i SECRET DEPARTMENT OF STATE Wnshlngtan D C 20520 %a January 2 9 1971 MEMORANDUM FROM - Mr Leon Sloss INR DFR - Leonard Weiss d SUBJECT Your Memorandum on PM ISP TO 4 1 Launch-on-Warni gy I want t o thank you for your memorandum o f December 28 on launch-on-warning I t i s a thoughtful memorandum I t will probably come as no surprise to you however that i t leaves me less than satisfied M y dissatisfaction stems i n part from the semantics used The term launch-on-warning perhaps because o f e a r l i e r debates on the policy issuesinvolved seems t o generate strong reactions and in theprocess obscures thecentral points I previously made to you and Sey L w i 6 4 $ ' w To refresh your memory i n our previous discussion I was quest i o n i n g the degree o f our vulnerabilitytoSovietnuclearattack and thus the need for ourresortingto measures such as hard-point defense which feel would blow up the e poss i b i l i t yo f a S agreeme% I was also raising in this context the feasibility of an ABM-only agreement consistent w i t h adequate protection o f our security interests Stripped t o i t s e s s e n t i a l s as fol lows d my reasoning was and s t i l l i s 1 Our fundamental protectionagainstnuclearattack--and p ' $ nuclear blackmail--lies i n our capability to inflict such intolerable damage on the enemy as t o deter him from possibleattack LC' 2 W e would appear t o have that capability in part in our capacity to get our Minutemen o f f the ground before any Soviet could knock them out should the Russians attempt a nuclear first strike That i s there wouldbe time between the launching o f Soviet missiles and their h i t t i n g US targets to get our own missiles on the 3 The Soviets would know that we had this capability SECRET I I SECRET __ -2- 4 Knowing t h i s they should be deterred from the possibility of undertaking a f i r s t strike Even i f the Soviets m i g h t calculate t h a t there i s asubstantial chance we would not employ thiscapability they would s t i l l have t o allow for the possibility that we would and even i f the possibili ty were small i t should be sufficient t o deter them because o f the intolerable destruction they would suffer i f the possibility became areality In other words because of theintolerablelevel o f destruction w i t h which they might be visited they would have t o assume the worst case'' i n j u d g i n g what they themselves might do 5 Thus I concluded thatdespitethe SS-9's and possiblefuture qualitative improvements by theSoviets we s t i l l have a significant deterrent so long as our own Minutemen could get off the groun'd in time 6 In addition and more important o f course we s t i l l hqve our sea-based missiles andheavy bombers and the political factor would provide a further heavy constraint on theSoviets as well as ourselves onany first resort t o nuclear weaoons thouah f o r the sake of analv s i s we l e f t theseconsiderationsaside-to focus on thedeterrentcaiab i l i t y o f a land ICBM force In these terms your memorandum s t i l l leaves me unpersuaded 1 I f I understand your argumnt correctly i t i s i n large part thatthedeterrent is not credible It implies that we might launch everything i n a spasm even when theSoviets m i g h t launch only-a few missiles and thattheSoviets would calculate t h a t we would not engage in mass destruction when they were h i t t i n g us with just a few You suggest accordingly that the Soviets wouldhave a strong tempt a t i o n ' t 0 probebelow thethreshhold of the numr of missiles they could launch before we would react I d o n ' t find this a very plausible argument Nuclear weapons are o f suchtremendous destructive capability that I f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o conceive o f the Russians probing even w i t h only a few o f them Were they t o probe in the sense o f actually sending some over thev wouldhave t o calculate t h a t we would respond at least t o the extent o f the amount they m a y have thrown atus and they would have at least t o allow t h a t the initial exchange would escalateintoa more massive one and thus they should be deterred from startingthings in the first place I f they shouldreason this way-- as I would expect them t o i f theyare rational--then I doubt they would even threaten t o probebelow thethreshhold as you suggest since t h e y d appreciatethatthe t h r e a t i s not credible In general I f i n d this whole concept of probing with missilery below some threshhold highly unrealistic politically SECRET I - 3 SECRET -3- 'f - p3 xi ' B'p 'l ' li - v I F 4 a ' 1 I k j- j' I' 2 You appear t o question thetechnicalfeasibility o f developi n g a system which would be sufficiently fast discriminating and un- gmbiguous in providing the warning required to make such a deterrent credible I am no expert in these matters b u t I am advised by Frank Perez and others who are more knowledgeable t h a t this i s quitefeasible 3 You also suggest that such a warningsystem would be very costly perhaps as costly as increased Minutemen survivability I am advised t h a t thecost i s n o t as great as you suggest Even i f i t were however I would prefer t o see the money going into such an effort than t o plunge i n t o hard-point defense w i t h the adverseimpact i t would have on thepossibility o f reaching a SALT agreement 4 I f u l l y endorse your p o i n t that theessence o f a s t r a t e g o f deterrence i s t o exploit the existence of weapons without actually usingthem That i s precisely what I am talking about I t seems t o me t h a t i f i n fact we have the capability to strike the Russians a devastating blow i f they should attempt a first stri ke the Russians cannot afford--as we couldn't either--to assune anything else b u t thatthatcapability will beused And i n making that assumption neither they nor we would resort i n the first instance either to small probing i n your terms or massive employment of nuclear weapons 5 Finally so that our perspective i s not llost let me emphasize that i n arguing as I have a against ABM action by ourselves which woul d prejudicethe chance ofgettlng a SALT agreement and b for an ABM-only agreement i f a more comprehensiveagreement covering 0ffensive weapons is not negotiable I have raised the question of the' deterrentcapability of our land ICBM force as a subordinateaspect o f our totaldeterrentcapability I expect our pri ncipal detW enCe t o l i e in our sea-basedforce I have raisedthe launch-on-warning capability only t o illustrate furtherthe immensepower at our disposal and to'suggestthatthe concerns about thesurvivabi1 ity o f our nuclearforce and the threat to our security have in my Viev been greatly exaggerated ' Enclosed i s a memorandum by Frank Perez which discusses i n greaterdetail some of thetechnical aspecks o f theissuesralsed YCWmemorandum I Encl As stated cc INR-Mr Cline m 1Jlj- --- ___- @ J T - S PC-Mr S Weiss PM-Mr Garthoff in January29 1971 MEMORANDUM - Mr Leonard Weiss - Frank H Perez TO INR DFR FRO 4 INR RSG SUBJECT Thoughts on Launch-on-Warning e During the past decademajoradvances have occurred i n the technology r e l a t i n g t o b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e e a r l y warning detection tracking and discrimination Utilization of these advanced techniques provldes h i g h confidence t h a t a flock of geese or an accidental or unauthorized missile launch would not serve to trigger a spasm response w i t h a l l o f i t s catastrophicresults Infact technology has progressed t o a s t a g e where theunpopular and distasteful subject of launch-on-warning s h o u l d be re-examined i n a more rational and less emotional manner p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of the growing impact of Soviet A t this stage techno1og y on the s u r v i v a b i l i t - y of ourstrategicforces t Wdyny t pv 4 l ymye aFFrcpy ate ec k -t c-nJb t e launch o u o u warning s h In order to provide such a capability i t wouldbe necessar Y t o construct--in addition to systems already 'in operation or nearing PAR type along ICBM operationalstatus--perim$teracquisitionradars approach corridors The resulting combination o f systems would provide unambiguous information on the nunlbers of attacking objects where they werelaunchedfrom and where they would impact The rationale for considerinq this aDDroach i s as folloWs If the Soviets were t o develop a creiible counterforce capability against Minuteman the possibility of t h e i r using i t f i r s t in a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n would e x i s t The current DPRC s t u d y on s t r a t e g i c f o r c e surviva b i l i t y shows that technical advancements particularly i n the form of could a t t a i n a Counterhighlyaccurate MIRVs indicatethattheSoviets force ca pahility aaainst the US hlinlltmanforce i n the 1975-80 time '1 I A i i T NO FORN'DISSEM - 2 - A s i g n i f i c a n t d e t e r r e n t t o any temptation on the part of the Soviets to use their counterforce capability i n a f i r s t s t r i k e i n order to gain an advantage would be t h e ' t h r e a t t o launch Minuteman before i t c a m under d i r e c t a t t a c k If theSoviets were uncertain as t o t h e US response i t i s doubtful t h a t they would consider a counterforce f i r s t s t r i k e a g a i n s t f4inutenian t o be a viable option The p o s s i b i l i t y of trading Soviet cities for empty US s i l o s would weigh heavy on the Soviet political leadership i n reachingsuch an awesome decision the US might respond t o Inorder t o convincetheSovietsthat an all-out Soviet surprise attack against Minutemanby launching some p a r t or a l l o f the force would require the US t o have i n being a h i g h l y Such r e l i a b l eb a l l i s t i cm i s s i l ee a r l y warning and trackingcapability a system would providewarning o f a mass missile launch a t thetime i t occurred and would be capable of accurately and reliably determining the nature of the attack i n s u f f i c i e n t time f o r t h e Minuteman force t o be launched on the basis of an informed judgment by thePresident The key t o a credible capability would be highly sophisticated and r e l i a b l e systems t o d e t e c t mass launchesfrom the Soviet Union as soon as theyoccurred and theytoquicklydefinetheattack i n terms of i t s s i z e and the intendedtargetareas I t would alsorequirerapid procedures t o communicate with the President and theNational Command Authori ty Me a i r e a a y have systems i n operatiort whicit d eLiesSgiied to provide immediate and continuouswarningof inass missilelaunches from theSoviet Union These are the 440-L OTIi system and the 647 e a r l y warning s a t e l l i t e 440-L i s now operational and functioningsatisfactorily The f i r s t 647 s a t e l l i t e was launchedrecently b u t f a i l e d t o achieve the desired stationary orbit overtileSoviet Union Instead i t went i n t o a highly elliptical orbit Nevertheless we have receivedsufficientdata fromthe s a t e l l i t e t o i n d i c a t e t h a t i t s designobjectiveprobably will be achieved i Deterlnining that a mass launch hac occurred while a very important part o f a launch-on-warning capability would not be enough We would have t o have absolute assuranceastothe s i z e o f thea-ttack and would need t o k n o s p e c i f i c a l l y whera the attack originated and t p where i t was directed With the deployment along ICBM approachcorridors of advancedphased array radars of thetype re are p u t t i n g into Safeguard PerimeterAcquisition Radars- PARS we would be able t o accurately and reliably determine such f a c t o r s a s t h e number of attacking objects where they were launched from and where they were intended to impact Thus we would know o i a large-scale attack directed against Minuteman i n time t o be able to launchthe Minuteman force or a givenportion of i t before i t comes under d i r e c t a t t a c k SECRETfl'lO FOREIGN DISSEI4 tET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 3 - Intermsof cost such a warning and tracking capability would notappearto be excessive The 440-L OTtl system i s already i n being and the program for the 647 e a r l y warning s a t e l l i t e system already has been approved and i s in t h e i n i t i a l phase We arealso o f constructing PAR radars at i almstromandGrank Forks intheprocess which will perfornl the acquisition function for all of ourSafeguard deployment a t defended Minuteman complexes Additional PiXR type radars required to assure a highly reliable and redundantassessment of the threat would not appear to represent an additional major cost f a c t o r In any case this approach would be s i g n i f i c a n t l yl e s s expensjve t h a n other solutions being considered for the Minuteman s u r v i v a b i l i t y problem--ARM defense ofMinuteman rebasing Minuteman i n a mobile Inode or the phase-out or phase- down of Minuteman with g r e a t e r emphasis on SLBMs and bombers The argumentcould bemade t h a t the Soviets might first attack ballistic missile detection and trackingradars PAR type S O as t o blind the us and then f o l wo i t h an all-out counterforce tt ck aqainst blinuteman This ho vever v ot15dbe a dangerous t a c t l c on t h ep a r t O f theSoviets Such a radarattack would a l e r t t h e US and couldpermitthe US t o launch i t s m i s s i l e s a f t e r a mass missile launchagainstthe US was To mitigatethe remote p o s s i b i l i t y o f such detected by 4 40-L and 647 a radar attack the US could e l e c t t o protect a key segment of i t s b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e warning and tracking network w i t h %Is In the S LT C O E L L E X we couiii pvupwse uur dtl rerlse be n o t around i dasnington b u t r a t h e r a t Malmstrom which i s one o f i x o safeguard sites currently being constructed Fro111 i lalmstrom alone we probably would s t i l l be able t o track and identify with sufficient precision and r e l i a b i l i t a major ICBM a t t a c k d i r e c t e d a t our Plinuteman complexes would know t h a t around US President and the National Command Authority and t o make a decis ion t o launch Minuteman However about 15-20 minutesprobahly would passbefore the nature of the attack would be sufficiently defined so as t o determinewhether i t was i n f a c t a Inajor attack directed against Minuteman Thus i n any systemdesigned topermitlaunching of blinuteman on unambiguous k r a m l n c j would require highly sophisticated and reliable procedures for alerting the President and theNational Command Authority so t h a t thq wouldbe f u l l y informed on a continuinabasisof developmentsas theyoccurred However i t i s most unlikely that a S o v i e t f i r s t s t r i k e would occur exand i n such a situation the President cept i n a periodofextremetension and theNational Command Authority iould be e s p e c i a l l y a l e r t t o r e a c t to S o v i e t i n i t i a t i o n of an attack Once the attack had started the Soviets 30 minutes would be available i n Mhich t o a l e r t t h e 1 A Soviet counterforce attack against Minuteman'might be conducted withoutconcurrentattacksagainst US population and industrial centers Launching the Ninuteman force against SIOP t a r g e t s which includeSoviet population and industrial targets probably would cause the Soviets to r e t a l i a t e i n k i n d Therefore i t might be prudent t o earmark a certain portionoftile Minuteman force sa y 200 o r 300 missiles Which could be I SECRET NO FOREIQN DISSEM i -4- cii launchedagainst h i g h value military targets away from population the remainder of the Minuteman force and industrial centers while rode o u t theattack In such-anattack h i g h valuetargetscould include isolated heavy bomber bases submarinebases nuclear s t o r a g e s i t e s mi1itar ydepots R 81 D c e n t e r s e t c -Thus i f the Soviets d i d destroy the bulkof the remaining Minutemen they will have s u f f e r e d r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r l o s s e s and will have expended a large number of t h e i r m i s s i l e s On balance even ifwe were toprovide ABM defense of Minuteman as a d e t e r r e n t t o a firs'C strike there auld s t i l l be considerable merit i n h a v i n g a h i g h l y r e l i a b l e i n t e g r a t e d b a l l i s t i c missile early warning and tracking system which would give the President the option t o respond t o a Soviet attack based on his assessment of the situation This would seem preferable to no option other than t o ride out the attack and thenrespond with what residual remained As noted in the d r a f t DPRC s t u d y on s t r a t e g i c -force survivabilit y uncertainties surround even a dedicatedhard-sitedefense o f Minuteman because there is considerable uncertainty about future Soviet penetration aids and re-entryvehicletechnology In summary an unambiguous launch-on-warning capabilitycould serve t o deter the Soviets from seekingtodevelop a counterforce capabilityagainst ivlinuteman More importantly i t couldserveto s i g n i f i c a n t l y rpdiuce any i n c e n t i v e t o use -uch a force i n a preemptive s t r i k e i n the hopes o f g a i n i n g some s t r a t e g i c advantage This primary lattercc 1sideration i s particularlyimportant sincethe on t h e US objective o f US s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s i s to deter nuclear attack To Etbtain thedeterrenteffectinherent i n thecapability t o launch-onunambiguous-warning vouldnotrequirethe US t o annoullce a launch-onwarningpolicy The mere f a c t t h a t we had developed and deployed the sophisticated components required for such a capabil'ity would serve as a sianal t o theSoviets t h a t the US was prepared t o exercise this option I t i s recognizedthat this memorandunl has only scratched the surface of t h i s very complex and emotional issue I t is elanhasized t h a t this tnmorandunl i s no-t advocating the adoptionof a launch-onwarn-ing policy rather i t i s raising issues and arguments wh'ich need more carefulexamination and s t u d y i n l i g h t of changingconditions both in terms of the military threat and technologicalopportunities SECRET NO FOREIGII DISSEM This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu