we COPY NUMBER A Study of the Implications of a Communist Chinese Nuclear Capability U R L Blachly M G Weiner L Goure' S T Hosmer A L Hsich B F jaeger P F Langer December 1962 RAIL-PR A REPORT PREPARED FOR UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND Classified by Dow grade to c1 Declassify an or Review on W Dam 5 341 gum mammal 31' gm etnam aos OHainan hailani Philippineg Cambodia S Vietnam in defense of the L mted State-5 S C Secs 793 and 794 the marine person is This repnrt contams Informatitm a ecxing the national u-Itl-un the meaning of the esptuttage laws Title 18 transmissmn or the revelation of whicjxin'am manner to an unautl pru'm'tmed 1w lats A Study of the Implications of a Communist Chinese Nuclear Capebility U R L Blachly M G Weiner L Goure' S T Hosmer A L Hsieh B F aeger P F Langer 1 December 1962 A REPORT PREPARED FOR UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND Classification changed to 1 3 ttussm By Piublicoations Date 6-24-75 Operanng nmy 'I'heRandCorpoz-anon 7 pg De I309 0 IANIA MONICA 0 CALIIOIHIA AT YEAR NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 5200 10 I I m 1 -111- SUMMARY This Report demonstrates that the anticipated attainment by Com- munist China of a modest nuclear capability'will present important military and political problems to the United States and to the free world In particular a nuclear-armed China will pose a substantially broader spectrum of challenges to the U S position in Asia than she has to date Among these will be the direct use of nuclear weapons on U S bases or Asian countries the use of nuclear weapons as an umbrella for overt nonenuclear military Operations and support of in- surgency the political and propaganda exploitation of her nu- clear capability to capitalize on and to create op- portunities for achieving Chinese objectives We conclude that despite this wide range of options Peiping's exploitation of her nuclear capability will be based on a cautious and rational evaluation of risks and costs Critical to these risk calculations will be Peiping's assessment of the role of the Soviet Union the Chinese-U S military and political balance in Asia and the opportunities for low risk gains In view of our analysis of Soviet policies we conclude that Peiping will have to be conservative in evaluating the degree of assistance and support she can anticipate from the Soviet Union in deterrence of the United States or in a military conflict with the United States Examination of a series of hypothetical nuclear and non-nuclear campaigns shows that a Chinese military confrontation of U S forces in the area could involve very high risks for the Chinese In view of I II wuss-as UNEIASSIHH -17- past Chinese rationality and caution in their use of force it is un- likely that the Chinese will consider such risks acceptable So long as China cannot rely on Soviet military support for her objectives and is confronted with a U S capability and a determinatic to make the risks of overt military Operaticms extremely high she is likely to emphasize the politics-propaganda exploitation of her nu- clear capability Targets for such efforts will include the U S - Asian alliance and base system Asian nations' self-defense develop- ments and the internal stability of Asian nations However insofar as China's possession of a nuclear capability and means for it s political acploitation lead her to believe that risks are low and potential gains high she will increasingly engage in low level military operations and supporting actions for indigenou Cotmnunist movements To meet Chinese challenges and to counter the wide range of re- percussions in Asia which are discussed in this study the United States must make credible its deter-unnation and its capability to oppose effectively all Chinese aggressive action This implies in addition to political and econcmic programs a continuing requiremen- for a flexible and relatively invulnerable posture that includes fas' reacting nuclear and non-nuclear delivery and support systems within the Pacific theater The study suggests that a significant contribution to U S stra tegy would be the designation and maintenance in the Pacific area of U S nuclear forces specifically identifiable as targeted for China and capable of fladble and selective employment against a wide rang a M9 of Chinese aggressive actions Such an identifiable iorce could present a credible deterrent to Chinese aggression without reducing U S deterrence of the Soviet Union would minimize the risk of Soviet intervention resulting frtn1mdsinp terpretetion of U S intentions and would strengthen Asian confidence and will to resist alASSi 'iB - PREFACE This is the major pub cation of a study of the implications of a Camnunist Chinese nuclear capability The study was undertaken at the request of the Director of Plans Headquarters United States Air Force -0- Although all pages of this Report are marked Secret Secs I II V and VI are unclassified g Home The authors wish to express their thanks to the many persons who contributed military political technical and economic material to ssm w Among persons whose contributions were particularly'valuable dur- ing the course of the study are Burke W R Elswick H F Harris R B Johnston R G McKee B C Slivinski and D S Zagoria In addition a supporting study'by K C Yeh has been published separately Constructive comments and suggestions of substantial value were received from many persons among them A L George I C C Graham A -M Ehlpern 7M W Hoag F S Hoffman R E Room B C Idndsay R G Lockhart D P Mozingo D E Oyster E W Paxson F M Sallagar and R Schamherg The authors wish particularly to acknowledge the important and valuable assistance that they received from E E Conger in the final stages of the study and in the preparation and editing of this Report w cm - - masses - CONTENTS Vii ix Section commsm messy Basic Objectives and Chinese Military Chinese Relevant A5pects of a Chinese Foreign Policy 1h 54mm THE SOVIET ROLE IN CHINESE 17 Basic 18 Common Sino-Soviet 20 Differences in Soviet and Chinese 21 Soviet Influence on China's Military 22 Soviet Support of China in Military an IV SOME HYPOTEETICAL 30 Force 31 Case I U S Nuclear Retaliation Following Chinese Aggression in the 33 Case II Two-sided Nuclear ho Observations Concerning Cases I and ha Case Non-nuclear Campaigns in the Taiwan Strait Area 1 9 General 56 IIKELY CHINESE MIEITARY COURSES OF ACTION 58 Factors Favoring 58 Opportunities for Low Level Chinese Military 65 VI THE IMPACT ON ASIA AND ON THE U S POSITION IN THE AREA 67 Impact on U S Alliances and 69 Impact on Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control in Asia 75 Impact on Self-defense Efforts of Asian Allies and Neutral T8 Impact on Political Stability of Asian 82 Impact of Possible Chinese Low Level Military 85 -x11- VII CONCEUSIONS AND The I China's Risk The smelt Chinese Implications for the United Timing of U S Appendix A POSSIBLE CHINESE AND U ORDERS OF 101 110 w i amnesia I INTRODUCTION The growth of Communist Chinese military power represents a threat to non-Communist Asia and to the U S interests in the area This threat will take on new dimensions when China has nuclear wea- pons She is likely to acquire a nuclear capability within the next decade despite economic reverses technical limitations and disagreements within the Communist Bloc This Report presents the major implications for the United States that are expected to develop with Chinajs attainment of a nuclear capability The Report considers 0 Chinese strategy the Soviet role in Chinese policies 0 significant military options available to the Chinese and the political impact of a Chinese nuclear capability on Asia and on the U S position in the area methodology A substantial combined military political and technical study of China's acquisition of a nuclear capability underlies this Report The scope of this study was delimited in two major ways First we hare not attempted to analyze the full range of political military and economic problems posed by China nor have we made a full assessment of the relationship between China's rate of economic growth and her military development Rather we have brevity Cemmunist China will be referred to as China exce in part of Sec IV I - in masses concerned ourselves with the specific problems that will flow from China's acquisition at a modest nuclear capability Second making use of the best available pertinent datan-military political and economic--vith respect to China and the Soviet union we have focused our analysis on their likely'behavior rather than attempting to cover the entire spectrum of conceivable developments We have used a similar approach in examining the reaction of noneCommunist Asia to China's anticipated exploitation of a modest nuclear capabili The study considers the 1965-1970 period and assumes 0 There will be no drastic change in the U S -Soviet military and political balance of power 0 There will be no drastic change in U S commitments or policies in the Far East 0 While the possibility exists that the Chinese may acquire by concentrated effort a token long range strategic nuclear capability for use or threat against the Continental United States such a development is considered very unlikely The methods of study for the project include 1 military war gaming and tactical analyses of military situations involving the use or threat of nuclear weapons 2 political analys based on continuing RAND studies and 3 of political military economic and technical findings Among the areas considered are Political Nuclear Force and Chinese Military Doctrine and Strategy WI Wdumssma -3- Reactions to a Chinese Nuclear Capability by Japan India and Other Asian Nations Sine-Soviet Relations Disarmament and Chinese Strategy Military Pacific Force Postures 1962-1970 Analyses of Possible Nuclear Campaigns Against China Technical Analyses of Chinese Weapon Development Analyses of Chinese Nuclear Delivery Vehicle Development Economic Chinese Industrial-technical Capabilities The Chinese Petroleum Program Simplified Cost effectiveness Comparisons of Nuclear Delivery Alternatives From some of these areas studies that support this Report a are in preparation or are available Published Memoranda are cited in refeIence Organization Section II of this Report reviews China's basic objectives the techniques she has used in the past and trends in her military doctrine and foreign policy--all in the context of expected changes stemming from her acquisition of a nuclear capability Reference 1 is a summary of the maJor points of this China study in the form of a briefing r mummies a i l m Section reviews past Soviet influence On Chinese developmeni and policies examines both Joint and conflicting Soviet and Chinese objectives and considers what appear to be the probable Soviet reactions to and degrees of support for a wide variety of possible Chinese policies strategies and actions Section IV describes three hypothetical cases of confliCt between the United States and a nuclear-armed China in the 1966-57 time period Case I pertains to a U S retaliation to Chinese nu013 aggression against Iaivan Case II examines a Chinese nuclear attac U S bases in Asia followed by a U S nuclear retaliation against the Chinese Mainland Case considers overt nonpnuclear Chinese aggression in the Taiwan area Section discusses likely Chinese low risk strategies includi politico-propaganda exploitation of a nuclear capability and low level military action Section VI examines the impact of Chinese possession of a nucls capability on Asia and on the U S position in the area in terms of U S alliances and'bases 0 nuclear disarmament and arms control proposals for Asia 0 Asian indigenous self-defense efforts 0 political stability of Asian nations and 0 possible low level military operations Section VII presents the major conclusions and implications of the study The appendixes include possible Chinese and U S military deve ments in Asia and provide the Orders of Battle used in the hypothet conflict cases of Sec IV UNCI -5- II CQMUNIST STRATEGY China's strategy for the period in which she possesses a modest nuclear capability is explored in terms of her basic objectives her military doctrine the options available for direct and indirect use of nuclear weapons and her evaluation of external conditions at the time BASIC OBJECTIVES AND Wis of China's foreign and military policies illuminates certain basic objectives that bamng an extreme reorientation in Chinese leadership are expected to remain essentially unchanged for the next decade These objectives have serious implications for U S policies in the Far East all of than directly or indirectly impinge on U S interests in the area One major Chinese objective is the achievanent of great power status and recognition of Peiping as the sole voice of China in world councils Another major Chinese objective is the achiev-ent of hegemony in Asiauincoiporation of Taiwan into Peiping's dmain and extension of Chinese dminance to South and Southeast Asia and to Japan and Korea The Chinese recognize that attainmnt of this hegemony will depend primrils' on the extent to which U S power and influence can be removed from the area As important steps in this direction Peiping will continue to seek to 1 erode the U S base-alliance syst- generally 2 eliminate U S security and military assistance arrang-ents 3 limit U S access to the area and neutralize U S allies in the Far Eat A third mjor Chinese objective is the acceleration of the Commnist mov-ent and the enhancement of Peiping's role therein China will continue to try to draw the Canmmist parties of Asia Africa and Latin America into her sphere of influence At the same time she will attempt to increase her bargaining power with the -6- Soviet Union and to gain a greater voice in Bloc decisions regarding international strategy doctrinal formulation and the use and dispo- sition of the Bloc's military power In the past China has employed a range of techniques -political economic cultural and militaryb-in pursuing her objectives These techniques continue to have utility for Peiping but without nuclear weapons of her own or assurance of Soviet backing China is limited in the military means available to fUrther her objectives in the Far East This restriction however is temporary As China enhances her military strength particularly when she detonates a nuclear device and moves toward acquiring a nuclear capability she will attempt to use this added power in the interest of her basic objectit China is expected to exploit by propaganda and political means her first nuclear detonation Premature or precipitate military actions are discounted although politico-propaganda successes might provide a framework for low level military actions under specific safeguards 2 The Chinese have predicted that the manufacture of their own nuclear weapons will mark another new turning point in the international situation at which time the revolutionary movement in the world in general and Asia in particula will advance with more vigorous More important than a nuclear detonation in effecting China's future behavior will be her acquisition of nuclear weapons and the a The possibility that the Chinese might delay exploitation of their initial nuclear detonation until they have acquired a limited capability is considered very remote Some reasons are presented in Ref 2 - lilASSihi means fer their delivery _Her exploitation of a nuclear capability in pursuit of her long term db3ectives will he influenced'by 0 traditional Chinese military doctrine the impact of nuclear weapons on Chinese military thinking 0 options for direct or indirect use of nuclear weapons 0 Chinese evaluation of external conditions at the time such as the Chinese-U S politico-military balance the role of the Soviet Union and existing opportunities CHINESE MILITARY DOCTRINE Role of Force in Traditional Strategy China's traditional military strategy as reflected in the writings of Mao Tee-tung evolved pragmatically in response to concrete problems and experience The most important background factor was the realization that Chinese military equipment and skilled manpower were vastly inferior to those of the main enemy Because of this inferiority Mao developed a view of war as a protracted struggle that relies heavily on the use of political economic and diplomatic techniques in addition to purely military means Mao's view of war is both complex and different in important aspects from the traditional Western military view To Mao war is more than the application of force when political means fail instead war is but one of several instruments of policy operating within a broad political context an instrument that can operate at any point and time in the struggle Force is to be used in relation to the political objective and within the framework of the politics-military 4 de balance Mao holds that force is not to be used in the adventurist sense but only when the political situation favors or requires it when opportunities exist or when the expectation of success is high The key to Mao's military thinking lies in the primacy he grants to the political element He established an integrated doctrine whereby a weak force could hope to succeed against a militarily stronger enemy Mao expressed it in 1936 as Our strategy is to pit one against ten while our tactic is to pit ten against By 1916 this formula was translated into his famous dictum of strategically despise tactically respect the enemy 5 By this Mao meant that the trend of historical development was with the forces of socialism even though the strength of the capitalist or imperialist enemy night here to be acknowledged in specific situatio In effect this was a reaffirmation of his contention that force was an instrument to be used cautiously and rationally depending on the politics-military'balance The top military leaders of present-day China have been schools in these principles and are experienced in their successful applicat Mao's military writings are still studied in China today not becans of the tactics deceits and ruses they espouse but because they throw light on the continuing Chinese problem how to make politics gains from a position of military inferiority Next we will examine this type of strategy in the context of ti nuclear era and in relation to China's assessment of the role of nuclear power Impact'of Nuclear Weapons on Chinese Military Thinking Except for a brief period in 1955 Chinese public statements have in principle disparaged the impact of nuclear weapons on modern military operations and strategic concepts As differences between the Soviet Union and China became more open after mid-1959 the question of war became one of the major issues in the public In contrast to more conservative Soviet pronouncements were the Chinese arguments that war was inevitable particularly local wars instigated'by1U S imperialism that war was not to be feared and that nuclear war would not result in the annihilation of mankind but would destroy only capitalism Chinese statements of this nature have been widely accepted as implying that the Chinese do not understand the significance of nuclear weapons for modern warfare There is however considerable evidence to the contrary as demonstrated in China's military doctrine on nuclear war her internal developments her assessment of the threat her military caution and her views on deterrence Military Doctrine and Nuclear War Chinese military thinking recognizes the key implications of nuclear weapons for modern military operations and strategic concepts In mid-1955 certain Chinese military leaders openly discussed these implications thus acknowledg- ing that the emergence of nuclear weapons was a new development in military science and expressing concern about the possibility of a sudden attack Later statements admitted the full destructiveness of This discussion of the impact of nuclear'weapons on Chinese military thinking is an abbreviated portion of a more detailed and eci ic analysis on aimed Ref 6 t 1 uncussmm H nuclear'weapons In October 1957 Chinese Air Force doctrine define the military threat as that of destruction of military areas industrial complexes and communication centers by surprise attack from the air It emphasized the immediate need for a combat-ready air defense system and pointed to the need to destroy the enemy in the air before vital centers could be destroyed In thus admitting the vulnerability of China to attack Chinese military doctrine acknowledges the concentration of industrial complexes in a few area and weapon production in a few plants Also implied is an awareness that the transportation system is limited principally to railroads that despite a long coastline there are relatively wa portS that command and control are held in Peiping and that despite a large number of airfields there are only a limited number that can be used in air defense Future wars will be fought with nuclear weapons and will have the character of a very short blitzkrieg After these two countries the United States and England have decided on a new war of aggres- sion they will make use of bombers carrying nuclear and thermonucle guided missiles rockets and so on Their airplanes will fly over other countries aiming at destroying important factories military bases and vital communication lines and During the duration of the whole war the Air Defense Force ADF will play an important role The ADF should under no circumstances let any hosti plane invade the sky above our own important defense bases and BhOl protect our nation's political and economic centers and industrial bases and avoid the bombing of our vital military areas and communi- cation Every air attack is expected to be Si the invention of atomic chemical and thermonuclear weapons as we as the speedy development of newer types of air-attack weapons the possibility of a surprise air attack is greater and greater and the destructive power of such an attack becomes corre5pondingly more UNCLASSEPEEIJ Internal Developments Another indication that the Chinese have recognized the importance of nuclear weapons is their determination to develop their own nuclear weapon capability Probably as early as l95h 55 they began working toward creating the basis fer their own nuclear weapon production Since 1958 the Chinese have made no secret of their intent to develop their own nuclear weapons and to Imaster rocket technology Assessment of the fbreat China's reappraisal of her vulner- ability to nuclear warfare in the 195h 55 period can be attributed in part to her growing awareness of the enhancement of U S striking power in the Far East during that time Since then Chinese policies have shown considerable sensitivity to U S military developments and policies in the area This was particularly evident in the reaction to the statement by then-Secretary of State Dulles on March 8 1955 in which he described U S sea and air forces in the area as now equipped with new and powerful weapons of precision and counted atomic missiles among conventional weapons Chinese newspapers have commented on the reported assignment of Matador missiles to Taiwan in 1957 the increase in U S military including nuclear capabilities in the area during the 1958 Quemoy crisis and more recently the stationing of Nike-Hercules missiles in Taiwan the establishment of a Nike-AJax group in Japan the proposed buildup of Polaris submarines in the U S Pacific Fleet the reported presence of 3-525 in the Far East theater the rotation of Jet fighter planes U S and U S -SEAIO and U S -Japanese maneuvers and training exercises as well as efforts to strengthen U S capabilities for UHELASSHEEB 42- low level 'military operations in the area China's Military Caution Caution has increasingly dominated China's employment of military force for offensive purposes ever 5 Peiping developed some recognition of the destructiveness of nucle weapons and the implications of these weapons for modern warfare In 1951 Chinese decisions not to press the war in Indochina nor t push' the Taiwan Strait crisis appeared to be based on a more reali estimate of phat conflict with a nuclear-armed United States might In the 1953 Gummy crisis Chinese operations remained a low level of violence Apparently Peiping was anxious to minimize the risk 6f a direct clash with U S forces Thus there is 81111313 evidence that the U S military posture in the Western Pacific has imposed important restraints on Chinese military actions View of Deterrence Chinese awareness of the implications of nuclear war must have brought hme to them the real extent of thei military demndence on the Soviet Union Though the nature of the Soviet comitment to China in the period remained unclear China's leaders had no alternative but to rely on whatever nuclear deterrent the Soviet Union then possessed At the time of the Sovf China's intervention in the Korean War is often cited as evic' of incautious Chinese behavior This View is subject to important vations 1 there is considerable evidence that the Chinese were slow in identifying themselves with the North Korean cause in mid-I carefully assessing risks and gains 2 the Chinese appear to be pared to take greater risks in what they regard as defensive rat than offensive policies and 3 at the time of their entry into Korean War it appeared that the Chinese had only an imperfect unde standing of the meaning of nuclear weapons for modern warfare and role of nuclear weapons seems to have played only a minor if 8113' part in their risk calculations -13- 5555 fr Union s Sputnik successes in late 1957 the Chinese appear to have overestimated the Soviet strategic capability and the gains to be achieved thereby Since then the Chinese while continuing to be cautious in their own military'behavior have attempted to persuade the Soviet Union to take a more aggressive stance toward the West preferably in support of Chinese objectives Peiping's unwillingness to risk an independent confrontation of U S forces in the area demonstrates that China has been deterred from taking military actions directly involving interests in the area To date the Soviets apparently have been unwilling to give the Chinese an advance commit- went I In other words Chinese practice--caution and rationality in use of military means and awareness of their dependence on the Soviet deterrent--contrasts sharply with their verbal bellicosity their continued public disparagement of nuclear warfare and their persis- tence in describing the United States as a paper tiger to be despised strategically The reiteration of these themes provides the Chinese with the means for bolstering internal morale disguising China's present military weakness and pressing the Soviet Union for support The themes also serve to indicate the premium that Peiping places on retaining an image of China as revolutionary in behavior Perhaps more important they indicate Peiping's belief that American power in the area is transitory and suggest that China is optimistic about achieving her major objectives in the long run CHINESE OPTIONS With the attainment of a modest nuclear capability China will 1 -1h- gain an important new instrument for attempting to implement her basic objectives Among the options open to her will be the direct use of nuclear weapons on U S 'bases or Asian countries 0 the use of nuclear weapons as an umbrella for overt non-nuclear military operations and support of insurgency and the POIitiC l and Propaganda exploitation of a nuclear capability RELEVANT ASPECTS OF A CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY ASSESSMENT Chinese preference for one or more of these options at the time she possesses a modest nuclear capability will be strongly influenced not only by her basic objectives her attitude toward the United States and her rational military doctrine but also by her conteme porary assessment of 1 the role of the Soviet Union 2 the Chinese-ms military balance and 3 the opportunities for low risk gains in line with Chinese long term goals Since Chinese caution has in part been a function of military dependence on the Soviet Union the Chinese will continue to evaluate the character and scope of Soviet assistance both political and military that they might anticipate and the political price that might be attached Peiping will continue to assess the East-Nest balance particularly the impact on U S policy of the Soviet militar posture In the event this posture significantly limits U S respons Peiping may be tempted to take advantage of this even without an advance Soviet support commitment However in the absence of such a situation and assuming continued Soviet reluctance to support the Chinese militarily Phiping will have to determine how best to fW mists -15- manipulate Soviet reaction what risks can be taken independent of Soviet support in the hope of compelling Soviet involvement and what advantage can be taken of tensions in U S -Soviet relations While calculating the risks to themselves carefully the Chinese might resort to a number of indirect tactics Paiping may subject to safeguards seek greater Soviet commitment for Chinese objectives by mobilizing Bloc pressures in her behalf or by attempting to persuade the Soviet Union that Soviet support would reduce the risk of '5 escalation The Chinese have continually analyzed their military capabilities in relation to the UZS force posture in the area From 195h on such analyses seem to have contributed to a recognition that lacking Soviet support China was deterred from military operations that would be likely to elicit a U S response The Chinese however have not been reluctant to test the credibility of U S political intentions as by their restrained use of force in the 1958 Quemoy crisis It is anticipated that the Chinese will continue to make such military analyses and assessments of the U S political mood and will'base their evaluation on the risks involved In addition Peiping's policies will be affected by the degree to which opportunities exist or can be created for low risk gains Weaknesses in the U S position ambiguities in U S commitments in the area and indecisiveness in U S reaction to crisis situations could persuade the Chinese that risks were reduced Similardan vulnerabilities among U S allies areas of friction between the United States and her allies as well as instability'within both 2 - -16- allied and neutral countries on China's Periphery could be viewed'by PEiPing as providing opportunities for exploitation Because of the importance of the Soviet Union in Chinese foreign and to some extent internal policy the following section will consider the implications of Soviet policy for Chinese strategy it win - 3 17- SOVIET ROLE IN CHINESE POLICY In view of the different and sanetimes conflicting Soviet and Chinese interests and objectives the future of Sine-Soviet relations is difficult to predict These relations could range from an open break through various degrees and forms of cooperation to close coordination of policies and actions As will be shown Moscow- Peiping relations are not likely to take the form of either extreme case within the next decade Both China and the Soviet Union have a considerable interest in preserving some form of unity and cooperation As long as China lacks the military capability for attaining her territorial and political objectives in Asia in the face of U S opposition her dependence on Soviet military and political support is likely to remain very great Even in specific instances where China map believe that she can achieve her objectives by her own capabilities alone she would still prefer to be able to count on Soviet support in case of unanticipated responses by the United States or other powers Similarly China is important to Soviet foreign domestic and Communist Party politics China also contributes greatly to the over- all strength and prestige of the Communist Bloc However her politi- cal and territorial ambitions often conflict with Soviet interests and raise many problems for Moscow This section will discuss common points and differences in Soviet and Chinese approach likely Soviet influences on China's military pos- ture and a possible range of Soviet moves in support of China during military conflicts a meme -18- BASIC FACTORS Foreign policy and foreign relations for the Soviet Union are of course governed to a large extent by basic Soviet self-interests The fundamental overriding consideration in Soviet policy is the promotion of the interests of the Soviet leadership and of the Soviet Union These primary interests predominate in Soviet relations not non-Communist states but also with Communist Bloc countries Consequently the following factors may'be expected to contribute heavily to Soviet policy towards China Preservation of the Soviet Union and of Its Political Systen The Soviet leaders obviously regard the preservation of the Sovi Onion as bf paramount importance Since they also regard its preser- vation as essential to the promotion of world communism the Soviet leaders would neither consciously sacrifice the Soviet Union to promo the world revolution nor risk a high probability of suffering heavy damage merely to preserve or expand communism in areas not under Sovi control Consequently Soviet policy decisions will reflect a Soviet assessment of the East-West'balance of military power and of the risk entailed in each policy choice of Soviet Economic and Foreign Political Interests The Soviet leaders give priority to the strengthening of Soviet power and economic wellabeing They are clearly unwilling to make significant reductions in either the Soviet Union's rate of economic growth or in its military posture to assist in attainment of China's objectives 'r I Join -19- masses Neither the present nor any foreseeable Soviet leaders are likely to accede to Peiping's demands that the Soviet Union provide sufficient economic aid to permit all other Ccmnunist Bloc members to achieve canmunism concurrently with the Soviet Union 11- is also evident that the Soviet Union first promotes its own foreign policy interests and would not endanger its chances of success for the sole benefit of other- Conmunist countries This is especially true in the case of Chine whose successes are likely to strengthen her position vis-d-vis the Soviet Union and thus to improve Peiping's chances for challenging Moscow's leadership of the Counmnist Bloc Preservation of Soviet leadership of the International Communist Movement Soviet control over foreign parties has become sane- what less rigid However for reasons of prestige and power Moscow still is determined to remain the leading power in the international Communist movuent retaining control over the EuroPean Communist parties and maintaining a dominant influence in other important areas Moscow is therefore quite sensitive to any challenge to its position in the internetimal Columnist movement Moscow appears also to fear that independent actions by foreign Columnist countries or parties could involve the Soviet Union in unwanted and dangerous conflicts with the West PreserVetion of the Unity of the Bloc A related factor is the importance to the Soviets of the growth of the size and power of the Communist Bloc Preservation of some de- gree of Bloc unity medal hr in the face of the Western and Asian alliances contributes to Soviet security as well as foreign policy muse-m at amass - Disintegration of the _Bloc could create serious danestic political problems for the Soviet leadership Moscow would also fear that it might encourage the West to initiate an active rollback policy and to destroy the Communist countries piecemeal Furthermore the possible rivalry between contending Cmmist factions could lead to a disastrc disintegration and weakening of the international movement that would undermine the Western image of Soviet power again endanger ing Soviet security COMMON SING-SOVIET OBJECTIVES These obvious divergences in the interests and objectives of the Soviet Union and'of China should not obscure the fact that the two nations basically share a cannon ideology and a number of fundamental objectives that have great significance for the United States These cannon objectives include 1 expansion of communism and of Commist Bloc in fluence in Asia 2 breakup of the anti-Omanist alliances in Asia 3 elimination of U S military bases in the Pacific area and withdrawal of the U S ndlitary presence from Asia neutralization of Asian countries that at present pursue pro-Western policies and 5 support for local pro-Communist or so-called na- tion liberation movements and revolts in Asia The essence of the Sino-Soviet dispute resides basically in dif- ferences over the relative priorities in the attainment of cannon ob- jectives over the strategy and tactics that should be used and in 1 competition of the two powers for dunnant influence in various under developed countries 333% -21 - DIFFEIENCES IN sovrsr 'Ama APPROACHES China does not seek aibreak with the Soviet Union but more auP' port from it Unlike Yugoslavia for acample whose primary objective was the preservation of its independence Soviet controls China's political and territorial ambitions make a break with Moscow undesir- able since it could mean a postponement in the attainment of Peiping's objectives Furthermore the Chinese leadership would fear that if China were isolated the West would take advantage of this to demand political concessions and might be encouraged to roll back Communist influence and controls in other Asian countries or even in China herself- Chinese demands for major Soviet support may be moderated by a more realistic picture of Soviet military and economic capabilities To bring pressure on the Soviet leadership and to increase China's role in the international Conmunist movement and in the underdeveloped countries Peiping has attempted to form a Chinese-controlled bloc of Cmmist parties within the international Communist movement This attempt has met with relatively little success and has brought Peiping into direct conflict with Soviet interests The Chinese leadership apparently has recognized that unrestricted rivalry with the Soviet Union would be in view of China's relative economic and military weakness to her own disadvantage However China has not abandoned all efforts to increase her in uence and to gain the leadership of Asian and other Communist parties By remaining in the Communist Bloc Peiping could better negotiate or pressure Moscow into some recognition of Chinese interests as well as hamper any Soviet attempt to engage in open and unrestricted competition with China Further Peiping is more -5 -22 - i I likely to obtain support from other Cmunist parties by staying in the Bloc than by forcing the other Communist parties to choose public and perhaps irrevocably between Moscow and Peiping Consequently China would have to pay a high price for breaklng with the Soviet Union while anticipating little or no advantage from it The initiative for a break appears therefore to rest primarily with_Moscow rather than with Peiping A break is unlikely however unless China persists in policies that create intolerable challenges or risks for the Soviet Union 00119131151 harmonious relations and close Sino-Soviet cooperation are also unlikely in view of the conflicting interests and ambitions While China will not accept complete subordination of her policies to Soviet control it is equally improbable that Moscow would be willing or able to satisfy all of Peiping's demands Although the Soviet Union may attempt to use its military and economic assistance in order to influence Peiping's policies complete control is unlikely Bino- Soviet relations are thus likely to continue in a state of partial and shifting cooperation and rivalry timing which the Soviet Union will give some recognition to Peiping's needs and interests and may provide her with relatively low cost and low risk assistance and sup- port Consequently Moscow's ability to control or restrain China's policies and actions will be indirect partial and unstable SOVIET INFLUENCE 0N POSTURE In the past the Soviets have provided considerable military and economic assistance to China including aid to the latter's missile and nuclear programs Recently that assistance has been markedly '1 Hot i 1 93 i Iii-Imam -23 reduced In the future such assistance will depend on the state of Sino-Soviet relations and probably on China's ability to pay for any support she receives In general the Soviet Union is unlikely to welcome China's acquisition of an independent nuclear capability be- cause it would 0 lessen Peiping's dependence on the Soviet Union and weaken the latter's special status as the Cmmist Bloc's nuclear shield raise China's prestige in the international Com- munist movement and in the underdeveloped countries 0 increase the danger of escalation and expansion of any U S Chinese con ict thus increasing the chan- ces of Soviet involvement 0 lead the Chinese to believe that they were in a position to demand Soviet support for their ob- Jectives by threatening to involve the Soviet Union in a nuclear con ict and 0 further weaken Soviet in uence over China's actions Nor would it be in Moscow's interest to provide China with an inde- pendent stratech delivery capability Fran the Chinese standpoint Peiping is to ask for or agree to the stationing of Soviet nuclear weapons on Chinese territory because of the political price including Soviet control of such weapons Further Moscow very pro- bably would not agree to any type of Joint control over such weapons The Soviet Union probably would also prefer to delay gLving Peiping an independent capability for waging protracted and high level non-nuclear local wars Moscow would be concerned lest Peiping pursue more aggressive policies that might subsequently involve the Soviets in a Chinese-initiated conflict In summary then Soviet economic and non-nuclear military assistance comm to China is likely to continue so long as these two powers do not breal relations II'he rate or level of this assistance will depend on the - factors previously discussed but is unlikely to satisfy all of China's needs SOVIET OF CHINA IN MILITARY CONFLICTS Soviet policy and actions in the event Chins initiates or becomes involved in a miutary conflict will be determined by many factors Among them are Soviet evaluations of the character and locale of the conflict 0 Chinese objectives 0 U S military capability will and intentions the' danger of escalation the politico-military impact on other countries 0 the effects of its probable outcome on the Soviet political and security situations 0 the probable risks and costs arising from various Soviet policy choices and the importance to the Soviets of the area of con- flict In general the Soviet Union has little interest in supporting China's mansion especially by means that appear likely to involve it in an armed conflict with the United States The following para- graphs will discuss some probable Soviet reactions to varied situation and Chinese actions In the event of a Chinese aggressive military threat one Soviet reaction might be to use this threat as a means for obtaining politi- cal concessions from the West by politico-diplanatic means thereby - mamas -25- exercisi'ng some control over the conflict and perhaps acquiring cre- dit for Camnunist Bloc gains If the Chinese do undertake a military campaign outside their own territory Soviet reaction will depend in part on the area involved in the conflict as it reflects Soviet political interest prior Soviet investment risks of escalation and potential Soviet gains For ex- ample where the Soviets appear to have little interest as in the Taiwan area little support probably would be forthcoming In the Indochina area where the Soviets have demonstrated greater utereat they might 31188-38 in limited low risk action themselves or in co- Operation with China With the far greater Soviet stake and long range expectations in India Indonesia and Japan the Soviet Union will seek to protect its own interests there and to prevent sole Chinese domination of these countries In the event a Chinese ndlitary campaign appears to be facing defeat outside China the Soviets are tmlikely to intervene overtly or to provide large scale military assistance They probably would attempt to limit the effects of such a Chinese defeat and to discourage any U S attempt to exploit the defeat In any Chinese overt military venture the Soviet Union probably would oppose Chinese initiation of the use of nuclear weapons es- pecially during a period when the Soviet strategc posture is not signi cantly superior to that of the United States From Moscow's point of view introduction of nuclear weapons could lead to a den- gerous escalation of the conflict Under most circumstances the Soviet Union would prefer to keep any conflict involving China localized and relatively restrained in inmates - um -26 UNCLASSIHEB its level of violence Ellie Soviets probably would shape any assist- ance so as to avoid provoking a dangerous intensification and expan- sion of the conflict They might attempt to restrain China attacking U S bases in Asia and the Pacific in order to have both their own territory and China treated as sanctuaries Even if the United States were to use nuclear weapons against Chinese forces out- side_ China Moscow probably would oppose any Peiping plan to attack U S bases outside the immediate area of conflict The Soviets pro- bably would seek to negotiate a cessation of military action and a settlement that would allow the Chinese to retain sane gains In the event of a threatened or actual U S attack against China proper Soviet actions are neither predetermined nor automatic The Soviet Union has a treaty of alliance and mutual defense with China signed in 1950 that provides for mutual assistance in the event either country is attacked by Japan or by a direct or indirect ally of Japan in the act of aggression Soviet public ccnminnent to China' defense was further amended in two letters Khrushchev to Pre- sident Eisenhower in September 1958 which stated that the Soviet govermnent viewed any attack on China as an attack on the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union would use its nuclear weapons in re- taliation for any nuclear attack on Chinese territory However the Soviet threat of nuclear retaliation expressed in these letters and i the 1962 declaration was kept ambiguous It did not specify how against what targets and on what scale the Soviet Union might use its nuclear weapons and it did not specifically ccaUdt Moscow to attacks against U S territory or to a general nuclear war Fur them I uai i a mussma 27' these Soviet declarations were made after the imediate threat of an attack on China appeared to he past The Soviet Union thus posed as a protector and ally of China without naming serious risks Despite the treaty obligations and public cormnitments the Soviet Union would refuse to provide Peiping with a blank check by itself to an autcmatic response in advance of a conflict Otherwise Soviet influence on Chinese poucies'snd actions would be weakened and China could involve the Soviet Union in a war not of its choosing A large scale U S attack on China would create a difficult sit- uation for the Soviet Union Moscow's response would depend not only on the Soviet assessment of the U S military and political objectives-'- but also on the value that the Soviets place on the preservation of the Communist power position and system in China Despite Sine-Soviet rivalry and irrespective of the state of Sino-Soviet relations Moscow has a major stake in preserving Communist rule in China for reasons of prestige strategy and security A collapse of the Chinese regime would have unfavorable repercussions in the international Communist movement and would Constitute an unfavorable shift in the over-all East-West balance of power Moscow would expect that a successful rollback of in Asia would encourage the United States to attempt similar operations elsewhere Therefore the Soviets would be under great pressure to intervene if they fail to deter the United States by diplomatic means and threats or low risk demonstrations Unless the balance of power clearly fa- vors the Soviets their intervention would not risk an attack on the Massive U S attacks could be interpreted as punitive measures de- signed to re-esta'blish the status guo ante hellum in a contested area to force Chinese withdrawal from another area to weaken China's economic and military pasture or to destroy the Communist regims in Peiping We 28 United States and 1Iir'oul he designed to avoid provoking a U S attack on the Soviet Uhion The character of such intervention is more likely to he defensive than offensive and to be combined with political moves and pressure on U S allies and neutrals in order to bring the conflict to an end At the same time there would be the danger that the Soviet Union might misinterpret U S military'moves against China as a prelude to an attack on the Soviet Union especially if the United States has not clearly distinguished hetween the Soviet and Chinese threats and the Soviet military plans are based on a pre-emptive strategy This problem has relevance for'most circumstances in which the Uhited States fails to distinguish between forces expecially if ZI- tbased for use against China and these for deterring the Soviet Union A U S policy of separating the threats would also reduce Peiping's ability to blackmail Moscow for support by threats to take action that might lead to a U S attack on the Soviet Union In summary the Soviet Union probably vill try to confine its support for Chinese strategy to a minimum level consistent with Soviet objectives and risk calculations However during the course of a conflict as Moscow reassesses the political and military aspects of the conflict and especially as it is able to test and to clarify U S intentions and reactions to various Soviet threats and moves the Soviet Union might'vell undertake support of China or increase the extent of assistance to her In view of the foregoing the Chinese are likely to he conser- vative in their evaluation of the degree of assistance and support -29- they can anticipate from the Soviet Uhion in the event of a conflict with the United States Chinese actions will depend more critically on their contemporary assessments of the Chinese-U S politico-mili tary'balance and on the available opportunities for low risk gains Because of the importance that Peiping will attach to her assessments of the power balance in the area the following section considers the risks for China and the United States in terms of three cases of di- rect Chinese-U S military confrontation A sdhseqpent section deals with available opportunities for low risk Chinese gains 3 SOME HYPOTHETICAL MILITARY The possession of nuclear weapons will enable China to confront the united States and Asian nations with a greater range of military challenges than at present The Chinese would have the option of using nuclear weapons directly on U S bases and Asian countries or as an umbrella for non-nuclear military operations and suPPOft of insurgency The anticipated military consequences of such actions would play a major part in China's determination of the risks in- volved in each choice In this section three hypothetical conflict situations between Communist China and the United States and its allies are presented These were-taken to provide a rough assessment of the military con- sequences of China's possession of a nuclear capability and to give some indication of the magnitude of the risks that the Chinese would face in a military confrontation with the United States we recogniz however that in reality political conditions will affect the characi of U S responses and will influence Chinese assessment of the militz risks involved The political conditions are discussed in detail in subsequent sections The hypothetical cases are Case I U S nuclear retaliation following Chinese aggression in the area involving A more detailed presentation of the material in this section is being prepared by B F Jaeger and Ms G Weiner Politico-military analysis two-sided war-gaming techniques and standard military planning factors were used in the case studies Force requirements and the outcomes of the conflicts were based on standard planning factors for U S military forces 'Wl A--U S programmed theater forces against Chinese offensive air and missile capability and B--U S programmed theater forces with aug- mentation against Chinese offensive air and missile capability Case II Two-sided nuclear exchange involving Ar-Chinese pre emptive nuclear attack on U S air and naval forces augmented in the Far East followed by B--Retaliation against Chinese offensive air and missile capability by surviving U S forces Case Non-nuclear campaigns in the Taiwan strait area FORCE POSTURE The basic Orders of Battle assumed for these case studies are consistent with present 1962 U S military programs for the 1966-67 time period _the U S Military Assistance Program for Nationalist China and recent intelligence estimates of the military strength of Communist China For purposes of the study it is assumed that in this time period Communist China would have a mcdest nuclear capa- bility arbitrarily established at 36 with nuclear warheads and approximately 60 nuclear weapons for medium and light bomber delivery Maximum warhead yield is estimated to be 200 ET The Chinese MRBM force is stationed in three complexes 0 in Kiangsi province approximately 50 miles north of Nan-Ch'ang The specific assumed Orders of Battle are presented in Appendix B FUIther detail on possible Chinese and U S military developments is presented in Appendix A Selection of the 1966-67 time period was based on the availa- bility of information of U S programs for that period The size type and disposition of the Chinese nuclear capability are not intended as estimates or predictions of Chinese developments The Chinese capability was selected as a representative threat to the U S forces programmed for the period This capability would strain the upper limit of Chinese scientific industrial technical capability accor ng to a study in preparation by D N Morris 1 cm mamas -3 2- 0 M-2 in Liaoning province approximately 100 miles north of Mukden and 0 M-3 in Hanan province approximately 200 miles southwest of Changsha Each complex has four launch sites with three missile pads Installs tions are not hardened to more than 5 psi The Chinese airbase comPlex is assumed to consist of more than 200 airfields over 60 of them vith permanent runways of 7000 ft or more Although there are differences in the condition facilities and operational readiness of the fields they provide a'broad basis for the support of air operations Badger aircraft are based on at least seven major airfields and light bombers Beagles on three airfields The air defense posture assumed for China consists of an ex- tensive early warning aw radar network with complete high altitude coverage along the coast and west to about langitude 1000 E but wit very little or no coverage west of that line Low altitude coverage is present along the entire coast line to about 20-25 mi offshore and inland around the principal government and industrial centers am at major military installations The radar coverage is coupled vith enough surface-to-airbmissiles SAM of the SAee type to provide ove lapping coverage of the maJor political industrial and military centers The SAM coverage along the coast opposite Taiwan is fairly These complexes are hypothetical with their locations selec on the basis of the following criteria as far inland in China as possible while remaining within llOO-n mi range of all meJor v 5 military installations in the Far East permitting multiple target coverage when possible on railroad routes in appropriate terrain and close to other Chinese military installations especially large airfields uncussma %ai 1 2 mm mm -33- heavy AntiJaircraft artillery coverage parallels the SAM coverage in concentrations of both medium 85-mm and and light ST-mm batteries Throughout the case studies we have made the critical assumption that there would be no direct intervention or participation by the Soviet Union within the time frame of the campaigns This assumption 0' is in line with the analysis in Sec CASE I U S NUCLEAR RETTLIATION FOLLOWING CHINESE AGGRESSION IN THE AREA This case assumes that the Chinese hare attacked Taiwan with nuclear weapons and that the United States launches a coordinated strike against airfields and missile sites on the Chinese Mainland within at hours after the Taiwan attack The U S objective is the destruction of Chinese offensive air and missile capabilities Restrictions placed on U S operations include no U S operations from or through Taiwan and no use of Nationalist Chinese forces This limitation is based on the nature of the assumed attack on Taiwanywhich essentially eliminated any possibility of using Taiwan for air operations 0 no operations by U S aircraft based in Japan and no use of Japanese bases by any U S aircraft This restriction is based on the assumed nature of Japanese-U S relations at the time no U S overflights of North Korea North Vietnam or the Soviet Union This restriction is based on the military requirement of minimizing Chinese warning and on the avoidance of any possible intervention by these countries in -3h- UNUASSMM no support of U S operations'by non-U S forces This restrictipn is based on an assumed U S desire to maintain freedom of action and on the desirability of a quick response no Chinese government control industrial or non-military facilities attacked of Programmed Theater Forces Against Chinese Offensive Air and Missile Capability Case involves a preliminary appraisal of a campaign against China in which only pregrammed theater forces are to be used However_ there are several difficulties that would limit the effectiveness of such a campaign 1 Some of the Chinese airfields are beyond the operating radius of the attacking aircraft A Chinese basing policy that took advantage of this condition would result in the survival of a force large enough to be used in a substantial counterstrike The Chinese early'warning and air defense posture would Pose a threat to high altitude attacks In order to reduce losses to an acceptable level low altitude penetration would be necessary Such tactics would further limit the range performance of the aircraft and reduce the target coverage The penetration of attacking aircraft would provide the Chinese with sufficient time to launch their MBBM force and to have part of their aircraft airborne for air defense operations or withdrawal to secure bases in the interior Therefore it would be vital to the success of the U S operation that the missile installations and bomber bases be struck with little or no warning Missiles could provide such a capability but would not be available in the programmed force in appropriate quantities and with adequate ranges and penetration speeds This restriction was also useful for assessing U S ability to attach China without allied support '35- As a result of these limitations we concluded that an attack on the Chinese offensive and missile capabilities would let a reasonably large portion of these capabilities survive For these reasons Case l-A was not examined in detail B--U S Programmed Theater Forces with Augmentation Against Chinese Offensive Air and Missile Capability The U S objective for this campaign is the same to destroy Chinese offensive air and missile capability within 2h hours after a Chinese nuclear attack on Taiwan The same target system airfields and ballistic missile sites is assumed and operations are to be carried out under the same restrictions However in view of the limitations on the effectiveness of the programmed force described above the U S capability in the theater is augmented and improved as indicated below The two major Chinese offensive target complexes are the MERE sites and the bomber'bases particularly those capable of supporting Badger operations Some of the Badger bases are 1000 mi inland For the missile sites a capability to destroy them with little or no warning is desired This capability should also be highly invulnerable to Chinese offensive and defensive action We have assumed that the missile sites will be soft in the 1967 time period and thus could be attacked with airburst nuclear weapons that lack a high degree of delivery accuracy Attacks on the bomber bases would need surface bursts by nuclear weapons to destroy the runways and preclude their future use Such attacks call for highly accurate weapons this implies air drops using laydown weapons These attacks should also provide minimum warning to the Chinese - ml- _36_ Among the many possible weapon systems or combinations of systems that could provide some or all of these capabilities are 0 3-525 with Hound Dogs or Skybolts and laydown weapons 0 based in various countries in the Far East 0 ICBMs based in the Pacific area Alaska Hawaii Australia 0 with Polaris Ar3rmissiles operating in the South China Sea or the Pacific Ocean For this campaign programmed theater forces are augmented by one wing of B-52s based at Guam and one with 16 Polaris A-3 missiles of QSOO-mile range is used These two systems are selected as being illustrative of the desired weapon_capabilities The selecti does not imply that they are preferred systems since no comparison wit other combinations was made Concept of Operations The Badger'bases and the MRBM sites are attacked by 3-525 with the coverage of the missile complexes comple- mented'by Polaris missiles that can reach their targets without sig- nificant warning Also the Okinawa based Mace are used against the Chinese missile complex nearest Okinawa relying on saturation to get through the defenses Because the Badger'bases are far inland they are attacked by 3-525 that overfly'Burma and penetrate the radar coverage from the southwest providing minimum penetration of Chinese air defenses Two Hound Dogs per base are used to achieve a high kill probability Appendix shows several assigned to the Pacific Fleet in the 1967 time period It was assumed that only one of these was assigned to Chinese targets masses -37_ surname with minimum warning ' The 3-525 also drop laydown weapons on the 7 000-ft or longer runways of bases in the same general area One Beagle base is attacked by the B-S2s The other two Beagle bases near the coast are attacked by fighter aircraft with laydown weapons Fighter bases with runways of 7 000 ft or longer along the coast and as far inland as U S fighters can reach are attacked by U S- fighters using laydown weapons Airburst weapons are generally used against bases with runways shorter than 7 000 ft Summary of Operations 0f the approximately'200 Chinese air- fields 88 are targeted for U S strikes These include all fields known or believed to be occupied on the basis of assumed intelli- gence information and all fields with 7 000-ft or longer per- manent runways The 12 sites in the three missile complexes and four radar picket ships are also targeted 0f the total of 10h targets 65 airfields 12 missile sites and the picket ships are known or believed to be occupied All the missile sites and l airfields are covered'by more than one delivery vehicle The 17 airfields include all those believed to be occupied by the light or medium Jet bombers and those air- fields occupied by substantial numbers of fighters that lie along the major penetration routes The methodology used for examining this and the subsequent military campaigns include two-sided war gaming and is described in Ref 8 Technical and operational characteristics were based on standard military planning factors Campaign results were based on expected-value computations autumn com i -38- from the total force available the following forces are used 27 3-525 from Guam each with 2 Bound Dogs and laydown weapons 29 F-th from Kadena Okinawa 3h and F-ll-Cs from Osan Korea 16 Mace from Okinawa and 12 Polaris missiles This provides a total attacking force of 253 weapons against 10h targets Campaign Results All 12 missile sitesa the picket ships and 81 of the 88 airfields were destroyed or severely damaged Fourteen targets were hit by fewer than the assigned force including seven that were not hit at all Five of these were occu- pied airfields and two unoccupied The missile sites were damaged au 'iciently that no offensive missile capability remained All airfields occupied by Light and medium Jet bombers were severely damaged except one central China base occupied by one-half a regiment of Badgers This represented the major surviving Chinese offensive capability Several regiments of fighters survived the attack Some had been on airfields that escaped attack Others had been airborne in defensive operations when their home bases were attacked The surviving fighters would have been severely handicapped in any sub- sequent action because of the extensive damage to their bases and support and maintenance facilities They constitute an extremely limited See Appendix CW i offensive threat and donly a minor defensive threat to any subsequent U S strikes The U S losses were limited by low altitude approach tactics and the use of Hound Dogs and ballistic missiles against fast-reacting targets As a result the Chinese defensive fighters and SAM bat- teries had restricted opportunities to engage U S forces Only seven aircraft were lost to enemy action four to Chinese fighters and three to Two of the seven aircraft destroyed had already 1 released their weapons Observations Some observations drawn from these campaigns and force postures are 1 Operating from an undamaged posture U S programned theater forces could destroy a substantial portion of the Chinese offensive posture but these forces would be handicapped by insufficient range penetration and quick response capabilities 2 Augmented theater forces could reduce the Chinese offensive capabilities to a very low level 3 The U S losses in an augmented-theeber-force campaign could be quite low Chinese defenses suffer from serious deficiencies in radar coverage SAM capability and defensive fighter effectiveness against high speed low altitude penetration The Chinese offensive capability surviving an attack by summed U S forces would be only a minor threat to the U S military posture in the Pacific 5 Commitment of all U S forces in the theater was not necessary during this campaign Neither the Philippine- based USAF aircraft nor the Seventh Fleet aircraft were used 6 Either surviving elements of the committed U S force or the U S forces not emitted would ensure a U S capability for a substantial second strike a- Attrition summations were based on information in Ref 9- i_ 4 0- - 7 ith a substantial portion of the Chinese airfield complex deStrOYEd their ability to redeploy surviving or airborne aircraft is vary limited Any attempt to supply replace- ments for the lost aircraft by the USSR would be limited by the same destruction CASE II TWO-SIDED NUCEEAR EXCHANGE This Case examines a Chinese-initiated nuclear strike and U S retaliation Part A analyzes a Chinese attack on the augmented U S air and naval forces in the Far East and Part analyzes a U S re- taliatory strike using forces that survive the Chinese attack The background for this case study assumes that at the time of the Chinese attack 1967 U S -Soviet relations are extremely tense to the degree that nuclear war is a strong possibility The Chinese believe that in the event of war they would also be attacked by U S forces The Chinese choose to strike first in an attempt to destroy U S bases in the Far East with the presumption that the surviving U S theater forces could not critically damage the Chinese-Mainland The same Orders of Battle as for Case I-B are assumed except for three more aircraft carriers and a number of support ships assigned - to the Seventh Fleet One of these carriers is undergoing maintenar at Subic Bay Naval Base the Philippines Two-thirds of the Pacific Fleet has been deployed to the Far East as a result of the extremal tense international situation A--Chinese Pre emntive Nuclear Attack on U S Air and Naval Forces Augmented in the Far'Eagt The Chinese launch three coordinated attacks aircraft strike on Guam and Iwo Jima an aircraft and missile attack on all other U S land bases in the Far East including five Nationalist Chinese airfiebds on Taiwan and an aircraft attack on the Seventh Fleet Wt rst '57f fi iissgy The timing of-these attacks must be carefully controlled to preserve the element of surprise for all targets The Chinese tactics call for all airborne attacks to be conducted at low altitude in the hOpe of achieving surprise and minimizing losses Guam and Iwo Jima The Chinese attack Guam and Iwo Jima with five Badgers each carrying a nuclear weapon The bombers fly at low altitude over the water gap between Taiwan and Northern Luzon On this leg five other Badgers serving as tankers accompany them to perk mit this strike to be a'rbund-trip mission The bombers are refueled and proceed to their assigned targets Three are assigned to Anderson and Agana air bases on Guam and two to military targets on Iwo Jima Because of the high state of tension nine of the 3-525 based on Guam are assumed to be airborne at any time and 13 on ground alert The programmed warning system for Guam has limited capability against low altitude attacks and targets on Guam received only two or three minutes warning of the approaching bombers Thus only three addi- tional 3-525 are safely airborne prior to the detonation of the Chinese BOO-KT nuclear weapons U S and Nationalist Chinese Theater Bases The Chinese fire 27 of their 36 missiles in this Operation The missile strike is followed immediately by an air strike with both nuclear and non nuclear weapons The targets for the Chinese nuclear attack are listed on p he Six targets survive the missile strike because of various missile malfunctions The followup air strike is highly effective and only two targets ultimately survive Naha Air Base Okinawa t CW was f ue- ana Misawa Air Base Japan Neither base constitutes a threat to China Only tran5por't- and air defense aircraft are statiOned 3-13 Naha and the aircraft at Misawa are not available for nuclear Opera- tions Because the Chinese believe that threats will suffice to fore- stall any Japanese action the Chinese do not conduct a second strike aginst the Japanese bases TARGETS OF THE CHINESE ATTACK Nuclear Weapon Assigent Target Missiles Banbs Okinawa Kadena AB 2 Naha AB 2 1 Hawk batteries 2 a Mace sites South Korea Fighter'base FMMubwee meub EB Own Hawk battery HPHH Philippines Clark AFB Basa Subic Bay NaVal Base PHH Japan Yokota AB Itazuke AB Iwehuni MCAF Misawa AB Taiwan Ping-Tung Tumnm Chia-l Kung-Kuan Tao-Yuan Agass- Guam Anderson AFB 1 plu 2 a Iwo Jima Twas-a am masses -h3- _The Chihese 105 only two Badgers and two Beagles in this action Ten fighters at Clark AFB Philippines represent the only sur- viving offensive force for the United States in this Operation Clark AFB had been missed by the missile strike but was destroyed by the air strike Chinese losses are low because of the effectiveness of their missile strike and the ineffectiveness of the U S air defenses against the low altitude attack The Seventh Fleet The heavily augmented Seventh Fleet has been divided into two task forces Task Force is approximately 750 mi east of Shanghai off the island of Kyushu and Task Force 2 is 750 mi south southeast of Amoy The 750 mi distance limits the Chinese to Badgers for a round-trip attack Only the attack on Task Force 1 is analyzed The results are assumed to be applicable to an attack on Task Force 2 Because of the alert status 50 per cent of the fighters and attack aircraft are armed and ready on deck A combat air patrol of fighters and E-2A early warning aircraft are airborne The Chinese launch a strike of 30 Badgers 20 Beagles and 20 Farmers against each task force The Badgers fly low and carry 15 nuclear weapons and 15 large non-nuclear bombs The Beagles and Farmers fly high and are intended as decoys up to the task force perimeters The Chinese know the general location of the task Thirty per cent of the aircraft are assumed to be undergoing maintenance and 20 per cent are in a non-alert status for other reasons The probability of detecting the low flying aircraft increases to better than 0 8 as they approach the line of deployment of the radar picket ships stationed 150 mi from fleet center Assuming in WI 41 14 - forces but they do not know the location of the centers of gravity Further they do not kmow the size and disposition of the forces In spite of the Chinese attack a very large percentage of the ready carrier aircraft are launched Fourteen Chinese aircraft are l to the U S guided-missile ships and air defense fighters during pene- tration One carrier in each task force is sunk and a second in Tea Force 1 is damaged sufficiently that its remaining aircraft are assum not available for a strike against the Chinese Mainland After the Chinese strike the U S naval air defense fighters continue to attack the remaining bomber force With the assistance of the 3-31 aircraft for detection and vectoring control the attackin Badger force is essentially eliminated Summary of Results Only two U S land bases survive the Chines nuclear strike Naha and Misawa ABs The transport and fighter aircr on these bases do not constitute a threat to the Chinese The follow ing U S offensive forces survive and are assumed to be available fo attacking targets on the Chinese Mainland 12 3-525 from Guam each with 2 Bound Dogs and laydown weapons 0 10 from the Philippines 0 8 Mace from Okinawa lOO-psi hardened 103 A-hEs and A-th from the Seventh Fleet 16 A-3Bs from the Seventh Fleet detection at the picket ship deployment line Badger speed of #80 knots and negligible communication delay to the carriers the carrie have approximately 20 minutes to launch their aircraft The minimum time required to launch all combat ready aircraft is estimated to be eight minutes 4 5- 12 from the Seventh Fleet Polaris submarine available for this Operation and 2 carriers In the Operation the Chinese losses are estimated at hh Badgers and three other aircraft Observations Some observations drawn from this campaign and 5 force postures are 1 A modest nuclear capability could be used by the Chinese to damage heavily the augmented U S theater forces However some portions of the force would survive and be available for a retaliatory strike against China The success of the Chinese attack depends critically on a number of conditions including The timing of the various phases of the operation is of major importance All events must take place on a precise schedule to prevent the premature disclo- sure of the strike which would allow the United States to get a larger percentage of its offensive and defensive aircraft airborne before the attack arrives The effectiveness of the attack on Guam is dependent on 1 the ability of the Chinese bombers to pass between Taiwan and Luzon without being detected by the task force in the Philippine Sea 2 the ability of the bombers to escape detection by the aircraft on Guam and 3 the number of B-525 on air alert at the time_of the attack Remaining Chinese offensive forces represent a limited second-strike capability which can be used either directly or as a threat to deter possible responses to the attack The U S land bases have limited early warning capabili- ties against low altitude attacks Since many of these 133 ILASSIEED mum is- -bases are surrounded by water or must be approached over water the uSe of existing over-water detection systems for early warning would further limit the effectiveness of the Chinese attack 5 There is little likelihood that the Chinese could mount any form of attack on the Seventh Fleet that would pre- vent the launching of nearly all ready aircraft The possession of an air-launched guided missile with a nuclear warhead and a range of l50 mi would increase the effectiveness of the attack provided the carriers could be located precisely but this capability is not assumed for the Chinese in the 1967 time period- B- Retaliation Against Chinese Offensive Air and Missile Capability by Surviving U S Forces We next examined an attack on the Chinese Mainland by the U S forces that survive the attack described in Case 111A An attack by these U S forces would be carried out in a period of confusion with- out coordination and with some duplication we assumed that there is preplanning for such a contingency and that each aircraft would attack targets included in existing emergency plans Concept of Operations The target structure is the same as that of Case I The B-SEs attack the MRBM sites and the Badger bases with Hound Dogs and laydown weapons The 3-525 penetrate from the south- west over Burma for deep targets The Polaris are fired against the MRBM sites The surviving Mace are fired against coastal air- fields All aircraft missions over the Chinese Mainland are carried out at low altitude to minimize detection and losses Summary of Attack by USAF Units Two 3-525 are assigned to cover each major target and each aircraft is assigned up to four targets using its two Hound Dogs and four laydown weapons The 12 B-SEs hit 18 airfields and 12 missile sites The eight Mace hit eigb -mmnu 47- airfi lds in the gen ral vicinity of Shanghai The ten from Clark AFB hit ten airfields in South China Summary of Attack by Seventh Fleet Aircraft The Navy emergency plan calls for two aircraft to be assigned to each target The Navy aircraft attack 72 targets comprising 68 airfields and four radar picket ships Several of these airfields are also attacked Iby the Mace and Summary of Results A total of 10h targets are hit by the U S retaliatory strike lT'survive These consist of one missile site one bomber base nine fighter bases and 6 unoccupied airfields The U S losses are 30 fighter and attack aircraft and three Three Polaris abort in flight as do two Mace A third Mace is destroyed by Chinese air defenses The surviving Chinese force consists of one MREM site 16 Badgers and several squadrons of air defense fighters Observations Some observations drawn from this campaign and its force postures are l The augmented U S theater forces surviving the nuclear strike could destroy a substantial portion of the remain- ing Chinese offensive capability The success of such a U S attack would depend critically on a number of factors With the enemy expecting an attack losses to the striking force may be high and duplication of targeting assignments is desirable i I- The attrition of the U S force was develOped from data given in Raf 9' i CLASSEHED IN '0 Authorization to attack is necessary within one hour after Seventh Fleet aircraft take off from the carriers that are destroyed in the Chinese attack Otherwise these naval aircraft would not have sufficient fuel to complete their mis sions The U S retaliatory strike is carried out in a preplanned and relatively orderly fashion This assumption is probably Optimistic and therefore the results should be downgraded to some degree 0 Alternate targets are not assigned for the aircraft in a dual coverage role In the strike many weapons were not drOpped because the target had been destroyed by the first aircraft assigned to that target 2 The U S losses could be high because the U S attack is expected and all elements of the Chinese air defense system are in a high alert status 3 Range limitations will not permit the naval aircraft to return directly to their task forces and they must recover over such friendly areas as Taiwan South Vietnam and South Korea In the event that adequate landing facili- ties are not available the pilots parachute to safety h The Chinese offensive capability surviving an attack by the augmented U S forces would not represent a serious threat to U S military posture in the Pacific 5- The U S theater forces surviving the attack on the Chinese Mainland do not provide the United States with the capa- bility for a major second strike OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING CASES I AND II These cases were studied to obtain a general estimate of the effectiveness of programmed theater forces against a Chinese nuclear capability On the basis of the postulated conditions the following general conclusions are drawn 1 Undamaged U S theater forces augmented by one wing of 3-525 and with the use of one could destroy a substantial portion of the Chinese offensive capability -h9 The'augmentation would be required to reach distant targets and to minimize warning time for the The same U S forces could carry out a major second strike if necessary 2 If the Chinese strike first they could severely damage the U S military posture in the area Further augmenta- tion Of air and naval forces would be required to provide a satisfactory U S retaliatory strike capability in this case 3 Both the U S and the Chinese effectiveness would depend - critically on adequate intelligence concerning the size disposition and location of opposing forces For the Chinese this would be particularly true when attacking the Seventh Fleet for the United States in target assign- ment of occupied airfields h Both sides have deficiencies in early warning in air defense against low altitude attack The vulnerability of U S forges could be reduced by appropriate improve- ments in equipment 5 After a U S strike from a damaged posture Bnly minimal theater forces would be available for a second strike against surviving Chinese military government control industrial and political targets If such a strike were needed additional forces would be required CASE NON-NUCEEAR CAMPAIGNS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT AREA Provided the United States continues to maintain a nuclear posture commensurate with growing Chinese nuclear weapon develOpment Cases I and II suggest that direct nuclear aggression by the Chinese would entail high risks for them The Chinese would still have the military Option of using their nuclear capability as an umbrella for overt non-nuclear military Operations as a threat to enhance the possibilities of achieve ment of limited objectives by non nuclear Operations Case appraises some of the implications for the United States of such a Chinese strateg Em ah - uncussmw The'locale for Case is the Taiwan Strait particularly Quemoy This area was selected for several reasons The I958 crisis provides both a precedent and historical data that permit comparisons with objectives attributed to the Chinese in Sec II The Communist Chines have often voiced their intent to reincorporate Taiwan and the Offshor Islands with the Chinese Mainland For defense of the Offshore Island U S intentions are ambiguous and allied support may be questionable whereas for the defense of Taiwan a firm U S commitment and a greate probability of allied support are assumed Case is not intended to represent a detailed analysis of the variety of possible situations and events that might develoP in the Taiwan Strait area It is intended to illustrate the increased polit- ical implications that could deveIOp in some situations in which the Chinese might attempt a non-nuclear military Operation at the time they have the capability to resort to nuclear weapons It also pro- vides some indications of the possible significance of nuclear weapon to the Chinese for this type of Operation and of some of the conse- quences for U S military reaponses Two situations were examined the major one is an attack on Big Quemoy The second is a limited examination of a Chinese assault on Taiwan A more complete discussion of both studies is in preparation by B F Jaeger and M G Weiner brief analysis of possible Chinese actions against some of the smaller Offshore Islands Pai-Ch'uan group Tang-Yin Shan Wu- Ch'iu Hsu etc was also undertaken In general it indicated that the Communist Chinese could successfully assault one or more of these smaller islands without extensive military preparations that might produce warning of their assault Using standard military planning WI ml -51- 13M QASSERM Chinese Assault of Big Quemoy For this situation we assumed in line with current intelligence that Quemoy's defensive capabilities have been improved since 19583 approximately 60 000 troops on the island high quality guns increased to more than 350 widespread deployment of mines barbed wire and defensive fortifications and a high level of combat effectiveness maintained in the Nationalist Chinese armed forces The nationalist Chinese Orders of Battle which are based on 1966 Military Aid Program force goals plus an assumed modernization program and the U S Orders of Battle which are based on current prOgram data are indicated in Appendix B We assumed that Communist Chinese preparations for the attack on Quemoy would provide some warning resulting in increased levels of alert certain redeployments within the theater and augmentation of U S theater forces Japanese reaction to a new Offshore Island crisis in the face of Communist China's nuclear strength is deemed to be uncertain As a consequence two tactical fighter squadrons a tactical reconnaissance detachment one Marine attack squadron plus a Marine fighter squadron and supporting elements based in Japan are immediately factors an estimated Chinese force of from one to five divisions approximately 200 combat aircraft and an apprOpriate number of land- ing craft and dunks would appear adequate to carry out the attack depending on the particular island or islands chosen The military capability to undertake such action exists today and is not dependent upon Chinese possession of nuclear weapons We found no indication that nuclear weapons would play a dominant role in the local military situation Such an assault would raise problems concerning possible military reaponses for the nationalist Chinese and would have political implications in the Far East particularly for U S -Nationalist Chinese relations J'rltiASSi E hm -52- mamas deployed to Taiwan and Okinawa This obviated the need for later dependence on Japanese basing Provision is made for direct ZI support of these and other Pacific-based forces in the event of a denial or restriction of the Japanese logistic base A U S Army Hawk battalion is airlifted from the United States to Taiwan to aug- ment airfield defenses for the qu forces TWO tactical fighter squadrons from the CASF are deployed to the Philippines Subsequently two other squadrons are moved from the ZI to Japan replacing those redeployed to Taiwan This is to demonstrate the U S will to assist in the defense of Japan and other areas in the event of escalation or expansion of the impending conflict Tactical reconnaissance inflight refueling aircraft and trOOp carrier forces are also in creased The Seventh Fleet is augmented by two attack carriers an ASW carrier and support ships and deployed to the Taiwan Strait An augmentation force of one 3-52 wing based on Guam is also assumed as in Cases I and II as well as the use of one The total Communist Chinese military strength is as described in Appendix B but a maJor part of the force is assumed to be held in place by other commitments Approximately one-fourth of the total Communist Chinese air and naval capability and less than one-fourth of the ground forces are considered available for the Quemoy assault In line with the assessments in Sec direct Soviet military support for the initial Communist Chinese assault is assumed unlikely The direct assault on Quemoy by COmmunist Chinese amphibious forces is presumed to follow preliminary heavy shelling and air attac on the island to reduce the defenses The assault force requirements 5 3 5191555 th ml mm -53 - 3 4 5311 are estimated to be I5 to 20 divisions 2 000 to h 000 air sorties and 3 000 tO h 000 landing vessels and Junks In order to estimate the results of such an attack we assume that there is no Opposition by Nationalist Chinese or U S air units Even without Nationalist Chinese air Opposition a highly unlikely condition Communist Chinese casualties from the Quemoy defenses alone would be in excess Of k0 000 men with heavy materiel losses EOwever if Nationalist Chinese or U S air forces vigorously Oppose the assault through attacks On staging and transit Operations costs in both men and materiel wOuld be greatly increased This factor plus the problems the Communist Chinese would face in coordinating and executing an assault of this magnitude would give them only a marginal chance Of In view of the marginal chance of success the substantial losses the limited value of the Objective the many uncertainties in prepara- tion and execution of the Operation and the variety Of possible Nationalist Chinese and U S responses an assault On Quemoy under the conditions postulated appears to involve high risks for the COmmnnist Chinese The value Of a Communist Chinese nuclear capability as an umbrella for such Operations is highly questionable Based on the Factors that could be strongly adverse to Communist Chinese Operations include the preparation assembly and loading of the invasion forces which could provide hours to weeks Of warning the difficulties in coordinating the 2 000-plus air sorties the loading moving and landing of the 3 000-plus Junks the logistic support required for initial attacks replacement of losses and buildup on the beaches etc Because these could be major for the Communist Chinese our estimates of force requirements and losses are probably conservative meme mum e- uncussmm circumstances assumed in the case study it would not contribute sig- nificantly to the military Operation Moreover the direct use of nuclear weapons against Quemoy despite any local military advantage would increase the risk of expansion of the conflict out of all pro- portion to the value of the Operation to the Cammunist Chinese While the military situation in both non-nuclear and nuclear operations would tend to favor the United States there would be political problems associated with the Communist Chinese of a nuclear capability that would be aggravated by U S participatio in the defense of Quemoy These problems wOuld include 1 pressures on the United States to avoid involvement in an issue that is considered unimportant and that is unpopular in same countries 2 pressures on the Uhited States to limit the nature and magnitude of its reaponses and to avoid actions that might increase the danger of escalation and 3 restrictions on the freedom of use of some U S bases required for deployment lagistic support etc that might influence U S ability to respond effectively No attempt was made to cOnsider these implications in the Taiwar Case study but their impact on the U S politico-military posture and actions is considered in Sec VI Chinese Assault of Taiwan Case also included a limited examination of Communist Chines capabilities for a non-nuclear campaign against Taiwan In this sitz tion the U S force deployments are the same as those assumed for the assault on Quemoy Estimates of the Communist Chinese force requirements use the same planning factors as those for the attack 01 Quemoy - WAL 55- GNHASSEHW On this basis the assault force requirements would tax the total Communist Chinese military capability Naval and air requirements would be particularly demanding Assuming Communist Chinese air power is used in an attempt to markedly reduce or eliminate the Nationalist Chinese Air Force the requirements approach the linits of Communist Chinese estimated total Operational and logistic capability Commitment of U S air and naval units would make the costs of Communist Chinese non-nuclear campaign almost prohibitive with only the remotest chance of success Such a non-nuclear campaign involving the commitment of the major portion of the4total military capability of Communist China is not in line_with our estimates of their risk calculations If the Communist Chinese were to risk such a campaign the United States might consider a nuclear response such as nuclear attacks on the staging bases and invasion fleet With appropriate timing and target- ing including the timing of the authorization to use nuclear weapons such a response could be militarily effective in stopping the invasion lc For their part it seems unlikely that the Communist Chinese would risk using nuclear weapons prior to or as part of the invasion in view of the variety of responses available to the United States The possibility of a U S response from an undamaged posture following a Communist Chinese nuclear attack on Taiwan as in Case I would be an essential part of their risk calculations Like the case of an attack on Quemoy a Cammunist Chinese assault on Taiwan would involve political problems Bewever U S responses be 1955 to the pressures and limitations described above it -56- WMSSEH 4 because of the generally recognized U S obligations to defend Nationalist China and the importance of this area to the free world Observations on Case 1 A Communist Chinese overt non-nuclear campaign against Quemoy or Taiwan would represent clearly identifiable aggression Against Quemoy it could be carried out only at considerable cost and with a marginal chance of success Against Taiwan the costs would be almost prohibitive and the chances of success remote Both campaigns could bring the Communist Chinese into direct military confrontation with the United States and involve high risks for than 2 A Communist Chinese nuclear capability would be of limited military value for use against Quemoy although possession of such a capability would create political pressures on the United States to limit its response and might neces- sitate Operational and logistic adjustments 3 In an assault on Taiwan the use of nuclear weapons by the Communist Chinese could have local military value but would involve extremely high risks for them h A Communist Chinese nuclear capability would appear to create greater political than military problems in U S defense of the Taiwan area GENERAL OBSERVATIONS These Cases have been presented to illuminate the magnitude of the risks that the Communist Chinese wOuld face in military confronts tion of U S forces in the Pacific area Under the conditions postulated in this study U S theater forces operating from an undamaged posture augmented by 3-525 and using one could virtually eliminate Chinese offensive air and missile capabilities Even in a situation where the Chinese strike first U S capabilities to retaliate are adequate to inflict severe damage on the Chinese offensive capabilities and to reduce them to such a masses gamma low level that they represent a very limited threat In non-nuclear Operations particularly against nationalist China the Communist Chinese would suffer heavy losses and would have only a marginal chance of success related RAND study of Chinese large scale aggression in Southeast Asia supports this conclusion Several campaigns involving a S -Chinese confrontation in this area were analyzed The cam- paigns assumed military capabilities for the Chinese that are similar but not identical to those assumed in this current study a smaller Chinese nuclear capability at a somewhat earlier time period The Southeast Asian study concludes that early interdiction of Chinese invasion routes by tactical use of nuclear weapons against alarge scale aggression is likely to be militarily decisive W twain-1m V LIKELY CHINESE POLITICAI AND MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION As noted earlier the manner in which China pursues her basic ob- jectives at the time she possesses a modest nuclear capability will be strongly influenced'by her contemporary assessment of the role of the Soviet Union the Chinese-U S military balance and the opportun- ities for low risk gains Our snaJJsis of the Soviet role in Chinese policy Sec in- dicates that there is good reason for Peiping to be conservative in evaluating the degree of assistance and support she can anticipate from the Soviet Union in the event of a military conflict with the United States Section IV indicates that a direct Chinese confrontation of U S forces in the area could involve very high risks for the Chinese In view of their'past rationality and caution in the use of force the Chinese are not likely'to consider such risks acceptable This section considers China's likely politico-propaganda ex- ploitation of her nuclear capability and its use in low level military operations This discussion is an extension of the analysis of Chinese objectives military doctrine and strategy presented in Sec II FACTORS EAVORING POLITICO-PROEANGANDA EXPLOITATION So long as China is not certain of Soviet military support for her objectives either directly or by deterrence of U S responses and is confronted'with a U S determination and a capability to make the risks of overt military operations extremely high she is likely to prefer a course of action that emphasizes the politico propaganda use of her nuclear capability Such a course would be in accord with past Chinese doctrine which stresses politico-propaganda techniques particularly when confronted with a militarily stronger opponent Moreover in view of extreme Asian sensitivity to nuclear'weapons such politico- propaganda exploitation may well be considered by Peiping as providing a greater likelihood of success If effective such exploitation could in turn create increased opportunities for low level military prdbes at reduced risk crvi tt bdh'v ml no - galls 59' Targets for Exploitation There will be no clean break between China's political exploita tions of the first detonation and of an operational nuclear weapon capability Beginning with her first nuclear detonation China will seek acceptance as a nuclear power thereby attempting to enhance Chinese prestige gain recognition of Peiping as the sole voice of China in world councils effect a peaceful but favorable solution to the Taiwan issue obtain a political price for China's partici- pation in disarmament negotiations and reinforce trends in Asia toward neutralism and accommodation with Peiping 2 As China approaches a true nuclear capability she will pursue these goals more aggressively and will view this development as a means for securing gains of a more directly militaryhpolitical nature in particular those that would reduce U S influence and power in the area Priority targets for the politico-propaganda exploitation of her nuclear capability will include 1 the U S -Asian alliance and base system 2 Asian nations' self-defense efforts and 3 internal stability in the area The U S -Asian Alliance and Base System Peiping is likely to believe that when confronted with a nuclear-armed Chins U S allies in the area will be more inclined to question the military credibility of the U S posture in Asia She will expect concern by the U S allies that their hosting of U S bases will increase the possibility of their involvement in a nuclear conflict with Peiping China'would hope that this concern will generate indigenous pressures for a re- appraisal of foreign policy alignments and military alliances and result in restrictions on U S use of bases and facilities in the event of conflict with Peiping particularly over such issues as the Offshore Islands and Taiwan China'would further anticipate pressures for self-m mosed limits on U 5 military policies in the Far East and demands for the United States to' 'come to terms with Peiping UNCLASSIML -60- Asian Nations' S-elf defense Efforts Peiping will seek to cast doubt on 135- military and' Political intentions in the area thereby hoping to discourage any effective self-defense efforts by free Asian nations Peiping would hope to discourage nuclear arming of Asian nations India and Japan which might be capable of develop- ing their own nuclear weapons and such nations as the Republics of China Korea and the Philippines which might well press for nuclear sharing China might resort to such tactics as nuclear blackmail mobilization of indigenous pressures in the country concerned or exploitation of disarmament proposals whether instigated by China or by other Asian cotmtribs Internal Stability in the Area Peiping- would also anticipate an exacerbation of political friction within 'free Asian nations be- cause of her nuclear progress particularly as regards the nature of an appropriate response to the Chinese achievement GEM-118 friction within countries allied with the United States when as in the case of Japan it is combined with internal pressures to amend trade with China to restore diplomatic relations with the mainland regime or to come to an accommodation with Peiping would be ex- pected to lead to a polarization of political sentiment and increased internal dissension In the case of Asian neutrals Peiping would hope that her prestige as a nuclear power would convince such countries that a pro- Chinese neutrality represented the wave of the future and that resultant political instability would create opportunities for increased pressures from Peiping China is also likely to believe that her nuclear capability will enhance the prestige of indigenous Commist movements increase their domestic political influence and stimulate national liberation movements along the Chinese pattern China's nuclear capability will be expected to intimidate local governments and to inhibit their responses to local Communist activities for fear of antagonizing nuclear-armd China Hints of Chinese intervention will be ex- pected to discourage requests for U S support of counterinsurgency operations Hell short of any overt Chinese military intervention COIIFIBEII masses mam -61- masses Peiping' might anticipate political gains It is also possible that revolutionary movements in' some of the independent Asian countries might be so encouraged by China's growing power and prestige as to attempt to overthrow existing pro-Western governments in antici- pation of support from Peiping or at least deterrence of effective resistance Politico- propaganda Techniques China's possession of a nuclear capability will enhance the range of politico-propaganda techniques available to her for achiev- ing her long term objectiyes Some likely approaches deriving their significance particularly from China's possession of a nuclear capability are discussed below lapreciation of the U S Military Position in the Area Peiping will contend that her possession of nuclear weapons has brought about a decisive shift in the balance of forces in the Far East She will claim that he nuclear capability cancels out the U S nuclear deterrent and that her non- nuclear force is clearly smerior to that of the United States and U S allies in Asia In the light of this alleged superiority Peiping will portray the United States as inca pable of defending U S allies in Asia as restrained from using nuclear weapons--in short as deterred from engaging in either nuclear or non- nuclear conflict in the area of the Danger of War To exploit Asian fear of involvement in a nuclear war and to generate pressures for re- stricting U S access to the area Peiping will emphasize the dangers of U S miscalculation of U S use of nuclear weapons in desperation and of war begun by accident or unauthorized action Peiping will exploit the fear of a nuclear war to reinforce the unpopularity of the Taiwan issue among Asian neutrals and to generate dissatisfaction with the U S China policy among U S allies This would be aimed at making U S support of Taiwan more difficult and encouraging the United States to settle the probl- on Peiping s tems 'ml I UNCUSSIHEJ -62- Nuclear'Threats and Blackmail Through these techniques Peiping would hope to gain advantages from her nuclear capability without in- curring the risks of direct action Peiping would have many options for the use of nuclear threats and blackmail She no doubt will also be prepared to make generalized threats emphasizing the vulnerability of U S allies and U S bases in Asia to nuclear destruction while alleging that China with her large _population vast territory and less centralized industry could always survive a nuclear attack Peiping probably will declare as did the Soviet Union that those countries containing ULS bases are hostages for U S behavior that such bases expose the host country to the danger of destruction in a nuclear war if the United States becomes involved in a conflict in Asia She will argue that the irresponsible aggressive behavior and policies of the Uhited States are raising the danger of a nuclear war and that only removal of U S bases and influence from the area will eliminate the threat of a nuclear conflict DTn-ing crises more specific threats particularly a warning that U S intervention would bring nuclear warfare to an Asian country might be used to intimidate a local government to discourage it from seeking U S assistance and to generate pressures on the United States not to intervene or to limit the U S interven- tion However such specific threats would leave the Chinese bluff open to challenge It is probable that Peiping will prefer more generalized threats and will limit specific threats to contingencies For example Peiping could take public credit for a U S failure to pro- vide the Nationalist Chinese with nuclear weapons moving full well that the United States had no intention of providing such weapons Taiwan and Japan probably will be major targets for nuclear threats and blackmail because of Peiping's high stakes and high expectations of success In both areas blandishments may well accompany the threats 1 31' go i WI -63 a At the same time Peiping may also be prepared to use her nuclear threats either overtly or implicitly to make favorable border adjustments or to increase he influence in buffer areas such as Nepal Credibility of the Chinese Threat In order to get the United States and Asian countries to accept the alleged Chinese capability and to give an impression of confidence in their on military Chinese nuclear threats probably will be complemented by major efforts to create an impression of great military strength Chinese military and political leaders will select appropriate occasions to claim cer- tain types of offensive and defensive capabilities While there are serious limits to the credibility that can be achieved by such asser- tions at least among technically sephisticated audiences it is quite possible that following the detonation of a device Peiping might achieve an exaggerated estimate of her nuclear power To underline their military claims the Chinese can be mected to make a concerted use of displays and demonstrations of military equipment maneuvers air shows missile firings and continued nuclear testing in conjunction with the deve10pment of new weapon systems Wide publicity would also be given to any reorganization of or new training in the People's Liberation Army PIA that would demonstrate its adaptation to a nuclear con ict The establishment Of a rocket Gama-Ed within the PIA training exercises involving nuclear weapons or any civil defense measures that would supplement these steps could be cited as evidence of China's reduced vulnerability Chinese indication of great military power will be handled with intent to preclude adequate asses-ant of true capabilities I1 he and publicity may be in greater volinne than was charac- teristic of the Soviets lming a comparable period which could lead to misinterpretation of the true extent of Chinese nuclear capabili- ties and to a willingness to accept Chinese claims UNCLASSHSEB rm uu hSS i The Disarmament Issue At the same time that she shows her nuclear flag China hay increasingly'make use of the disarmament gambit as a means of mobilizing Asian pressures on the United States A5 at present Peiping Will proclaim her willingness to participate in disarmament arrangements but her participation in such negotiatio will continue to be dependent on a political price--recognition as the sole voice of China in international organizations and political recognition by the United States including acceptance of her claim to faiwan Peiping will seek to leave the impression that these are its final demnds and that U S acceptance of china-'5 legitimate interests would lead not only to disarmament but also to a political settlement in the Far East to the reduction of tension in the area and to the elimination of the possibility of a nuclear conflict While in no way prepared to accept an Asian nuclearafree zone China may well continue to advance this concept on an undefined and ambiguous basis Or she may prefer to let other Asian countries or the Soviet Union press this idea in the belief that concessions would be offered to her in order to secure her acquiescence By paying lip service to the concept of a nuclear-free zone China in any event would hope to reduce unfavorable Asian reaction to her nuclear development inhibit Asian self-defense efforts particularl3 of a nuclear character mobilize Asian pressures for restrictions on U S military policies in the area and elicit some type of U S- acceptance of the idea in principle This latter would then be used by Peiping and left-wing Asians as a'basis for protesting any further U S nuclear and missile buildup in the area since such action would be propagandized as a violation of the U S acceptance in principle of the nuclear-free zone The Chinese Image--Revolutionary and Conciliatogy To create an environment that would underline the credibility of their nuclear posture without creating such resentment and suspicion in the area as to prejudice political gains the Chinese are likely to project an image of themselves as both revolutionary and conciliatory in behavior On the one hand they are likely to press for their rev olutionary objectives They will probably give renewed emphasis to mm Wt -65- the charge that the U ited States is a paper tiger but now-because of China's nuclear capability--one that should be despised 29313 strategically and tactically They will continue to assert that they are not afraid of a nuclear war On the other hand they are likely to insist that disarmament measures are necessary and possible and that a nuclear war would be a calamity that can be avoided only if the United States pursues less aggressive provocative policies if U S bases and influence are removed from the area and if the Cnited States moves toward settling outstanding issues with Peiping The Chinese will want to create the impression with Asian and other audiences that the United States is the threat to the peace in Asia and that a rapprochement with Peiping is possible and pref- erable to a direct confrontation FOR LOW LEVEL CHINESE MILITARY ACTIONS China has been and still is ready to engage in lowr level military activities such as border conflicts and to provide assistance to indi genous movements when risks are low and potential gains high Situations vulnerable to this kind of Chinese maploitation will con- tinue to exist whether China possesses a nuclear capability or not However at the tine she possesses a nuclear capability China may believe that the opportunities for lowr level military actions have increased She may reason that possession of a nuclear capability will deter resistance to Chinese moves and will keep the risks of such actions within acceptable limits She may believe too that the politico-propaganda emloitation of her capability has been effective enough to warrant an accelerated drive toward achievement of her long term objectives Consequently at the tin she possesses a nuclear capability China may 0 be more prone to provide overt or covert support to local Commnist uprisings and insurgent movements directed against pro-Western and neutral governments in the area 0 consider the time appropriate to test U S and free Asian responses in such areas as Taiwan and the Offshore 13 amass a islands with a view to exploiting the situation both militarily and politically and be even more willing to make overt use of her militarv'Power to compel the settlement of border problems on her terms In turn China may'undertake such actions with the expectation that even limited successes will enhance her position in Asia and add further weight to her politico propaganda efforts However Peiping is not likely to be insensitive to U S or Asian reaction to selective military probing If U S responses tend to raise the risks in a given operation Peiping is not likely to for military action but rather to seek to capitalize on U S firmness with a view to achieving political gains If Chinese action result in adverse Asian reaction Peipin is expected to assess carefully the longer term political costs of local military successes In any event Peiping will attempt to retain the ability to keep the operation_at the desired level or to terminate it qpickly if politics or military factors so dictate ru- if' was 'i 1 13 -67 VI THE IMPACT ON ASIA AND ON THE U35 POSITION IN THE AREA Section analyzed probable Chinese political and low level military utilization of a modest nuclear capability This section examines how such exploitation by China is likely to affect non- Communist Asia and the U S position there From the outset it must be kept in mind that because of dis- similarities in geographic economic and historic conditions the United States and non-Communist Asia see the problem of China and the question of nuclear weapons somewhat differently Moreover in assessing the Asian reaction to the emergence of China as a nuclear power the diversity of internal and external and conditions that prevail in the area must also be recognised With the exception of Japan a case of special significance to the United States no attempt has been made to examine in detail every Asian country's reaction We have preferred to point up the important problems that are caused or intensified throughout Asia by Peiping's nuclear capability and to single out those factors that will determine the degree to which these may become more or less acute Further we have attempted to indicate the types of U33 actions that would seem useful in countering adverse effects that may spring from the hnpact of China's emergence as a nuclear power As Peiping explodes her first nuclear device--and even more so as she acquires a modest nuclear capability --we must anticipate four kinds of Asian responses capable of adversely affecting U S interests 1 recognition of Peiping's increased weight in Asian and world affairs 2 doubts about the future balance of forces in the area 3 Asian concern that Peiping will employ her capability for the achievement of it- A detailed study of the Japanese case is in preparation by P F Lang Essentially the Asian reaponse to the emergence of China as a nuclear power will begin at the very moment the shockwaves of Peiping's first nuclear blast radiate across Asia since the maJority of Asians will tend to equate a Chinese nuclear detonation with the acquisition by Peiping of an effective military capability Even among the techni- cally more sephisticated Asians a Chinese detonation will be viewed at least as cdnfirming the image of a dynamic aggressive China and as suggesting the imminence of a Chinese nuclear threat - CW assumin- -524 her immediat'e objectives and 11- domestic pressures for a reappr of existing foreign policy commitments and aligtments in the ligh China's emergence as Asia's first nuclear power Peiping must be expected to capitalize on these Asian reacti in order to further her ends As pointed out earlier Sec V Chinese efforts will aim at five major areas of 11 3 and Asian co 1 the U S -Asian alliance and base system 2 the U S military presence in Asia as affected by Chinese exploitatibn of the nuclear disarmament and - arms control issue 3 the Asian nations' self-defense efforts h the internal stability in the area and 5 low level Chinese or Chinese-instigated military operations While these five areas have always been the targets of Peipi anti-U S strateg China's nuclear power status will provide her a new for the exploitation of existing opportunities a for the development of new ones In this sense nuclear power vi add a new dimension to the Chinese challenge in Asia A number of factors Will generally have an important influer on the nature of the Asian reaction to Peiping's exploitation of nuclear capability These factors are 0 the local predisposition toward and commitment to a specific foreign policy orientation largely the result of geopolitical and historic conditions 0 the relative awareness of and experience with the Communist threat and more specifically with the Communist threat from China 0 a sensitivity to the risks attached to nuclear weapons modified to the extent that a given Asian nation is able to view a modest Chinese nuclear capability in its proper strategic perspective 0 the degree of internal stability and its vulnera- bility to Chinese external and Commist internal pressures the Soviet policy in the area especially as it appears to maximize minimize or counteract the impact Ci f Chinese policies or actions and the Asian estimate of the East-West balance of in general and the local balance of forces in particular -69- A y U S program aimed at counteracting Peiping's anticipated military and political exploitation of her future nuclear power status must take these factors into account and must attempt to modify them in line with American interests A prerequisite for such U S policies is the realization that U S actions today and in the near future as much as those taken after China emerges as a nuclear power Will determine whether a Chinese nuclear capability will lead to Chinese political and military advances No furture U S guarantees to protect U S Asian allies and the neutral countries of Asia against the threat of a nuclear China is likely to reassure these Asian nations unless such guarantees have been rendered credible by a consistent record of U S military and political perfor- mance against Communist pressures IMPACT ON U S AILIANCES AND BASES The U S alliance systu presently covers the defense of much of Asia and entails the maintenance of major American bases in Okinawa Japan South Korea and the Philippines This treaty system will continue during the next decade to form a cornerstone of American policy in Asia The direct military value of this U S military presence in Asia in both operational and logistic terms is generally accepted li'his presence also has important political implications that in turn affect the U S military posture in the area The bases tangibly demonstrate continued U S Willingness to work for the future of a non-Communist Asia to protect and serve the local interest and to assure Asia' 8 freedom for political and social development Such concrete evidence of American involvement in Asia and of American determination to share the risk implied in the East-West confrontation can be reassuring to U S allies and does discourage Communist attempts at seizure of power Under the proper conditions the American military presence can therefore reinforce the foundations for a mutuality of U S -Asian interests and can facilitate a comon policy and joint military and political action against the external Communist enemy 'Illhr As Peiping acquires some degree of a nuclear capability however the presence of U S bases on Asian soil will raise for U S Asian alliesnand indirectly for the United Statesu-two major questions Will the U S alliances continue to be capable of providing protection against Chinese or Sins-Soviet pressures Will such protection entail unacceptable risks for U S allies and heighten rather than minimize the danger of conflict with Peiping Doubts about the Continued Military Validity of the U S Alliances Peiping's acqusition of a nuclear capability is likely to be viewed in Asia as having sharply reduced the value of the American nuclear deterrent It may be reasoned that as soon as the U S deterrent is confronted with a growing Chinese nuclear capability the United States and its Asian allies will face the dilenma of permitting the Chinese to dictate the terms of conflict or risking escalation-into a nuclear conflict Therefore once China becomes a nuclear power U S allies might come to view their alliances with the United States as having become ineffective or dangerous The United States will thus be confronted with the task of convincing its allies that the balance of power remains essentially unchanged and that the U S alliances retain their military validity This may be particularly difficult where the alliances are not rooted in strong of long standing on the side of the West and where public Opinion is already deeply divided about the wisdom of the U S alliance as in the case of Japan To meet this situation the United States must seek more even than in the past to make its posture in Asia politically as well as militarily credible by demonstrating to its allies an unchanged U S ability to counter any Chinese threat At the same time it is important that U S allies be convinced that firm and quick U S actic against China on the local level will be the surest way of keeping the Soviet Union out of the conflict and of preventing the expansion of the conflict into general war This suggests a need for the continued presence in Asia of U S military forces equipped to act quickly and decisively able to choc a -- WM 3 35mi -71- age- asses the initial level of conflict and to vary that level as the situation requires Such a capability could greatly relieve the anticipated neutralist pressures generated by fear that the United States when facing a Chinese nuclear threat might find itself unable to defend its allies except at the exorbitant price of a nuclear war Such a U S posture could also effectively reduce the impact on Asia of Chinese claims of military parity Allied FEar of Increased Risk The image of a nuclear-armed Chinese regime pitted against what might seem an inflexibly hostile and nuclear-armed United States maintaining forward positions in Asia would'be profoundly disturbing for China's neighbors Asian nations will tend to fear that the Chinese regime long frustrated in her immediate gpals such as the Offshore Islands and Taiwan by superior U S power will now press more vigorously for these goals and that this state of affairs will correspondingly increase the dangers of a direct U S -Chinese military confrontation Concern about the possibility of escalation to nuclear conflict will be particularly strong where there are U S bases Peiping's propa- ganda nuclear threats and blackmail could further intensify the fear that U S bases might become the targets fer Chinese nuclear action and that the civilian population of the host country may come to play the role of unwilling hostage Such'blackmail is unlikely to result in a complete denial of U S bases 'but it could substantially stimulate allied efforts to lower the risk inherent in their alliance with the United States Such attempts on the part of U S Asian allies to lower the risk factor will not necessarily be prompted by genuine fear of involvement in a U S -Chinese conflict but may well be generated by a particular government's fear of the domestic political conse- quences of Chinese blackmail magnified and utilized by neutralist Opposition forces 1 11135me s -72 These efforts are likely to make themselves felt in three ways 1 as attempts to reinterpret or modify the terms of the alliances 2 as pressures aimed at restricting the use of American bases or at extracting from the United States a greater return for use of the 138-585 3-115- 3 as efforts to obtain more influence over U S policy toward China Allied pressures for a modification of the terms of their American alliances to minimize the risks thought to arise from the emergence of a nuclear armed China may impose strains on both multi- lateral and bilateral U S military arrangements in Asia With respect to the multilateral SEATO arrangement the strains already in evidence may be intensified as a result of this new dimension of China's military power It seems probable that SEATO's European members which have already demonstrated a reluctance to support strong SEATO action against Chinese pressures will be even more cautious with respect to a nuclear-armed China This concern when compounded by the Asian nations' concern about China's increased military power may tend to further reduce confidence in the viabili t of SEATO guarantees Asian SEATO members may seek bilateral arrange- ments with the United States as the preferred way of guaranteeing their security Such a trend could fragmentize the effort in Southeast Asia and thus render collective action against China even more difficult inset of China's nuclear power status is also likely to make itseIL'lEI felt in strictly bilateral treaty arrangments Certain U S Asian allies especially Japan in responding to risk considera- tions and the resulting internal pressures may seek to maximize their control over U S military action in the area while minimizing or qualifying their contribution to any U S -initiated action in a conflict not interpreted to be of inmaediate concern to the particular country -73- sw- a Such a trend could seriously restrict the military value of U S alliances in Asia Once U S Asian allies view their alliance with the united States as a one-way street in terms of a narrOWLY defined local interest they might gradually acquire a de facto veto over U S freedom to initiate military action in the area as well as over U S decisions to choose the appropriate level of such action Ehe U S military posture against the Communist Bloc would then to the same degree be deprived of flexibility the U S response to Communist aggression would be slowed down by the need for drawn-out local consultation and over-all military planning would be rendered increasingly difficult _ Fear on the part of U S allies that Chipa's nuclear capability will pose increased risks for them may also affect U S military bases in Asia directly The allies are likely to be less willing to be host to U S bases and more desirous of restricting the utili- zation of U S military bases on their territory They may demand prior consultation as a prerequisite for any use of these bases particularly if it involves the deployment of military equipment and forces into and out of the area the storage of nuclear weapons and the logistic support of U S forces Ehese problems are likely to be most severe in Japan and by extension in Okinawa It seems inportant to take preventive action now when allied pressures for increased control over U S bases are still mild First despite possible difficulties such actions might entail the United States might exploit to the fullest its present legal rights Further the United States may'wish to take military measures that would inhibit allied application of restrictive control over U S bases thereby recapturing a larger measure of flexibility and inde- pendence This could be done for example through frequent exercises involving several U S bases in various countries to break down or soften the presently existing local restrictions Another approach would be continuing rotation of forces and equipment among U S bases in different Asian countries The cost of such measures is likely to a we 9 2 its I J ll -7u- Ullii ii t be small compared to the possible return in terms of political and military flexibility Peiping's attempts to aimloit her nuclear power status by mo- bilizing opposition against the U S military presence in Asia may also accentuate the problem of protecting U S bases against inter- ference from local Gomunists pro- Communist Socialists or fanatically neutralist elements Particularly vulnerable in that respect would be the deployment of forces road-bopnd military traffic the oper ation of airfields and all kinds of local logistic support As in other respects Japan may cause the United States the most concern for it is the ally to neutralist political pressures as well as our most important partner in Asia strategically and economically The United States can reduce such dangers by continuing to work toward the improvement of the general environment in which U S forces must operate and by minimizing local sources of friction at the earliest stage Specific measures will depend on the local contact what may be a major problem in one area is not necessarily so in another However as important as any measures the United States might be able to take directly in protecting its bases are the policies-or lack thereof--of the particular local government At least in the case of Japan it would be desirable to press the government for more active cooperation with the United States in shielding U S bases against local interference Finally China's emergence as a nuclear power may accentuate the doubts of Japan and other Asian nations about the soundness and continued validity of the U S China policy The issue may be raised whether the containment line drawn during the era of a pre- nuclear China could or should be maintained unchanged once China is a nuclear power Such questions will be emphasized where neutralist sentiments are strong where the threat of direct Chinese aggression appears remote and where the feeling is widespread that the Offshore Islands and even Taiwan are mendable or not worth a military con- flict The Asian neutralist nations' views on the Offshore Island- Taiwan problem will further tend to affect negatively allied swport for any U S action in the Taiwan area re M Ssmi -75- An' increase in Chinese pressure against the Offshore Islands even if unaccompanied by military measures is likely to cause anxiety in Tokyo and elsewhere in Asia It may result in pressure on the United States to be reasonable and in discouraging the United States from maintaining against China military or political positions that could be considered provocative In case of danger of military conflict in the Taiwan area the United States must anticipate political pressure to reach some kind of peaceful settlement Should a U S -Chinese clash occur over the Offshore Islands the Japanese gov- ernment may refrain from lending open support to U S operations and proclaim with an to domestic repercussions that the issue does not involve Japan The more protracted the conflict the higher the political cost is likely to be Difficulties of a political nature in Japan will tend to produce in turn adverse repercussions in Okinawa To enJist_more active Asian support for U S policy in the Taiwan area the United States should seek to clarify for the benefit of non Comunist Asia the rationale underlying that policy and point up the fact that it is acting in the interests of free Asia against Commist aggression It is also important that the United States be in a position to defeat any kind of Chinese attack quickly before repercussions prejudicial to U S interests can gain momentum and in such a manner as not to emose unduly Asian bases and their uviron- ment to Chinese retaliation or Soviet intervention In this respect the United States could go a long way in 5118-31113 Asian fears regarding a U S -Chinese military conflict by giving concrete indications that the U S strategic posture allows it to deal separately with China and the Soviet Union MACE ON NUCLEAR DISAMLENT MID ARMS CONTROL DI ASIA The develoment of a Chinese nuclear capability will tend to focus Asian attention on arms control and particularly on nuclear disarmament However these issues are likely to pose problems for the United States and for its Asian allies since they lend themselves as was described earlier to exploitation by the Chinese roam uncussma -76- Peiping could raise the question of arms control'without pr ducing domestic peace movements or otherwise impeding her mili development plans For non Communist Asia however and especis where danocratic freedom prevails as in Japan a Peiping propae campaign for disarmament could stimulate neutralist demands that Asia be left to its own devices and that the Pacific be trans into an area free from foreign control In other words local responses to such a Chinese campaign could increase popular pres on Q S bases and place friendly governments in a difficult pos with regard to their domestic neutralist opposition More specifically nuclear disarmament schemes such as pro for the creation of a nuclear-free zone of peace in 3513 may stitute a danger to continued maintenance of an effective milit presence of the United States in the area because of the vulner of the U S nuclear posture in Asia to political pressure First the Asian anti-nuclear movement is for the most par- dominated by anti-American elements that endorse the Communist peaceful coexistence line and link this concept to the demand the removal of all U S bases from Asia Secondly there is a' spread notion in Asia strongly supported by Communist propagan that to station U S nuclear weapons on Asian soil not merely increases the risk of war but is morally'wrong Ihirdly the cept of a nuclear free Asia enjoys broad popular support in a politically as widely disparate as India and Japan Continued sensitivity to nuclear testing and the dangers fallout in Japan and elsewhere in Asia as well as a growing It may appear desirable for the United States to stress dangers of Chinese fallout when the Chinese undertake nuclear ing and to blame Peiping for increased radioactivity in the are Japan On balance however this does not seem to be sound for reasons First Chinese testing is not likely to subject Japan large amounts of fallout Second U S long range interests we better be served by minimizing rather than stimulating Japanese about the dangers of fallout WHILASSEHH d'r 1 '77' of a U2S -Chinese nuclear clash will tend to heighten the appeal of any nuclear disarmament proposals The mere raising of the issue by ill tend to have important repercussions throughout non- Communist Asia repercussions largely unfavorable to the United States Bapecia L'LY in Japan and O nawa agitation for inspection of or tighter control over U S military deployment and'weapons will increase and political pressures for restricting U S freedom of military action will mount The United States may be confronted With strong pressure from the Asian neutrals and some allies to freeze even if only temporarily the U S military posture in Asia as evidence of U S willingness to contribute politically and militarily to a relaxation of tensions The will of the United States to resist Asian pressures for a removal of U S nuclear weapons from the area may be further tested by intensified Communist prOpaganda campaigns dwelling on the dangers of nuclear accidents and of miscalculations that would allegedly lead to inadvertent war and nuclear escalation Selective Chinese threats against U S military bases in Asia but aimed at host countries may further weaken the U S political position It is true that China's development of nuclear weapons will lead some Asians to place the blame for a nuclear-arms confrontation in the Far East at least partly on Peiping However considering the general political context of Asia it must be anticipated that substantial pressure groups in Japan and in the neutralist countries of Asia will be inclined to Justify PEiping's action as having'been caused by alleged U S intransigence and hostility toward China forcing Peiping to develop a nuclear capability It is evident that the United States should prepare for Chinese or Communist Bloc exploitation of Asian demands for nuclear disarma- ment It will be necessary to reveal to U S allies and neutral nations in Asia the pitfalls and risks hidden in any Communist pro- posal for an Asian nuclear-free zone Also important will be a long range policy for desensitizing allies especially the Japanese with regard to nuclear weapons and their implications The further encouragement of peaceful applications of atomic energy in Asia and bilateral as well as regional atomic development projects in the area might contribute to this goal m swam Mi 48- The final answer- to the problems posed by Peiping's anticipated political use of nuclear disarmament schemes however Lies essentially in convincing the non- Communist nations of Asia that the U S nuclear presence there constitutes a lesser risk for them than would U S withdrawal and that this presence serves not only the interests of the United States but theirs as well 0N SELF-DEFENSE EFFORTS OF ASIAN AND NEUTRAL NATIONS China's emergence as a nuclear power will tend to stimulate the defense effort of some A sian nations and is likely therefore to con- front the United States in certain areas with increased demands for military assistance This will be particularly true of those allies like Nationalist China South Korea and South Vietnam whose ideo- logical rationale is anti-Omanist whose interests clash directly with those of the Commist Bloc and whose very existence may seem threatened by the emergence of a militarily strong nuclear- armed China This same trend toward an intensified self-defense effort may also become pronounced in those non- allied countries on China's periphery that may feel particularly exposed to a Chinese military threat but that are unwilling to submit to Chinese pressure as has been the ease with India While China' nergence as a nuclear power may thus provide the United States 1with opportunities to galvanize Asian resistance against Chinese pressures it may at the same time create a number of problems for the United States For one thing allied requests for U S military assistance may reach unrealistic dimensions There is also the danger of competition among U S allies for an increased share in American military alloca- tions which might force up the level of U S military expenditures in Asia Even more than now a coordinating effort will therefore be required in implementing military assistance programs in Asia Further the stepped-up military effort of a particular Asian ally may in turn accentuate tensions in the area A substantially increased military effort on the part of Pakistan for instance UNLLASSEHJLB com - - -79- would result-in a larger Indian military program and vice versa Such a situation could then provide the Soviet Union with new oppor- tunities for unbalancing the Asian situation through the increased injection of Soviet military aid Another consequence of China's nuclear power status could be Asian requests for U S nuclear assistance Some of the strongly antirCommunist Asian allies may wish to receive U S nuclear weapons _to enable them to counter the military and pressures of a nuclear-armed Peiping Or the United States may be faced with demands for a Jointly controlled or a multilateral nuclear deterrent especially if such an arrangement has meanwhile been made in Europe In view of the high degree of instability in Asia the diversity of conditions and the existence of acute regional conflicts such pro- posals would seem dangerous and undesirable in Asia for many years I to come In order to mitigate the above mentioned pressures the United states might attempt to identify clearly the extent of both Peiping's nuclear capability and the credibility of the Chinese use of nuclear weapons Secondly a conspicuously strengthened U S military position in the theater would boost allied morale the United States might lend some support to the further buildup of its allies' non- nuclear weapons posture emphasizing U S -allied military cooperation and measures to strengthen the image of a combined U S -Asian military effort against the'background of a U S deterrent posture While a nuclear-armed China probably will stimulate self-defense efforts in certain areas of Asia it may on the other hand tend to discourage and inhibit such efforts in other areas This applies especially to Japan and to the smaller neutral nations which are vulnerable to Chinese attempts to use nuclear weapons politically China's emergence as a nuclear power will once more plunge Japan into violent debates over its foreign policy orientation and the desirability of rearmament A somewhat larger minority than hitherto may advocate the amendment of the antiwar clause in the Japanese constitution but there is not likely to be an immediate and marked decrease in opposition to such a move Unless the Communist p cm I 30- threat is felt more directly than it is today the Japanese govern- ment is Iml sely to risk political difficulties by attempting to promote a drastically expanded self-defense effort Sim-1531 Japan's traditional opposition to nuclear weapons may soften somewhat but is unlikely to change fundamentally or im mediately as a result of China's acquisition of a nuclear capability If Peiping attempts nuclear blackmail against U S bases in Japan and against the Japanese people the responseuat least in the near future-mill be toward intensified pressure for restricting the functions of U S bases rather than for creation of a Japanese nuclear arsenal However as long as a conservative government re- mains in power Japan probably would react to Chinese nuclear pressur by increasing its defenses against internal insurrection and against infiltration frun abroad While the short-run prospects for the Japanese self- defense effort are not very encouraging Japan's attitude toward rearmament and nuclear weapons may improve gradually evenmlaJJy perhaps permitting the integration of nuclear weapons into the Japanese defense system The speed of this process will depend on several important developments including 0 Chinese behavior toward Japan and in Asia especially Southeast Asia particularly as it affects Japanese interests directly 0 the degree of economic and political stability in Japan 0 the degree of Japan's economic involvement with the United States and non- Communist Europe and the extent to which the United States has succeeded in convincing the Japanese Socialists that closer Japanese cooperation with and support for American military and political strategy will serve the cane of peace and social progress in Asia As long as the United States maintains and continualily a credible military and political posture the indigenous defense efforts in the Philippines Thailand and Malaya are likelbr 150 show some increase in rewonse to China's emergence as a nuclear power molasses mm -81- 13 On as in Japan the United States probably will encounter a tendency to concentrate on the strengthening of internal security and to rely for protection against Communist aggression on the American military umbrella and American guarantees Australia and New Zealand are more likely to respond by displaying both a will- ingness to allocate greater resources to their defense program and a readiness to subordinate their program and to coordinate it with the needs of a Joint military effort with the United States Australia probably would even accept American nuclear weapons on its territory but may also consider developing its own modest nuclear arsenal The smaller neutralist nations which presently maintain only limited military forces are unlikely to react to the emergence of China as a nuclear power by a major self-defense effort At best they may attempt to offset increased Chinese influence by requests for more aid and by a strengthening of the internal security forces to combat infiltration and incipient revolutionary movements on the issue of nuclear weapons these same nations are likely to press even harder than today for international control of nuclear weapons and for the creation of an Asian nuclear-free zone Among the larger neutral nations of Asia India is particularly significant because of its importance to the balance of power in Asia and its developing rivalry with China It is the only country in Asianand will remain so during the next decade -that combines the necessary political and material conditions to generate confidence in its ability to contain Chinese pressures largely through an indigenous military effort India's confidence is not likely to be eroded by a Chinese nuclear detonation the development of Chinese nuclear weapons or any other external factor short of military defeat However China's mclear power status may stimulate the Indian search for political solutions of the China problem UN admission settlement of Taiwan issue and Indian support for disarmament schemes capacially insofar as nuclear weapons are concerned 0n the other hand India is likely to attempt to redress the Indo Chinese militarywbalance by increased defense efforts This may be reflected in increasing Indian demands for U S financial and technological aid as well as for military assistance In this respect India's inclination to shop abroad for sophisticated or expensive weapons is likely to become more pronounced The traditional Indian opposition to the acquisition of nuclear weapons may undergo some change even in Nehru's lifetime- if China emerges as a nuclear power if Indian efforts for nuclear dissrnenent should fail and if India becomes convinced of China's aggressive intentions India may then embark on its own nuclear weapon programs Apart from Japan India is the only Asian power that can hope to produce nuclear weaponS'within a reasonable length of tine and with relatively little outside aid lhe emergence of India as a nuclear power could not fail to set off a chain reaction in Pakistan where the magnitude of'the defense effort tends to be determined more by the scale of the Indian armament program than by China's military policies at least as long as the Kashmir issue remains unresolved Fear of a nuclear-armed India might in turn adrersely affect Pakistan foreign policy alignment and its role in the SEATO and CENTO alliance As far as the self-defense efforts of U33 Asian allies and Asia neutrals are concerned the emergence of China as a nuclear power would seem therefore to present both a danger and an opportunity for the United States I IMPACT ON POLITICAL STABILITY OF ASIAN NATIONS The discussion of the Chinese approach Sec V has shown that Peiping will seek to exploit its nuclear power status to intensify unstable conditions in non-Communist Asia and that in pursuing this objective the Chinese are likely to resort to a selective application of threats and blandishments tailored to local situations The threats might include various kinds of pressures on a particular Ml -53- Asian government accompanied by indirect pressures exerted through local Communist and otherLgroups sympathetic to Chinese policy The blandishments are likely to include not only the disarmament ploy but offers of political and territorial settlements and economic incentives as well This Chinese strategy may produce a number of problems for the countries concerned and indirectly for the United States When subjected to Chinese pressure the leaders of a particular Asian country must reckon with the sharpening of opposition attacks against their foreign policy orientation and a resulting increase in domestic tensions To avoid domestic strife the local government may be tempted to abstain from any action that could be labeled provoc-_- ative by Peiping and by the domestic opposition In a political or military crisis situation the United States may therefore be denied support for its policies or actions Such a passive attitude would encourage the opposition further in pressing its advantage With growing political instability external pressures will become inr creasingly effective stimulating in turn intensified domestic political agitation Further China's political use of her nuclear capability may gene- rate severe pressures not only against but also within the existing governments The danger of intragovernment struggles will'be particu- larly acute where as in Japan the government in power constitutes a rather loosely knit association of factions or interest groups ifactors that would favor such a Chinese strategy include a weak or apparently weak uys military position in the area acceptance of the Chinese threat as credible belief that Soviet intervention is quite possible a high sensitivity to threats of war and imp1ications of nuclear weapons an increase in neutralist Communist or pro-Com- munist pressures dependence on China for trade well developed inter national mass media channels and internal propaganda channels for Chinese use explosive international or regional issues and internal conflicts in the subject country that could create tension and dissension for the local government 1m I NIN- -sh- As-'evidenced by the experience of the past factional strife within the dominant governmexit coalition resulting from the confluence of external and internal pressures could at least temporarily disturl relations with the United States Other problems related to the disturbance of internal stability in Asia by a Chinese nuclear capability concern the possibilities of increased Communist influence in non-Comunist Asia - 0 growth of anti-U S popular fronts and 0 creation or recrudescence of Communist- style national liberation mdergromd and insurrectionary movements The virulence of the Asian Communist movement would be increased by the image of a more powerful China equipped with nuclear weapons Such an imge would tend to support the claim of being the wave of the future By this same factor Peiping might gain 3- greater voice vis-a-Yis the Soviet Union in the councils of Asian and world Communism and closer organizational ties with other Asian ComuniS't parties However U S military or political successes over the Chinese would tend to check and perhaps reverse pro-Peiping trends among the Asian Communists Peiping's revolutionary prescriptions generally will appear more valid and have greater appeal throughout Asia once China bee- nes a nuclear power The Asian Communists are likely to be more militant and to press more aggressively for seizure of political power Furth in Japan where the Socialists continue to cling to the Mist dogma and the left wing clamors for unqualified recognition of China acceptance of Peiping s pglitical demands withdrawal of U S bases from Asia and adoption of a neutralist foreign policy the political left will tend to react positively to Peiping's call for a political struggle under the banner of peace and independence In such circumstances the dividing line between Communists and non-Conmunists of the left may become increasingly blurred and the non-Communist left will be vulnerable to Commist attempts to create a united anti-U S front mu WI - mama -35- Asian nations embroiled in domestic political struggles and containing strongly disaffected elements would in effect provide an invitation to Chinese exploitation As a result political unrest up to and including the level of insurrections be expected to increase The most likely targets for such probing actions are the politically and militarily unstable areas of continental Southeast Asia perhaps including the Philippines as 1well Also more militant Commist attempts to break the grip of pro-U S regimes my extend to South Korea and possibly Taiwan if the regimes there fail conspicuously to create a broader base of popular support 5 IMPACT OF POSSIBLE CHINESE LOW IEVEL mm OPERATIONS As has been pointed out a nuclear-armed China may be more likely than present China to resort to low risk military operations Depending on the political and military context China may provide level military support to local Conmnmist uprisings and insurgent movements directed against existing non-Cummunist governments may probe U S and free Asian Emacs in such areas as the Offshore Islands or may attempt to compel a favorable settlenent for her border disputes Such Chinese militaiy actions would dramatize for the United States many of the problems resulting from the emergence of a nuclear- armed China Any U S response to Chinese military action would be faced with substantial political pressures from many Asian nations to limit its character and scope While such pressures are manifest in Asia today they would be intensified and broadened by the new nuclear dimension of the Chinese challenge The character and intensity of attempts to restrict U S freedom of action vis- a-vis Chinese military moves will depend on a number of factors in addition to internal political considerations and each country's assessment of the prevailing local balance of power the degree of overt Chinese military involvement apparent Chinese objectives local attitudes toward the victim of aggression the anticipated level of U S response and the risk of escalation especially concerning the use of nuclear weapons and the danger of Soviet rm unansam masses -86 tervention The anticipated mounting pressures to restrict U S freedom of action in Asia would confront the United States with two major prob- lems On one hand the United States must maintain the credibility of its deterrent posture in the face of a greater Chinese challenge and be able to 1 3'3513 011 1 to any Chinese probe--should the United States be deterred from reacting vigorously and effectively serious damage to its political and military position in Asia could ensue A milital setback resulting from the effect of political restraints on U S military action would be especially likely to set off a chain reactior that could endanger U S alliances and render remedial action exceed- difficult on the other hand the United States in reacting to Chinese military moves must reckon on increased adverse political pressures that might endanger the general U S posture in Asia and capacially its alliance and base system It obviously'would'be desirable for the United States to couch its military responses so as to minimize adyerse political pressures While this will be difficult some general guidelines suggest themseln First it would seem important that the United States retain the capability of responding unilaterally and rapidly to developing militz conflicts in order to pre-empt the mhbilization of political pressure that could hinder or render more difficult later U S military inter- vention Such action would present U S allies with a fait accomnli and dispel unjustified fears regarding the consequences of responding to Chinese moves and concerning the risk of escalation In the same manner the United States should attempt to cut short emerging con- flicts as rapidly as possible since any protracted military involve- ment would allow undesirable political pressures to gain momentum If the United States is to respond rapidly and effectively to the range of covert and overt low level military actions available to the Chinese continued improvement in its non-nuclear capabilities in the area is indicated lhis would require the development of con- cepts methods and equipment to increase the flexibility and speed of U S responses that use programmed forces as well as improved capabilities to deploy and support additional forces if the situation the Jainism-ta -87- An obviously factor will'be to obtain Asian backing for U S military action against Communist intervention by ensuring that Asians understand the rationale for the general U S Asian policy and for the specific U S action The United States should emphasize that U S military action in defense of one country is indivisi ble from the defense of the entire area and that by reacting to Communist aggression the United States is reducing rather than increasing the danger of general conflict WWI Wt 33 - VII CONCLUSIONS AND HIPLIGATIONS THE THREAT China's initial detonation of a nuclear device will be used by Peiping to create the impression that China possesses a military capability and is a significant nuclear power From that time on and increasingly as China develops a nuclear capability the United States will be confronted with a wider range of possible Chinese threats and actions than hitherto By the time China possesses a modest nuclear capability she will have the following options the direct use of nuclear weapons on U S bases or Asian countries the use of nuclear weapons as an mhrella for overt non nuclear military operations and support of insurgency and the political and propaganda exploitation of her nuclear capability to capitalize on and to create opportunities for achieving Chinese objectives RISK CALCULATIONS An examination of Chinese military doctrine and past behavior indicates that Peiping's policiw are essentially based on a cautious and rational evaluation of risks and costs Critical to Peiping's risk calculations will be her assessments of the role of the Soviet Union the ChinesaU S military-political balance in Asia and the opportunities for low risk gains As indicated in Sec I the possibility that the Chinese might attain a token long range strategic nuclear capability for use or threat against the Continental United States is believed to be unlikely within the time period considered in this study Although such a capability might be very attractive to the Chinese in View of their objectives it would present them with formidable economic technological and industrial problems Nevertheless should the Chinese attain such a capability or create the wide5pread impression that they possess it this situation would undoubtedly aggravate the problems confronting the United States It would not however changc the basic nature of the conclusions and implications presented in this section masses 50mm mm 1 5-5-5 39 C'onsequently provided the United States maintains a credible military and political posture in the Far East China is tmlikely to risk either direct use of her nuclear capability or high level non-nuclear military operations with her nuclear capability as an umbrella unless she believes the Soviet Union is prepared to support militarily her actions directly or by deterrence of U S responses THE SOVIET ROLE However an examination of Soviet policies toward China indicates that the Soviet Union is unlikely to run major risks or sacrifice its sol-r- interest in China's behalf In view of this Peiping is likely to be conservative in her evaluation of support attainable from the Soviets Such support as Moscow may provide to Peiping will depend on the specific circumstances of the conflict on the state of Sino Soviet relations on Soviet objectives and on Soviet assessment of U S intentions and military capability In general the most likely forms of Soviet assistance to China in a conflict situation will be political support and economic and non-nuclear military aid The Soviets will attempt to restrain the Chinese from any use of nuclear weapons And the Soviets are more likely to intervene in a nuclear conflict between the United States and China if 0 U S objectives in such a conflict appear to be the overthrow of the regime in China 0 the Soviet Union believes itself threatened because the United States fails to or cannot distinguish between China and the Soviet Union or the diversion of U S forces to attack China weakens significantly the U S deterrent posture against the Soviet Union CHINESE OPPORTUNITIES So long as China cannot be certain of Soviet military support for her objectives and is confronted with U S determination and capability to maiethe risk of overt military operations extremely ml mamas mamas high China is likely to exploit her capability on the politico- propaganda level Objectives of this aimloitation will be to reate 0 strains on the U S alliance system in Asia Asian pressures to restrict the presence and utilization of U S bases 0 Asian efforts to restrain U S freedom of action in responding to Chinese challenges and 0 increases in neutralist trends political insta- bility and internal unrest A nuclear armed China probably Will also be more likely to engage in low level military operations and probes The likelihood of this will increase if she achieves sigificsnt success in her politico- Propasanda campaign- I DIPLICAEPIONS FOR THE UNEED STATES The key factors in minimizing China's ability to aimloit her possession of a nuclear capability either directly or indirectly are the maintenance of a credible U S deterrent military posture and political policies in the Far East The U S position in Asia Willa be greatly facilitated by U S public policy that clearly distinguishes between the Chinese and Soviet threats The credibility of this posture will require the continuing presence of U S forces in the theater sufficient to demonstrate to the Chinese and to free Asia the U S capability to respond at any level to Chinese aggression This will involve the augentation of U S forces in the theater to ensure an evident and clear capability to retaliate against any Chinese nuclear attacks and the improment of U S non-nuclear capabilities for responding to levels of Chinese aggression requiring such response I u 5 a '1 -91 seesaw Designation of Theater-based Nuclear Forces Targeted for China A major contribution to the U S posture in the Far East would be the designation and maintenance in the Pacific area of U S nuclear forces identifiable as targeted for retaliation against Chinese aggression Impact of Such Forces on China In general the Chinese are aware that the United States ms the ability to bring overwhelming force to bear on China However from the Chinese point of view the credibility of U S will and intent to employ this power would be enhanced by the maintenance of identifiable U S nuclear forces in the Pacific area Such forces 1mould represent a recognizable and credible deterrent to Chinese aggression In view of past Chinese reactions to the U S military posture in the Far East Chinese policies are likely to remain highly sensitive to any strengthening of U S theater forces that are clearly designed to meet any level of Chinese threat that leave no doubt that Chinese actions could be countered while still deterring the Soviet Union and that underline the firmness of U S political intentions in the area Chinese policies are not as likely to be influenced by U S ZI forces which could leave ambiguous the differentiation between responses to Soviet and Chinese threats and which would not clearly reinforce U S poli- tical intentions in the area Impact of Such Forces on the Soviet Union Such forces would also reduce the likelihood of Soviet intervention in a U S -Chinese conflict They would demonstrate U S capability for selective use against China without weakening or being confused with forces main- tained for deterrence of the Soviet Union The designation of this force would 0 decrease the possibility of Soviet Ihisinterpretation of U S actions reduce Soviet inclination to interpret U S actions as threatening and provocative 0 increase Soviet ability to constrain Chinese aggres- sive actions and enhance Soviet ability to resist Chinese blackmail was -92- UNCLASSIFM Impact of Such Forces on Free Asia The presence of such forces would be a major demonstration to Asians that the balance of power in the Far East had not changed and that the United States remains capable of and determined to defend free Asia against Communist aggression It would also strengthen Asian confidence in the U S alliance system undermine the credibility of Chinese threats against U S bases and host countries in the Far Beat and contribute to facilitating common defense efforts in the area Such a posture if accmpanied by U S moves emphasizing to the free Asians the risks the Chinese would face in aggressive action and the vulnerability of the Chinese Mainland to nuclear attack would also impair Chinese political exploitation of their nuclear capability particularly through nuclear threats against U S bases in allied countries This combination of political and military policies would in- crease Asian confidence in the U S ability to deal with a nuclear- armed China at low risk to their countries and would decrease both their inclination to seek with Peiping and their re- luctance to face the risks involved in comtering Chinese aggression Characteristics of Such Forces Such theater-based nuclear forces should be 1 Relatively invulnerable to political and military threats militarily this means appropriate warning and protective measures against Chinese aircraft and missile attacks Politically it means employment capabilities and basing including the stationing of weapons in areas not readily subject to political restraints on U S free'dom of action that minimize the opportunities for the Chinese to threaten attacks against the forces Emphasis on force rotation among allied bases in the area and full use of endsting base rights could increase the evidence of U S capability and intention to support its allies as well as reduce the possibility of allied restrictions on the presence or employment of the forces 2 Clearly identified at all times as forces targeted for Chin Fin'ther the United States should be able to launch them without the Soviets confusing these forces with those U S forces maintained for deterrence of the Soviet Union This means that the forces must be I sr ummhhis i' -93- so based as to avoid overflight of the Soviet Union They also must be powem enough to permit an adequate reaponse to Chinese W95- sion without weakening thdse forces maintained for deterrence of the Soviet Union 3 Useful under a wide range of conditions These forces should be capable of quick action against Chinese missile and bomber complexes and of effective retaliation to Chinese attacks Eamandable to meet increased Chinese capabilities With the acquisition and growth of a Chinese nuclear capability the structure of the theater based nuclear forces should permit ready augmentation by additional forces as needed to maintain an identifi- able deterrent posture The preceding few pages have 1 described a concept of a nuclear force specifie- am targeted for China and based in the Pacific theater in order to be identifiable to China the Soviet Union and free Asia 2 indicated the likely impacts of such a force posture on these countries and 3 identified preferred characteristics of such a force In the light of the military and political considerations pre- sented in this Report the establishment and public designation of such a force seems highly- desirable A theater-based nuclear force could be constituted of one or more of the following 3-525 with Hound Dogs or Shrbolts and lay-down weapons BEE-Is based in various countries in the Far East ICEIS based in the Pacific area Alaska Hawaii Australia 0 with Po1eris AP3 missiles operating in the South China Sea or the Pacific Ocean Some of these alternatives or canbinations of them may be prefer- able to others when examined in tens of the specific military con- siderations and the desired political benefits indicated in this study However detailed comparisons of the possible alternatives in composi- tion basing vulnerability command and control or the cost effective ness for a theater-based nuclear force or the relation of such a force to programmed theater forceS are outside the scope of this study 4qu iji l s i iht -9i- mumm- Nuclear- free 'Zone Problems China's acquisition of a nuclear capability will result in increased pressures for the concept of an Asian nuclear- free zone Both Moscow and Peiping can be wanted to use this scheme as a propaganda weapon to capitalize on Asian sensitivity to nuclear weapons to intensify neutralist sentiment in Asia to weaken the U S military and political position there and particularly to 'compel the United States to restrict any nuclear buildup in the area Consequently the United States must anticipate opposition to any strengthening of its nuclear presence in the Far East and must be prepared to cope with the dangers inherent in proposals for an Asian nuclear-free zone - Belated Defensive Capabilities Anticipated Chinese military capabilities as well as Soviet military developments require continued emphasis on improving U S and aIL'Lied defensive capabilities in the theater Consequutly the United States should glare greater attution to those programs in the metric area that are directed at attaining 0 increased early warning of aircraft or missile attack 0 greater integration of the early warning networks through the incorporation of semi-automatic and automatic systems increased radar coverage for low altitude enemy penetration improved air defense against low altitude attacks impluentation of a bomb-slam system reduced vulnerability of ccnmand and control improved cmnnand and control capability particularly following an enemy attack and 0 increased flexibility of U S forces through rotation exercises and combined U S -allied operations 0000 These and other measures included in U S programs for the Pacific area should continue to be directed at decreasing the WW WW UNELASSEFEEQ -95- vulnerabilitybf the U S Pacific posture at increasing the ri es to the Chinese of any attack on the U S posture and at encouraging greater participation of alliance members in defense efforts Improved Non-nuclear Capabilities The above improvements in U S deterrent and defensive capabilities would present high risks to Chinese aggressive actions Under these circumstances the Chinese can be expected to 31 91 31 1 their nuclear militazy capability in actions involving low risks The magnitude of Chinese aggressive actions will depend upon Peiping's assessment of U S capabilities and willingness to respond The United States and its allies will be confronted with the need to deter or respond to Chinese low level' aggressive actions her support of local conflicts or situations that provide Opportunities for Comnmist expansion or intervention To respond quickly and effectively to the range of covert and overt low level military actions in which the Chinese may engage improvement in U S non-nuclear capabilities seems indicated The continuing development of concepts methods and equipment that in- crease the fleidbility and speed of U S responses - by programmed forces will be needed as will be improvements in U S capabilities to deploy and support additional forces in the area if the situation requires them It is likely that the need for such improvements will be greater when the Chinese possess a nuclear capability than at present since delayed inadequate or ineffective responses to Chinese actions could provide the Chinese with additional opportunities for military and political gains Supporting Political Pregrams The U S militaiy measures in Asia should be accompanied by political programs designed to reduce any unfavorable impact of Chinese possession of a nuclear capability and to underline U S determination to resist Comammist aggression The objectives of the political and information should include trusses -95- enhancing- Asian appreciation of the U S presence and capabilities reassuring Asians of U S capability for appropriate responses to Chinese aggressive actions without undue risk to U S allies deriving maxim political benefit from demonstrations of U S military and technological advances partiqu-E y from the U S space program and missile tests in the Pacific 0 reducing pressures on U S freedom of military and political action and 0 creating a basis for U S efforts to obtain allied military participation and cooperation in subsequent nuclear defense arrangements mam OF U S MEASURES - To obtain greatest effectiveness U S programs should anticipate rather than react to new levels of the Chinese threat In conjunction with the continued strengthening of the U S military posture efforts should be made in advance of a Chinese detonation of a nuclear device to create conditions that will mitigate its Imfavorable political effects on Asian countries and degrade enacted Chinese propaganda attempts to build up and exploit an imge of great Chinese power Both before and at the time of the event a Chinese nuclear detonation should be placed in its proper perspective While pointing out the difference between a detonation and the acquisition of a nuclear capability major attention should be directed to emphasizing and demonstrating the continued U S military superiority in the area As China works toward a nuclear capability a theater-based deterrent force should be established and publicly designated As China emands her nuclear forces the United States should progressive 1y strengthen its deterrent capabilities so as to retain decisive military superiority in the area mm -97- 5' I Appendix A POSSIBLE CHINESE mm U s MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS CURRENT CHINESE MITITARY POSTUEE 1962 As a result of increased economic difficulties competing demands on her limited industrial base and cm-tailment of Soviet technical and material assistance China's production of modern weapons is at 'a low level Recent intelligence estimates provide the following general picture of the current Chinese military posture Ground Forces The Army cos of more than 2 5 million-men with 158 combat divisions is the world's largest army It contains approadmately 108 infantry 3 airborne armored 3 cavalry 25 artillery and anti-air- craft artillery AM and 15 public security forces 12 The Navy is primarily a coastal defense force It consists of approximately 1 0 principal combatant ships including 29 submarines The Navy also contains a patrol force of approximately 250 vessels including 150 motor torpedo boats It also has approximately 35 mine warfare vessels and 260 amphibious vessels 200 of them landing craft Its over-all capability is considered adequate only for operations 1 against a minor naval power 3 Air Forces and Air Defenses The Chinese air forces consist of the Chinese Comunist Air Force CCAF and naval air forces These are made up of approximate- ly 10 medium bombers Bull Jet light bombers Beagle 2035 Jet fighters 1950 Fagota and Frescos and 85 Farmers and 200 trans- The air defenses include more than 200 radar sites that provide various degrees of early warning EH and low altitude coverage as well as ground control intercept GCI capability lS The anti- aircraft artillery capability is built around approximately 3000 W li tlAi h 1 guesses -98 guns more than 1700 light 35- to 57-min guns more than 1300 medimn 85- to loo-mm guns and fewer than 50 heavy over loo-m guns including those 'in the CCA A limited number of surface-to-air missiles SA-25 provide some medium and high altitude coverage 16 TRENDS IN CHINESE mums mamas 1965-1970 The Chinese military strength probably will change within the next decade as a reflection of several conditions These include 1 'the indigenous economic capacity and technical capability for the dasign development production and operation of particular weapons or weapon systems 2 the amount and type of military and military- economic-technical support received from other countries primazily the Soviet Union and 3 Chinese politico-military objectives and doctrine and the force levels that are generated as a result Th2se' conditions have complex interrelationships and in view of the uncertainties involved we have not atteugted to identify specific Chinese military developments for the future Instead we have attemp to indicate probable trends in the development of Chinese military during the 1965-1970 period The Orders of Battle used in the milita appraisals of Sec IV are consistent with these trends and are listed in Appendix B Ground Forces Some reorganization of the CCA is expected A decrease in man- power together with modernization of artillery armor transport and that will increase firepower and mobility are expected to leave the over-all strength about the same Naval Forces The strength and size of the relatively small Navy will remain about the same but emphasis is expected in development of patrol craft destroyers submarines and amphibious-lift vehicles with a This could range from no assistance to massive and immediate support in the form of complete operational weapon systems ajwi kghf - comm -99 moderate building program for patrol and amphibious craft Destroyer and submarine construction programs could be seriously handicapped by lack of Soviet technical and material support Production of associated weapons and equipment also could be seriously hampered Air Forces The air forces probably will undergo the greatest changes in terms of both amount and types of equipment We anticipate the following changes 0 a decrease in the number of fighters 1 0 some modernization of aircraft equipment and armament including air-to-air missiles We 0 addition of several new types of fighters of Soviet desim some in substantial numbers a decrease in Jet light bombers addition of medium Jet bombers and moderate increases in transports and helicopters To accommodate these changes logistic maintenance and support facilities may be expanded and modernized The air base complex is expected to grow from its present size approximately 200 bases It Will continue to include both operational airfields and those 'that are not continually Operational but can be used Airfield modernization and expansion prog-ams will continue In general the combat capability of the air forces will improve with increased development of radar GCI proficiency increased pilot and maintenance proficiency and more technical experience in sophis- ticated weapon systems Other Improvements in Military Capability In condunction with these trends in Chinese military strength several changes in defensive and offensive postures are anticipated The defensive changes are discussed first -1oo- 3 7' Older radar'd'will be modernized or replaced Equipment of foreigr manufacture probably will he replaced by Chinese-made equipment Suh- stantial extension of high and low altitude coverage is enacted particularly along the coast and in western China- The total number of units probably will decrease We sweet a reduction in the number of medium guns some augmentation of light suns particularly 57-min for low altitude defense increased emphasis on radar-controlled gun batteries and improved commication equipment and organization No marked changes in the deployment policies are foreseen Government and control centers large urban in trial complexes and coastal regions will continue to have high priorities and there probably will be some new radar installations at airfields used for basing medium bombers and at surface-to-surface missile SQ-I site's Defenses are expected to be augmented by substantial mmbers of SAM units of the Soviet SA-E type thus increasing the medium and high altitude defense coverage at many points The same deployment concepts as for the and Soviet defenses are expected to dominate i e heavy concentrations aromd civilian installations and increased concentrations around banber and 83 locations Very limited numbers of SSA-3 low altitude missiles may become available with the first installations probably sa-a dispositions around principa cities Major trends in the develOpment of offensive systems may include the following Introduction of short range non-nuclear tactical air-to-surface missiles ABMs that follow Soviet design These could be used by all the newer aircraft but by only a few of the older types Two major types of SSMs may be developed There may be limited quantities of mobile 100-300 mile missiles Operated by the Army The second type could be 3 700-1100 mile ballistic missile MREM that might carry a nuclear warhead of something under yield The first Chinese nuclear detonation may take place perhaps be- fore 1965 Two areas of emphasis in subsequent development of nuclear weapons may be warheads for delivery by Badger and Beagle aircraft and lj uASEEi Lr no -lOl- warheads 'for delivery _ More than a one-year gap is expected be- tween the initial detonation and acquisition of nuclear weapons Even then production would be in relatively limited quantities Although these truds represent likely directions of Chinese development there are other possible directions For example there could be greater emphasis on missile development In extreme this could be an attempt to develop a strategic capability against the Continental United States Early development of an ICE-1 might be very attractive to the Chinese in view of their objectives although it would present formidable economic technological and indus trial problans The Chinese might develop a submarine-launched nuclear weapon that need not necessarily be a ballistic missile It would be less diff'imJlt to develop cruise missiles or specially configured piloted aircraft to be lamche'd from a modified submarine of the types already available to the Chinese A nuclear-armed ASH could be developed although this would he a difficult extension of the anticipated Chinese trend in non-nuclear Am develoment In smary the United States coTJld in the 19 55-19-370 period be facing a limited number of nuclear weapons 0 delivery vehicles with ranges to cover present U S bases and forces in the Far East and increased air defense capabilities in the form of more and improved radars guns and missiles ANTICIPATED U S POSTURE IN THE PACIFIC The following material on U S military forces likely to be deployed in the Pacific during the next five years is based on current service planning and emphasizes the USAF deployment The Orders of I - Battle used in Sec IV are included in Appendix B All The total Arm strength daployed to the Pacific is expected to remain at three divisions The addition of two divisions to the strategic reserve will improve potential aumentation of U 5 capabi- lities in the racific Increased effectiveness is expected fran greater emphasis on counterinsurgency activities with improved equipment concepts and tactics plus an expansion of the Special Forces Also augmentation of Military Air Transport Service mas and equipment prestockage in the theater should make possible more rapid reinforcement of theater forces from the U S -based reserve The light-aircraft program should provide improved nobility reconnaissance and liaison Reorganization of the Am into the ROAD Divisions and weapon moderni- zation are estimated to increase firepower by 20 to 25 per cent The Programmed increase in SAMs will imroxre defense of 0 5 installations in the area Navy Navy strength in the Pacific will increase over the next several years Older carrier aircraft will be replaced The SAM destroyers and frigates will he tripled to increase fleet defense aginst attack by manned aircraft The submarine force will he mdernized with more nuclear-powered boats added for longer cruises and generally more efficiut operations and the older guided-missile submarines replaced by The two Marine divisions and two air wings will rennin as at present under operational control of the Pacific Fleet Of these one division less one regiment at Kaneohe MAS Hawaii and one air wing less one group at Kaneohe will continue in their deployed Far Eastern locations and the remaining division and air wing will continue to be stationed on the West Coast Reserves in the United States are assumed to remain the same Emmet a - -- -103- - Air Force units deplofed in the Pacific will increase in amber and quality The 23-57 light hanhers will he retired and the present three fighter wings will be increased to five The fighter wings will he modernized by phasing in and F th The EW and low level coverage of the air defense net will be expanded through bilateral and U S programs Some automatic or semi- automatic data processing will permit more efficient conduct of the air battle Fever specific defmsive aircraft F-loas will be required as indigenous forces become combat-ready and as more versatile U S tactical aircraft and SMS are deployed Irhe air transport capability in the theater is expected to grow through the deployment of additional units and aircraft Similar increases in numbers and modernization programs are to take place in the USAE units such as the USAF elements of the Strike Command that can be deployed from the United States to support con- tingency Operations in the Pacific UNCLASWEQ nds-r I -loh- - - Appendix ORDERS OF BATTLE ASSUMED FOR THE HIPOTHETICAL MILITARY CONFLICTS 1966 commas T CHI-DIESE- F1 ters Fresco 1088 Fresco 128 Farmer 38h FlashJight 10 Fishbed neW'Mig #8 Fitter Fishpot Type new generation 112 Total Fighters 1770 Jet Fighter Miners 116 Bombers - Light Jet Bomber Beagle 90 M dium Jet amber Badger 31 2 Total Bombers 205 Transoorts Light Transport Cab Coach Crate 205 Medium Transport Cub Cemp Coot 22 Total Transport 227 Light Heliocopter Hound 65 Misc Propeller ASH 35 Grand Total 2MB Ground Forces The Communist Chinese ground forces are assumed to be approx- imately 2 5 million men in the arnw plus about 500 000 men in securi forces The Chinese are assumed to have a relatively extensive SA-E and force with fully adequate high altitude and EH coverage -- mm Naval OB Vessels for DD and SS Types Anyhi bious Operations Destroyer 1 Tank landing Ship IST 33 Destroyer Escort 1I- Medium landing Ship 13 Submarine 29 landing Ship Infantry l6 Utilityr landing Craft Patrol Craft 10 LOU 10 Patrol Escort Lani Craft 330 Old Patrol Escort 3 Radar Picket 6 Au lianr Vessels Submarine Chaser 21 - 33 Motor Boat 150 AN - 6 A0 3 Motor Gun oat MI- ARL 1 Old Motor Gunboat 2 Am 6 River Gun oat 5 Others Mine Warfare Craft Service Craft 300 Fleet Minesweeper 12 Coastal Minesweeper 1 Au liary Minesweeper 3 13 xm -105- 1986 ms PACIFIC Air Force OB Base Type of Squadron Typ hircraf umber a Japan Yokota Tactical Fighter F-ll-C 75 Air Defense F-102 26 Misana Tactical Reconnaissance RF-hc 15 Tactical Fighter F-105 75 Itazuke Tactical Fighter 75 Air Defense F-loe 20 Tachikawa Troop Carrier C-lzh 32 Troop Carrier 0-130 16 Okinawa - Kadena Tactical Fighter F-hc 75 Tactical Reconnaissance 18 Tactical Missile Mace 36 Hana Air Defense F-102 33 Troop Carrier 0-130 32 Philippines Clark Tactical Fighter 75 Air Defense F-102 20 TrooP Carrier 0-130 16 Guam Anderson Augmentationb BP52 1 -5 F One tactical fighter squadron is deployed from each wing in Japan to bases in Korea and 18 aircraft are assumed on alert with nuclear stores Assumed for campaigns described in Sec IV Wt -107- SAM Typesa Base Battalions Mission Nike-Hercules Korea 1-1 2 Defense of airfields and port area Hawk Korea 1 Defense of airfields port supply areas Nike-Hercules Okinawa 2 Defense of island Bani Okinawa 2 Defense of island Nike-HErcules Philippines 1 Defense of Sdbic Bay and Clark AFB areas Nike-Hercules Guam 1 Defense of island El No other arm ynits were examined Hegx QB Shins 7th Fleet Combat Units Number Attack Carrier cm 3 ASH Carrier cvs 1 Guided Missile Cruiser cm 2 Guided Missile Destroyer DDG DLG 10 Destroyer DL DD DDE DE 20 Destroyer Radar Picket DDR DER 8 Submarine 83 SS1 8 Submarine SSE N llN ASaa iw I -105- Aiicraft'Units prior to augmentatioql Type Ember of Aircmf b light Attack 128 Heavy Attack 16-21 Fighter Composite 19 ASE fixed Hing 2h ASW helicopter 12 Marine Air on Japagl Type Minibar Figh'ber 60 Attack 60 Photomphic 33 -109- i966 IiATIormusr UN Assmig Army as Infantry Divisions 15a Reserve Infantry Divisions 9 Armored Divisions 2 Airborne Regiments 1 Guided Missile Command Nike-Hercules Battalions 2 Hawk Battalions aSix divisions or 6h 000 troops assigned to Offshore Islands on rotational basis Navy OB Destroyer Escort 1h Patrol Craft Torpedo Boats 2h Mine Warfare Vessels High Speed Transport Amphibious Vessels Marine Brigades Marine Battalions HPEHE Air Force OBS Tactical Fighter Squadrons All-weather Fighter Squadrons Reconnaissance Squadrons ASH Squadrons TransPort Squadrons Air Sea Rescue Squadrons Hawmm gAir Force modernization was assumed ff Based on l9oo posture force goals indicated in FY 1963 Military Assistance Program UNQASSEMJ fair-unlink- 1 2 10 13 3 I -110- UHQASSNA REFERENCES Blachly R L L Goure S T Boomer A L Esieh B F Jaege P F Longer and M G Weiner I lications of a Communist Chinese Nuclear Ca abiIL'Lt A Briefin U The RAND Corpora- tion August 19$ Secret Esieh A L Some Thou ts on Conmunist China's Exploitation of a Nuclear Detonation The RAND Corporation RBI-312 PR April 1935 iConfidential Liu Ya-lou Seriously Study Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking Chieh-fan -ch n Pao May 23 1958 in S C M P No 1900 November 25 19% Mao Tse-tung Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War Selected Works New York International Publishers 1951 Vol I p 239 Mao Tse-tung On Sane Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy Selected Works Foreign Language Press Peking 1961 Vol Iv p 1 Hsieh A L Camunist China s Strategy in the Nuclear Era Prentice-Hall Inc Englewood Cliffs New Jersey 19 Chu Hsin I an Liang and Chou Linpshen editors Fang-k'ung Ch n Air Defense Troops Peking October 1957 Weiner M 6 War Gami Methodolo The RAND Corporation ASTIA no AD 23E5055 July 10 1959 Wright Air Develoment Division The Effect of SEed on the Pen- etration of a Tactical Aircraft #rating at Low Altitude WADD TR- 392 May 19 Secret Paxson E W The SIERRA Pro set A Stud of Limited Wars U The RAND Corporation Report R-317 May 1 1953 lSecret For- merly Restricted Data Reinhardt G Escalation of Limited War in Laos U The RAND Corporation RM-EWPR June 195 Secret Restricted Data Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff 6 2 Dopartznent of the Army Order of Battle Forei Ground Forces October 1 1961 Secret Office of Naval Intelligence Office of the Chief of Naval Oper- ations Department of the Navy Stren and Disposition of ForeiE Navies October 1 1961 Secret 11 Force Interligence Center Sine-Soviet Bloc Aerosnece Order of Battle 1 19 Secret 15 Air Force Intelligence Center Radar Order of Battle Sine-Soviet Bloc January 1 1962 Secret 16 Air Force Intelligence Center Anti aircraft Artille- Order of Battle Ccmmunist Far East Forces October 1 1931 iSecretS nameless - L- This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu