if i jgrim I i in infamy- 1 1- INTERNAL NDTE ND N-l 2 A EDNHENT UN FUTURE WEAPONS SYSTEMS Letter te Charles Herefeld AREA end Geerge Rethjene ABBA by J F Ruina JUN 2 1 993 THIS DQCUMENT HAS BEEN DUWNGHADEU pm Diwe r KMM 3 $39 Tier I September 3 1964 JASON DITISIDN INSTITUTE FUR EDEFENSE ANALYSES libhH MS EAED IDMHQ 54 2955 I I We I I cunh'msin rnrma un gram uT tha hilHn 11 mg Ll'n'n' man U 5 and 75-4 Thu Ir September 3 1964 Dr Charles Herafeld Deputy Directer JUN 2 1 19% Advanced Research Prejects Agency THIS DOCUMENT HFIS BEEN The Pentagen f h FP115H I Washingten 25 D C and Dr Geerge Rathjens Deputy Assistant Directer Science A Technelegy Bureau US Arms Centrel and Disarmament Agency Elst Street and Virginia Avenue Nashingten 25 D E Dear Charlie and Eeerge After the cenversatiens I had with yeu earlier this summer seme ef us did think seme abeet new strategic weapens systems and tried te assess hew eur theughts new abeut what's ceming up differ frem what they were twe er three years age It seemed clear te me that fer Jasen te ge threugh a cemplete list ef all suggested develepments which as yeu knew range frem the reasenable te the ridiculeus weuld net be fruitful Alse enly te be critical ef seme ef the mere eutlandish weapens systems inventiens at this time is net even fun and surely net fruitful new that the gevernment itself is se much mere intelligent abeut these things and is clearly ne lenger prene te believe in the technelegically naive inventiens ne matter hew imaginative they may be What I did de was te gather Dysen Dell-Mann LeLevier and myself te discuss en the basis ef eur past_bnewledge generals ly and a recent expesure te seme ef Aerespace s thinking what the future weapens systems' situatien is I weuld like te cenvey te yeu seme ef eur theughts and cenclusiens ne matter hew tentative and incemplete they may be Te start with I sheuld tell yeu that we are very impressed with the seundness ef the Aerespace briefings These centrasted greatly te what I had expected and te what I had heard frem the IJEBLASSIHEU r't Dr Charles Hersfeld Page A Dr George Hathjens September 3 1954 Air Force in my Pentagon days when Microwave Radiation weapons and Bambi were so prominent On the other hand the strategic views of the Aerospace narrow In considering the strategic implications of their projected defense they did not for example include Polaris In considering what inhibitions there may be in U E strategic weapons developments they did not consider the national image deterrent creditability national policy and possible treaties that the U S may have but only considered such inhibitions as the Secretary-oquefensenimposed budget limits or booster quantity limits In regards to the erotic weapons systems our reaction is not really any different from what it was two or three years ago Although these systems have changed in detail they do not seem to have more nor less promise than before which means that no doubt most if not all of them are doomed to failure for one reason or another Surely there is some chance that one of these may prove feasible but I'm not holding my breath waiting for any of them In regard to l erotics you will find Christofilos' paper on a Space Pleet which he wrote this summer at Jason very interesting In the conventional ABM versus offensive missile dual we feel that whereas in the days of Nike Zeus the issue was whether the defense system could work at all against an attack designed to cope with it in contrast now considering the possible in- clusion of a hot bomb in the defensive interceptor and considering what we know about penetration aids and reentry Nikeux offers a very substantial challenge to an offensive system Although I think the defense is still clearly the underdog and it can without doubt still be defeated by a determined and sophisticated attack even if only by methods which exhaust the defensive missile supply the match is not a trivial one to evaluate On this score you are probably much better versed than we and I am sure you have your own educated conclusions and prejudices would like to add as a footnote here my personal view that in order to realise in the operational inventory strategic systems with truly effective penetration capability we will have to have a program dedicated to this end with the same kind of national commitment and dedication that we had in the Atlas Polaris and Minuteman programs ESSIHED- Dr Charles Hersfeld Page 3 Dr George Rathjens September 3 19E4 The new thing on the horizon which should he taken very seriously is the development of very low C E P Ts in an ICEM force This reduces the yield requirements for counterforce capability very dramatically thereby making various new developments feasible and attractive Foremost of these is what the air Force calls HIRE Multiple Independent Reentry Eehicles -- a development that is clearly feasible although it will no doubt have its engineering difficulties With no limits on the size or nature of the U S nuclear arsenal HIRE only provides a cheaper way of doing what might be desirable But given some limitations for any reason what- soever the possible use of HIRE can make a qualitative difference in capability Use for counterforce is most obvious but HIRE can also be used to complicate the problem for defense The coming Penetration study should surely include HIRE's role in countering defensive systems a systematic study of the implications of HIRE under various limiting conditions for the U S and S U arsenals ought to be undertaken Perhaps this should be part of a more general study which tries to assess the effect various con- straints in the form of treaty prohibitions inspection reu ouirements etc have on the arms race and what constraints tend to have the arms race become more or less stable etc But Jason is not the organisation to carry out this kind of study since Jasonites are part time and work sporadically However if IDR should undertake such a study individual members of Jason can and should make a substantial contribution Another topic with which a new study might concern itself is the long range implications of military space activities It is especially important to try to determine whether any conceivable space reconnaissance systems may make a decisive difference to the chances of arriving at lasting strategic stability or control of the arms race If such systems appear I I Dr Charles Hersfeld Page 4 Dr Gecrge Eethjens September 3 l954 tc exist they shculd he included as an integral part cf any study cf the future cf the missile fcrces is likely that in the run the size cf missile fcrces will depend mcre en the quality cf the intelligence data available tc the gcvernments ccncerned than en the characteristics cf the missiles themselves Sincerely ydurs J P Ruina cc Marvin L Kenneth M Watscn P E This letter was written hefcre I knew I wculd return tc and IDA full time This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu