IWiO partners particuLarly UK m e ud FRC t o take comparable action Of particular inportaGce is r e m of the Frenc'n f l e e t to I s c 0 9 m and l r e t u r n of French Plrry divisions t o Brope c 1 Om mu3 E A vlm w r v 1 I hi5 o b v- # ---m -- to i n w s t h e i r combat e Zectivexeas mttcrs The provision of nuclear capeble ueays to tf'sFFtG is a pariicularly'sensltlve point witin M e r Khr lshchev a d tlie East GemElAs __ _ _ --- -- 7 A i r Acticns C o C d prm -c e interceGLion possible z t t r i t i o 9 of n i x r c f t E m p s s i b i l i t y trms wauid be unc dlei-Ged 2 saviet ug %- 0 - c 4 'c m a c e m- rs of hostile air cr scbcerine penetretions of this line rrl - d h Risk of a t t r i t i o n and pcssible capture of US personnel Risk of Soviet pr0mand a gain iri UN and w r l d opinion Soviets could respond in rind over Arctic and Europe On balance US w i l l derive net advantage w i t h public opinion risks offset by increased respect for US deterninatioz and izpmved US intelligence -fort cen be sustained for protrscted period or t e d n a t e d a t oui- option d Increese ZLIiW md p m t c g r a i csorties Sino-Soviet peripkxy d r- e Res- k 8 U-2 fllghts f Increase reconnaissance f l i g h t s in Berlin air corridors g Fly-o-rer of Soviet Siberia end Arctic stations h On selective basis d e s t q j Soviet L O Ce i r c r e i t V I C attempt to intede- - d t h our operatione - 8 I V rt c mente deterrence end provide strategic indication of Us resolve 'c lime I eG - 1i o m kl f rnv PI s 0 0 - _ eel- ' _- I i I 4-5-__L-------zI tizxee Elxpansion - m y e n t a i l sd iitional operations qzicst roiti _ 'Yietriaa CIUCC14 i n t e r r e n t l o r s q q o r t for sum Tnailad e Pakistan Respmse i n kind - In a6dition t o Scrriet moves gcalcst countries a-bove may Induce sFniilar So iet sponso d J C I O D c g l n s t S Korea Taivcn Re-roce3ility Once ccmit ted srd faced vith Soviet i-eoponscs i r d i c n t d a5c-re t h e r e w a l d b e no acceptable a l t e r n a t i v e to susteiaed a c t i o n u r t i l military victorf achiewd or u L t i l t h e opposition agreed t o Ee7ptiate a settleuent on terns acceflable to the US E I-i '3 b kployment t o South V i e t n e n Pi eqLoj r t - cc11of US forces a S2st 753515 37rssiderx3 i 55ci icc r e q r i r e d to r e s z x - cir lt @ C W S A R 0 j - d -ti GO rent to e l i p i n a t e c a - n n d s t slpWrte2 ad a w n t e a P e t i r t eo fiiong e wit F S a coaesive force Lid main obstacle to Ry cmtro1 Should t h e s i t u a t i o n d e t e r i o r e t e in s p i t e of - asures n w being underteken deploy organized forces Obtain Mea's r e q i e s t Wcne I _ -- 'nngh' 1 311311 Lit Annex to Appendix A To SECRET 001 vm b m9 0 0 00 300000 no 00 d bo 00010 H0 0051 0 50 00 madam 000000 000303000 00 050 10 0 500005 n pmg 000m I - $413 PHWKI Do NMHH 0 11 1 0400 7 1 1 or nsm om OU 0 00 30 00 hem 0 0000000 0 10000000000n 3000 mhm hpw umm do no - Pmdn hgu mumUUhmE U 00 mvh nmw Hdwmuh 0 0 MD 00 090 01 00 00 0 003 00 on 30 03 mogeomd 0w mm 1 4 DH m amou 010000 0 - 0 10 5 905 0 0 0000010 133 0 00 1 3 Amy LouanH 000 000 005 000me Ho 0030000000000 001 005 00 0r 50800 - ung mm m 00 00 010 00 0 ummwawuhmxb 000 000 4 00 com 085 00 4mm 0 06 00 100 3 0006 0 0 50% Hm 0 1 1 0 0095 may lirruhwunu ia' 511 00 50 0 Hag 2 IA iO A i r Zecdiress ck nce trie state i o r e d i n e s s cr' YATO lime I % x l d indicate a l l i e d support of Os positicn ' oSd enhance t h e air defense posture i n Qrcpe Soviets could ifiterfere r i t h air operztlms in t h e air Eccess corridors t o Berlin To highlight t h continuance of extraordinary a c t i v i t i e s or kef m i l i t a r y cczmer2ers b Cvaxncement of b itM-iml of Pcismel S e w n uithdrava of n o n e s s e n t i a l uersoa- Kotify A l l i e s end exzlain reasons R e s t r i c t Atmristtrw51 h n e s t i c public q i n i o n will have t o bfl conditioned t o t h i s etep F wct timing of c a x m x e z z n t OZ evacDetion of dependents v f l l be dctcrnined in coordination with UXZXCFXR IIotipY Allies of planned w l i c y w i l l increase force readiness by r e t a i n i n g experienced p@rzoa el i n the area 4 x o p c s i t i o a of B r i t i s h Brexch end S s r a n i l i t a q - forczs 2 CoqAetion of Xtt dra al ol' Personnel Conplete m c u z t i o n of depx0ents and hospit l p a t i e n t s frm fo1b-d a In Europe S t a t e E q x r t r e n t cacplete evacuation of non-essential US natio-iis 3 Squadron Dispersal Eyecute USAFE IiA N squadron dispersal plan i PrepsitLon forces i n optima positX6n Dispersal of force t o @rove survivability IrPpnvzt signal of de mination to So-fiefs we by organic equipnent and theeter airlift Can r e a deployed ncmihal time Soviets would counter with similar deplayment cen ti returned to nomal readiness upon completion of requirement I 2 4 Autobgha Traffic Organize all miutary autobahn tMflc Allied agreemnt r e p i r e d convoy procedure can be naintalned ind e f h i t e l y and ascontinued v i t h reduction in tensions Soviet response in kind wuld not effect US operat ons Zv m A - E z E- -- f' muss-Is dos 35 POLTEICAL mesons A active nebizllinr by Italian ltalien agreement required light forces in S-reits of entree-to 0 maintain surx'eillence of Albania ports wt' 11 particular attention to eulxsarine activities 6 Submarine Recreise Conduct suLuerine exercises withu 33 tish as British agreemnt 85 UK submarines and forces in rem red Black Sea and eloag laid- 151 coast within terms of Montreaux convention we 7 ASH S weillence A Execute ASH surveillance with visible Advise Allies - patromng at the Straits of Gibraltar - I and in the Turkish Straits - 8 Naval Gountemeasufes hectare naval ccuntemeesm-es against Ignore Soviet pi-oteSts' Soviet and cm shipping as follows From-acted Eelay of ship s servicing hankering provi- 3311133 th - Regina-be the movement of ships in Allied ports A 333 To info-m Soviets that their military posture and deployments are unier surveillance Would improve ASE-I activities of US forces in Mediter- ranean Can be sustained for moderate duration and discontinued 0 1 US Itelian decision or unilateral Italia decision upon reduc on of tensions To elem Soviets to and UK naval strength in area in war fighting condition In position to close Bosphorous if approPri-ate Forces can be maintained in area only if adequate beck-up available Redeployment can be effected by decision and on short notice Will give evidence of increasing US firmness of purpose assess am xrpuaddv oqp xeuuv 15 a I Bill I 6 tens-so 9 3 strict icx CI 3Loc Air ProMbi Soviet O air C operatticns i x l u d i n g civfl Over mid iaLb US and Allied territory ision to restrict Sovlct en S taLia'Jle to tine deqree t h a t Al la Disgersal of COhWS P o x e s Execute disperse1 pLcn f o r COtiUS besed forces Denies icternatioiial use of nmigational ails I I I -i a - - Oomwmm odeZG wM mcme i XIPUG I Hm bHHdonam bPow who 0 axwocdm pwwdow m mmen monm ms Hownw Hm wow meuuwm dd 53' a ww Odmumawonm Hammad Mwadmwu OMmewwoum Wm mu anunnwn we mu mlwm m sa no Gm man waum Mu damsm man you awnw anhamma meuw mm mc wrm mm noum035w madman mum Hmwunm mnd wuw bwwumm Mm4wwmw ow Hmm w uwm oaww yo Um mndHour on xauuv -Mapyv h LN 51 3 I I Lzuoas aom 0 trill I I - TOP SECRET 3 APP3IDTX J 4 TYPES AND AMOUNT OF OPPlGISIV 3 NOITNUCLEAR FORCE FOR CERTAIN CONTXEJOENCIES U THE PROELEM 1 'I3 dotelmine tho type and m n of t a f i m n i v o nonimclcar 1 ASSITMPTIONS 2 a Assumptions for this conoldcrntlon include those net ' f o r t h i n paragraph 2 of the basic pa1m- b 14 That tho preparatory measui ' a8 outllncd I n Appanc llx c T h a t t h e opcretions envisagrd h r these P i t u a t i o n s are confined t o thc arc of Sant d T h a t any aggressive ' 15 16 A have been taken 13 10 1 1n n y B C 31-1cmductcd 17 I n Western Europe 19 -- wauld invoke the NATO a l l i a n c e and Lhat t h e p r o b l a n thcn 20 becomes one of NATO a t w a r with tho S a v i o t B13c and 21 t h e r e f o r e outside the scope of thls pancr 22 PACTS-DI ARINO-ON- 3 See Annex TOP -- A t o Appendix x PI OBLEM A 23 SECFT JCSM-431-61 21 Appcndlx B T O P SECRET I ' D I S C U S S I O N L1 4 F o r dlsoussion see Annex hereto 1 CONCLUSIONS 5 Under t h e assumption t h a t t h e USSR does not employ nuclear 3 weapons t h e estlmated forqes requircti taro a When opposed by 03R f o r c e s ol one 2 T h s J o i n t Chief of 4 S t a f f r e a f f i r m t h e i r view t h a t t h e hypothea Lo of opposition 5 from QDH forcoo alone is i n v n l i d and that tllera i s ng 6 01 1 - c owever using przeqnt cistivc OE3 f o r c e s as a u n i t of measure- 7 8 e n t 6 d i v i s i o n s and about 225 t a c t i c a l a i r c m f t it 3 s t a n t i v e d i f f e r e n % b e t w e n GJIR and Soviet 1ni lI tarj f o r c e s K 1 9 considered t h a t a bnlarlaed f o r c e ai' seven d i v i s i o n s supported 10 by f o u r t a c t i c a l a i r wings could rcopen accegs t o B e r l i n 11 Thie size f o r c e is based on the aosuniption that p o l i t i c a l 12 l i m i t a t i o n s r e s t r i c t m i l i t a r y operations t o t ie a x i s of t h e 13 Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn and t h e a i r f o r c e s to defensive 14 o p e r a t i o n s only b When opposed by readily avn tlabl e USSI1 nnd CDR i'oiv es i n t h e a r e a of East Germany onlg - Undor such a s i t u a t i o n t h e 18 c o r r i d o r alone 19 Operations would have t o be conducted t o 'with t h e o b j e c t i v e of es2o bllrkiiy a defcnoe l i n e on Naiase River l i n e Forces 011 t h e o r d e r 01 ' I t h e Oder- 21 50 a l l i e d d i v i s i o n s 22 23 required t o achieve' t h i s o b j e c t i v e 24 TOP S E C i l E T j 20 and a corresponding magnitude of a i r sl reiigth would be JCSM-431-61 I 17 h o s t i l i t i e s could not be l i m i t e d t o the Holmsfudt-Berlin meet and d e f e a t Soviet and GDR forces throughout East Germany 1 15 16 22 Appendix B I b TOP SECRET c To allow t h e cormnunistotime and opportunl' yto c h a t h e i r decision t o block access If t h e actton begins with Allied forces oppoked by GDli forcca only 3 balanced sovan 2 3 d i v i s i o n a l f o r c e w i t h adequate air suppor'i would p r o v i d e 5 durine t h e f i r s t f i v e days t i m e 5 a i d opportunity f o r the Oommunlsts t o ohallbe t h e i r decifjion t o bloc i cct'3s In the 6 event t h a t t h e Soviet8 enter d t h e o p e r a t i o n a t any t i m e tl-rc 7 s i t u a t i o n described i n p a r a g r a p h II b 2 woiild p e r t a i n 8 Allied f o r c e of 3even divi5iCnC a ready COlXLlJ ted t3 ' he p e r a t i o n could avoid Ceetruction i TOP SECRET JCBM-431-61 I 1 23 The 9 10 TO SBCRET --- _ _ A h ' I Z X TO L PENDIX a - B DISCUSSION 1 Proccedinz cn t h e hypothesla t h a t preparatory measures have been taken t h e US and Allied foi ces i n Europe can b e considered 2 t o be on a war-tFme besls and 1 i a li igh s t a t e of r c a d i n e s s As j t h e United S t a t e s Al ied 3Ctlon t o use military f o r c e t o reopen 4 ground acca ss t o B e r l i n t h r e a t e n s to ovcrcomc thc German 4 Democratio Republic CDT f o r c e s 6 i c Sov sts iiust d e c i d e ciChe - t o permit t h e ri3H f o x e s fo be ilel'c i cQ o r tc come $3 t h e nid of r 7 3 t h e GDR 2 Assuming t h e 'S I C S conic t o t w aid of the ODR the o p e r a - 9 t i o n s could n o t be lirdtsl t o a cors-idor a1 or g t h c IIelmst dt - 10 Berlin axi3 but r a t h e r w u l d be a major 11 WDY i i l k m t Germony The f o r c e e which t h e Sovie5s h a w rc di y vo i %blc f o r enidloy ment i n West Europe would r e q u i r e in A l l i c d att c c t o d e f c c t t h e Bloc f o r c e s i n Eas'c Gemany und to holti t h i s area by occupy- 12 13 111 Actually i n 15 t h i s o p e r a t i o n t h e o b j e c t i v e 02 Besliri becomcc secondary and 16 t h e p r i m a r j i s s u e becoues t h e u n i f i c a h o i i of' Gcimhny 17 i n 6 p o s i t i o n s along t h e Oder-Neinse River I i n c P 1 To d e f e a t t h e Bloc f o r c e s i n t h i s court of at tion wulclr c q u i r c o n Lhc 18 o r d e r of 50 d i v i s i o n s togexher with the air f o r c c s and freedom 19 I of a i r a c t i o n commensurate vrith t h e na gnitude of the ground operations The followin Laia1 4tt I tvvail a That an i n i t i a l foroo of' rdven d l v l s i o n s have attacked 8 i n t h e opcration t h e Soviebs entered t h e 24 t h a t a t some p o i n t b The a t t a c k of t h e S o v i e t s 18 l i m i t e d t o t h e Allicd f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g I n East Germany and t h a t basco and f o r c e s 22 23 I 21 along t h e Helmstedt-Berlin axis agL1nst GDR f o r c e s only and c o n f l i c t i n o r d e r s t o prevent t h e d e f e a t o f t h e GDR f o r c e s i 20 i n Western Europe are n o t at2ackucl I 25 26 '27 28 -' ' TOP SECREP 4 The sequence cF aqtions and reactrons are outlined below 1 a The decision t o e n t e r nuclea war i f n e c e s s a q will have 1 2 been made a t t h e a t a r t of t h e adtion t o rcopen g r o u i d access a b A l l i e d preparations 4 c S o v i e t s si n a pence t r s a t y w i t h GDR and declare t h a t 5 GDR w i l l control i n t o Ber1 ia CCCRSB 6 d GDR reprebentatives refuoe e n t r y a t he 7 Kelmstedt check 5 p o i n t by physicCl f o r c e i n tfie fcnn of aimed border p o l l c c e h small mSl tciry pr$ 'c f h t l tcsn t r i c d and is f o r c i b l y locked by what appcaro t a Le only ClDR f o r c e s f The United S t a t e b coinmitu a 6cveii di visioa f o r c e egainst thh GD3 forcerr ' L1' 9 Ci14 f o r c e s 2 n i t l a l l y f i g h t a delnying 3 10 L 12 a c t i o n but sub3equenCly as t h e US Porcc advances attempts 13 t o s t r i k e t h e r e a r and flanks of t h e i 5 fo -cc The US force 14 h a s prepared againot t h i s and thercforc i t s progrcss toward 15 B e r l i n continues 16 g A t t h i s point i t must be rea l zed t h a t t h e Soviots a r e 17 f u r n i s h i n g a t l e a s t l o g i s t i c and toclinical assistance t o the 18 GDR Some marmed a i r c r a f t m y be furnished e i t h e r frcm Soviet A i r Force o r from s a t e l l i t c o 3 13 20 h Increased advance of t h e US Forces i n d i c a t e s to t h e 21 Soviets that a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e s a r e necessary t o r e i n f o r c e t h e 22 GDR A t t h i s point Soviet- ii1Pyr 23 1 Launch an a s s a u l t on Ycstern Europe with t h e 24 divi'sions looated with t h e GDR 2 Commit t h e Soviet d i v i s i o n s w 1 t f i i c CDR in support 25 26 of GDR f o r c e s ' e f f o r t to h a l t and destroy t h e US Forcc 27 advancing toward Berlin 28 3 Commit only small portion of t h e Soviet d i v i s i o n s 29 I n the ODR t o strengthen defenses jusi enough t o counter- 30 balance t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e US Force 31 ' EL Tab t o Annex t o Appendix B - i - - i''' ' ' TOP SECRET 1 4 Conduct nonnuclear Bir operati ons a g a i n s t B b l a t i o n s i n Western Europe lj i US i n s t a l - T h i s can be combined with any of t h e above courses of a c t i o n o r can be conducted i n i tially a8 t h e s o l e course of a c t i o n 5 I n i t i a t e submarine a c t i o n ag cunel allied 8 h i p p n G be madc forces t h c t k s t Gcriinali border with combat c 10 11 nonnuclear of US b a s e s - asrf i e l do and i n s t a l l a t i c n s I n West 12 Germany 13 When t h e Soviets e n t e r t h e c o n f l i c t i n s u p p o r t o f the GDR f o r c e s blocking access t o B c r l i n 14 15 d If West B e r l i n i s seized by East Gcr1nar s o r by S o v l e t s 16 In any a c t i o n including pai-a-tnCtltary rnas ced as a c i n l 17 disturbance 18 e If t h e US Borce proceedinK along t h e Helmstedt-Berlin 7 b When t h e Soviets conduct a t r bomb irdment even t iough 0 - 5 0 under any of t h e following s i t u e t i o n n - 3 6 5 The d e c i s i o n t o i n i t i a t e general nuclear war might a When t h c Sovioto crosc 2 4 and mining I n a l l i e d watera J 1 19 axis is i n danger o f a n n i h i l a t i o n because of heavy Sovlet 20 air-ground attaclc 21 TOP SECRET - iJCSM-43 1 61 28 Tab t o Annex t o Appendix B 5 ' AP PENDIX C ADEQUACY OF CA FABILITY THE PRODL13 l 1 To det ermirie t h e ndcquac of ou- c a l a b i l i k yt o prooccute 1 by 31 October 1961 t h e courso of act1oii ICGc r Lb d In Qucstion 2 #2 assuming t h e p r c p m a t i o n s r c f e r - o d t o in Qucotion #l have 3 I f t h e 3 Octc xr 1561 $ap-b Llfty been made 1 u a t e f o r e f f e c t i v e execuL on is J i x l c dmade- hod lorre would it taka t o c r e a t e he r e q u i r e d C a p a b i l i t y T h i o adequacy t o he consfdered from 11 5 G the viewpoint of ful A l L L w J cooperctlons includir g We3t 7 German p a r t i c i p a t i o n an9 a l s o as a u n l l a t o r a i US a c t i o n 8 FACTS BEARING ON THE 1'ROUJXN 2 Seo Annex A t o Appendix 9 A DISCUSS1914 3 For diacusslon seo t h e Arinex h c r c t o 10 CONCLUSIONS - 4 After a mobilization period or f o u r inontho tile US o r 11 t h e US aiid i t s European a l l I e 3 h30 t h e c a p a b i l i t y of d c p l o j r h c 12 s u f f i c i e n t ground and a l r forcoo t o 1 uropu t o r c o t o r e acccss t o 13 B e r l i n I f oppooed only by GDII 14 T h l o Same 3 izc f o r c e could avoid d e s t r u c t i o n for a perloc c f'ivc dnyo or 15 clays if opposed by GDR and Russlan f o r c c s 5 Due t o t h e i n a b i l i t y t o deteriniiic 15 16 t h a q u a l i t y of European 17 A l l i e d f o r c e s and due t o tha I n a b i l i t y t o p r e d i c t with confldcnce 18 t h a t aL1 European A l l i e s and t h e Unltcd S t a t e s will co nwnce 15 f u l l mobllizntion four months p r i o r t o ail a n t i c l p t a c InciClent 20 In B e r l i n it S coilsidei-ed t h a t t h c r e m u l d n o t be o u f f i c i e n t 21 f o r c e s I n Europe by 31 October 1961 t o retitorc acces3 t o B e r l l n 22 a g a i n s t s u c c e s s i v e l y highey l e v e l s o f GDR and Soviet r e s i s t a n c e 23 TOP SECRFT JCSM-431-61 29 Appendix C TOP SECRhz 6 6 Because of t h e need for a l r aesembly areas It is impractica b33e3 utag lr a r c n s and 1 f o r t h e United S t a t e s t o con- 2 P s a minilnun i ' u l l 3 s l d o r u n i l a t e r a l ockion I n t h e Dcrl'Ln area cooperation of t h e Federal Republic of Geimang BP 5 is rcauircd and t o a l e s o e r degree t h a t of Pyarice ant Gr eai Britain required - I8 5 also G I n a d d i t i o n ' he Uiiited S t a t e s cannot p u t suf' icicnt f o r c e n In Europe i n a four month pcriod t o rectorn ilcces 7 against s u c c e s s i v e l y higher levc3 a o ' GDR a tiicl Soviet r e s i s t a n c e 7 Considerin t ic reinL' xcewr t e e d for l n d u s z r i a l i m b L l t i mIn u r d c r that t h e 'nlted S t a t e s an s u g p o r t i t s A l l i e s - a3 S mtr of b c r L I i s i d e s a xl the 10 v f l l R S i t 0 ovm f'orccc it would not be f oasible foi' Ewoy sn AXSes 01' the Un i rx d 5 1 i t e s t o cnigagc I n nonnuclear war with t h z S o v i e t 1 3 1 0 foi'ccs wkl ci 1 could he brought i n t o the area by 31 Octobcl- 1961 i r z a t l o n of t h e Allied c o u a t r l e s iqequiile Ij E AB 111Oli' h ca scs i l l o S 1 - a d o n y a f t e r l u l l mobilization o f A l l i e s and 'the Unitccl S t a t c n 1s a t t a i n e d one y e a r plus do t h e Allied i o i ' c c a p p b wt c e x i s t in comparab l e numbers with Soviet i oi ces - TOP SkcRET XSM-431-61 -30 ' TdP SECRET AN TO API'ENDIx c DISCUSSION 1 Summary of Reaulrements A cuniinaq of t e forces required io included I n Appendix B Sin1 e E e r l i n is located I n the c e n t r a l a r e a and since the p r l m w involvement o r us f o r c e s w i l l take plcrce i n t h e c e n t r a l arc% a dctiiiled study and adequacy o f capnbilll i c s wiJl bc l i n i t e d - oft o requirements t h i s area IIowever i t m u s k L e t r o n g l y ernpheslzcd most t h a t since the a c t i o n s o tclirdd irr khcnc ctu lios - coalf' l o a d t o general nar i t I s moot importanl t h a t l hc n o r t h a r e a ar d s o u t h area be reinforced I f fhLs Is not nccorll iinhd t h c c c n t r a l area can be outflanked id t h e c n t i r e NA'JY posit n Europe be placed i n jeopardy Sununnry Central Europe are a To r e s t o r e 8ccet s if oppoocd I t h c 'cquireineiiCs f o r L ' 0'' i n ccntra3 on ly by A l l i e d d i v i s i o n s and f o u r toctlca'l a i thc GDR wing Scvcn wculcl bc required b To permit progressive i q p l l C a t i J n of nonnuclear forces as successively higher l e v e l s ol' GDR md Soviet r e s i s t a n c e were encountered Forces on t h e or'dei of ma nitude of 50 Allied d i v i s i o n s and a corrcspondlne i iagnitude o f a i r strength wouid be requireq ' 2 c Navy Since I t It E CC t h a t the a c t i o n s contained i n t h i s study a r e taken p r i o r t o coinmcncernent o f h o o t i l i t i e s - - - - -- It follows as a corollary-that P rmy arid A l r Force u n i t s s e a l i f t e d t o Europe would be moved adiiiiiii stratlvely under peacetime conditions Under a c t u a l crlndftiona t h i s as- sumption might not prove t o be valid in view O f Soviet c a p a b i l i t y t o i n i t i a t e submariiic warf tm a t any t i m e or t h e i r choice Preparations m u s t be mdde t o insure t h e I I I 7 TOP SECRET - Annex to C Apnendix JCSM-431-61 31 1 f I I TOP SECRET s a f e t y of seaborne movements a g a i n s t Sovict i n t e r f c r m c e ' k1 Navy mobllizatlon should be concurrent with t h e o t h e Sarvices t o bring ships t o wartime complements and t o prov i d e the planned ASX augmentation i n hipsand a i r c r a f t from Ready Reserve 2 Sununary of Capnbilitj es a w e s e n t f o r c e s i n Europe a r e Countq us Air Force orccs ---- 5 - A _ 5 divisioll3 15 4 Givision3 rerluccd Y treng th UK Army-Fonca -- as follows France 9 reduced strength The forces of UK France and PRO 15 Willgs 10 wings diViDiOnS 12 d i v i s i o n 5 FRQ mlgs 10 wings havc a c a p a b l l l t y f o r l i m i t e d defensive opcrations and little 3r no or'fcnsJvc a a p a b i l i ty b The c u r r e n t JSCP indicatcu t h a t li1rl n thc f i r i t four months Qf f u l l mabilization a f t e r d e c l a r a t l o n 3f a n a t i o n a l emergcsncy by the President t h o US ha3 t h e c a p a b i l i t y of moving 10 M v i s l o n s to Europe Including t h e three STRAC Divisions and one Marine Div Wing 'remi which c a n be moved a t any time b u t which normally rvould hc moved during the first 30 days a f t e r m 3 b i l i z a t i s i c The US A i r Force would m3vo 23 ocjuadrons t o Europc during the f i r s t 30 days a f t c r mob%ll zatian T h i s includes tho CASF which o w be movod ai ru yl inic Curing t h i n 3ane p e r i o d of time Allied c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o the a l r f o r c e i n Central Europe would amount t o an estimated a d d i t i o n a l 6 wiwa d It i s estimated t h a t by Mi-4 montho oui- p r i n c i p a l A l l i e s - i n Western Europe could mako thc followi ng a d d i t l o n a l f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e Country I Army Forces UK 6 divisions 4 wings Franoe - 2 d i v i s l o n s 2 Willg3 FRQ 8 divisions - - TOP BECW -- A i r Force Forces 32 none '11' b' I 11 4 I Annex to Appendix C 'jl' $ I 'I li' I I b d TOP SECRET 1 e Based o n t h e abcve'f'feurca t h e t o t a l US and Allied forces a v a i l a b l e bv Mi4 F Ocstimatod 2 t o be Countq - A r n v Forzes us 13 d i v l a i o l i s 22 wings 4 uI 10 dlvlsio is 1 9 wings 5 France 6 division3 12 w 5ngs G FRG 20 d i v i s l u n s 10 wings 63 wings 7 v Air Force Forces 3 - - 49 d i v i o i n n y MTAL f The l aVy bYifCate tk Lt Qilc lo FISTS Lr2nnportrs ' -' i n o g e r a t l o n i n t h e At ntl'c 2 x 1 II JVC troopo d u r l r g a fsur 1 lcnth periotl a total Oi' nOvJ lh OO S1nc c it 1 s assuincd that t h i 3 1s an Ginin2 t i ' ive inovc n o t f o r c n l yl o g p o m d by t h e RUeeianS tho mo79ment ol' edcLltSoncl mri and carco 1s 0 9 10 12 I3 only contingent on t h e c h a r t e r rcquisitS n arid r e a c t i v a t i o n 1 4 of a d d i t i o n a l bottom3 t o carry tllc r e i i - d personnel and 15 tonnage 16 Tlie s e a l i f t c a p a b i l i t j c in bc Lncrcascd t o more t h a n m e t t h e t o t e l contemplated l l f t rcquirenents Alr- 17 l l f t would hB available t o liandl c priority moveinents and 18 advance echelons 11 3 m e t Capabilities_ Thc Divisions i n East Geimaiv It Ru3Sia l3 13 p r c s c n t l y heve 20 eutlrnatcd that they hrvc the 20 21 c a p a b i l i t y of r e i n f o r c i n g t h e i r f o x e s i n East Germany a t t h e 22 rate of f o u r Divisions p e r 23 % - t h r e e Divisions p e r d2 y f o r tha i ' i r s t t e n d i y s and d l'o f the f l r s t inonth a f t e r D-Day f o r a t o t a l of' about 128 Divlsions Addltionslly 24 25 theoe Divisions would be supported by 1000 t a c t i c a l e i r c r a f t 26 p o s i t i o n e d i n East Gerniany and bnclccd by m o t h e r 2500 t n c t i c a l 27 tybe a i r c r a f t l o c a t e d i n Western USSR n l m c 2a 4 I n view of t h e foregoing t h e f'ollowlng p o i n t s crc considered approprlate 23 30 a It is impossiblc for t h e US t o c o r r j out t h i s o p e r a t i o n 31 without necessary @ l i e d cooperation I It I n a d d i t i o n t o pro- v i d i n g a u n i t e d f r o n t t o t h e Sovieto w l t h t h e a t t e n d a n t I I TOP SECRET Annex t o Appendix C I 33 JCSM-431-61 i 32 33 1 2 3 4 - 3 i 7 8 9 US Forces 1s t h a t capo'alll ty and concept nrc baccci on t h e 10 u s e o f t e c t i c n l nirlclear weal orls m t h c r than m ' clilnn tlia J l S o v i e t s man f o r t o o u r own iim forces CZ the u i 01' t h c 3 c r raprJns is denied t h e convc1itlo iiil bomb a n d artf iery 12 13 support which could be made ova ll nb e Por ttlis operaillon 1L b would be f a r below l e v e l 6 t h a t wcre en Yl oyed snd concidcred 15 necessary i n Europe during farlcl I J x 3 i 16 c Tine U S Forceo t h a t have been 11 11t i01iod in th% j btlidy 17 a r e earmarked I n c u r r e n t n obll lzotlong LanE f o r deployment 18 t o Europe I n a d d i t i o n to t h e s e foi cc s t h e Unlted S t a t e s 19 h a s b o t h ground and a i r f o r c e s whl ch r e now eermrlced f o r 20 deployment t o o t h e r Ereas 21 Thcse a c d f t l o n a l forcer could be s e n t t o Europe however t is would have an adverse 22 e f f e c t on o u r world-wid - I 23 - '-- 'I WA posture 24 d The equipment znd r a l r r t b C uI tcrl Ll needed t o I n i t i a l l y o u t f i t the a d d i t i o n a l mobflj zed i'onccs reqwircd 25 i n t h i s study must n e c e s s a r i l y bc drawn from 26 vim reserve 3 s t o c k s which a r e 'inaeocpate foi a f o r c e o r L h f o s i z e 27 A d d i t i o n a l l y l o g i s t i c a l ouppoTt 01' dep loyeci f o r c e s of t h i s 20 magnitude engaged I n an extended nonnuclear war would c r e a t e 20 f u r t h e r c r i t i c a l s h o r t a g e s i n c e r t a i n conventional wenpons n No r e l i a n c e can be placed on t h e vmr pro- 3' and nmmunltlon 2- d u c t i o n base f o r m q o r items of combat equipment t h a t a r e not 32 - -_ - I n a m d u c t i o n on M-Day and i n most c a t e g o r i e s I n which TOP SECRET JCq-431-61 -- ' 33 -1 34 --_ - ----___ Annex t o e d4 IPSO I 9 c 3 I IIJ 8 '11' - _- - COP SECRET s rsc ' a r i t i c a l shortages exist a peri@d of' fi-om one to two years 1 would be required t o balance production and consmpx l on 2 requirements I 3 e The divl810113 of the UIG France and PRG arc p r a c 2 i c a l l y 4 I a l l understrength l o g l s t l c s u l 3 o r t1s mar inal and they 5 should not bo considered i n terms of c a p a b i l i t y of US 6 divisions 7 1 I 35 I Annex t o Appendlx C - This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu