September 23 1961 In u-W - 2 zl4 zpll APPENDIX I TO THE MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT Recommended Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces 1963-1957 This Appendix summarizes the main factors I have taken into consideration in determining united States' requirements for Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces in the years l963-196T The Appendix includes I Recommended Force levels and their Fiscal Implications II The General Basis for My Recommendations on Force levels The Basis for My Recommendations on Specific Weapon Systems I Recommended Force levels and Their Fiscal Implications I recommend that you approve for inclusion in the FY 1963 budget the procurement of the following operational missiles and aircraft to supplement our Long Range Nuclear Delivery Forces Total Purchase Cost to FY 1963 Be Funded NOEL millions of Dollars 100 Minutemen Hardened 8c Dispersed 1 6l 281k 50 Mobile Minutemen 935 270 6 Polaris Submarines 1 072 I 963 92 Slqbolt Missiles 31 200 100 Ice-135 Tankers Total for FY 1963 Decisions $3 102 $1 987 Total Funding Requirementa from Prior Years' Decisions Total for FY 1953 Moreover I recommend that we adept for planning purposes the force structure sunmrized in the table on the next page In those cases in which the forces I am recommending differ from those recommended by the Navy and Air Force the latter are shown in red beneath mine 11 Cisecl Under th 1 ma'edorr of Info In 1 manic Act 5033552 Documentg of i - II-on u-u 1 q of The ea ab -r- 6 7 Documents dk #53 1 030mm roasts Bid acal Tsar 1961 1962 1963 136 - 1565 196 1967 Bombers s 526 30 gso s h7 1 125 855 585 1750 223 - -- 3 Total More 1 720 1 565 1 295 1 160 935 710 710 - - Air Lama'ned Kissiles semi Dog 216 1 50 522 522 52 522 3362 E'qbolt - 322 1 1 Total sir- Is 216 7350 522 522 1 212 1 and Polaris Kissiles Atlas 36 TS 135 135 135 126 11 7 1102 0 6 51 78 uh 115 11 11b Finutcnan Bin -- -- 150 600 700 800 900 2 Eim'hamm I-b'bile -- -- -- 50 100 100 2019 11 80 96 101 288 hao 560 656 mm WrmB 1 2 2 222 507 maxim 1 100 7 Other - Quail 221 392 3 92 392 392 392 392 30-135 1100 0140 520 620 61 0 61m 6170 xc-97 600 050' 31 0 20 13B -- -- m-30 135 -- -- 3 13 as 23 23 Alert Force Yea-Jana 9 No of Weapons 1 390 2 350 2 050 3 050 3 1040 3 870 15180 Egetons 1 530 2 750 3 300 1 350 11 7110 5 130 5 050 5f Embers of aircraft and missiles are derived by 035131 133 mum-1 00 squadron unit by the numbers of squadrons Easy do not BED Combat mining Launch or mxbemce pip ins missiles or emsni - support air-cm 211000170 1 new 1961 505 a the bcnbers 121 11 be on 15 mt 31100211 alert somber-s represent s biong'l launchers Embers of missiles represent the total umber of missiles in operational marines Approximate 67$ of these rub- mrincs will be on station or at sea Ens table excludes lT Regulus ms eg inno em tional sum- 1102 i'rm end-PI 61 to ens-n 61 and 5 Gui-Fr 50 This difference is a consequence of the dirfemnce in reccnsended 3-52 far 5 1 000 by end-II 68 1 100 by ens r 69 and thereafter Embers hzre exibility in choice or some and yields for se or this cuzpariscn it was assured cm'_ p101 ur-lmched missiles 2 The estimated Total Obligational Authority required to procure and operate these forces over this period is shown in the following table The difference between the Total Obligational Authority required to finance the forces I am recommending and that required to finance the forces recommended hy the individual Services is shown on the second line Over the five years 1963-67 the cost of the aircraft and missiles recommended by the-Air Force and the Polaris resommended'by the Navy exceeds the cost of the forces I am recommending by approxiw mately $10 billion As will be shown later in this paper the extra capability provided by the individual Service proposals runs up against strongly diminishing returns and yields very little in terms of target destruction In my judgement it is an increment not worth the cost of $10 billion over the five year period Total Obligational Authority H62 FY63 FISH H65 H66 H63 FY63-67 Vf illions of Dollars Secretary of Defense Recommendations 9 3 8 9 8 0 5 6 1 7 14 1 31 3 Service Proposals over Secretary Defense 1 5 1 6 3 0 2 2 l h 9 7 The forces I am recommending for procurement in FY 1963 are compared with the recommendations of the Service Chiefs in the following table The numbers represent operational aircraft or missiles Secretary Initial Recommendations of Chiefs JCS of Chairman Navy Air Defense JCS Army USMC Force Become 3-52 Aircraft 0 09 013 #59 1 5 Skybolt 92 92 0 92 92 ICC-135 100 100 100 100 120' log Titan 0 18 18 Minutemn 100 3009 1009 1009 600 300 Minuteman Mobile 50 SO 0 0 50 50_ Polaris 96 96 96 160 128 5 recommended by the Air Force for 1952 procurement 2 The Chief of Staff USA agrees to a limited procurement of the system to minimize engineering and economic risks The CEO and Commandant 1am believe research and development should continue and budgetary planning should proceed but the decision to allocate substantial funds for productic should be delayed 5 The Secretary of Defense along with the Chief of Staff USA the and Commandant USMC recommend a total strength of 6 0 aircraft the CJCS recommends 760 the Chief of Staff USAF 800 In each case command support aircraft would be in addition to the numbers shown These recommendations are for at most the stated number of missiles During a discussion between the Secretary of IEfense and the Chiefs on September 11 1961 they stressed their concern about the reduction in our nuclear capability as the B hT's were phased-out The Secretary of Defense therefore added 5 Wings of B hT's to his recommendation for FY 1963 and FY 196h bringing it to the level shown on page 2 RR The aircraft and missiles recommended for procurement in F1 1963 by the Air Force and the Polaris submarines recommended for procurement in FY 1963 by the Navy would cost approximately $3 1 billion- more to buy than the aircraft and missiles I am recommending Of this approximately $2 billions would require funding in 1962 and FY 1963 As well as these forces I will recommend at a later date that the Air Force be authorized to procure and operate a secure command and controlT system for sac Except for 20 KC-l35's which will be available for use as airborne command posts the cost of this system has not been included in the figures on page 3 II General Basis for Force Level Recommendations The forces I am recommending have been chosen to provide the United States with the capability in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack first to strike back against Soviet bomber bases missile sites and other installations associated with long-range nuclear forces in order to reduce Soviet power and limit the damage that can be done to us by'vulnerable Soviet follow-on forces while second holding in protected reserve forces capable of destroying the Soviet urban society if necessary in a controlled and deliberate way With the recommended forces I am confident that we will be able at all times to deny the Soviet Union the prospect of either a military victory or of knocking out the U S retaliatory force If the most likely estimates of-Soviet forces prove to be correct the forces I am recommending should provide us a capability to achieve a substantial military superiority over the Soviets even after they have attacked us The recommended forces are designed to avoid the extremes of a minimum deterrence posture on the one hand or a full first strike capability on the other A minimum deterrence posture is one in which after a Soviet attack we would have a capability to retaliate and with a high degree of assurance be able to destroy most of Soviet urban society but in which we would not have a capability to counter-attack against Soviet ndlitary forces A full first strike capability would be achieved if our forces were so large and so effective in relation to those of the Soviet Union that we would be able to attack and reduce Soviet retaliatory power to the point at which it could not cause severe damage to U S population and industry we should reject the minimum deterrence extreme for the following reasons a reterrence may fail or war may break out for accidental or unintended reasons and if it does a capability to counter- attack against high-priority Soviet military targets can make a major contribution to the Objectives of limiting damage and terminating the war on acceptable terms - - -- b By reducing to a minimum the possibility of a U 8 nuclear attack in response to Soviet aggression against our Allies a minimum deterrence posture would weaken our ability to deter such Soviet attacks On the other hand we should regect the attempt to achieve a full first strike capability for the following reasons a It is almost certainly infeasible The Soviets could defeat such an attempt at relatively low cost For example we do not now have any prospect of being able to destroy in a sudden attack Soviet missile submarines at sea Nor would we be able to destroy a sufficiently high percentage of a large hard and dispersed force b It would put the Soviets in a position which they would be likely to consider intolerable thus risking the provocation of an arms race c It would be very costly in resources that are needed to strengthen our theatre forces The forces I am recommending will provide major improvements in the quality of our strategic posture in its survivability its flexibility and its ability to be used in a controlled and deliberate way under a wide range of contingencies Target Unstruction Requirements The following list of high priority targets aim points in the Soviet Union has been derived from studies performed in June lQGl by the Staff of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee under th direction of Lieutenant General Thomas Hickey The estimates have been rounded to the nearest SO in each category to avoid a misleading impression of accuracy End-Fiscal YEar i262 Gail Urban-Industrial Aim Eoints 200 200 Bomber Bases 150 150 Support Airfields-h 50 50 Defense Suppression 390 300 Nuclear Storage and Production - 50 50 -I Naval and SUhmarine Eases 50 50 Soft ram Sites h missiles per site 100 100 Soft 1034 Sites 2 missiles per site 100-300 50-200 Hard 1034 Sites 1 missile per site 200-500 hoe-1100 Total 1900- 17c0 1350-2200 253 manque-n on 9938 Hp p u 35 0093 on gagghnu nhnp o-Ed uaao Sabapunuoa pa u 335m Bunch o uaaquouu s 3 33 0 8353a un Eu @553 unaum u 3 3 union uogou no 39 3 5 Ping gunman ago no #36 83 any 3 non mama on a can EH Hap aum uhu no t2 05 5 3332 38 3 3539 5 53 gnu po bm BR 2 b u uuna gang no 930 and 3 hmm uni mwma no 3 EDH pu bm up no 38% 8 3 6 5 union Ea 8 2Q 68H 5 3th g-n gu omnmhun 8H gun on van 93 u uv nuao ran 3m Janna Ho nah unoE any onaon as hp v35 cans He 8 3 33 qu 3 9 30 3 3 3 333 333 and won 35m 8 333 3 2 633 3 5350 3 3 03 3 3 an 23 89905 5 330 Sang a an 82 3 55 oaaun a #29365 3093 g HS dd - 33 H5 3 3695 p a umuu an un 05 wuap muop and H du n pd Duh Hue p 88 58 3 933 3- dram 3 8326on an 38m 4339 3 - baboon 39683 Egg 3% an agdgugg u nuw guuiu w uomgdu Eagg gppgu gopov gpao gnow EEno RE dv-o uo h hnn 33393353 Egghga gn u E pumn u apo bmuo abn agg guuvmnvu p gl 353 ou tm aha 9333a n u o bna bununuuonh bm o 5E3 gg a pg h nn u nu 9 3550 H 333 guanoo wnuwo uu uo Bun noaapha up 09 add 3 5 33 3 3331435 08 g nu ou Enm - - 3 There are also uncertainties about the performance of our forces in striking back after a Soviet attacks uncertainties associated with the weight and effectiveness of possible Soviet attacks the ability of our forces to survive under attack the reliability of our missiles and the ability of our forces to penetrate Soviet defenses But these uncertainties are not unbounded One can place reasonable quantitative limits on them and estimate the effectiveness of our forces under alternatively optimistic and pessimistic assumptions This is what has been done in the following analysis The survival reliability and penetration factors used are all based on the general assumption that the wer'begins with a well planned and well executed Soviet attack with limited warning against our forces in a state of normal peacetime alert and that we are hitting back after being attacked Thus the following estimates do not represent maximum capabilities under the most favorable circumstances For example they'exclude cases in which we strike first or cases in which we are attacked during a period of tension and alert These cases have been excluded'because we are testing the adequacy of our forces and therefore must look at unfavorable circumstances Within the general assumption of a well planned Soviet attack opti mistic median and pessindstic survival reliability and penetration factors have been chosen to reflect the range of uncertainty It is possible to imagine outcomes lying outside this range but their likelihood appears small The optimistic factors represent favorable but attainable performance The great weight of likelihood appears to be between the optimistic and median cases The combination of all of the pessimistic factors describes a very unfavorable and relatively'inprobable case example it is assumed that in 1967 only l-l h per cent of the manned bombers reach the bomb release line and 90 per cent of the Titans and 70 per cent of the fixed Minuteman missiles are destroyed before launch These factors were chosen to produce an answer to the question What happens if everything goes badly The details of the assumed factors together with an explanation of their choice can be found in Annex to this Appendix The pessimistic factors do not include an allowance for attrition hy Soviet anti-ICB-i defenses We recognize that the Soviets do have a large program in this area However we are pursuing a vigorous program of development of penetration aids decoys and multiple warheads and we expect to be able to penetrate Soviet defenses in this period Moreover if attrition by Soviet ICEM defenses appears at all likely we will be able to compensate for it in large measure by concentrating our forces on the - top priority targets The following results are shown in terms of expected percentages of the targets or value in each category destroyed In the case of Urban- Industrial Floor Space and Urban Blast Fatalities the estimates are of damage to the contents of the 170 largest cities down to a population of 90 000 which contains approximately 80 per cent of the total industrial floor space of the Soviet Union and'approximately 50 million out of a total of 210 million people The estimates of total population fatalities are percentages of the Soviet total The Unsheltered case corresponds to the effects expected in a population without extensive civil defense preparation but advantage of what shelter is normally'available The Sheltered case-i g corresponds to fallout shelter for ho per cent of the urban population and i 20 per cent of the rural The At least reflects the fact that the esti N' mates do not include fallout from attacks on The effects on surrounding cities of attacks on naval bases are included in the estimates The assumed number of Soviet ICEM sites varies between the optimistic cases in which the low end of the range is used and the pessimistic cases in which the high end is used Therefore the percentages shown should not be interpreted as representing fractions of the same numbers Two forces and two years are shown on pages 9 and 10 I Those forces I am recommending for End-Fiscal Year 1955 and 1967 and II Those forces proposed by the individual Services though not jointly'by the JCS for the same years - - The calculations suggest that either force would provide us with a powerful capability to carry out the objectives mentioned earlier However as I indicated earlier the extra capability'provided'by the individual Service proposals runs up against strongly diminishing returns and yields very little in terms of extra target destruction Moreover the theatre forces were not included in these calculations though 510 '62 includes about 270 alert aircraft and missiles from these forces 0n the other hand with the exception of the defense suppression targets no targets iniChina or the_other satellites were included However we do not now expect China to d velop a significant long range nuclear delivery force in the time period under consideration If she does and a change seems indicated there will be time for us to increase our forces appropriately commas 01 9mm CAPABILITIES 01 mm mm Em Percent meted 1 11 Polestion and Matt Ut 'mtm rr ueTubal Fowlatics Fatalities - Unshel tend at least 1 3 ha 33 33 25 25 Partly at last 35 35 26 20 so Filing Targets Ember Bases 99 99 33 93 53 30 support Airfields 97 99 52 1 6 7 3T Erma Suppression 16 87 33 33 'r Ruclear Storage 5 Matias 96 98 69 69 6 5 Naval a Submarine been 9 98 98 62 62 Sort 1m Sites 96 100 1 5 80 5 5 Soft Sites 99 100 1 5 88 19 59 Hard 1cm Sites 71 75 15 19 1 1 Alert Force il-Lro r gmaucmunmium 1 All 11 13 L 2 Weapons - 32m 9059 21 82 2993 1107 399 691 Hegntons Wars 5600 3386 hm 1560 2017 571 951 Successful attack mm render the bases inoperable but If owner would leave untouchd missile submarines at sea 3 There an 1 9515 Elurt Ila-Hymn wl 9 354 hurt He ffF T lli in mm EZDFIWLEARI Percent Mam layman Emimn Pessmisticzjj- II I II - I th and 12252131321 Urban-maria Floor Space - or U rnn Bust FatalitiesTubal Wm Manuela Unshelterd at least ST ST 32 32 25 25 Partly Bhaltared 'at last 30 30 26 a 19 19 hints- 11 Targets Ember Eases 98 99 91 99 81 29 Ewart mm 99 9 TE 96 Defense Wain 88 95 so 61' 9- 19 Emlw Storage 9mm macs Both 1m Sites 99 99 85 92 2 96 Sort 1cm SiteEar-d mas-sites 5h n 'r 25 1 5 Alert Force weapons Alert Forc cm Target 3mm Tutal _92 m15t1c Median Pessimistic 1 II II Weapons use 5395 3028 1578 1505 3826 633 1912 Memo 5950 7530 3 1 5295 1725 332 Th0 2272 10 Relationship of Recommended Force to Sovier Force The direct comparison of force nuioers as such is less inportant than the ways in which we base and operate our forces For exairple we could out-nmber the Soviets t ree to one in and still have an inadequate deterrent posture if our missiles were soft and concentrated However the force increments which I am recommending are all in a protected mode hard and dispersed or while Given a well protected posture relative numbers are still for several reasons a A large Soviet superiority in 1335's could overcome the protection afforded our ICE-34's by hardening and dispersal and raise it possible for the Soviets to destroy most our fixed-base forces in a missile attack b A large Soviet superiorit in missiles would worsen the outcome of a thermonuclear tar c A large Soviet superiority in would be likely to have a very unfavorable impact on Soviet aggressiveness in the cold war rIfherei ore we have no intention of letting ourselves be seriously out- nmbered in ICE-5's by the Soviet Union now many will the Soviet Union have in the mid-1950 s The answer is intrinsically uncertain because it is still subject to Soviet decisions which may not yet have been node and which will be influenced by our own decisions However we do know a good deal about their posture today We are able to estimate that the Soviets now have from 25 to 50 operational ICEM launchers Their build-up appears to be deliberately paced not a crash program On the basis of wimt has been observed so far the Soviets will have from 200 to 1 00 in mid-19514 But even if the most pessimistic Air Force estimates prove to be valid in mid-196k we will still equal the Soviet Union in at about 850 each This will be combined with a substantial U S superiority in all other categories of long range nuclear delivery systems Moreover if the Soviet Union exceeds our most pessimistic estimates and builds up a much larger force by 1965 or 1967 we are confident that we will find out about it in time to expand our progress- appropriately As a hedge against this @iiely ity we are expanding our Minutemn production capacity to over 60 missiles a month nen this is done the lead time for hard and dispersed Mini teman will be about 25 months Therefore we will have a great deal of flexibilityto expand the program at a later date if it should prove to be necessary to do so In other categories of long range nuclear delivery systems we will have a substantial superiority Soviet long range aviation now comprises about 1 000 medium bombers or tankers and about 150 heavy bombers or takersS equipped with air-to surface missiles The heavy bo er category is far more significant than the rue-dim bomber category We will have 630 heavy bombers plus almost as raw tankers Because the Soviets would have to use some of their bombers as tankers this will mean an effective U S heavy bomber force approximately four or more times as large as that of the Soviets The 1581' now has shout 20 conventionally powered sulmmrines diich are probably cepeble of launching short-reuse ballistic missiles 150-300 nautical miles though not while submerged 1953 the Boviets could probably introduce nuclemr povered sub- mrines with lsunch system enploy ing mdim range ballistic I csiles There is no evidence to tangent that the Soviets here I - progren sppmeching our Polaris program either in site or quality msis for Reconsendstions on 8p_ecific WesEn BEtem Choices Vithin the genercl quantitative requirements for additional long range nuclear delivery system suggested by the shore considerations the following are the reesons for my specific program reconnendstions B- 's The Air force his proposed the procurement of 52 additional 1 5 wing unit equipmnt plus 1' comnd support vith 1952 nds The cost of procuring and operating these sircrsi t vith 30 usocisted tankers and Bh bolt eissiles to a 5 year period would be about $1 h billion It reesens for recon-ending easinst this procurement ere the following 3 Fe already have I large force of intercontinental bombers In mid-1955 it will countries 630 80 3753's and it we do not decide to phase them out sooner 225 B hT's The alert 3-52'3 and B-SB's alone will be able to carry about - 1500 bombs plus 1 000 air launched missiles The alert B-hT'l vill be able to carry another 200 barbs b An emninsticn or the target system shows that nest mats 'and all of those of the highest priority are best attached by missiles first because the targets are soft ' fired and of known location and therefore vulnerable to missile attack second in the case of the military targets the missiles reach their targets much faster then do bombers and therefore vould be sore effective in catching enemy Wife end missiles on the ground and third our missile systems have a much greater survival potential and Endurance in the wartime environment and therefore can be used 1-rith more control and deliberation e The bombers ere sort and concentrated and they depend won warning and quick response for their sin-rival under stuck his is I less reliable means of protection Ind dispersal or mobility Moreover it mans that the bcnbers maths omitted to cttockveryesrly in the war and deliberate my '1 ff 1 u-c For the seas coat in tau rm yen - xyaten costs 1 ring or 3-52' with tankers um Emlts we or 6 Polaris 3111221111525 GAM- 11' Id dgteme garlic indicate that the 1235 effective means for mach-sting Harman- are low altitude 9322th and defame amnion both a nch are mare cffectim than to cata- nm the 6 ch at 12 15 utituda The 51 51 31 is inim cd to 35 01-16- Llu jc mthapcmtim @3131 de 3-52 rare st mlstird low cost The E00 Skybolt Lssilcx an mm mmum wm mt-mwmm mmitpoasihl thnvith gravity bombs The total cost for 1150 Skybolts ton - th period 1962-1967 is wanted to be $1 6 bmim EEC-132 haw-sewn mm o slao mtiml have MIParce studies indicate Qatar Kill-135's are required vith mat a increment going team the - 3-52 farce About 70 32-135 are twat-ad to amped M 20 for cmdposta mdBOto smatth m beymd swear h'ro tankers me the 3-52'3 to reach thcir targets Esther the E515 fertbelirlrm statedrequirezmt forum-emu 13 123 mmnm um bombers topemtrate warms Malice-intimate charm-e favorable route or to y me at 10' alum Imp-wed penetratim egg-ability achieved this my and Smelt for defense swash not both required Ibmmr Skybolt 3mm to be tfectin Therefore in my audgmt the mm or Wait is not gured The fare pravid 1 70 to am the 3-52'33 83 for th 3-58'133 70 to md 80 for comand TitanII approximately taprmenndoperate for S's-ears Elm- 7 7' Titan II has a payload It 1111 be able to 612 11an ratber thanr m mds new W41 ror mnu im - Rtth total sistmeastatl tm - is About tom- 'tms that a a Kinubcmn heard and diapers-ad 1t equal cost 1 an- gr to be preferred to me Titan because first they are less wlnara'blc and second tax-gt cm Moreover we already plan to have a substantial force oi Atlas and Titan which should be adequate for those special pwpoaes requiring large payloads Therefore I do not momend procurement of additional Titans Minute-man Hard and Di_spersed Hinutcmn 8 has the lovest system cost or any or our at about $5 5 millions per missile in 5 year costs It is clearly the preferred way to acquire more However I am not recornending that we procure more than 100 in 1963 because our over-all force requiremnts do not make it necessary The difference between the Air Force proposed procurement of 600 missiles in 1963 and the 100 I rccosmending in 5 year system costs is approximately $2 75 billions lbbile Kimrtemn Mobile Rinutesnn would serve as a hedge winst our being homily outnmbered by the Soviet force a low Soviet GEE or failure or the hardened Minuteman to meet cstisated blast resistance-- conditions lowering the survival potential of herd and dispersed Minutemen It would also serve as a hedge aginst uncrpected'adnnces - in Soviet anti-submarine warfare capability that would reduce the seem-it or Polaris However lbbile Ninutmn urban-e troubles of its on - including wartime fallout wick my redme substantial its sax-tine endurance peacetime sabotage and espionage and operational problem associated with the transport of explosives and attempted randm operation Moreover ii' to were to complete the Air Force recon-ended program of 300 Hobile Minutemen Kobile Minuteman would Cost about 2 5 times as much per missile as Minutemen hard and Therefore we are not yet certain that Hobile Rinutemn will be required The action I an recommending is in the nature of lead time reduction on the missile production program the combination of contingencies favoring Mobile Minutemn does not occur I shall mansion- the decision and reconnend cancellation of the production program Polaris This System has the most survival potential in the wartime environment or any of our long range nuclear delivery systems Polaris missiles do not have to be launched early in the var they can be held in reserve and used in a controlled and deliberate my to achieve our wartime objectives For example Polaris is 'ideal for comter-cit'y retaliation However as the calculations shown above indicate the force already programmed is large and can cause great damage to the population and industry of the Soviet Union IIbis reduces the mgencq 0 - I it othoJu-ilziu ts Come more Polaris sulmrinel 111311 3 Thamt on35mrmu 11310 5mm 3317 15 APPEHDIX I ASSUHED OPERATIONAL FACTORS FOR 1965 ARD 1967 TARGET DAMAGE CALCULATIONS All assumptions are characterized alternatively as Optimistic Median or Pessimistic I Assumed Soviet Force timistic Median 1 3 12g 1 1 7 Ember of #00 500 750 1000 Soft Sites 3 psi 100 so soc 125 Hard Sites 300 psi 200 LOO 350 750 Yield 7am 10am 7am 10am 1 n m1 8 mini 7 11 211 6 11 1111 Reliability 7 75 75 8 Pessimistic 1555 1 1 13 00 1500 no em 500 1100 7am 10am 5 nasi 5 8 85 The Soviets are assumed to apply their forces against ours in a rough oytimal fashion Thus for example Titan I will have a considerably lower survival rate than Atlas of aqua tratio'n of missiles makes it a more attractive target a Soviet missile attack are included in our force survival rates 1 blast resistance because the concen Only the effects of It '15 seemed that we launch our surviving missiles before Soviet bombers arrive The validity of this assumption does depend on our having a survivable high level command and control system 1b II II Assumed Survival Reliability and Penetration Factors The probability of a missile or aircraft delivering its weapon to the target can he thought of as the product of three factors Survival Rate under enemy attack or SR Reliability Rate or RH Penetration Rate through enemy defenses or PR For any given Soviet force level the Survival Rate of our forces will vary with our force size The forces proposcd' the individual Services will therefore have higher survival rates than the forces recommended by the Secretary of Defense because they are larger In those cases in which they differ the Survival Rates associated vith the forces I am recommending are designated by I those associated with the individual Service proposals by II The assumed factors are shovn'in the tables which follow To avoid a misleading impression oi spurious accuracy all factors have been rounded to the nearest 05 An explanation of the basis for the assumptions follows the tables A-2 17 fable I $553 ch Reliability 8'35 35891013 by Weapon Scenes 19635 Alert- were El a 0 Ft elg CEP A1 15 RR PR Iielgi CEP T t I 3E3 RR PR JEield EP 26 1 12 nl RP PP Yield CE I 1 15 15 Avg or 3613 a M1132 53 1 53 11 - RR P3 eld CE Polaris A-3 E Enid CE Emmi D95 on Alcrt 51 RR aid CE 51 35 11 on Ala-t 3-52'3 3ft PE PR EM 115 Median Pessimistic 50 1 20 10 TO 5 50 10 55 140 1 Basis for Assumed Operational Factors No great precision can be claimed for these factors The use of an optimistic-pessimistic range is intended to indicate the existence of uncertainty However the ranges can be taken to include all values having a substantial likelihood Alert Bomber Survival Rate In the optimistic case we receive tactical warning and act on it fast enough to launch all of the alert bombers In the pessimistic case for any of a number of possible reasons 90 per cent of the alert bombers are caught on the ground In the median case half the alert bombers get off This can be taken as an approximation to the results of a 25 per cent airborne alert though in the case of an airborne alert the fact that it is known which bombers vill survive attack should make m0re efficient targeting possible Bomber Penetration Rate The range 75 - 50 is roughly consistent with SAC estimates The improvement to 80 in 1967 is associated with effective air defense suppression The 25 pessimistic assumption descriles a case in which the-Alert Force has been mostly caught on the ground in which only a small force survives penetrates in an uncoordinated way and without effective air defense suppression ICBM Survival Rates These are explained by the assumed Soviet Forces Missile Reliability Rates The optimistic numbers are Service estimates or design objectives The pessimistic numbers are based on estimates made in WSEG Study No 50 - so This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu