I l' I 31 1 m3 - 22mm i 1 warm Him mm 1331 - We a mum 1 mm l3 1 1'1 11 1- 1 i km 11- It' g mg 1% mmamtmm w my 93 3 it 3 1 that Wm tm -i h A mm mm gamut mm 3 mm 3 arm 1711175 4m- 4 31 I- LII- w-rl-L'i IF- - mmwm wm 5W1 Mm 31 21 SEMI Section I Section II Section Section'IV Su-tion APPENDIX STRATEGIC ANALYSIS CF THE IMPACT OF THE ACQHISITICN BY COMMUNIST CHINA OF A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY Page No - SUMMARY OF THE APPRAISAL 1 - THE 3 - BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 3 - TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THIS PROBLEM 3 - IMPACT OF ACQUISITION OF A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY BY COHMUNIST CHINA Ln UNITED STATES ACTISNS REQUIRED to caummarsr THE INHCT A CHINA CAPABILITY 13 - i1l- I '1 1 -i a 633% I Iguana - I Nut qu'I lab AW Jr- 3 SECRET - OF THE APPRAISAL l The attainment of a nuclear capability by Communist China will have a marked impact on the security posture of the United States and the Free World particularly in Asia 2 The United States and her Allies should use the time that is still available to counter this impact through coor- dinated political economic and military actions 3 Specifically action should be taken now prior to 1962 to - a Postpone the attainment of a nuclear capability by Communist China as long as possible b Prepare to lessen the impact on Asia and Africa of news or the first nuclear detonation c Strengthen western alliances in Asia d Strengthen the pro-Western orientation of non-alliance countries a Develop an active Atoms for Peace program in India r Assist Japan in the peaceful application of nuclear knowledge 3 Accelerate the over-all economic development or the non-communist under developed countries h Cause the uncommitted peeple to recognize communism as a basic threat to their security and enhance their will to defend themselves against it i 3trengthen the internal security of non-communist Asian nations J Exploit Sine-Soviet differences k Discourage the development of Nth Country nuclear weapons capabilities in Asia 1 Exploit the weakness of the Chinese Communist regime 4 Plans and programs should be initiated new to attain the following military objectives in the mid-range period approxi- mately 1952-64 to 1968-70 eacasc' Jess- ef Si 1 Appendix In moo-omino- SEBRET SECRET a Strengthen the US nuclear capability in Leia and the 1 Western Pacific 2 b Strengthen the air defense capability in the area 3 c Strengthen the nonnuclear capabilities in the area 4 d Provide certain selected Asian allies in the area with 5 a potential nuclear delivery capability 6 5 The following additional objectives are required in the 7 long-range period 1968-1970 to well within the 1970 decade 8 a Complete a cohesive alliance or alliancea which will 9 form the center of resistance in the area 10 b Strengthen the US baee complex in the area 11 2 Appendix SECRET FTW 35 are m3 Si A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE 1 To ACQUISITION BY COMMUNIST CHINA OF A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY I - THE PROBLEM a Envelop a strategic analysis of the impact of the acquisition by the CHICOMS of a nuclear capability on the United States and Free World security posture and deployments with particular respect to Free Asia and Africa b Determine actions which should be taken in order to counteract the impact of Communist Chinese achievement of a nuclear capability II - BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 2 This study does not consider the impact of arms control or nuclear weapons control measures A meaningful agreement in this area involving Communist China would change the results or this analysis but the type and extent of such measures cannot be assessed at this time - TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON THIS PROBLEM 3 Nuclear Weapons a Communist China may be able to test a nuclear device between 1952 1964 These dates could as moved up or back depending on the tempo of Soviet aid b Six months or so after detonating a nuclear device they could have a crude fission weapon deliverable by the BULL bomber which the USSR has already made available to Cowmunist China However at least two years would probably be required after the first test to produce a small stockpile of elementary weapons at which time a limited capability NIB 1-61 ragraph 223 on file in Joint Secretariat NIB 100-4 0 paragraph 3 on file in Joint Secretariat sscaer Jcsn n25-51 3 APDendix o-SEERET SECRQE would exist with an aircraft which could reach Japan 1 Taiwan ekineua South Korea and South Vietnam as well an 2 additional areas in Southeaet Ania In addition by 1955 3 they may have a substantial dunner of Jet medium bombere ' 4 aneuming continued Soviet assistance - 5 q A substantial growth in the opacity or the CHIGOMS 5 to'prcduce and assemble complex military equipment is Accordingly during the five year period after detonation 9 8 a device a capability could be developed for nuclear weapone 9 carried by fighter type aircraft and used an warheads for 10 unguided relatively short-range rockets The rate o tech- ll nological advance will or course be highly dependent on 12 USSR Even furnishing proven designs ugpl pmateri-IB ally aid the calcon extort Providing intricate machine 14 tools wonld further accelerate the rate of advance Oon- e15 vereely withdrawal of U333 would retard the 16 caicon'e program but would not eliminate their ability to 17 produce nuclear weapons at a later date 18 4 guided ggeeile gyeteme The Communiet missile 19 program in estimated now to be in the early research and developbeo ment They will certainly move as rapidly as they are 21 capable towards the development of ballistic missiles probably 22 concentrating initially on a'nieeile with a range or aeo ed no 23 and capable of carrying a fiction warhead They could develop at each micelles by the 1968-1970 period on with considerable 25 Soviet much earlier # The Demmgniet nineae 25 could not by themselves produce the ICBH necessary-to give 27 than a capability against the United Staten until well after 23 29 HIE 13-50 paragraph 61 on file in Joint Secretariat HIE 1-61 paragraph 2g on file in Joint Secretariat HIE 13-60 paragraph 02 on file in Joint Secretariat sacaer' Jcsnuhas 61 4 Appendix - J Iv - IMPACT OF THE ACQUISITION or A NUCLEAR communism CHINA 5 This section contains brief summary of the impact on Asia Africa and Latin America that may result if Communist Cnina acquires a nuclear capability In addition the poccible 6 on 551a p -A primary goal of Communist China is to be tho acknowl- edgod loadorrof Asia and to extend Goqmyniot control throughv out Ania The Communist Chincnc view tho United Staten no 8 2 3 effect of Communiot china emerging as a 4 5 6 the major to her or this obJectiyo who 9 U3 pocrtion in Asia in hoped-on political and economic co lo oborotioo with our Alli a tho maintonancc of'Froe world ll armed ctrongth in Acic and the ocean areas contiguous thereto 12 and efforts will convince the people of Asia 13 that recictancc to Communion and allicncc nith the Pros world lu offer a better future than that Communist China 15 mhuo the United Status is engaged in a long term contact l with Communist China throughout Asia - 17 b The firot impact on Free Asia or communist min 13 acquicition or a nuclear capability would occur as noon on 19 thc first dcvicc is dctonotod he should expect tho 20 to Voluntarily onnounoc accomplichment and oxploit tho 21 to tho rulloap through propaganda The impact or 22 this propcgohdg ccnnocho overwastimateq Ewen though the 23 initicl propagcnda night the pcaoctui or 24 nuclear power the military effect will be mom as obvious to the countricc on Communist China's periphery 26 The dominant reaction could he a fcar that tho chances of 27 war had and there would ho stronger for ad dull acceptance of Communist China on a member of the world 29 cog - 5 Appendix SEBRET A community while some countgiee in Asia wogld increasingly look to the United Stetee to provide counterbalance to Communict China's oilitefy etrengtp tpere would also be a heig tencd inclination toward eccemmodation with Foipihg c Once Communiet chine detonatee a nuclear device and particularly when it ettgine nuclear yeapone cepebility its foreign policy will become more trpculent and militant She will attempt to exeggerete countently her actual cope- bilitp To great extent the western oriented peripheral notions Nationalist china priooe We South Vietnam South Korea and Heleye have considereq that a rough sort or balance exiete between Chloe's manpower on the mainland and Hg military power deployed in Asia and the instep Pacific- onion- 3 may be expected to m every effort to convince thege-pwowueeteru peripheral nations that this balance no longer exists and that the united Staten can no longor proteot countries located close to China and far from the United States Euring this initial poring Hhila pommnnict chine in building up a smell stockpile of nuclear weapons and depend- ing on menncd aircraft for the gala delivery means the xuopogaode and political eaventegeo or becoming nuclear power would outweigh the actual military advantage gained by the cartons US Military power assigned to BACON and available for deployment to the Aeien periphery will remain euperior at least through the rivet two genre of the period The reeuipgment for-centiecing the pro vectere nations that this superiority Ixiltg would however become difficult Increased requeete fen indigen- air erence capabilitie poet be anticipated In enm- mqny the price and-difficulty or maintaining a pro-Heetern orientation or non-communiet nations would go up politically-32 economically and HIE 13-60 90 on rile in Joint Secretariat I 5 Appendix marches-61 33 gma e within three to five yearn other aoqoiring a nuclear capability the $310038 will be capable of developing an appreciable atoekpile of weapons doliveratle by a variety of aircraft possibly including some supersonic tighter types ' the actual military balance or power in the Western aniric and Southeast nill then start to swing toward Communist China the United States and her Aeian Allies increase their military posture in the area i r CHICOM militorn power would be ooneiderably augmented' by the acquisition or a nadinm-range mieeilg with a nuclear- 10 madman possibly in the 19634970 tine Period a 500 nm ll mioeile based in China North Korea or Horth Vietnam will 12 provide complete covegage o Okinawa Fornena anq 3outhoaet 13 Asia on well on partial coverage or Japan and the Philippinee lh who problem or maintaining UB-alliancee and the pro Weetern orientation of free Asian nations during thin period will be 16 moat complex none-or the peripheral nations has the techniw 1 col or economic ability to maintain a mieaile defence eyotem 15 Only Japan and Incia have the eenatilitn or developing an 19 offensive mieeile capability to function ea a_portia1 20 deterrent and the'neutraliat tendencieo in each of these 21 ecuntriee in too strong to warrant placing anon reliance at 22 thie time on their nilitary e crte in the mieaile a nuclear 23 iold - 2t 7 In 1 _on frioa and Latin ric 1 25 a Communiet China hoe been giving great attention to 25 Africa anq Latin America In arrica it has given etqong' 2 to the Algerian revolutionary regime concluded 28 eeveral agreements with Guinea and sent trade and eultcral 29 ozone Appendix seen-nes ei SECRET em dele etiene to neny new African countries who CHIOOHE undouotedly estimate that the confusion inexperience anti-coloniet sentiment and racialiem which exiet in Africa can be exploited not only for Communist but for Chinese Comet benefit CHIQQM activities have been greetly stepped up in Latin America raining will almost certainly r further increase its ectivitiee in Latin America and my well egrert a growing eppeel due in part to Mint China's rapid economic program from on under-dov eloped etctee b The acquisition or a nuclear capability by the 10 GM would have political or propaganda 11 implicatione in these are rather than mill-m The 12 attention or the wider-developed end or politically immature 13 cationic would he directed to the superior neuomplielment cr- an Asian ccnucuniet nation vie-e vie ouch mn-comuniet 15 countries an India and Japan nominee of technological 16 in the nuclear meter field will probably be male Even though the GHIGDMS cannot 5'1ng any substantial l'd Joontributicn in the reactor area before the latter part or the decade they could begin to cdvence 3n lines of techno- logical leadership This image would the ettm- 21 tivencee of extensive economic and educational agreements 22 35 with the under-developed neticne or the world as 8 my En commie chine'g mic go 5 world Power 214 @meniet China is determined to be accepted as underworld 25 power Rei- acquisition or a nuclear capability could heve 95 particular hearing in the following groan n Eeletio g 5333 tan m me exact relations that 25 211111 exist between then We national in the future cannot 29 be detemiged with degree o it thie time 13-60 paragraph 35 epd 333 on file in Joint ecnteriet' $ iTiU 8 meet I 1 IL BET new Although opaniys llise it is beliefs that the Soviets have provided technical assistance in the nuclear area at a deliberate pace honing to postpone the attainment of a native Chinese nuclear weapone capability ac long as 1 2 3 a pa tible Acquisition of her own nuclear capability yould 5 increase Conmunist China's Freedom o action both politically 5 and militarily This treedom or action coupled with an 7 aggressive CHICOM policy in Asia and arrica might possibly 8 predate a number of specific igetances where the objective 9 of Communist China are in conflict with the onqactives or the 10 USSR a united aggressive foreign policy of the USER ll and Communist China when both are nuclear ponero would 12 pose an increased danger to the Free world On the other 13 hand a militant unilateral CHICOH policy in Asia alone it can pose dangere to the UB position in Asia which would 15 have serious long-range implications 15 b gelations with the United ctions The acquisition 7 a a nuclear capability would increase communiet China's 18 status as a world power particularly in the eyes-or the 19 new countries of Africa and Asia Thie reacticn could in- 20 crease existing pressures for admitting her to the united 21 to e Arms gentrc Even before the caplosicn or a nuclear 23 device raining'a military power and potential may inereae- 24 ingly complicate the international disarmament problem If Western disarmament negotiations with toe USSR make sig- 25 26 niricent grogrees international pressures will probably 2 grow greatly for communist Quinn's participation Ieipins's 2 latcroae with respect to disarmament will become even 29 greater once China has become a nuclear power raining will 30 HIE 1332-50 outgrew l cn me in 'J'oinr secretariat SECM 9 Armed JcatL-hes-si hing-u gu F expleie this eituepien in metre to enhance i-Ee inter-z i nabiqml Lemme but at me Been time mg attempt te prevent a the eonclueien or am' din-mt agreement 11 least until 3 it become a nuclear gamers 1 UNITED era-rm erxou REQUIRED a memwm 7 9 Three time period ere eeneiQered in this Ines-v 8 legal All they are determined by agitating in Gemini 611111630 9 teehgeiem their limits git-e net They do however 10 cemepend generally to the inert-range mid-mag and lengw 11 range planning periods of the Jami Prom fer Planning 21 2 e The first time period begins nee animus with the 13 detenetion 93 the Gemuniet Chinese at 1 nuclear device 11 pmbebiyw in the perio f 196 2r 196h 15 b The time perind beanie with the detonation of 16 a device 11 extend manual the date 1when ne 11 tint are pmduoed and eteekpiled and 11113 an 13 when the primary deliver whiqle changes from the airplane 15 to the gilded mieeile Developge t or a 5m nefmienile in 2G possible by the and er the decade 1 62 1968-1970 21 e The thin time pat-19 hesige with the advent of 22 mieeile capability It extend through the date when 23 mint China will mane an appreciable number or abut-t 24 er medium-mug guide- 1 miepilee wit nuclear wax-heads this 25 per-ind H111 terminate at such time 'the mum enquire 25 a lens-range attack mutability abreast 1031's eomb tile 27 well me - 1970 25 it She above dates are eubdeet to cheese queer-ding to 29 the degree or teamed egaietame- given to the 33100143 by 30 the USSR The mutate-m 'eitheugh but agreed View 3 1 HIE 60 paragraph 1 tile in 3015' Secretariat HIE 3-60 pix-agent 22 01143113 in int genreteriat o my 10 Appendix men-425 61 it My aE HRH Iv 53 - b'h 1' 1s thdt jths psriod could begin w1th tho astonation of 1 molesr ado vice as early as late 1961 The third purist 2 m1ght then begin ss-sarly ss 1965-1955 1f tho USSR increased 3 her by furnish-1 13 premium ports 1% and assesolges 5 10 pox-106 Now until 1952-19514 ho followmq 6 actions shoals be 1n1t1stod now 111 order to We the immat- 7 of the first csiIcpM nuclear osteoatiozi one the atuamnt of Nuolosr ca 131111 9 Communis $ Z stss Long as Possible who United States la apprapf ata Pros world Allies should take all 91 esuihls overt- sn Eoovart actions has to postpone attainmont 12 of to1s ospsb1lity os1sng as possibIs oocorted efforts by 13 apprurriste b3 govsr mootal agonoiss 1n oonjunotion with those 14 of Foss brld all1e should be dirsctod 15 of mutull ohgsot11s 15 b Progsro3 to lesson impact on 151s sad 1 Africa of news or the first nuclear detonation The Uthed 18 must use the on or two years avs1lsb1s to woman 19 drastically tho psyohologiosl impoot of the first cannon Ea detgmtion Ibis agent hss' potsqtisl repercussions 1 1 21 As1s for exosed1ng tho 1mpsot or the rirst-USSR-spsoo Availsble should be used is proposing a 1111' motion and warfare plan for mouse execution by tho Dspastment 9 state Department or Cent 11 Intelligence Agency as United States Information agency The Elan shoals provide tor actions at all echelons of government o1plomstio and military which will s1mul tsusously advsnoo cm the acquisition by consummt China or 1ch ospob111ty dogs not change the giggled- 612 DEW mo rootlets 1 on fills in Joint amass Jess-$142541 11 Appendix ahaa balanoa or power in aia the Eastern Paoirgo in her favor does not change US policy toward our Adian Alliaa or our dateymination to auppogt than but does prove tho amyhaaia in Qommuniat ideology on armed aggression and arma development at tho expound of that could be taken to advanoa the wall-being of the people o Strengthen Haatarn Alliances 1n Aaia Tho foresee- able impagt or a cooauniat Chinese nuclear capability pro Vidaa now urgency to strengthen tho political economic - and military aspects of our Asian Alliances Peripheral Ania ia going to oxparianoa donaiderahly greater stresses and strains baroro the aad of this doaada than have been experienced in tho ragga and the United States should act now while oar military power in the area in atrahly superior Although this araa is not now susceptible to a NATO type or alliance the united atataa muat work for a solidarity of non communist that in considerably strongar than that whioh now exists Positive atop ahould bo-takan to insure that thago countries are not to nuclear blaclonail Mont bilateral Japan and multilateral 3 3 treatiea should be used as starting points aolidarity 6 Strengthen tho_pro-Naatarn Oriontation or anallianca Ihi task is 8 3 urgent as the above for certain of the noutraliat countries ogoupy important positions second only to thoao countries with which tho United States maintains apaoific allianpoa Those nations moat be brought into the Free world community primarily through political and economic actions 5 Develop ao Aotiva Atoms for Peace Tmograi in Iadia This taak ia in addition to the gonaral political-academia taakn outlined in abovo It ia important because of the position of India and Communist china amoag the under Om mmkmei-I m-qosmammwo dev310pad nationa at the world Both couattie aromattagptipg 34 ani- tb tl 53 53 3 53 3 ranid advancement the methods being amnloyed by India 1 fundamentally booed on Western philoaophy moat not appear 2 ea aecond boat throughout the world It koala be to the 3 Unitad Staten advantage if India unnamed a position or 4 leadership in Asia in the development or nuclear reactoro 5 for powering medical research etc India haa moderate 5 capabilitieo in the area'or nuclear technology which 7 could no increased hr US 3 f in the peaceful application of nuclear 9 knowledge Japaneae in this area 19 additional proof or the technological advancement of non- 1% communion Anion countries reaent and future teohnologi- 12 cal advanooa should be publicized within periphayal Ania 13 Full advantage of Japan's contribution y the peooeful 1 application or noolear knowledge anould be advertised 15 to anauro that tho Aeian world in koanly aware or Japan'c 15 and local leadership in this field In addition '17 it will be to tgo advantage cr the United States if Japan 18 remaino technologically allied to the Heat a Accelerate the over-all economic develognent of the' non-communistI under-devaloagd countriga This teak in inherant in cash of the tanks outlined above The Free world moat be able to show demonstrably that the Communist philosophy is not required for the economic acyclopnant 2% or a country In addition many scientgfic advances have 25 been forthcoming an a reault or the extenaion of tho pare- 35 matcre of knowledgo on the neonatal use or radioactive anbe 2 at ca Peoples of non-coununiat annoy-developed countries 33 should be educated on to how this technique could further 29 the economic atandardc or those nations in such fields as 30 medicine and agriculture '31 HIE loo-u-a Table i on file in Joint Secretariat sacaam' 13 Appandi HEGFET - h Geuee the uncemmitted pedgle to regeggiee communism 1 an beein threat tn their eeggrity and enhende hheir will 2 ta defend themselves egninet it The United States should 3 innuleete 1n the peeplee or the develaping eenntriea en a of their stake in the efforts of the Heat to 5 hleek the spread qr communism in order to gimme their 6 one will be defend themselves 7 i treng hen the internal non-eomhuniat 3 Aeien'netione These nations must net fell to communism 9 infougn internal subversion and insurgency conducted in 1d conaunetien with pressures from commie China eoebined ll programs are 12 requireg 13 a Exploit aim-soviet Differences Attempts should be made an to widen rirta in the relegione between 15 the USSR and China by both overt end newt-1 meane 15 Exploitation in the field 17 should be made to open any rirt'between the USSR and Game 13 munieg China to the end the Sovieye will realize the 19 implicit denser in a Chinese nueleer capability 2D the develepmant of Nth country nuclear mam capabilities in Aeie matter or policy the 22 united stetee ehould attempt to discourage the acquisition 23 or en indigeneue nuclear weapons capability by additional 24 nations in Asia Such a policy eheuld hp designed to 25 elevate the importance of the nuclear capability of the 25 united Stetee 1n the eree the policy should 27 show the dieedmentegee which will necrne when undeqeleped 28 eountriee nee enerce Sr other then the peaceful 29 scale or nuclear neaeereh earthen the United States should 39 attempt to heye any ys-Boviet agreement en cessatien at 31 nuclear testing extended to include other een tpiee 32 particularly Cqmmunlet Chine in arder to limit the develepn 33 ment or nuclear weaggne by other Seviet Bloc neuntriee 34 SECRET 11 Appendix wet-$25431 RE sens The United States should not adhere to such agreement unless Communist China encodes within reasonable Bering of tine l Esplsit the weakness of the Communist Regime The United states and selected Asian sllies ennuld undertake effective end coordinated clandestine activities utilising trained indigenous forces to exploit the weakness cf the Chinese Connunist regime snd to lessen its control within China The ultimate objective or these setitities unuld be ts reduce Chinese Communist power-end Prestige throughout Asia then tending to offset the prestige advantages scanning free the attainment of nualear sunshility 11 Hid mm period Approximately 1969-1964 to 1968-1910 The measures listed above nest he continued during the stresses and strains union will ocour arten the GHIOOMS obtain nuclear capability ihe following additional military objectives sheuldtte attained early in the perict nosevsr plans and pro- must be new s trengtnen the 08 nuclear cepebilit in_ s1s and the western teeific Thane is a requirement for demonstrable' deterrence that will sensinee the peripheral nations that the acquisition or unclean capability has not given the OHIGOHS a power advantage in Asia or the western Pnsitio eves During this period the United states H111 have a missile advantage this could be exploited through frequent- training exercises there US missile units support indigenous troops- US weapons storage rights should be acquired in talented Asian countries b strengthen the Air Defense cepsnilitg in the area A complete air defense system or the name type sennot be developed in Asia pnimssil$ becnuse of the technological and economic status or the countries concerned Pressures to equip each country with tee air defense missiles and einerert reqninsd for complete protecting but beyond the 15 Appendix 3'3333 31 3E 33 we couqtry'e ability to operate and maintain moat be avoided Rather a careful balance between indigenous and U3 capa- hility must be obtained in the aignifioant areas The CHICOH tapability during the later part of the period will 1 2 3 4 probably require increased errorta such as coordinated 5 regional air detanae organisatione in such areas an akinnwa - 6 South Korea - Japan nuc1ear air defenaa oapahilitiea may 7 be roqoired with eelaoted Asian cpugtriea manning the miaailae or aircraft while the United statea retaine eon- trol of nuclear components 10 o Strengthen the nonnuelear ogpabilitiea in the area 11 the GHIQOH conventional military oapahilitieq will almost 12 certainly continue to grow and will increasingly threaten 13 the nonoommunipt Asian periphery Thin oouroe of action 14 therefore includes defense o the peripheral nations 15 againat nonnuolear attack from either the CHIOUNS or oom- 16 muniat satellite as well as an effective indigenous aoantorr17 guerrilla capability 13 d Provide certain Selected Asian Alliga in the'irea 19 with a Potential nuclear gainer-r The provision 20 orla potential nuclear delivery oapabilitr imploding 21 missiles to selected allies will materially o faet the a Chineae Communist gain and will unhange the Free orid 23 position of strength in the area Such provision will 2a to with the united Statue retaining ooptrol or nuclear 25 componenta 1 26 12 Long-range period From 1963-1970 to well into the 27 1970 deoade This period characterized by a CHICD 'miauila- 23 nuclear capability will to tag moat difficult time for the 23 peripheral oountriee of Asia The nations initiated above an under both time periods moat be continued The following 31 additional objectives are required 16 q -qHEPP ndil Jose-he Ei 1- - mi - - as a 0 lets a coh siv silicone or allianc c will form the centBEJof resistance in the area is noted above the peripheral countries of Asia even those allied to the United States do not have now the capability of forming a cohesive alliance which will form an all Asian bulwark against Communist China Major steps in this direction must be taken during this decade if these countries are to survive Political economic and military solidarity must be achieved The United States should begin now to assist and guide the Asian nations in this direction b Strongthen'the US base complex in the area United States bases located in the Eastern Pacific and Asia should not be evacuated because of a direct missile threat posed by Communist china However the vulnerability of the base complex must to realistically assessed vis-a-vis the CHICOH missile capebility by the end or this decade Technological advances in mobility can be exploited to reduce the vulnerability of us forch in the ma As an example the security of US forces in the Far' aot could be increased by 1 Development or US possessions in the Western Pacific to provide depth and dispersal in militaxw l deployments 2 Development of additional based within Asian countries bound to each other and to the United States by alliances seem Appendix JOSH-142541 om-ammn-wmw This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu