Vim 72m 0 J'mm x3 em 43104611 W Locum- 0 57 47 65 x vm A 77 0 me 61996 T0 UNCLASSIFIED PER AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY International Studies Division Study Memorandum 4 i 9 Institute for Defense Analyses we sly ma a c fir v5 Tf holf 2 5 a Mam c129 1 0a 5 2- 76 31 115127 SIISSIHEI Study Memorandum No 14 MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF A COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY U John B Cary Major General United States Air Force Retired Prepared for IDA in support of a study to be submitted to the Department of Defense under Contract No SD-SO Task Order effective 1 July 1961 AUG 6 I996 DOWNGRADED T0 UNCLASSIFIED PER AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECT DR DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PRDJECTS AGENCY SAID The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of IDA or of the Department of Defense International Studies Division Institute for Defense Analyses 1666 Connecticut Avenue N W Washington 9 D C August 31 1962 THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK ii This paper was written for Study PACIFICA an analysis of the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power Study PACIFICA is being prepared by the International Studies Division of IDA for the Department of Defense under Contract No SD-SO Task Order effective 1 July 1961 Brigadier General Sidney P Giffin USAF Ret is the Study Leader The author Major General John B Cary is a retired officer of the United States Air Force and Deputy Director of the Inter- national Studies Division He has served as Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Operations Pacific Air Forces Director of Plans Head- quarters United States Air Force and Director of Operations Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe JAMES 3 KING JR Director International Studies Division THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK iv CONTENTS SUMMARY CHAPTER I PURPOSE AND SCOPE INTRODUCTION GENERAL SITUATION ASSUMPTIONS METHODOLOGY VALIDITY AND LIMITATIONS II PEACETIME IMPLICATIONS JAPAN THAILAND MALAYA BURMA LAOS AND CAMBODIA INDIA NEPAL AND PAKISTAN OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES US ALLIANCES AND ALLIES COUNTERACTIONS IMPLICATIONS FOR GENERAL WAR AND FOR MILITARY ACTION BY THE SOVIET UNION GENERAL WAR General War Through CPR Catalytic Action IV PRESSURES ON THE SOVIETS Soviet Assistance in Local War Pressures for General War IMPLICATIONS FOR WAR IN THE FAR EAST AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC MILITARY POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES General Future Capabilities Vulnerabilities of US Forces in the Western Pacific and Far East Restraints on US Military Intervention 'Nuclear or Non-Nuclear Operations Freedom of US Decision Force Configuration MILITARY POSITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA NORTH KOREA AND NORTH VIETNAM General Military Utility of a Nuclear Capability Vulnerabilities of the People's Republic of China VUlnerabilities of North Vietnam and North Korea Asymmetry of Vulnerabilities The East Asian Communist Assessment of Respective Vulnerabilities WAR IN SPECIFIC LOCALITIES INTRODUCTION Assumptions Methodology Categories of Hostilities CHINA KOREA TAIWAN AND THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS VIETNAM THA ILAND INDIA AND PAKISTAN BURMA LAOS AND CAMBODIA SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY ASSESSMENT DETERRENCE OF COMMUNIST CHINA COMMUNIST RISKS DETERRENCE OF LOCAL AGGRESSION General Military Capabilities to Oppose Local Aggression US Will to Employ its Military Capability Nuclear Sharing REGIONAL DETERRENCE The Regional Deterrent Force vii 105 VII IX X VARIATIONS SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS ACCELERATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT AN EARLY CPR DETERRENT STRATEGY IMPLICATIONS LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONS CHINA AS A CLASS NUCLEAR POWER CHINA AS A CLASS A NUCLEAR POWER CONCLUSIONS SUGGESTED ACTIONS GENERAL TO FORESTALL INITIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS TO BOLSTER ALLIED WILL AND CAPABILITIES Air Defense Improvements Visible Presence of US Forces Bilateral Arrangements with Thailand Improved Military Relationship with Pakistan TO IMPROVE THE US DETERRENT POSTURE Establishment of an Effective Regional Deterrent Force Encouragement of Chinese Doubts of USSR Intentions Vulnerability Studies on East Asian Communist States 115 115 119 120 122 125 125 128 131 137 137 138 138 138 139 140 140 140 140 141 142 I TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF us FORCES i DEPLOYED TO FORWARD AREAS 142 Ground Forces 142 Land-Based Air Forces 142 Logistics 143 TO IMPROVE US FORCE CAPABILITIES FOR QUICK LOCAL RESPONSE 143 Strategic Mobility 143 Thai Defenses 144 Forward Base Environment 144 Bilateral Planning 145 TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WESTERN ALLIES 145 Australia 145 The United Kingdom 146 APPENDIX A ESTIMATED COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 147 B US ALLIANCE SYSTEMS IN THE FAR EAST 149 C OPERATIONS 161 D A LANCHESTER EQUATION ANALYSIS OF INVASION AND RESPONSE by Seymour J DeitchmanVULNERABILITIES OF COMMUNIST CHINA TO NUCLEAR ATTACK 187 F COMPARATIVE GROUND FORCES--LATE 19605 209 G THE NATO ANALOGY 211 ix THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK v The initial nuclear detonations by the Chinese People's Republic ZCPE7 and the subsequent development of an operational nuclear capability will stimulate pressures generally adverse to US military interests Reactions in Japan and Thailand will be particularly significant should these nations swing toward neutralism the US military position in North and Southeast Asia would be severely degraded The Chinese threat may however propel these nations into even closer alignment with the United States Actual effects will depend on prior actions by the United States in Asia the nature of the internal US reaction and estimates by Free Asian nations as to the over-all stra- tegic situation in Asia resulting from a Chinese nuclear capa bility All of these factors can be influenced by the United States The US alliance system in Asia is considered adequate for military purposes and requires no significant alteration A regional nuclear capability for the CPR will not signifi- cantly increase Communist capabilities in general war A Chinese nuclear capability will however tend to increase pressures on the Soviet Union to support Chinese aggression and will increase xi the likelihood of circumstances arising requiring from the Chinese viewpoint Soviet military support However the amount and type of assistance provided will be strongly influ- enced by the clear Soviet desire to avoid a nuclear war and certainly general war at almost any cost A locally effective Chinese nuclear capability will frus trate any attempt at invasion of the Chinese mainland increase the range of Communist military and paramilitary actions that can be conducted without incurring US military response and permit a nuclear response to US military actions Present US freedom to decide on nuclear operations in an Asian war and to impose other ground rules through the threat of nuclear operations will be lost The initial military situation in a local war or crisis is likely to be prejudiced as the threatened Asian ally reluctant to provoke China and fearful of possible nuclear devas- tation procrastinates in requesting US assistance The United States too will be more cautious in committing military forces against Communist forces backed by a local nuclear capability The resultant delays in a political decision to commit US military forces will require more forces more effort and a greater pres- tige commitment than would otherwise have been necessary Wars in specific localities in Asia are examined Military advantage will as a rule accrue to the CPR only through the existence xii 3 of an unused capability permitting the CPR to employ most effec- tively its huge ground forces An unused nuclear capability can give the CPR somewhat greater latitude in the use of force at the lower levels and may prevent US initiation of nuclear operations in situations in which otherwise the US would consider nuclear operations to be necessary The United States can retain a large measure of control over escalation of hostilities in the Far East and the capability to impose ground rules for limited war including the determination as to whether hostilities will be nuclear or non nuclear through rapid effective reaction especially at lower levels of hostili- ties and by a suitable deterrent posture These capabilities should be made adequate to cause the Chinese to estimate that escalation would be ineffective and unprofitable -a result facili tated by China s extreme vulnerability to nuclear attack The US deterrent posture for this purpose should consist of Pacific-based nuclear offensive forces likely in any event largely to be required in the Pacific Command z noog7 These forces should be assigned to the PACOM suitably protected and designed and discreetly advertised as specifically a counter-CPR force The evident existence and capability of this force should bolster US allies serve as a strong deterrent to open aggression and particu larly to initiation of nuclear operations by China corrode the Soviet alliance and minimize the risk of escalation to general war I '3 int Mina ii The body of the paper is based on a stated rate of nuclear progress by China and on the assumption that Sino-Soviet relations remain approximately as at present Changes in the present state of Sine-Soviet relations or a modest acceleration in China s nuclear program or in the attainment of a token intercontinental nuclear force would not result in significant disadvantage for the United States Delays and stretchouts in Chinese nuclear programs which are more likely will be to US advantage If and when China becomes a first class intercontinental nuclear power and this is by no means certain comparable to the United States and to the Soviet Union China must also have become a first class industrial power This combination of military and economic power will permit China to extend its influence over additional areas in Asia and thus will reduce geographically areas where the projection of US military power may be required But if war in Asia should occur it will be more intense more dangerous and require larger forces than previously The projection of Chinese influence on a global basis must be anticipated Regional deter- rent actions hitherto valuable will lose their effectiveness and US strategic plans must promise reaponse against both China and the Soviet Union if intercontinental nuclear war occurs The specific conclusions of this paper are on pages 131 36 Specific actions are suggested pages ameliorate adverse military implication of Chinese nuclear developments xiv 5 M g an i 3 was PURPOSE AND SCOPE INTRODUCTION The US intelligence community estimates that the People's Republic of China 63371 will explode an experimental atomic device within the next two or three years will have a locally effective nuclear capabilityz about three years after the initial atomic detonation and may subsequent to 1970 become a major nuclear power with an extensive stockpile of a variety of nuclear weapons and with long-range ballistic missiles and other sophisti cated delivery vehicles This nuclear progress by the CPR will have major political and military repercussions The purpose of this paper is to examine the military implications of these achieve ments for the United States and its allies The body of the paper is limited to consideration of the period ending presumably about 1972 with the acquisition by the CPR of operational quantities of l The People's Republic of China is the official name of the Communist regime that governs mainland China The term China sometimes used in this paper for the sake of brevity refers to Communist China 2 A locally effective nuclear capability as used in this paper is defined as the ability to deliver one or more nuclear weapons on targets within 1 000 miles of launch sites within Com- munist China thermonuclear armed intercontinental ballistic missiles ZECBME7 Certain longer-range implications are however also discussed This paper will examine in order the military implications of China's nuclear accomplishments in time of peace for general war and for Soviet military action for wars in East Asia and the Western Pacific and for US deterrence of the the effects of possible variations in present estimates of CPR nuclear progress and in the state of Sine-Soviet relations longer-range implica- tions certain conclusions stemming from these analyses and finally suggested ameliorating actions that the United States might take to offset the military advantages otherwise accruing to the CPR from its nuclear weapons and weapons systems program GENERAL SITUATION The Specific quantitative estimate of Chinese nuclear capa- bilities used for the body of this paper is reproduced as Appen- dix A 3 In summary this estimate credits the Chinese with an 3 The accuracy of this estimate is not a critical factor A moderate acceleration in China's nuclear progress would still provide ample time for almost any countermeasure that the United States may wish to adopt see Chapter X below possibly except- ing measures needed to preclude deleterious reactions to China's initial test detonation Delay of even several years in China's estimated progress and some delay will probably result from cur- rent economic troubles is unlikely to find the United States in a significantly different political military and technological environment Hence the military implications and the US counter- measures required should not be materially different if China's nuclear progress is slower than reflected in this estimate although requirements in terms of time would of course be eased 2 a I initial aircraft-deliverable nuclear capability of about twelve 20-kiloton 1327 weapons by the end of 1964 a warhead inventory passing the fifty mark in 1967 the introduction of medium-range ballistic missiles in 1966-67 and of thermonuclear weapons in 1969 and an initial operational ICBM capability possibly in 1972 at which time China's warhead stockpile could be about 550 fission weapons or 275 thermonuclear weapons or some combination in between This estimate is based on a moderately slow program that is continuing economic difficulties within the This nuclear capability will be additive to the CPR's conventional military forces which will remain approximately equal in size to her present forces but moderately improved in quality The external objectives of the CPR will almost certainly include 1 The acquisition of Taiwan and the offshore islands 2 A measure of control over and possibly territorial expansion in Southeast Asia 3 Regional leadership or hegemony in Asia 4 The elimination of Western and particularly US influence in Asia and the Western Pacific 4 The estimate here used is taken from Donald B Keesing The Communist Chinese Nuclear Threat Warheads and Delivery SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA ISD Study Memorandum No 17 EIDA Washington D C This PACIFICA paper will be issued shortly 4 5 A position of leadership within the Communist bloc and the international Communist movement 6 The expansion of communism particularly in the under- developed areas 7 Eventually world wide acceptance of China as a superpower at least equal to the United States and to the Soviet Union 5 It is also practically certain that the CPR will use its nuclear capability as a lever or as a backdrop for intensive prOpaganda blackmail and political warfare to further these aggressively expansionist objectives ASSUMPTIONS For the purposes of this paper it is assumed that 1 There will be no effective disarmament or arms control agreement accepted by Communist China as binding upon her 2 The United States will retain readily available forces in the Western Pacific Far East area on a scale approximating present Service programs 3 The United States will retain secure long-range strategic strike forces over and above those necessary for employment against the Soviet Union adequate for strategic operations against China 5 For a detailed discussion see Harold C Hinton Communist China's External Policy and Behavior UNCLASSIFIED ISD Study Memo randum No 18 IDA Washington D C This PACIFICA paper will be issued shortly 1 - i - - mm fa-i la 4 There will be no war resulting in major dislocation of the economies of the United States China or the Soviet Union The body of this paper is based on the additional assumption that the state of Sino-Soviet relations remains approximately as at present- that is these countries remain politically and mili tarily aligned and hostile to the West Stress and strains within this association will however result in a degree of friction and mistrust and in lack of cohesion in foreign policy objectives The effects of variations in this assumption are discussed in Chapter VII In discussing US military capabilities no attempt has been made to recommend Specific employments Such an endeavor which would connote specific war planning is inappropriate for a study such as this and in any event would necessarily be based on so many assumptions largely surmise--as to have little if any value Military requirements are therefore discussed in terms of capabili- ties which will permit a variety of decisions by the United States More specifically discussion of US nuclear forces is based on the clear realization that if employed at all they need not be used to their full capacity nor against any target system postulated herein METHODOLOGY VALIDITY AND LIMITATIONS The analyses and judgments in this paper are based on exten sive consultations with US military and diplomatic officials in 5 mama the Pacific the Far East and Europe on consultations with and data furnished by representatives of the US Armed Services the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State in Washington on broad situation gaming to a degree sufficient to permit assessment of basic military environ- ments and on research in official US diplomatic military and intelligence documents as made available to the PACIFICA staff Advice and assistance were also received from the civilian con sultants of Study PACIFICA The analysis employed is considered to be of sufficient depth to provide a valid basis for the broad conclusions reached and Spe- cific actions suggested While no specific cost estimates have been undertaken suggested actions have been limited to those con- sidered to be reasonable projections of past and current funding programs The present paper is in accordance with the PACIFICA directive to determine implications for US policy While the conclusions are believed to be well founded the method of analysis does not have the precision or detail needed to determine Specific force require- ments or deficiencies to serve as a basis for judging or recommend ing revisions in contingency war plans to establish the cost of or determine priorities between specific alternative military programs or to provide a basis for assessment of alternative tactics or weap- ons Specific recommendations of this nature would require extensive 6 1 f'w a - Jimrlk 1 detailed analysis war gaming and costing of various alterna- tives and would necessarily be based on assumptions largely hypothetical in nature An extensive research program of this type is beyond the sc0pe of Study PACIFICA THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK PEACETIME IMPLICATIONS Other PACIFICA papers examine the possible repercussions in Asian nations and in Europe of China's explosion of an atomic device and subsequent development of a nuclear capability 1 The purpose of this chapter is to set forth the direct military impli- cations of these possible political repercussions This analysis does not constitute a prediction of future events it is an exami- nation of the military effects of events which may occur To some degree the United States can control the course of events encour- aging favorable trends and discouraging adverse ones Actions toward this end insofar as they pertain to United States and l The implications summarized in this chapter are discussed from other points of view in other papers of the PACIFICA study namely for Southeast Asia by Tillman Durdin for South Asia by Loy w Henderson for Australasia by Arthur Burns for Japan by Donald B Keesing and Roger Pineau for Korea by John B Cary for Taiwan by Harold C Hinton for Continental Europe by General for the United Kingdom by Roderick MacParquhar and for the Soviet Union by John R Thomas Loy w Henderson Reactions to a Nuclear Armed Communist China South Asia U CONFIDENTIAL has been issued as Study Memorandum No 11 dated May 30 1962 Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China Europe and the United Kin dom UNCLASSIFIED by General and Roderick MacParquhar has Been issued as Study Memorandum No 12 dated September 15 1962 Other studies will be issued in due course 9 P sti - allied military activities in the Far East are discussed in Chapter X 2 The more important peacetime implications of a Chinese nuclear program will in large part depend upon the potential reac- tions to the initial atomic detonation as affected one way or the other by Chinese exploitation and to other Chinese nuclear exploits prior to the time China has and diaplays a locally effective nuclear capability This chapter therefore is largely devoted to the developments which may be generated during this two- to three-year time period Certain discernible longer- range trends are also discussed JAPAN3 Japan will be subjected to at least some degree of shock by the initial Chinese atomic demonstration and to carrot and stick pressures from China as its nuclear capabilities develop Japan's reaction to these influences could range from the extremes of dis engagement from the US alliance and accommodation with the People's Republic of China ZEng on the one hand to an intensified coopera- tion with the United States to the extent of permitting the 2 See below pp 137-46 3 See also Donald B Keesing and Roger Pineau Reactions to a NucleareArmed Communist China Ja an U SECRET tudy Memorandum No 15 Washington D C This PACIFICA paper will be issued shortly 10 AW introduction or storage of nuclear weapons in Japan and an increased independent defense effort on the other Either of these extremes could result only from the reinforcing interac- tion of many critical but largely unpredictable variables which include Japan's domestic political situation and its external economic relations the world situation in general and especially the posture of the United States compared to the postures of Com munist China and the Soviet Union The initial Chinese test detonation will probably lead to an intense public largely emotional reappraisal of Japan s position in the world its security policy and its relations with the East and the West But with forethought and preparation by the Japanese government- hopefully instigated and assisted by the United States --and given no change in the present world general political envi- ronment neither the initial atomic explosion nor subsequent Chi- nese pressures should cause major change in Japanese policy because the reactions among the principal opposing factions in Japan will be countervailing Groups favoring an accommodation with Communist China will gain adherents but advocates of close ties with the United States and of an increased defense effort will also gain supporters by pointing out the hopeless condition of Japan s military forces under the menace from a nuclear-capable Communist China and Soviet Union Although a middle-course ll m u it WW reaction is thus anticipated the extreme reactions must also be considered in terms of their military implications A neutral 4 or pro-Communist Japan would at best deny to the United States and at worst provide the Communists with the only strategic base in the Far Bast- outside of China and the Soviet Union--presently adequate for the support of major military forces and operations Japan s location is the key to operations in the Korea Manchuria-Maritime Provinces area of Northeast Asia Japanese bases are irreplaceable for these purposes possible alternates are either too vulnerable and undeveloped Korea too small to serve as an adequate base area Okinawa and Iwo Jima or too dis tant for sustained and general utility Taiwan the Philippines and Guam The United States is now dependent upon bases in Japan for 1 Operational and logistic support of forces in South Korea and the protection of the sea and air lines of communication to Korea 4 The term neutral in this paper is used in a rather spe cial sense The word implies both political and ideological avoid ance of relationships with the non-Communist West--political neu trality in the sense of shunning military alliances or political obligations India ideological neutrality in the sense of cultural aloofness from the West 23g3 Indonesia 12 EM 2 Initial general war strikes against targets in Manchuria and Siberia by all Navy and Marine land based aircraft in the Pacific Command and a large part of Pacific based Air Force aircraft 3 The ready availability for redeployment to a crisis area of all land-based Navy and Marine aircraft and a portion of Air Force aircraft based in the Western Pacific 4 Support of sustained operations in and over the Yellow Sea Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk and the protection of these operations If Japan should become neutral--or worse pro Communist--the United States position in Okinawa would be adversely affected At best there would be strong political pressures for the return of Okinawa to Japan at worst the island could become in effect hostile territory occupied by US forces A neutral Japan would be highly vulnerable to attack by the Soviet Union US assistance in the defense of Japan would be rendered difficult and probably would be impossible without ulti- mately carrying operations to the Soviet Union This strategic weakness of a neutral Japan while not likely to lead to general war would make that country most vulnerable to threats and pres- sures It could lead to ever-increasing concessions on the part of Japan which in the long run could conceivably give to the 13 Emmi w Communists and deny to the United States the military position and assets of Japan In summary neutrality for Japan would seriously impair and possibly prevent the defense of South Korea would impede US mili- tary operations against northern China Siberia and adjacent areas and would impair the ability of the United States to project its sea and air power into the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan and ad- joining portions of the Asiatic mainland A pro-Communist Japan-- which might succeed a neutral Japan--would give to the Communists and deny to the United States all of the advantages of these highly strategic islands and their adjacent sea and air space It is possible and even probable particularly if the United States has prepared the ground that Chinese nuclear achievements may propel Japan into even closer alliance with the United States and cause Japan to build up effective defense forces Japan s adamant stand against atomic weapons may be eliminated her defense forces permitted to have nuclear defensive weapons US forces based in Japan openly permitted offensive nuclear arma ment and Japanese facilities made openly available as bases for US nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered vehicles While the initial Chinese atomic detonation should not be used as in itself suffi cient basis to press the Japanese along these lines any evolu- tionary trend in this direction such as would be normal for the 14 fv-m 7 highly nationalistic Japanese should be discreetly encouraged to the end in particular of affording the United States nuclear freedom If a flat prediction were necessary the safest would be that Chinese nuclear accomplishments alone will have no militarily significant bearing on Japanese policies or actions The possible even though not necessarily probable adverse military implications are so serious however and the possible implications favorable to the United States are so advantageous that it is clearly in the US interest to overinsure as feasible against adverse reactions and to encourage favorable ones THAILAND Just as Japan is the military key to the Northeast Asia area so Thailand is the key to Southeast Asia It has the only reason- ably adequate port in mainland Southeast Asia north of Singapore it has the best developed and most usable airfield complex in all of Southeast Asia it has a road and rail net and communications radiating from Bangkok which although poor by Western standards are superior to those elsewhere in Southeast Asia The country is suitably located to support operations in or against Burma Laos North and South Vietnam and Cambodia Its facilities will prob- ably be essential for the rapid air transport of US forces to Burma and farther west As a result of past deployments of US 15 mam forces to Thailand that country has already been partially developed as a base for US forces--the only such prepared base in Southeast Asia As the CPR develops its nuclear capability a reaction in Thailand adverse to US interests is likely only if the Thais should estimate that the United States can no longer be depended upon with certainty to assist effectively in the defense of Thai- land Such an unfavorable estimate may require not only a per- ceptible raising of over-all Chinese military capabilities through nuclear developments but also an apparent deterioration in the ability of the United States to assist its Asian allies Such an estimate would result in a strong tendency in Thai- land to seek an accommodation with the Communists probably with the Soviets as a curb on Chinese ambitions particularly if Vietnam should be wholly lost to the West The United States if denied Thai facilities because of such an accommodation would be unable to counter Communist military or para-military moves any- where in Southeast Asia except under severe handicaps Even oper- ations in support of South Vietnam would be handicapped if the only land area available were in South Vietnam itself Else where in mainland Southeast Asia a military solution to Communist aggression of any kind would become virtually impossible 16 Malaya or the Federation of Malaysia is unlikely to be MALAYA directly influenced in a military sense by Chinese nuclear accomplishments If the train of events started by a Chinese nuclear detonation Should result in substantial change in the position of Thailand however Malaya would be directly affected If aggression clearly attributable to the Communists should occur against Thailand Malaya would probably feel its own security threatened and call on the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth and possibly on the United States for assistance 5 If Thailand should become neutral or oriented toward the Communists as the result of political action or internal insurgency it is un- likely that Malay government policy would be changed Such events in Thailand however would likely presage the revival of Communist insurgency in Malaya This could result in a pro-Communist govern ment of Malaya or it might lead to another protracted guerrilla campaign absorbing sizable UK forces with obvious implications for NATO and possibly an involvement of the United States 5 Throughout this paper the term military assistance is used to describe assistance provided by active military units combat or support The term military aid is used to describe assistance- in the form of equipment supplies and advice--pro- vided under the Military Assistance Program 17 um h As a minimum result of a Chinese capability to attack Malaya with nuclear weapons bases in Malaya and Singapore will become even less likely to be available for support of British and Common wealth forces that may be committed to assist nations in Southeast Asia other than Malaya BURMA LAos AND CAMBODIA Chinese nuclear developments alone are unlikely to cause sig nificant reaction in these countries All are subject to direct overland attack which none can counter and Chinese capabilities to invade these countries will not be appreciably enhanced by a nuclear capability Laos and Cambodia will continue to be avenues for infiltration of and possibly bases for attack on South Vietnam and Thailand If however the new government of Laos avoids actual Communist domination Cambodia although potentially unstable will remain geographically insulated from the Communist bloc and can retain independence of action Burma will almost certainly retain its policy of neutrality probably generally oriented toward the CPR The latter may with some likelihood of success use its developing military capability as a lever to encourage ever closer alignment of Burmese policy with that of China The CPR would appear to have little more to gain by military threats or actual aggression against Burma 18 'w INDIA NEPAL AND PAKISTAN5 It is not likely that there will be militarily significant reaction in India or Pakistan to an initial Chinese nuclear detona- tion India already afraid of China might initiate an atomic weapons program of its own hoping for British assistance in this effort Unless major assistance is provided by the United States or Great Britain however an Indian nuclear-development program would be unlikely to produce a significant delivery capability for many years While a nuclear program alone might have appreciable political and effects it would have little effect on the over-all strategic situation in Asia during the present decade If relations between India and Pakistan remain exacer- bated an Indian nuclear-weapons-development program would be of concern primarily to Pakistan India is too self-centered in outlook to undertake preventive countermeasures against Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia or even to be acutely concerned about actions which Southeast Asian nations might take to accommodate to a nuclear-capable CPR An open attack by China against Burma a move which as we have indi- cated does not appear to be in China's interest or the develop ment of a threatening situation in Nepal would however be 6 See also Henderson Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China South Asia U 19 193% perceived by India as a direct threat requiring counteraction Nepal has already shown signs of willingness to reach an accommo- dation with the CPR The relatively level southern part of Nepal provides military access to India in much the same way that Laos offers entry across Thailand's northeastern frontier While Nepal is unlikely to be substantially influenced by a Chinese atomic detonation previous Chinese penetration of Nepal would greatly intensify Indian alarm and reaction to the event India may seek closer relations with the USSR in the hope that the Soviets can and will restrain Chinese military adventures While these actions could lead to an India more closely aligned with Soviet political economic and military policies such a drift toward communism might be forestalled by timely counter- measures on the part of the United States and hopefully Great Britain- particularly actions designed to dampen the initial shock effect of the first Chinese detonation It is possible that India and Pakistan both acutely aware of the Chinese threat might as a result of a Chinese atomic detonation reach agreement between themselves on their major differences and present a common front against a common enemy The United States and Great Britain should offer discreet encouragement to this end A more likely consequence however would be the intensification of Indian-Pakistani differences over 20 m Kashmir Pakistan may seek a closer relationship with the CPR to obtain backing in the dispute with India supported by the Soviet Union over Kashmir and moral support against encroachment by Afghanistan but probably not to the extent of alienating the West Any inclination by Pakistan to adopt this approach would be intensified either by an impression of increased Chinese military power stemming from Chinese nuclear feats or by a closer alignment of India with the Soviet Union The best prospect for offsetting any such tendency on the part of Pakistan appears to lie in con- vincing the Pakistani that the United States will retain military superiority over the CPR in spite of the latter's nuclear-weapons program and that the United States is able and willing to assist Pakistan in defense against Communist aggression But the United States must anticipate demands from Pakistan for increased mili- tary aid as the price of continued alignment 7 OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES No militarily significant impact stemming directly from Chinese atomic achievements is foreseen elsewhere in Asia pro- vided the US reaction is one of strength and confidence South Korea Taiwan and the Philippines are all strongly anti Communist 7 For a more detailed discussion of the alternatives facing Pakistan see ibid pp 26-29 21 this posture being a reflection of popular conviction as well as that of the governments they should therefore remain largely immune to nuclear blackmail These countries however and also South Vietnam are vulnerable in varying degree to air attack even by the obsolescent aircraft now in the Chinese air force Increased demands for US military aid particularly for the pro- vision of adequate air defenses can be expected Pressures will probably be generated for developing indigenous nuclear forces Neither Ceylon nor Indonesia is likely to be affected signi ficantly in a military sense by Chinese nuclear developments Both are too remote to be immediately threatened by China and too unschooled to understand clearly the significance of a nuclear capability Indonesia's present neutrality based on somewhat closer cooperation with the USSR than with the West and on a sharp distrust of Communist China is unlikely to be affected solely by the development of a Chinese nuclear capability US ALLIANCES AND ALLIES Occidental Allies The French apparently are determined to avoid any further military involvement in Southeast Asia Having suffered a stinging defeat in Indochina they also appear to be determined to prevent military operations by any other Western power that might by comparison further decrease French military 22 U1 g 3 Git ww prestige Great Britain almost surely would assist within its limited capabilities a member of the Commonwealth probably would accede to a request by an ex-colony for military assistance and probably although reluctantly would fulfill military com- mitments under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in the event of clear Communist aggression However the United States should not expect the British either to participate in or to agree to US actions--other than in defense of Commonwealth members - taken either outside the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization JSEATQ7 or in meeting ambiguous aggression Other European allies more concerned with the defense of Europe and mindful of the cost and results of the Korean War will exert all possible pressure on the United States to prevent or limit US military involvement in the Far East Of all the Occidental allies only Australia and New Zealand and possibly Canada can be depended upon to support even morally any US military action in Asia US military plans therefore should be based on the premise that there will be no military participation by an Occidental ally that any French missions in Laos and Cambodia will not assist and may obstruct US military operations and that no Com- monwealth facilities or forces except Australasian will be available to assist the United States unless there is a clear threat to a member of the Commonwealth 23 tam US Alliance Systems in Asia The United States now has bilateral defensive alliances with Japan South Korea Taiwan and the Philippines The United States is formally aligned with Thailand only through the multilateral arrangement of SEATO and with Pakistan through SEATO and the Central Treaty Organization While the United States is perhaps hampered from entering into formal security arrangements with the nations of former French Indochina by unilateral commitments assumed at the time of the Geneva agreements of 1954 ending the Indochinese War present US understandings and arrangements with South Vietnam con- stitute a de facto political and military alliance US alliance systems in the Far East are examined in Appendix B9 in the light of first their military utility in a political environment that includes a nuclear-capable China and second their political usefulness as a means of assuring US allies of the US determination effectively to assist them in withstanding a nuclear capable China In summary SEATO appears to have little practical military utility It should however be retained to avoid damage to the 8 See below pp 156-57 9 The United States though not formally a member of CENTO is represented at the council meetings by observers and is a full member of the military and counter subversion committees 24 relationships of the United States with its European allies and also because the existence of this treaty organization might be useful to the United States in the event of overt Communist Chinese aggression Other possible multilateral arrangements in the Far East would appear to offer little if any military advantage If Thailand should require further or more formal assurance of US commitment a bilateral agreement would be justified Improve ment on an informal basis in military relationships with Pakistan is desirable These arrangements with Pakistan should include an expansion in the functions of the Military Assistance Advisory Group ZEAAQ7 and preferably its placement under the Commander in Chief Pacific thus paving the way for a closer operational relationship between the two countries while at the same time minimizing the probable adverse effects on US relations with India A firmer commitment of the United States to the strategic defense of Australia under the ANZUS treaty could result in more effective military support of any operations under taken by the United States in Asia and particularly in Southeast Asia COUNTBRACTIONS The possible deleterious effects of the Chinese nuclear pro gram and particularly the initial test detonation will flow essentially from one or more of the following 25 mu 1 An estimate by Asian nations that the possession of a nuclear capability will give Communist China strategic superi- ority over the United States in Asia Such an estimate would stem in the first instance from ignorance of the essential factors underlying the strategic posture of the United States vis-a vis the People's Republic of China The likelihood of such an estimate will be intensified if the initial CPR nuclear accom- plishment comes as a surprise 2 A desire by Asian nations to seek closer association with the Soviet Union in the belief that the latter may serve as a restraint on an aggressive nuclear-capable Communist China conversely in the case of Pakistan a desire to seek the support of a nuclear-capable CPR in furtherance of Pakistan's disputes with India and Afghanistan 3 Concern over the adequacy of indigenous defenses against a nuclear-capable CPR 4 Increased reluctance and decreased ability on the part of Occidental allies to support or assist US military operations in Asia Whether or not these deleterious influences prevail will depend in large measure on the character of the regimes then in power in non-Communist Asia on the nature of other world events preceding China's initial test detonation and coinciding with the 26 subsequent development of a Chinese nuclear capability and par- ticularly on US actions and attitudes An apparent deterioration of the US position in Asia or a reaction in the United States reflecting a lack of confidence in US and allied military capa bilities to defend Free World interests in spite of Chinese threats or actual aggression will significantly increase pres- sures to reach an early accommodation with China All of these major factors are subject in varying degrees to US influence Actions that the United States can take to alleviate or prevent possible harmful reactions and to encourage beneficial ones are largely political in nature However certain mili- tary actions can materially assist these larger efforts such actions are discussed in subsequent portions of this paper Those operations 13st necessarily wholly military that would be undertaken primarily for their effects are dis- cussed in Appendix those involving Specific military actions of the United States are set forth in Chapter X Suggested Actions ll 10 See below pp 161-71 11 See below pp 137-46 27 PAGE LEFT BLANK EB a IMPLICATIONS EOR GENERAL WAR AND FOR MILITARY ACTION BY THE SOVIET GENERAL WAR For the purposes of this paper the term general war refers to an armed conflict involving both the United States and the Soviet Union in which the total resources of both powers are employed and the national survival of both is at stake Almost irrespective of the number of nuclear weapons one assumes the CPR will be capable of producing these can constitute only a marginal increment to the nuclear power otherwise available to the Communist bloc The Soviet Union can already deliver a massive attack against the United States and simultaneously strike all militarily important targets in the Western Pacific and the Far East within range of Communist Chinese forces The United States is therefore now threatened by a general war capability which will not be significantly increased by the addition of a Chinese regional nuclear capability and the actions required to insure the availability and effectiveness in general war of 1 This chapter parallels Chapter IV section on the Soviet Union of the Study PACIFICA final report The Emergence of Com- munist China as a Nuclear Power U DATA ISD Study Report TWO IDA Washington D C 1962 29 new Wm-m m deployed US forces will then still be necessary and with no appreciable change in form or magnitude Possession by the CPR of a nuclear capability may increase the likelihood that local hostilities in the Far East will expand into general war If general war should stem from these circum- stances US forces in the Pacific theater might be mal-deployed or attrited to an extent that would seriously impede their immediate use for assigned general war tasks Some diversion of strategic strike forces to the local effort may also have occurred with a resultant diminution of ability to carry out initial general war tasks These disadvantages may be offset by a higher state of alert for other US and allied forces as a result of tensions induced by the local hostilities and by completion of general war offensive strikes against China or the Asian satellites prior to the initiation of operations against the Soviet Union Further Communist forces are just as likely to be mal-deployed and attrited and China s small stockpile of nuclear weapons destroyed or expended Escalation from local to general hostilities therefore is unlikely to offer military advantage to the Communists General War Through CPR Catalytic Action Possession of a nuclear capability will permit Chinese covert use of one or more nuclear weapons either clandestinely introduced or delivered as mines or at short range by ship or submarine on the 30 mm Hm Egg United States or the Soviet Union The Chinese might be tempted to do exactly this if they believe that they would thereby trigger a thermonuclear exchange between the US and the USSR leaving China relatively undamaged A few nuclear explosions--or even one--occurring within the US or the USSR not immediately identifiable as domestic in origin could and today probably would result in a thermonuclear exchange This situation exists now because 1 of a state of tension 2 the United States and the Soviet Union have only each other as a danger- ous nuclear enemy and 3 the present reciprocal vulnerability of strike forces requires a hair trigger reaction capability if with fail safe attributes With the passage of time and as China and other powers develop a nuclear capability albeit modest any tendency toward a reflex response to a few nuclear explosions occurring in the US or USSR should moderate It is apparent that should one of these last two powers choose to attack the other attack on a scale which China could mount clandestinely would be foolhardy to the extreme A minor clandestine attack by China therefore could hardly be credibly attributed to one of the two major nuclear powers and thus should not catalyze an immediate thermonuclear exchange Nevertheless the CPR should be given no reason to believe that she might catalyze a thermonuclear exchange with benefit to herself On the contrary the United States should assure Communist 31 as China that it is on the target list of any such exchange and thus has a heavy stake in helping to avert any thermonuclear exchange The regional deterrent force later recommended in this paper2 should provide publicly evident assurance that the United States can destroy Communist Chinese political industrial and military power at the same time she is engaging in a general war with the USSR The regional deterrent force can thus play an important role even in the deterrence of covert as well as overt action by the CPR for catalytic purposes PRESSURES ON THE SOVIETS There are strong ideological and political pressures on the Soviet Union to support any Communist military or paramilitary operations which may occur in Asia Bloc leadership cohesion and prestige will is involved as will be the loyalties and future effectiveness of Conmunist parties worldwide Further there are compelling ideological reasons quite apart from the fact that they are allied powers for the Soviet Union to succor China in mili- tary difficulty 3 These pressures may be increased through the acquisition by Chira of a nuclear capability China can be expected to exploit her nuclear achievements for political purposes to the 2 See below pp 105-113 3 The wording of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance however also permits the Soviets to deny on legalistic grounds its applica bility under almost any circumstances 32 an point that considerable damage would be done to her prestige not to say that she would lose face should she be forced to back down after challenging the United States Success in developing the most modern and complex weaponry can be advertised by China as a triumph of the Communist system thus implying that a defeat for the CPR would be a defeat for the Communist system The Chinese may be able to obtain Soviet support for some types of Chinese or Chinese-sponsored non-nuclear military opera- tions by exploiting Soviet fear that otherwise the Chinese might resort to nuclear Operations or to actions risking a US nuclear response Support of the Chinese would retain for the Soviets more control over the course of local hostilities and give greater assurance that these would remain non-nuclear- and the Soviets have clearly demonstrated that they wish to avoid a nuclear war at almost any cost Soviet Assistance in Local War Unless local hostilities are initiated by China over the objections of the Soviet Union some degree of Soviet support of China must be anticipated This support will almost surely include political and support and the provision of critical military supplies and advice Direct Soviet military intervention might also be involved probably by volunteers 33 i 533mm an There are severe limitations however on the amount of effective military assistance which Soviet forces can provide 4 Certain specialized military functions such as submarine warfare and air transport and possibly an increment of offensive air power could be of great utility to the Chinese But generally speaking Soviet military intervention would be limited by the same logistic factors which severely limit Chinese offensive capa- bilities and Soviet forces could only substitute for Chinese forces Thus effective Soviet assistance from the Chinese view- point during this mid term phase is most likely to consist in the main of strategic cover for Chinese local operations Pressures for General War It must be anticipated that China's possession of non- sion and commensurately impair any Soviet restraining influence An aggressive nuclear armed and possibly recklessS China will be they would be undeniably of Soviet origin A Chinese nuclear capa bility will permit the Soviets to furnish nuclear weapons or to conduct volunteer nuclear operations in support of Chinese mili- tary moves while denying that the Soviet Union is involved The Soviets however will almost certainly view this situation as a source of danger rather than of profit 5 The record indicates that the CPR has been reckless only with words and cautious in action Mao Tse-tung has sometimes been overimpressed by developments of modern technology however and acquisition of a few nuclear weapons may lead to his being overconfident It should not be forgotten that the USSR launched 34 as more likely to miscalculate both its own power and the strength and the will of the United States and its allies to counter Chinese aggression Nuclear capability obviously will permit China to transform non nuclear operations swiftly into nuclear war and to strike at distant targets As a result China is more likely to find herself involved in unexpected military difficulties which can be redressed from the Chinese viewpoint only by actual or threatened Soviet attack against the United States Thus pressure on the Soviet Union to provide military sup- port for any military operations the Chinese may undertake will continue and may even increase At the same time however a situation is even more likely to arise in which effective assist- ance to China would require a direct Soviet threat to the United States The Soviets may therefore find themselves in a difficult position they must either offer a credible threat to initiate general war requiring at least an apparent willingness to follow through if necessary or they must withhold effective support from their ally The first course would risk destruction of the Soviet Union possibly through US pre-emptive attack The second would the North Koreans into what rather to Soviet surprise shortly became a war with the United States at the time when the USSR was first emerging as a nuclear power But if Soviet experience is a guide the CPR may rapidly develop a sense of responsibility in respect to hostilities which may develop into a nuclear exchange 35 result at the minimum in grave embarrassment within the bloc and it could have far-reaching effects on the cohesion of the bloc and the future of communism In the dilemma which the Soviets may face their decision to intervene especially a decision involving a willingness to initiate general war is the less probable The Soviets have demonstrated that they have no stomach for aggressive moves that might lead to a thermonuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union The contemporary balance of United States and Soviet strategic strike forces the state of Sino Soviet relationships and the clarity or ambiguity of circumstances of aggression all will have a bearing on the Soviet decision whether to undertake or to with- hold strategic operations directly against the United States in support of its ally The likelihood of Soviet military response directly against the United States will be increased or minimized by the following considerations 1 The Soviet Union is unlikely to give support to Chinese Communist aggression undertaken without its prior agreement and the Soviet Union will be reluctant to agree to overt military moves unless these are instigated and controlled by the Soviet Union Ambiguous Operations that can if necessary be called off prior 36 i to a direct confrontation of United States and organized Communist forces will doubtless continue to receive Soviet support But the Soviets can generally be depended upon to withhold support of unambiguous Communist aggression--they are most unlikely to invite repetition of the Soviet-inspired Korean War 2 The clarity or ambiguity of re5ponsibility for a situa- tion leading to major hostilities will strongly influence the Soviet decision to honor or to ignore its formal alliances par- ticularly the Sino Soviet Pact A clear case of US aggression or the escalation by the United States of a local crisis far beyond the requirements of the situation would make it difficult for the Soviet Union to withhold its support Contrarily Chinese mili tary initiatives likely to lead to escalation would permit the Soviets particularly if forewarned by the United States to deny within the bloc that the mutual defense provisions of the alli ance were involved in these circumstances Soviet support of the Chinese would be unlikely 3 The speed and adequacy of the initial US response will be of signal importance If sufficient US offensive power is brought to bear to obtain an immediate local decision at the outset of hostilities the Soviets would be faced with a fait accompli Attack upon the United States could not recoup the local situation but would bring certain devastation to the Soviet Union In these circumstances the Soviet Union would be most unlikely to attack the 37 m United States On the other hand a slowly developing situation which resulted in a series of threats and counterthreats could propel the Soviets into a position in which regardless of rational factors they might consider themselves forced to attack the United States 4 The launching of US-based strategic strike forces would alarm and alert Soviet long range strike forces It might result in an immediate Soviet strike against the United States if US inten- tions were misread or in a similar strike with slight delay if the Soviets should judge that there had been a significant reduction in the US second strike capability Immediate Soviet counteraction would be far more likely if their own long-range strike forces remain largely in a targetable soft configuration 80 long as the United States retains immediately available forces adequate in size and power to mount a massive thermonuclear offensive against the Soviet Union and provided local or regional hostilities in the Far East are not permitted to escalate slowly and on an uncontrolled basis generating uncontrollable emotional issues Soviet attack on the United States as the outgrowth of Communist Chinese action would present the Soviet leadership with risks far beyond the stakes involved in the immediate hostilities 6 Soviet 6 The Soviets stress that a limited war such as one involving the United States and China must not be allowed to be transformed into a general war involving the USSR since in case of Soviet destruction the Communist cause will suffer a fatal blow The Soviets thereby imply that if China suffers nuclear damage however 38 intervention therefore while possible need not be consiggi probable In fact a principal Soviet interest in the developing nuclear striking power of China should be to see that it is not used The United States should be able to count on assistance from the Soviet Union to restrain China from potentially explosive military actions--at least to the extent that Soviet influence can be made effective In the circumstance of strain in Sino-Soviet relations this influence could be effectively exerted negatively - no promise of Soviet aid to China in an extremity brought on by the Chinese Communist China could also be brought to doubt that the Soviet Union would engage the United States in general war in order to succor China Nevertheless while there is little likelihood that Soviet strategic strike forces could be triggered against the United States by unilateral Communist Chinese action ambiguous Chinese great this would not administer a catastrophic blow to the Commu nist cause and would be tolerable if the alternative was Soviet destruction It follows from the Soviet position that if the Soviet Union were confronted with the choice between involvement with the certainty of a fatal blow to the world Communist cause or abstention in a United States-China conflict which might inflict partial but not fatal damage to world Communism the Soviet choice would be clear The implication of the Soviet posi- tion was obviously designed for Chinese consumption 39 1 3r 35 b5 5 2 provocations could result in a series of escalations that might cause the USSR to View the situation in a different light Chinese possession of nuclear weapons because of the resulting possibility of escalation must therefore impose restraints upon United States actions in Asia and it would appear that the United States should employ nuclear weapons in Asia only under conditions in which it is plain to the Soviets that the action is intended to be limited and to fall well short of an invitation to general war 4U CHAPTER IV - IMPLICATIONS FOR WAR IN ms PARW This section examines the military position of the United States a nuclear-armed Communist China and North Korea and North Vietnam in relation to war in the Far East and the Western Pacific The following chapter will examine wars in specific locations in the light of this analysis MILITARY POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES General US forces in the Western Pacific and Far East constitute essentially a light screening force deployed for immediate res- ponse in time of crisis whether major or minor Except for quite minor operations these forces are dependent on reinforce ment from the United States They now have these general tasks 1 This chapter parallels Chapter IV sections on The United States Versus A Nuclear-Armed China and on Implications for the United States of the Study PACIFICA final report The Eme ence 9f_Communist China as_a Nuclear Power U ISD Study Report Two IDA Washington D C 1962 41 2 maintain a general war stance l Offensive air forces primarily but not exclusively aimed against the Soviet Union The commitment of these forces is an integral part of the Single Integrated Operational Plan ZSTOE7 for general war 2 Ground forces in Korea and air and naval forces in Japan Okinawa and adjacent waters are continuously in posi- tion for immediate reSponse in the event of renewal of hostili- ties in Korea 3 Naval forces a large segment of the Pacific-based air forces and the Marine and the Army contingents on Okinawa main tain a posture of readiness for immediate deployment to any area of local crisis 3 4 Air defenses primarily immobile are deployed for the defense of US forces and installations These US forces in general are concentrated or are depend- ent for support on a relatively few large-scale bases all within range of light bombers and medium-range missiles based in 2 The term air forces and similar generic terminology is used unless otherwise qualified to include all land- and ship based air units of the United States Air Force Navy and Marine Corps The term ground forces similarly includes both United States Army and Marine Corps forces 3 The terms local war and local crisis are used in this paper to refer to hostilities or incidents limited to a specific locality such as Korea Taiwan or Vietnam Broader actions over all or large areas of Asia are termed regional war 42 a China In addition to these forward forces the United States maintains on Hawaii and Guam military forces which serve as an immediate reserve In any contingency short of general war these forces are dependent in varying degrees on allied combat and support capabilities Present arrangements provide for retention by the United States of command of all US forces regardless of the area of commitment Future Capabilities By 1970 when the Chinese will probably have a highly sig nificant local nuclear capability United States forces in the Western Pacific and Far East may if US authorities so decide have increased capabilities that will be of major tactical sig- nificance in a bilateral nuclear environment 1 SAMOS and other satellite systems will afford a major improvement in US reconnaissance and targeting capability 2 The Polaris and to some degree the Army Pershing missile system will add a significant increment to US offensive nuclear capabilities By the late 19605 the United States can also have a medium-range ballistic missile either land-based and hardened or ship-based 3 US nuclear capabilities in a local war situation should be significantly increased through the availability of the Davy 43 Crockett The nuclear-armed Bullpup will also provide a major capability in local nuclear war 4 The US defensive posture will be materially enhanced through programmed increases in the Nike Hercules and Hawk units through the semi-automation of the air defense ground environment in Korea Japan Okinawa and possibly other areas and possibly through the provision of Mauler and Red to the ground forces The Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System probably can be available by 1970 5 US ability to respond in a crisis situation will be materially improved through advances in strategic airlift capabilities through the provision of roll-on roll-off cargo ships by floating depots and by the provision of STOL and pos sible VTOL aircraft yulnerabilities of US Forces in the Western Pacific4 and Far East General US forces in the Western Pacific and Far East are continuously faced with the threat of a surprise massive 4 A rough calculation indicates that the CPR would require about 15 accurately delivered weapons some 45-60 launched weapons for a minimum local air counterforce role about 60 accurately delivered weapons 180-240 launched weapons would destroy all major fixed soft US military targets in the Western Pacific Attacks on these scales would not however be effective against concealed hardened and mobile targets 44 I a a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union Many actions have been taken and presumably will continue to be taken to permit the effective employment of these forces in spite of such an attack These actions include concealment Polaris hardening Mace improvement of communications scatter sys- tem dispersal relocation of stocks from Ascom City and particularly the development of a rapid reaction capability on the part of land and sea-based aircraft and missiles While these measures will also reduce US vulnerability in a nuclear war with Communist China they are inadequate in some respects for this purpose Land-Based Air Forces The problem of survivability of land-based air forces subject to nuclear attack in a regional war with China differs considerably from that in a war with the USSR The means available within economic limits to reduce vulnerabilities include active air defenses moderate hardening of critical facilities and a degree of dispersal The only means now available however which promises the survivability and effective use of a substantial portion of the forces exposed to nuclear attack is a rapid reaction capability While such a capability may be of great utility in general war war with China will almost certainly require an appreciable time for decision to launch nuclear attacks against the Chinese mainland 45 KNEE a rapid reaction capability is thus unlikely to be of material assistance in the survivability of exposed forces Until a decision is taken to launch major offensive strikes against all of China it must be assumed that a war with the People's Repub- lic of China will be prolonged and therefore require the sustained employment of major US forces based in the Far East Hence the retention of operational and supporting facilities in the area in spite of a constant threat of Chinese nuclear attack is important All of these factors indicate that minimizing vulnera- bilities of US land-based air forces in the Far East to nuclear attack will be a continuing requirement becoming more important and more difficult when China obtains a locally effective nuclear capability Naval Forces US naval forces at sea will for a great many years be much less vulnerable to CPR than to Soviet attack Missiles are relatively ineffective against moving not easily targetable surface ships and practically useless against sub marines Unless the Chinese obtain modern long-range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft 5 with sophisticated electronic 5 This role conceivably may eventually be filled by recon- naissance satellites 46 search equipment and air-to surface missiles or a modern navy they will be restricted to small-scale attack on surface forces by obsolete light bombers This is not to say that there will be no impact on US naval operations stemming from a Chinese nuclear capability Naval forces operating within range of Chinese delivery vehicles particularly in close-in relatively restricted waters such as the Yellow Sea and Taiwan Strait will incur substantial risk which must be either countered or accepted--the latter probably at some cost in freedom of action Sustained close in operations such as were common during the Korean War will become high-risk actions unlikely to be under- taken except under compelling circumstances Naval ships in port and naval bases will be neither more nor less vulnerable to attack by the CPR than by the Soviets Like ground forces however see below these will be more inviting targets to the CPR than to the USSR and hence pos sibly somewhat more likely to be targeted in the initial strike of a surprise attack Ground Forces Ground forces concentrated in normal times on Okinawa and in a small sector along the Demilitarized Zone of North and South Korea and their logistic support installations will be no more vulnerable to attack by the CPR than by the Soviet Union They will however be much more 47 likely to be specifically targeted by the CPR for attack since these forces offer no immediate threat to the Soviet Union They do however pose a continuous threat of attack against China proper as well as against the Asian satellites and in local hos- tilities actual or potential they become a primary threat to CPR military operations and hence would constitute a most inviting target The vulnerability of these forces and facilities cannot easily be reduced 80 long as China possesses a significant air-delivery capability probably at least through 1970 improvement in the US and allied air defense posture is desir able The eventual deployment of the Field Army Ballistic Mis- sile Defense System or another forward area anti-ballistic- missile system may reduce vulnerabilities to missile attack The present extreme vulnerability of the logistic system how- ever can be reduced only moderately through additional disPer sion an economical remedy for this Achilles heel is not now in sight Command and Control Facilities Many of the same consider ations that affect the survivability of land-based air forces apply to command and control facilities In the absence of nearly automatic pre-planned offensive strikes survival of these mechanisms is of critical importance Yet these 48 facilities must be prepared to operate continuously during hos- tilities of a non nuclear nature when their attractiveness as targets for a Chinese pre-emptive strike would continuously increase Other Vulnerabilities Local war in any area of the Far East will require the forward deployment to the area of US forces The movement of forces of any magnitude and their subsequent support will create concentrations of forces equip ment and supplies These concentrations will create attractive nuclear targets Until or unless China's nuclear capability is destroyed large scale airborne and amphibious operations against major organized Chinese forces would entail a very high degree of risk Restraints on US Military Intervention A Chinese nuclear capability is likely to prejudice the initial US military position in a local war or crisis situation Most of our allies in the Far East will be to some extent intim- idated by the threat of Chinese nuclear operations and any natural reluctance they may have to become the scene of nuclear conflict will be heightened by the Chinese capability There will be a strong tendency therefore on the part of threatened 49 lm- Asian states6 to hesitate before requesting US military assist- ance This can result only in delay in US military intervention and thus a deteriorated situation In addition except in clear cut cases involving vital US interests it will be more difficult for the United States to agree to commit forces to local opera tions In addition faced with the threat of nuclear attack on its forces the United States must in major conflicts decide either to initiate nuclear warfare itself and accept the conse quent risks and political onus or face increased risks and dif ficulties in its military operations These increased risks may result in some delay in the commitment of US forces even in clear-cut cases Finally a nuclear capability in Chinese hands will acutely discourage military participation by allies not directly menaced and particularly the European powers This general reluctance will curtail the likelihood of broad or solid political support for US military moves and thus may induce additional US political reticence to commit US forces Any delay in the decision to commit military forces will normally lead to a requirement for more forces as compared to the force requirements for early intervention and to greater 6 Particularly Cambodia Laos Malaysia Burma and India Thailand Pakistan and South Vietnam may also be included if the prior course of events should lead them to believe that US military capabilities vis-a vis Communist China had been appre- ciably reduced 50 costs in time and resources thus considerably raising the 7 The increased effort involved stakes involved on both sides combined with the deteriorated situation facing United States and allied forces will significantly heighten the risks of escalation both in scale and in area Nuclear or Non Nuclear Operations The most obvious implication of a Chinese nuclear capa- bility for the United States is that the United States cannot alone decide whether a local war in Asia will involve nuclear operations If the United States intervenes in major local hostilities it must decide in advance either to initiate the use of nuclear weapons when and if necessary and if needed at all the need will be greatest in the early stages or refrain from first use of nuclear weapons while taking simul taneous action to minimize the advantage to the Chinese of their first use Freedom of US Decision With its present monopoly on nuclear capability in Asia the United States has almost complete freedom of decision on 7 The advantages accruing from a rapid response to an act of aggression in terms of reductions in the size of forces required and in casualties can be vividly demonstrated See Appendix D below pp l73-85 Put simply delay means auto- matic escalation Sl up the ground rules governing a local war not directly involving the Soviet Union By its own choice the United States can decide to fight with or without nuclear weapons It can estab lish ground rules on the area and the scale of hostilities and on the permissible size and character of aggressor forces Serious Communist breaches of these ground rules would risk invoking escalation completely controlled at least locally by the United States which can at any time or place exercise its option for unilateral nuclear operations A locally effec tive nuclear capability at the disposition of the CPR will put an end to this US monopoly in Asia Even though China's nuclear capability will not be comparable to that of the United States the Chinese too will be able to initiate nuclear opera- tions or to expand the area of local hostilities by means of nuclear strikes in other areas The Chinese can if they choose make a pre emptive nuclear first strike against the forces of the United States and its allies The ability of a nuclear armed CPR to escalate hostilities either by the initiation of local nuclear operations or by more distant nuclear attack can be countered by making such escala- tion unprofitable or ineffective It may also be made unattrac tive by the promise of appropriate US counteraction the Chinese cannot match or ineffective by obtaining a decision in the local 52 hostilities sufficiently early so that Chinese escalation cannot recoup the local loss The first avenue requires an adequate and flexible US deterrent posture the second avenue requires speed and adequacy of initial US response to aggression par ticularly at the lower levels Deterrence An overriding prerequisite to the commitment of US military forces to non nuclear war in Asia will be the conscious provision of a military sanction adequate to prevent Chinese first use -a military capability that will insure that the Chinese correctly estimate that their first use of nuclear weapons will surely lead to retaliatory destruction far beyond the possible benefits to be achieved from success in the local operations The problem of thus deterring a nuclear-capable central question in assessing the impact of a nuclear- capable CPR on US military capabilities and requirements--is discussed at length in Chapter VI Speed of ReSponse If the initial reaction by the United States and its allies to Communist aggression is sufficiently rapid and of adequate weight to obtain early control of a crisis situation Chinese escalation would be unlikely to affect the outcome of the local hostilities -particularly since an early local decision will keep the scale and intensity of the hostilities and the degree of great power prestige 53 involvement therein at the lowest possible levels Thus Speed of response will become even more important when China becomes a nuclear power Yet as indicated above commitment of mili tary forces to local hostilities by the United States will then tend to be delayed first by inhibitions aroused in some threatened states against requesting United States military assistance and secondly by increased caution on the part of the United States in deciding to participate in local hostili- ties after the United States can no longer alone establish ground rules for their conduct In an environment that will tend to increase delays in arriving at a political decision for military intervention it appears important that the military capability for quick response be improved as rapidly as possible This requirement includes not only the immediate availability of forces and of adequate means of transport but also prior pre- parations in potential areas of hostilities to facilitate the reception and support of United States forces that may be needed Force Configuration While it is generally held that US forces can fight either a nuclear or non-nuclear war there are sufficient differences in requirements between the two situations to demand a decision in advance of the commitment of forces on the question Whether S4 5v US forces will forgo the first use of nuclear weapons and there- fore accept the risk that the Chinese may not refrain from first use of nuclear weapons From a ground force viewpoint the dis persion requirement of combat forces in a nuclear environment is incompatible with the concentration of both men and conventional firepower required to fight a non-nuclear battle the degree of tactical mobility needed in two-sided nuclear operations com- pletely transcends the essential needs and present capabilities of forces committed to non-nuclear operations From a land based air viewpoint non-nuclear war minimizes the requirements for dispersion and defense but increases drastically the num bers of offensive sorties needed to obtain a given degree of damage Thus in a non-nuclear situation there can be a much higher concentration of forces on any individual airfield and a greater proportion of effort can go into offensive resources but the forces committed must be very significantly increased Prom both a ground force and land-based air point of view major modification is required in logistic support arrangements to permit operations in a nuclear environment While the operations of combatant forces of the Navy at sea are less affected in character by foreknowledge that opera tions will be nuclear or non-nuclear the total naval force requirements will depend in part on this determination Navy 55 Jim capabilities for supplying forces ashore will also need to be designed in light of the decision on use or nonruse of nuclear weapons and the resultant design of the logistic systems ashore This may require significant changes in the composition of the transport fleet and possibly in arrangements for its protec tion Similarly in a nuclear environment the Air Force can expect materially increased demands for large-scale air trans port operations as a substitute for in-place logistic facili- ties within a local area of hostilities Thus forces committed on the assumption that operations will be non nuclear are unlikely to be configured to fight a nuclear war effectively conversely forces configured for nuclear operations are unlikely to be effective in non nuclear operations It is necessary therefore that a decision be made by the United States in advance of the commitment of forces either to fight effectively on a non-nuclear basis and to accept the risks minimized through a suitable deterrent posture that the Chinese may not respect the ground rules established by the United States or to initiate nuclear operations SE gau- MILITARY POSITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA NORTH KOREA AND NORTH VIETNAM General The People's Republic of China will have these basic mili- tary capabilities to which a nuclear capability will be additive 1 Very large and presumably well-equipped ground forces These however can be used outside of China proper only in con- tiguous areas and they then face major logistic difficulties The logistical problem will require either that ground opera tions except in Korea be on a relatively minor scale or that the Chinese pre-establish forward bases to support larger opera tions The establishment of these bases would of course pro- vide long lead time strategic warning 2 Large scale but relatively backward air defenses fixed in China itself 3 Offensive air forces that will be capable of delivering nuclear weapons as indicated in Appendix A 8 In addition the CPR will probably have additional offensive air forces of limited conventional capability 4 A probable airlift capability for approximately one division and a probable amphibious lift capability of up to 8 See below p 147 57 s l three divisions Lacking however the necessary naval and air combatant forces to make a major opposed amphibious or airborne landing these capabilities can be used only in exceptional cir- cumstances where US and allied air and naval strength have been neutralized against very close-in objectives where the Chinese can gain local air and naval superiority or conceivably in special circumstances permitting the Chinese to achieve complete surprise Until the CPR develops long range amphibious or air borne capabilities she cannot invade such remote areas as Japan Okinawa or the Philippines 5 A significant force of long range submarines These however have in the past apparently been used exclusively for coastal defense purposes No significant improvement in Chinese naval capabilities is anticipated 9 6 The ability to foment and support extensive insurgent and guerrilla operations where the ground is favorable for these Again major efforts in this field will be limited to peripheral areas permitting overland or short-range unopposed air or sea supply of the insurgents 9 The economically competitive nature of programs to create a valid nuclear capability on the one hand and on the other of programs to provide strategic mobility a valid airborne or amphibious capability or a major naval capability will probably prevent simultaneous progress down more than one road This road will almost surely be that leading toward a nuclear capability 58 I 3 Military Utility of a Nuclear Capability The primary utility to the CPR of a nuclear capability will lie in the political and fields in Which the military significance of nuclear capabilities seem certain to be exploited A locally effective nuclear capability will have potential military significance for the CPR in these respects 1 Defense of the Chinese Mainland While to most Westerners an invasion of the Chinese mainland would appear to be beyond the capabilities of any conceivable forces that might be marshalled for the purpose the Communist Chinese have indi cated a high sensitivity in this regard Chinese Nationalist forces on Taiwan and US and Republic of Korea iib forces in Korea have evoked continuous diversions of Chinese military resources and attention A nuclear capability would provide an almost certain means of defeating any attempt to invade the Chinese mainland 2 Counterforce Operations Against Pacific-Based US Nuclear Offensive Forces In time the Chinese can acquire a significant first strike counterforce capability and presumably thereafter a significant retaliatory capability A Chinese first strike capability would at the least require increased caution on the part of the United States in committing military forces to local action where they might face Chinese forces in expanding 59 is an area of local conflict and particularly in initiating nuclear operations during such a local action 10 A retaliatory capa- bility when achieved would provide in Chinese eyes an appre- ciable deterrent to direct US attack upon China and in any event would permit nuclear response to US nuclear operations China may also believe that through a nuclear strike on US forces in some circumstances she could require the Soviet Union to engage in operations against the United States She may further believe that the existence of this capability might cause the United States to refrain from attack on China in the event of a US-USSR war It is difficult though not impossible to visualize a situation in which a Chinese first strike against US forces in the Western Pacific and Far East would be advantageous to the Chinese--at least until they have achieved near-equality with the United States in long-range strategic striking power The Chinese may believe however that circumstances might arise which would lead the United States to accept the destruction of these forces rather than invite near-certain as the Chinese 10 The Chinese may or may not realize that the existence of this capability would also invite US first strike counter- force operations against the Chinese mainland as a prelude to the commitment of US forces to any local operations and par ticularly to nuclear operations the United States may decide are necessary 60 SEEP would hopefully expect counter-retaliation in the form of a first strike by the USSR Circumstances might also arise which would lead the Chinese to believe that a Chinese pre- emptive strike could blunt an intended US attack on the mainland 3 Increased Freedom for Chinese and Communist Military Operations The existence of a Chinese nuclear capability will increase any reluctance that threatened Asian nations may have to request US military assistance and will tend to inhibit a US decision to intervene militarily except in cases clearly involving essential US interests These factors will at least to some degree curtail US military intervention in lesser situations and thus commensurately increase the range of Com- munist military and paramilitary operations that can be con- ducted without invoking US military response 4 Selective Military Use Certain local war situations might arise in Asia that would permit Communist forces to gain a decisive local advantage by the employment of a few weapons at particular times and places These are discussed in more detail in Chapter v 11 11 See below pp 69-96 61 5 Vulnerabilities of the People's Republic of China12 China's basic social and economic structure is less vulner able to nuclear attack than that of the more industrialized nations and particularly the United States People and industry per se as targets would require a very extensive nuclear offen- sive the results of which cannot be predicted with certainty China as a modern governmental and war making entity however is highly vulnerable to nuclear attack Chinese nuclear delivery forces during the present decade are expected to be very limited in numbers unhardened and highly vulnerable Other Chinese forces will be largely concen- trated on eastern Chinese bases all of which are within range of US Pacific based strike forces and in quantity well within the destruction capability of those forces A critical factor in the feasibility of a counterforce effort against Chinese nuclear strike forces will be the ability of the United States to locate and to target these forces accurately Until the CPR approaches superpower status its nuclear forces will be numerically insufficient to retain an appreciable second strike capability after a major attack if they are exposed Either the United States or the Soviet Union could mount a pre-emptive attack of sufficient weight to destroy 12 See also Appendix E below pp 187-208- 62 Km SQ China s total nuclear capability almost regardless of the degree of hardening dispersal or active defense which the Chinese can attempt Survivability of Chinese forces must thus rest pri marily upon denying both the United States and the Soviet Union the capability to target these forces presumably through con- cealment and mobility of missiles and through concealment of a nuclear capability in aircraft For the purpose of this paper however it is assumed that US intelligence capabilities are adequate to tanget at least the bulk of Chinese nuclear delivery forces accurately This appears to be a wholly reasonable assumption in view of the size of the CPR force in comparison with US forces in view of the known difficulties of providing concealment for major operational forces and in view of demon- strated US intelligence capabilities in the past If the assump tion should not be warranted in the sense that the Chinese were able to hide their entire force successfully or even most of it the consequence would be to give them a second strike capacity which although limited to near-by targets would nevertheless add substantially to US problems In particular such a capacity would impair though it would not entirely discount the credibility of the regional deterrent force pro- posed in Chapter VI of this paper 63 Chinese governmental and military controls communications and transportation and distribution centers are largely concen- trated in or around large metropolitan areas as are primary military forces These metropolitan areas also include the preponderance of the governmental military scientific and technical elites as well as a high proportion of the total heavy industry A successful nuclear attack on these metropoli- tan areas would render the CPR incapable of waging modern war and such an attack in view of the co-location of vulnerabilities would need to be on only a comparatively modest scale 13 The projection of Chinese military power beyond the borders of China would cause concentration of troops and materiel and a saturation of inadequate lines of communication creating addi- tional and probably critical vulnerabilities to nuclear attack Vulnerabilities of North Vietnam and North Korea North Vietnam and North Korea have essentially the same socio-economic structure as the CPR with generally similar but greater basic vulnerabilities 13 Calculations comparable to those made for attack on US forces see above indicate that in 1970 about 25 accur- ately delivered weapons would be required for a minimum first strike counterforce operation directed against Chinese nuclear delivery vehicles Some 65 additional accurately delivered weapons should be adequate to destroy the CPR as a modern govern- mental and war-making entity See Appendix E below pp 187-208 64 North Vietnam has a basically agrarian economy with all appreciable industry governmental and military controls and transportation and distribution centered in the Hanoi-Haiphong area Even agriculture is largely concentrated in this flat highly vulnerable delta area Nuclear attack unless with weapons specifically designed and targeted to cause personnel casualties and ground contamination could not destroy the basically agrarian way of life in North Vietnam but a very few weapons in the one metropolitan area could completely destroy the existing government economic life and military direction of the country Further North Vietnam is at present completely open to such an attack North Korea's vulnerabilities are intermediate between those of North Vietnam and the CPR Government and military controls are centered in Pyongyang there is some evidence how- ever that extensive hardening and passive defense measures have been undertaken to protect these elements Industry in the Western sense is centered mainly in the Pyongyang and Hamhung areas There are 16 airfields now supporting 485 aircraft There is an extensive but qualitatively poor air defense system in North Korea 65 Asymmetry of Vulnerabilities US forces in the Far East and also those of US allies are now so disposed as to be vulnerable to nuclear attack There are and will long continue to be however glaring asymmetries between the basic vulnerabilities to initial nuclear attack of the United States and the CPR-uthe great imbalance in numbers and types of nuclear weapons and in delivery vehicles the capability and invulnerability of US strategic strike forces the ability of the United States to use the sea for its own pur poses and particularly the fact that the United States as a base for war will for many years be automatically a sanctuary in a war with China as opposed to the accessibility of all of China to US nuclear attacking forces This great disparity in vulnerability in a bilateral nuclear exchange is too patent to need elaboration The East Asian Communist Assessment of Respective Vulnerabilities An appreciation of both the capabilities and limitations of nuclear weapons has developed in each of the present nuclear powers in generally the same sequence While the CPR may find a way to compress the sequence it is unlikely that Chinese thinking has yet progressed much beyond the capability of the weapons and delivery means which the Chinese expect to have in the near future These weapons are city busters even though 66 sum pygmies as compared to the weapons available to the United States and the Soviet Union Delivery vehicles will be suitable primarily for use against large soft targets the destruction of which does not require precise delivery Weapon scarcity will require that only the most remunerative targets be attacked The strategic thinking associated with this type of weapon by other nuclear powers has generally been limited to the concept of people and industry as suitable nuclear targets and it is in these categories that the Chinese are less vulnerable than the more industrialized nations This might lead the Chinese to underestimate their vulnerability to nuclear attack particu larly if they should estimate that the destruction of opposing forces in the immediate area would cause the United States to accept local defeat rather than accept the risk of Soviet intervention It is much more likely however that the Chinese leader ship essentially pragmatic and realistic would more accurately assess the probable results of a bilateral nuclear war involving the United States and Communist China It is in the US interest to assist the Chinese in all feasible ways to make an accurate assessment and at the earliest possible time Even if North Korea and North Vietnam should correctly assess their own high vulnerability in a nuclear war it is 67 entirely possible that they may overestimate the protection afforded them through extended deterrence stemming from the Communist Chinese nuclear capability Just as the CPR exhibited belief that the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile and space vehicle ZSputni 7 in 1957 counteracted at least to some extent US nuclear superiority so these two minor states are apt to believe that a token Red Chinese nuclear capability will serve to protect them in their own military adventures This possibility can be countered by bringing home to them not only their own vulnerability in a war but also that of the CPR EB CHAPTER WAR IN SPECIFIC INTRODUCTION The previous chapter discussed over-all considerations apply ing to a war in the Far East involving a nuclear-capable Communis China This chapter applies these over-all considerations plus specific factors pertaining to each area in the Far East and South Asia in which local hostilities are likely to analyze the basic military environment and evaluate the utility of nuclear armament to the People's Republic of China ZEBR7 Assumptions The discussion of specific limited war situations in this chapter is based on the following assumptions 1 The nuclear capability of the CPR is generally as stated in Appendix A to this paper 2 1 This chapter parallels Chapter IV section on Utility of A Chinese Nuclear Capability In Hostilities In Asia of the Study PACIFICA final report The Emergence of Communist China as a Nuclear Power U DATA ISD Study Report Two IDA Washington D C 1962 2 See below p 147- mm 2 The over-all strength of indigenous ground forces and the extent of Chinese capabilities for invasion is as projected in Appendix F 3 3 The Communist Party of China retains control over the people and government of mainland China 4 The Soviet Union does not openly intervene at least initially in local hostilities in the Far East 5 Laos and Cambodia are neutrals Burma while neutral is oriented toward the CPR 6 Singapore Malaya and North Borneo have federated into the Federation of Malaysia Commonwealth forces have been largely withdrawn 7 The United States is not allied with but may respond to requests for military assistance from India or the Malaysian Federa- tion if they are attacked These countries are therefore treated in this section as allies 8 The alliances among the Soviet Union the CPR North Korea and North Vietnam continue with no substantial increase in the I amount of territory under Communist control Japan South Korea Taiwan the Philippines South Vietnam Thailand and Pakistan with no substantial changes in their internal political situations remain aligned with the United States The United States retains control of Okinawa 3 See below p 209 70 an Hill Methodology The assessments contained in this section are based upon general considerations notably the asymmetry in nuclear capa bilities that will exist between the United States and the CPR during the perizd before China has an effective intercontinental capability The endeavor has been to examine the basic military environment in order to permit a broad assessment of the utility of a nuclear capability to one side or the other but particularly to the CPR in specified contingencies Detailed war games have not been undertaken and are not considered necessary to substanti- ate the conclusions reached in this chapter Categories of Hostilties Military conflicts in the Far East and South Asia can be con veniently grouped into five general categories These are identi- fied below subsequent discussion of the various contingencies will be in the same order First category a war between the United States and China proper Second category open hostilities in areas on the periphery of China involving opposing major organized forces These areas include Korea Taiwan and the offshore islands held by the Nation alist Chinese Vietnam and Thailand 71 1 - a Third category wars in the Indian subcontinent India Pakistan and Nepal Fourth category open Chinese aggression against nations unable to provide significant indigenous opposition These include Burma Laos and Cambodia Fifth category Communist subversion and insurgency in areas vulnerable to this type of conflict Such activity is particularly likely in regions near the Chinese frontiers but all of non-Communist Asia may eventually be affected This cate- gory also includes for the purpose of this analysis relatively minor actions by the Communists whether with regular or irregular forces against isolated areas near China's periphery There are some nations that the CPR will have no capability to invade They include Japan the Philippines and so long as China stays within her present borders Malaya These nations may be subject to attack as part of a larger war but should be immune from direct localized overt Chinese aggression The utility of a nuclear capability to the CPR in forwarding its ambitions with regard to these three areas is therefore limited to blackmail and pressures Thus no discussion of limited war involving these nations is included in this chapter 4 A series of such actions might of course significantly change the military geography as well as the internal political situation of the attacked nation 72 9 251 - I'I u wuh elem A war between the United States and China should be regarded as a regional war 5 Such a conflict will extend to all of China and will involve major US forces and at least indirectly most major US allies in the Far East The war can occur either directly as a result of Chinese attack on US forces or major US allies through other Chinese provocation or more likely as the out growth of hostilities initially limited to a specific area on China s periphery The basic and vulnerabilities of China and of the United States in the Far East have been discussed earlier In summary China will have a great numerical preponderance over the United States and its allies in ground forces and locally in air forces greater dispersion of forces but a comparatively small and initially primitive nuclear capability China's war-making capability will continue to be highly vulnerable to nuclear attack The United States and its allies will have supremacy on the seas qualitative air superiority and vastly superior nuclear capabili- ties including for at least a decade the entire United States as an inherent sanctuary US local vulnerability stems primarily from the high concentration of forces and logistic support and this weakness can be reduced by timely remedial actions 5 See above p 42 n 3 73 of principal US allies--that are within range of Chinese delivery vehicles To be meaningful these offensive operations in view of anticipated Chinese capabilities would necessarily be nuclear Unless there is some major political deterioration within Com- munist China Operations by the United States and its allies would also necessarily be limited at least initially to relatively long-range nuclear offensive strikes against Chinese territory Non-nuclear offensive operations within the capabilities of the forces estimated to be available to the United States and its allies could not-in themselves force a decision Invasion of the mainland appears to be far beyond the capabilities of any con- ceivable forces that the United States and its allies could commit except in the aftermath of a major nuclear offensive Offensive It is a practical certainty therefore that if a regional war with China occurs it will involve bilateral nuclear operations but limited so long as the USSR abstains to targets in the Far East including mainland China and the Western Pacific 74 fzi' i The United States will have a variety of targeting options for its nuclear operations On the assumption that US recone naissance capabilities will permit accurate targeting of Chinese nuclear delivery forces China's nuclear capability could be quickly and cheaply destroyed by a pure counterforce Operation The destruction of other Communist forces would be feasible but targeting difficulties and the greater enemy dispersion would require an increased weight of offensive effort maintained over a longer period than for the counterforce action Opera- tions against urban centers exploiting this extreme vulnera- bility of China could be undertaken at the discretion of the United States Given these basic military factors the following conclu- sions are apparent If the United States strikes first and this may well happen if hostilities occur as the result of Open Communist Chinese aggression on its periphery the United States with no serious impairment of its general war capability can if it so decides 1 Eliminate by its first strike the ability of the CPR to launch a second strike of serious consequences 2 PrOgressively if not simultaneously eliminate all CPR offensive capabilities all CPR organized military capabilities except in scattered localities and finally the ability of the CPR to maintain or control effective military forces 75 Silent nth 1 v Even if given the advantage of the first strike the United States cannot except at an enormous cost in time and resources 1 Invade and occupy mainland China 2 Create by military means alone conditions which will lead to the installation of a government of mainland China friendly to the United States 6 If nuclear hostilities were initiated by the Communist Chinese by means of a surprise attack aimed in the first instance against US forces and bases in the Far East and assuming adequate prior preparations on the part of the United States in the way of force configuration control and survivability US Pacific based second strike and subsequent capabilities should be sufficient to permit the inited Gtates to accomplish the same results as those just stated with the same limitations on capabilities In this case however the accomplishment of the destruction of Communist Chi- nese nilitary capabilities might take longer and would of course involve much greater damage to US forces and to US allies It 6 The disarming or devastation of China through a nuclear offensive is not likely to create immediate conditions which will permit the Nationalist Chinese to return to the mainland The destruction and chaos which would however might permit the gradual more and more of mainland China comed back as heroes They would are each within their military result from such an offensive takeover by the Nationalists of They would not however be wel- need to occupy successive small capabilities consolidating each successive bite before proceeding A contingency at least as likely would be the occupation of parts or all of China by the Soviet Union 76 SHIP might involve use of US strategic strike forces with a possible resultant minor degrading of the capability of the United States for general var Such an exchange with China could eliminate once and for all a major potential world adversary and would have shattering results within the Communist bloc It would involve some but probably not catastrOphic destruction in allied lands of US forces and their facilities Taken alone however it would not be likely to provide a final answer to the question posed by China and it should be assumed that subsequent action by mas- sive military forces on the Chinese mainland will be required Whether these required military actions would be in the nature of relief and rehabilitation the occupation of hostile territory or a confrontation with Soviet forces can be only a matter of conjecture KOREA Korea as an arena of conventional combat requires and can accommodate very large forces on each side up to 60 or more divisions Yet as clearly demonstrated in the korean War the terrain and logistic limitations severely curtail mobile offensive or defensive operations Non-nuclear operations restricted to the Korean Peninsula are thus likely to result in another static situa- tion of stalemate 77 I - I inThe deployment of large forces to Korea and their employment requires on both sides major dependence on operational and support facilities outside of Korea on the Communist side in Manchuria and probably the Shantung Peninsula on the US-Republic of Korea ZEQK7 side in Japan and Okinawa These extensive supporting facilities provide lucrative nuclear targets as do force concen- trations and logistic facilities in Korea proper Non-nuclear Operations against these targets on a scale within the capabili ties Of either side are most unlikely to provide a decisive advantage In a bilateral nuclear-armed environment it is unlikely that a stalemated non nuclear ground situation can be redressed through large scale amphibious or airborne operations in view of the very high risks involved If in such a situation a military solution is to be achieved by tither side therefore there must be either the massive destruction of opposing forces and their means of support employment of nuclear weapons in a manner that directly affects the course of battle in the front lines or an expansion of the war so that the decisive battle is fought in circumstances more favorable to the side which chooses to expand the area of hos- tilities The first course would require the initiation of nuclear operations which probably will need to extend to parts of China for Operations or to Japan for Communist Operations 78 3 Other than extended nuclear operations no military means are visible on either side that would permit the opening of a second front with decisive effect on operations in Korea If hostilities are resumed in Korea there will thus be strong military reasons on both sides to initiate nuclear opera- tions The existence of such pressures should not be construed as a prediction that operations must necessarily develop into a nuclear exchange a stalemate may again be politically acceptable to both sides It will however be to the military advantage of the United States by permitting flexibility of decision to take whatever preparations--both military and political--may be neces sary to enable the United States to initiate nuclear operations should it choose to do so Similarly the United States and the Republic of Korea should take all practical action to minimize vulnerabilities if nuclear operations should be initiated by the Communists These vulnerabilities are particularly acute in the event of war in Korea TAIWAN AND THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS Taiwan The situation of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands is unique in that an invasion would require a major but short-range amphibious or airborne effort since the critical phase of an invasion would be of very short duration the defense is wholly dependent on forces in position from the outset Using assorted junks and fishing craft in addition to normal amphibious shipping the Communist Chinese could mount an amphibious 79 Operation Of six or possibly more divisions Such an operation would create a series of critical targets extremely vulnerable to nuclear attack An amphibious attack could be defeated by a very few nuclear weapons used against the tranSport force while concentrated in loading areas while the transport fleet is at sea while the ships are concentrated Off the coast Of Taiwan preparatory to a landing or against the initial bridgeheads before the attacking force has consolidated its positions ashore While such an attack could thus be easily and cheaply defeated by nuclear means it would also be highly vulnerable to attack by conventional weapons on a scale within the capabilities of US and Nationalist Chinese forces normally in the area An airborne Operation against Taiwan or a combination and amphibious operation would be even more difficult for the than an amphibious attack Because of the requirement for a sea borne follow-up to any airborne Operation many of the same vulnera bilities would exist as for an amphibious attack Additional vul- nerabilities would be created in the launch and dr0p areas and the transport aircraft themselves would be highly vulnerable to the air defenses on Taiwan It thus appears that a major airborne Operation would be most unlikely to be successful under any foreseeable circumstances except as a minor adjunct to an amphibious attack Rn amphibious operation 80 am would be more feasible but would be a formidable task For one to be successful l The Communists must achieve complete surprise at least until the transport fleet is well at sea This is not impossible in view of the extended periods of bad weather over the Ta wan Strait and the short sailing time 12 to 24 hours involved The Communists would also need to be secure however fiom eaily detection by electronic maritime reconnaissance over the Strait 2 US naval and air protection for Taiwan including spe- cifically the US capability for early nuclear response would need to be either eliminated or at least greatly reduced 7 It is con- ceivable that this might occur through political action It is more likely however that a major diversion of regional U5 com- batant strength to some other threatened area might lead the Com- munist Chinese to estimate that residual US strength in the area could be substantially neutralized through nuclear attack 3 The vulnerability of transport concentrated off the coast and of the initially landed forces would need to be overcome by preparatory fire directed against both ground and air forces on Taiwan Adequate preparation for an opposed landing does not 7 If a credible threat of an invulnerable nuclear offensive capability in the hands of Nationalist Chinese forces were created it is most unlikely that the Communists would conclude that an invasion of Taiwan could succeed 81 ii- appear to be possible by conventional means estimated to be at the disposal of Communist China a nuclear capability would permit accomplishment of this essential task Thus nuclear weapons under favorable circumstances may pro- vide the CPR with a military capability that would lead it to believe it could invade Taiwan successfully -a capability which the CPR probably lacks under present circumstances 0n the US-Nationalist Chinese side an attempted invasion of Taiwan could be countered under normal conditions by either con- ventional or nuclear weapons As has been indicated however one of the essential conditions that would permit a Communist attack to be successful is a reduction or diversion of US capabilities to oppose an attempt at invasion In such a circumstance the defense of Taiwan would require the residual US forces to use nuclear weap- ons against one or more of the critical vulnerabilities of the attacking force or else to accept the probability of Communist Chinese success It follows that if the United States is deter mined to defend Taiwan both the United States and the Government of the Republic of China should be prepared militarily and politically to use ruclear weapons if needed and these states should also minimize as feasible vulnerabilities to nuclear attack by the Communists In this connection it should be noted that the political disadvantages flowing from US first use of nuclear weapons 82 in Asia would be markedly reduced if these were aimed at Communist forces obviously involved in aggressive action particularly if such first use were against the aggressor force while at sea If an invasion of Taiwan should be attempted it is thus likely to result in a bilateral nuclear engagement Such an invasion attempt could lead to a regional war with the CPR 8 Offshore Islands The offshore islands notably Quemoy and Matsu now held by the Nationalist Chinese can be effectively denied to either side by a very few nuclear weapons--by fallout if not by blast Such a Communist nuclear attack would in iso- lation be an implausible means toward liberation of these islands Nuclear operations are more likely to result from an attack on Taiwan as well From a military viewpoint and con- sidered apart from the defense of Taiwan the defense of the offshore islands will thus not be materially affected through CPR acquisition of a nuclear capability The defense of the offshore islands by conventional means in View of their proximity to the Chinese mainland is a diffi- cult task Their defense through nuclear attack on Communist concentrations on the mainland prior to and during the early stages of an invasion attempt would be a simple matter There 8 For the nature of such a war see above pp 73-77 83 s will clearly be severe political restraints on US use of nuclear weapons in the defense of the offshore islands The Communists are well aware of these restraints and probably consider any con ventional action limited to the offshore islands to be immune from nuclear attack by the United States A credible threat of National- ist Chinese nuclear operations would however provide a major deterrent to Communist aggression against these outposts VIETNAM Open aggression against South Vietnam does not appear to be a profitable course of action for the Communists unless very favor- able circumstances exist which however they may be able to cre- ate The total organized ground forces which the Communists can logistically support in an attack against South Vietnam9 are about equal in size to South Vietnamese regular forces The terrain and lines of communication prevent major front-line concentrations of either defending or attacking forces and the initial local Chinese air superiority is not likely to have a major bearing on the course of front line hostilities Both sides present inviting and highly 9 Estimates used in this paper of Communist ability to support regular forces in an invasion of Vietnam include forces advancing via Laos Communist control of Laos should not therefore substantially improve Communist capability to support an invasion Communist capa- bilities to support insurgency would of course be significantly improved see below pp 93-95 84 Agath- vulnerable nuclear targets in the north the Hanoi-Haiphong complex and in the south Saigon with its port airfield com- munications and governmental and military control concentrations Other profitable nuclear targets except possibly transitory force and supply concentrations would be few in Vietnam prOper attractive nuclear targets would exist in the form of concentra tion of forces supplies logistic facilities and lines of communi- cation in adjacent areas within China and on the United States- South Vietnam side in the Philippines and probably Thailand A direct attack upon South Vietnam alone10 would be an inviting course of action for the Communists if three conditions exist l Organized South Vietnamese forces are in large part diverted to the struggle against insurgency affected by wide- Spread disaffection and disloyalty or otherwise barred from effective employment 2 The Communists are convinced that insurgency alone will be insufficient and that open aggression will also be necessary 3 The Communists believe that the United States cannot or will not be willing to participate effectively in the defense of South Vietnam l0 If the Chinese should overtly attack Thailand such an attack would almost certainly progress so as eventually to include South Vietnam A key element therefore in the security of South Vietnam is the security of Thailand This is discussed beginning on page 88 below 85 these preconditions do in fact all exist nuclear opera- tions by the CPR would be unnecessary If the Communists calculate wrongly that the United States lacks the will or capability to assist effectively in the defense of South Vietnam and consequently the United States does react to Communist attack but only with conventional forces limited ini- tially to operations in Vietnam itself the situation which would emerge would at best be a difficult one for the defending forces If the first precondition does not then exist that is if the present state of insurgency has been brought under control the South Vietnamese reinforced by major US forces should be able to attain a significant numerical superiority over the organized forces that the Communists can support over their tenuous lines of commu- nication This numerical superiority might permit the United States and South Vietnamese forces eventually to defeat the Communists but in view of the physical environment such a victory if possible at all would take a very long time and would be a very expensive operation If on the other hand major Communist aggression is coupled with widespread insurgency defeat of the Communists by con- ventional means would be improbable but a complete non-nuclear Communist victory requiring the conquest and occupation of the more developed portions of the country as well as the mountain and jungle areas would be equally improbable Thus open Communist aggression in a non-nuclear environment is likely as in Korea to lead to stalemate 86 Under these circumstances the deployment of US forces and materiel would almost certainly create highly lucrative nuclear targets Hence it is conceivable that a Chinese nuclear capa- bility might be used to establish a locally decisive advantage and bilateral nuclear Operations whether initiated by the Com munists or the United States might eventuate It would be more advantageous to the Communists however to de emphasize and possibly abandon Operations by organized forces in favor of additional emphasis on insurgency and guerrilla operations than to invite reprisal not necessarily localized by superior US nuclear power A nuclear capability is therefore unlikely to be used by or offer any real military advantage to the Communists in the conquest of South Vietnam except as it may serve as a restraining influence on the United States An evident will and capability of the United States to carry the war with nuclear weapons if the United States should so desire into the heart of North Vietnam and if necessary China should almost certainly preclude open aggression against South Vietnam This capability should make it evident to the Chinese that their use of nuclear weapons would entail extreme risk yet barring catastrOphic political developments they are not likely to be able to invade and conquer South Vietnam without using them If this US will and capability appeared to China to have been lost 87 H11 in a military sense precluded by US political decision or susceptible to neutralization by a Chinese first strike on US forces then an invasion of South Vietnam might be attempted The existence of a visible US regional deterrent discussed in detail in Chapter and time political basis for its employ- ment at the discretion of the United States is thus of primary importance THAILAND Under present conditions the United States and the CPR face almost equal difficulties in supporting and maintaining organized regular forces for conventional military operations in Thailand While the Chinese can sustain sufficient forces to defeat an unassisted Thailand their logistic problems would limit the attack in the main to armed forces whose overland pro- gress would be slow On the United States-Thai side the deploy- ment of US ground and air forces to Thailand except for compara- tively small forces in readiness in the Western Pacific would also be relatively slow and constricted through the single port of Bangkok and generally the airfield complex of Bangkok-Takhli Khorat The United States could eXpect to receive at least several days of strategic warning however as Chinese forces 11 See below pp 104-113 88 traverse Burma and Laos and during this time could preposition carrier forces and air and ground forces within Thailand US deployments into Thailand dependent upon the single port and few airfields would create attractive nuclear targets However logistic limitations would make extremely difficult if not pre- vent Chinese exploitation of any nuclear operations and would create a situation of extreme danger to China if the United States retaliates Chinese initiation of nuclear warfare is thus not probable and should be readily deterrable The situation will be greatly changed if Laos should become a Communist state The Communists could build up major military resources in Laos and could infiltrate forces there This con centration would permit a much heavier weight of attack by well equipped forces with some possibility of achieving tactical surprise Unless there is prior major improvement in Thai forces or actions are taken to permit the predeployment of US forces to Thailand and these actions would probably preclude Chinese attack a non nuclear defense on the ground would appear to be unpromising Communi initiation of nuclear warfare would there fore be unnecessary Thus a Chinese nuclear capability is not likely materially to affect local hostilities in Thailand The existence of a credible threat on the part of the United States to carry the war 89 to the source of any aggression will be of critical importance in deterring open aggression or at a minimum in holding it to a low level of intensity as well as deterring Chinese initiation of nuclear operations It will of course be important to avoid or at least to keep to the minimum feasible any concentration of forces or resources that would invite Communist nuclear attack INDIA AND Despite the persistence of armed conflict between the Chinese and Indians in border areas claimed by both neither India nor Pakistan would appear to be profitable or likely targets of Chinese military conquest In the first place unless there is a major Chinese effort to develop Tibet or Sinkiang to support military operations--an effort which owing to the remoteness of these areas might be expected to require several years--or a very great improvement in Chinese air transport capabilities China will not be able to support major forces in Operations against India or Pakistan Further it can be reasonably assumed that the Chinese would be deterred by the expectation that the United Kingdom would actively assist the attacked nation and might be prepared to respond with nuclear weapons if the Chinese should use them first 12 12 For a discussion of British policy on nuclear weapons in Asia see Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist China Euro and the United Kin om tu Memoran um No A Washington D 5 1962 The United Kingdom by'Roderick Mac- Farquhar pp 8 13 90 M luau mJJ-u C -J i 3' The situation might be materially changed if Nepal should become in effect or in actuality a Chinese satellite l3 If Nepal is available to the Chinese as a base the CPR should be able to overrun parts of India in a very short time although the occupation of all of India would be a most difficult and time consuming task if possible at all Any build-up in Nepal would of course provide long term strategic warning which would doubtless be heeded by India--and reasonable preparation by India aided by the West should more than offset Chinese advantage accru- ing from an unimpeded build-up in Nepal In either case Chinese nuclear Operations could 1 Assist in breaching the initial Indian or Pakistani defensive position If however China can transport and support forces adequate for a major invaSion an initial nuclear assist would be unnecessary If she cannot initial success could not be exploited 2 Largely destroy primarily through a counter-city offen- sive the ability of the attacked nation to defend itself with organized forces Destruction of this nature would however destroy the only reward of conquest and hence almost surely would 13 See on this point Loy W Henderson Reactions to a Nuclear Anned Communist China South Asia U ISD Study Memorandum No ll IDA Washington D C 1962 pp 13-17 25-26 91 s all not be undertaken Even if nuclear weapons were so used China would still require very large forces for an extended period tO consolidate its gains and the stringent logistic limitations governing Chinese Operations would probably prohibit this Thus it appears that a nuclear capability under any likely circumstance would not provide a decisive military advantage to China in an invasion Of India or Pakistan Yet another situation would exist if India and Pakistan were at war with each other and the CPR intervened on behalf of one party presumably Pakistan Neither India nor Pakistan appears capable Of defeating the other under present circumstances Pre- sumably Open warfare between these two states would be preceded by extensive mobilization on both sides Whether the increment Of force which the Chinese could then provide--either in terms Of additional conventional forces or in terms Of an initial nuclear assist--would be a decisive advantage to its ally is problematical in a situation with so many unpredictables However CPR interven- tion in such a situation and particularly CPR use Of nuclear weap- ons should be deterrable China cannot afford tO dissipate its limited nuclear stocks on a third country nor even become heavily committed in the West while facing a major threat by US forces from the East including the threat Of nuclear reprisal for Chinese initiation of nuclear Operations 92 BURMA LAOS AND CAMBODIA The Communists now have the ability to conquer these countries at will The primary problem facing the Communists in connection with any military ambitions they may have with regard to these nations is to keep the level of hostilities low enough to preclude a US decision to intervene militarily and particularly to preclude a US decision to counter Communist aggression by direct attack on China or Vietnam The existence of a CPR nuclear capability will affect this situation only if it causes the United States to exercise greater restraint in committing military forces and thus permits the Communists to use force more openly and at a somewhat higher level of intensity SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY China has the capability of instigating and supporting extensive and widespread insurgency and guerrilla activity including isolated actions by organized or irregular forces in all nearby areas and to a lesser degree elsewhere in Asia including Indonesia With the passage of time the political environment in Korea Pakistan and possibly the Philippines may deteriorate to an extent that would permit low-grade Communist aggression This Communist capability will not be directly enhanced by a Chinese nuclear capability although as discussed 93 as 3 1 will _nli m a fun-dull W'h' in Chapter political exploitation of China' 5 nuclear accomp- lishments may assist the CPR in preparing the climate for low grade aggression The following effects on US and allied military operations to counter insurgency or guerrilla operations are possible but unlikely 1 In all threatened areas there is a scarcity of ports air- fields and communications and support facilities The concentra tion of US resources whether forces committed to the scene or merely materiel and other support for indigenous forces can cre- ate vulnerabilities inviting Communist Chinese nuclear attack Such an attack would of course end the insurgency phase and introduce open warfare 2 Unless the will and character of the threatened govern ment is strong it is conceivable that Communist Chinese nuclear blackmail if coupled with suitable blandishments might lead to a capitulation or accommodation by the supported government at the expense of any US forces already committed to the scene The only likely danger attributable to a Chinese nuclear capa- bility however is an increase in the level of provocation that would cause the US to intervene with military forces This polit ical restraint can have serious military implications The United States is unlikely to be swayed in making an early decision to 14 See above pp 9-27 94 assist such staunch allies as Korea and the Philippines but a decision for US military intervention in less crucial areas may well be delayed by extensive efforts to find a nonmilitary solu- tion Further countries such as Thailand and Malaya may pro- crastinate in seeking the assistance of Western powers when there is a chance that such aid might result in nuclear operations on their territories The military situation may thus have deteri- orated significantly before US forces are committed or other significant assistance is provided to the threatened nation OVER-ALL ASSESSMENT While the use of nuclear weapons might be locally advanta geous to the Chinese under Special circumstances major gain from a locally effective nuclear capability will accrue to the CPR only through the existence of an unused capability Its exist- ence will discourage any attempt to invade the Chinese mainland It will make extremely hazardous and probably preclude large- scale US airborne or amphibious Operations It may impede and delay US-allied Operations in response to Communist-initiated hostilities Communist China's strength will remain in her ground forces and it will be clearly advantageous to her to create situations in which that asset can be exploited China s real interest therefore must be to avoid a direct US-CPR confrontation if 95 possible but if a confrontation should nevertheless occur then to forestall US employment of its nuclear superiority At lower ranges of the spectrum of warfare China may succeed in preventing any US military intervention whatever At upper ranges of the spectrum China's nuclear capability carrying with it increased risk of an escalation uncontrolled by the United States is likely to induce greater caution on the part of the United States and thus enable China to succeed in preventing US initiation of nuclear Operations in circumstances which the United States might otherwise consider to require such weapons 96 'll 1 41- I U If i 3 -1 CHAPTER VI DETERRENCE 0P COMMUNIST CHINA The acquisition of a nuclear capability by the PeoPle's Republic of China 119 will create a period of increased military risk for the United States and its allies in the Far East Some risks will be new primarily however there will be an intensifi- cation of risks already existing An aggressive expansionist nuclear-capable CPR will be less subject to external restraints more likely to miscalculate its military capabilities and the will and capabilities of the United States and will have somewhat more independence of decision in matters which may lead to mili- tary action The most certain restraint on Communist Chinese military action and the surest way to cause a correct calculation of the price required for military aggression will be the maintenance of a military posture by the Free World and particularly by the United States adequate to insure a proper CPR assessment of risks- risks which are at least as great as those facing the United States and its allies 97 s_ r COMMUNIST RISKS Increased risks for the United States and its allies stemming from a Chinese nuclear capability have been considered in preced- ing chapters of this study Just as real though less apparent will be the increase in risks for the Chinese--although these may not be initially evident to the Chinese The United States will remain far superior to the CPR in nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities and will retain other major military advantages over China These advantages need not necessarily go unused If the United States should face signifi- cantly increased military difficulties in local hostilities an incentive would be created for the United States to carry out Oper- ations directly against sources of the aggression and the latter are highly vulnerable to nuclear attack If a situation should arise requiring intervention by major US forces in Asia a pre- emptive attack on CPR delivery forces would be the most certain way to eliminate the risk of Chinese first use The risk of gen- eral war is a two-edged sword and is as uninviting to the Soviets as to the United States China will be continuously faced there- fore with the strong likelihood that full Soviet support will not be forthcoming when it is most needed 98 DETERRENCE OF LOCAL AGGRESSION General Deterrence of local aggression depends on a military capa- bility which will cause the Chinese to estimate either that the local aggression is not likely to be successful or that other dire consequences more than offsetting possible local victory may ensue In either case the threat of use of the military capability must be credible Military Capabilities to Oppose Local Aggression Operations within a local area to counter local aggression by a nuclear-capable CPR depend first upon the ability of the United States to reinforce a threatened ally at a rate faster than the Communists can build up their forces Unless the United States should decide to initiate nuclear operations success in local Operations will also be heavily dependent on deterrence of Chinese first use and on minimizing advantages that would accrue locally to the Chinese through their first use of nuclear weapons Total US force availability does not appear to be a problem in this regard now or proSpectively unless one assumes that two or more local wars requiring major US intervention are under way simultaneously If consideration is limited to Asia such an assumption would appear to have little validity inasmuch as the limited CER ability to project power beyond its own borders would 99 make a two-front war even more uninviting to China than to the United States Specific capabilities to permit effective local US military Operations and present and prOSpective deficiencies in this re- gard involve at least these major factors l Rapidity of US military intervention will become even more essential than now not only to defend allied territory successfully but also to control escalation Additional highly mobile immediately available forces and transport in the Pacific Command may not be essential but would at least be highly desir- able More importantly the rate of reinforcement in likely areas of local war is now severely curtailed through inadequacies in ports and airfields These deficiencies should be ameliorated as a matter of high priority 2 Indigenous forces must be able with the assistance of those US forces which can be immediately brought into action to retard a hostile advance long enough to permit the deployment of additional US forces adequate to repel the invasion A major deficiency in this regard may arise in the case of Thailand which if Laos should become a Communist base would be highly vulnerable to major attack 3 The United States and its allies must be clearly able to continue to fight in a bilateral nuclear environment either locally or on a broader basis even if the CPR is given the advan- tage of first use of nuclear weapons This requires the maximum 100 - an practical reduction in vulnerability of committed forces and particularly in the vulnerability of supporting logistic facili- ties in a broader sense it requires the capability to carry the war to the heart of China if that should be required 4 Where strong inducements can be foreseen on both sides to use nuclear weapons particularly in Korea and Taiwan US military forces must be prepared to exploit their nuclear capa- bility This requires first the military capability and a suit able political basis to permit the United States to initiate nuclear operations if it should choose to do so It requires also that the forces of the United States and its allies be prepared to operate effectively if the Chinese use nuclear weapons whether on Chinese initiative or in reSponse to US use The present situation with regard to tactical mobility diSpersion of bases air defenses and logistic vulnerability in the two critical areas is inadequate in this reSpect These inadequacies which are clear to a sophisticated Opponent are now probably sufficient to warrant a conclusion by the Communists that the United States cannot fight a bilateral nuclear war and hence will not employ nuclear weapons locally to oppose aggression by a nuclear-armed power US Will to Employ its Military Capability The United States clearly has the capability to contest any Chinese aggression and--considering military power solely--the 101 3 capability to defeat one way if not another any open Chinese attack Communist estimates however of US determination to use this capability if required will be based largely upon US actions 22222 to the achievement of a locally effective Communist Chinese nuclear capability If the United States has earlier failed to support an Asian ally effectively the CPR leadership may well estimate that the United States will not except for issues of the gravest concern to the United States involve itself in mili- tary operations against forces supported by a nuclear-capable OER The United States already has appeared reluctant to commit forces for the defense of Laos and until recently South Vietnam in spite of its regional nuclear monopoly its willingness to inter- vene when it has lost that monopoly locally may appear to Asians to be highly doubtful The Open reluctance of EurOpean nations to agree to any Western military action in Asia will be assessed by the CPR as a further brake on US military support of its Asian allies Thus the credibility of US will to oppose local aggress- ion may well be reduced by the acquisition of a nuclear capability by the CPR Nuclear Sharing A nuclear capability actual or potential in the hands of selected Asian allies might serve as a deterrent to local aggres- sion by a nuclear-armed China 102 A rudimentary potential nuclear capability now exists for certain allies and will be increased in the future in the form of dual-capable air defense and ground force weapons A poten- tial offensive nuclear capability also theoretically now exists in the Nationalist Chinese Air Force through the provision of a low altitude bombing liA 7 capability in its this offen- sive potential does not in fact exist however because of the incompatibility of the airplane with weapons available in the Pacific Command absence of special weapons wiring and black boxes in the airplane and the lack of maintenance and test equip- ment for the LAB installation The Chinese Nationalists have however been practicing LAB maneuvers Observation of this training plus the knowledge that the United States has nuclear weapons and nuclear Specialists on Taiwan must lead the Commu- nist Chinese to estimate that if the Chinese Nationalists do not now have an offensive nuclear capability the United States in- tends at some point in time to provide one These past actions to provide a rudimentary potential nuclear capability to Asian allies have caused no significant Communist reaction It appears from previous analysis that any military require- ment for a nuclear capability in allied forces in Asia would not exceed 1 A small but relatively invulnerable offensive capability for Nationalist China and possibly South Korea as a hedge against 103 the contingency of diversion of US strength from the immediate area resulting in a Communist conclusion that a quick conquest might then be possible and to offer a credible threat of a nuclear defense in areas where it would be politically difficult and prob- ably impossible for the United States to use nuclear weapons-- Specifically the offshore islands 2 An air defense capability against a Chinese air-delivered threat particularly in Japan South Korea Taiwan and the Philippines If the Chinese air delivery capability should significantly exceed that listed in Appendix or if for some now unforeseen reason US deployments to the Western Pacific should be greatly reduced there could be strong military reason for providing a valid potential nuclear capability to some Asian allies If the future military situation develOps as now foreseen however there appears to be no overriding military requirement to do this A decision to provide or withhold a nuclear capability for Asian allies should accordingly be made essentially on political grounds REGIONAL DETERRENCE Control of the scope and intensity of local operations can best be achieved by a military capability which insures that an 1 See below p 147 104 eXpansion2 or escalation of hostilities beyond limits openly or tacitly set by the United States will incur punishment far tran scending the possible rewards of success in the local Operations This requires deterrence that is regional in its scope Regional deterrence--that is the placing of all of Commu- nist China in the position of a hostage--can deter major overt military aggression by the CPR and can reduce the risk of CER escalation of local hostilities As pointed out above it is crucial in any situation in which the United States denies itself first use of nuclear weapons The Regional Deterrent Force Concept Inasmuch as the destruction of Chinese capabilities to wage war requires no more than perhaps one hundred or so delivered weapons it is evident that this task could be carried out either by US strategic forces or by US forces assigned to the Pacific Command Highly effective and relatively invulnerable US strategic forces are and will be needed in any event to restrain the Soviet Union Operations against China would not significantly reduce their total capabilities against the Soviet Union 2 Including expansion through CPR intervention in a local war not initially involving the Communist bloc 105 s1 WQHEE PACOM forces now assigned and proSpectively available are of adequate size to carry out the offensive strikes required in a regional war with China These forces also are and will be re- quired to signify publicly the US commitment to the defense of its Asian allies to bolster their resistance and to permit immediate re5ponse in local hostilities Further these forces will need to be made progressively less vulnerable to Soviet attack and this improvement will in turn make them somewhat less vulnerable to Chinese pre emptive attack Thus the regional deterrent force of the United States as regards military capability could be either strategic or theater forces It is to the advantage of the United States however primarily in the political sense to design and discreetly adver- tise its forces in the PACOM as a Specific counterforce for the CPR 3 This judgment is offered in light of the following con siderations 1 One key to minimizing the risk of general war is a clear understanding by both the Soviet Union and the CPR that they are considered by the United States to be wholly separate entities If the United States should indicate that it considers the two 3 It might be considered that the situations in NATO and the Far East are analogous and that arguments for and against a NATO regional deterrent apply also to a wholly American regional deterrent in the Pacific-Par East area This is not regarded as a valid extrapolation See Appendix G below pp 2ll-l7 106 5m - or powers to be militarily inseparable so that an attack on China would have to be considered by the Soviet Union a prelude to attack on itself then attack on China would almost certainly invoke immediate Soviet reaponse against the United States The United States must therefore as an essential step in minimizing the risk of general war insure a clear realization on the Commu- nist side that the United States considers the Communist military threat to be separable The design and publicizing of a counter- CER force separate and apart from strategic forces Specifically designed and long publicized as an instrument for destruction of the Soviet Union would assist in making this distinction obvious The existence of such a force clearly adequate to devastate China but offering little if any increased threat to the Soviet Union but also not significantly diminishing the deterrent threat to the Soviet Union should make clear to the Soviets that a war need not and should not involve the USSR Such a capability if prOperly and to the extent practi- cable inflexibly deployed against Communist China could not be mistaken by the USSR as directed against or seriously threaten- ing itself There could be no question concerning a dilution of the US nuclear threat against the USSR In a situation requiring US nuclear attack against the CPR the USSR might be able to con- clude prudently that its own destruction in an exchange with the United States was not indicated and thus might well avoid the ultimate escalation 107 1 side-r 2 The chance of CPR miscalculation would be minimized if the Chinese clearly understand that the nuclear offensive forces immediately facing them are designed and intended as a counter- China force The Communist Chinese are likely to estimate that diversion of long-range strike forces against China would sub- stantially impair US capability against the Soviet Union they might well consider therefore that this force must be reserved for use against the USSR They should be given no Opportunity to act on an underestimation of the power and capabilities of US longurange striking forces to which they have not been exposed which they cannot see and which they may understand only imper- fectly 3 If nuclear operations against targets in mainland China should be required the use of PACOM forces would avoid the sig- nificant disadvantages inherent in the use of the United States as a base for nuclear offensive Operations If the United States were to re3pond to aggression by means of a nuclear attack on China and if this attack were launched primarily from the United States Communist counteraction would require Soviet attack on the United States since only thus could further US operations be im- peded A decision to carry the war into China would thus be made politically more difficult for the United States This difficulty which would be clearly recognized by the Communists would materi- ally weaken the deterrent effect 108 SEEP -v 4 In the absence of an adequate Pacific-based US deterrent nuclear escalation by the CPR of local hostilities would require the United States to decide whether to accept local defeat or alternatively to invoke its long-range strategic strike capa- bility with the possibility of triggering a Soviet first strike against the United States perhaps partly on the basis of a calcu- lation that the US long-range nuclear strike capability has been diluted and eSpecially if these Soviet forces remain vulnerable partly in the belief that subsequent attack on the USSR is intend ed It is far from certain that the United States would decide in such circumstances to escalate hostilities to this degree as an alternative to local defeat The circumstances would be sharply changed by the provision of PACOM forces visibly adapted to the Specific task of retaliation against Communist China 5 The existence of a visible Pacific-based US capability to destroy China's ability to wage war would appear to be an impor- - tant element in bolstering US allies who may well doubt the reliability of depending for their ultimate defense on a US decision to invoke its long range nuclear strike force 6 Finally a Pacific based US deterrent force aimed Specifi- cally at the CPR would develop important political and logical advantages in that it could hardly fail to corrode and divide the Sino Soviet military alliance 109 The regional deterrent effort by the United States need not be completely successful to be Chinese initiatives will in any event be subject to restraint to the extent that the Chinese suSpect that the Soviets may not support them More- over a US regional deterrent force will encourage and tempt the Soviets to defect even though they may not entirely disassociate themselves from the Chinese the support they provide for any Specific action may well be reduced No major reconfiguration of PACOM forces as now programmed will be required to tailor them to satisfy the requirement of a Specific counter to a nuclear-armed CPR Reasonable moderniza- tion will be necessary to keep ahead of the Communists in weaponry Sea-based forces will be an important component because of their invulnerability to Chinese attack Vulnerability of land-based forces and of command and control systems should be progressively reduced so as to provide with certainty a capability for controlled but delayed re5ponse These preparations must be of a nature to permit participation of these forces in extensive non nuclear local hostilities without creating vulnerabilities to a surprise pre-emptive Chinese nuclear attack 0f crucial importance how ever is the conscious although discreet construction of an ade- quate political and basis to permit these forces to be effective in a deterrent and divisive role 110 SW A good case can be made politically for the design of PACOM nuclear offensive strike forces inflexibly poised to devastate China but offering no threat to the USSR To some degree the facts of geography will achieve this result PACOM forces are as far as the Soviet Union is concerned limited in any event to Operations in Eastern Siberia far removed from the more criti- cal Soviet military industrial and pOpulation centers Terrain and political restrictions will necessarily require that land- based offensive weapons be based largely on Okinawa and southward Practically however the ultimate in divisive effect of these forces cannot be attained within reasonable economic limits nor is it desirable that these forces be unable to reSpond rapidly to local crises requiring redeployment Further the deterrent posture should rely heavily on sea-based forces which are practi- cally immune to Chinese surprise attack and which minimize Asian sensitivities to the presence of nuclear armament but whose mobility suggests the ability to attack Soviet as well as Chinese targets It should nonetheless be entirely possible to make it obvious both to the Communists and to our allies that the primary atten tion of these forces is devoted to the People s Republic of China In addition to any public statements or similar verbal indications that may be made many military indications to this effect can be created Command post and other exercises involving the seem 5m exclusive use of PACOM forces against China the elimination or minimization of PACOM play in at least some world-wide general war CPXs the publicized presence in more southerly Pacific waters and ports of Polaris submarines and ship-based medium-range ballis- tic missiles and similar devices can make this point clear To be effective indicators of this type must of course be backed by the reality of assignment of mainland China targets as a high priority to PACOM strike forces Characteristics The regional deterrent force should meet the following criteria 1 It must remain adequate to destroy the essential war-mak- ing capability of the CPR without detriment to the general war posture of the United States 2 It must not materially increase the threat to the USSR US forces in the Pacific while basically adequate for a regional war with China provide only a marginal increase in the total US capability against the USSR If the regional deterrent force is clearly designed for and considered to be a counter to CPR aggres sion it can be used for that purpose with far less risk of bring- ing on general war than if it were considered by both the United States and the Communists as an inseparable important segment of the US threat to the USSR ll2 The force must have relative invulnerability be reSpon sive to control at the highest level after the onset of hostili- ties and avoid a hair trigger posture This requires the dis- creetly publicized presence of concealed weapons the hardening and dispersal of land-based strike forces the survivability through hardening and redundancy of command and control facili- ties and -so long as the Chinese retain a significant bomber threat--the maintenance of effective air defenses for these forces Any lesser posture will invite attack whenever the Chinese believe they can destroy the local capability of the United States to retaliate effectively 4 The regional deterrent force should be reinforced in times of local crisis in the Far East Local hostilities in the Far East will create a strong temptation whenever the United States and its allies enjoy military success for the Chinese to expand the scale or area of hostilities Further a local crisis will almost surely cause movements and redeployments of forces now in the Far East focusing on the area of local hostilities Thus unless conscious preventive action is taken the regional deterrent posture is likely to be degraded at the very time when it needs to be strongest 113 THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK 114 SENI- SEEP CHAPTER VII VARIATIONS The preceding analysis has been based on the assumption that the development of a Chinese nuclear capability will proceed within the present Sino Soviet political framework along the gen- eral lines and in the approximate scale and time frame stated in Appendix A 1 Certain alternative political and technological courses of action are possible however which may affect the mil- itary situation in the Far East SING-SOVIET RELATIONS Implicit in the body of this paper is the assumption that re lations between the People's Republic of China 15337 and the Soviet Union remain about as they are at present that is strains exist while the coalition persists This is regarded not only as the most likely situation in fact but also as the contingency most complex in its military aspects So long as the USSR-CPR alliance remains in effect however strained Sino-Soviet relations may be the Communist Chinese will have considerable independence of decision and may also be able 1 See below p 147 115 to blackmail the Soviets by threatening to use nuclear weapons in an aggression unless given Soviet support and conventional mil itary aid The Chinese may therefore be able to induce the Soviets to agree to adventures that the latter would if firmly in charge be inclined to veto The Chinese should thus be in a position to extract military and economic assistance from the Communist bloc hardly available to them in the event of a rupture in relations with the Soviet Union A violent rupture of Sino-Soviet relations like that between Stalin and Tito which must be regarded as a possibility would leave the CPR isolated from major sources of military aid and eco nomic support thus probably moderating the rate of her progress toward industrialization and improvement of conventional military forces and depriving her of any expectation of support for Chinese aggression While such withdrawal should have little effect on China's progress toward nuclear-weapons capabilities progress in delivery vehicles would probably be materially delayed China also would need to divert major military effort and resources to secure herself from Soviet attack Military measures taken by the United States to cope with a CPR emerging as a nuclear power under circumstances of strain in her relations with the Soviet Union appear certain to be fully adequate to deal with the CPR in the situation of a real break in Sine-Soviet relations 116 s f There remains the possibility that Moscow might establish rigid control over bloc policy and action including the policy and action of the CPR In that case the United States and its allies would continue to face the familiar Soviet threat en- hanced by a considerable addition of territory and a modest addi tion of resources but diminished by a reduction in complexity The combined USSR-CPR military resources would not be signifi- cantly increased although flexibility and coordination in their use might be appreciably enhanced Thus in this event which must be regarded as quite unlikely during the time frame of this paper 2 some of the military actions suggested might profitably be amended The necessity would remain for example to deal with local wars and guerrilla wars in the Far East but restraint of major aggression would be imposed by threat of attack on the Soviet Union A regional deterrent force would lose its signifi- cance as a divisive influence on Sino-Soviet relations but would remain useful as a threat to war making capabilities within the Communist Chinese sector of the bloc It is not inconceivable that China and the Soviet Union might draw closer together with a relationship roughly similar to that of the United States and the United Kingdom but to a degree short of total Soviet control This circumstance could only exist if China significantly moderates its actions and policies and accepts 2 From the present to 3 1972 See above p l 117 shit over-all Soviet leadership within and outside the bloc In these circumstances it must be assumed that the Soviet Union would be fully committed to support any military action undertaken by the Chinese and that there would thus be somewhat greater likelihood of Soviet use or threatened use of its nuclear capabilities when necessary to succor China A US regional deterrent force might therefore in these circumstances be somewhat less effective It should still be a effort however both for whatever direct deterrent value it might have and also as a divisive factor between China and the Soviet Union Whatever effectiveness the US regional deterrent posture might lose would be more than offset by the increased ability and desire of the Soviet Union to restrain Chinese opportunism It is conceivable further that such an adjustment in Sino- Soviet relations might result in significant Soviet assistance to the Chinese in their nuclear development program Real accelera tion in this program however can be achieved only if the Soviet Union provides finished articles warheads or delivery vehicles to the Chinese This is not believed to be a real possibility the Soviet Union is most unlikely to create a nuclear threat on its periphery that might eventually be used against itself The Soviets are thus most unlikely to furnish such systems in response to a possibly transitory Chinese accommodation they must insist on certain and complete Soviet control A relaxation of Sino Soviet 118 5317' in strain is therefore not likely significantly to accelerate Chinese nuclear progress ACCELERATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT Possible variations in Chinese Communist nuclear weapons development and delivery vehicle programs are discussed in an- other PACIFICA paper ain which it is assumed that little or no further direct Soviet aid will be forthcoming for either the delivery-vehicle or nuclear weapons programs Current intelli gence estimates are compatible with this assumption In the event that Soviet assistance were substantial ad- vanced Chinese capabilities would be achieved at an earlier date Unless the Soviets provide fissionable materials outright in large quantities however the Chinese stockpile will be a serious limiting factor at least until 1968-69 Because there appears to be little likelihood that the Soviets will give the Chinese a serious capability to attack the heart of the USSR the improved Chinese capabilities would probably be regional consisting of medium jet bombers medium-range ballistic missiles and thermonuclear warheads The acquisition of these vehicles earlier than the Chinese could achieve them by their own efforts would probably have the net effect of moving the regional threat up in time by as much as two to three years 3 Donald B Keesing The Communist Chinese Nuclear Threat Warheads and Delivery Vehicles U DATA ISD Study Memorandum No l IDA Washington D C 119 '4 The first date for a deliverable Chinese thermonuclear weapon is subject to a wide range of uncertainty Given good intelligence or some luck with design ideas the Chinese after testing their first nuclear device in 1963 or 1964 might attain a thermonuclear missile warhead as early as 1967 Some observers however con sider that this may not come about until three years later The date of thermonuclear acquisition is significant because the Chinese are expected to increase their fission yields only slowly within the 20- to 50 kiloton range for deliverable weapons until the ad- vent of a thermonuclear weapon It is possible that the initial Chinese test operation will involve a series of detonations either within the time span now estimated for the initial detonation or somewhat later Such a series might or might not be evidence of a full-blown local nuclear capability from the outset it would almost certainly be advertised as such by the Chinese This sudden emergence of the People's Re- public of China as a nuclear power with an operational capability whether real or notional would intensify the shock effect of the initial detonation and would thus enhance the CPR opportunity to obtain political and advantage from its initial test AN EARLY CPR DETERRENT STRATEGY Another course open to the Communist Chinese would be to con centrate their resources and efforts upon the early acquisition of 120 u- a nuclear threat against the continental United States and to rely on this force for indirect defense against nearby US forces Starting with the early Chinese nuclear devices there could be very limited Chinese capabilities for delivery against the United States especially the Pacific Coast by submarine surface ship and clandestine means and against Alaska and Hawaii by the above means plus a one way sneak attack using medium bombers Bulls Any such capabilities will be inadequate to threaten major de- struction in the United States and the chance that the CPR might use them in the face of the threat of much greater retaliation would appear remote A more serious threat to the continental United States could be made assuming a rapid recovery from the present economic crisis by combining a relatively massive program of fissionable materials production once the processes are established with an early breakthrough in the thermonuclear field and relying on the large-scale production of a relatively cheap cruise missile de- signed to reach the United States An early cruise missile would probably have such poor accuracy as to require reliance entirely on high yields and fallout but it would be a low-cost item with few design problems The earliest date on which the cruise missile and thermonuclear warhead combination could be assembled in quan- tity would probably be 1967 or 1968 and then only at considerable cost in deferred ballistic missile opportunities The obvious 121 mar SIM inadequacies of such a weapon and its lack of growth potential must make this an unattractive course for the Chinese unless the alternative development that of the intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM would result in an extended delay As another alternative the Chinese might concentrate on an intercontinental ballistic missile program at the expense of shorter- term capabilities In this case the first Chinese ICBMs could be tested as early as 1969 An initial operating capability would then be likely by 1970 or 1971 and a sizable ICBM force could be deployed by 1973 or I974 IMPLICATIONS No significant disadvantage to the United States is perceived in any of the likely variations discussed above Any major change in Sino Soviet relations will either delay and reduce Chinese capa- bilities at one extreme in the event of a complete rift or at the other simplify the political and strategic problem by substi- tuting one potential enemy for two by creating in effect a single power--in the event of near-complete rapprochement with no appre- ciably greater total capability than the sum of the two components taken separately While the Chinese may be able to acceleiate their nuclear program in advance of that envisaged in Appendix A by one two or possibly three years there will still be time for the 4 See below p 147 122 sum- United States to complete any significant countermeasures that may be required Concentration upon acquiring an early crude inter- continental capability would not permit the Chinese independently to cause great destruction in the United States and would appre- ciably delay the Chinese in obtaining more meaningful military weapons More likely variations imply delays and increased difficul ties in Chinese progress toward achieving a nuclear capability 123 THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK 124 syn CHAPTER LONGBR- TERM CHINA AS A CLASS NUCLEAR POWER The possession of one hundred- or even of several hundred-- thermonuclear-armed intercontinental vehicles will not necessar- ily make China a Class A nuclear power To have Class A power as a matter of political reality China must be believed to have achieved the ability in a retaliatory strike to deliver an effective blow against all nuclear powers likely to combine in a hostile coalition This means that the CPR will require a very substantial long-range capability that credibly can survive the first strike of all or most of the other nuclear powers A significant first strike or other partially effective intercontinental capability say one hundred missiles would make China what might be called a Class nuclear power Under most circumstances such a Chinese capability would increase restraints on either of the two greater powers against undertaking actions 1 This chapter parallels Chapter V section on Military ASpects of the Study PACIFICA final report The Emergence of Communist China As A Nuclear Power U SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA ISD Study Report Two IDA Washington D C 1962 125 5 so menacing as to threaten the integrity of China 01 the survival of the Chinese Communist regime Restraints on American actions however should not be great in practice because the United States appears unlikely to pursue any objective in relation to China that might charge the Chinese threat with reality A Class capability would also improve China s ability to operate under its own nuclear cover affording it greater freedom of military action but placing increased strain on the Soviet Union and hence on the Sino-Soviet alliance An even greater strain on the Soviet alliance will result from the fact that long-range capabilities against the Soviet Union would be available as an automatic by produCt of emplacing such forces against the United States The Soviet Union could be expected to view the creation of Chinese nuclear offensive forces capable of bringing the entire USSR under threat with extreme unease Possession of a Class capability would place the CPR in an inherently dangerous position Unless the CPR succeeds in con- cealing delivery vehicles to an extent that would prevent target- ing by either the United States or the Soviet Union its forces are almost certain to be highly vulnerable and because they con- stitute essentially a first strike capability will invite pre- emptive attack by a stronger power 126 If for no other reason than this China may well feel obliged during this period to avoid giving serious provocation to either the United States or the Soviet Union Because of the danger of a pre-emption and because any major use of forces against Communist China must of necessity aim first at destroying its nuclear capabilities the Chinese can be eXpected to work in great secrecy creating stringent require- ments for US reconnaissance capabilities But desPite efforts at concealment during the transitional period from regional to Class A nuclear power China can never be certain of substantial invulnerability to a hostile first strike Vulnerability could result in a hair trigger Chinese pos ture materially increasing the likelihood of an ill-conceived launching of the Chinese intercontinental force Besides inflict ing severe damage upon US civilian assets and population a Chinese first strike might also degrade US strategic capabilities to such a degree as to dangerously weaken the United States rela tive to Soviet strategic forces If the Chinese overestimate the cover their threat affords to local operations endangering the vital interests of the United States a situation of great danger would ensue This danger would of course be bilateral but it would be particularly acute for China and every effort should be made to assure that China accurately assesses her risks 127 During the period when China possesses only small and vulner able intercontinental striking forces the basic arrangements already discussed in relation to US regional military problems will remain valid--particularly actions designed to divide the nuclear strength of the Soviet Union and China The requirement for selective and deliberate direction of US nuclear forces will continue As China increases its strategic strength however operations against China may have to become increasingly depend- ent on American long-range striking forces CHINA AS A CLASS A NUCLEAR POWER China will not be able to attain Class A nuclear status until she has acquired a fully develOped modern economic and industrial base This will not occur for at least a decade and probably several decades But in the meantime the technology and mili- tary capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union will not remain static In addition to improved nuclear capabilities it is entirely possible that scientific and technological develop- ments by these two powers may have rendered intercontinental nuclear attack outmoded as the primary strategic factor by develop- ments in defense againSt nuclear attack by military uses of Space or in consequence of concepts and weapons now quite unfore seeable In the economic and industrial fields even rapid growth may be insufficient to permit China to approach parity with the 128 uncussmw most advanced countries Finally intervening events including wars or arms control measures could foreclose the possibility of Chinese acquisition of Class A nuclear status It is far from certain therefore that China will in fact ever approach parity in weaponry with the United States or the Soviet Union Certainly if China does so the process will take a very long time and parity will be attained in an era now unpre- dictable in its political military and technological aSpects But for the purpose of further discussion it is assumed that China does at some indefinite time in the future attain Class A nuclear capabilities not outmoded by scientific and technological develOpments elsewhere Once China places the United States under a major second strike nuclear threat the US deterrent requirement will change First inasmuch as a nuclear exchange with China will involve attack on the United States there will be no Special deterrent value in limiting the threat of US nuclear attack against China to forces based in the Far East or elsewhere outside the United States Second the United States could not afford to plan to engage in a thermonuclear exchange with only one of two hostile superpowers leaving the other relatively undamaged and in a position to achieve world domination An attack on the United States by either must therefore be expected to cause US reSponse against both regardless of what use might be made of American 129 mm as strike forces in the actual event Prior indication of this in- tention should minimize any inducement for either China or the Soviet Union to play the game of Let's you two fight US forces in the vicinity of China will retain value other than for general war purposes to the extent that a requirement exists to fight actions of a localized or limited nature well below the point of an intercontinental exchange 133 dh1 UNHM89 95 355 CHAPTER IX CONCLUSIONS The more general military implications of the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power can be summed up as follows 1 A Communist Chinese nuclear capability will increase risks --for the United States and its allies that China will escalate hostilities to the point of initiating nuclear operations for China that it may misread relative and thus overplay its hand and that the vulnerability of its nuclear forces may invite US counterforce operations for the Soviet Union that it will be subject to increased Chinese pressures and might in some measure be implicated through Chinese initiatives in Sino-American hostil- ities These risks will increase as Chinese nuclear capabilities grow 2 A military advantage for the People's Republic of China will result primarily from restraints on US military inter- vention at the lower levels and increased US reluctance to exploit its nuclear capability at the higher levels of hostilities The Chinese may obtain an advantage from the actual use of nuclear weapons only in Special less likely circumstances Nevertheless 131 sun- the existence of this capability will require precautionary meas- ures by the United States and its allies More Specific implications are 3 The CPR nuclear weapons program and particularly the initial detonation will create political and influ- ences that could materially weaken the military position of the United States and its allies in Asia While serious adverse reac- tions are not necessarily inevitable they are of such potential significance as to require planned and timely US preventive action to reassure the allies of the United States and strengthen their resolution and to discourage the Communists 4 Any CPR nuclear capability will diminish whatever freedom to decide whether military operations will be nuclear or non nuclear the United States now enjoys as well as its present unilateral ability to enforce ground rules for any local hostilities by posing a major nuclear threat The Chinese capability will a Permit the CPR to escalate hostilities in area and intensity if it should choose to do so b Decrease foreign political and military support for US military actions in Asia c Tend to delay and restrain US military intervention particularly in situations not of vital immediate importance to the US 132 UNUMSSIFIEB d Give the Chinese commensurably more latitude for aggressive action without incurring direct US opposition e Increase the likelihood of bilateral nuclear opera- tions in any local war situation that involves major organized CPR and US forces f Permit the Chinese to make a pre-emptive strike against the forces of the United States and its allies in the Far East or under favorable circumstances to gain a decisive local advantage in hostilities initially non-nuclear in character 5 A highly significant military advantage that will accrue to the CPR from its nuclear capability will be the additional reluctance of the United States to initiate nuclear operations which will give China commensurably greater freedom to exploit her superior ground force capability 6 Chinese capabilities to conduct first strike nuclear operations will create a strong likelihood that hostilities in certain areas particularly Korea and Taiwan will be nuclear This circumstance will require first the creation of a basic military environment in these areas that will permit prompt and effective US and allied Operations in a nuclear war second the reduction of political and disadvantages that may result from a US decision to initiate nuclear operations and finally the maximum practical reduction of present vulnerabilities of US and allied forces in these areas to nuclear attack 183 sm- 7 These advantages for the Chinese from their new ability to escalate local hostilities in Asia can be minimized by measures to deter such escalation at the higher levels and by a US reac- tion capability sufficiently rapid and of adequate weight to make Chinese escalation of lesser hostilities unattractive and ineffec- tive 8 A deterrent force deisgned Specifically as a counter to the CPR can generally deter overt aggression by the permit the United States to impose ground rules within limits if aggres- sion occurs and minimize the risk of escalation uncontrolled by the United States--including escalation to the general war level- while serving as a corrosive influence on the Sino-Soviet alliance and as a fortifier for Asian allies of the United States This US deterrent force should consist of the nuclear offen- sive forces assigned to the Pacific Command modernized as neces sary and provided with a high degree of survivability that is not dependent upon fast reaction It should be reinforced in times of crisis in large part uncommitted to local Operations clearly sufficient to destroy China's ability to wage war and obviously offering Specific threat to the CPR rather than the USSR 9 More specifically this US deterrent force if supported by a firm political base will enable the United States to retain a large measure of freedom to decide whether local hostilities in Asia will be nuclear or non nuclear in character 134 1 mm 10 Although a Chinese nuclear capability may exert increasSec'IF'EB pressures on the Soviet Union to support Chinese military initia tives a nuclear exchange whether in a peripheral area or against the Chinese mainland need not of necessity result in a Soviet attack on the united States In addition to the Soviet reluctance that will be induced by the existence and readiness of uncommitted US strategic strike forces Soviet reprisal against the US can be further discouraged by US actions including parti- cularly the rapidity and effectiveness of the initial US regional action and the separation of the forces used against the CPR from those directly threatening the Soviet Union ll The CPR nuclear program may not follow the course now estimated either because of Soviet assistance or because the CPR selects an alternative course of action The more likely varia- tions will result in delay in China s nuclear program but some others are conceivable that might either actually increase the initial political and advantages to be gained by the CPR by reducing moderately the time available for US counter- action or that might entail some earlier direct risk to the United States The counteractions suggested here if taken in time should however be adequate to cope with these variations In sum the countermeasures suggested as being required in the near term will retain validity until and unless the CPR attains superpower status 135 12 As China achieves a small but vulnerable intercontinental capability dangers for both China and the United States will in- crease This capability may require US counterforce operations as a prelude to any major military operation in Asia Force vulnera bility is likely to result in a hair trigger Chinese posture that could lead to an ill conceived launching of the Chinese interconti- nental force These extraordinary risks are likely to induce substantially more cautious action by both China and the United States in any situation that might evolve into a military confron- tation 13 China may eventually possess intercontinental nuclear capabilities approaching equality with the United States and the Soviet Union but this is far from a certainty If such is achieved strategic plans of the United States must promise reaponse against both China and the Soviet Union if intercontinental war should occur The regional deterrent posture will then lose its special effectiveness though the forces committed to it will continue to serve usefully by providing a portion of the general deterrent to military action by the CPR 136 CHAPTER SUGGESTED ACTIONS GENERAL This chapter lists US military actions designed to deny advantages that might otherwise be gained by the People's Republic of China as the result of its nuclear weapons program and to improve the military situation of the United States and its allies vis-a-vis a nuclear-capable CPR Examination of the military situation created by a nuclear- capable CPR reveals no single realistic countermeasure and no sat- isfactory package of a few countermeasures that would offset the CPR advantages completely though one countermeasure the regional deterrent could have dramatic effect The listing which follows is therefore Taken together these actions should have highly significant cumulative effects Avenues considered to be politically unacceptable or economically infeasible have been excluded Most of the actions suggested involve little if any additional cost The total cost involved for all the actions listed is nevertheless high although these include many actions which would probably be necessary in any case and total costs of course are dependent on the scope and phasing of the actions that 137 are adOpted But increased costs are inevitable in the increased- risk environment that will result from the emergence of the CPR as a nuclear power The actions suggested below are grouped for convenience into categories according to their primary purpose This device is not intended to indicate that the purpose or effect of a specific action can be wholly catalogued under a single heading All of the actions listed will have some general effect TO FORESTALL INITIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS These measures are covered in Appendix C 1 Those of a Speci- fically military nature include such measures as the provision of schooling in the realities of nuclear warfare for Asian elites and combined military planning with Asian allies TO BOLSTER ALLIED WILL AND CAPABILITIES Air Defense Improvements For at least the next several years any Chinese nuclear offen- sive delivery capability must to a significant extent include aircraft Present programs envisage substantial improvements in air defense capabilities in Japan Korea Okinawa and Taiwan and these are the areas most likely to be subject to CPR nuclear attack 1 See below pp l61-7l 138 In addition to some improvements in the air defenses for the Philippines rudimentary air defenses presently US-manned and on a non-permanent basis have been provided in Thailand and South Vietnam All major allies should have some assurance of self- protection at least from a primitive Chinese offensive nuclear strike If the estimate in Appendix A approximates actual Chinese progress 2 present programs should suffice provided those for Thailand and South Vietnam are put on a permanent basis and manned by indigenous personnel The United States should be prepared however to accelerate and enlarge current programs if subsequent events should indicate the development of a larger-scale or more sophisticated Chinese aircraft delivery capability Visible Presence of US Forces Until recently when the US reacted to Communist threats in South Vietnam and Thailand exercises of mobile US forces parti- cularly those deployed from within the United States were infre- quent of small scale and limited in locale Provision should be made for frequent demonstration of the mobile character of US forces in areas not immediately threatened as well as in areas that are 2 See below p 147 139 Bilateral Arrangements with Thailand Further action may be desirable Details are given in Appendix 3 3 Improved Military Relationship with Pakistan This also appears to be desirable Details are given in Appendix 3 4 TO IMPROVE THE US DETERRENT POSTURB Establishment of an Effective Regional Deterrent Force No single US countermeasure to CPR acquisition of nuclear weap- ons will be as significant as the constitution of an effective regional deterrent force plainly capable of devastating the CPR but posing relatively little threat to the Soviet Union Some actions to the end of improving the survivability and reSponsive- ness to control of what are in effect already elements of a US regional deterrent force are now under way or are planned Insofar as land-based elements are concerned however these measures are devoted largely to insuring short-term survivability in the event of a Soviet first strike Long-term survivability and reSponsive ness to control are necessary in the face of a nuclear-capable CPR 3 See below pp 156-57 4 Ibid 140 This requires additional effort in the way of hardening and con- cealment of forces and of command and control facilities diSper- sion of logiscic facilities and possibly improvement of the air defenses for US forces and facilities A missile capability afloat including both Polaris submarines and ship-based medium-range ballistic missiles ZERBME7 is a highly desirable element of the regional deterrent force because of the comparative invulnerability of these elements to CPR attack and because political complications will be minimized by their use Deployment of the Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System or some counterpart should be accelerated Hardened land-based would also make a significant contribution to the regional deterrent posture early deployment rather than magnitude of num- bers is the critical element Encouragement of Chinese Doubts of USSR Intentions This can be an important and political by- product of US military posture and policy Details are given in Appendix C 5 5 See below pp l l 7l and particularly 166-67 171 141 imam Vulnerability Studies on East Asian Communist States Such studies should be initiated by the Department of Defense Details are given in Appendix C 6 TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF US FORCES DEPLOYED T0 FORWARD AREAS Ground ForCes The ability of ground forces to fight in a nuclear environment requires a high degree of tactical mobility in all committed forces Present US forces in or available to the Far East do not have this mobility and some improvement is called for Land-Based Air Forces As feasible additional base facilities suitable for use by US combat units shouid be made available to permit additional deployments and disn- sion particularly in Korea and Southeast Asia These facili-_es can be provided least expensively either by a program to expand indigenous civil aviation capabilities or through funding in part by tne Military Aid Program to sup- port indigenous uir force operations In either case the facili- ties provided shauld of course be compatible with the requirements for support of US forces 6 See below pp 165-66 142 The most apparent and dangerous vulnerability of US forces LOgistics that may be committed to potentially nuclear operations in for ward areas lies in present logistic facilities and practices A detailed survey should be made to determine Specific actions that can be taken to eliminate or to reduce these vulnerabilities TO IMPROVE US FORCE CAPABILITIES FOR QUICK LOCAL RESPONSE Strategic Mobility Rapid US local response will be essential in order to control escalation by a nuclear-capable China and to minimize pressures for active Soviet support of Chinese military Operations This capability requires a high degree of strategic mobility both for forces stationed in the Far East and for forces in the United States that may be called upon to reinforce the Pacific Command 1Ph00g7 Significant improvements in the immediate availability of highly mobile forces within PACOM and in strategic mobility through improvements in strategic trans- ports and floating stockpiles are included in present programs A further increase in locally available air transPort in PACOM may be desirable Further significant increases in the mobility of US forces will require primarily improvement in the forward base environment of likely areas of hostility 7 7 See below pp l44 45 143 seen Thai Defenses If future events should lead to the development of a Communist forward base in Laos Thai force requirements should be carefully re-examined in the light of actual development toinsure that the Thais can retard hostile operations sufficiently to permit the introduction of US forces Preparations to improve the Thai base structure to permit the accelerated deployment of US forces will be particularly important through provision of dispersion and redundancy Any such improvements should also reduce vulnerability to a minimum-scale nuclear attack Forward Base Environment The generally primitive logistical environment in Korea and Southeast Asia militates strongly against prompt effective mili tary operations whether by allied or US forces and entails exces- sive concentration of deployed military resources In view of the heavy current interest and emphasis on this question of environ- ment specific recommendations are not offered other than to note that any improvement in ports roads railroads airfields and communications--or local availability of petroleum products and tranSport and heavy engineering equipment--would directly assist any US military deployments operations or support that may be required Economic and military aid programs should be carefully 1cm si r coordinated to insure that any effort subsidized by the United States contributes to the over-all US allied military capability Bilateral Planning Present bilateral planning with US allies in the Far East is generally limited to broad concepts and the basic elements affecting combined control or coordination of operations Such generalized planning requires our allies to draw their own con- clusions on the actual capabilities of US forces to assist them in defense of their territory More specific planning which would carry at least a connotation of US force commitment would permit these nations to assess US capabilities more correctly and thus provide a much better basis for timely and realistic requests for US assistance when and if a threat arises This planning should Specifically include the allocation of tasks arrangements for the reception and forward movement of US forces the provision of locally available supplies and services and similar matters on which the rate of build-up of US forces depends TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WESTERN ALLIES Australia Australia can reasonably be expected to support US-military operations in Asia and in particular in Southeast Asia both morally and within its capabilities in action Australian 145 5% capabilities for effective military support are severely limited by distance lack of suitable forces and inadequate transport- and these difficulties will be intensified if Malaya Singapore and North Borneo federate Active encouragement and assistance Should be given Australia to maintain a significant mobile ground and air force capability together with the means for the rapid forward movement of these units when required Improvement in air and sea tranSport capabilities and logistic support capabilities Should have first priority The United Kingdom The creation of the Malaysian Federation will probably lead to tLe substitution or a British presence in the form of a small naval force for present Commonwealth forces now based on Singapore and Malaya While little assistance can be expected from UK forces for US military operations the retention of some British capabil- ity in the area can reduce the probability of attack on or US involvementin Malaya India and Pakistan The United Kingdom should be discreetly encouraged to retain existing base facilities in Singapore Malaya and the Indian Ocean in usable condition even though largely in standby status This retention will at least conserve some Britisn capability to commit forces to the area 5M Ill-Il-Ib ESTIMATED COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES END WARHEADS DELIVERY VEHICLES REMARKS OF YEAR Unitsl Max Yie1d2 MRBM ICBM Initial test detonation in 1963 or early 1964 1964 12 20 KT 345 1965 25 310 Initial Operational Capa- bility 1iog7 with Beagle 1966 40 280 5 1967 65 30 KT 250 10 IOC with MRBM 1968 115 225 30 1969 180 MT 205 60 First thermonuclear weapon 1970 285 1854 105 1971 400 1654 150 1972 550 1 MT 1504 200 IOC with ICBM 1 One unit represents fissionable material sufficient to pro- duce a fission weapon of approximately nominal yield 20KT Two units would be necessary to produce a thermonuclear weapon regard- less of yield Thus beginning in 1969 the Chinese could have either the stated number of fission weapons or half as many fusion weapons or a combination in between 2 Assumed to be a basic weapon of about 2500 pounds which would be compatible both with the Beagle and with If Badgers are available greater weights and hence greater yields could be used 3 Assumed to be Beagle Badgers might be available if furnished by the USSR or possibly by the late 1960s through Chinese production Alternatively a new fighter bomber nuclear-capable might be avail- able by the end of the decade 4 Manned aircraft may no longer be essential at this time in view of ratio of missiles to warheads if China has solved the target- ing problem If not Beagles probably will have been replaced by newer types This estimate is based upon Donald B Keesing The Communist Chi- nese Nuclear Threat -Warheads and Delivery Vehicles U SECRET- RESTRICTED DATA ISD Study Memorandum No 17 EDA Washington D C This PACIFICA paper will be issued shortly The numbers of warheads follow the Moderately Slow production program described in that paper on the assumption that a plutonium-producing reactor came into operation in 1961 147 Sill ll' Ha 11mm APPENDIX US ALLIANCE SYSTEMS IN THE FAR EAST Proposals have been made to deal with US security problems in the Asian-Pacific area by the revamping of present US alliances or by unilateral US guarantees A variety of alternatives has been suggested among them a Northest Asia Treaty Organization which at a minimum would include the United States Japan and South Korea a Pacific Treaty Organization including South Vietnam the Republic of China South Korea the United States and possibly the Philippines the dissolution of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and its replacement by an organization from which the United Kingdom and France especially would be excluded and a new Eisenhower Doctrine covering some uncommitted nations of Asia presumably India Burma Malaya and Ceylon It is believed that none of these proposals is attractive The prime question that has to be answered in each case is does a new formal arrangement improve on existing agreements A second question--is the proposed arrangement practicable - rules out such suggestions as might call for an Asian-Pacific structure similar to NATO because the conditions are sharply 149 saw v if 5 5 mm different 1 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization faces a single source of danger in one principal geographic area when a secondary defense area was introduced with the accession of Greece and Turkey considerable strain was placed on the alliance In Asia the United States along with assorted allies faces several sour- ces of danger in several geographic areas With Japan the United States faces threats from the Soviet Union and ultimately from the People's Republic of China ZEPR7 With South Korea the United States faces threats from North Korea the CPR and the USSR The threat to South Vietnam comes from within and from North Vietnam and perhaps ultimately from the CPR but the South Koreans may consider that it does not seriously affect them The Filipinos may likewise consider that threats against South Korea or Japan do not necessarily constitute a danger to the Philippines In fact among Asians allied with the United States the only common factor in their resistance to external Communist threats is the existence of this alliance The Asian allies unlike- under certain circum- stances--the European allies appear to be incapable of agreeing on the direction of forces held in common The major forces and certainly the swing forces- naval air and mobile ground elements - must be US forces under US control 1 For further discussion of this point see Appendix G below pp 2ll l7 150 sum 1 0 '4 EB The United States now has bilateral agreements with Japan South Korea Taiwan and the Philippines It has the ANZUS Treaty with Australia and New Zealand It is allied with Thailand and Pakistan in SEATO With South Vietnam which is also covered by a SEATO protocol Special arrangements for satisfactory coopera tion exist through the Military Assistance Advisory Group agreement In the North Pacific any effort to achieve a trilateral alliance of Japan and South Korea with the United States would almost certainly result in a worsening of military cooperation in the area The two Asian countries dislike and distrust each other As matters now stand the air defense of both is joined under a single US command an arrangement that could not be improved upon and that would probably only deteriorate as the result of a formal alliance agreement A secret protocol to the bilateral agreement with Japan assures that the United States can use Japan without prior consultation as an operational base for emergency UN opera tions that might again have to be conducted to defend South Korea As for South Korea itself the United States has greater de facto military control under UN ausPices than could be confirmed politi cally by any agreement stemming from a new alliance system and to formalize the situation further even by a status-of-forces agree- ment could only reduce the latitude of US military action 151 yin-n With respect to Japan important restrictions exist at present but these are not likely to be relaxed under the terms of a wid- ened and formalized alliance system The requirement is that the United States consult with the Government of Japan on movements of missiles or nuclear weapons into Japan and before conducting com- bat operations directly from Japan Transit and logistic rights are not thereby affected and consultation requirements in an emergency should prove to be hardly more than a formality The restriction making it formally impossible to store nuclear weapons in Japan iS'a very real hindrance to the immediate capability of US forces primarily tactical air forces stationed in Japan In an emergency requiring such action a way could probably be found for moving nuclear weapons expeditiously in Spite of this restric- tion if time permits In view of the present Japanese attitude toward nuclear warfare and nuclear weapons it would be unwise to raise the question with the Japanese Government now and hence for the time being at least the situation should be accepted as it 15 2 No reason is seen to abandon the system of bilateral agree- ments between the United States and South Korea and the United States and Japan in favor of a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization 2 But the situation should be mended if and when circum- stances become favorable as of course they may when Communist China acquires nuclear weapons US aircraft based in Japan might then be afforded the opportunity to make a more certain contribu- tion in the event of general war 152 smut s f'ztitn On the contrary military considerations argue against an enlarged 3' security treaty Without US insistence and participation there is no present possibility that Japan South Korea Taiwan and the Philippines could unite in a defensive alliance Taiwan the Philippines and South Korea can in no real sense reinforce each other and for them such an alliance would be wholly political and prob- ably both impracticable and unmanageable Except in the event either of a general war or a regional war between China and the United States both Taiwan and the Philippines are likely to be involved in quite different situations of limited warfare than are South Korea and Japan taken singly or together From the military point of view a widened alliance of the United States with these four countries is unnatural and unnecessary Bilateral agree- ments are better and more flexible in every case A bilateral agreement with Taiwan is necessary so long as the United States is committed to that island s defense The agreement is militarily useful for intelligence purposes as well as for providing a military base The Republic of China has sev eral times in the past offered to make forces available supported of course from US resources for anti Communist operations else- where in Asia Inclusion of Taiwan in a multilateral arrangement might facilitate the use of Nationalist Chinese forces outside of Taiwan but cannot be considered as a requirement for this purpose 153 So long as the Nationalist Chinese are willing to provide the troops the United States to support them and the host nation to receive them formal multilateral treaty arrangements would appear to be unnecessary If this combined willingness does not exist multilateral alliance arrangements could hardly be effective The bilateral agreement with the Philippines is desirable as providing a military base deSpite restrictions placed upon the United States by the exigencies of Philippine nationalism While a stronger guarantee that Philippine bases would be available for operational use by US forces especially for use in the defense of Taiwan would be desirable it is unlikely that stronger guaran- tees than now exist could be obtained through any alternative arrangement Turning to Southeast Asia we witness there a SEATO organi zation that may as regards originative action be viewed as little better than moribund Chinese Communist and Indian propaganda has contributed to making this treaty organization in the eyes of many neutrals a symbol of vestigial colonialism in Asia Never- theless in the event of overt Communist Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia the provisions of the SEATO treaty may become effective membership in the organization may then compel the United Kingdom and even France to acquiesce in counteraction and broader political support both in Asia and in Europe for military action may be forthcoming Further membership in SEATO probably 154 all-ii played a role in the past and may again in the future in influ- encing individual states Pakistan Thailand and the Philippines in particular to offer token military forces for military action to oppose low-level Communist aggression Finally the inherent uncertainties on when and if SEATO might agree to concerted mili- tary action can serve to discourage Chinese military opportunism No multilateral alternative to SEATO more advantageous to the United States appears to be practical No Asian nation not now aligned with the United States would be likely to join in such military alliance regardless of its name of membership unless the United States were excluded--an arrangement certainly not facili- tating US support of a threatened area Exclusion of Britain and France from membership would eliminate all possibility of practi cal assistance by those nations and reduce the likelihood of obtaining their political support and the attempt to exclude them might damage US relationships with European allies of great impor- tance to the United States Communist claims that any new alliance is a colonial device to exploit Asian nations would not diminish this propaganda would merely focus even more than before on the United States Although SEATO as an organization has proven ineffective in the face of past ambiguous Communist aggression a weakness that has undoubtedly tended to degrade the alliance in Asian eyes the possibility remains thatovert Communist agression could evoke a concerted response 155 liifZE shy d In sum weak and imperfect though it may be SEATO is a useful device unlikely for the time being to be bettered by any practicable alternative multilateral arrangement An effective substitute for SEATO might be an alliance against Communist China in which both India and Pakistan would participate Such an alli- ance would not be likely however unless a way could be found for composing Indian Pakistani differences and unless India should be prepared to alter its attitude with regard to alignments The US relationship with SEATO nations is weakened by the Special situations of Thailand and Pakistan These nations have no formal security arrangements with the United States except through regional security organizations SEATO in the case of Thai- land SEATO and more indirectly CENTO in the case of Pakistan Neither Thailand nor Pakistan has real confidence in guarantees offered by the United States solely through regional security arrangements In the case of Pakistan the problem is complicated by the susPicion with which India would view any obvious new link between the United States and Pakistan It might be possible without entering into a bilateral security agreement with Pakistan to improve this situation in Pakistani eyes by placing the Military Assistance Advisory Group there under Commander in Chief Pacific ZCINCPAQZ rather than under the United States Commander in Chief Europe ZEINCEUEY and enlarging the scope of the MAAG's activities 156 new to include a measure of bilateral planning This change would place US military reaponsibilities for Pakistan under the comman- der with operational reSponsibilities in the area The continu- ing exchange of operational and intelligence views combined with US advice and assistance in Pakistani operational planning even though necessarily on a highly selective basis would constitute a significant commitment of US assistance and support beyond that stemming from the less-certain coalition arrangements and without providing undue alarm to the Government of India Pakistan would presumably remain a member of the Central Treaty Organization retention of which is required partly because it associates Iran with the West and partly to provide coalition means of dealing with Soviet-Afghan threats to Pakistan Threats to Pakistan from India may be more real than any of these factors but can hardly evoke US military reassurance at any time when the United States is also attempting to buttress India As respects Thailand it would appear that the real change in relationships that has been required may have been accomplished as the result of recent executive assurance of US commitment to the defense of Thailand The Thais should consider that they have thus received assurance that inaction by SEATO will not prevent action by the United States in event Thai security is threatened If the Thais require further or more formal assurance from the United States it should be provided 157 South Vietnam Laos and Cambodia could be considered for formal bilateral security arrangements with the United States only by violation of the Geneva agreements of 1954 which the United States unilaterally agreed not to disturb Cambodia and Laos as confirmed neutrals are at least for the time being excluded from consideration as security partners With South Vietnam the United States possesses military agreements and arrangements capable of being expanded de facto to satisfy the requirements of any likely situation and any attempt to formalize the situation further would probably only make it worse from the military point of view As respects the possibility of covering a reluctant India Burma Malaya and Ceylon with a new Eisenhower Doctrine the lack of a specific US military commitment appears preferable until such time as circumstances arise to make a commitment desirable and desired by the beneficiaries of the guarantees In any event the United States should not gratuitously offer to enter into such commitments It is important that these Asian countries do not re- ceive them in the spirit of conferring a favor on the United States More real and useful benefits ought to be obtainable from the ANZUS Treaty than are obtained at present An understanding might be reached by which the United States undertakes the strategic defense of Australia and New Zealand against threats of nuclear attack or invasion thus relieving those countries of insupportable burdens they apparently are striving to assume This should 158 sum involve no additional cost to the United States inasmuch as forces otherwise available can assume this largely political commitment without reinforcement In return Australia assisted by New Zea- land could reconstitute its existing military establishment so as to provide a substantial mobile combat force along with the necessary tranSport to make it readily employable in Southeast Asia in response not only to SEATO decisions but also to those reached within ANZUS It is concluded that except as reapects Pakistan Austral- asia and possibly Thailand existing security arrangements are adequate and from the military point of view unlikely to be improved Consideration should be given to placing the MAAG Pakistan under CINCPAC rather than US CINCEUR The possibility of a more fruitful military collaboration with Australia and New Zealand should be explored Finally a more formal bilateral arrangement may be desirable with Thailand if the Thai government wants it THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK s ll' tee no e i J Ir APPENDIX OPERATIONS A operation may be defined as any planned action or series of actions a major objective of which is the creation of a desired state of mind or mental reaction in the target audience All suggested actions listed elsewhere in this paper therefore fall broadly within the field of operations particularly those actions dealing with alliances improvements in us and allied military forces the maintenance of deterrent forces and educational measures More narrowly operations can be limited to the communication of ideas by measures adapted solely to creating a desired reaction These measures may be employed continuously or may be designed specifically to take advantage of a single action or situation and completed within a definite time span In the first category lie such activities as propa- ganda white gray and black and education This appendix con- cerns itself primarily with those operations de- signed for a specific situation it is also limited to measures that affect the military situation and that require some degree of implementation by us military forces 161 haw m Among the many criteria necessary for effective operations two are considered to be of overriding importance l The thought conveyed must be essentially truthful and grounded in reality 2 The United States must speak with a common voice in order to communicate the desired thought and induce the desired reaction OBJECTIVES General objectives of operations that the United States may undertake to counter a nuclear-capable China include A Minimization of any tendency toward neutralism or accommo- dation on the part of non Communist Asian nations and maximization of tendencies toward closer relations with the United States This objective applies particularly to Japan Thailand and India B Assurance that both the Communists and US allies under- stand that the United States has and will continue to have both the will and the capability to l Oppose local Communist aggression of whatever nature 2 Take decisive military action in the event of open provocation including a breach by the Communists of any ground rules established by the United States in a situation of local crisis 3 Exploit US nuclear and other military superiority as required 162 C Minimization of the likelihood of open Soviet support of Chinese Communist military adventures and the inspiration of doubt in the minds of the Chinese leadership on Soviet intentions in this regard These general objectives suggest the following specific objec tives for operations 1 Elimination of the shock effect in large segments of the Free World including the United States that is likely to result if the initial Chinese test detonation comes as a general surprise 2 Minimization of the likelihood of an estimate by our Asian allies and by the Communists that the emergence of the People s Republic of China 1CP37 as a nuclear power will materially affect in the foreseeable future the over all strategic situation and particularly the military balance in the Far East between the Free World and the Communist bloc 3 Assurance that both US allies and the Communists correctly estimate the will and capability of the United States to counter effectively and and to defeat Communist aggression regardless of a locally effective Chinese nuclear capability 4 Assurance of a proper appreciation by the Asian Communist bloc states of their vulnerability in a nuclear war involving the United States 5 An increase in the doubts which must exist in any case of the Communist Chinese leadership that the USSR will in fact 163 employ or even credibly threaten to employ Soviet long-range striking forces in support of Chinese military operations 6 An increase in any existing element of mutual suspicion between the Communist Chinese and the Soviets as regards the other's intentions in areas of competition 7 Minimization of any tendency on the part of non- Communist Asian states to seek either closer relations with the USSR as a restraining influence on an aggressive nuclear oapable CPR or as in the case of Pakistan with the CPR itself in an effort to achieve local objectives SUGGESTED ACTIONS The following operations primarily military in character are suggested 1 Nuclear Education for Asian Elites l The primary objec- tive through education of Asian elites in the nuclear facts of life -is to convey an understanding of the overwhelming US mili- tary and economic might compared to that of Communist China and to convey belief in the ability and determination of the United States to protect its allies against any threats from Communist China l A detailed proposal for such schooling is presented in the PACIFICA Report on the Nuclear Orientation of Asians dated March 27 1962 164 new 2 Combined Military Planning For at least several years Chinese nuclear capabilities will be small and relatively primi- tive and the asymmetries in nuclear capabilities and vulnerabili- ties will greatly favor the United States and its allies US allies can be made fully aware of these facts by the early initi ation of combined planning for the defense of allied territories conducted on the assumption that China will for the next few years have only a small locally effective nuclear capability The United States is already engaged in coordinated planning with all Asian allies either bilaterally or -with Thailand and Pakistan-- through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Direct bilateral combined planning can emphasize the limitations of Chinese capabilities and at the same time inure the military and political leaders of our allies to the Chinese nuclear threat An Asian version of the command post exercises as origi nally conceived for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe ZERAPE7 to be conducted by Commander in Chief Pacific should also be a useful device for these purposes 3 Vulnerability Studies of Far Eastern Communist States Communist China North Korea and North Vietnam are all highly vulnerable to nuclear offensive operations This vulnerability may be underestimated by the Communists with the result that they may be tempted to initiate aggressive operations If this vulner ability is not recognized by our allies it may weaken their 165 sm- n 5m glf adherence to the West or cause them to delay a request for US mili tary assistance unnecessarily A detailed study of the vulnerability of the Far Eastern Communist bloc would clearly indicate in terms such as personnel casualties and percentage of industry destroyed the extreme vulnerability of those states and properly publicized should give cause for caution to the Communists and comfort to our friends Such a study preferably accomplished through detailed computerized wargaming should be supplemented by unequivocal and pointed but low key statements or other indicators designed to in- sure that the CPR correctly estimates that it would be the target for major nuclear offensive strikes in the event of substantial provocation or of a general war 4 Encouragement of Chinese Doubts of Soviet Intentions In spite of possible increased pressures on the USSR engendered by a CPR nuclear capability to cover Chinese military actions strate gically there will always be some element of uncertainty on the part of the CPR leadership as regards Soviet willingness to accept the grave risks of a serious US-USSR engagement solely to assist China These doubts can be nourished in the first instance by the publication of austerely objective analyses of the diSproportionate nature of USSR risk as compared to USSR possible advantage Such articles could set the stage for more sophisticated divisive action particularly action employing covert means The establishment of a separate obviously effective regional deterrent to CPR nuclear 166 1mm 1 aggression should prove highly exploitable for corrosive and divisive purposes 5 Common US Voice on Use of Nuclear Weapons If there is reasonable probability that the United States may decide to use nuclear weapons in the event of hostilities in specific areas it is essential that the point he brought home to the Communists that US response will be prompt of adequate weight and if necessary nuclear This can be done only if all US official representation in or visiting these areas speaks with unanimity on US determi nation to use nuclear weapons if they should be required Such a common voice would not of course commit the United States to em ployment of nuclear weapons in the event of hostilities it would however assist in ensuring that the Communists are unambiguously aware of US will and capability to resist aggression by whatever means may be necessary 6 Selective Release of Intelligence on Chinese Nuclear Capabilities While there apparently is general recognition as reflected by the many rumors which have appeared in the world press that the CPR will eventually achieve a nuclear capability it is also apparent that preponderant opinion considers this capability as a vague event which may happen only at some distant time in the indefinite future If the initial shock effect both in Asia and in the United States is to be minimized action should be taken progressively to alert the Free World to the reality of 167 5 the Chinese nuclear program and to the imminence of the initial test detonation As evidence becomes available on the developing Chinese nuclear program this intelligence should be released for public consumption This would then provide a factual backdrop for other actual and Operations that may be adopted It is particularly important that the Free World be alerted to an imminent CPR test detonation when available intelligence is suffi cient to make a reasonably certain prediction of the event COVERT OPERATIONS Most warfare operations must necessarily be of an overt nature The impact of overt actions can however be reinforced exaggerated or toned down through covert means The term covert operation as used in this appendix is lim- ited to actions intended to cause the intelligence activities of the target governments to arrive at conclusions desired by the US These operations consist of providing intelligence of a real or notional nature in a manner which will provide hard evidence specifically designed to cause the target government to arrive at conclusions predetermined by the United States This type of op- eration is analogous to strategic deception it involves the same methods entails the same organization and requires the same tight centralized control as a strategic deception effort 168 up SHIT U'l'm gnm Covert operations to be successful must meet the following primary criteria 1 They must be based on real actions or circumstances and must be specifically designed to capitalize on those realities 2 They must provide a number of intelligence indicators that are mutually reinforcing and confirming 3 The organization and assets must be available prior to the initiation of the operation 4 The intelligence provided must be consistent regardless of the governmental departments or agencies involved Close cen- tralized control on an interdepartmental basis is thus essential The design of a covert operation depends on the assets available on the occurrence of specific real activities and on timing It is thus not feasible to devise any specific covert operation apart from its context Attached for purely illustrative purposes is a statement of two types of operations which might be undertaken one almost wholly military devised to meet the requirements of a specific potentially military situation the second primarily non-military Which might be implemented over a longer time depending on the occurrence of fortuitous events 159 ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX TWO ILLUSTRATIVE COVERT OPERATIONS 1 PURPOSE To reinforce estimates by the Communists and by US allies of the intentions and capability of the United States to use military force in a specific situation Possible Indicators Alerts and exercises of forces that might be committed Stand-down of air transport A marked increase some of which may be deceptive in communications traffic between pertinent headquarters units and activities in the crisis area Carefully timed visits to the area of vary Important Persons particularly of military VIPs both openly and pseudo-clandestinely Negotiations for supplies and services with the threat- ened government Aircraft movements to and from nuclear storage sites in the Pacific and movements of aircraft already tagged by the Communists as associated with movement of atomic weapons to the crisis area The sudden imposition of new communications security and other security measures both within the crisis area and by forces elsewhere which may be involved 170 Communications manipulation to exaggerate all of the above measures with particular regard to the numbers of military units and headquarters that may be involved 2 PURPOSE To encourage mutual distrust between the Soviet Union and the CPR and in particular to encourage CPR doubts of Soviet intentions with regard to the use of or to the posing of a credible threat to use Soviet long-range strategic forces Possible Indicators Minor adjustments in US aid programs to give the im- pression of pertinent United States-Soviet accord and coor- dination such as obtained fortuitously in India High-level diplomatic consultation with USSR represent- atives appropriately timed succeeded by leaks diplomatic or military of notional intelligence on the nature of the subject discussed and the amount of agreement reached Covert reinforcement to both the USSR and the CPR of the US intention to employ PACOM forces in the event of war with the CPR solely against the CPR reserving strategic forces to counter Soviet involvement Exploitation of any real or notional act that would in dicate Soviet dissimulation with regard to the CPR particu- larly exploitation of any agreement notionally embroidered 171 THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK 17 APPENDIX A LANCHESTER EQDATION ANALYSIS OF INVASION AND RESPONSE Seymour J Deitchman Research and Engineering Support Division Institute for Defense Analyses The Lanchester equations are applied to invasion and reaponse in a circumscribed area The parameters of timeliness in response and total effort required to win are explored INTRODUCTION The Lanchester equations describing certain types of military engagement were published in 1916 l Lanchester treated two types of modern combatodd and even sides reapectively and x10 and x20 their initial a and A the average effectiveness of 2323 men in killing 299 men and the average effectiveness of 299 men in killing even men and assume that men put out of action are dead and all men in action are firing Then a and are defined as rate of fire times the kill proba- bility of an aimed weapon rp while A and are defined as the kill probability of random shots from an individual weapon or rate of fire times the ratio of effective area of the weapon to area occupied by the enemy 173 a b 1- When each side is visible to the other side and every man on each side is able to fire on any opposing indi- vidual the loss rate on one side is proportional to the number of opponents firing and i1 ax2 i2 -bxl This leads to the square law for equality of fighting strength the condition under which neither side wins a x202 2 10 When each side is invisible to the other and each fires into the area the other occupies the loss rate on one side is proportional to the number of men on the other and to the number of men occupying the area under fire so that $1 -A xle i2 -B x132 This leads to the linear law for equality of fighting strength A x20 x10 Since the inception of the Lanchester equations there has valid been a proliferation of equations of this type applied to analysis of many situations of warfare 2 and It has however been difficult to show that the equations are It is virtually impossible to choose values of the con- stants or casualty rates a priori to forecast how a battle will turn out nor do the equations account for all the vagaries of Actually each fires into the area he believes the other to occupy In this which may be different from that which he does occupy case the two are assumed to be the same 174 1 a real battle The few attempts at testing the validity of the equations for situations consistent with the assumptions have had to rely on historical data peculiar to each situation for evaluation of the casualty rates and so even in cases where validity has been examined this has been done on an a posteriori basis without generality Despite these limitations of the Lanchester equations they do in their original form represent a simple and elegant description of certain types of military exchange Even though they cannot ordinarily be used to predict quantitatively the course of a military engagement they have proved useful in elucidating some general principles regarding the situations to which they can be addressed With this in mind the Lanchester equations have been used to explore some parameters of invasion and response in a circumscribed area ANALYSIS The equations for open combat with constant input of 2 resources by both sides neglecting operational attrition175 @133 Oih 91 an where and are constant rates of input of men or units by odd or even respectively The solution to these equations when where 2 II % xlo 15 9 H610 19 6 20 - 9 and t0 is time from the start of combat The value of deter- mines which way the battle goes if is negative even wins and if is positive odd wins Consider now the situation in which odd invades a single bounded area with a force of x10 and maintains a constant build- up of forces P during his invasion with negligible Opposition until time ta when even enters from outside with a force of x20 It is assumed throughout this section that both sides remain equal in capability regardless of any differences in detail of tactics or weapons The situation in which only one side uses nuclear weapons is thus excluded 176 saw and starts the battle to oppose the invasion Then at time 0 t ta x1 x10 Pt 3a x2 0 at ta x1 x10 3b X2 3 20 and this is the point where tc 0 so that for any tc - ta tc 0 eq's 2 with give the values of x1 and x2 The buildup required by even just to break even is given by QB @210 X20 ta 3 4 The total effort required by even to win assuming can be measured by even's total input to the battle 177 336-11 hen - 6T 320 tow 5 where is tc when odd is destroyed or gives up Values of QB are shown in Fig for x10 l l l and various values of x20 as a function of ta The values chosen for the variables are consistent with measurement of relative force in terms of divisions or corps and time in terms of days or weeks Pig 2 shows the course of the battle for a few cases computed using eq's 2 Fig 3 shows values of ET for 2323 for the conditions given These have been determined by selecting initial values of x20 arbitrarily and arbitrarily choosing values of QB appropriate to given values of ta with the aid of Fig 1 Corresponding values of tow for use in eq 5 were obtained from curves like those in Pig 2 The penalty for delay is very great when even's input rate Q is greater than that needed to win the total input required increases by a factor of approximately five The battle could be defined as ending when even has a preponderance of force or odd is reduced to some fraction of his greatest force or odd goes-t5 zero In this qualitative anal- ysis the last has Bean selected the nature of the results is not affected by this asSUmption Further if odd stops his buildup at some time ta' and even does not enter until ta ta' the effect of delay beyond ta' disappears In the real situ ation even though the odd buildup stops odd would continue to consolidate his making the battle more diffi- cult for even as his delay increases The equations as given do not describe this situation and the analysis applies only to the case where ta ta' 178 i 7 as delay increases over the range 0-5 An input rate double that required to break even reduces the penalty particularly for larger values of ta' The effect of input rate is much greater than that of initial force These results are con sistent with what is known about the advantage of applying over- whelming force in a military situation But it should be noted that the break-even input rate itself increases rapidly with ta Thus as delay in reSponding increases available resources will be strained ever more severely and these resources will approach the point where they first become inadequate for application of overwhelming force and then for winning at all Looked at another way if response is sufficiently rapid not only is the total input and therefore cost in casualties required to win smaller than if there is substantial delay but the resources required and available are more likely to be consistent with each other There is evidently a tradeoff between allocation of resources to large forces if response capability is slow and allocation of resources to the provision of a rapid response capability for a relatively small force which may nevertheless be substantial in absolute terms Airlift sealift and maintenance of foreign bases are all eXpensive but so too are the equipment and support of the large forces that would obviously be required to win if the logistic system is not 179 adequate for a rapid response to an invasion of an allied country While the need for such tradeoff analysis is intuitively obvious this very crude application of the Lan- chester equations to the problem poses the issue very clearly as a critical one and indicates a direction for quantitative definition of fast and slow reaction It may become possible to say precisely what is meant by too little and too late Another question posed implicitly and related to the previous one although it cannot be treated by this approach is that of the effect of response time on enemy actions There is probably some ta which if sufficiently small is very likely to discourage odd and lead him to abort his invasion plans For some larger ta particularly if even's initial force is small and his potential buildup capability is not obvious 299 will be encouraged to continue This consideration too favors a capa- bility for early and massive response and must be taken into account however intangible it is in the effort balance sheet CONCLUSIONS The Lanchester equations have been applied to analysis of invasion in a single bounded area followed by a response from outside the area The analysis shows that there is a great premium on reacting quickly with adequate strength to win the opening battle and that far less total resources are needed to 180 win if the available resources can be brought to bear quickly It is not so much the size of the initial countering force which matters as the rate of buildup of forces which can be thrown into the conflict Planning to win clearly requires study of the tradeoff between provision of expensive means of high mobility for a relatively small part of the potential defending force and provision of the very much larger force that will be needed to win in the event of long delay in responding to attack l l THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK 182 all Jr a - a 2 113 BUILDUP FOR EN EFFORT IN FIGHTING UNITS REQUIRED BY EVEN Figure I Figure 3 COURSE OF THE BATTLE -0 08 2510Figure 2 THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK 154 REFERENCES Lanchester F W Aircraft in Warfare the Dawn of the Fourth Arm London Constable and Company Ltd 1916 Morse Philip M and Kimball George E Methods of Operations Research New York The TechnoIogy Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley 8 Sons Inc 1951 Weiss Herbert K Lanchester-Type Models of Warfare Proceedin of the First International Conference on GperationaI ResearEE E fora I9573 Baltimore Gperations Research Society of America 1957 pp 82-99 Engel J H Verification of Lanchester's Law Journal of the Operations Research Society of America Vol 2 No 2 May 1954 pp 163-71 THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK LEE In APPENDIX VULNERABILITIES 0P COMMUNIST CHINA TO NUCLEAR ATTACK This appendix is based primarily upon present CPR vulner- abilities projected to 1972 While a very large-scale CPR effort continued over a long period of time and pursued in spite of the severe economic penalties involved could moderately reduce China's present vulnerabilities it does not appear possible for the People's Republic of China to change radically its basic socio- economic and military environment within one decade Action to reduce specific vulnerabilities such as passive protection for selected military forces and military and governmental control elements minimal civil defenses and improved air defenses is feasible within limits The following discussion anticipates that actions taken to this end will not be allowed to compete substantially with general Chinese economic programs PEOPLE Mainland China s social and economic structure is relatively less vulnerable to nuclear attack than that of more highly industrialized countries There are about 500 cities in China with 25 000 or more population The prevailing type of building 187 construction makes these cities very vulnerable to atomic blast and heat and in the more densely populated areas radiation casualties would be high But it would require an extensive nuclear campaign directed specifically against people to cause casualties proportionate to those that would result from nuclear strikes at the United States or the Soviet Union even though these strikes were directed primarily against objectives other than people Even though relatively less vulnerable it is obvious that densely populated China would suffer many millions of casualties as the result of a nuclear offensive almost without regard to the primary objective of the offensive operations There are some fourteen cities in China of over one million population and by 1972 there should be sixteen or possibly more Attack on these cities would require few weapons and would cause heavy casualties Further and most importantly the governmental party military industrial and intellectual elites are heavily concentrated in these cities as are skilled technicians and engineers It is these people whom the CPR can least afford to lose INDUSTRY Modern industry is relatively new in China for the most part established since 1950 The Chinese industrial base has 188 two distinctive characteristics l'i' 58 IEO 1 Modern industry is concentrated to a high degree in approximately thirty metropolitan areas some of which have been wholly developed by the Communist regime 2 Unlike most industrialized nations China has very few complexes that contribute enough of a specific sector of the economy to be identifiable as a profitable target in a campaign devoted to the destruction of selected elements of the industrial base As a result of these two factors the industrial capability of China is extremely vulnerable to nuclear attack and such a campaign would not require great selectivity in targeting It is also true however that the large number and diversification of the industrial plants within most metropolitan areas would make confident prediction of the specific effects of such a campaign on the Chinese economy difficult--although it is clear that it would largely destroy modern industry within China MILITARY Counterforce Predictions on the future positioning and configuration of Chinese nuclear delivery forces must necessarily be largely surmise Measures to improve the survivability of aircraft however except possibly some small measure of ground alert I 189 uzzm #533 2 2 mm -- capability appear to be most unlikely There is no evidence of the introduction of SOphisticated air defenses except for some obsolescent surface-to-air missile defenses provided by the Soviet Union for metropolitan areas Work on the one such system that has been started at Peiping apparently has not been completed and there is no evidence of any further effort along this line It is possible though unlikely so long as the present state of Sino-Soviet relations persists that additional Soviet assistance may be given to improve these defenses The state of the Chinese economy and other military demands upon it would appear to preclude independent development by the CPR of a significant modernized air defense capability It is practically certain that China will not-develop defenses or even warning means against ballistic missile attack during this decade With regard to China's own ballistic missiles those of up to medium range 1 100 nautical miles probably will be mobile and basically patterned after USSR designs Early intercontinental ballistic missiles will most likely be in a generally soft configuration probably dispersed and possibly given some shielding through siting in appropriate terrain north and west of the densely populated areas of China 1 l A less likely case but one to which some attention should be given is that the Chinese learning from US and USSR experience will delay the establishment of their ICBM system until the weapons can at least be given some concealment 190 ill- m Assuming l A nuclear delivery capability for 1968-70 as stated in Appendix 2 Airplanes disposed with approximately one regiment 30 airplanes per base 3 Missiles in a mobile soft configuration disposed in clusters of ten and 4 A US intelligence capability to target these delivery forces accurately 3 a minimum counterforce operation against the CPR would require approximately 25 accurately delivered weapons Other Forces China s enormous ground forces 115 line divisions are dispersed throughout the country but mainly in the eaSt and as an initial object of nuclear attack would appear to be unprofitable Attack on transportation distribution facilities support elements particularly petroleum products communications and control should however render these forces practically unusable except 2 See above p 147 3 This is a critical but highly uncertain assumption See above pp 62 64 191 - p t internally within China and then only as in-place forces Ground forces committed outside the borders of China are highly vulnerable to nuclear attack In areas where major forces would be required Korea and Taiwan the forces themselves will be massed and vulnerable The conduct of ground operations large or small by organized forces would require Chinese dependence on supply and support facilities in nearby China and on inadequate communications to and within the forward area While there is a trade-off between size of force and quality of logistic support organized forces depending-upon substantial quantities of modern equipment such as ordnance armored vehicles and motorized trans portation will be heavily dependent on the survivability of these concentrated logistical facilities The minor Chinese naval capability could be denied by the destruction of China s three principal bases Chinese air defenses depend upon fighter aircraft centralized control and inadequate communications and can be neutralized by attack on any of these highly vulnerable elements TRANSPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION Support of both air and ground operations is dependent upon a primitive transportation system the inadequacies of which are clearly evident even in peacetime particularly in the distribution of petroleum and agricultural products during the past few years 192 Are These transportation means both surface and air radiate weblike - from major metrOpolitan areas In spite of recent major Communist Chinese efforts to improve the transportation situation particularly railroads present estimates indicate that a transportation system of adequate capacity eliminating the bottlenecks and vulnerabilities now presented by the focusing of these facilities on major poPulation centers cannot be achieved within a decade The transportation system is and will continue to be further handicapped by inadequate resources critical in modern war including particularly POL Lacking appreciable reserves and dependent upon many distribution points the larger of which are concentrated in the major cities the CPR's supply of combatant forces and the civilian economy as well can be readily disrupted by a relatively small-scale nuclear attack on key points CONTROL ECHELONS Medium and higher echelons of CPR control whether of the government the Communist party or the military are almost without exception located in the larger metropolitan areas These control echelons are essential elements for the continuing conduct of a war and its support are vital to effective recupera tion after nuclear attack and indeed are probably indispensable to the survival of the Communist regime itself These control elements--in terms of facilities people and communications--are 193 5m highly vulnerable to carefully planned nuclear attack on a rela- tively small number of metropolitan areas CO-LOCATION OP VULNERABILITIES The most striking aspect of the CPR vulnerability to nuclear attack is the co-location in metropolitan areas of the individual vulnerabilities Even an attack of relatively small weight on say Peiping would destroy essential military and governmental control capability would destroy important military targets in the form of air and ground forces and facilities would seriously disrupt communications and transportation with effects far beyond the area of Peiping would destroy a significant portion of the national industry and would cause a very large number of casualties of a nature most detrimental to the Communist Chinese war-making and recuperative ability AN ILLUSTRATIVE ATTACK A hypothetical attack on China has been sketched for illustra- tive purposes It is delineated in an addendum to this appendix This illustrative attack would involve 90 weapons on target 4 The most distant target is less than 800 nautical miles from the coast A rough calculation indicates that such an attack would 4 The numbers of launched or programmed weapons required would vary widely possibly up to 300 weapons programmed depending on the assumptions used as to types and configuration of delivery vehicles reliability attrition and so forth 194 not only destroy China s nuclear delivery capability under the estimates used for this study but also would kill about 40 to 50 million people by direct blast and thermal effects alone and would destroy a very large proportion of that country s modern industry It should also destroy China s capability to control governmental and military actions thereby jeopardizing the hold of the Communist regime on the people of China as well as cause extensive damage to her inadequate transportation and communications systems SUMMARY Although the CPR as a social and economic entity is somewhat less vulnerable than the United States to nuclear attack her specific vulnerabilities are nevertheless of a nature that would permit a nuclear offensive to be highly effective in terms of rendering the CPR incapable of continuing to fight Due to the co-location of vulnerabilities the nuclear offensive would com- paratively speaking need to be on only a modest scale 195 134 ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX This addendum is a summary of a hypothetical attack on all of China Part 1 is a listing of metropolitan areas of over one million population each by 1972 showing the number of designated ground zeros DGZs and the objectives within each area Part 2 is a similar listing of industrially important cities of fewer than one million population Part 3 sets forth the minimum requirements for delivered weapons for a counterforce effort under the assumptions set forth in the body of this appendix Designated ground zeros have been selected that primarily affect military targets but distributed together with weapon selection so as to maximize damage to industry logistic and similar targets In view of the uncertainties in such projections far into the future no attempt has been made to devise more than an illustrative attack In summary l The attack would require 65 delivered weapons on metro- politan areas 2 An additional 25 delivered weapons would be needed for 196 a minimum counterforce effort 3 About 40 to 50 million casualties would result from the blast and thermal effects There would also be a large number of casualties from residual nuclear radiation including fallout 19 uh THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK lgEl I - l99 Priority ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX PART 1 MAINLAND CHINA-CITIES OVER ONE MILLION POPULATION BY 1972 Name Shanghai Peiping Peking Tien chin Tientsin Chung-ching Chungking Shen yang Mukden Kuang chou Canton 1962 Pop Est Millions 7 1 3 1 2 4 2 0 Designated Ground Zeros DGZS 5 Remarks Primary war resource center of China-shipbuild- ing petroleum refining and storage steel chemicals and all military and industrial products National control and communication center with important new industries such as electronics machine tools chemicals drugs military depots and scientific research Major nationally important industrial com plex specializing in vehicles steel chemicals rubber and medicines Outstanding industrial city in Southwest China producing steel nonferrous metals chemicals and military equipment National strategic source of aircraft heavy machinery nonferrous metals railroad stock ordnance and chemicals Also a provincial capital Primary industrial base or South China with petroleum storage air force storage steel and chemicals and regional civil naval and air force control centers THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK EDD T08 Priority 7 10 ll 12 13 Name Wuhan Ha erh-pin Harbin Nan ching Nanking Hsi-an Sian Taiyuan Lanchou Lanchow Chengtu 1962 Est Millions 1 9 1 2 1 1 1 0 ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX PART 1 Cont'd DGZs Remarks Provincial capital air force control and repair center military equipment produc- tion and storage Second largest steel mill in China Provincial capital key railroad center military storage aircraft production air force storage and heavy electrical equipment Provincial capital military control center arsenals and military depots electrical equipment and chemicals Provincial capital atomic and scientific research electrical equipment and nearby aircraft plant Provincial capital new major industrial center specializing in steel chemicals aluminum explosives heavy machinery and military weapons Provincial capital West China transporta- tion center Key plants include isotope separation aluminum petroleum and chemicals Provincial capital aircraft plant electronics equipment and regional industrial center SUE HNHHE Ida SIHI 1 a 203 Priority 14 15 16 1962 Pop Est Name Millions Changchun 1 0 Dairen Ching-tao 9 Tsingtao ADDENDUM T0 APPENDIX PART 1 Cont'd DGZs Remarks Provincial capital air force storage railroad stock and China's largest vehicle plant Nationally important in chemicals ship- building railroad equipment petroleum port and military storage National naval and naval air force headquarters submarine base port railroad equipment chemicals and magnesium gamr9 4' it THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK 234 4 It in EDS Priority 1 Complex Name Anshan Pushun Pao tou Paotow Chi nan Tsinan Hang-Chou Hangchow Kunming Cheng hsien Chengchow ADDENDUM T0 APPENDIX PART 2 MAJOR INDUSTRIAL CITIES 1962 Pop Est Millions 7 DGZS 2 Remarks One third of China's steel nationally important in coke and chemicals Petroleum aluminum magnesium coke chemicals and explosives Major heavy weapons and tank manufacturing center also twelfth largest steel mill in China Provincial capital military region head quarters steel chemicals and machine tools Transportation center provincial capital and developing industry with a steel mill Supplies Southwest China with chemicals steel machine tools military weapons and optics Regional military and civil control center Provincial capital main transportation center for East China and third largest POL storage in China THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK QUE 207 Priority 8 10 ll 12 l3 l4 Complex Name Chi-chi ha-erh Tsitsihar Pu-chou Poochow Minhow Changsha Loyang Shih-men Shihkiachuang Tangshan Chi lin Kirin ADDENDUM T0 APPENDIX PART 2 Cont'd 1962 Pop Est Millions 5 DGZs 1 Remarks Heavy industry such as steel machine tools and military weapons also supply center for North Manchuria Regional civil military and air control centers and regional industrial complex Provincial capital many medium sized regional industries steel metals vehicles chemicals and POL storage New industrial city producing most of China's heavy duty tractors and ball bearings Coke chemicals iron steel ammunition textiles and fifth largest railroad yard in China Sixth largest steel mill a major railroad manufacturing and repair facility and a major aluminum plant under construction Largest chemical combine in China other heavy industrins Eli 1d ADDENDUM T0 APPENDIX PART 3 OPERATIONS 1970 Objectives DGZs airfields 150 aircraft - 5 20 missile sites 200 missiles 20 If US intelligence capabilities are less effective than assumed additional weapons would of course need to be allocated for counterforce operations to compensate for uncertainties EBB WP APPENDIX COMPARATIVE GROUND PORCES--LATE 195031 ASSUMED CAPABILITIES Available 2 for Defense Chinese Invasion Area Indigenous Capabilitg Burma 1% 6-8 Cambodia 3 3 Japan 13 0 Korea 19 2 us 463 Laos 6 Philippines 1 0 Malaya 0 Republic of China 17 6 Thailand 4 4 74 Vietnam 10 94 Pakistan 5 India 12 1 Division equivalents estimated to be available 2 Estimated initial threat that can be employed in view of logistic factors 3 Includes North Korean forces 4 Includes North Vietnamese forces 209 wivrvvi THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK 21E APPENDIX THE NATO ANA LDGY It has been suggested that the situation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ZNAT97 as it has developed over the past twelve years is comparable to the situation in the Far East as it will develop as a result of Chinese nuclear progress and that US policy must be consistent between Europe and the Far East The purpose of this appendix is to examine this analogy in light of present US nuclear policy for NATO US POLICY FOR EUROPE In Europe NATO faces essentially a single enemy--the Soviet Union Any major military operations in Europe would involve the forces both of the United States and of the Soviet Union If these Operations become nuclear NATO nuclear objectives would thus include Soviet nuclear forces These forces must be considered an indivisible target and if nuclear operations are involved NATO must therefore attack all Soviet nuclear forces Since the target system is indivisible NATO nuclear forces must also be indi- visible -that is capable of being used as a single instrument against a single indivisible target system 211 sum NATO nuclear forces include US and some allied tactical air forces and intermediate-range ballistic missile units under NATO operational command They include British forces and will include more loosely French forces both under national command But these NATO nuclear forces also include US strategic strike forces which comprise by far the largest part of the nuclear capability available to NATO Backed by the certain intervention of this mas- sive nuclear power when it is needed forces positioned in Europe can contribute only marginally to the total nuclear power available and can accept great risks if necessary to permit them to Operate effectively in a non nuclear role Thus forces in Burcpe should be designed primarily for non- nuclear Operations with a secondary capability for battlefield nuclear operations if the latter should become necessary The sur- vivability of these forces should be secured through the deterrent effectiveness of centrally controlled strategic forces These stra- tegic forces will consist essentially of forces under US command but should also include British strategic forces and also any other stra- tegic strike forces that may be created in Europe In view of the capability of US strategic forces however and the inability of other forces to contribute significantly to the over-all NATO capa- bility additional strategic forces in Europe whether under national or NATO command are unnecessary and would be counterproductive It is of course a major objective of the Soviet Union to separate the 212 sum-n United States from its allies in NATO and the existence of other strategic nuclear forces would be used by the Soviet Union to forward this objective THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST When China attains a nuclear capability there will be two separate major Communist centers of nuclear power in Asia which unless there is a sharp reversal of the trend in Sine-Soviet rela- tions will not be in complete harmony By reason of this dishar- mony and in the absence of Soviet force and other commitments to China if hostilities occur in the Far East the USSR will not be automatically involved and in fact is likely to remain on the sidelines if the United States acts with adroitness Thus if bilateral nuclear operations involving the People s Republic of China 5337 should occur these need not entail nuclear strikes against the indivisible Soviet nuclear forces In sharp contrast to Europe where Communist nuclear power has been until now at least under unified control in Asia Communist nuclear power will be divided and it is strongly to the advantage of the United States to take all possible action to see that this nuclear power remains divided Free World nuclear power in the Far East is now and will con- tinue to be exclusively a US capability There is no practical possibility that any non-Communist Asian state will create an 213 suit smur- effective nuclear capability within the next decade or so There is no single Free World operational command Free World nuclear strength in the Far East is wholly under US unilateral control and will remain so unless the United States decides to share this responsibility with one or more allies There is thus no dual nuclear control that the Communists can exploit No pressures now exist to dilute US control of these forces there is no apparent benefit to be secured by nor is there any significant influence to cause a division of responsibility for nuclear operations against China between the United States and its many disparate allies in the Far East If consideration is limited to those Free World forces in the Pacific and Far East that face a nuclear capable Communist China the situation then becomes more nearly analogous to that in NATO although with major differences In such a situation the United States and its allies face a single major enemy the CPR whose nuclear forces must be considered as a single indivisible target If an effective US regional nuclear strike force exists it then provides a single instrument under central US control for destruc- tion of the indivisible nuclear force facing it With this US force in being forces deployed to forward areas can also accept risks as necessary to permit them to fight effectively in the local action The regional deterrent force would thus correspond roughly to the position of the entire US strategic force as related 214 sun s to Europe forces committed to local areas of hostilities in Asia would correspond roughly to forces positioned in Europe There remain major differences in this limited context between the situation in NATO and that in the Far East a All non-Communist nuclear power in the Far East is and should remain under complete US control b The United States will have and can use if needed its long-range strategic capability against the CPR It thus has a super as an additional enforcement agency directed at the CPR Conversely US nuclear power in the Pacific will not be exclusively committed to operations against China- it will be available to augment US strategic forces or perform other taSks as the United States may decide It will remain an integral part of the total US nuclear strength For the purpose of Single Integrated Operational Plan ngQE7 operations the US regional deterrent force will be no more divided from other US nuclear forces than any other element Polaris of US nuclear strength c Until the CPR approaches superpower status it can be anticipated that its technology will be five to ten years behind that of the United States and the USSR lhus the problem of deterrence of or nuclear engagement with the CPR will be tech- nically less difficult than the problem facing NATO 215 5 1 '0 an we d US long-range strike forces have been designed basically for attack on the USSR and their participation in lesser hostili- ties particularly non-nuclear hostilities is unlikely on a sig nificant scale US nuclear-capable forces in the Pacific Command thCQ 7 on the contrary though considered the primary threat to and deterrent of the CPR may also be called upon to participate in large scale non nuclear operations Thus nuclearncapable forces in the PACOM must in large part be designed so that they can be effective in a non-nuclear role without destroying their nuclear capability and hence their deterrent effect on the CPR It should be possible to harmonize these conflicting requirements by the conscious design of forces to that end- an objective simplified by China's relatively primitive capabilities SUMMATION In Europe the nuclear threat stems solely from the Soviet Union This monolithic threat is opposed by nuclear forces unified in spite of internal differences within the NATO alliance which the Soviets have tried unsuccessfully to date to exploit by an uncompromising commitment by the United States the stationing of US forces in Europe and the creation of a unified command for forces in Europe In the Far East the Communists face a single nuclear threat the United States but Communist power is divided because of strong Sino-Soviet differences the absence of a clear guarantee from the 215 cur-V'- - - jig -3 1a Soviets who speak of volunteers to aid their Asian allies and the lack of force commitments or other military unity between the two major Far EaStern Communist powers In the Pacific there is a genuine opportunity to exploit the differences that already exist in the adversary s camp 6 03 a use d US long range strike forces have been designed basically for attack on the USSR and their participation in lesser hostili- ties particularly non nuclear hostilities is unlikely on a sig- nificant scale US nuclear-capable forces in the Pacific Command on the contrary though considered the primary threat to and deterrent of the CPR may also be called upon to participate in large-scale non nuclear operations Thus nuclear-capable forces in the PACOM must in large part be designed so that they can be effective in a non-nuclear role without destroying their nuclear capability and hence their deterrent effect on the CPR It should be possible to harmonize these conflicting requirements by the conscious design of forces to that endu-an objective simplified by China's relatively primitive capabilities SUMMATION In Europe the nuclear threat stems solely from the Soviet Union This monolithic threat is opposed by nuclear forces unified in spite of internal differences within the NATO alliance which the Soviets have tried unsuccessfully to date to exploit by an uncompromising commitment by the United States the stationing of US forces in Burcpe and the creation of a unified command for forces in Europe In the Far East the Communists face a single nuclear threat the United States but Communist power is divided because of strong Sino-Soviet differences the absence of a clear guarantee from the 216 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu