305 saggia l NU HAK TALKING POINTS DOD STRATEGIC TARGETING STUDY BRIEFING Thursday July 27 1972 Johnny Foster is set to brief you Thursday July 27 on the DOD Strategic Target Policy study The study was prepared on a very close-hold basis Without Laird's approval I was given a summary so the fact that we have advance rm terial should npibe revealed Background The 510 is based on and driven by the National Strategic Target Attack Policy NSTAP a document given to SAC by the JCS It does not relate to Administration guidance NSDM 16 which essentially deals with weapon acquisition not weapons use The current has changed little from the original policy paper prepared by McNamara's staff in the early 19603 although the strategic situation has changed radically I The NSTAP objectives are threefold -- To destroy the Soviet and PRC nuclear offensive capability SIOP Task Alpha -- To destroy the Soviet and PRC military target system STOP Task Bravo -- To cause heavy damage to the enemy's military supporting industrial base and its urban-industrial centers 5103 Task Charlie REE Ejihbbi 3 TOP '5 drigzg P Wt l i 2 In 3 Cl- The shortcomings of this policy are obvious Its only objective is to Win the nuclear war by destroying the enemy There is no effort to control escalation or plan for limited options Moreover no consideration is given to the great uncertainty that exists as to how a war might begin -- the assumption is that one side or the other launches a major attack perhaps the least likely scenario A small Committee chaired by Johnny Foster then prepared a new draft policy paper nuclear target attack policy -- NTAPL which is essentially the study you will be briefed on OSD Draft Targeting and Attack Policy The new policy paper is radical departure from the current pgligr -- in substance as well as format In essence the differengi is that the current policy is to Win the war through destruction of the enemy's forces and military capability The new prgpos ed poliCy aims at trying to stogthe war quickly and at a low level of destruction It also deals with all offensive nuclear weapons tactical and theater as well as strategic weapons The first major bbjective of the new policy is to control escalation This is done several ways -- Establishing boundaries e g types of weapons type targets and launch location -- Deterring enemy escalation by ensuring we retain a highly survivable capability -- Avoiding instability use or lose pressures by tailoring targeting tasks to the appropriate type of weapon g bombers should not be used for the reserve since they are not survivable -- Avoiding destruction of the enemy's key national command- control facilities to ensure he can control escalation and not resort to automatic respons es The second major element is poliCy for the situation where efforts to prevent escalation fail In this case our forces would be used to TVE minimize the enemy's residual military power and recovery capability and not just destroy his population and industry Weapons A 110 cation Pric ritie The draft NTAP also prescribes the priorities to be followed by the target planners in allocating weapons for targets Under the new proposal there would be a sharp distinction between weapons priorities for the options based on normal day-to-day alert 5 essentially retaliatory options and a generated alert option essentially a pre-emptive strike The table below compares the weapon assignment priorities for the current policy with the proposed policy Weapons A ssignment Priorities Current Policy New Policy Priority Retaliatory or Pre-emption Retaliatory Pre-empjcion 1 Strategic nuclear targets - 2 targets Command Nuclear forces Control including hard silos 3 General purpose forces Residual Command nuclear Control and GP forces 4 - Hard silos GPF targets This is not the order in which targets would be struck but the priorities followed in allocating weapons to the target array For example the targets Would get first call on weapons Thus those weapons probably that have enduring surviv- ability would be allocated to the UH mission Should we pre-empt this does not mean we would go after the targets first -- rather we would likely go after Soviet nuclear threats to us and our allies withholding survivable capability to deter the Soviets from hitting our targets I 3 Attack Options TOP SE Recognizing the uncertainty over how a nuclear conflict might start the new policy prescribes a wide range of options which fall into three basic classes 1 Major-Attacks -- These are the large war attacks along the line of the current SIOP There are four options 1 major Soviet and East European GPF and nuclear military forces 2 the first option plus political and economic targets 3 and 4 the same two options but for the PRC rather than the USSR 2 Selected Attack Options -- There are 12 such options designed to control escalation The selected attacks are smaller packages of the targets in the major options Coupling these selected packages with various withholds should provide boundaries to discourage escalation The withholds include targets collocated with major urban areas targets in any specific country Moscow and Peking etc and can be applied to the major options as well In all cases a reserve to carry out the task would be maintained using survivable forces to discourage the enemy from a major attack or attack on our cities Among the selected attack options are strikes against 1 Soviet nuclear threat to the U S 2 The threat to NATO 3 War at sea targets 4 Threats to our allies in Asia 5 Soviet air defenses 6 PRC nuclear threats 7 PRC command control and conventional forces TO VE TOP 5 bush 3 Limited Options -- Obviously a wide range of limited options would be possible drawing selected parts of the above options To facilitate use of limited options a- special planning staff would be established to develop preplanned options and design ad hoc options as required in a crisis The Next Steps The JCS are now reviewing the new target policy After their comments are received the paper will be revised and submitted for Presidential approval you should make sure of this When the final policy is isSued SAC will then begin redoing the SIOP This will be a long process -- probably a year or more Obviously much more work will be needed to implement the pOIiCy if it is adopted For example -- This Work needs to be integrated into the Strategic Objectives Study and the study completed and brought to the NSC for decision -- We must determine what changes We will want to make in our declaratory policy and explain the new policy to NATO the allies are likely to have serious concerns about it Areas You Should Probe I suggest that you raise questions in the following areas -- When will the policy be submitted to the President for approval How do the limited options support our strategic objectives - -- How does this targeting policy relate to our weapons acquisition policy to -- Since we need to get the worked into the Strategic Objectives Study how can we best proceed Foster probably will not know and I suspect Laird is trying to derail the study J TIVE IL This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu