I Wrin EDECLWI 'u'tnULiuy - gym - 33F Flam Jahnke I 18-22-2014 DE ARTMENT OF STATE COVER SHEET 30 09 1 TOP SECREI NUMBER on i5 %u@ BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENHS Origin subject reference no or other pertinent data It i 1 Approved draft on '13w6- 62adtd 12 14 62 #135493-35 FORWARDED 2 COPY INFORMATION ACTION COPY can no 11 INFORMATION COPY TELEGRAMS DESPATCHES ETC 19 comes I 3 DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM 12 17 63 E Tayloz' 12 17 -62_ Taylor Date Top Of cer 5 7 a H 11 PERSONS TO WHOM Room on OFFICE READING nocumsw sm apL SHIEHATURES DATIE aways on DATE RELEASED 12 17 -62 E Taylor f 124174152 12-17362 2 201 zmx 7 332213 DQcIds3193 452 mm - ff 1 I NT OF STATE etam dass n Cher gel classify tow - wan concurrence ssify in part and excme as shown I a - vim- faPRINTING OFFICE mama 515969 LDECLASSIFIED Amherin TS no 185h93-r CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY _hw 1h December 1962 SIB MENDRANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTEIIJGENCE BOARD SUBJECT SNIE l3 6 62t COMMUNIST PROGRAM 1 The attached draft estimate has by the Board of National Estimates pursuant to a of it by the USIB representatives 2 This eatimeke has been placed on the agenaa of the USIB meeting scheduled for 1030 wednesdey 19 December Acting Deputy Assistant D rector Rational Estimates' DISTRIBUPION A MILIEARI f yr I FOIFH CIA FOIAHJ 50 USC 403g - CIA I GROUP 1 Excluded from autematic - downgrading-and declassification acId 3193 452 LDECLASSIFIED 31 2 3 185h93-f CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 1h December 1962 SUBJECT 3 33-6 62 commie cmzeis NUCLEAR Peoeam Tm PROBLEM To aeceae Communist China s progress toward acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability and to estimate certain implications of such a development A CONCLUSIONS 3 A Previons estimates of the likely date by which the Chinese might be able to conduct a firet_nuclear est were based on an accumulation of evidence which pointed to a steady pace of advance in the Chinese program At present given the absence of any new positive evidence pointing to progreea and some indications of difficulties and delays we believe that the program has been seriously retarded The evidence is not now adequate to made a Excluded from automatic downgrading and declaseification Lae# 33244 EDECLASSHHED werin I I conflict judgment about the likely date of a first nuclear explosion in China Although it might occur as early as 1963 we believe that it is more ma Peres h 6 B If the Chinese made a high priority to acquire key missile components from other countries thezjnight _be able to produce Soviet-designed shortnrenge surface-toueurface ballistic missiles as early as 196k but they probably could not w_ produce mediumurange missiles before the latter part of the decade wn - in They prohahly_could-not marry a nuclear warhead with a guided W- miesiie system until the late 1960's orpearly 1930's depending on the date of initial nuclear testing gf Paras 12 1h C We do not believe that the acquisition of a nuclear weapons wfcapability would result in major changes in Peiping s domestic or ggeign poligdes mwinternally it would tend to raise the self whaww m mgw confidence of the party leadership and appeal to the national pride of the general populace ' Externally 'it would probably-increase - 39 See the representative of the Aseistant Chief of Staff Intelli- genoe footnotes at the end of paregraphs 6 and in the DISCUSSION I a 'gf See_the representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army footnote at the end of paragraph 1% in the DISCUSSION I DeeIdzal 374 2 DECLASSIFIED Amhm yluQ 33lZi il China's vacal aggressivenesa and determinatian to play a leading role in Asia and in the warld Communist movement we do not however 'believe that the Chinese acquisition of a limited auclear capability will significantly alter its willingness to take military risks or that it would lead to a general policy of open military aggression Paras 16-26 Hw# 33244 aaxaz31937452 -- DISCUSSION I I CURRENT as CHINESE ADVANCED 1 The Chinese nuclear and missile programs east have been seriously affected by'the withdrawal of Soviet technical assistance in mid 1960 and by se backs to Chinese technological development resulting from the general economic decline cf recent yearss Cwer the past two years drastic cutbacks in industrial producticn and shortages of_fcreign exchange for industrial imports pfsbably have compounded the preblems involved in acquiring the high quality machinu ery equipment and'inatrumen s required for these programs Even in the absence of any ether evidence it would be a fair inference that these factors had had a retarding effect on the Chinese effort to acquire advanced weapcns Euclear Hgapens 2 gsw# 33244 This paper reviews in summary form some recent-evidence certain basic Judgmentsu For a fuller treatment of the subject see NIE 13-2u62 Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons capa ilityg dated 25 April 1962 HIE 13 2-60 The Chinese Cpm unist Atomic Energy Program dated 13 December_l960 11mieea Distribution CIA 50 use 403g - HI bemld 3193 452 EDECLASSHHED USC 403g a CIA mew 3 Novertheless there are some indications that Peiping is continuing activities aimed at develoPing an atomic energy program of some size There is firm evidence of continued uranium prose pecting mining and concentrating activities Recent official statements have reiterated that China is making a deterhined effort to develop nuclear weapons moreover the scale of preparatory acti- vities described in previous estimates makes it unlikely that China The areas most likely on the basis of other evidence to contain such facilities have been covered in photography There are still a num- ber of areas the Szechwan basin 'theoretically suitable for a production reactor in terms of logistics security availability of electric power and water flow which have not been photographed No il ga positive indications of any kind point to the actual existence of Egg w e such facilities in these areas We believe that the chances are og ug 's better-than even that if such facilities existed in China we would g w have acquired knowledge of them 5 l A 'nw# 33244' despite its shrunken industrial base and technological deficiencies ' would not do what it could to press forward a nuclear weapons program It is possible that the Chinese have simply postponed plans to build the large industrial facilities necessary to develop a full-scale- program at an early date and are now channeling scarce resources into a stretched out and perhaps a smaller program Previous estimates of the likely date by which the Chinese might be able to conduct a first nuclear test were based on an ac- cumnlation of evidence which gave some sense of the pace of the Chinese program At present given the absence of any new positive evidence pointing to progress any estimate of such a date is neces- sarily marked by great_uncertainty On the one hand the Chinese Communist_leadership continues to have strong reasons to restore its diminished prestige with the Chinese people to press its strug- gle for equality with the USSR in the Bloc and generally to forward its external ohjectives a for wishing to achieve a nuclear explosion at the earliest possible date _On the other hand the scale of Soviet assistance is a key factor governing the pace of the Chinese program and with Sino Soviet relations now in a worse state than ever before a renewal of Soviet assistance appears unlikely for some time to come Further the rate of advance of Chinese tech- nology is an uncertein factor although we believe that the Chinese mecld 31937452 Authorin 0 jFOIAib l CIA usc 4039 CIA can move forward independently on at lesst a-li gtsd nuclear weapons program - 5 we still canmot exclude tog possibility t ot the Chinese Communists could achieve an initial nuclear detonation in the 1963 196h period However this possibility has to be bass on several promises which are open to gusstiono To_support it it is necessary - to postulate-that Peipiog hos been conducting a very high priority - i an - program aimed at the possible nuclear detonation that wars a this program is being cooried out despite China's severe economicw troubles and that wit out Soviet assistance the Chinese teohggcal have proved adequate moreover it is nocessarylto as ms sume that the Chin se were able to put into production early 15 1961 the uranium metal plant which was nearing completion in m1d 1966 when the Soviet teohoioisns more witgopsgp Finallyowitolsonsoessarx to arm m- WW assume the in China of a plutonium pyoduction reactor Hw# 33244 It appears to us likely that the Chinese enoouotered delays and difficulties in putting the uranium metal plant into operation after the Soviet withdrawal more important the Chinese would_prob ably have experienced even more serious delays in subsequent stages iocId 3193 452' DECLASSIFIED '2 A-uthorigtmm of the plutonium production process The French experienced serious- delays in solving problems in the chemical sensretion process The evidence is not now adequate to make a confident judgment_about the likely date of a first nuclear test in China Although it might occur as early as 1963 we believe that it is more likely to occur some years later The development of a significant weapons cayability after an early first explosiongbased on a small-scale saga one 200 I 'f _1 megawatt reactor would require considerable time Within a Year after any testis few fairly crude fission weapons could probably be WW no produceda It would-take about four to five years longer so produce say 30 fissiOn weagons If the first test occurs i later in the decade the Chinese may have the larger troduction'fecil- ities and greater numbers of skilled personnel which would enable them to move more rapidly toward acquisition of a significant weapons MW i The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence USAF believes that the Chinese Communists are likely to conduct their first nuclear test in 1963ulg6h They have accorded a very high priority to the development of nuclear weapons and that they prdbably regard an advanced weepons capebility as a political and military necessity if they are to achieve the international status they seek He also believes that sufficient economic and scientific resources are available to the Chinese Communists to support a few very high priority projects as recognizes that the Soviets withw drew support from the Chinese nuclear weapons program in 1959 1960 and that this has significantly retarded the progress of the_Chinese footnote continued next page fsw# 33244 tseIa 31ssv452 Ameriqu I capability Even if the Chinese explneed a issioe device by 1963- 196h they probably Woulg not eedpire bermonueleer capability until after the end of t e decadee Footnote coetinued from previous page Communists weapons program in certain areesa Nevertheless -he considers it techeical and industrial resources are available and are being into the Chinese Communist atomie'energy program on a sufficient priority to permit them to have put a plutonium reactor into operation con- trery to the judgment made 1m garagreph 2 and to preduee suf- ficient fiseie able maeeriel for the test of an implosion nuclear device some time in 1963 l96hg The representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff Irtelligence i USAF believes that if the Chinese detonate their first device in the next year or so it wouid be within their capabilities to de- velop and test a'thermonuclear device by the end of the decade Such a device prdbebly would be extremely heavy and Would repre sent only a token thermonuclear capability Even such a limited thermonuclear capability would go far to esteblish Chine ae a greet power and would have profound impect 'pertic- ulerly in Asia me# 33244 Demld 3193 452 DECLASSNIFIED Missile Delivery Capabilities 8 Such evidence as we have suggests that Communist China's progress toward acquiring a nuclear weapons delivery capability with missiles has been very slow since the general withdrawal of Soviet technicians in midulg o By that time construction sf the Shuangchengtzu Missile Test Range begun in 1958 had to the point that initial firings could have begun for purgoses sf out the missils facilities and range instrumentation and for orientation of Chinese personnel There is no reliable evidence which makes it possible to assign a date at which actual flight test firings for research and development migh have begun but we do not believe that these could have occurred much before the end of 1961 W M g 3s ths some firing has occusred in 19 2 but the rate of firing can st only have been sporadic and limited flight tests have been conducted have probably ufilized missiles of gxist design in the ranges from 150 nautical miles n mil tolwloo n m 9 UNCODED %Q1Acb 1 CIA 50 use 403g CIA 'uw# 33244 I I 3 we infbr this program h s_at and evidence that the Chinese 3 P09 Nevertheless 11 @5150 indicated that 1 Hyman h um Chime s'e 10 The misaiie system @ vqived g these sites is apparently one the Soviets adap dffromfiheir airatp surface missile which 14 also beihgfuseq in Cuban coastal defense missile sites 11 There is till no evg ence fiat Chinege fie 5aid Ha axenf i $61A b k1 CIA 7 50 usc 403g CI Pllm I __uscLAssnnED For the next fa gesrs we do not belieVB that the Chinese on their own will have either the rawindustrial base or the technological competence to produce certain components of ballistic missile systems Chinese research and Umgw development is probably not yet enough to achieve native missile designs This means_that China's future progress toward acquiring a ballistic missile production capability entirely from its own re- 'sources is likely to be very 12 Our evidence is insufficient to permit comfidsot estimates om the timisg of successive misSile developments For the present it seems ualikely that the Chinese will receive missiles from the USSR In developing their own production capability for offensive missiles we believe they would seek first to produce short-range surface-to- surfsce ballistic missiles In order to do so at an early date mun-w Peiping would need to make a the - we own-rm my MW technical resources from external sourcgg If_these conditions_are me wtheysmight be Mensa-z meuwmw ww w _able to Eggduoe Sowietedesigned 33-1 150 mum and 350 nsm missiles as early as 196k Howevep they'would probably not deploy Such missiles in any more than tokeo numbers before they had a com- patible nuclear warhead The areas falling within range of such wespons are shown om the map at Annex 1 12 u' EEO-P D cld33193T452 Wm qu ma 'nssass244 13 The Chinese _robab 4in could set produceinedigm range_mis siles before the latter part oerisipliphsxemtowusesaggiet designs of the $00 n e or 1 1oo nam types mis- siles of sueh designs were we be Fpnoxi esimhme Sovie meet-mum - 1h Because of the numerous variables in both programs we can- not foresee with exactness Just when in the long run the Chinese would be able to margxba nuclear warhead with a guided missile system embelieve that achievement until 2 - he Chinese could not reach such an the is i2 3r196hp or the - 'r orme 1rnss does not occur gntil the latter part of this Chinese have almost certainly not taken even preliminary steps to develop submarine missile systems ICBNB and sntimissile systems The achievement of an independent capability in these more technically advanced fields wOuld require 10 years or more even with some Soviet assistance The representative pf the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army believes that the limited Chinese Communist industrial base and relatively small numbers of technically compe- tent personnel will prevent their production of any large numbers of ballistic_missiles for the next'few years However he believes this estimate does not give sufficient consideration to the'tech- nologicel capabilities of the Communist Chinese as indicated by the facilities at the Shuang-cheng tzu Missile Test Center He believes that the facilities at the Center represent a substantial missile research and development program Such a program if given sufficient priority and concentrated on one or two missile systems of either short or medium range type could provide from native resources a missile delivery capability'for 3 small number of compatible warheads when such warheads become available n13- ioeld 3193le52' 1 giroraft Delivery capabilities 15 Because of slow progress toward the acquisition of a guided missile capability the Chinese Communists would if they succeeded in developing nuclear weapons in the next few years have to rely on manned aircraft for delivery of such weapons The Chinese are now Mame calm estimated to have 3 eedutwew ' - BADGER Jet nadinm homoerat The light bombers would not be -able to carry the crude weapons which are likely to he aVailable in the early fears of the Chinese program The Chineae aircraft industry is apparently limited to the production of Soviet Jet fighters small hate transports and helicopters but not late models Eehhglieve tw_anmw reneWal of Sino-Soviet cooyeration will be required before the Chinese be able to make significant advances toward_an operational de- ployment ofme jet gedium bomber forceE It is unlikely that the Chinese will undertake to develop longwrange heavy bombere or that they will obtain such aircraft from the Soviets PROBABLE DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES- 15 Communist China's detonation of a nuclear device and sub- aeqnent steps toward a nuclear weapons capability would probably heVe little influence on the character of the regime's domestic pro- grameo For the next few years Ieiping is likely to continue its a 1h - Eoold 3193T452 Tme# 332dd Author WW present policy of giving highest priority to investment in agricule tore sue its suoporting industries ' Within this framework of prior- 'ities the regime will nrobebly'be willing to assign resources only _for limitee programs of eavenced weapons development If the regime succeeds in overcoming the economic decline of recent years it will probably devote larger resources to such programsa Because of the generally low level of China s technology and the small number of - trained personnel available Chinese progress in such fields would be slow in any case IT Communist China's first test explosion and subsequent moves toward a nuclear weapons capability would have important but mixed effects on various sections of the population ' The party end-govern meet leadership would have renewed confidence in the correctness h M The regime would certainly launch a massive propaganda campaign to catch up with the west in science and te hnologx c Most Chinese sew would be intensely proud of the national accomplishment although some elements might question whether the cost was not related to shortages of food and consumer goods Nuclear achievements would heip restore popular faith in the regime particularly among cadres and persons already deeply committed to it but the degree of popular - 15 - ecld 3193 452 DECLASSIFIED out ow-W 4f OvP support as manifested in increased production efforts in factory and form would de end on many other factors MELITARY IMPLICATIONS 18 Chinese Communist militany doctrine has denied that nuglgar I weapons have decisifg gllitary_significanoe and we believe that their' fle smln4 Es are unlikely to undergo any sudden of radical Change 1 The basic dependence on nonnuolear military'tsctics and mm ww- km primary reliance on masses of troops will almost certainly contonue WW WM However the acquisition of advanced weapons would stimulate efforts to improve military-organisation and to develop new tactics and tech- niqoes appropriate to nuclear war It would probably also tend to improve the morale of the Chinese Armed Forces 19 The Chinese would probably value nucleer'weapons primarily fog support in exertinngressuxes short of general was Even after acqnisition of such weapons es believe that the hinese would prefen to advance their goal of hegemony in Asia by the use of political pressures limited border wars and indirect sopport to- local wars of liberation However possession of nuclear weapons Peiping's View probably weakening the resistance of neighboring countries to Communist insurgency in 5 16 - - Docld 3193 452 I A uthority inhibiting their requests for US assistance 0r counteraction and in pressuring them to accede to Chinese demands new 20 Although the regime has publicly emphasized China s ability to survive nuclear attack it probably genuinely fears such an eventuality Hewever Peiping has usually appeared more ready than the Soviet Union toiake military riske or to aehy the existence of such -risks -We dg not believe tget the Chinese acquisition of a limited mm-h nuclear capability will significantly alter its to take military risks Quilts other hagqg we believe it would not lead to a generel'policy of open - IV FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIGNS 21 The acquisition of a nuclear weapohs capability by Communist Chine would not given the limited character of that capability alter main future the reel relations of military power among w w ggwmajerwetatee China fer many years'to come will not be able to approach the nuclear power ehich the US and USSR can bring to bear even in the ger Beet However the Chinese feat in exploding a nu- clear device at all would have a profound impact on many peoples and governments and would alter their sense of what the relations of power 33244 A Do 1d23193 452 I Author a A WW were or might come to be The Chinese Communists would of course r take advanmage of this to seek fuller acknowledgment of their claims to pre-emioence in Asia and their status as a world power 22 Noclear achievements might from time to time lead Communist China to increase political pressures on its nonaligned Asian neighbors but probably would not lead to any basis reorientation of policy toward them Peiping would probably seek wi g_some success to blur the distinction C pehdli y R 1me I in order to bui nuclear power Ejatus and scgentific 'Nw# 33244 It would exert pressure on neighboring states having military relations with the US emphasizing the increased danger of such ties These moves_would probably be cautious hoaever to avoid arousing fears or resentment among China's neighbors which might alienate or drive thee toward the West Propaganda would be likely to e phasize China's peaceful intentions and-the defensive nature of its nuclear capability in contrast with aggressive US designs and military bases The_aim of such prepagnada and piessure would be to encourage a Chinese Communist oriented neutralism among Asian states and especially among China's immediate neighbors 23 ToWard the US and its Asian allies Peiping would probably become more aggressive vocally but it would still be concerned not asexs 3193s452 m DECLASSIFIED Maritme to provoke serious counteraction It would realize that a nuclear capability in itself was insufficient to remove the US presence from Asia and on the coutrary might encourage the buildup of US nuclear missiles in South Korea Japan and Taiwan Peiping s propa- ganda toward Taiwan would seek to exploit fears of nuclear destruction by renewing old gropaganda appeals for peaceful liieratiou on the basis of a Joint anti-US move Howeuer we believe that the Communists would not attempt any military moves in the Taiwan Strait unless they persuaded themselves that US involvement was unlikely Because of Japan's great sensitivity to the dangers of nuclear War we believe Peiping would handle the Japanese with great caution It would hope to persuade Japan to drop its alliance with the USAQQEEM pressing this to the point that the Japanesemyould con- i - der acquiring nuclear weapons 2h Communist China has long sought to win world recognition i as a great power whose participation was necessary for the success ful functioning of international agreements and organizations It would immediately flaunt any successful nuclear detonation as proof r W of great power status and would probably calculate that in time nae-ta WI world opinion would override objections to China's full partici- patiou iu international councils Peiping would almost certainly -19- ua# 3saas I DodIdz3193T452 _DEcLAssnnEo if g mamw agiggi ' consider that its leverage was increased for entry into the UN on its ons terms terms that would exclude the Republic of_China 25 Peiping has repeatedly warned that China will not be bound by disarmament agreements reached without its participation The price of participation has been defined as recognition of the Communist regime by all negotiating states and US evacuation of Taiwan As a nuclear power Paiping would expect to use the disarmament issue - more effectitely to generate international support_for ts position - 03 Taiwan and for removal of US forces from the Far East It seems w 1 3- - Nym-r-v Win-en unlikely that the Chinese would be any more favorably disposed toward serious negotiation on disarmament that they are now They'would probably regard any effort to involve them in arms control arrangements as an attempt to deny them equality as a nuclear power 26 It is probable that the USSR's unwillingness to assist the Chinese in acquiring a nuclear capability was one of the key issues involved in the Sine-Soviet differences of recent years China's independent acquisition of nuclear weapons would probably tend to prolong and perhaps intensify strains in the relations of the two Communist great powers Peiping would almost certainly intensify efforts to expand its influence in the world Communist movement a 20 m-o-p s-m-o aDonld 3193 452' -_AuthorityM5 2 1 - I advertising its nuclear achievements as further proof of what an und rdeveloped nation can_do for itself if it follows a course of unflinching struggle and ideological purity The Soviets fearing that Chinese possession of nuclear weapons ould lead to more adVen turist policies might move toward limiting their military guarantees to China under the SirlouSovie'b alliance 21 - qu z33 a boald 3193 452 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu