6 59 F- I arr- - Study Report Two THE EMERGENCB OF COMMUNIST CHINA AS A NUCLEAR POWER U STUDY PACIFICA FINAL REPORT Wratten for the Department of Defense 1n response to ARPA Task Order T-23 dated November 8 1961 effective July 1 1961 under OSD Contract No SD-SU dated March 15 1955 The Vlews expressed herean ct necessarlly those of the Dapartmen cf Defense INTERNATIONAL STUDIES DIVISION INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Avenue W E D Zestemser 30 1962 Dam 1111638313 THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK STUDY PACIFICR Staff Members Sldney F Giffln Study Leader John B Cary Harold C Hlnton Donald B Keesing Consultants Frank Armbruster A Doak Barnett A Beaufre Thomas G Belden Arthur Burns James B Cross Owen L Dawson Tallman Durdan Alexander Loy W Henderson Maury J Lisann Roger Pineau John R Thomas Herman Kahn W Kaufmann Hyman Kuhlln Choh-Mlng L1 John M H Landheok MaoParquhar Philip E Mosely Adam B Ulam Rlchard L Walker In to these consultants whose cooperatlon and technical a551stance 1n thelr spec1allzed fIEldS were 1nvalu- able Study PACIFICA prOfltEd from the knowledge and skall of a number of other and unoff1C1al at home and abroad--who greatly to thl study 595cm HANDLING nsoumeo SEGREL nor RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK 1U SEER-EL LEIEER OF Institute for Defense Analyse- 1666 Connecticut Avenue N w Washington 9 C January 16 1963 The Honorable Henry S Rowen Deputy AsSistant Secretary for International Security Affairs Department of Defense Washington 25 D 8 Dear Mr Rowen I have the honor to transmit to you the final report of Study PACIFICA on The Emergence of Communist China as a Nuclear Power This report was written by the International Studies DiViSion of this Institute for the Department of Defense in response to Advanced Research Projects Agency Task Order T-23 issued November 8 1961 effective July 1 1961 which estab lished ProgectI ow Study7 PACIFICA under Office Secretary of Defense Contract No SD-SO dated March 15 1958 Brig Gen Sidney F Giffin USAF is the Study Leader Study PACIFICA includes in addition to this final report a number of supporting papers these are listed in Appendix to this report Some of them are being transmitted as separate documents It should be noted that the report takes account of develOpments through August 1962 Sincerely yours James E King Jr Director International Studies THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK 991% Egg SUMMARY CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1 II THE CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT ll COMMUNIST EXTERNAL POLICY AND BEHAVIOR ll External Objectlves ll Chlnese Reasons for Nuclear Weapons 13 The Chlnese External Record JA The Chlnese Vlew Effec s of a Change CHINESE NUCLEAR NEAPON SYSTEN REQUIREMENTS 17 Range lB Numbers l9 Surv1vab1l1ty 20 Targetlng 20 CEP Yzeld and Reliabillty 21 Manned Vehicles vs Mlss les 22 Intercon nental Requ rements 23 v11 Other Requ1remencs Summary of Early Chlnese Requnrements PROJECTIONS OF THE CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT Assumptlons Variants Nuclear Warheads EV1dence- T1m1ng of the First Test Warhead Technology and Yields Dellvery Vehicles--Current Production Manned Bombers M1551lea for Reglonal Purposes Intercontlnental Dellvery Vehlcles A Numeracal Progectlon ECONOMIC LIMITATIONS THE AGRICULTURAL CRISIS Source of the Agrzcultural Problem Outlook for the Pcture Need for Hard Cholcee THE SHORT RUN AND THE THREAT The Spec1al Menace 1n Nuclear by Communlst Chlna THE COMMUNIST BLOC Ex9101taczor of Early Tests Iv SEER-ET The Sov1et Unson North Korea and North Vietnam EUROPE AND AUSTRALASIR THE ALONG THE PERIPHERY OF CHINA - Japan The Repuollc of Chlna lfalwaj7 Southeast Aala India and Paklstan IMPLICATIONS OF REACTIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY THE INTERMEDIATE PERIOD THE SOVIET UNION Utility of Chinese Nuclear Armament 1n General War Pressures on the Sov1ets Sovset Realstance 1n Local War Pressures for General War THE UNITED STATES VERSUS A NUCLEAR-ARMED General Future Vulnerabllitles of US Forces in the Western Pac1f1c and Far East China's M 11tary CHINA Vulnerabzl1 es cf the People's Republlc of China lOl 105 106 of North Vletnam and North Korea Asymmetry of Vulnerabilltles The East Aalan Communzst Assessment of Respectlve UTILITY OF A CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY HOSTILITIES IN ASIA Categorles of China Korea Taiwan Offshore Islands Vletnam Thailand Indla and Pakistan Burma Laos and Cambodla Subver51on and Insurgency IEPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNIST CHINA IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES Effect on A51an Increased US Cautlon Reductlon 1n Support for the US Posture Nuclear or Non-Nuclear l09 110 ll2 112 ll3 V Freedom of US Communlst China Speed of Response Nuclear Sharlng DETERRENCE OF COMMUNIST CHINA D1v151on of Chlnese and Sov1et Nuclear A Regional Deterrent Force Alternate Forms of a Reglonal Deterrent Force Force Force Comp051t10n of a Regional Deterrent Force POLITICAL CHANGE SING-SOVIET RELATIONS SUMMARY NUCLEAR POWER IN THE INTERMEDIATE PERIOD THE LONG TERM MILITARX ASPECTS Early Interconthental Threats China as a Class 5 Nuclear Power Chlna as a Class A Nuclear Power POLITICAL ASPECTS Class for Chlna Class A Capab Ltzes for China Al MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE 142 144 144 l168 172 VI APPENDIX A Other P0551b111t1es US Sov1et Cooperatlon COMMUNIST CHINA AND ARMS CONTROL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCLUSIONS China as a Reglonal Nuclear Power Chlna as an Intercontinental Nuclear Power for Arms Control RECOMMENDATIONS Actions for Department of Defense Inltlatlve Other United States Actlons EXTRACT FROM ARPA TASK ORDER T-23 NOVEMBER SUPPORTING PAPERS EXTRACT FROM PACIFICA INTERIM REPORT OCTOBER 20 1961 EXTRACT FROM PACIFICA REPORT ON THE NUCLEAR ORIENTATION 0F ASIANS MARCH 27 1962 R11 192 193 19 1 199 199 199 204 205 206 207 214 217 219 221 231 235 SUMMARY The elm of final report of Study PACIFICA as to assess the for the United States of the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power and to suggest steps that maght be taken to the adverse impact of this development PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS Detasled conclusions and recom mendatlons are presented 1r Chapter VI pp 199 216 In broad summary l Even g1ven the beneflt of reasonable doubts Communlst Chlna can present no more than a regional nuclear threat for a number of years Early threats W111 be more ard p31 tl 3l than Adverse reactaons among non- Communlst states par 1 ularly 1n R513 to 1n1t1al Chinese nuclear cs- 9 resuted ard even counteracted-- 212 whlle favorable reactions can be re1nforced--by an 1mage of US against aggre551on 1n Aala bur also elsewhere durzng the perlod before the f1r5t Communisr Chlnese nuclear detonation The US reactlon at the tlme 1f calm and concerted can also do much toward amelloratlng adverse and effects 2 With a redlrectlon of m1551ons and some improvement of posture US elements required 1n any event for the Weatern Paelflc Far Bast area can be as a locally nuclear deterrent force Such a force Ill g Chlna's new to escalate hostilities through nuclear operations W111 requlre that the Unlted States make a consolous ch01ce between 1n1t1at1ng nuclear Operarlons or the of Chinese escalatlon If the Unlted States dec1des not to use nuclear weapons 1 have to be prepared for the of Communlet Chlnese f1rsr use- even though such f1r5t use car undoubtedly be deterred some degree of confidence Further to 1n the local US malltary posture should be reduced concentratlon of forces and resources deployed forward to local areas should be adjusted to avold creatlng attractlve nuclear targets and the abllery TU One other assumptlon on the env1ronment 15 less axlomatlc The dlscussaon generally assumes that at least in the short- and mld-term perlods Slno-Sov1et relatlons will remaln 1n approxzmately the1r present state a strained amperfeot alliance In recent years the differences between China and the Sovaet Unlon have broken into the open There are numerous evadences of ravalry for influence in the and newly 1ndependent natzons Algeria and Syrla competi tlon Withln the world Communist movement and ungenerous economic and by the Sov1et Unlon with 1ts partner There as evzdently also mutual dssenchantment on the part of the polatlcal leadershap of both countries and genulne differences or outlook on pollcy and Strategy these often acrlmonlous per sonal and clashes are or even tactics 1n a deeper struggle for control of communlsm and of Asaa Yet all these strazns the alliance continues held together by mutual nterest as well as shared 1deology Its dlssolutlon would be a severe blow to both countr es and to the anternational posztzon of the Communist movement The two eXtreme states of relatlons p0531ble are complete solldarlty and an open break along Stalin-Tito lanes A genuane and full reconcallatlcn could be reallzed only 2'6 nezther szde has showr any tnrougin mucus new willingness to make Effective solidarity could hardly come about save by SOVlet dominance in which event the Wesr would be presented once again with the familiar threat of a single hostile nuclear-armed power supported by a giant Reian satellite Some of the implications of these two poSSible extreme states of Sine SOViet relations are conSidered in the mid and long term sections of the report In the main however this report has been prepared upon the hypotheSis that relations will continue as at present The primary reason for choosing this hypotheSis is of course that continuance in the current state of strained relations seems the most likely course for the future It may also be argued however that this is the situation most danger- ous to United States interests because of its ambiguities Rmerican policy and action cannot be known in advance The Vigor or the weakness of US policy in action will have highly Significant and even deCiSive effects upon China's ability to explait the of nuclear weapons This study gener- ally assumes that US policy is in fact conSistent With the interests and with the enormous power of the United States Research Methods General technical liaison for the study was prOVided by the Office of the ASSiStant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Very considerable assistance and information were received from US Government agencaes including the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the three Armed Services the Department of State the Central Intelligence Agency the Atomic Energy CommiSSion the Bureau of the Census and the United tates Information Agency ExtenSive travel was undertaken by the PACIFICA staff pIOViding or-the-spot inicns and data from US Missions in countries around ne Chinese periphery from all major US mili- tary commands and Staffs wittin the Patific Command and from key US representatives ir Earope A distinguished group of special ts and experts assasted the Study as consultants see page and supporting studies were prepared by these consultants as well as by staff members The study benefits greatly from their adVice but this report represents solely tne of ne PACIFICA Staff also liSted on page Meetings with specialists and experts of the United Kingdom and France in the military serVices the ministries of foreign affairs intelligence organizations and the academic field were held under the auspices of the Institute of Strategic Studies in London and the Center for Foreign Affairs Studies in Paris Of particular importance was the support and assistance received from the Washington intelligence community and the Atomic Energy CommiSSion with respect not only to Communist Chinese weapon developments but also to the state of the Chinese economy and the state of Sino Soviet relations This aSSistance permitted certain supporting studies to be made that have not been paralleled elsewhere see Appendix B Inasmuch as reactions to the initial Communist Chinese nuclear detonation could be Significantly adverse to US intereSts a effort was made to assess the pOSSible reac- tions of peoples around the periphery of China Pour avenues were followed 1 Access was obtained to information within the Department of State This included consultation with State Department offi cials both in Washington and abroad as well as responses to the Department's Circular Telegram 06-999 17 May 1961 in which an estimate was requeSted of the probable country reaction to the first nuclear detonation in China 8 SEER-EL ssensL 2 Fleld trips by the PACIFICA Staff already referred to obtalned addltaonal and later judgments from Amerlcan efficaals 1n these countrles as well as Views of nongovernmental observers on the scene 3 The A51a Foundatlon of San Franc1sco made avallable estlmates of country reactlons from its field representatives in each Asian nation 4 More detalled analysis was largely through consulrants of reactions on a oountry-by-country heals both to ar 1n1t1al exp1051on and to the subsequent development by Com- munist Chlna of a local nuclear capability SECREL THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK CHAPTER II THE CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT The substance of report begins With an evaluation of the Communist Chinese nuclear threat The dimensaons of that threat over the coming years W111 be determlned largely by the Communlst regime's pollcy toward the out51de world 1ts milatary requlrements in nuclear warfare its prcgected nuclear capa- and the economlc llmatatlons on those This chapter examenes these factors COMMUNIST EXTERNAL POLICY AND Excernal Objectlves Communist Chlra undoubtedly sees a future nuclear capa- 1n large part as contributing to the promotlon of 1 For a more detailed treatment see Harold C Hinton Com- munlst Ghana s External Pollcy and BehaV1or UNCLASSIFIED ISD Study Memorandum No lanDA Washington D PACIFICA paper Will be issued shortly ll natlonal objectaves that it as already pursuing by non nuclear means Communlst Chlna's long-range objectives center on bulldang Ghana into an industrnal and pOllthal power of the first rank by the end of the twentleth century Through achlevement and by other means China also seeks the enhancement of Chlnese prestlge and 1nfluence throughout the world the exclu- 510n or the Unated States from Asea Chlnese and per- haps terrztorlal expansaon 1n A51aE1co-leadersh1p the Unlon and perhaps ultlmate primacy 1n the Communlst bloc and the 1nternatlonal Communlst ultlmate Communist world domanataon It 1s clear that the leaders of the People's Republic of Chlna regard the United States as their maln enemy and obstacle and that thear objectzves are 1n1mical to the anterests of the Unlted States 12 Chlnese Reasons for Wanting Nuclear Weapons It would enhance China's 1nfluence on the conduct of the Cold War uncluding summlt 13 SEER-E1 conferences and arms control negotiations 2 With success and the passage of years it might enable China to assume one day the role of a Class A nuclear power3 along with the United States and the Sovnet Union The Chinese External Record The Communist Chinese record in the employment of force is marked on the whole by caution and realism in the face of superior hostile power an approach probably due in large part to the influence of China s competent military professionals When resorting to force as in Korea China has tried by means of subterfuges and legalisms to confuse the issue and minimize the chances of large-scale hostile retaliation Communist China s record in the employment of its nonviolent instrumentalities on the other hand has been marked by a recur- rent tendency to overplay its hand sometimes as in its dealings 2 3 For the purposes of this report a Class A nuclear power is one that has achieved or is believed to have achieved the abil- ity in a retaliatory strike to deliver an effective blow against all nuclear powers likely to combine in a hOStile coalition For further discuSSion see below pp 177 183 14 semi the Sovzet Union Indla and Japan to the p01nt of counter- product1v1ty tendency appears to from overeptsmastlc assessment of the balance of forces 1n the world and mm A513 1n partlcular a euphoria 1n turn derlves from a combinatlon of Chlnese Ethnic arrogance and Communist In Chlna's foreign policy the degree of aggressmve- ness and rellance on Vlolence has varled from one perlod to another and may be expected to vary 1n the future The Chinese Vlew of War An estimate of the attual uses to which Chlna 15 llkely to put ts nuclear capazalltg ween acqs red requ1res an apprecza- tlon of Chznese ews of war The Ch nese leaders apparettl lakes the outslde world to elzeve that 1 eteral war to be nev1table and llkely 5 prove China's 23522-2 rela v- tt tee United States and the Sovzet Unzon Communlst Chzna in authorntative statements therefore asserts the 1nev tab111ty not of world war but of local war which 1t says the W111 wage agalnst national llberatlon movements 1n colonial areas against newly independ- ent nations and perhaps aga1n5t soc1al st Communlst coun- trles The Communast bloc to the same staterents cannot deter the Wes from such wars but 1t can and must deter thelr escalatlon The bloc also has the oblzgatzon to take part 1n such wars by all necessary means 1nclud1ng overt armed counterlnterventlon If local wars started by the West are not actively combatted and contalned am this way the may escalate into general war Effects of a Change 1n In the future there emerge in Communlst Chlna a rela- t1vely moderate wath a somewhat dlfferent program 1nclud1ng an increase of investment 1n agrlculture and industry and a reduction of external tensions and risks by methods probably includlng restralnt 1n the employment of the Chlnese nuclear capaclty Inasmuch as the emer- gence of such a regzme could occur only wath the support of the armed forces whach favor a nuclear for China the effect on Ghana's ultlmate nuclear amb1t1ons and on the mllitary employment of the when acqulred would probably be CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEM For their purposes the Commurlsr Chlrese requlre nuclear forces that are useful 1n the defense of the Chlnese malnland capable of targets 1n the non-Communlst nation of 4 See Chapter II of Donald B Keesing The Communist Chinese Nuclear Threat Warheads and Delave vEElcles ISD Study Memorandum No ETDA D 6 PACIFICA paper W111 be lssued shortly 1 Hale capable of effectlvely United States forces and military faC1lltlES 1n the Western Paciflc and the Far East and capable in some future parlod of attacking the Unlted States and other distant areas Vehlcles ranges between 1 100 and 3 500 naut m could only be 1nterpreted as deszgned for use aga1n5t the Sovaet Unlon but the latter would also be threatened although less obV1ously by longer-range forces nomlnally dealgned agalnst the United States It would be loglcal therefore for the Chlnese to try to Jump 1n productaon d1rect1y from the 1 100 naut m range to ranges of 5 000 naut m or more Numbers Various types of Chlnese nuclear operations would requare attack on approx1mate1y the following number of soft L1 e not speczally proteCted agalnst nuclear effects targets 1 Hostllitaes 1nv01V1ng a spec1f1c locallty such as Korea or Talwan 5 to 25 2 A manlmum counterforce operatlon agalnSt unprotected US Gellvery forces on flxed bases an the Western Paczfac 15 3 Attack on all important faxed soft US targets at the Weatern Palelc and Far East ancludlng those just men- tioned 60 At 4 m1551les per target see dlscusslon of CEP requirements below for 15 to as targets the Chlnese requlrement for attack on the above target system would be 60 to 340 ml551165 Forces for use aga1n5 hardened daspereed an mobale targets would be 10 Buryivability In view of their nuclear inferiority and their exposure to overhead reconnaissance the Chinese are likely to consider con- cealment of misalles however difficult as mandatory They will probably carry secrecy to great to prevent targeting of their nuclear capability Mobility would also be highly de51rable to facilitate concealment and add to the flexibility of and hence economy in Chinese nuclear striking forces Targeting China and the lands in its Vicinity are among the most poorly mapped regions of the world There 15 no evadence that the Chinese have succeeded in obtaining geodetic and other data needed for accurate location of targets With probable inaccuracies at both ends of their trajectories early Chinese misSiles will be militarily useful only against very large fixed soft targets and even then their effectiveness W111 not be accurately predict able China will need manned vehicles that can seek their own targets for use against large soft targets when assurance of des- truction 15 necessary and against hardened dispersed and point targets at least until Chinese weapons and supporting systems begin to achieve real sophistication 20 A second targetzng problem Stems from the need to be able to attack mobile targets 1n the Western Pac1f1c Unless and until t acqulres an adequate reconnalssance Communlst Chane can only hope to meet requzrement n a manner through the dual use for reconnalssance and bombardment of whatever bombers are available CEP Y1e1d1_andtRe11abilltv Accuracy and are further difficult requirements for the Chinese The neutrallzataon or destruction of the struc- tures and aircraft typically dlspersed above ground on an air fleld could be av a Single f1551on weapon only at the devace were exploded at Optlmum alrburst hetght near the exac center of the target A probable c rcular error of as as half a nautical mlle would rer-ce the expeCted damage to only two of the azrcraft and Structares Clearly a m15511e such a small warhead woul SE ar anadequate reglonal weapon except an very large namoers or except With unreallstacally and low CBP A thermonuclear warhead of one-half 5 A klloton 13 7 15 equal to the explosive power of one thousand tons of TNT a megaton 337 to one - meek tweak megaton 500 KT on a m1551le one nautlcal mlle CEP and 60 per cent reliability could be expected to destroy over 90 per cent of a soft air base target system only if four were programmed per target For alrcraft dellvered weapons the Chinese will need to accept the CEP of the aircraft they have 1n hand prlmarily the IL-28 Beagle unless they get the Badger For lack of modern malntalnable all-weather equlp- ment they Will probably have to rely ba51cally on a Vlsual to attack targets thelr m1551le technology Warheads adaptable 1n ssze and welght to both aircraft and m1551le requirements well be found de51rable by the Chlnese to avoed separate warhead development programs for each type of delivery system Manned Vehlcles vs M1551les The Chanese well face a serzcus problem in to obtain favorable results from thezr possesslon of reglonal forces because of the d1ffzculty of making such forces surv1v- able agalnst a Strike Targeting and other delivery problems well requzre the of a number of nannec vehlcles for ca'y yearc eve tnotgh such verccles are po- ht- difflcult to conceal or Otherwzse proteCt whereas rlgorous Chinese requlrements for appear to call for mobale m1551les The Chinese are unlikely to dlvert resources to developlng a sea-based submarlne or surface m1551le capa- bllity in View of the long lead time and h1gh cases involved 1n obtainlng such a capabllity and its low utility in the face of US seapower Other Requlrements There 15 clearly no logical 11m1t to the Chanese need for hzgher-yzeld warheads especzally warheads for messiles Just as there as no 11m1t to the need to reduce CEPs Untll the reglonal and 1ntercont1nental requzrements out- lnned above are met the Chanese are not llkEly to dlvert appre- tlable effort to the development of other nuclear systems such as low-yleld battlefleld weapons or antlasrcraft artsm1551le and antssubmarsne dev1ces Space athlevenerts bezng oessrable for the sake of Chlnese prestnge a lquC-naut m ballistic would probably be used to launch the Ears small Chinese satellite Summary of Early Chinese Requlrements For local and reglonal uses the Chinese W111 have requare- ments for both and manned aircraft 25 The manned vehicle capabillty to include 1f feasible a small hunter-kzller force appears necessary to offset targeting anade oracles as well as the lack of accuracy inherent 1n early Chinese mlssiles PROJECTIONS OF THE CHINESE NUCLEAR THREATS The followlng two paragraphs are not releasable to forelgn natlcnals 7 on Communas Chlnese nuclear-warhead and dellvery-vehlcle programs as by the effect1Ve secrecy that surrounds Chlnese anc ch1et assastance to these efforts Moreover Chlnese programs are as yet am too early a stage to per dependable long-range extrapolatlon But desplte the culties numerlcal progectmons are necessary in order to 6 See Kee51ng Communzst Chlnese Nuclear Threat Warheads and Del vegy_Veh1cles gassan NI SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT RELEASABLE To roman the magnltude of the threat and to permlt adequate of consequent and problems The at est1mste that the Ct1rese can detonate an snatial nuclear devsce by 1963 out probarly later deraves from ev1dence largely clrcumstartlal 1f plausible It 15 assumed that a plutonaum-produczng Chlnese reactor was placed an operation as early as 1961 Although no such reactor has been by US the Chlnese possess uranlur ore and prooably metallsc uranaum have had access to the constructzon of producnrg reactor and have made frequent announcements of thelr intentsor to produce nuclear weepors For the purpose of study extrapolatlon of Chlnese nuclear progress s therefore oasec on the probabl Ch1rese requsrenents dsscussed above technologlc l fattors and the expetlence of Other count es It s deemed preferable to start Chinese technologzcs under a moderately eXparszve eStlmate of future economsc development and then to suggesr 11m1tatlons and delays that would Stem from a more con- stracred economy procedure results 1r a esr1mate that may err on the early srde but that therefore the coerce of and measures adequate to lo SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS meet the threat 1f 1t materlalizes early should be at least ade quate 1f the threat as delayed Fanally with respect to the numerical warhead and dellvery- vehlcle progectlons of study the flgures are an fact not to the accuracy of the subsequent ana1y51s to the con- clu51ons or to the recommendatzons of this report Progress could be delayed from the projected schedules by several years and the figures 1ndicated could be halved w1thout materlally the analysis Assumptlons To permit concrete projections 1t 15 assumed that no further a551stance Will be forthcoming on nuclear weapons or dellvery systems but that trade relataons between China and the Sovaet Unlon W111 contlnue that the Chinese nuclear weapons program due to its h1gh prlorlty has suffered relatavely from the current economlc crisis that the Chlnese 1ndustrial sector recover in the mad-19605 from 1ts present state of near-collapse through a partial correction of the agricultural and food satuatzon that moderate Chinese 1ndustrial gains will be scored after recovery and that nuclear and missmle pro- grams receave high prlor1ty despite competlng needs 28 mm Varlants It 5 clearly 1n the power of the Sov1e to pot advanced weapons of Sovzet manufaCture 1rto Calvese hands or to a551st Chinese productlon of such weapons Sovaet help might take the form for example of Chlna weapon dealgns or with Badger medlum bombers or With short- or medlum-range missiles The Sovzets are likely to be reelstant to aeolstance as they have been an the past Since they must be sensatlve to the disadvantages and damage accrulng to them from nuclear capabllaties not under Sovzet control If early help 2 gzven tne Chlnese would prefer and would galn mos from toe rece pt of SoV1Et-manufaCtured oelzvery vehlcles Sovze elp tc Cbzoese prodUCtlor would be 1ted appeal vzeu of Chzoese to I l more Elm renew dependence ar toe 3 epac1ty of Chane to absorb further help oarse be slowed to almost Cnlpese achaeve enta a y degree by economlc troubles are related cutbacks A 315- cu551on of Chinese eoonomnc follows this sectnon 7 See below 3 47-54 Nuclear Warheads the First Test I One of the most important clues suggesting a priority Chinese nuclear weapons program lies in the fact that the Chinese have themselves as early as 1958 and as late as September 1962 8 stated flatly that they have such a program All the indications suggest that Soviet aid although significant in getting China started has been of niggardly proportions in the nuclear field Mining and concentration of uranium ore in China were begun about 1955 With SoViet assistance None of the ore is believed to have been shipped to the SOVlet Union and several mines remain active The following three paragraphs are not releasable to foreign nationalsA7 Design of a plant to produce metallic uranium from concen- trated ore was begun with Soviet help in 1956 is believed that such a plant became operational by early 1961 but attempts to pinpoint the exact acts have not succeeded All efforts to locate or confirm the eXistence of China s first plutonium-production reactor or reactors and associated 8 Foreign Minister Chen Yi in odo Tokyo 20 September 1962 as Cited in Foreign BroadcaSt In ormation Service Daily Report Far Basr No 184 20 September 1962 p BEES 30 SPECIAL HANDLING neoumso SEEKEL N01 usuasnau 1'0 some moans chemloal-separataon have thus far felled Technloal con51deratlons lead experts to belleve that a reactor e1ther is now or soon wall be an operateon The evadence 15 fazrly strong that 15 belleved to have been halted at the tame of the Withdrawal of Sovaet techn1c1an5 1n 1960 By comparlson pl tonnum production oralloy produc requlres a more complex faczl ty thousands of stages uranzum-asotope separation A H each a small amount 3 cascade 15 an extremely d1ffzcult engineerang project 1rputs from many 1ndu5tr1e5 and 1mperfect10n5 1n the cascade can 9 Oralloy 15 uranium a high proportion of the lsotope u-235 and plutonzum are the princzpal flssionahle mate- r1als from which nuclear weapons can be made 10 A cascade or gaseous-diffusion plant 15 a facilaty for the proportzon 1n uranlum of the isotope U-ZES SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS drastically reduce its efficiency The Chinese with their shortage of technical skills can therefore be expected to rely primarily on plutonium until they Significantly improve their industrial and engineering base The Soviet withdrawal and the economic difficulties caused by the agricultural crisis have probably slowed the Chinese nuclear-materials program but it is difficult to say how much in the absence of further information on plutonium production Chou En-lai in his September 1961 discussion with Field Marshal Montgomery 15 reported to have implied that the nuclear program had been stretched out so that China could meet other pressing needs At Geneva in early August 1962 CPR Foreign Minister Chen Yi conceded that development of a Chinese atom bomb still reqUired a lot of time although he asserted that considerable progress had been made 11 A note of pessimism is also detectable in captured documents that suggest that Chinese armed forces have been told not to expect new types of weapons for a few years The above statements imply delays compared to timetables based on technical feasibility Nevertheless the metallic uranium slugs turned out by China's first uranium metals plant 11 Interview reported in Frankfurter 6 August 1962 as Cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report Far East No 152 6 August 1962 pp 3334-5 32 stem were presumably intended for use in a large reactor for plutonium production If the metals output was used in 1961 to start up such a reactor plutonium production would now be under way and the product could be separated fabricated and ready for use in a test deVice as early as the first half of 1963 The intelli- gence community accordingly conSiders 1963 the earliest feasible date but recognizes the probability of delays of as long as several years due to the chronic economic criSis If the assumptions already cited are in fact correct the year 1964 would be the most likely time for the first Chinese test since delays of a year or more are easy to imagine under current Chinese conditions even in a high-priority program There is a strong possibility espeCially if the Chinese plurcnium program is deSigned to be large enough to produce an early stockpile that the firSt Chinese tests could be in a limited series or at lease tnat the firSt test could shortly be followed by a few others Warhead Technology and Yields _ he following section is restricted data Atomic Energy Act 1954 The prevailing intelligence eStimate that the first deliverable Chinese nuclear weapon will be a crude ATOMIC ENERGY DATA 4 0 Six- to ten-thousand-pound fission bomb based on plutonium implo- Sion is probably a correct description of the first testable deVice But unless the Chinese have been given the Tu 16 Badger medium bomber in the meantime they are not likely to make a weapon of such a crude device for the lack of any delivery vehicle except for their few aged and ineffectual Tu-4 Bulls Soviet-built versions of the US 3-295 More probable is an attempt to Jump directly to a deVice of around 2 500 pounds that can serve as the basis for a bomb of 37 inch diameter suitable to the bomb-bay deSign of the Beagle the only operational Chinese bomber as the ba515 for a warhead snitable for mating with Soviet-type medium-range ballis- tic miSSiles and as a ready-made primary12 for nuclear tests relating to the deSign of thermonuclear weapons There is a possibility that a plutonium-implosion deVioe of the right weight and diameter could be produced within one to two years after the first Chinese nuclear test and made into a weapon soon after that Such a 2 500-pound deVice should yield l5 to 25 kilotons assuming an economical use of plutonium Even with use 12 A two stage thermonuclear weapon includes two fiSSion devices the one used to trigger the weapon is known as the pri- mary and the other surrounding material involved in the quion reaction is known as the secondary 34 ATOILIC ENERGY EMA 4 SEER-EL of uneconomacal quantities of plutonium the maximum yield should remain at most 50 to 60 kilotons After ach1ev1ng a 2 500 pound fission dev1ce the Chinese can be expected to pursue a deliverable thermonuclear weapon For this purpose they will probably conduct a relatively large number of tests making up for any 1nsuff1c1enc1es in their instrumenta tion by trial-and error Part way through the process after teeting various secondary designs with respect to the channeling of pressure and radlation they can be expected to experiment with devaces hav1ng some yield from fu51on as well as fleeion At the same time they will probably conduct additional tests and experiments in order to reduce the Size of their primary from 2 500 to about 500 pounds and thus to permit fabrication of a misalle- and Beagle-deliverable thermonuclear device In minia- turizing their primaries the Chinese will be somewhat handicapped by the inability without enricned uranium from a cascade to obtain Stockpile quant ties of the tritium indispensable for b005t1ng With an unboostec SOC-pound primary they could expect to obtain from a 2 500-pound warhead a yield in the range of 300 to 800 kilotons or roughly one half megaton -over a megaton if they possess design sophistication up to current American Standards to UI ATOMIC ENERGY EMA 4 EECREJL The problem of producing a thermonuclear device Will be largely one of scientific imagination The Chinese have first- rate scientists and they are aided by the knowledge of what other nations have accomplished At the same time they W111 be comparatively poor in computer facilities test instrumentation and the quality of available engineering and materials so that optimized designs will probably not be achieved for some time No nation to date is known to have built a thermonuclear deVice with an all-plutonium primary a d_secondary but France is known to be deing so and many existing designs are adaptable to an all plutonium combination Success by the Chinese intel1igence serVices in obtaining blueprints of a foreign thermonuclear deSign would save conSiderably on test experimentation and prob- ably speed the program All things conSidered a reasonable expectation is Chinese production of a deliverable thermonuclear deVice five or six years after the firSt fiSSion test- p055ibly as early as 1969 13 This achievement might be accelerated by a combination of good 13 This is to say that the Chinese may produce a thermo- nuclear device earlier than part of the intelligence community now suggests--assuming of course that the initial Chinese fission device is in fact detonated as early as 1963 or 1964 36 ATOMIC ENERGY EMA MEL and breakthroughs but the tametable could at least as ea51ly be retarded By the 19705 the Chinese should be able to produce molt - megaton warheads and should get ylelds above one kiloton per pound for thelr heaV1e5t deV1ces Chloe can be expected by that time to get 1nto the productlon of uranlum 1nclud1ng oralloy and to raise yields markedly even for small warheads by the use of The followlng paragraph 15 restricted data Atomic Energy Act 195457 In maklng projectlons the tlming of the first test as less zmportant than the ease and schedule of progects for produc1ng materlals By assumlng an all plutcnlum program based on a reactor of plausible 512e 153-200 megawatts and by further assuming that a second and subsequent reactors of the same dealgn are 1ntro- duced on a given schedule at as poss ble to make def1n1te stockpile projections Allowance must be made for down time plutonium used up 1n tests improvement 1n reactor power levels over tlme the t1me needec 1' the productlon process and the extra tzme reedec an nferlcr performance the tame the I'd SEER-EL Chinese go through a production cycle As a variant it is possible to assume that a moderate sized gaseous diffusion plant will go into operation to produce oralloy starting some time in the late 19605 The following table presents a series of sample extrapola tions that start with the operation of a first uranium metals plant in early 1961 and the use of the product to activate a reactor in the same year l4 STOCKPILE IN NOMINAL-YIELD FISSION WARHEAD MID-YEAR A 1964 5 4 4 4 1965 21 21 l7 17 16 1966 45 43 30 30 24 1967 92 75 50 4B 34 1968 163 119 B9 72 56 1969 264 177 147 103 90 14 The programs suggested by columns A to represent fast to slow possibilities for the Chinese depending on their choice of various combinations of reactors and cascades For details and a full explanation on each projection see Keesing Communist Chinese Nuclear Threat section on Stockpile projections 15 Two of these units are roughly sufficient for one thermo nuclear weapon SE m MEL As a generallzatlon the 20-weapon mark appears llkely to be passed sometime 1n 1965 the 50-weapon mark an 1967 and the 100- weapon mark an 1968 or 1969 As a rough extrapolatlon the level of 200 thermonuclear or 400 weapons or some comblnataon should be reached about 1971 Dellvery Vehacles--Current Productlon Chinese research and development resources are and Chlnese relevant experlence to date 1n these flelds 15 even more 11m1ted The Chanese arms 1ndustr1es have had experience With Soviet anstructlon and supervisaon an produc1ng -or at least MIG get fighters ocean golng sub- marlnes radars light transport azrcraft and a few other sophls- tlcated weapon systems but nothang that would be sultable for the combat dellvery of nuclear weapons For the most part the Chcnese are stll dependent on thelr for complex parts an each system and productlon was greatly dlsrupted or completely stoppec by the of Sov1et assistance 1n 1960 The most promcnent casualty 1n terms of future nuclear dellvery capabilaty was a plant apparently belng tooled up for production of the Badger medlum bomber near the c1ty of Slan Chlnese independent production of even the most complex equzpment seems to be merely a matter of tame but for Lack of 1 meek sufficient technical manpower to go around the Chinese must concentrate their resources particularly in research and development on a very few systems Manned Bombers The present Operational bomber forces of Communist China consist of about 450 IL-28 Beagles All of these aircraft two- fifths of which are under Navy command were built years ago in the Sov1et Union and are now obsolescent Many Chinese bombers are probably becoming maintenance-weary and the number available is diminished yearly by attrition and cannibalization Beagle a light bomber from the early jet era has a maximum combat radius with tip tanks of 740 nautical miles target speed is only 385 knots and combat ceiling is less than 40 000 feet The stringent bomb-bay limitations have already been mentioned in connection with nuclear weapons Range characteristics would per- mit attack with difficulty on all important potential targets in the Patific Far East but other characteristics make this air- craft highly vulnerable to sophisticated air defenses and in general an undesirable if usable vehicle The Beagle has radar bombing equipment but there is no significant evidence of training or other preparations for instrument bombing operations The best hope with Beagle against United States forces would seem to be low- level visual attacks 4C Esau The current estlmate 13 that the Chlnese do not possess the resources to produce the Badger especaally while also to produce missmles desplte the fact that fac111t1es for a productlon complex are already partially bullt The Chlnese havang apparently abandoned or deferred their produc- tlon effort are probably tryang to induce the Sov1ets to sell them Badgers the Sovaets have already dellvered a few of these bombers to Indone51a Compared to Beagle Badger is a much larger more complex and versatlle alrcraft wath a much longer range combat radlus as up to 1 850 nautlcal males and heavaer payload more than 10 000 pounds Performance is better than Beagle although below the 3-47 the Unlted States equlvalent The Soviets have equapped the TU ls With aar-to-surface missiles having ranges of 55 and 100 nautzcal males and these also would oe de51rable to the Chinese In View of thezr need for manned delivery 1t is almost certs th ne Chlnese wall keep Beagles 1n the inven- tory as long as they car keep them operatlonal and lack better replacement systems If the Ch1nese can obtaln some substantlal number of Badgers 1n additlon the result will be a major jump 1n thelr attack capabalatles and an ea51ng of the1r nuclear war heac welght earlzer development of multi- megaton weapons TEGREL Ballistic Missiles for Regional Purposes ZThe following section is not releasable to foreign nationals 7 16 A distinctive feature of the location is that it is almost at the geographical center of China and hence in the only area from which missiles cannot be sent much over l l00 nautical miles to destinations within Chzna aa- SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS fl Work on program began before the of Sov1et techn1c1ans from Chlna 1n July August 1960 It has con- tznued alnce that tlme presumably SOV1et-bu11t m1551les In the absence of any other ev1dence resolv1ng paradox1cal sztuatzon 1t must tentatzvely be supposed that the Sov1ets have glver the Chlnese and tralning experlence With thelr shorter-range and have helped bulld a test slte but probably have made no commitments to supply Sov1et misslles for operational Chlnese forces The Chlnese can be expected to have already commenced a pro- gram of or roughly ztztat ng the deszgn cf the 43 SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS stem medium-range ballistic vehicles that they have seen Therefore unless the Sov1ets have somehow managed to tie up all of China's missile personnel on joint projects or the Chinese are getting or truly expect to get Soviet help in terms of operational mis- siles the Chinese are presumably attempting an independent effort to produce missiles The question is how long would it take for the Chinese to produce something like the Soviet original To this a tentative answer of about five years can be assigned probably starting from 1960 for limited hand produc- Two or three additional years would be needed for convert- But there tion ing production to a fully-tooled assembly-line basis are clearly many uncertainties in such an estimate The Soviet ballistic missiles that the Chinese have pre- sumably had a chance to study are liquid propelled and to Some These misSiles are degree are either mobile or transportable credited with CEPs of about one nautical mile at 700 naut m or one and a half nautical miles at 1 100 naut m Guidance is radio inertial and fairly simple for ranges up to 1 100 nautical miles there is little re-entry problem Allowable warheads are on the order of 2 500-3 000 pounds The Soviet versions are fairly reliable but the performance characteristics of a future Chinese even if patterned on SOViet miSSiles can only be guessed 44 SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED Wow RELEASABLE TO some NATIONAIS Intercontinental Delivery Vehicles There is as yet no ev1dence of a Chinese effort or inten- tion in the direCtion of intercontinental ballistic missiles or any alternative major intercontinental delivery system There is also no evidence of work on solid-propellant missiles although solid fuels would have definite advantages for the Chinese par- ticularly for intercontinental purposes and much information on such fuels 15 uncla551fied 1n the United States In the absence of eVidenoe it can only be estimated that the Chinese will prob- ably be able by undertaking a high-priority ICBM program imme- diately following their presumed medium range ballistic misSile project to obtain at least an l ltial operating capa- b211ty by the early or mid-19705 assuming that their economic situataon permits This would be a very expen51ve and difficult Drogram requiring new range fatalities ground support equip went numerous hard-to-produce componerts and the solution of set-ous re-entry problems A Numerical Progection Collation of the available information and estimates on manned bombers and ballistic missiles suggests most tentatively the following progection MEL VEHICLES END OF YEAR MRBM ICBM REMARKS 1964 345 1965 310 Inltlal 0 eretional Capa- 13111125 A with Beagle 1966 290 5 1967 250 lO IOC with MRBM 1968 225 30 1969 205 60 let thermonuclear weapon 1970 185 105 1971 165 150 1972 150 200 IOC With ICBM The Communist Chinese obv1ously could slow down the acqulsl- tzon of advanced dellvery means compared to schedule but they could not ea51ly accelerate their progress unless they receiVe major a5515tance from the Sov1et5 or achieve rapid industrlal galns i 17 Assumed to be Beagle Badgers might e ther be acquired from the Soviet Union or produced domestlcally by about 1969 Alternatively a new fighter bomber nuclear-capable might be avallable by the end of the decade It such a case the number of alrcraft 1n the early 19705 would not necessarily 61m1n15h as shown 46 Teens 1 IF- husk ECONOMIC LIMITATIONS THE AGRICULTURAL Industrialization in Communist China 15 concentrated on developing the country's military potential by bUilding up tre technical and industrial capacity indispensable for the produc- tion of advanced weapons Within such limits as the scarc1ty of skilled personnel nuclear development can take place as an insulated special effort probably up to the level of a few nuclear tests and a token capability But the achievement of a militarily significant nuclear capability including means of dellvery requires all round technical and industrial advance and cannot be separated from industrialization 0n the other hand the military effort as bound to influence the industriali- zation program In the -te EGSCs after intensave planned development Ll gun-o anna made impre551ve strides an transforming an economy whose cooern industrial sector was far more backward than that of Defore the Revolution Up to-date equipment and Russaa until 1963 advisers were prOVided by the Soviet Union After the notorious Great Leap Forward and the commune 13 For a more detailed treatment see Donald B Kee51ng Economic Limitations on Communist China's Nuclear Achievements Study Memorandum No 20 its Washington D C This PACIFICA nape wall oe issued shortly 4 stoeek experiment however the industrialization effort fell into severe difficulties because of the withdrawal of most Sov1et aid and more important because of a maSSive agricultural oriSis In the second half of 1960 the regime embarked on a retreat Large-scale food purchases were begun from abroad five and one-half million tons were purchased for delivery in 1961 and over four million tons have been purchased in 1962 Agriculture received higher priority and agricultural organiza- tion reverted to a much more decentralized form Despite this shift of policy in agriculture and other sectors the economy as of 1962 is beset by hunger unemploy- ment low morale shortages of raw materials and finished goods greatly reduced machinery imports a low level of activity in industry and construction and continued agricultural problems Malnutrition and demoralization appear Widespread Source of the agricultural Problem Analysis suggests strongly that the Chinese agricultural difficulties are due not only to the communes and their mis- management compounded somewhat by adverse weather but also to more intractable and more fundamental causes insufficiency of inputs relative to the output reddirement and incentive problems 1 BID ml lull Ill-Inn I'IImu-Il I I'll Mun sstesL that are not completely soluble so long as grain deliveries necessary for rapid industrialization are forced from the peasantry These are long-term problems so that agricultural diffi culties are Sure to compound Chinese industrial difficulties for at least another decade Agricultural needs will compete With other uses of China's industrial capacity At its source the problem is one of land and population China's population based on the rudimentary census of 1953 plus reasonable extrapolations is probably about or approaching 700 million Tb feed this multitude China possesses only 270 illion arable acres The Significance of this can be seen by an approx1mate thumbnail comparison with the United States and the SoViet Union Arable Area l960 Food Grain Output Population million acres million metric tons millions China 270 180 700 United States 465 196 190 SoViet Union 580 125 2 3 Potato production is included on the basis of one-quarter actual weight in accordance with Communist Chinese practice The Situation is not quite so bleak as this comparison would suggest because pOSSibilities for irrigation and double-cropping are considerable and because the Japanese with to be sure better initial have achieved more than twice the Chinese output per unit of land The Japanese achieve this result by careful conservation practices and an application of chemical fertilizer at an annual rate that in China would imply some 55 million tons per year as compared with an actual peak use in China of 4 million tons Like other imports fertilizer imports have fallen off recently and most of the other inputs such as animal power labor and natural fertilizer have been reduced by the agricultural criSis In some regions Communist mismanagement has even caused a deterioration in basic 5011 and water conditions Outlook for the Future To produce adequate sustenance for 700 million people about 210 million metric tons of food grain is needed If as many experts believe the population increases to one billion by 1980 some 300 million metric tons would be reQUired Except for the 1958 crop China's highest recorded harvest has been only 185 million metric tons Thus even with good weather and efficient management the Communist industrialization program Will be 50 sseem a I Jean dg iw rm damaged by shortages of food agrlcultur raw matertals and agricultural exports There may be a contlnu1ng requlrement for food imports competing for preclcus forelgn exchange In the long run however Chane should be able--1f Commonlst as 1gnored--to work its way out from under 1ts precarious food prob- lem through drastlc populatlon control zmproved management of agrscultural resources and massive dlverslon of 1ndustr1al resources 1nto inputs for agrlculture such as chemlcal The 1ndustrial12ataon program can be expected to recover some of 1ts momentum as crops 1mprove Probably 90 years of excellent harvests or three years of moderately good harvests Will be needed to repazr the damage done to the modern 1ndus- trlal sector of the economy already has a consaderable reservolr of faCtorles and labor as a legacy of the '305 After that recovery ways can probably be found better to 1nsslate ndustrsal advances from the rest of the economy especaally 1n the 1ndustr1es most closely assoc1ated w1th modern weapons technology Effective populatlon control would have benef1C1al effects as short a tame as ten years Until then the 11m1tat10ns of food productlon and graln collectlon can be expecred to delay but no to stop ndus al and 51 technical advance Only acute famine conditions can be expected to suspend the growth of China's nuclear potential assuming this growth is pursued with determination If it is not the annual advance of industries and technology connected with nuclear capa- bilities will be accelerated or retarded according to the harvest Long-term industrial progress in Communist China given a degree of prior agricultural and industrial recovery from the present dislocation Will depend first of all on guaranteeing a minimum adequate food supply to the nonagricultural population through forced collections peasant sales imports and continued winnow1ng out of nonessential personnel from the urban labor force With a stable and adequate flow of food to'the cities China can base industrialization principally on improving the quality rather than on increaSing the size of its force of urban workers and technicians while expanding the available capital plant as rapidly as p0551ble A combination of new machinery and new skills can then enable a relatively rapid rise in productiVity and thus in output even if urbanization must continue to be held sharply in check In this way it W111 prob- ably be possible to insulate Chinese industry to a degree from the dire poverty of the agricultural sector provided the latter does not again assume critical proportions for the entire soCiety 52 ssanL Sov1et aid to China or American aid in the form of large- scale fOOd shipments would significantly accelerate Chinese achievement of nuclear capabilities In the absence of such aid agricultural trouble might cause China to defer production and deployment of new nuclear delivery vehicles in quantity but the Chinese can be expected to undertake highly selective vehicle- develomeNt programs nuclear-stockpile accumulation and warhead experiment almost regardless of economic troubles These pro- grams indispensable to Chinese progress toward increaSing nuclear capabilities cannot be regarded as prohibitively expenSive need for Hard Choices At least for the proximate future the Chinese Communists if they are to make China a major nuclear power must pay a high price in terms of such other important goals as the satisfaction of CiVilian needs and tne improvement of conventional military forces There are limits houever to the transferability of skills and resources from advanced weapons programs to the Civilian economy Within the nuclear warhead and delivery vehicle program scarCity of resources will compel a choice between neglecting short run capabilities anc setting back the long-run program and between ballistic anc some alternate means of delivery seem All the hard choaces facing the reglme will become more and the alternatives will become less attractlve at tlmes when the economy is in trouble conversely any cause for economlc recovery should speed the process of acquiring nuclear capabilities 54 CHAPTER THE SHORT RUN AND THE THREAT The knowledge that Communist China is testing nuclear weapons will produce around the world sharp political and effects Military implications at first deriVing primarily from the political reaction in the Far East could be eVident from the beginning and certainly will emerge as the time approaches when the People's Republic of China ZERE7 can deploy even small and local nuclear operational capabilities Well before these capa- bilities develop they will have been antiCipated politically and nations likely to be directly affected by the eventuality of Chinese offenSive nuclear power will probably have begun to behave as though the CPR were already in possesSion of that power This chapter discusses p0581ble reactions within various regions to Communist China's emergence as a nuclear power and the implications of these reactions for US policy The effects of China's attainment of an initial nuclear capability are examined But a protracted delay in Chinese testing will of course moderate such effects 55 Etc 1n order for the Communlst bloc for Western Europe the United and Australasaa and for the rlmland along the perlphery of Chlna Condi tions 1n China and elsewhere the Unlted States can affect only marginally if at all will also 1nfluence the reaction For example The Speclal Menace in Nuclear Testing_ y Communlst Ch1na An approprlate question is why should there be partlcular alarm at testing by Communist Chlna when at least four other states possess nuclear weapons and one the Soviet Unlon has detonated a devace hav1ng a force of over 50 megatons So far as the world in general is concerned tests are obv1- ously a prelude to the possession of a nuclear armament and the menace 18 twofold in what it portends First 56 The Chinese nuclear tests however should create a deep impression on the peoples not only of A51a but of Africa the Middle East and possibly Latin America as well in part because China will be the first non-white and or underdeveloped nuclear power Except for the most sophisticated members of their elites--few in all areas--these peoples are generally likely to feel pride in the Chznese a 1evement even as they experience new 57 WWII tumult 'I'li flurries of fear concerning testing and fallout The first test I will in many areas seem equivalent to a nuclear operational capa- bility and will also seem to mean an immediate impairment of the US military p081ti0n Communist China s prestige and hence its influence on local radical movements Will probably be enhanced and a net gain for radical political organizations is likely to result THE COMMUNIST BLOC Chinese Exploitation of Early Tests If political conditions are not propitious at the time China is technically able to begin nuclear testing the regime can be a 5 expected to delay tests for maximum political advantage as long 9 k as several months A longer delay than this for political pur- poses seems unlikely SE Provided China is economically Viable at the time of the first nuclear test and hence able to project the image of great future power Opportunities for Chinese political and explai- tation of nuclear tests should prove considerable The Chinese situation differs in significant respects from that of the Union when the latter tested its first nuclear device in August 1949 Sov1et leaders made no announcement of this test until the United States revealed that it had taken place The world reaction at the time was favorable to the Soviet inter- est despite the fact that the themselves made little attempt to enhance the reaction They were plainly taken by sur- prise when the United States announced their test China knows that the United States will probably detect any nuclear test and also that the United States will announce the fact unless the Chinese themselves do so They also know that the United States if the US treatment of the Soviet Union under 51ml- lar Circumstances is any precedent will not use force to prevent Chinese acquiSition of nuclear capabilities While it must be antic1pated that the Chinese will prepare their tests in secrecy and that the CPR will antiCipate the 59 United States by maklng its own announcements on other nations for early If nuclear 15 long delayed mlssiles from Chlnese productlon could also become avallable for purpose prove suff1c1ent to pub11c1ze prev1ous Chlnese misalle from 2 Shuang-cheng-tzu It might 2 See above p 42 I I run W1thin China despite some bitterness resulting from the knowledge that the regime has been developlng expensmve nuclear oapabilltles during a period of food shortage pride 1n the nuclear achievement seems certaln to proV1de a 11ft for Chinese morale 3 This 15 likely to be particularly ev1dent among elite groups with Signiflcantly useful results an terms of the redoubled efforts they will exert 3 Chlnese everywhere includlng the 14 overseas and the ll on Tazwan can be expected to feel 1f not to show prlde 1n the Chinese technological accomplishment 61 Team 5 The Sov1et Unlon Practlcal eV1denoe of a lack of fraternal unity w1th1n the Communlst bloc ls 1n hale The Sov et Unlon has shown 1nterest 1n reducing pressures on the Communist Chinese reglme or 1n alleviating the travail of the Chlnese people durlng 4 For further of arms control and Communist Chlna see below pp 194 98 5 For a more detalled treatment see John R Thomas Reac- tions to a Nuclear Armed Communlst Chlne the Sovlet Unlon U SECRET 15D Study Memorandum No 19 IDA D 0 Thze PACIFICA paper w1ll be lssued shortly 63 Work the current agricultural criSis There has been little reduction in the hard terms of trade which China encounters Within the bloc and no resumption of large scale assistance In contrast the Soviet Union has been conducting massive aid programs in India and Indonesia interpretable by the Chinese as eVidence of SOViet indifference to their problems and hostility to their interests Recently Soviet ideological political and military journals have been conducting an educational program on the realities and dangers of nuclear warfare with obVious indi- cations that one of the intended consumers 13 China 6 SOViet assistance in terms of the type of facilities built and the timing of the Withdrawal may actually have been designed to limit or even frustrate the Chinese program See Thomas The SoViet Union and Donald B KeeSing The Communist Chinese Nuclear Threat Warheads and Deliver Vehicles CUE SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA ISD Study Memorandum No 17 ZIDA Wash- ington D CJ7 64 7 For the purposes of this report a Class A nuclear power is one that has achleved or 15 believed to have achieved the 13 a retallatory tc dellver an effectlve blow agalnst all nuclear powers lzkely to comblne 1n a coal t10n For ther d15cu551on see below pp 177 183 65 mm MEL North Korea and North Vietnam The reactlons of members of the Communlst bloc other than the Sov et Union are largely predictable in terms of present bloc 8 EUROPE AND AUSTRALASIR 8 For greater detazl see the following PACIFICA papers General and Roderlck MaoParquhar Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communist Chlna Euroge and the Unlted Kangdom ISD Study Memorandum No 12 IDA D C 1962 and Arthur Burns Reactlons to a Nuclear- rmed Communist Chlna Australa51a UNCLASSIFIED I55 Study Memorandum No 13 IDA Washington D C 1962 This last W111 be issued shortly 67 However the United Kingdom deepite its withdrawal of forces from the area retains a measure of influence in the Far East and shares the interest of the United States in stabilizing non-Communist areas of Assa Under the Circumstances it appears essential that the United Kingdom and the United States should recognize their common long term interest in ASia SE a H HE ALONG THE PERIPHERY OF CHINA Along the Unlted States it 15 Asia that W111 be most 1rectly affected by Chlna's emergence as a potentlal nuclear power rounc the Chlnese per phery of the Unlted States--and even 69 HER-EL neutral countries--appear certain to react to Chinese nuelaar test- ing according to their estimate of the American position in the Far East at the time and in the light of the US reaction to the ini- tial tests These states are also likely to affect each other and to some extent the United States as well by their individual reactions so that the backlash of and political responses to the initial tests could produce reinforcing and mul- tiplying effects across the Pacific mm 1 I 9 For greater detail see Donald B Kee51ng and Roger Plneau Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communzst Chane Japan U SECRET ISD Study Memora aum No 15 IDA D 0 Th 5 PACIFICA paper be 72 52am 10 See PACIFICA su PPOrtln Japanese Government s 'Gray le 74 HEEL 11 These factors are analyzed in detail in John B Cary of a Conununlst Chlnege Nuclear U SECRET ISD Study Memorandum No 14 IDA D C 962 pp 10-15 75 see below pp l45-53 12 The Republic of China 1%in 12 For greatgg detqal see the PACIFICR supporting paper 323 of Chlna Ta1wan UNCLASSIFIED by Harold C Hinton 15 1ncluded 1n IDA7ISD Study MemorandUm No 16 to be lssued shortly 7E -Jh Southeast Hela Southeast A51a as 1 does currently the most area for Communlst aggre351on 1n the Far East 15 llkely to be underg01ng pressures Wh1Ch Will be underllned by the event of the 1n1t1al Communlst Chlnese nuclear test 7 Burma's tendency to mollify Communast Ghana will probably be confirmed by the event of an anatial Chinese nuclear test Assuming that the trend of affairs elsewhere 1n Southeast A51a and 1n South Asla favors Free World interests Burma should be able to retain 1nternal and some semblance of 1nde- 7B MEL TIER-EL l3 Indla and Pakistan A new dimenszon W111 be added to the fear and With the Indlans regard the Chlnese as the CPR proceeds With nuclear tests However the government of Indla whether under Nehru or his successors W111 have ample reason to keep Indlan attentlon concentrated on internal economic scolal and political programs 13 For greater datasl see Loy w Henderson Reactions to a Nuclear Armed Chlna South Asza CONFIDENTIAL ISD Study Mem- orandum No ll IDA D C 1962 SC Rusk An analy51s of the present all1anoe system of the United States from the veewpolnts of utllity and of prov1d1ng necessary assurance of Amer1can support to the 15 1ncluded as Appendlx of the PACIFICA substudy Mllatary Imp 1catlons of a Communist Chlnese Nuclear by John B Cary and lssued as Study Memorandum No 14 pp 149 59 In summary present alliances appear adequate for these purposes although Pakistan and possibly Thailand may feel that more formal or closer collaboratlon With the Unlted States 15 necessary 0 The depth and momentum of the influences described above will be intensified or reduced by the surrounding circumstances many of which can be influenced by the United States These include a The nature of the regimes then in power in ASian nations b Prior success or failure of the Free World and particu larly the United States in stemming Communist advances in Asia but also elsewhere c The nature of the reaction within the United States and to a lesser extent within Europe to Chinese atomic exploits d The ability of ASian governments and elites to make an accurate assessment of the military and political Significance of the Chinese nuclear program to meet initial Chinese nuclear tests Without surprise and to convey confidence to their peoples e The actuality of US military superiority over the Commu- nists in Asia as conveyed by the then-existing US military pos- ture and published programs espec1ally in the Western Pacific and Far East THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK BE CHAPTER IV THE INTERMEDIAEE PERIOD The preceding chapter was concerned with the period between the explosion of Communist China s first nuclear device and the development of a locally effective nuclear capability The focus was therefore on the political and repercussions of China's first nuclear tests The midnterm period with which this chapter deals will be characterized by the existence of a Communist Chinese operational nuclear capability usable locally in the Far East The climate of change during this period will stem primarily from China's acquisition of a valid nuclear capability with the resulting change in the military Situation leading in turn to the creation of new political problems The influences largely and political created by China's early nuclear experiments will continue and may be intenSified during the mid term period It is posSible that these and other influences may have caused significant alterations in the political enVironment particularly in Asia It is generally assumed however in order to analyze the mid-term effects that 87 major shifts adverse to the United States have not occurred and that the political Situation in the Far East remains essentially as at present In the present chapter in contrast to the preceding the Specifically military implications of China as a nuclear power come to the fore This chapter therefore is in some sense the core of the report The utility of Chinese nuclear armaments in general war and the factors that may affect a Soviet decision to engage in either local or general war as a result of Communist Chinese action or other pressures are first discussed This is followed by an analysis of the military position of Communist China and of North Korea and North Vietnam versus the United States in the Western Pacific and the Far East areas The utility of Chinese nuclear forces in specific ASian hostilities is then examined in the light of this analySis The over-all implications of the preceding factors for the peeition of Communist China itself and for the United States and its naian allies are deduced and chapter ends with a discussion of the effects of changes in the pattern of Sine-SOViet relations on the conclusions reached in the foregOing analysis 88 SEER-EL has In discusSion of US military capabilities no attempt has been made to recommend Specific employment Such an endeavor which would connote Specific war planning is inapprOpriate for a study such as this and in any event would necessarily be based on so many assumptions- 1argely surmise when projected far into the future - as to have little or no value Military requirements are therefore discussed in terms of capabilities that will permit a variety of deCisions by the United States More Specifically discussion of US nuclear forces is based on the clear realization that if em- ployed at all they need not be used to their full capacity nor against any target system presently postulated THE SOVIET umowl Utility of Chinese Nuclear Armament in General war Almost irrespective of the number of nuclear weapons one assumes the Chinese will be capable of producing these can l The implications of Chinese nuclear armaments for general war and SOViet military action are also discussed in John B Cary Militar 1m lications of a Communist Chinese Nuclear capability U Study Memorandum No 14 IDA Washington D C 1962 Chapter pp 29-48 an at - constitute only a marginal increment to the nuclear power other- wise available to the Communist bloc The Soviet Union already can deliver a attack against the United States and can simultaneously strike all militarily important targets in the Western Peeific and the Far East that may be within range of Chinese delivery vehicles during this time frame Pressures on the Soviets There are strong ideological and political pressures on the SoViet Union to support any Communist military or paramilitary operations which may occur in ASia Bloc leadership cohesion and prestige Will be involved as will be the loyalties and future effectiveness of Communist parties worldwide Further the Sino- SOVlet alliance creates strong ideological reasons for the Soviet Union to succor a China in military difficulty 2 These pressures 2 The wording of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance however also permits the Sov1ers to deny on legalistic grounds its appli- cability under almost any Circumstances 90 may be increased through the acquiSition by China of a nuclear capability SoViet ASSiStance in Local War Unless local hostilities are initiated by China over the objections of the Union some degree of SOViet support of China must be anticipated This support will almost surely include political and support and the prOViSion of critical military supplies and advice Direct Soviet military intervention might be involved probably by volunteers 91 There are severe limitations however on the amount of effec- tive military assistance that Soviet forces can provide 3 Certain specialized military functions such as submarine warfare and air transport and possibly an increment of offenSive air power could be of great utility to the Chinese But generally Speaking SOViet military intervention would be limited by the same logistic factors that severely limit Chinese offensive capabilities and Soviet forces could only substitute for Chinese forces Thus real Soviet aSSistance effective from the Chinese Viewpoint is most likely to require first and foremost SOViet strategic cover for Chinese local operations during this intermediate term phase Pressures for General war or 6 ae a1 VIEWS on prlmacy surv1val of the Sov1et Unlon see John R Thomas Reactnons to a Nuclear-Armed Communlst Chane the Soviet Union SECRET ISNStudy Memorandum No 19 In Washington This PRCIPICA paper will be issued shortly THE UNITED STATES VERSUS A NUCLEAR-ARMED General US forces 1n the Western Pac1f1c and Far East es- sentlally a light screening force deployed for immedlate reaponse 1n time of whether major or minor Except for qplte mlnor operations these forces are dependent on relnforcement from the United States in a 11m1ted war altuatlon They now have these general tasks 2 Ground forces n Korea and alr and naval forces 1n Japan Okinawa and adjacent waters are continuously on posltson for 1m- medlate reaponse 1n the event of renewal of hostilztles 1n Korea 3 Naval forces a large segment of the Paolflc land-based as forces and the Marine and the Army on Okinawa 5 as also dlscussed 1n Cary Military Impli- cations Chapter IV pp 41-68 6 The term alt forces and 51mllar generlc terminology 15 used unless otherw1se oualified to include all land-and ship based a1r unlts of the Unlted States Force Navy and Marlne Corns The term ground forces 51m larly 1ncludes both Unlted States Army ard Karate Corps forces 9E TECH-EL posture of readlness for 1mmed1ate deployment to any area of local malntain a 4 A1r defenses prlmarlly flxed 1n nature are deployed for the defense of US forces and installatlons These US forces in general are concentrated or are dependent for support on a relatlvely few large-scale bases all W1th1n range of bombers and medium-range mlssiles based 1n China In to these forward forces the Unlted States malntalns on Hawaii and Guam forces serve as an 1mmed1ate reserve In any contingency short of general war US forces 1n the Far East are dependent 1n degrees on combat and support capaballtles Present arrangements env1sage retentlon by the U ltEd States of command over all US forces regardless of the area of Future 7 The terms local war and local are used 1n paper to refer to hostllatzes or 1nc1dents 11m1ted to a spec1f1c localzty such as Korea Taiwan or Vletnam broader actzons over all 0 large areas of Asza are termed regzona war 0c 5 US abillty to respond 1n 3 51tuat10n should be materlally 1mproved through advances 1n strategzc capa- b 11tles throu the rcv151cn cf roll er roll-o f car 0 shlos 100 MEL MEL by fleatlng depots and by the prov151on of STOL ghort Takeoff and and p0551bly VTOL iVertlca Takeoff and LandlnET e rcraft of US Forces 1n the WeSCerr Paelflc and Far Eas US forces 1n the Western Paelflc are eontlnuousiy faced w1th the threat of a surprise and m3551ve nuclear attack by the Sovee 102 Chlna s M111tary Capablligg The Chinese nuclear threat has already been Potentlal Chinese nuclear capabllitles must however be 1n conjunction Chlna's total malltary capabilities which have limltatlons See Chester above pp 11-54 The economically competitive nature of major military programs will largely prohibit China from undertaking the development of extenSive new military capabilities Simultaneously with the devel opment of a nuclear capability Some modernization of her ground forces and possibly some qualitative improvement in her air de fenses and in her conventional air offen51ve forces is anticipated But China's economy does not appear to permit the additional devel- 0pment of effective navel amphibious airborne or air logistic capabilities The pregectlon cf Chanese military power beyond the borders of China would cause concentratlon of troops and materlel and a saturatlon of 1nadequate llnes of communicatlon creating addl- tional and probably critical to nuclear attack Vulnerabllitles of North Vietnam and North Korea UTILITY OF A CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN HOSTILITIES ASIA12 Categories of Hostilltles Malatary conflicts an East Aala can be convenIently grouped Into fave general categories These are defzned below subsequent dlscu5510n of the varlous Will be In the same order category a war between the Unzted States and the PeoPle's Republzc of Chlna ZEEg7 proper Second category Open hostilItIes In areas on the periphery of Chlna Involving oppOSIng major organazed forces These areas Include Korea TaIwan and the offshore islands held by the Natzonallst Chinese Vletnam and Thazland category were In the Indaan subcontinent India Paklstan and Nepal Fourth categorg open Chanese aggresszon agalnst natlons un- able to provade Signiflcant Indzgenous appealtlon These Include Burma Laos and Cambodla 12 For the assumptaons on tress analyses are based and rther discus510n see Cary leltary Chapter V in out espec1ally pp ll Fifth category Communist subver51on and insurgency in areas vulnerable to this type of Such aot1V1ty 15 partlcularly llkely 1n regions near the Chinese frontiers but all of non Communist Asia may eventually be affected 3 See above p 99 factnote a A If the CFLnese shoulc overtly attack Tha 1and such an tteck wouLd almosr certazrly ccnt1nue to include South Vietnam key element therefore 15 the securlty of Scutr Vletnam 15 the 126 ecurlty cf ha1 and FEEREL subgecr 15 also discussed 5 Cary Mllitary tzons Chapter IV pp 49-56 136 26 It might be canaldered that the altuationa 1n NAIO and the Far Eas are analagous and that arguments for and agaznsr a NATO reglonal deterrent apply also to a wholly Amerlcan reglonal deterrent 2n the Paelflc Far East area Tris 15 not regarded as a valad extrapclatlon See Cary Appendlx G 13 211-17 155 29 See Cary Appendix E Vulner of Conunumst Cbma to Nuclear ttack pp 187-205 168 shag POLITICAL CHANGE SING-SOVIET RELATIONS The assumption generally followed 1n report 15 that Communist Chlna and the Sov1et Unlon remaln for many years in an subjected to serlous atralns The two less llkely 1f China remains Communlst-oontrolled are a break analogous to that of Stalln and Tito or a of Chlna by the Sov1et Unlon The latter p0551b111ty would be highly dzstasteful to the present Ch nese Communlst and presumably would be I 172 SFEREL unwelcome to any succeeding leadership Events could tranSpire however that would force the Communist Chinese to surrender most of their independence in return for the Soviet aSSistance that alone might keep them in power Such a development would Virtually eliminate the deterrent effect of US regional forces but would also Simplify by concentrating the nature of the Communist threat inasmuch as Moscow would then be the sole initiator of important political and military decisions While a Sino-Sov1et monolith might and probably would create major new problems for the United States these would not flow from the acquisition by China of a Significant nuclear capability THIS PAGE LEFT ELM my THE LONG TERM In the precedlng chapter the exlstence of a CPR regional nuclear capabll1ty was assumed and ate dlscussed In chapter a later as examlned namely China's emergence as an 1ntercont1nental or strategic nuclear power It W111 be necessary to conslder 1n two forms The firet the posse551on of a capaballty W111 make Communist Ghana a Class nuclear power The second and less likely contingency the possesslon of a second strike capabllity agalnSt all likely hostlle nuclear powers wall Class status The and the political 1mp11catlons of each of these stages be analyzed 1n turn The chapter concludes a dlscu551on of the 1mpact of Chlna's of nuclear weapons on the prospects for arms control and disarmament agreements 1 MILITARY as Early Intercontlnental Threats Early Chlnese hermonuclear developments wall however presage the next stage of Chinese nuclear power -the of long range dellvery veh1cles such as intercontinental ballastlc 1 This subject 15 also discussed 1n John B Cary M111tar Implicatlons of a Communlst Cglnese Nuclear U ECRBT ISD Study Memorandum No 14 IDA D C 1962 Chapter pp 125-30 2 See above 5 23 5mm a misalles ICBMs Stage could beg n at the earlieSt 1n the early or mid-19705 3 3 pp 45-46 179 China as a Class A Nuclear Power As indicated in Chapter China will not be able to attain Class A nuclear status until it has acquired a fully developed modern economic and industrial base This will require at least a decade and probably several decades of industrial progress But in the meantime the technology and military capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union will not be remaining static In addition to improved nuclear capabilities it is entirely p0551ble that scientific and technological develOpments by these two powers may have ottmoded intercontinental nuclear attack as the most effeCtive weapon through developments in defense against nuclear attack through military uses of space or--at least as probable--through concepts and weapons now quite unforeseeable In the economic and industrial fields rapid grOWth may still be insuffiCient to achieve for China anything approach- ing parity with the most advanced countries Finally intervening events including were or anms control measures could foreclose the pOSSibility of Chinese acquiSition of Class A nuclear status 5 See above pp 55 47 ff L83 SEER-ET TEGR-EL 4 It as far from certaln therefore that Ghana W111 1n fact ever approach parlty 1n weaponry with the Unlted States or the Soviet Unlon Certalnly 1f Chane does so the process wall take a very long t1me and parlty will be attained 1n an era now unpre- dictable 1n its polltloal and technologloal a5peets But for the purpose of further disou551on 1t 15 assumed that Ghana does at some 1ndefinite tame 1n the future attain Class A nuclear not outmoded by scientific and technologlcal developments elsewhere 15 Class A for China Events of the long term although unpredlctable are certain to change the world env1ronment substantlally Progec- tnon of the long-term furure 15 necessarily surmise The dlscu531on here 15 11m1ted to what appear to be some of the more likely and important 1mp11cat10ns In fact of course the possi- billtles are 11' TECREL Ehlna's p sltlon 1n the world-and 1ts other powers includlng the Sov1et Unlon W111 substantlally change when Ch1na 15 wldely belleved to have attalned Class A nuclear power and this will be true almost wathout regard to the 1mmed1ately preceding eltuatlon China conceded the to attack effec- tlvely 1n a second ezther or both of the other superpowers W111 become malltarlly independent and wholly capable of pursuing separate pollc1es or even of headlng a separate bloc China from tlme to tlme 301n with natlons hostlle to the Soviet Unlon and even be dlsposed to enter into alignments of convenience the United States--1n WhiCh Chlna would have to be accepted 1f at all as a fully 1ndependent power Another pOSSlbillty would be such an inten51f1catlon of a struggle between Chlna and the Sov1et Union for hegemony over the Communlst bloc that conquest of the West would be postponed to a later parlod 189 COMMUNIST CHINA AND ARMS CONTROL It seems evadent that no extensave agreement on dlsarmament or the control of armaments can be placed 1n effect particularly when Communlst China begins to a nuclear armament unless Chlna 15 1noluded The prospects for achlev1ng agreed arms con- trols of real appears therefore more a long- than an early term prospect It must be antaclpated however that pressures and 1nduce- ments for arms control negotiataons Will be powerfully stimulated by China's emergence as a nuclear power and that negotlatlons must then 1nclude Communist China The Unlted States can antacapate 194 sscesk 4 - '5 Chinese inltiatlves of considerable 1n connectlon and - itself be well adv1sed to COHSlder WeStern inatlatlves The deserves systematlc study Though the need to curb the effects of Chlnese nuclear weapons may prove to be an area of overlapping anterest between the Unlted States and the Sovaet Union Chane 15 lakely to prove a thorny problem at the stage if 1t is ever attalned when major arms control agreements can otherwise be negotaated Should Sov1et standards of laving continue to rise and should there be a relaxation of restralnts on the 1nd1vadual in the Sov1et Union the Sov1et need for enemles could tend to disappear In event -wh1ch does not yet appear 1mm1nent -the Soviet rulers may conclude that real and effective control of arms particularly of nuclear arms would be worth paying for In Chane on the other hand as far 1nto the future as can be foreseen the population wall not attain consumer goods remotely 1ts desares or even 1ts needs and the llkElihOOd as that as much as any oppressave reglme 1n history the People's Republic of Chlna Will requ1re the contanuang amage of a homeland beset by enemles Meantlme the regime can be eXpected to be antensely of increased contacts between Chinese and foreigners 6 A Situation can thus be envasaged 1n the Sovaet Unaon may seek and Chlna oppose the amelloratlon of tensions through 6 These 1nfluances would be moderated if as seems p0551ble Chane should become permanently dependent for foodstuffs on 1nter- national trade and hence on a stable internatlonal economlc order 196 SEER-EL HIE - measures of arms control Current Elna-Soviet dlfferences on 7 dlsarmament objectlves may foreshadow such a 90551b311ty 7 For a detailed discu551on see John R Thomas Reactlons to a Nuclear-Armed Communls China the Sov1et Unlon SECRET ISD Study Memorandum No 19 IDA D C Th s PACIFICA paper be issued shortly 197 CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCLUSIONS 1 The problems that a nuclear equlpped Ghana W111 pose to the United States will at least 1nit1ally he polltical rather than malltary For at least a decade both the political and mllatary aspects of the Sltuatlon should prove- 1 See Chapter above pp 81-55 at 199 15 A detalled proposal for such schooling is presented 1n the PACIFICR Raport on the Nuclear Orlentatlon of Asmans dated March 27 1962 See Appendlx E below pp 235-46 213 hf THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK APPENDIX 3 STUDY PACIFICA SUPPORTING IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR ACHIEVEMENTS The Threat Impact on Chinese Pollcy ImplIcations Donald B Keesing The Communlst Chanese Nuclear Threat Warhegds and Dellvery VehICles SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA Study Memorandum No 17 Donald B Keesing Economic Limitations on Communlst ChIna's Nuclear Achlevements TSD Study Memorandum No 20 Harold C Hlnton CommunIst Pollcy and Behavlor ISD Study Memorandum No 1 John B Cary MIlItar Im llcatlons of a Communist C lnese Nuclear ISD Study Memorandum No 14 August 1962 Part Two Reactions to a Nuclear-Armed Communlst China In Specified Areas Arthur Burns AustralaSIa ISD Study Memorandum 0 l3 1 Papers are unless ctherw15e indacated All tItJes are unclaSSIEISd 219 - ' bhn B EEry Durdln Loy w Henderson Harold C Hlnton Donald B Kee51ng and Roger Plneau Roderick MacFarquhar John R Thomas General Part Three Other Reports Koreaf' ISD St dy Memorandum No 16 Southeast Asza South Asza CONFIDENTIAL ISD Study Memorandum No 11 May 1962 The Republlc of China Taiwan ISD Study Memorandum No 16 JaEan SECRET ISD Study Memorandum No 15 The Unlted Kingdom ISD Study Memorandum No 12 September 1962 The Sov1et Union SECRET ISD Study Memorandum No 19 Europe and NATO ISD Study Memoran- dum No 12 PACIFICA Interlm Report SECRET October 20 1961 of observatlons and recommendatlons following staff field trip 1n August and September 1961 PACIFICA SECRET March 27 1962 Report on the Nuclear Orlentatlon of Aalans APPENDIX PART ONE PARTIAL LIST OF CLASSIFIED SOURCES All documents are issued by Central Intelligence Agency unless otherwise indicated Serials are listed alphabetically others chronologically SERIALS Current Intelligence Weekly Summary December 1961 - July 1962 SECRET Economic Data Book Agency for International Development Statistics and Reports Division CONFIDENTIAL Economic Report on Communist ASia December 1961 - July l962 CONFIDENTIAL The Commune the Great Lea Forward and Sino- Sov1et Relations August - December 19585 SECRET Mac Tse-tung on Strategy 1926 1957 SECRET The Dispute on World Communist Strategy Autumn 1957 Autumn 1959 SECRET The Sino-Soviet Diapute June 1960 November 196_1 TOP SECRET Competition in North Korea SECRET The Indian Communist Party and the San-SOVlet Dispute SECRET 221 SEGREL T e New Stage of the Sino-SoVIEt 1961 - January 1962 SECRET North Vletnam and Slno-Sovzet Relatlons SECRET The Great Leap Forward 1n Communist Chlna SECRET Chlnese PoEulatlon Increase The Politlcal Impll- cations SECRET Mao Toe-tong and Dlaleotical Materiallsm OFFICIAL USE ONLY Mao Tse-tung and Hlstorlcal Materlallsm I Revolu- tlon OFFICIAL USE ONLY Mao Tse-tun and H15tor1ca1 Materiallsm IV The Tran51tlon to Soczallsm OFFICIAL NLY Mao Tse-tuno and Historlcal Materlallsm Con- trad1ct10n5H 1n 6 Soc1a115t Soclecg OF USE ONLY Solon 1f1c Intelligence Digest December 1961 - July 1962 SECRET Bloc M111targ_Report December 1961 July 1962 FIDENTIRL B OTHER The Slerra Pro ect A Study_of lelted wagg RAND Corporatlon Rr3l7 May 1 1958 SECRET Communlst Chlna and Nuclear Warfare RAND Corporation R9357 February 1 1960 SECRET gge Base for Industrlal ExpanSJon 1n Communzet Chlna EM 60-11 July 27 1960 SECRET 222 EECEEL Sov1ef Bloc Mriitary A551stance RAND Corporat1on August 19 1960 SECRET Dependence of Communlst Chane on the Sov1et 819c for Industr1a1 Development ETA7RR ER 61-1 January 1961 SECRET The Role and Structure of Pub11c 0 1n1on 1n Commun1st Ch1na Un1ted States Informatlon Agency 0551ce of Research and Analysas R-13-61 March 21 1961 CONFIDENTIAL Chlefs of Staff March 31 1961 Annex A111ed M111tary Forces to Strateglc Object1ves Plan for FY 1966 1968 JSOP-66 SECRET The Slno-Sovuet D1spute and 1ts Sagn1f1cance TS #142274-6 April 1 1961 TOP SECRET Department of State C1rcular Telegram CG-999 May 22 1961 Request for react1ons to Ch1nese nuc1ear exp1051on SECRET Incomang telegrams A11 SECRET Bangkok 696 Buenos A1res 1713 Cairo 1065 Canberra 6013 Caracas 1202 DJakarta 3295 Hong Kong 1894 Kabul 1156 Karach1 967 Katmandu 364 Kuala Lumpur 612 London 5036 Man11a 0-354 Mex1co City 3623 Moscow 3084 New De1h1 2937 New York 3229 Ottawa 11 Par1s 6-1944 Phnom Penh 376 Rangoon 921 Sa1gon 1852 Ta1pe1 802 Teheran 1519 Tokyo 3528 Me or Effects of Economic D1ff1cu1t1es 1n Commun1st Chlna 1960- 61 CIA7RR EM 61-10 May 31 1961 SECRET C A Targets Paper of Chlnese Communlst A1r Ground _and Naval Forces and Support Fac111t1es 1n the Talwan Campa1gn Area June 1961 Georgetown Unavers1ty Research Preject for A1r Force Inte111gence Center Ass1stant Ch1ef of Staff gence HQ USAF SECRET Economic Inte111 ence Stat1st1ca1 Handbook 1961 A ERA 61-3 June 1931 JCSM-425-61 June 26 1961 Memorandum for Secretary of Defense Strateg1c Ana1y51s of the Impact of the Acqu151t1on by the Commun1st Ch1nese of a Nuclear Capab111ty TOP SECRET Taxataon 1n Communlst Chzna 1950-59 CIA July 1961 UNCLASSI- FIED 223 SECREIL seem -I The oro es Natlo' i l Product of Communlst ER- September 1961 CONFIDENTIAL Growth of Indusrrlal Productlon 1n Communist Chlna 1952-1960 RR ER 61-48 Decetner 1961 CONFIDENTIAL A5515tance Plan FY 1963-1967 CINCPAC Offlce of the Darector of ffzce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Internatlonal Security Affalrs Department of Defense December 27 1961 SECRET Over-A11 Intell ence Estlmate for Plannln Mid-1961 throu Mad-1969 SM 43-62 ZJolnt Chlefs of Staff January 11 1962 TOP SECRET Jelnt State-Defense Clrcular Telegram 1274 January 16 1962 Request for information on nuclear weapons and warfare educatlon 1n Far East Incomlng telegrams CONFIDENTIAL except where otherwise 1ndzcated Bangkok 1190 Canberra 469 DJakarta Karach 1389 Manlla 948 New Delh 2456 Rangoon Salgon 1028 Seoul Ta1p21 Tokyo 2266 Wellington 219 Extracts Statement by Secretary of Defense before Senate on Armed Servaces January 18 1962 SECRET JCS Comparatave Data Book CM 522-62 January 25 1962 TOP SECRET Slno Sov1et Bloc Economlc Act1v1t1es an Underdeveloped Areas 1 July - 31 December 1961 EIC 14-Sl2 February 28 1962 SECRET Chlcom Aerospace Science and Technolognes Foreign Technology D1v1saon Air Force Systems Command erght-Paeterson A1r Force Base Ohlo March 5 1962 SECRET NOPORN Studv of stare Target Svstens for North Korea and China Dlrec- orate of Targets Irtellagerce PACAF transmatted Maren 23 1962 TOP SECRET 225 SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOT HELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS Conunu 'st ISA notes received March 2'8 3 962 TOP SECRET Korea--A Stud of South Korean Forces Aptal 1962 Office of the A551stant Secretary of Defense Inter- national Securlty Affaars Department of Defense TOP SECRET Some Thou on Communlst Chlna's Ex loatatlon of a Nuclear Detonation Allce Langley Heleh RAND Corporatlon RM-312S-PR May CONFIDENTIAL PART TWO OFFICIAL UNCLASSIFIED SOURCES Current Background Amerlcan Consulate General Hong Kong Extracts from Chlna Malnland Publlcatlons American Consulate General Hong Kong Foreign Broadcast Information Servace Selectlons from Chlna Malnland Magazlnes Amerlcan Consulate General Hong Kong Survey of China Malnland Press Amerlcan Consulate General Hong Kong Survey of the Sov1et Press CIA PART THREE SELECTED UNOFFICIAL SOURCES hard John The 312e Composntlon and Growth of the Populatlon of Mainland China D C US Bureau of the Census Serles P-90 No 15 1961 Amerlcan Assoclatlon for the Advancement of Science Selences 1n Communist China Washington D C 1961 Barnett A Doak Communlst China and Asla New York Harper and Brothers 1960 ESE 3mm The IncluszLor of 'Commuruet Chane 1n an Arms- Control Program 1n Brennan Arms Control Disarmament and National Securlgg New York George Bra21ller 1961 pp 282-303 Communlst Economlc Strategy The Ease of Maln- land Chlna Washington D C Natlonal Assocaatlon 1959 Berberet John A Solence and Technology 1n Communist Chlna Research Memorandum RM 60 IMP-72 Santa Barbara Callfornla December 8 1960 Boyd R G Communlst Ghana's Porelgn Pollcg New York Praeger 1962 Chandra-sekhar Srlpatl Red Chlna An Asaan Vaew New York Praeger 1961 Chugoku Kelzal szutsu Chanese Economic and Techno- loglcal Atlas Chanese Economac and Technological Tokyo 1961 Chukyo no Kalha su Development of Atomic Energy 1n Communist Chloe Showa Dolln magazane Tokyo September pp 28 36- Davad J Sovaet RMSSIE and the Far East New Haven Yale Universaty Press 1946 Dawson Owen Supply and Requlrements of Ferrellzer 1n Communlst Chzna to Meet the Needs for Future Food Crop Productlon Irrigation 1n Communzst Chlna and Calcu- lated Status of Communis Chlna's Food Crap Produotzon and Consumption and Future Ontlook Unpublashed an author's posse551on Evans Gordon H Communist Chlna s A-Bomb Program The New Leader New York September 16 1961 pp 15-17 Ghana and the Atom Bomb Royal United Servace Inst1tu 1on Journal London February 1962 pp 30-34 May 1962 pp 130-34 Arms awo ne Man -lztar Revaew For Leaverwortb Fan Ke Kansas June 1962 SEER-EL - Gallofs Le ge ral Plerre Le danger atomlque Entreprlse December 23 1961 Garthoff Raymond L Sovzet Glencoe The Free Press 1953 Sov1et Strategy 1n the Nuclear Egg New York Praeger 1959 The Sov1et Image of Future War Washington D C PUbllC Affalrs Press 1959 Allce L Communist China's Strategy 1n the Nuclear Era Englewood Cliffs N J Prentice-Hall 1962 Kapltsa M S Sovetsko Kntalskle Otnosheglia Sov et-Ch1nese Relations Moscow 1958 Kramlsh Arnold Atomlc Energy 1n the Sov1et Union Stanford Stanford Unlvers1ty Press 1959 Leng Shao Chuan Japan and Communlst Chlna Kyoto Japan Press 1958 L1 Choh Ming The Economlc Development of Communist China Berkeley of Callfornla Press 1959 The Statistlcal SyStem of Communist Chlna Berheley of Californle Press 1962 Lin Shae-ch et a1 Ten Glorzous Years Foreign Languages Press 1960 Long Live Forelgn Languages Press 1960 Lowenthal Rlchard Dlplomacy and Revolution The of a Dispute The Chlna Quarterly London January - March I Marshal R Programme KPSS 1 Vaprosy Ukreplenlla 311 Program of CPSU and Questions of Strengthenlng Armed Forces of USSR Kommunlst No 7 Moscow May 1962 pp 11 22 sreeEL Mao Tseetung Selected Works 4 Vols covering 1926 45 London Lawrence and wishart and New York Internatlonal 1954-56 Volume IV covereng 1945 49 Peipzng Porelgn Languages Press 1961 An off1c1al trans- lation of all volumes 5 1n preparatlon Modelskl George A Atomlc Energy 1n the Communist Bloc Melbourne Australla Melbourne Press 1999 Montgomery Marshal Viscount China on the Move The Sunday Times Maga21ne London October 15 1961 pp 1-2 Orleans Leo A Professzonal Manpower and Education 1n Communlst China D C US Government Offlce 1961 Peng Ming ggtorzla Kitelsko-Sovetsk01 Druzhby Hastory of Chlnese-Sov1et Moscow finer-v0 Sotslalno- Ekonomicheskoy theratury 1959 Popov V K Proval Aggre5511 Katee The Failure of US Aggre551on 1n Chlna Moscow 1955 Ravenholt Albert V Red China's Food New York Amerlcan Unlver51t1es Field Staff Reports Serv1ce January 19 1961 Rostow Walt w ProsPects for Communist Ghana New York W ley 1954 M I Ocherkl Bkonoggchesk1kh_0tnoshen11 Ketaem Notes on S no Sov1et Econom1c Reletlons Moscow 1997 Major-General N G On the Character of Modern War Kharaktere Sovremmenn01 Valny International Affairs Mezhdunarodnze Otnoshenlla Vol X October 1960 pp 23 27 Thomas John R Sov1et BehaV1or 1n the Quemoy Crlsis of 1958 Orbls Philadelphia 1962 pp 38-64 Tucker Robert w tab 11tv and the Countrv Problem ISD Study Memorandum No S Washington D C IDA 1961 228 SEER-K - -- Unlt weth addenda UN member replies on for renunelatlon of nuclear weapons Aprll 2 1962 Allen S Chlna Crosses the Yalu New York The Company 1960 Contradictions in the Moscow-Peklng Ax1s Journal of Gainesv1lle Florlda Volume 20 No 1 February 1958 pp 127-61 The Loglc of Communist Chlna's Polloy The Yale Rev1ew New Haven August 1960 pp 1-17 Zagorla Donald S The Slno Sov1et Conflict 1956-61 Press 1962 225 THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK APPENDIX l Dellcate Balance of Terror January 1959 and Nuclear Sharlng NATO and the Country April 1961 2 A subsequent report W111 luclude a brlef study assuming necessary informatlon becomes avallable as a requlrement 1n connection With a force structure might be of use 1n preparlng nstructlon materlal 23E This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu