ti 33B 961 7 ch-Z w I DONALD I KMNG 33696 THE COMMUNIST CHINESE THREAT ARHEADS AND DELIVERY VEHICLES 1 3b 1 - WI Him international Stddies Division Study Memorandum I7 u-w-u- A IDA Institute for Defense Analyses -- I q 3 II a Copy aon 90' copies IDA NO 63-1091 5 313 523DATA f7 MIC ENERGY c1 0 - Ila j'L This'docunant contains information affecting the national datenu of the titer Scetas within the eeaning of the Espionage Laws Title 18 u 3 Code Sections 793 and 794 the transeission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law EXCLUDED moms non DIR 5200 10 DOES NOT APPLY The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of IDA or of the Department of Defense Not to be quoted at length abstracted or repro- duced without the specific permission of the Institute for Defense nnalyses a ail 9 1113 warms-r amass mm mm mu mum minus um I- II 3 Id un nun o wHJ u Prepared in support of a a Department of Defense under Contract r of btembei- L13 1963 3k eff active 1 1 cl' 1 4 l A xi 3 7 9 INTERNATIONAL DIVISION FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES 1666 Connecticut Avanun N W Washington 9 D C Issued 'April 1963 31 d ud 1 The author Donald B Reeaing is an economist and Far Eastern specialist Before joining the Institute forpstanss Analyses he was with the Systems Analysis Office Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories where co-autlured'a of analytic studies on theater air power space research needs comand and control and other subjects He has also taught u d economics at Harvard University where he served on the staff of the Harvard Defense Studies Program and later as an associate of the Harvard Economic Research Project This paper was written in support of Study PACIFICA an analysis of the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power Study PACIFICA was prepared by the International Studies Division 1t- of IDA for the Department of Defense under Contract No SID-SD Task Order T-23 effective 1 July 1961 Brigadier General Sidney F Giffin USAF Ret was Study Leader canes E mo JR 2 Director International Studies Division 111 - a TA 1 _d_q ma -- Ind-I-a- -n ing-m 1 I cm I 'amrossnunscom On Soviet Support On the Gamma Econany and Foal 011 a China Chain of Policies for-Nuclur DevelopmentII Situation OF CHINESE WAR MW RHEJDNAL 123W Rang'aocu'uoo Whers I I Survivability Targeting CEP Yield and umbility Manned Vehicles vs 1113311 on momma Military Consi erations Production Considerations mums THE TIMING THE FIRST TEST a First Deliverable DeviceFirst 'I'hemonuclear Weapons Econanizing Nuclear Materials PRESENT PROMION EXPERIENCE AND-RED CAPABEHIES AND MEDIUM-RANGE EMISTIC HISSRES I xii a 0 4 J '19 my -- - 1cm TABLES SERIES meme OF INITIAL zoo-m am SERIES 01- mun-mm 5mm Human-mm 23 33 11 mm W RF M CAPHBLE OF a SOVIET EALLISTIC MISSILES as as 13 43 v SW An attempt is made to project into the futute Communist ina s nuclear capabilities in terms of warheads and delivery vehicles and to analyse Chinese nuclear requires-mu It is assumed that the Communist Chinese will accord high priority to advanced weapons programs but will receive nb signiticant Soviet help Intelligence is accepted to the effect that the Chinese are already engaged or are about to engage in production of plutonium by means of a nuclear reactor and that they have also had a chance to observe tests and assembly of Soviet short- and medium-range ballistic missiles on a test range in mine Nuclear stockpile projections are undertaken based in part on the assumption that effective operation of a Chinese mdtallic uranium facility began as early as January'lssl If Chinese nuclear programs have been delayed for one or several years by severe technical or econonic setbacks projec- tions of stockpiles and technical characteristics of weapons should allowing for this delay still be generally valid the us policy purposes it was necessary to give the Chinese the II benefit of the doubt to enable consideration of the more serious threats that China might pose without Soviet aisistance ix Lo An accompanying estimate of nuclear requirements from the Chinese point of View underscores the immensity of the technical problem for the Chinese For local and regional purposes Commu- nist Chira even when it acquires missiles will still require a manned-vehicle capability to offset targeting inadequacies and to compensate for the inaccuracy inherent in the early missiles The problon of attacking ships at sea will be particularly crest Even unhardened fixed land targets such as airfields will call for the use of thermonuclear rather than fissionpmissile warhead to offset moderate circular probable errors The ballistic missile requirement will be for range of at least 700 nautical miles and preferably 1 100 nautical miles which will permit flexible deployment against all the important bases and capital cities around the Chinese periphery Of particular importance to the Chinese will be concealment of missiles to prevent targeting by the United States The Communist 'hinese mus jump t1 operational missiles with ranges of as much as 6 000 nautizal mlles to threaten credibly the United States itself Intercontinental torces must be made survivable in the face of advanced future weapons and reconnais- sance systems Emplacement by the ninese cf any missiles with ranges of 2 000 nautical miles or mute will sutomstitaily thfhaten q the Soviet Union are The projections suggest the following timetable for Con-u- nist Chinese nuclear weapons program that enjoys high priority and that already has a favorable start hf Severe technical or oconanic ditfioultieetor e_deliberete lhuman-out would result in ayetematic little acceleretion of such I schedule appears poeeible with-0hr direct Soviet assistance After all stockpile ecquisitim aims 5 the eccmulation of production facilities for nuclear weapons and advances in warhead technology depend on reputed hut er tests Delivery vehicle is likely to prove even nope difficult and expensive for China then warhead developmenta In I - Chinese are likely to concentrate on ballistic missiles in Ihich case starting some time between 1966 and 1968 they could pro- bably have the capability to deploy a few nuclear-tipped medium range 700 to 1 100 NM ballistic missiles of their own manu- facture The threat would reach the vicinity of 100 fairly accurate supplemented by bombers in 1970 at the earliest ICBHs cannot be deployed by China until some time in the 1970s Apart from minor clandestine threats seaborne strategic systems are and unlikely A crude intercontinental aerody- namic threat is also unlikely unless an ICBM program encounters unforeseen difficulties xii n I INTRODUCTION PURPOSE AND SCOFE This discussion of the Communist Chinese nuclear thrust is I intended to supplement and complement existing national intelli- gence estimates intention is to retlect in addition to tho basic intelligence indications unoerlying considerations discussed only to a limited extent in the estimates These factors inoludo Chinese requirements for nuclear weapons systems nunorical pro- jections of the Chinese threat based on plausible assumptions -u I and key choices open to Chinese decision-makors The purpose is to summarize the evioence and reconstruct some of the basic Iconsiderations so that the reader can better judge for himself to suggest a relatively specific and quantified-picture of the threat I IONS On Soviet Support Assumptions regarding future level of Soviet support and assistance to Communist China are extremely important in defining i- IT the Chinese threat Except where otherwise stated the iolloe urup assumptions are made r a No new Soviet commitments to render large-scale technical EJt and economic assistance will be forthcoming 'i rede with the Soviet union in commodities important for Guneae industrialisation may continue Ho additional weapon systems adaptable for nuclear de- livery vi ll be supplied outright to the Cmaunist Chinese 9 Soviet assist 1lnce will not be renewed in the nuclear field and will not be extended in the missile eld On the Chinese Edam and Food Situation Withdrawal of Soviet technical assistance in 1960 and sulle- quent diminished deliveries of Soviet-built eminent have caused major setbacks to Chinese industrial and technical progress The agricultural or food and population situation moreover threatens to be chronically so precarious so severely to retard Chinese industrialization and military-nuclear develment over the next decade or lonoer Chinese economic troubles poee serious difficulties for estimators because it is extremely herd to dia- cern how much any particular high-priority effort such as the nuclear program has been set back For US policy W how If ever it is desirable to explore whether the us could handle 2 am most severe threats that China could pose without outside support- 2w This paper therefore assumes that the nuclear weapons procrae has 2 Egg been seriously set back by the general industrial breakdown f and food shortages Instead projections are based essentially a judgment of Chinese technical capabilities including addi- tions to these capabilities likely in the event that the indus- trial part of the economy resumes its expansion by the mid-605 Accordingly economic assumptions chosen for the present paper except where noted include the following a Chinese agriraJtural crises will not causeothe ruling 4 regime to set aside its nuclear ambitions nor lead tot a counterrevolution b The regime although not free from agricultural troubles for many years will bring the situation substantially under control By the mid-1960 China will begin to meet its agricultural needs c As a result industrial recovery will become effective by 1964-65 and thereafter the industrial sector of the economy will grow by significantly more than Sf-but usually not more than 10% a year I More severe economic difficulties would probably render in- feasible a number of the potential achievements discussed in the body of this paper 0n the Chinese Choice of Policies for Nuclear As a result of economic limitations the Communist Chinese have in the next few years a basic choice between policies which at the extreme are as follows a1 - a They can put their emphasis on the short run producing whatever nuclear-missile systems are possible starting in the 1960 Chinese industrial and agricultural capabilities will then still be woefully inadequate for giving a secure base to China as a nuclear power and the resulting unapons capabilities may he marginal In this case their other national goals will be set back including their conventional military capabilities their civil needs and possibly their long-run perform- ance in the nuclear-missile field b They can scale down short-run nuclear-missile efforts particularly production of equipment for operational use and divert the resources so saved into raising the general level of output and technology in industry and agriculture This choice means deferring systematic production of advanced weapons until the 1970e when I Chinese industrial and technical capabilities should be more developed Efforts on advanced weepons would be at the experimental ani prototype level An exception would I- 4 6 it as presumably occur in the production of fissionable- materials because stockpile growth is a cumulative process The adoption of this alternative policy would possibly produce over time a greater advance in the level of nuclear-missile technology In this paper the assumption is generally made that Conwmist I China will choose essentially the first policy Over the present decade such a course would offer the more serious threats and these should be weighed Where the resulting capabilities appear unequal to the intended military task however the Chinese will have good reasons not to undertake production and deployment of the systems in question In such instances the Communist Chinese will probably choose the second policy rather than the first production of nuclear materials and modern delivery means in China are heclouded even for the Chinese by many uncertainties small existing base of intelligence makes extrapOlation hazardous but technology sets strict limits on the outcome Despite uncertainties a quantified description of the threat with variants is necessary to develop the implications of a Chinese nuclear capability SECURITY LIMITATIONS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Presentation of the subject in this form precludes extende discussion of existing estimates Assistance from within the intelligence community has been 1 generously forthcoming The cooperation of the Central Intelli- gence Agency has been outstanding and has been supplemented by the excellent cooperation of experts from the Atomic Energy the Defense Atomic Support Agency the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research the United Stat-I Air Force and other agencies d We 6 II All or ems mm arm GENERAL I External objectives of Communist China that can be directly furthered through an early nuclear capability 1mMa 1 1 Security for the Chinese mainland 2 Consolidation of Communist power in China by the liberation of Taiwan 3 Enhancement of China's regional role through reduction of the power and influence of the United States in Ilia and the Western Pacific and through projection of Chinese influence in nearby areas 4 increased influence and prestige on the world scene and progress toward eventual superpower status Mastery of advanced weapons technology would also IppOIil strongly to feelings of national pride and thus have important internal advantage Anv sense of urgency which the Chinese may 1 For a more detailed treatment see Harold c Hinton - Columnist China's External Polio and Behavior MASSIFIED 1313 Hemora um No 13 MM Was i'ngton U 5 This PERM paper will be issued shortly J- a have with regard to their nuclear program would be reinforced by a fear that China might be permanently excluded from major nuclear- power status by an hmerican-Soviet deal or arms control agree- ment i In furtherance of their objectives the Communist Chinsea rab quire nuclear forces that are useful in the defense of the Chinese mainland capable of attacking the cities and forces of non-Communist nations in Asia capable of effective attack on US forces and military facilities in the Western Pacific and the Far East whether on their on bases or deployed to forward areas and capable in some future period of attacking the United States and other distant areas The Chinese require regional nuclear forces sufficient to impose caution and restraint on American non-nuclear operations and to decrease the attracriVAness to American forces of employing nuclear weapons in ituations involving China A walludeveloped regional capability could give the Chinese military advantages they now lack in some situations particularly in hostilities in- volving Korea or Taiwan and would permit a Chinese nuclear responsn to US nuclear attack Under special circumstances with sufficiently powerful fortes a Dre-emptiVE attack on US forces mioht be advantageous to China moron awaits 52222 The range remirements for attack on possible objectives are given in Table 11-1 on pages 11-12 at Corrmunist Chinese range requirements are relatively short for regional purposes and relatively long for pur- poses A minimum of 700 nautical miles range in necessary to make China a full-fledged regional nuclear power although haliI that distance would be useful against Taiwan Korea and the northernmost portion of Southeast Asia and in defenee of the Chinese mainland A nusnle of 00 range would reach not only Korea and Taiwan but also Okinawa and all Japan not to mntim Saigon Bangkok Manila Pangoon and New Delhi This renal mun I not Only suffice for almost all important peripheral targets but I would also give some flu i oility of deplOyment within China A range of 1 1 1 NH would advantageous--if it could be achieved I without substantial delay in the program-#0 cow-r additional peripheral targets and particularly to provide further flexibility of deployment At the other extreme a range of 5 000 to 6 000 3 would be necessary to constitute a serious threat to the United States and at least b 503 NM would be desirable Vehicles with range between 1 100 NM and 3 000 could only - be interpreted as designed for the against-the Soviet Union which ELL 9 a' Immr qua could be dare safely threatened as a byproduct of building-forces designed against the United Status This circumstance an oyeratlonai Icqpiremcnt to jump directly from the 1 100 NH range to the vicinity of 5 090 NM or moreraid 1t 41 an TABLE IIbl RANGE Approximate diatanoa in nautical mil-a from a roadhaad or railhaad in Communist China 2M Taiwan New Delhi from Tibet Vientiane -l orn -North 'mailand Korea Pusan 120-200 290-32 350-700 NH Okinawa Central Thailand Khorat Northern Japan Southern Japan Itazuki Saigon from Hainan Phnom Ponh New Delhi from Sinkiang Bangkok Manila Rangoon Central Japan Tokyo 700-1 100 NM r h Karachi Kuala Lumpur Svardlovak 1 040 Singapore 1 090 1 100-3l500 NH Guam Djakarta Moscow Adah Aleutian Leningrad Darwin Australia Anchorage Alaska Bonn Paris London 11 1k mm -r HT - i maud - 4P NM Honolulu 3 620 Seattle 3 890 Sydney 3 910 San Francisco 4 250 Los Angelss 4 540 Chicago 4 930 New York 5 200 washington 5 250 Miami 6 030 New Ybrk from Chungking 6 630 Buenns Aires 8 600 Number Depending on the tvpe of campaign Chinese nuclear Operations would require attack on approximately the follouing number of soft1 targets 1 Hostilities involving a specific locality such as Korea or Taiwan 5 to 25 2 A minimum counterforce operation against unprotected us delivery forces on fixed bases in the Western Pacific 15 3 Attack on all important fixed soft US military targets in the western Pacific and far East including those just man- tioned 60 At 4 missiles per target see discussion of require- ments beIow for 15 to as targets the Chinese requirement for attack on the above target system would be 60 to 340 missiles 1 In the sense of unhardened not underground or otherwise heavily protected against nuclear effects 12 a- Q Forces for use against hardened dispersed and mobile targets would be additional - Survivability In view of their nuclear inferiority and their exposure to overhead reconnaissance the Chinese are likely to consider con- cealment of missiles however difficult as mandatory They will I probably carry secrecy to great to prevent targeting of their nuclear capability Mobility would also be highly desir- able to facilitate concealment and add to the flexibility of and hence economy in Chinese nuclear striking forces Targeting --1 mainland the lands in its vicinity are aeong the most l- poorly mapped regions of the world There is no evidence that the Chinese have succeeded in obtaining geodetic and other data I needed for accurate location of targets With probable inaccu- racies at both ends of their trajectories early Chinese eissiles will be militarily useful only against very large fixed soft targets and even then their effectiveness will not be accurately predictable China will need manned vehicles that can seek their own targets for use against large soft targets when assurance of destruction is necessary and against hardened dispersed end u point targets at least until Chinese weapons and supporting systems begin to achieve real sophisticationu'Jb it-oh la I A second targeting problem stems from the need to be able to attack mobile targets in the Western Pacific Unless and until it acquire an adequate reconnaissance capability Communiat China'- 1 can only hope to meet this requirement in a minimal manner 61' the dual use or reconnaissance and bombardment of whatever bombers are available 25 1 field and Reliability Accuracy and reliability are further dlificult re iromanta for the Chinese A probable circular error oi as little as half a nautical mil would reduca the expected ditabling damage to only two thirds of tho aircraft-and structures Clearly a ballistic missile with such a small nar- head-uould be an inadequate ngional weapon except in very large numberq or exonpt with unrealistically high reliability and low CEP A thermonuclrar warhead of one-half megaton 500 KI on a missile with one nautical mile CEP and 60 per cent reliability il 5 3 431 - a I could be expected to destroy over 90 per cent of a soft air-base target system only it four missiles were prograened per target warheads adaptable in size and weight to botn aircraft and missile requirements will be found desirable by the Chinese'to- avoid separate warhead development programs for each type of I delivery system Manned Vehicles vs Missiles The Chinese will face a serious problem in trying to obtain fsvoreble military results from their possession of regional rnrnee because of the difficulty of making such forces surviv- able against a pre-emptive strike Targeting and other delivery problems will require the retention of a significant number of manned vehicles for many years even though such vehicles are difficult to conceal or otherwise protect whereas rigorous Chinese requirements for survivability appear to call for mobile ballistic missiles 15 m ua a aw fe Because of the vulnerability of manned vehicles the Chinese are likely to exaggerate their missile capability and to under- state their manned vehicle capability REQQIRENENTS There is thus far little or no evidence that the Communist Chinese see intercontinental nuclear forces as a priority objec- tive for the immediate future With even a primitive nuclear capability Communist China will be able to develop a minor capacity for direct attack-on the United States by means of nuclear mines short-range sneak sea- borne attacks on coastal cities and clandestine delivery During the period when the Chinese are unable to do more they may at least tacitly threaten the United States with such attacks The Chinese are unlikely to divert significant resourcss to developing a sea-based 'submarine or surface missile capability in view of the long lead time and high costs involved in obtain- ing-such a capability and its low utility in the face of US seapouer A credible nuclear-armed missile or airborne threat against the United States would require a range of at least 6 000 nautical miles preferably more and at a minimum -16 x 1 Either ballistic missiles with warheads of at least one megaton and a CEP not greater than 3 to NH for use against - metropolitan areas or crude ballistic or aerodynamic l l vehicles carrying large at least 10 MT warheads with a on -T the order of 25 to 100 miles for use in operations aimed at producing damage by fallout 2 The ability to absorb a first strike attack and or to prevent the United States and also probably the Soviet Union from locating the Chinese force accurately enough to permit an effective pre-emptive or preventive attack This latter require- ment means concealment and either mobility or hardening Rapid reaction would not necessarily be required Excavated storage sites in mountainous areas might be used to provide hardening at low cost 1 Missiles with a small would give greater assurance of i damage and as compared to aerodynamsc vehicles would be less subject to poet-launch attrition Sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missiles would also appeal to the Chinese love of prestige and would provide an important step into space technology For one type of vehicle or another the Chinese minimum re- quirement even if only for political purposes would hardly be less than about 100 missiles deliverable against the United i 17 BETA States Eventually the Chinese would probably went a missile force comparable numerically to those of the United States and the Soviet Union 1 There is clearly no logical limit to the Chinese need tor higher-yield warheads especially warheads for missiles just II there is no limit to the need to reduce CEP and to improve reliability Atomic demolition primarily a retardation device and enti- submarine deV1cee would appear to have little utility for China at Small battlefield types of weapons might be useiul to the Chinese but to a lesser extent than to the United Steele shone development of th $e weapons has been deai-ned to oom- late for smaller ground forcu 1 r Air defense nuclear armament would be of considerable utility to the Chinese auch armament could not houever be available for at least a decade by which time the Chinese mutt 1 estimate that the primary nuclear threat to China will be from 1a or ballistic missiles mus sgsin little priority is apt to be 14 given to the development of these weapons Space achievements are desirable as a matter of prestige and an 1 100 NH Mll would probably be used to launch the first small Chinese satellite ems or EARLY new For local and regional uses the Chinese will have reqpire- mi ments for both ballistic missiles and manned aircraft The manned vehicle capability to include-i reasible a small hunter-killer force appears necessary to offset targeting inadequacies as well as the lack of accuracy inherent in early Chinese missiles The ballistic missile requirement will be for ranges of at least 700 nautical miles and preferably 1 100 nautical miles 3 Missile forces should be movable preferably mobile and readily concealsble The specific compromise among yield re- liability numbers time and resource' requirements which the Chinese may adopt can only be surmised However a reasonable initial goal would include a of not over one nautical mile a yield on the order of 500 kilotons or more and an early in- ventory of not less than 60 weapons growing to at least 340 1 9 gunWhoa-ml NUCLEAR WARHBADS GENERAL EVIDENCE on the Communist Chinese atomic energy program is fragmentary and often indirect From available indications the history of the program appears to be as follows In the period 1950-55 Communist China engaged in preliminary preparations for a nuclear effort including prospecting for uranium with Soviet help the end of this period and the mainlaml noise also recruited about forty capable Chinese nuclear physicists true the Heat Chinese technical and industrial capabilities were still so low that independent quantity production of fissionable materials was out of the question The key Chinese decisions to start a full-scale military nuclear weapons program with as much Soviet assistance as could be obtained were apparently made in stages between 1955 and 1957 or possibly early 1958 In 1955 the Soviets publicly agreed to supply laboratory quantities of fissionabls materials and other assistance to research and in 1955-56 the Chinese drew up a - twelve-year plan for developing science and technology in which 21 me first mining of uranius began near 1 1' atomic energy was given first priority During the 1956-57 period Soviet cooperation apparently began on production of nuclear-weapons materials in China The late were marked by intensive high-priority Chinese efforts with reluctant SOViet assistance 0n the research front the Soviets provided a small five-to-ten megawatt nuclear reactor and other equip- ment They also trained Chinese scientific personnel in Soviet institutions including the Joint Institute for nuclear neeaarch at Dubne and helped launch an intensive study of nuclear physics in Chinese universities Information about the weapons progra- 1a much scantier but the Soviets apparently furnished teohnical advisers plans and certain equipment for various facilities-- uranium mines ore concentration plants at least one metallic uranium plant on which work started in 1957 and possibly small cascade for oralloy production 1 It is notwyet ulnar whether assistance was given on construction of one or more nuclear reactors for plutonium production or on facilities for chemical separation of plutonium Several uranium mines have been identified but no ore is believed to have been shipped to the USSR The'quantity and 1 A cascade or gaseous-diffusion plant is safacility for raising the proportion in uranium of the fissionabte isotope u-ass Oralloy which is uranium with a high proportion of the isotope 0-235 and plutonium are the pxincipel fissionabla materials fnoe_ which nuclear weapons can be madequality of ore mined is not known with accuracy Available sui- dance is consistent with the accumulation by mid-1962 of the equivalent of several hundred tons of metallic uranium probably I 11 less than two thousand tons From about the second half of 1956 there use a subtle change in the Chinese propaganda line on modern weapons and war In ay 1958 came the first public statement in an article by the air force chief 1 that in the future the Chinese would have nuclear weapons Rumors and reports of related busy activity also pointed to a large-scale nuclear effort In these years there ales abundant evidence much of it between the lines in public state- manta of friction between the two Columnist polars related to I Soviet reluctance to see the Chinese armed with nuclear vsepons I - Some observers suspect that Soviet assistance was not only our- tailed but also designed to limit the Chinese program I In 1959 photographs were made of a long unidentified build- ing in Lanchow near two major hydroelectric projects that offer' a prospective future electric power surplus The building is a slim rectangle in the shape of one half of a Soviet U-ahaped L5 gaseous diffusion plant cascade for uranium isotope sepaletion Er 1 Liu Ya-lou Seriously Study Mao Tee-tung's Military 1 2 Thinking Liberation Arm News r May 23rd 1958 Cf I Leonard Hashim 1e Spread of Nuclear Hume - London 1962 p 133 at 23 11 31 - if humahuu 1 - although some experts say the resemblance to Soviet facilities is not close An ample industrial water supply and a railroad spur that does not come right up to the building add to the indica- tions that this might be an incomplete cascade Poeer lines did not appear to be installed in 1959 As of early 1962 power lines were still not constructed and the Yenkou Dam upriver although complete was not yet producing electric poeer com- parisons with 1959 suggested that construction was abandoned or suspended in 1960 The only advance had been in finishing the roof and the site appeared inactive Of course there is a possibility that this plant was in- tended as a more innocent industrial facility If the building were the start of a cascade it would be a small one a sort of pilot plant Ean with another similar building added the re- suiting complev could use little more than one third of the 995 an capacity which was planned to be installed at Yenkou and would produce only a handful of nuclear weapons a year There appears to be room at the site for no more than two additional shrilar buildings without major modifications of the surround- ings A facility of this size would nut account for the 1 050 MW of electric power to be installed in a few years at the large nearby Liuchia Gorge dam 2d lit-I etc H The Soviet withdrawal of technicians in mid-1960 seems to have included those in the Chinese atomic energy program The official Communist Chinese line or the military value of ueapone and men reverted for some months to a pre-1956 note Then in November 1960 at the Moscow Conference of Communist parties the number two Chinese Communist leader Liu declared a that Chine would have nuclear weapons in the near future and said that China already had four reactors capable of producing plutonium an ambiguous statement that could have referred to known research reactors which are too small to produce quantities sufficient for ueaponsl Premier Chou En-lai in a September 1951 interview with Field Marshal Montgomery reiterated China's in tention to obtain nuclear weapons but implied that the nuclear timetable had been extended to accommodate other pressing needs of China Japanese and other newspaper stories pointing to sisable plutonium accumulation from China's small research reactors in- cluding the one in Peiping do not correspond to other evidence Research experiments reported in the Chinese technical literature _ as having been made with the Peiping reactor are incompatible with 1 Liu Shac-ch'i is Chairman of the People's Republic of China and second to Mao as Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Chou En-lai ranks third in the top party organization and partv protocol 25 If fig 9 7 L 5 - I 1 NFI Iwud cm I i its Operation for a significant output of weapons-grede plutonium There is however indirect evidence of possible plutonium pro- duction on a much larger scale than these unclassified reports would suggest I 9 The most indications points to the probable operation from early 1961 and possibly from mid 1960 but with serious delays and difficulties of a plant for producing metallic uranium the exact site of which has not been pinpointed This plant is believed to have been built starting in 1956-57 with Soviet help and is believed to heve been almost complete at the time of the withdrawal of technicians The-plant presumably is now turning out uranium slugs for use in a reactor or reactors for producing plutonium By correlating these fragments of information with the known mining and ore-concen- trating activities and by making assumptions regarding the plant's capscity--probably not much over one ton of metallic uranium output a day--it is possible to guess that by mid-1962 China had processed several hundred tons Br metallic uranium perhaps 500 tons but probably less than 1 000 tons A major uncertainty stems from the failure to locate a plutonium-producing facility or to obtain positive evidence of its existence Presumably the Chinese have taken great pains to hide the reactor and its associated plutonium-separation complex 26 5 In view of the Chinese need for concealment and eecrecy to avoid being targeted and of the apparent existence of a uranium metals plant a reactor may be assumed to be in existence and probably already in operation This assumption eakea it poaaibla to estimate the timing of the first Chinese nuclear teat on the basis of production of the metallic uranium plant and of other countries' experience 1 CHOICES 0N FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION The principal choice in fissionable materiala production is whether to produce-plutonium oralloy Lp 23 73 or hoth Pluto- 1 nium is produced from natural uranium through bombardment of u-ase with neutrons usually in a nuclear reactor The production pro- blen for oralloy and lesser degrees of enriched uranium in one of separating u-235 from the common isotope u-23ag3 the two iaotopes differ for purposes of separation only in characteristics relat- ing to their different mass - 22i2%i I I 1 See below pp 34-39 uf 2 u-233 is also fissionable but its co-produet 0-232 haa undesirably heavy radiation emission making 0-233 for practical purposes an inferior weapons material 3 The concentration of u-235 in natural uranium in only 1 140th or 0 714% Oralloy with 93 5% -235 in known up top product Any uranium in which the proportion of 0-235 has been raised is considered enriched 27 1 Eu Ai il AI I I Military Considerations Apart from fabrication and handling difficulties plutonium is a little better than orallcy in most military urns pornitting a greatnr degree of miniaturization for a devicc of a givcn yilld Clear plutonium that is plutonium containing vcry littln of the undosirablo isotope is better than in almost all respects but is expensive The content of plutonium incrnases so that the nualitv with tho pnriod of irradiation in producing the plutonium within a reactor--hut tho longer the irradiation porior the less is pluto- nium A compromise is thus notassary between purity and low cost Puw240 has thn'effeot of increasing the neutron radiation background mzltiplving ptablens of safety and the likllihocd of itiation whioh can greatly loulr yoildpredetonntion prei -- a 17 - -- if - ed uranarnm- mriied as to be oralloyu not so is nocesaary t a military nuclear program for at lnast tho_ it relativelv a-pbiatioanqi parposes first to pcrmitboonting1 of fission weapgns ty making pcssible the production of significant quantities of trinilm and second to permit the construction of l Pocsting refers to injecting a gas mixture of duuterium and tritium 1n the core of an implosion devicc 28 ouhmerinoe Plutonium-fueled reactors are impractical and sent extremely difficult problems nf must be produced in a reactor fueled by-enriched uranium because the lithium used for tritium production poisons the reeotion and makes use of natural uranium imprecticll Enrichod rlntui irr also permit more economical production of plutonium Without ooat n9 ouever the Chinese will be reatrictod 7% to lower yields for a given weight For thin reaaon'it not for I othcra they will probably want to ado production of enriched uranium if not oralloy early in their program Production Considerations Large-scale plutonium production although baliavod by linear acceleration is accomplished in the uaapona - of the United States Great Britain the Soviet Union and France by means-of relatively large--and occasionally entremaly large-- reactors which may be fueled by natural uranium or by a combina- tion of natural and enriched uranium quantity production of plutonium may be attained with reactors having thermal outputs of 100 to SSO-megawatts the largest reactor exceed 1 000 MW thermal power The US cost of plutonium of which the coat of the metallic uranium reactor fuel is a large proportion is on the l I l' - per kilogram depending on quality - l I-h Bienni omcadncn ciae Oralloy and enriched uranium in general is produced in the 11% United States United Kingdom and Soviet Union in gaseous dif- I fusion plants cascades The French having decided that pluto- nium was an easier material with which to start have not yet moved into oralloy production They have however spent nearly one billion dollars on their first caacede without as yet putting the plant into production When the United States first started to produce orelloy in 1944 the atomic-energy program used two other processes relying mainly on the electromagnetic or mass spectrographic process daseous diffusion which started Opere- tions in 1945 proved to be much less expensive and the other methods were dropped For financial reasons other possible pro- cesses of uranium-isotope separation have also been rejected Among these the centrifuge process has been subsequently developed by the West Germans The security classification on related re- search has been reinstituted by the United States although for large-scale production the centrifuge process is not yet competi- tive with gaseous diffusion A great deal of information on reactor technology applic- able to plutonium production has long been available in the unclassified technical literature including the design of 150 to 300 an reactors for electric power production and the Chinese since 1958 have had some experience operating small reactors 31 9'1 rst - I supplied by the Soviets Plutonium production is therefore pre- sumably something the Chinese will be able to master difficulties should prove only moderate and should center on details of engineering and execution Technical problems with a reactor include producing uranium and graphite of high purity designing and operating the reactor and separating the plutonium afterward The latter is a major chemical engineering project that gave the French some diffi- culties Because plutonium is radioactive high1y toxic starts fires and can cause explosions plutonium separation and weapon fabrication must be remote-eonrro11ed It is an interesting commentary on the economic conditions in different countries that in the United States oralloy is con- siderably cheaper for a given fission yield all things considered than plutonium US oralloy costs kilogram n the Soviet Union oraiioy is likewise produced in larger quantity and is believed to be cheaper than plutonium In countries such as Chins however the reverse is likely to lg be true because oralloy production E-ZSS separation is likely to be extremely difficult and expensive Every method of producing oralloy or enriched uranium is essentially a brute-force method relying on the repetition thousands of times of processes each of which has a very small - - - - 32 will Ina 1 1 1 'h capacity for increasing the percentage of -235 The engineer- ing whether in a cascade or vith an array of centrifuges is of a nature with extremely demanding manufacturing tolerances In a cascade the highly corrosive gas uranium hexa- flhoride is pumped into several thousand chambers or stagei in each of which it is forced through a fine metallic membrane whicha r 1_ I ideally allows only individual molecules to pass This system requires thousands of huge compressors and other special machines with rotors and other parts coated with nickel or aluminum against the corrosive gas The mp-lent plumbing includes special seaie Total electric power consumed by the three US cascades today is approximately equal to the electric power produced in China ny comparison the large plutonium reactor complex at Hanford Washington requires about one eighth as much electric power as a single 05 cascade and such a complex can furnish the thermal power for its own electric needs 1n general centrifuges present equal or even greater- engineering difficulties than cascades and involve higher capital costs but they could save on operating costs A US centrifuge plant designed in the 1940s but never built would have had 30 000 individual centrifuges connected by a complex system of pipes and valves The design of a centrifuge involves serious alloy and rotor design problems connected with the high speed of rotation 33 - asf' 04 1 9 0-34 I - 2 J ll I 1 1 11 - Mmmug-t The first usa cede and its additions and successors are still a tribute to us engineering skill In view of these considerations and of Chinese shortages of engineers technicians and skilled manual 1abor -it is generally expected that China will put emphasis on the use of plutonium rather than oralloy for weapons morons INFLUENCIN-Z- THE mama 0 THE FIRST res Most estimates assume that the first fianionable material produced by China in testable qoantity will be plutonium and that it is likely to be produced in a reactor or raaotora fueled with natural uraniun presumably with metallic uranium slug from the metals plant that probably began operating about January 1961 IA The process of plutonium production starts with producing enough metallic uranium for a reactor 100 to 200 tons loading the re actor getting it to go critical and then raising it to full power the last of ehich can takeseveral months the first time uvenium is irradiated for several more months by mutrcne produced within the pile Then the reactor is shut down much of the fuel is rmnoved and the slugs are cooled for 60 to 30 days to reduce radioactivity Finally the processing of the im- dieted uranium begins in a plutonium-separation plant that prod hably is capable of processing each day no more than one or 139' I tons of Lhe uranium from the pile me processing of- ii-nir- should yield nil I of plutoniua required for a single nuclear test Then the plutonium must be fabricated into a nuclear device The allowable cooking time and therefore the quantity of plutonium obtained from one batch of uranium is limited as already suggested by the fact that as time goes on sane of the plutonium is converted into undesirable isotope p1utoniun-240 From the time concentrated ore arrives at the uranius metals plant up to the point of obta ming enough plutonium for one test the entire process described above is likely to take anywhere 1' from 18 to 30 months or more depending on 1 the sire of the reactor and capacity of the ursniwn Metal and plutonium- 35 - FL Wd m dkk m IA separation plants 2 irradiation time in the reactor and 3 the degree of difficulty experienced in producing uranium metal of the reguisite puritv and in operating the reactor and plutonium-separation plant for the first time Numerous possi- bilities exist for a delay of the program notably at a result of accidents and errors Assuming that the Chinese 1 use metallic uranium produced beginning as far back as early 1961 2 build a reactor of about 200 MW thermal power requiring about 200 tons of uranium 3 aim at an early buildup of their military stockpile at the expense of retarding the first test and 4 experience diffi- culties comparable to those of the French the production period is likely to be 24 to 30 months Thus plutonium for the first test could become available between January and July of 1963 The date would be later if the metals plant had a lot of down time or produced an inferior product in early 1961 or if operat- ing difficulties exceeded those of the French either for lack of technical expertise or because of the general economic crisis in China How long the Chinese having the plutonium would then re- quire to fabricate a device and explode it in an instrumented test depends on outside help received if any the extent of Communist Chinese familiarity with United States Soviet British 36 MIA and French tests weapons and calculations and Chinese fabri- cation difficulties with plutonium The resulting delay caused by fabrication time could be from 3 to 12 months This gives a spread for the first test assuming 24 to 30 months for the pro- ne indi- cated operating difficulties and accidente could cause further ductinn of plutonium of from April 1963 to July 1964 delays economic difficulties have probably done so already On the other hand the Chinese might hurry the first teetl in a special effort to obtain an early propaganda vehicle Assuming that the Chinese had no technical difficulties uhatever knew how to fabricate a device did in fact put their metals plant into effective Operation in January 1961 and hurried to achieve early propaganda benefits at some possible expense to the accumulation of a stockpile the first test could have taken place as early as 21 months after January 1961 that is by October 1962 At the other extreme if the metals plant has not been operating effectively and in view of economic difficulties this test could be delayed by as long as several years Most US experts feel that the Chinese program has probably already slipped at least one year compared to an early 1963 schedule based on technical feasibility 1 3 9 by irradiating the pile only long enough on the first cycle to produce plutonium for one test 13 It is important to note that the and timing 9 the 329 buildup of the Chinese stockpile depend only in a minor was on whether the first test is in 1963 or in 1964 or even 1965 Assuming that the metals plant has in fact operated since 1951 the later the first nuclear explosion the more rapid is likely to be the subsequent accumulation of a stockpile and the closer the second test is likely to be to the first especially if the delay_ is nOt caused by faulty basic design of production facilities It the Chinese drive toward an early stockpile and although experiendi ing few technical difficulties do not conduct their first test until late 1963 or 1964 they could be testing two or three other devices within six months after the first If they do not hurry for propaganda purposes their plutonium-production cycle could be such that plutonium production becomes virtually continuoua 1 except for down time caused by accidents end other troubles starting with the plutonium for the first device Thus estimates of the timing of the first test are somewhat independent of stock- pile esrimates which depend instead on the program for setting up production facilities for plutonium and oralloy 1t is interesting to uuapare the prospective Chinese lead a n 3 time for joining the nuclear club l with those of other nuclear - 1 That is no sooner is the reactor unloaded for the cool- ing of the irradiated pile than another pile is loaded and made ijF' to go critical and plutonium separation facilities are kept steadily at work in 38 Tl powers Presumably the Chinese decision to produce nuclear weapons was made about 1956 and intensive efforts on construc- tion or facilities began in late 1957 or 1958 at the latest Chinese industrial capabilities however were more spotty and backward at that time than those of any previous nuclear power If the first Chinese test takes place as early as 1963 this will represent a lead time of approximately six years based on_the period of full-scale effort By comparison the French achieved a first test five and one-half years after beginning a plutonium production program that had already been authorised two years earlier and four and one-half years after the decision to enlarge and accelerate the program with military funds ihe Soviet Union and the United States both had crash programs that took a little under four years 1 WEAPONS DESIGN TECHNOLOGY First Deliverable Device The prevailing estimate is that the first deliverable Chinese nuclear weapon will be a crude six- to ten-thousand-pound fission device based on a plutonium-implosion system On military 1 This assumes that the Soviet crash program dates from shortly after the Aobombing of Hiroshima in 19 s Some progress - had been made prior to 1941 the Soviet nuclear effort was apparently downgraded when the Germans gave up their high-priority effort in 1941 See Arnold Kramish Atomic Shaggy in the Soviet Union Stanford 1959 I - 39 I A powerful argument can therefore be advanced that tho Chinese will try to jump straight to a LBW-pound plutoniu- implosion devico starting with the firet nuclear tent Any effort on a b 339-pouna bomb for which there wee no adequate delivery means would bo unnec9 sarily wasteful of Icientifio and enginhering skills Ther is also good reason to believe that having exper1mented exten 1vp1y baforehand with non-nuclear exi plosivs in relation to implosion techniqpes the Chinese could -L i achieve an initIal weapon of the lighter weight without severe a doLay to their warhead development program A deliverable 2 500- 1b devicn might be available within one to two years after tho 40 E- IMF first successful Chinese nuclesr test However the Columnist Chinese msy choose to conduct sn esrlisr test with larger de- vice es sE physics experiment politicsl gesture end conservative but sursr means of reaching the miles Height The same 2 500-pound device should be with only es- modifications of serving as wsrhesd for tho realitie- rsnge ballistic missiles @3437 the Chinese are trying to build and as ready made primer for conducting'ths nuclesr tests necessary for the development of menu-molar ver- which would presumably be the next big step 3 First Thermonuclesr Weapons The problem of developing reopens is of quite different order than the problem of producing stomic usspons which is largely an industrial question The stonic-to- thermonuclear problem is largely question of sc isntific and technical imagination end it would be dangerous to on the ides that people such as the Chinese were lsckihgdn I imsginstive power or in scientific talents 41 - - - was me sl' e scams A still current estimate suggests that the Chinese will not be able to attain deliverable thermonuclear 7'ueepons until about 1970 but this estimate should probably be revised in the direction of shortening the required time Most experts seem to feel that the problem is not excessively difficult and should be soluble within five or six years of the first atosic test Thus 1969 appears a feasible date assuming a first fission test in 1963 or 1964 Advancement toward a thermonuclear capability must proceed in steps each of which requires at least one and probably several nuclear tests The Chinese shonld be able to take an initial fission device such as the 2 500-podnd device just mentioned and use it as the primary in a series of experiments designed to obtain information on radiation flow temperatures pressures casing materials secondary behavior and other aspects of thereo- nuclear design For such tests it would be desirable to have highly sophisticated instruments but up to a point mathematical computations and a trial and error procedure with more numerOus tests can be uscd as a substitute for good instrumentation Information relevant to TN design can be gathered as by- product of any nuclear test if the Chinese can produce the instrumentation The first tests specifically aimed at a thermo- nuclear device would probably involve a mockup of the secondary 42 with measuring devices attached to record such items as compres- sion and temperatures For all these tests the Chinese would he advantaged if they fully understood the behavior of their primary One interesting facet of the problem is the possibility that the Chinese intelligence services could get hold 0 TN-ueapon designs from any of the four nations that by then should be i thermonuclear -owers ' The results of I even on good it is the Chinese will be considerably helped by their knoaiedqe- of the shapes and approximate weights of US warheads This can be steel might save two years' experimentation ls obtained from publicly available sources Such information can be 6 supplemented by covert Operations in which the Chinese doubtless 3- k attain some success in Europe if not in the pnited States 43 I ll- when a thermonuclear device is developed for use with the earliest primary it could be delivered by Badger or Bull Again 2 I however the emphasis will probably be on producing I Miller thermonuclear warhead suitable for delivery I Economieing Nucleer Materials Something has already been said on the problems of convert- ing weights of plutonium orelloy or combinations of the two 1n o nuclear weapons Underlying considerations include the follouing 13 1 Tamping refers to surrounding the fissioneble miterisi within neutron-reflecting substance such as depleted natural uren um 45 d This will have the result of accelersting the effective growth of the stockpile compared to the figures shown in the tables STOCKPILE PROJECTIONS Plutonium Production is suggested above stockpile projections may he made with little reference to the date of the first nuclear detonstion assunihg that Chinese uranium metals plants and plutonium pro- ducing facilities are adequately designed The sise end nature of the program for setting up production facilities for plutonioe and oralloy are most important for stockpile purposes Of course some types of delays in the Chinese program-could en- force a time lag of one or more years on othereise valid stock- pile projections The experiences of other countries suggest that the scale of the initial plutonium effort will be a reactor at 150- to 200-HH thermal power unless a pioneer loo-MW reactor is built to hurry the first test explosion 47 cl new iug_agm lunt I 4 The first four nuclear powers all started serious production of plutonium for weapons with reactors in the 150- to 220-HH thermal power range 1 On this basis it is reasonable to suppose that the Chinese will start near this range probably close to 200 MW and that they will serialize the design long enough to build several that can utilize the experience of the first Power output of the basic reactor should improve with experience Perhaps some years from now the Chinese will jump to a large re- actor on the order of 1 000 to 2 000 MW but there is no pressing reason for doing so until they becone very sophisticated possess enriched uranium and seek to economize by way of a new investment l The French started with a small reactor Gal which achieved only 30 MW and then junme to a second 6-2 at 200 Iii and a third 6-3 that was a cop of the aeoond Tha copy wes a under construction long before original went critical and was phased into production about 18 months after its twin The British who pooled nuclear information with the US have built a series of some ten plutonium-producing reactors in the 180- ton soc-nu range power output improves with experience all more or less identical to the first one The us series of reactors at Hanford has included some monsters of over 1 000 MW but the first was in the same medium-sized range after a l-HH'model to demonstrate the method and the initial Soviet experience was also in this range #0 39 assuming an initial reactor in the 100- to ZED-HM range followed by a series of similar reactors it is possible to arrive at numerical stockpile projections For this purpose 1 January 1961 will again be taken as the approximate date on which the d Communist Chinese uranium metals plant began to produce slugs suitable for use in a reactor As a first estimate it will be assumed that the Chinese are able to design and build a reactor of 200-HW thermal power that a second similar reactor will be built and put into operation two years after the first and after that new reactors of the same size will be introduced at a rate of one each year This would of course imply a matching buildup of uranium mining 1 metallic uranium output and plutonium separation Accompanying I tions must be made regarding the rate of improvement in reactor power levels for this one design the test schedule the amount of down time in the process for which 25% reduction in output will be allowed the timing of the production process and so on The results are shown in Tab1e It must be remembered 1 that any oralloy production would add to the warhead stockpile I The projection is carried to the beginning of 1970 by which thee 511 seven reactors are assumed to be in operation 1 There is probably no serious limitation on the natural uranium available in China but the remote location of'moat mining r areas could impose high costs in terms of investment and_trans- portation 49 id- TRBLE 0m 1m 91mm mm AWN F - Assumetions 1 First test occurs about the end of 1963 2 Reactor construction schedule is as shown in text c349 first reactor goes critical December 1961 the next two years later then one per year until December 1969 rel 3 Power level of reactors rises 33-1 HH per year after late 1963 By end of 1969 all reactors are operating at no-Mn thermal power Each new reactor falls 45 ea short of current power output of older reactors its first time in operation 4 Reactors operate on equivalent of nine-month cycle in- eluding six months for irradiating time The first reactor's first cycle requires an extra three months rf'i'f for learning time I 0 5 After discharge from reactor an average of eight months is required for separation of plutonium and fabrication into weapons 6 Fabrication of deliverable weapons starts in second quarter of 1964 If Chinese must wait longer for an I acceptable design they would of course be temporarily limited to accumulation of plutonium 1 7 Output determined by assunptions above is reduced 25% 1 to allow for technical difficulties and accidents 9 Large number of tests is made as shown to accelerate weapons technology a u Some observers may consider this an unrealistically rapid buildup It is accordingly labeled moderately fast and slower lI alternatives are oifered In considering this schedule however it must be remembered that technical and economic delays might I lull cause as much as a two- or three-year lag in the dates in which case the Chinese might be hurrying to retrieve the lost ground A second estimate'is made by assuming that the initial re- actor pile is only 100 MW A design level of is achieved the second time the reactor is Operated A similar reactor is again put in operation two years after the first but this time new reactors are added every 18 months rather than every year and they continue to be of this smaller type the other tions are identical By 19 0 five reactors are in operation rather than seven 5 Together these two projections furnish a moderately tast'I and a moderately slow picture For those are extremely skeptical of Chinese industrial capabilities the Con-unist Chinese priority on nuclear weapons or the emphasis on plutoniua a third series is appended in Table based on only two re- actors of ISO-MW design the first produced 100 MN on the first cycle with no follow-0n The same brisk pattern of tests is still assumed 52 uh IV 39 Lu TABLE PLUTONIUH INPUT AND 8 used whereby - Oralloy Froduccion Chinese production of plutonium will presumably be supple- menth at some point perhaps already in the late by pro- duction of oralloy The most llKeLy guess is that China like the other nuclear powers will build a gaseous diffusion plant The Chinese may already have been assisted in cascade technology by the Soviets in the 1956-60 period If the building seen in is the start of a small cascade the Soviets must have given some help probably including the design of the basic machinery I There are two approaches to estimating future Chinese oralloy production to assume that the first production will 54 In each of the tables as already indicated a conversion is ll I1 I - reg come from the building at Lanchow or to compare other countries' experiences and make an irIieperIient projection of what the Comunist Chinese might reasonably be expected to do the present facility at Lanchow if a cascade and if and when machinery is put in place order the roof should utilise only 50 to 100 MW of electrical power probably 75 depending on the technology a figure that may be calipered to the more than 2 000 for a US gaseous diffusion plant Is noted hydroelectric projects not yet complete would provide on unexplained future pct-er surplus that could reach an eventual level of as much as 1 000 MW well in excess of know require- ments in the Lanchoe area If the unidentified building was intended as conplete cascade with very small-sized machinery it can be tinted on the basis of the roof area that operated at an efficiency com- parable to what the Soviets achieved with thirfirst J cascade the plant might produce 3 1 sucoeesful oralloy a year An alternative assunption would be the plant is or was intended to provide enriched uraniun for re- actor use including tritium production The oralloy requirement for a single nuclear weapon depend- 55 increment to the Chinese stockpile by operating a caecade of the apparent size of this plant is only in the range of_ 3 weapons a year depending on the efficiency achieved The exist- 1 inc plant area could also be used to take uranium halfway throuqh the separation piocres to obtain a product enriched about tone or it a year a quantity that would have about double the total U-235 content of the oralloy that could'be perhaps produced If it were not for the space difficulty one similar build- ing could eventually be added each year Thie is the say 6 cat- cades have developed the first one at Oak Ridge started with about one-tenth of its present electric pceer input The Lanchow plant whatever its purpose has not been com- pleted or put into operation As already auggeated a cascade puts a heavy burden on the machine-building industriea Possible explanations for the halt or delay of the work include the with drawsl of Sov1Pt technical assistance deliberately insufficient Soviet help at the beginning reevnr industrial setbacks caused by the food crisis increased priority of agriculture aa opposed to heavy industry delays caused by possible Chinese inability to 53 manufacture the tequ151te machinery as yet or a decision to con i centrare on plutonium instead H 56 L I 55 0 1 un-u- The Chinese assuming they are producing plutonium may be in no hurry to obtain oralloy In this case whether they add to a small pilot at Lanchoe or build a nee one does not matter much In relation to the stockpile obtainable with pluto- nium alone a handful of extra weapons due to oralloy will 't basically change the stockpile picture already presented Orallo will have a profound impact on the stockpile situation only en yearly production is sufficient to fabricate atone-or hundr cascade than could be housed in or around the building photographed I I of nuclear weapons and this will require a much larger in Lanchow large a cascade might the Chinese build and with what weapons output The first us and Soviet cascades utilis d 200 to 250 MW of electric power This is perhaps a useful scale to con- sider If the'Chinese experimented before building a plant to vl '41 improve and check their technology they might be able to start a - serious production program at a technical efficiency yielding - 3 3-1-- of electricity ecomieing -- 1 2 I i for a production plant of 200 MW would be about gig-cg a 4 i Inc - lfr h fa - - did capacity can be expressed in terns of the additional megawatts of electric power required uhich 57 i ti e l 1 pun ans A handful of extra tests would probably be undertaken re- ducing the stockpile increment corres-- - -l a I Other variants could be postulated but faster schedules would not accelerate stockpile grolth much until efter_ 970 ' results of combining this oralloy schedule with the three The plutoniLm in Table production schedules already sheen are summarised below The extremely slow all-plutonium varihnt is omitted because there seems to be little reason for the Chinese to build two plutonium reactors in the first half of the 1960s _ amidst an economic crisis and then not expend production in some way later The two slower plutonium schedules shown earlier are combined below not with the oralloy schedule shown in Thble 11183 but witl the same schedule lagged one year Thus only in the first variant does the oralloy production schedule have substantial effect on the outcome The last four varients ere all modereted'in one any or another to show the range within which the progrem might be slowed down compared to the first variant Attention is 59 7 Jul 4' I W u again drawn to the possibility that stockpile acquisition would take place at one or another rate but that tho cntiro och-dull would be shifted back one or more yours by technical and economic difficulties TABLE Table Inns is appended to show in more detail tho deriva- tion of 111-4 an i 0n the basis of such calculations it appears unlikely Ehar China relying on its own resources am cI i- I u b would emulate a Stockpile of as many as one hundred upon without the world's obfaining four or five years' notice that program is achieving successes 7 Inter 1' 3 IOTA 1 11 Results of Combinin Hoderatel Fast Plutonim Production - - Eh - mlm m q B Results Orallo Production awn in Table w 1 r The Fallowing key points can bc poutulatcd on chart 91 4 Chinese nuclear progress The dates urn only approximations 'g could be systematic delays of on or sort yeara'in all '3 i dates due to nines economic a technical difficulties I I 1 Any degree of slowing down or stretching out of the pro- '1 I gram is technically possible mp-uyamcxu- ur - m 5 til r 31 11 stand um 33 3 531 rmi-l It to V a pl- in 5 i if in 'u'rt'm- 71 I a 72 v 4 Hi a a 1 Ln 3I-L a u- 401- - 1 1T - 4 77 M a in 1 in - aw lo I I A II no as it be 6 Lu 1 Ma a esx' -suu-u k Impending production of an improved type of submarine was reported in 1960 but did not materialize after the withdrawal of Soviet technical personnel f3 '91 a No Chinese work with naval missiles of any kind has been re- ported The possibility exists but is relatively slight that the Soviets would furnish either cruise missiles or the design specifications for czuise missiles that can be launched from modified present submarines Chinese independent development of a submarine-launched cruise or ballistic missile could scarcely be achieved before the 19705 and the cost in scarce resources I would adversely affect other advanced weapons programs As can be seen by their displacement the Nucleus vessels now built in Communist China are not large submarines i By way of comparison b9 nuclear submarines are between 2 300 and 7 000 tons displacement while those carrying Polaris are in the 5 400 to 7 000 ron range with shilyards and construction perienee already acquired the Chinese should be able to build larger vessels on their own within perhaps three or four years Submarines can be very expensive because of their modern equipment and materials requirements In the United States con- ventional submarines cost at least $8 000 per standard displace- ment ton--about $13 000 if designed to carry missilesh beaLdJ-uhi - I M s Cum-Rb $2 a 5a I - 3 2 1 faked - 3 t 1h 7' La US intercontinental cruise missiles include the Snark which weighs 45- to 60 thousand lbs at launch and also although never i made operational a smaller simple decoy missile known as I Snark is saphisticated and expensive--mainly bicauao high accuracy a 1 and performance were required Qooae would cost lean than I $100 000 a unit being made entirely of fiber-glass and other it cheap materials A relatively small solid-prOpellant booster Lif would be required The pav load over a range of-5 000 NH how- ever would be only 1 000 lbs for Goose instead of Snark'o more than 6 000 lbs or China this would be disoouragingly small 1 1 At one time the manufacturer did propose to convert Goose c g i into a highly mobile purely deterrent system relyi on fallout 1 for its effect with probable circular errors LCEPgagon the order of 100 nautical miles a i a - del l vi as - It appears that little advantage in time would accrue to China from a decision to tuild cruise-type missiles instead of ICBMs and would be severe penalties in loss of capability and in requirements for scarce fissionable material It must therefore be as umed that the Chinese will not follow this road unless they encounter seue1a ard unp adicted ntstacles in the development of ICBHs SUMMARV Nuclear chiuery systems are particularly expensive for Communist China its Lesources are not equal to simultaneous developmenr of more than a handful of different systems at most From now until 19hr or 196 the only nuclear delivery threat is likely to be the presently obsolescent Beagle light bomber force plus for possible clandesrine delivery the submarines and ships already in existence unless the Soviets provide Badgers or other sophisticated vehicles Starting some timn belween 1068 and 1968 the Chinese will probably have the capalility to deploy at least a few nuclear- tipped medium-ranqe Ir 00 to 1 100 NM ballistic missiles of their own copied from Soviet missiles uiven a strong economic re i I covery independent production of medium jet Badgers would pro hably be feasible in roughly the same time period but missile and bomber efforts roqerhnr might be teyond Thinese capacity 9 The regional threat could reach the vicinity of 100 fairly supplemented by bombers by 1970 3 accurate thermnuclear mus at the earliest 1cm cannot be deployed by China until the early 1970 and quite possibly not until the mid-703 or later i i ii I 'Il'al' Ir um up 91 r l nl mp up a my I i 53 Data ll Mada-0M4 HM VAM8 OFFICIAL - PENALTY F02 PRIVATE USE 5300 mm comm lunar Ctass Page 1 Sam Prior m7 8RD 'wm-m us To 7533 '5 nan By 12m rum 0 18 worm Wilme WVA 22203-1714 1 is This cover sheet is unclassi ed when scparalcd from classi ed documwa Rest ta This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu