- - MEMORANDUM BM-3418-PR I MARCH 1983 3 I MILITARY ASPECTS OF A STUDY OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF A COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY U i B F Sager and M Weiner i '0 PREPARED FOR UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT BAND 0 7a ll DW SANIA - - COP N0 7 MORANDUM RM-3418-PR Blanca 1963 MILITARY ASPECTS OF A STUDY OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF B F Jaeger and 1M Weiner This material eonteina information eeting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title 18 U S C Seen 793 and 794 the trans- miseion or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law This research is sponsored by the United States Air Force under Project oontraet No AF 49 638 -700 monitored by the Directorate of Development i l Deputy Chief of Su Research and Development Hq USAF View or conclusions contained in this Memorandum dould not be interpreted as representing the o eial opinion or policy of the United States Air Force Clue-merrier chased to qu % - 22 31% In new It In some unnum- niew for declassi eatlon on 515 473 AT 12 YEAR NOT AUTOMATICALLY DOD DIR 52mm mumm 3961a PREFACE his is a supporting mm for RAND Report R-hll PR A Stag of the cations of a Cmist Chinese Nuclear Ca 111w Toe study was Im ertsken at the rte-west or the Director of Plans Heed- qusrters United States Air Force This Morandmn should be read in conjunction with since the political considere ons that might in uence U S Chinese Soviet and other nations' actions are not discussed herein summ This Memorandm is one of a series of publications 1which support a RAND study of the implications of a Cmist Chinese nuclear capa- bility rt presents data on three hypothetical military conflicts which are developed and analyzed in the coarse of the study The three conflicts were used to provide a rough assessment of the possible military consegiences of China's possession of a nodest nuclear capa- bility and to give some indication of the negnitude of the risks that they might face in a military confrontation with the United States The first situation involves U S nuclear retaliation from an mdamsged posture following Chinese aggression against Taiwan For the conditions and forces postulated it indicates that U S theater forces augmented by a wing of til-52's on Guam and utilizing one with Polaris missiles could virtually eliminate wine's offensive air and missile capability while incurring very small losses 'lhe second situation involves U S retaliation following a Chinese air and missile attack with nuclear weapons on ms and Allied bases in the Far East For the conditions and forces postzlated it indicates that the augmented theater forces which survive the Chinese attack would be capable of substantial destruction of Chinese offensive air and missile capability However the v 3 forces would be severely damaged and would be capable of executing only one strike The third situation involves Chinese nonnuclear opera- tions in the Taiwan snait area Uhder the conditions postulated it indicates that a campaign against Quelnoy could involve high manpower and mteriel losses for the Commist Chinese with only a nerginal chance of success and that a campaign against Taiwan would be extremely costly with only a very remote chance of success The main conclusions of this study are 1 that Cmist Chinese nuclear or high-level nonnuclear campaign would involve very high risks on their part and 2 that 11 8 bases in the Far East are vulner- able to ballistic-missile and low-altitude air attack with a need for more advanced early-naming equipment and additional Hawk or biauler 8AM system 1133 In - -- - uo nun -u-I u- mml ms The authors via to than Colonel 11 L Blachly General Ralph E Kooa USAF Ram and Admiral R G Iockhart USN Bet for their valuable advice and dining the conduct or the war games described in this Munorandm Inn - d C ou n-uum nn ups-n- am cpv n-uuo-om- I I -13- MACE WI WW Section I momcmon II ORDERS OF HAITI-E l ems-t millage Forces NEbionaJ-iat Chinese Forces 10 United States Theater Forces 10 i m Um mums 16 Case I nuclear Campaign Against Communist Chine 16 Case II Two Sim Hudear EICthge 31 Observations Concerning the nuclear Campaigns #6 Iv Hummus mums IN m TAIWAN sma- AREA 1 8 Operations Against Big Quemoy 1 9 Assmt on Taiwan 53 Observations Concerning the Honnuclear Campaigns 5h V TARGET AND WON APPLICATIONS 55 Air eld- Intemiction 55 mtiShj-Pping matims 56 VI commons AND monstrous 61 e mat Capabilities of Programmed U S Theater 61- CapEbilities of Augmented U S Theater Forces 61 Air DEfense Problems 63 Ronnucleer Chinese Aggression in the Taiwan Strait Area 63 moms 65 mm o -e on - Io u u C-Iu ehiv- I mam-11m The growth of Cummist Chinese-x military- power represents a threat to Asia and to the U S interests in the area This threat will take on new dimensions when China has nuclear weapons She is likely to acquire a nuclear capability within the next decade despite economic reverses technical limitations and disagreenents within the Bloc In response to a request has Headquarters United States Air Force Director of Plans The amp corporation mdertook a study of the major political military implications of a Cammist Chinese nuclear capability The study examines likely Chinese obJectives and strategy the probable state of Sino-Scrviet relations the impact of a Chinese nuclear capability on free Asia military and technical appraisals of ease hypothetical conflicts and some under political- Imilitary implications for the Uhited States EEhe study considers the 1965-1970 time period and assumes that 0 There will be no drastic change in the U S -Soviet military and political balance of power 0 There will he no drastic change in the U S enmit- ments or policies in the Far East 0 While the possibility'exists that the Chinese may acquire by concentrated effort a token lung-range strategic nuclear capability for use as a threat against the United states such a development is considered very unlikely in the 1965-1910 time period Reference 1 is the major report of the study Supporting the report are a series of studies which develop some of the aspects in greater The study damstrates that China's'initial detonation of a nuclear device is likely to be used by the Chinese to create the impression that China possesses a military capability and is a significant nuclear power me that time on and increasingly as China develops a nuclear capability the United States will be For brevity Cummist China and Commist Chinese will be referred to as BChinescl'Lexcept nhereronrusionnight occur - one- confronted with a wider range of possible Chinese threats and actions than hitherto By the time China possesses a modest nuclear caps- bility she will have the following options 0 The direct use of nuclear weapons on LB Far East bases or on Asian nations 0 The use of nuclear weapons as an unbrella for overt nonnuclear military operations and smort of insurgency The political and propaganda mcploitation of her nuclear capability to capitalize on and to create opportunities for achieving Chinese objectives In order to provide some indication of the military consequences of the first two options three hypothetical conflict situations have been developed and analyzed The objective of these case studies is to obtain a rough assessment of the mitude of the risks that the Chinese would face in a military confrontation with the united States For each of the cases the critical assum on is ends that there will be no direct intervention or participation by the Soviet Union The three hypothetical con icts which were mined dining this study are Case I U S nuclear retaliation following Chinese nuclear aggression against Taiwan involving alternatively programed theater forces against Chinese offensive air and missile capability or programsd theater forces with augmentation against Chinese offensive air and missile cape- bility Case Two-sided nuclear exchange involving sequentially A--Chinese pre-emptive nuclear attack on v 5 air and naval forces augmented in the Far East followed by against Chinese offensive air and missile capability by surviving U S forces Case Nonnuclear campaigns in the Taiwan Strait area The purpose of this biemrandim is to present more detailed data on these three cases than is contained in Ref 1 'This Manorandm should he read in conaunction with Ref 1 since the political con- siderations that might influence U S Chinese Soviet and other nations' actions are not disguised herein a q p n w n The need in the development and analysis of the hypothetical con ict situations included tun-sided var gaming and military- appraisals The methodology was adapted from the ver- gaming techniques described in Ref 7 The date presented herein are not intended to represent a prediction of U S or Chinese military or technical develoments They were developed solely for use in the gene situations as a means of assessing some possible conseqnnces of Chinese acquisition of a modest nuclear capability II The orders of battle used in the three hypothetical con icts described in this paper are seemed in all cases but efforts have been rude to use sm ahle substantiating date Data sources are cited in the text where appropriate COIWNIST CHINESEFORCES Air Force The Chinese Air Force composition is assumed to he as shown in Table l The makeup of the erce will be dependent on the extent and type of support the Chinese will receive from the Soviet Union For purposes of this study it is seemed that the Soviet Union will provide some defensive equipment but will not provide either herd- were or technical help where strategic nuclear weapon systems are concerned I The major differences between the force postulated for the 1966-1967 time period and the 1962 posture are reductions in total numbers of aircraft and the introduction of new typese It is seemed that the Chinese possess guided missiles equivalent to the Falcon Sidewinder end Bullpup missiles It is estimated that 'the fighter force will he reduced by 200 units between 1962 and j1966-1967 For the force the older Beagles ere phasing out and Badgers are being introduced in increasing mmbers A basic premise of the study is that the Chinese possess at modest nuclear-weapon capability For study purposes it is seemed that in the 1967 time period they will possess as many as 100 nuclear warheads with yields up to 200 KT These warheads weigh in the neighborth of 2000 lb Thirty-six of these warheads hsve been allocated for ballistic missile delivery and the reminder see for free-fell bombs The Chinese are known to be interested in ballistic missiles and the is mde that by 1966-1967 they will have developed - - Tdble 1 Assam 1966 1967 mm AIR OB Type number Aircraft Fighters Fresco A B 1088 Fresco 3 3 128 Farmer 21 Farmer ell weather 111-1 - b 10 Fishbed #8 Fitter Fiehpo'l new geheratiem 112 1370 Jet Fighter Trainers 1 16 Barbers Beagle flight Jet bomber Badger medium Jet bomber Total Transport Cab Coezh Crete light 33158 205 nah camp coot mum 242 Total light Helicopters Hound 65 Misc Propeller ASH Image 35 Total Aircraft 219 8 Missiles mm' 53 36 aSee text -6- iTs i ie'E th m- to mi range capable of delivering the warhead mentioned above Potential development aspects are discussed in Ref 3 The Chinese MRBM force is assumed to be stationed in three complexes 1 13 I-i-l in Kiangsi province approximately 50 11 mi north of Nan-Ch'eng 0 14-2 inLiaoangpm vince north of moon 0 M6 in Elman province approximately 200 mi south- west of Changsha 'saoh complex has four launch sites with three launch pads for a total of 36 missiles All installations are less than 5 psi hard The size type and disposition of the Chinese nuclear capability are not intended as estimates or predicticms or Chinese develomenu The Chinese capability was selected as a representative threat to the U S forces programs for the 1966-1967 time period This capability would probably strain the upper limit of the Chinese scientific industrial and technical capacity Navel Forces It is not expected that there will 'be s 513111th change in the Chinese naval forces from the present posture 8 other than modernization and replacement or a raw existing types here again much depends on the availability of Soviet assistance Current reports are that construction of new ships has been severely curtailed since the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China The assmned Chinese naval order of battle for the 1966-1967 time period is shown in Table The complexes are hypothetical and their locations are selected on the basis of the following criteria as far inland in China as pos- sible while still maintaining coverage of all major U S military installations in the Far East permitting miltiple coverage of targets when possible on railroad routes in appropriate terrain and close to other military installations especially large air elds It is vithin the capability of the Chinese to possess a few sub- marines capable of launching short-range air-breathing cruise-type coon un m T313132 ASSUMED 1965-1957 cm NAVAL GB Type Destroyer Destroyer escort Submarine Petrol Patrol escort Old patrol escort rude - picket Sub chaser Fast petrol Motor torpedo boat Motor gtmboerl 01d motor gun'boe b River armhoet Mine warfare Minesweeper eet Minesweeper coastal Minesweeper auxilim Amphibious 151 IBM 131 ICU landing omit mum AG MEL AN AD ARL MIA ops ems gems ore Number - Mi 'if ffi l an ib ious carpi-T hility of 20 000 to 25 000 troops supported by one armored and one artillery division less 50 per cent of their motor transport or a total lift of 60 000 armed infantry The sealift is made up of aging 0 5 World War II vessels my of which have been converted to other missions and all are in mestionahle operating'oondition This sealift can be augmented by the use of dunks The amber of Junks operating in China is very large andthey are capable of transporting many thousands of troOps They are not amphibious however and they must disembark troops and supplies in water depths offrometo6ft dependingonthe Jmhsizeandloadmg Also in the likely event that trained naval military crews are not sve shie extensive training and maneuvers are necessary in order to provide for an orderly operation The use of untrained crews in large operations involving thousands of dunks would be catastrophic In addition extensive retrofit in propu lnion and canmnications would probably be necessary in order to have the fleet operate effectively Gromd Forces The Chinese gromd forces other than entiaircraft defenses have not been mined in detail but the assumption is and that for 51966-1967 they have 2 500 000 troops in the any including security troops 9 I The assumed Chinese antiaircrsi t defense posture in the 1966- 1967 time period is piesentea in Table 3 In conjunction with this rather extensive and MUD en the Chinese have considers- his high-altitude radar coverageul which win he discussed later in this report The antiaircraft artillery coverage parallels the missiles with nuElear warheads in the 1966-1967 tine period Such a system could he developed by modifying existing suhmrines and air- craft The purpose of such a system would he to constrain U S responses to Chinese actions by threats of attack against U S coastal cities or other targets in the Pacific Such a system does not play a part in the hypothetical conflicts and is not assmned for the Chinese OB nu- in55-2 No of 83-2 H0 or aa-e Ho 01 Bites M am Inertia nor 31m AA Gum Iocatim not 311' Guns Industrial and man M i dl I180 5 3 Stif- $108 a i - other 15 San-Ya Edam Inland - new mud 71 99 75 Between Air elds 31-71 - Alloy Ana agaa I mm an Inn-aw 225 minus-mun - Ina-mans 50 atulence numbers refer to 5 mm listing or Chinese airfield based on Bot- 13- bma act T not V 1' Flo-Ia 1 I I Poncho Aron - Men Military District 15 Ponchos ma - - 125 - Wmmn- - - 150 4 2 a-II-lr-lI-lI-II-II-lo-h-h-l a @3355 a a mamas we wag-hm w 1 a 1 gamma See Bar In see Hat an Bar A see Ref 0 110- -- A-e coverage - in concentrations of both medium '85-m and loo-m and light batteries This seemed posture is beyond what the Chinese could provide through indigenous effort and thus is heavily dependent on Soviet willingness to provide them with defensive unmet The Military Assistance Program MAP force goals for 1965 12 are used as a guide to probable Nationalist Chinese force postures in the 1966-1967 time period with a continuing program of modernization under the aid prognam The Nationalist Chinese force posture used in this study is shown in Table 1L The 11 5 forces progrmmed for the lete 1956 time period are considered as available for operations in 1967 The Air Force posture Table 5 is derived free the 61 Program Doctnnent Series 13 The New posture Tables 6 and 8 is estimted on the basis of the 1959 New posture and current New programs The deploymt of these gmups will vary from time to time as a result of changing hypotheses for the various China Study war games No effort is made to project v 3 Am forces other than SAM bet- talions expected in the Far East in the 1967 time perineum This intonation is presented in Table 9 ran Table 1966-1967 amass on Type Number Air Force Posting- Fighters F400 225 1' th 1130 F-102 25 Reconnaissance BF-lm 101 as 12 Transport 0-119 96 Miscellaneous 20 Total 55' New Posture escort if Patrol ships 31 Motor toztpedo hosts 6 Mine warfare vessels lD High-speed transport 1 landing craft ISM 1881 1511 ICU 53 Am Posture pecial Forces Ema minnows Guided Missile Command 2 31 Nike- Hercules 1 Hand Infantry divisions 15'b Light intently divisions 6 Light semi-ed divisions 2 Airborne infantzy regiments 1 Total strength animrsi t types are assumed bSix divisions or 615000 troops assigned to 051 on rotational basis cane experimental plus 5 reserve cadre divisions l -12- - Table 5 1966-1967 11 3 AIR on PAR EAST Base Type Nimber Japan Yokota Mo 75 3-102 26 Elam 3-105 75 18 Itazuke F-105 75 - F402 20 Tachikawa 0-1211 32 0-13 16 Okinawa madame F-llc 75 a RFJIC 18 13010 a 134-763 9 White Beach 534-763 9 Gimbarua' 9314-763 9 Tanchaa' 934-763 9 Hubs 9-102 33 0-1 32 Philippines Clark F-loo 75 3-102 20 0-130 16 Gunmb Anderson 13-52 #5 F402 6 aAssmned site 166612166 bl he basins of Iii-52's in Guam is not currently programned by the USAF but such a force was used in the China Study war games for reasons indicated later - H m-m Table 6 ASSIDED 1966-1967 ms mm AIR on PACIFIC Pacific seventh Type Fleet Fleet Attack Carrier Air Grows Light Attack A llc 1h 28 A-SA Heavy Attack Squadrons 3-313 Fighter Squadrons F-BD r lm Gunpoai'he Debachnents BF-BA E-ILB E-2A ASH Carrier Air Groups ASH Scouting Squadrons s-ac 8-213 Heli er ASH 511-3 Patrol Smadrona Iandplane P-EH P-BA Patrol Squadron Seaplane 3-53 Mimi Sansley Patrol Inshore 8-20 S-2D Fleet Air Early Warning Weather Aw Met 85% 3 9 a ag mrxo 55 21 0 Ch 21 - 5826 3585 I Table 1966-1967 ms mm memo mm Pacific Seventh Type of- Vessel Fleet Fleet Attack Carrier cm 39 Class 3 1 01335 3 3 WW II Conv 3 new earner cvs 1 Missile Cruiser CAB CG 3 1 Missile Cruiser I GIG 3 1 Missile Destroyer 13m 15 5 Frigate DIG 15 5 Destroyer Leader DL 2 Destroyer DD 80 30 Destroyer Escort I Escort DE Bade - Picket mm 16 8 Radaz- Picket DER 13 Submarine 33 2h 6 We Nuclear 3513 15 Submarine Missile BEG - - Do nuclear seen - - Fleet BM Submadne 9 7 Table 8 mm mm AIR 03 mm mum Me of Squadron Aircraft Type Nmnber Fighter 1 F-SC 20 Fighter ho Attack 3 A-hn A-ll-E A-EA 60 Photggraphic 1 IRE-8A 20 Ia came of these units are deployed to Kedena Okinawa -- nun-now- a Table 9 mm 1966-1967 11 3 AM SAM mom FAR EAST Thu me Hunter - Mission MW - Nike-Hercules 1-1 2 Bn Hawk Bu Nike-Hercules 2 En Hawk 2 En Nike-Hercules 1 En Nike -Hercules 1 En - NUCLEAR CMAIGNS The separate nuclear campaigns are developed and analyzed As stated in Section I they consist of Case I U S nuclear retaliation following Chinese nuclear aggression against Taiwan involving alternatively A--U S pmgranmed theater forces against Chinese offensive air and missile capability or progressed theater forces with augmentation against Chinese offensive air and missile capa- bility Case II Two-sided nuclear exchange involving sequentially preemptive attack on U 5 air and naval forces augmented in the Far East followed by against Chinese offensive air and missile capability by surviving U S forces The Orders of Battle assisted for these campaigns were described in the preceding section The forces are augmented in various ways for various reasons as will be explained in the material I 13 8 NUCIEAR CAMPAIGN MST emu Case I assumes a situation in which the Chinese have carried out nuclear aggression against Taiwan and the united States laxmches a coordinated strike against the Chinese Mad and within 2h hours after the Taiwan attack Certain restrictions are placed on the U S Opera- tions They include the following No U S operations from or through Taiwan and no use of Nationalist Chinese forces This limitation results from the nuclear attack on Taiwan which eliminated any possibility of using Taiwan for air operations rhe methodology used for examining these cases and the non- nuclear case described in Section IV is tun-sided war gaming de- scribed in Ref 7 Technical and operational characteristics are based on standard military planning factors as described in Refs 15 through 17 and others and the results are subJec-t to the limita- tions of this material Over-all campaign results are based on expected-value computations with individual target kill or survival being established y_randcn1-mmber techniques I L17 o-n-odlo No operations by 11 5 air forces based in Japan and no use or Japanese bases by any U B air operations This restriction is based on the seamed nature of Japanese-v 5 relations at that time No 11 3 over- ights of North Korea North Vietnam or the Soviet Union This restriction is based on the military reqxirement to minimize warning of the attack on China and to avoid any possible intervention by these comtries No support of operations by non-U S forces This is based on an assumed 11 5 desire to mintain freedom of action and the need for quick response Re Chinese government control industrial or non- military targets attacked The main objectives of Case I are -to evaluate the magnitude of the threat which the U S posture in the Far East poses for the Chinese and conversely to evaluate the military capability of this 1 5 posture against the Chinese in the 1967 time period with the assumed 03's of Section II All operations are directed against The Chinese air-qefense system consists of SA-2 -type surface- rte-air missiles providing overlapping coverage of the major political - industrial areas and important military installations This coverage gie shown in Fig 2 Individual coverage along the coast opposite Taiwan is fairly heavy San-2 batteries also supply point-defense systems for some or the more isolated inland airfields Antiaircrai b artillery parallels the coverage with major concentrations or both medium as-m and loo-m and light 57-m batteries ammo government-industrial centers along the coast opposite Taiwan and at the more important military installations The air-defense fighter bases are shown in Fig 3 ihis restriction was also useful for assessing ability to attack China without allied support -H- 0- - I u F w Mi Ref Aircraft No 3 __1ongth rt-J No 2 7 000 Flashlight 10 1% 6 000 Fresco ABC 32 5 7 000 Palmer 16 Famsr AH 16 7 6 000 Fresco ABC 32 8 12 000 Badger - 16 11 6 000 - Fresco 430 32 Fresco DE 16 15 7 000 - Fresco ABC 32 Fresco 16 16 7 000 Uncommied 17 7 000 Fresco ABC 32 Fitter Fishpot 16 18 8 000 Beagle 3 20 7 000 Unoccupied 211 10 000 Unocoupied 28 7 000 Fresco ABC 29 7 000 Fitter Fishpot 31 6 000 Farmer Fame - AW 32 6 000 Fresco ABC 3 6 000 Fresco ABC 3 7 000 Fresco ABC asco DE 310111306 36 6 000 Fresco ABC Fresco DE 39 7 000 7 000 #3 7 000 Fresco ABC Fresco IE 1 6 7 000 Fresco ABC l 9 6 000 Frasoo DE manner 50 7 000 55 6 000 Palmer 16 Palmer AW 16 56 8 000 Badger 16 57 7 000 Fresco ABC 32 59 9 000 Fresco ABC 32 61 7 000 Unocoupied 65 - 7 000 Esmer 16 Fitter 313m 16 57 8 000 Badger 16 68 5 000 Fitter mom 16 59 7 000 Fresco DE 16 For footnote see page 20 330650005560 we so 4-19 Fresco ABC Farmer Unoccupied FIBBCO ABC FrescowABC Fresco ABC Badger - - Fresco ABC Fame - ABC Unoccupied -Unoccupied Fitter Fishmt Unoccupied Unoccmpied Fresco ABC Famar Fresco ABC Banner Banner Famer AH Unoocupied Uncommied Unoccxmied atbed Fresco ABC Fresco ABC Fresco ABC Banner Boner AH Banner Farmer Unoccupied Badger Badger Fresco ABC Fresco ABC Badger Fresco ABC Rune Fresco ABC Fresco ABC Fitter Ham Unaccupicd Unaccupied 5 3 5 35 16 16- 16- We 1 Aircraft 3E Unoccupied ABC Farmer AW Fitter Mam Fresco ABC Famer Fame - AW Fresco ABC Fresco ABC Unoocupied Beagle Fmaco 1E Unocogliod 5 6 $636 55% umber refer to a sequential listing of Chinose air- - fields based on Hot 18 Airfields are listed in alphabetic order and assigned a conjsponcling reference nm bor 1mbers to 131 111portion or China I The numbering was uhed for bookkeeping purposes in the campaign analyses l-l-ud r- - - A oiTohio early-warning radar network is seemed to exist with complete high-altitude coverage along the coastal regions and in the interior regions west to about longitude 100 Low-altitude coverage exists along the entire coast to about 25 1 mi offshore In the interior low-altitude coverage exists for selected important areas This extensive radar coverage is shown in Fig Reviewing the Chinese air-defense posture indicates an extensive capability against high-flying aircraft but very limited capability against low-flying aircraft This latter condition is exploited to great advantage by the 11 8 air strikes sums Programmed Theater Forces Against Chinese Offensive Air and Missile Capability Case I-A involves a preliminary apparisal of a campaign against China in which only programmed theater forces are to he used A brief survey of this problem indicated several difficulties that would limit the effectiveness of such a campaign l A casparison of approximate aircraft range performance Figs 5 through no with the target locations Figs 1 and 3 shows that the attacking aircraft cannot reach tho deep targets on a round-trip mission A Chinese basing policy that took advantage of this condition would result in the survival of a force large enough to be used in a substantial counterstrike 2 The Chinese early warning Fig and air-defense posture Tables 1 and JD and Figs 2 and 3 poses a threat to high- sltitude attacks In order to reduce losses to an accept- ahle level low-altitude penetration is necessary Such tactics would further reduce the target coverage 3 The penetration of attacking aircraft would provide the Chucse with sufficient the to lanmch their MRBM force and to have part of their aircraft airborne for air-defense operations or withdrawal to secure bases in the interior Therefore it would be vital to the success of the U S operations that the missile installations and boniaer bases be struck with little or no warning Missiles could provide- such a capability but were not available in appropriate quantities ranges and penetration speeds in the programmed force As a result of these limitations it was presumed that an attack on the Chinese offensive air and missile capabilities would result in - Law-altitude range 1 mi I- - l6 2 zoo-gal drop tonksi 2 275 -gal tanks 1 Mk-43 store Sea-level cruise at 0 50 Total range mi Fig 5 Range tradeoff for F-IOOD - tow-altitude range n mI-x IS 3 450-galdrOplunIIs I Mk-43 store Sea- level cruise at i I fuel reservTotal range ml Fig G Range tradeoff for F-IO-5 a 2 GOO-gal drop tanks - I Mk-43 store Sea-level cruise a i --Low-altl1ude range Total range n m Fig 7 Range tradebff for F-4C - - -a ude range 300-901 drop tanks I Mb 43 store 5% fuel reserve Sew-level arulse at 0 50 I f Sea-level cruise at 0 Total range n mi Flg 8 Range tradeoff for A-4E Law-altitude range n ml x104 l4 l2 IO 2 Mir-43 sfores Sea-level cruise at 0 55 73 000-lb Ryan weight 0 Sea-level cruise at 0 84 5 A fuel reserve Total range a mi Fig 9 chge trodeoff for A-SB 24 Low almude range n-mi-x 16 I2 l0 3 300-gal drop tanks 2 stares 5% fuel reserve Sea-level Cruise a 0 55 - w - on n Tomi range n 16 IE 20 Fig IO Range tradeoff for 24 - 11-4 - the survival of a reasonably large portion of these capabilities For these reasons Case LA Has not examined in detail B--U B Theater Forces with Augmentation Against Chinese Offensive Air and Missile CaE'oility The 11 8 obJectivs for this campaign is the same to destroy Chinese offensive air and missile capability within an hr after a Chinese nuclear attack on Taiwan 1 he one target system sin-fields and ballistic-missile sites is and operations are to he carried out under the some restrictions However in view of the limitations on the effectiveness of the programmed force described above the capability in the theater is augmented and improved for reasons indicated below The two manor Chinese offensive target corsplexes are the MRBM sites and the bomber bases particularly those capable of supporting Badger operations Some of the Badger bases are 1000 1 mi inland This capability should also be highly invulnerable to Chinese effusive and defensive action It is assumed that the missile sites will be sort in the 1967 time period and thus can he attacked with airburst weapons that lack a high degree of delivery accuracy Attacks on the These attacks should also provide minimnn waning to the Chinese Among the many possible weapon systems or combinations of systems that could provide some or all of these capabilities are the following l l- UJWH -I-u 9-h nu For this campaign programsd theater forces are amortized by one wing of 3-52'3 based on Guam and one with 16 Polaris 11-3 missiles of 2500-n mi range is used These two systems are selected as he hstrative of the desired Haggai capabilities me selec- tion does not imply that they are preferred systems since no compari- son was made with other cmbinetioms Cone of ions A11 missions are flown at minimum altitude over China in order to exploit weaknesses in the Chinese sir defenses and thus minimize U S losses 3111 93st of Operations Section II shows several 533mm assigned to the Pacific Fleet - - in the 1967 time period It was seemed that only one of these was assigned-to -Ghinese targets - sir elds include all barber bases and those 'sirfields occupied by substantial nmbers of ghters which lie along the major penEtratien - routes I From the total force available the following forces are used - This provides a total attaching force of The U S losses were limited by low-sltitude-spprosch tactics 1' and the use of mm and ballistic missiles against fest-reacting and heavily defended targets As a result the Chinese defensive fighters and SAM batteries had restricted opportunities to engage U S forces and attrition was emu Only seven U S aircraft i xii-E lost te hemr action four to Chinese fighters and three to in Two of the seven aircraft had already released their veapons Observations Some observations drawn from these Case I campaigns and force postures follow 1 2 3 7 CASE II Operating from an undamaged posture 11 3 progrmed theater forces could destroy a considerable portion of the Chinese offensive posture but these forces would be penalized by insufficient range penetration and quick response resulting in the survival of a reasonably large portion of the Chinese capabilities Augmented theater forces could reduce the Chinese offensive capabilities to a very lav level The U S losses in an cemented theater-force empaign could be quite lav Chinese air defenses are expected to suffer from serious deficiencies in radar coverage SAM capability and defensive fighter capability against high-speed low- altitude penetration The Chinese offensive capability surviving an attack by cemented U S forces would be only a minor threat to the ma military posture in the Pacific Comitnent of all of the aumented U S theater forces me not necessary during this campaign Neither the Philippine- based USAF aircraft nor the Seventh Elect aircraft veg used Either surviving elments of the committed ms force or the U S forces not comitted smald ensure the U S capability for a substantial second strike With a substantial portion of their airfield coupler destroyed theahility of the Chinese to redeploy surviving or airborne aircraft is very limited Any attempt by the USSR to simply replacement aircraft would be limited by the same destruction NUCIEAR EXCHANGE This case examines the capability of the Chinese to attack the aughented forces and a retaliatory strike Part A analyses an attack on the U S air and naval forces in the Far East and Part analyzes a U S retaliatory strike using surviving forces The background for this case study names that at the time of the Chinese attack 1967 relations are extremely tense to the degree that nuclear var is a strong possibility The Chinese _l I I I wanna fco m II i beliewe that in the event of war they would not be spared and would be struck by U S theater forces The Chinese choose to strike first in an attempt to destroy the U S bases in the Far East with the preemption that the surviving 8 8 theater forces could not critical- 1y damage the Chinese mainland The some orders of battle as were used for Case 143 are for both sides but with additional mutation of the Seventh Fleet As a result of the extremely tense international situation i ithree aircraft carriers one of which is undergoing maintenance at Subic Bay in the Philippines and a nuniber of supporting ships have been added Operating in candamction with the Seventh Fleet are two ASH task forces each of which includes at CVS aircraft carrier several destroyer types and a number of halter-killer submarines In all it has been assumed that two thirds of the Pacific Fleet has been assigned to the savanth Fleet AuChinese Pro- ne Attack on U S Air and Naval Forces I in i i Concept of Operations The Chinese attack has three coordinated components as aircraft attack on cum and I m dine on aircraft and r-missile attack against all other land bases in the Far East iincluding five Nationalist Chinese airfields on Taiwan and an air- craft attack on the Seventh Fleet The timing of these attacks must lShe carom controlled to preserve the element of surprise for all targets Table 1 1 is the asstmed Chinese target list with nuclear weapon assignments As was the case with the U S strikes in Case I the Chinese tactics called for all airborne attacks to be conducted at low altitude in hope of achieving maximum surprise and sustaining minimm losses Summary of Guam and Iwo Jima Attack The Chinese attack Guam and Iwo Jina with five Badger bombers each carrying a nuclear store The first leg of their flight is at low altitude over the water gap between Taiwan and northern Luzon On this leg the bombers are accompanied by five Badgers serving as tankers The bombers are refueled and proceed to their assigned targets Three bombers are assigned to Guam and two to Ian Jinn a ow- I I I umo-n-Iu- 0 CHICOM TAMEI LIST Table 11 Egg Ma a mmsuwmm mum Hahn Hawk Batteries Lhce Sites h 1 1 #0 amhmma memea meuB e Mm mmsuww HHPP cum Smew PHH mm Emma anu Mm PHHP mum Pins-Ms Tumm me mm$Mn Tm mn Wm Andersen memm Roam wmh mt 3 09p - - memen altitude capability is seemed to he no greater than 20 1 mi provi only 2 to 3 min of early weaning against a low-altitude attack The is a squadron of 12 lo-121K aircraft stationed at Agana on Guam Thai basic mission of this squadron is weather observation but it is Ii seems that in the tense situation that exists they will he functioni- ing in an early-warning role as well IDs-altitude detection capability is marginal and it is assumed that the patrol aircraft do not detect he incoming Chinese strike Ito Jim has no early-warning capability against low-altitude attack There are nine on airborne alert and 13 additional on ground alert es a result of the tense international situation With 2-1 2-min' early warning it is estimated that 12 Iii-52's are airborne prior to detonation of the laydman bombs which destroy the targets No Chinese aircraft are lost performing this mission Emery of Attack on ms and Chinese Nationalist Bases The Chinese fired 27 of their stockpile of 36 missiles at the targets i listed in Table 11 A cmp a tion of the results of this strike is given in Table 12 Six targets survive the missile strike because of various missile malfunctions The air strike which follows imediately is highly successful and only two targets ultimately survive Naha Air Base Chinese and Misses Air Base Japan A emery of the Chinese air strike is presented in Table 13 Neither of the surviving bases stitutes a threat to the China mainland in that only transport and EZ-defense aircraft are stationed at Hahn and the aircraft in Japan are not available for nuclear operations Because the Chinese believe that threats will suffice to forestall any Japanese action they do not conduct an air strike against the Japanese hoses The Chinese lose two Badgers and two Beagles to the U S Hawk defenses on Okinm Taiwan and' in South Korea 5 Sumary of Attack on the Seventh Blast The heavily augmented seventh Fleet is divided into two task forces Task Force 1 is located approximately 750 1 mi east of Shanghai off the island of Kyushu and Task Force 2 is located 750 1 mi south-southeast of Amy - 5 Guam has edemte high altitude search radar capability hut 1mm H - mahlela Range Launch 110 of p n a 3 Remarks Target n mi Site Masiles Okinawa manna 6'75 Hahn 675 Hawk Battery 675 Hawk Battery 675 3% so napaot error aa 35 oubh Korea Airfield #1 1 50 Airfield #2 150 Airfield #3 1450 03m hso Hawk Battery 1 50 Miss Manila abort Philippines Clark 8110 Basra Subic Bay 6110 Japan Iokota 880 Itazuke 61D Iuakuni 670 manual 750 83388 33% 333% 33% Miss Impact error Elven Pins-Elms 550 T61 -Nan 550 Chad -I 550 Kung-Kunn 500 Tao-Yuan 500 I-ld-lI-II-l I-IGIGHN 83 97 Miss Missile abort Pm x111 probability for one magma bPke K111 probability for two missiles - - T3319 13 CHEESE POST-MISSILE AIR STRIKE Target Badger Fighters Nuclear Conventional Result manna Mace 1 race 2 Mace 3 Race fl HHdI-iI-h-i Hit Miss Mina H11 H11 H11 Southorea Base Base Base 3 Own I-lr'iu-II-l Fir-lrlr-l Hit Hit Hit Hit Philippines Clark Basra Subic Bay t-lI-l I-lI-lI-l Hit Hit Hit Taiwan Ping-Tang T31 diam Ghai-I Tao-Yum Hr'lI-lI-lr-l 83543 43 7 n-1- The TjO-n mi distance is selected to reduce the Chinese attack capa- bility to Badger aircraft on romd-trip missions The ship canplement for the two task forces is shown in Tables 11 and 15 The aircraft canplement before and after the Chinese strike is shown in Table 16 In the mltiple-carrier task forces established for this opera- tion a decision was made that a single carrier in each force would handle the major elements of the fleet air defense and the other carriers would be primilqr concerned with offensive roles Precedent for such assignments was established in World War II Only the attack against Task Force 1 was deteloped and analyzed for this study The results were then seemed to apply in a similar mtoanattackonTaskForeea Taskibrcelhasthreeattack carriers OVA which have a total of nine catapults All catapults have the capability of launching one aircraft every 30 sec and all are on the alert and manned Because of the alert status 50 per cent of the fighters and attack aircraft are armed and on deck ready for any emergency A CAP 01' 11-1931 fighters and are supplying protec- the cover and early naming for the task force The Chinese launch a strike or 30 Badger 20 Beagle and 80 F ameraircmi tagainat eachtaskforce TheBadgars are yinglow and are carrying 15 nuclear weapons and 15 large nonnuclear bombs The Beagle andFemeraircrai t are yinghigh andare onlyfor decoy purposes in that they cannot reach the task forces because of range limitstims The 1153de forTaskForce 1 is showninFig 11 Also shown is the axis of the Chinese Badger strike The location of the task force is known to within a few miles by the Chinese but the size of the force and the location or the carriers within the force are not human Within the task force many ships carry radar re ectors to serve as decoys for the carriers The 30 Badgers attack in a single wave with aircraft 1 mi apart A single wave is stated in Ref 20 to he most critical for Terrier and Tartar missile systens and the Thirty per cent of the aircraft are seemed to be undergoing maintenance spa cent are in a nonplert status Tdble 1h ARHAMENT FOR SEVENTH TASK FORCE q qusdmunt v Dual-f urpose Guns MK I Missiiss ship 5 38 3 5o 5 51 hem Tartar Talos' i Directors 2 31 mammal 135-33 23 aq et 1i It It l 1t E rem 10 ships of this class bTualve 12 ships of this class cEight 8 ships of this class -38- - Ion - Table 15 TASKFORCEE q mamunt Dual P_urpoae Guns Missiles Ship 5136 3 5o 5'73 ham Terrier Tartar Talon Directors OVA '59 2t OVA 42 1t 1t 11 r-l 11' 0303030103 11' 2 313 a 11' cuu-gcumcucum Five 5 ships or this class Eight 8 ships of this class t Ji'ive 5 511125-93 tug clam Table 16 Item A-ILH hm km #9 mm pm E-EA ax creel Heatrike force OVA '59 WA we OVA 1-1 Surviving force Airborne 8111311011112 available 7 $29 91 mrm'n Taaki Prestrike force OVA WW2 Surviving force Airborne Shipbome available 11 5 21 - lm -hg m- hl Hr - up Codlng CVA Chinese strike track 0 CG Tales-Tartar CLG Tales 006 Tartar GD DLG Terrier DDR Radar Ew Missile range Radar ange Fug Il Deployment of Task Force 1 i spread or the aircraft provides the needed need-eh moth for detecting the prime targets the carriers The probability oi detecting the low- ying aircraft increases to better then 80 per cent as they approach the line of deployment of the DDR's destroyer picket ships Manning detection at the ma deployment line by either 1 3 29 or om Badger speed or hdo inn and negligible commication delay to the carriers the carriers could have a warning time of approadmtely 20 min Lemming Carrier 1 tohave or available combat air-crest the minimm lemon time would be about 5 min carrier 3 has three catapults and 1 1 aircraft on alert status These planes could be launched in a minimum time of '7 min Carrier 2 the defense carrier has two catapults and 32 ready aircraft Minimum launch time is 8 min On the basis of the above figures it lever likely that a very high percentage of ready aircraft would be launched in such a Chinese attack situation The Chinese Badger Eorce loses 11 - aircraft to the guided missile ships and fighters during the penetration phase or the attack t They also lose seven nuclear weapons which are fused for high-order atmation in case of disaster The proximity of Carrier 2 to the penetrating bombers insures its demise Whether or not Carrier 1 will be 511111 depends on the protection provided by the defense fighters and its own rather lethal defense provided by two twin Terrier bat- teries Although there is doubt as to whether Carrier 1 me such to be conservative it is assumed that its facilities and remaining carrier-borne aircraft are not available for a strike against the Chinese mainland After the Chinese strike the U S fighters continue to attack the mining 'bon aer force With the assistance of the E-EA aircraft for detection and air teetering control the Chinese Badger force is decimated emery 0 Results FETng Hr jiffy t it the Chinese are estimted to have lost Ml- Badgers 2 Beagles and fighter in this campaign - Observations Some observations draw from this Case II-A - campaign and force postures follow 1 1 2 The success or the Chinese attack depends critically on a number of factors The timing of the various phases of the operation is of reader importance All events met take place on a precise schedule to prevent the premature disclosure of the strike snd thus allow the United States to get a larger percentage of its offensive and defensive aircraft airborne before being hit 3 The remaining Chinese offensive forces represent a second- strike threat which can he used either directly if needed or as a deterrence to possible responses to their attack The 13 8 lend bases have limited early-weaning capability against low- ying aircraft Since mny of these bases are summded by water or met be approached over water the use or existing over-water detection techniques would further limit the effectiveness of the Chinese airborne attack 5 There is little likelihood that the Chinese could mount any form of attack on the Seventh Fleet that would prevent the - hisseslyien s msizcm -1119 an ASHwith a 150-11 mi range mald he of help prestnning the location of the can'iers could be determined at that range 1 6 Forty-eight ships of the Bevanth East are relatively inef fective in an air-defense role The addition of Mar-type SAM systems to these ships would more than double the air- defense fire power of the Seventh Fleet against low- ying aircraft Bo-Retaldation Against Chinesergfrensive Air and Missile gagh ity by Survivig U S homes The next phase emmines an attack on the Chinese U S forces that wire the attack described in Case 11-11 Such an attack would he carried out in a period of confusion without coor- dination and with some duplication For purposes of this study it is assumed that there is preplanning to the extent that each aircraft would attack targets assigned through existing emergency plans Concept 01' Operation The target structure is the same as that of Case I The 362's attack the MBBM sites and the Badger bases with Holmd Dogs and weapons and penetrate from the southwest over Bums for deep targets The holaris missiles are fired again the sites The surviving these are fired against coastal airfields All aircraft missions over the Chinese mainland are carried out at low altitude to We the detection problem for the defenders to take advantage of known deficiencies in the Chinese air defense and to minimize losses to the 11 8 striking force Emery of Attack by USAF Units It is assumed that the 12 surviving units of the 3-52 force arrange target assignments while they approach the Chinese mainland Priority is attached to the destruction of the new sites and the Badger bases Bro aircraft are assigned to each important target and each aircraft is assigned up to four targets The B-52's strike 18 airfields and the 12 missile sites The eight surviving Maces are targeted against eight airfields in the general vicinity of Shanghai The ten from the Philippines attach ten airfields in the southern part of China -I-uu 1 ames l Smmary of Attack by Units of the Seventh Fleet The assumed fortwoaircmi't against each target and each A-EB and A-5A is assigned two targets The lesson - 1mg behind this plan is that under emergency conditions the nunber of aircraft available is not known and thus redundancy is desirable Since the enemy is expecting the strike losses to the alert air defense my be high and thus duplication of assignments is again a desirable feature The Navy aircraft attack 72 targets - musing are also struck by the laces and worm-s- Mor Seventeen targets survived These consisted of 'The combat losses of the ma force were 30 fighter and attack aircraft and three Three Polaris missiles aborted in flight as did two Moses A third Mane was destroyed by Chinese air de nes I The emu-vim Chinese force consisted of 16 Badgers and several regiments of airfdefense fighters which were airborne dm'ing the U S attack Observations Some observations drawn from this Case II-B campaign and its force postures-follow l massacred meta aim in Rs 19' 3 Ia ESERFATIGNS comm TE NUCIEAR CAMPAIGNS The nuclear commune were studied to obtain a general activate or the effectiveness of programmed theater forces against a China with a modest nudeer capability as they might affect Chinese calcine- gtions or the risks involved in a mdor military confrontation with mead States On the bans of the postulated conditions the following general conclusion are drawn 10 E 3 -47 true or an attack on the Seventh Fleet for the United States in target assigmnent of occupied adr clds 11- For both sides there are de ciencies in early warning of law-altitude attacks and air defense against such m The vulnerability of U S forces could be reduced by ap- propriate improvements in ecpipnent 5 After a ma strike frun a Mad posture only a minim theater force would be available for a second strike against surviving Chinese military industrial or political targets If such a strike were regured _addit1cnal forces would be necessary - - A 3 8- IV NOREUCIEAR CMAIGNSDITEETAIHANSTRAITAREA i vaidsd the United States continues to mintain a nuclear posture consensual-ate with growing Chinese nuclear weapon developments the previous section suggests that Chinese attempts to use their nuclear capability in direct moles - aggression would entail high risk for them The Chinese would still have the military option of using their nuclear oapability' as an unibz'ella for overt nonnuclear military opera- tions as a threat to enhance the possibilities at schism limited obdeetives by nonnuelear operations Some of the implications of such a stragegy for the United States will be appraised in this section The locals for this case study is the Taiwan Strait particularly Quenoy This area was selected for several lessons The 1958 crisis' provides both a precedent and historical data that permit canparisons with objectives attributed to the Chinesmu The Cmmist Chinese - ihave often voiced their intent to reinoorporate Taiwan and the O shore Islands with the Chinese Mainland For defense of the onshore Islands v 3 intentions may be regarded as ambiguous and aJJied support may be questionable whereas for the defense of Taiwan a film U S commitment and a greater probability of allied support are assumed I- This case is not intended to represent a detailed analysis of the variety of possible situations and events that might develop in the Taiwan Strait area It is intended to illustrate some of the military situations that might develop in a time when the Chinese might at- tempt a nonnuclear operation with the capability of resorting to nuclear weapons It also provides some indications of the possible significance of nuclear weapons to the Chinese for this type of operation and of some of the consequences for U S responses Two situations are mined The under one is an attack on Big Chimney The seoond is a limited examination of a Chinese assanlt on Taiwan Political aspects of these situations are discussed in Ref 1 brief-analysis of possible Chin-see actims sgamst sons of the miller Offshore Islands Pai-Ch'usn group Ting-Yin Shad Wu-Ch'iu Esu mi AGAINST BIG QUE-DY Two operations areexsnined involving Quemoy a direct assault campadp and an interdicticm campaign- It is assumed that the Quemoy defense capabilities have been modified since 1958 The changes include a decrease in the number of troops on the island to appxondnately 60 000 an increase in the masher and quality of guns to 350 and widespread use of mines barbed wire and defensive forti cations Direct Assault on Queen Any invasion attempt against either Quanoy or Taiwan involves rather extensive preparations which would be impossible to disguise or hide The discovery of these preparations was asst to result in the 11 3 force redeploment shown in Table 17 The large shift of aircraft from Japan to Taiwan is the result of uncertainty as to the Japanese reaction to another Offshore Island crisis in the face oi the Chinese nuclear strength The exigmentation or the Seventh Fleet is generally similar to that which occurred in 1958 An amtation force of one 3 52 mg based on Guam and the use of one seam sub- marheisasmiasinCasesIdeI Approximtely one-fourth of the total Cummist Chinese air and navel capability and less than one-fourth of the ground forces are considered available for the Quemoy assault The major part of the etc was also undertaken Enamel-cl it is indicated that the Conmtmist Chinese could successfully assault one or more of these manor islands without extensive military preparations that might produce warning of the assault Using standard military planning factors an estimated force of from one to five divisions approxi- mately 200 combat aircraft and an appropriate member of landing craft and Janka would appear adequate to carry out the attack depending on the particular island or islands chosen Such an assault could raise problems concerning possible military responses for the Chinese Nationalists and have political implications in the Far met particu- larly for U S -Chinese Nationalist relatims The military capability to undertake such action exists today and does not depend upon Chinese possession of nuclear weapons nor are there indications that nuclear weapons would play a dwinant role in the local military situation hence further mmination was not mdertaken - - Inn o- m 30 Table 17 WWFORTAIHANSMITGBISIS Type Ember From To PACCM Forces USAF F-II-B 36 Japan Taiwan 6 Japan Taiwan MAG A-llE 18 Japan Taiwan MAG 1MB 18 Japan Taiwan Seventh Fleet - Japan area Taiwan area CASAF 32 I Philippines 32 U05 Japan - RFJEB 6 Japan RES-135 8 U S CASAF deployment Manna 0-130 32 11 5 Theater reserve 8 mt Fleet IVA Curler 2 Seventh Fleet INS Carrier 1 Seventh Fleet Amy STRAF Hawk 2311 U S Taiwan airfield defense iorce is considered to be held in place by other constituents Direct Soviet military support is not considered likely in line with politi-j cal assessments man in Ref 1 1' The amphibious assault follows a period 01 heavy shelling and I numerous air attacks to reduce the defenses The force requirement for the assault is estimted as 1 15 to so Conmmist Chinese divisions 2 2000 to 1 000 air sorties 3 vessels andJunks In order to estimate the results of such an attack no opposition by Nationalist Chinese or ms air units is assumed Even without Nationalist Chinese sir opposition a highly may condition Communist Chinese casualties from the Quenloy defenses alone are estimted to be in excess or men with heavy materiel losses It Nationalist Chinese and or ms air forces vigorously oppose the assault through attacks on staging and transit operations the cost in both res and mteriel will be greatly increased This factor pl the problems the Cmunist Chinese face in coordinating and mum 'an operation of this regattas would provide them with only a marginal chance of success - i In view of the marginal chance of success the losses the limited value of the o'baective the many uncertainties in propel-t1- tion and execution of the operation and the variety of possible U S and Nationalist Chinese responses an assault on Quency under the i conditions postulated appears to involve high risks for the Columnist Chinese The value of a nuclear capability as an mh brella for such operations is highly questionable Mareover the use of nuclear Factors that could be strongly adverse to the Columnist Chinese operations include the preparation assenbly and loading of the invasion forces which could provide hours to weeks of warning the loading moving and landing of the 3000-le 31mins the logistic support required for initial attacks replacement of losses etc Because of these major problems the estimte of force rcmirenents and losses is conservative 4 The value oi a Commist Chinese nuclear unhreus is liltely to be less in deterring military actions 1 especially deployments or r'ede'pioymen'ts'l 'th ' 3-108 than in creating special problems in such pn t-l-u n weapons against money would increase the risk of expansion of the con ict out of all proportion to the value of the operation Interdiction of Qumy The interdiction campaign was not fully developed became of the variety of possible actions and counteractions available to both sides In general terms the Chinese might consider interdiction of the supplies to Qnonoy for a number of reasons as s softening-up 'action prior to a direct assault as the first step in a major action against iniwen or as a probe of ms responses to increased military action in the area In all of these actions there are under political considerations The discussion of these is outside the scope of this Manor-madam but sense of them are considered in Ref 1 It is that at interdiction as a prelude to militsry action would require an effort that would severely curtail The ilength of the action could provide both sides with a masher of op- portunities to modify their objectives and operations A brief considered three such alternatives 1 Under the threat of extended interdiction and with the pos- sihle expansion of the conflict a review or the tactical i and strategic value of the island might favor the with- drawnl of the Nationalist Chinese forces This was considered an mlikely alternative and one in which under political considerations overshadow the military aspects of the situa- tion Both sides the Cmist Chinese and the Nationalist Chinese-with or without 11 8 support- engage in under but local efforts Since neither side appears to have a signif- icant military advantage in the initial stages such a cmpaigi could prove vory costly to both As the Chinese interdiction effort continued over an extended period of weeks or months both sides would have opportunities to actions as for example the anticipatory move of aircraft out of Japan the value of the Imhrella in increasing the dangers of escala- tion of the con ict and in creating pressures on the United States to restrict or limit its responses to Chinese actions against Qumoy involves political considerations outside the scope of this Memorandm may of these are discussed in Ref 1 - u_ - - is a-quII-A-I-oq oo- - - the manner and scope of their Operations Generally it appeared that adequate resupply of the islands could be maintained by various measures including poor-weather operations night operations and protected resupply Air actions by both sides in the imediate area might occur and U S support in the resuppily Operations and the air actions could have an important in uence on the effectiveness of the Conramist Chinese efforts 3 With each side having the capability and the opportmity to change the nature and locus of the conflict the interdiction situation is an Imstable one and might not stay confined to a limited operation Depending on a variety of factors primrily determined by the sitmtion prevailing at the time the con ict could expand in area and magnitude - Based on the estimate that the Communist Chinese could not under- take a localized interdiction effort that would be effective and tint an interdiction operation could be highly unstable the risks involved to them in such a campaign would be considerable 0N TAIWAN The next phase involves a united eaminaticm of Cmmist China's capabilities for a nonnuclear campaign against Taiwan The U s force deployments are the sane as those assumed for the on Quenoy I The Conmunist Chinese force mwirements are estinnted using the samei planning factors as were used for the attack on Quenoy On this basis an assau t on Taiwan would tax the total Comnmist Chinese military capability Naval and air reanements are partich lei-1y demanding Assuming Columnist Chinese air power is used in an' attempt to narkedly reduce or eliminate the Nationalist Chinese Air Force the requrements approach the limits of their estimated total operational and logistic capability Cannitmexrt oi U S air and naval units would make the costs of such an operation almost prohibitive 1with only the remotest chance of success Such a campaign is not in line with estimates of ommist Chinese willingness to accept such high risen If the Commlniist Chinese were willing to risk a campign involving the comitment of the under portion or the total military capability of Commist China the Mei - manna J 52 act 6- nuclear attacks bases and the invasion eet Appropriate timing and targeting including the timing of the authorization to use nuclear weapons could he militarily effective in stopping the inva- sion 2l I The use of nuclear weapons by the Cmucist Chinese prior to or as part of such an invasion is considei ed mainly in view of the variety of responses available to the United States The possibility of a U S response such as the one examined in Case I U S retaliation from an Imdamaged posture renewing a Chinese nuclear attack on Taiwan would he a dominating factor in Commist Chinese risk calculations I cm NWCI-EAR GMAIGNS 1 A Cmmnunist Chinese overt nomucleer campaign against or Taiwan would represent clearly identifiable aggression Against 'Quemoy it could he carried out only at cmsiderehle cost and with a seminal chance of success Against Taiwan the costs would he almost prohibitive and the chances of success remote Both We could String the Communist Chinese into direct military confrontation with the United States and involve high risks for them 2 Any major invasion attempt on the part or the Cmsunist Chinese 1would he accompanied hp preliminary- preparations which would be extremely difficult to disguise or hide and could provide the phited States with time to take diplomatic or military action to meet such a threat 3 A Commist Chinese nuclear capability as an mbrejia would be of limited military value against Quench although the possession of such a capability would probably create political pressures on the United States to limit its response and might necessitate operational and logistic adjustments 11- In an asth on Taiwan the use of nuclear weapons by the Communist Chinese could have local military who but would involve extrenely high risks for them in View of U S comitments and response capabilities u- d'l 5 I ease v In the nonnuclear campaigns described in the previous section U s end or Nationalist Chinese operations would be against the fol- lowing types or Cmist Chinese targets 0 Troop concentrations Concentrations of 31111155 and man hosts Isolated I11 1111ch small boats and ships Gun emphcenents Airfields Aircraft on thegrotmd and ail-home 3111191 amps Transportation facilities installations SSA-2 missile sites Early-waning and GUI radar andinthe '1967 time period there will 'be my advances in nonnuclear weapons and delivery capabilities for airborne attack Table 18 presents a listing of airborne weapons which should be available and various targets against which these weapons are effective In this time period the 55100 3-105 and ratio will 'be equipped for multiple-weapon cer- risge For example the 3-105 will be able to can-y sixteen 750-Ib bom _hs on short-range missions and eight 750-11 13th plus two lac-gal extemsl fuel tanks on missions of 550 11 mi radius using a hi-lo-hi lmission profile Two short studies were made of air operations against ail-fields and shipping to evaluate the effectiveness of these advanced ncmnucleer capabilities Ammo There are six Chinese Columnist airfields within 150 11 mi of -Quemoy Aircraft these airfields could be used in an attempt to This section several __min-ts that developed in the course of the analysis of Case end_ which have not been covered elsewhere in reports or the China study Im RECCHMENDED WEAPONS FOR AIR OPERATIONS 1957 Target Weapons ss upport Mission Troops in the open Troops in foxholes Troops in bunkers Gun Light-assumed vehicles Observation posts and CEBU-1A Mchet Lazy-Dog 20-min 3m CHI-1A Microjet napaJJn 3mm Gnu-63d Mm napalm 500- to 2000-11 bombs mm Bull-m 500- to soon-2 1 boobs ZURI CELT-3A Rookeye II 2 75-111 FEAR Bqupup 20-min guns Bqupup '500- to 2000-11 GP pillboxes bombs napalm Supplies Napalm Buildings 500' 750- and 1000-le1 GP bun'bs Bull Glad-33A mm Interdistion Miss on Bridges Bullpup 500- to 1000-1 Railroads Doanbrook mine 500- to 2000-13 GP - bcmibs Instinctivss Bt lpup Gnu-83A ao-m guns 2 75-in FEAR 3 11 oars mm 21m 2 75-1n FEAR 20m guns Roads Doan brook mine 500- 750- and 1000-130 GP 'banbs CHI-2A 20m guns 2 75-5 11 Truoks River 8 coastal shipping Ifies-going dunks destroyers etc - Bullpup 8 13 13mm ZUNI 2 75-1n FEAR 20-11311 guns Bunprp' B Balm ZIJNI Honeys 500 750- and 1000-11 GP 'ban bs mines Comterair Missim Fire control and EH radar and sites WW Parked aircraft Air-to -air cmbat sol-m Bullpup ARM Bqupup GM-33A 500- to GP bombs 500- to BOOB-1's GP bombs Dosn brook- type mines earth-penetration bcnn'bs new dev GET-3A Bullpup 3 3 2 75-1 11 guns Sidewinder mm a SARAH Sparrow Falcon Eagle 2 miss-a subproaeot e m tiplo manor # uni-Inna achieve temporary air superiority over Quenoy and to intercept air operations initiated from Taiwan Thusthere are where it would be desirable to neutralize these airfields for limited periods of time In the past my interdiction with airborne conventional weapons has been a low-effectiveness Operation This picture should change for the better dining the 1955-1970 time period Multiple racks on the 17-100 33-105 and r-hc should provide the capability for limiti- pletarget hitswitha singlepass oweralinea rtarget suchas a 1 1m The following factors are used to establish a typical nmway interdiction mission my m it m ath Emmy-thickness concrete in WM Ema ft nonecottolollo 3 Runwaywidbh Ema-3 ft aloe-0 0 0 0000 Attack speed ft sec Attm Bltitud ft Range-error probability REP rt De ection-error pmbeb ity it A coarse evaluation using these factors indicates that three F405 camdngeight 750-11 bonibs each have better than a 0 311 probability of taking this mmzay out or operation in one pass Two aircraft have a probability of greater than 0 7h but three sorties are advisable in order to provide redundancy in case one aircraft I shorts or is shot down The time of runway deactivation is a hmction of the aircraft complement involved 11 the aircraft must have concrete runways the runway will be out of action for over 21 - hours If they can Operate from compacted earth the runway will be out of action for only a utter of hours depending on the labor and equiment supply available In order to keep an air eld out of operation the sortie timing rate will be a direct function of the rtmway repair schedule The or of aircraft parked on the ail-fields regnres more sorties than runway interdiction but repeat sorties need not be as framient since the damged aircraft are out of action for at least a matter of days and some are completely destroyed At the have the option o fy ng in seplscement aircraft A survey of the Chinese airfield posture shows that they generally park their edrcraft in revetments without cover An effective weapon for use against such a deployment is the car-2A which will dispense 63 homblets in a pat- tern 1200 ft long by 80 ft vide 22 If two units were used per attacking aircraft the mean bomhlet density at impact Wild 'be one per 800 sq ft The CHI-2A banalets are small fragnentstion homhs which are effective over a ho-rt or more radius or an area greater than 5000 sq ft With the long pattem length it is possible to cover two revetments in a single pass Analysis of photographs of the air- fields near mercy indicates that 18 to air successful bombing passes are needed to cover all assuming two revetments per pass The GEE-EA carries 360 hanhlets thus each attacking aircraft is capable of making 5 or more homing recs More modifications of this teapm may sake it possible to eject an 360 hanhlets in a single pass if desired An effective comtermeasure to the CHI-2A is heavy wire mesh on top of the revetments In the likely event that this material is used the attacking aircraft my use some Elms 2 75411 FEAR rockets or tuneup 8 29 missiles against reveted aircraft targets Mum OPEATIOIIS The primer sntishipping emphasis for 0 3 and Haticnn ist Chinese forces should be against torpedo boats and dunks In any invasion attempt on the part of the Comunist Chinese Junks would he the min troop and arterial transport media In an invasion attempt against Taiwan the torpedo hosts could he used to harass the U S and Nationalist Chinese naval defense forces eand to defend their own invasion eet Although there have been no weapons especially developed for offensive action against small ships such as torpedo heats the use of 20-min cannon Bunpup S P and the CED-3A and or Rocheye II seems to be logical Torpedo boats are mill fast and maneuver-able and they rely on these characteristics for both offensive and defensive action _Thsar_are nomsua comm li-l-e-i-IIQ no- 'i airly vulnerable when hit Defensive armament might consist of 20- or ho-nn guns The oar-3d and the sockeye II are currently Ran items for the Air Force and the Navy respectively Each unit will pattern onthe order of 350bunb1ets oversn mcaoo ft ftvide or 211 000 sq ft Assmning a target arcs of 300 sq it such a system is capable of placing as many as four or five bonblets on any target in the impact area These weapons are intended for use against armored land vehicles but their shaped-charge effect would serve to penetrate the deck and possibly the hull and the blast and fragmenta- 'tion effects would act against any personnel or cement on the deck The destruction or 1th turns out to be a very difficult problem as they are capable of absorbing a large amount of damage without sinking or being out of action This is a result or the 'unique construction features of such ships During 1952 and 1953 the 11 5 Navy conducted an extensive study on how to destroy Jinks The dco dption g a typical Junk is quoted from the final greport of that study 3 Over-all Length - About 65 feet Beam - About so Loaded Draft - About 1 feet not including rudder i Propulsion - gofsail reminder having an muciliary gasoline angina usually a converted truck type Busts - Two-masted varying with origin and i function Sails - Heavy canvas with mltiple full-length battens - Rudder - Usuale extends below the keel and is retractable to facilitate benching and navigating in shoal waters Hull Construction - Multiple canpartmentation is achieved by heavy transverse bulkheads 'Ihe bottoms are fairly flat and the hull is heavily built with rough-hem strakes outboard Bows and stern are blunt the stern generally higher than the bow Hull and bottom planking can be expected to be of coniferous wood about 2 to 5 inches thick and fastened together with a large umber - fteen-y - a cinch- nails Most Joints are of the butt variety Eactensive mug is employed throughout the hull and deck Operational Characteristics - The speed under sail varies from about 1 knot to as high as 7 knots two knots is considered a normal sailing speed The speed attained under power may 'be as high as 10 to 12 knots 5 knots is considered an average Turning circles average 75 to 100 yards The referenced Navy study recommends only two ways to innobilize Junks The first of these is to use depth charges or nines having explosive power greater than 50 1b of m-l Those charges should explodevasay and the 11qu at depths no mater than #5 ft and no further than 10 ft from the side 01 the hx l The action of such a charge will destroy a Junk to the extent that it cannot be repaired the study reconnends explosive charges contact with the hull under water The lighter charge will destroy about 9 ft of the hqu but the reminder of the will remain intact A charge is estimated to 'be capable of destroying a medium-size Junk of strong construction At this time there are no air-delivered munitions capable of combating Junks in the remanded mnner The closest things avail- able are antisubnnrine depth bombs which would he very difficult to drop with the necessary accuracy In the likely event that satis- factory air-delivered 31ml munitions are not avaiJnhle in the 1967 time period preferred weapons will 'be the Bullpup and ZUNI1 rockets with short-time-delay fuse to permit underwater bursts other less satisfactory weapons would he depth bombs and GP bombs mansions China's initial detonation of a nuclear device will be used by - the Chinese to create the impression that Chins possesses a military capability and is a significant nuclear power From that tine on and increasingly as China develops a nuclear capability the United States will be confronted with a wider range of possible Chinese threats and actions than hitherto By the time China possesses a modest nuclear capability she will have the following options 0 The direct use of nuclear weapons on U S Far East bases or on Asian nations 0 The use of nuclear weapons as an mbrelle for overt nonnucleer military operations and support or insurgency - The political and propaganda exploitation of bet nuclear capability to capitalize on and to create opportunities for achieving Chinese objectives OF Pace-Rm ms THEATER FORCES Based on the campaign analyses- and force postures described herein the programmed theater forces iorthe 1966-1967 time period CAPABILJIEIES 0F memes WATER FORCES In light or the deficiencies mentioned above U S programmed forces were unwanted to provide This was done by stationing one wing of 3-52'5 on Guns andxtilizingme armiaci c J leet n suhmrines ecpippecmth noun m 0 n-eo-n u I-u i'6' Jul-3 sass-is missiles The rEsElts of ease Tihoioete that the magnented 13 3 farccs when operating from an undanaged posture can A pro-eruptive strike by the Chinese assuming the force posture in Section II against the progrmd but not augmented ms theater forces would considerably reduce IU S effectiveness in wanting a cotmterstrike To provide a comterstrike capahility the programmed theater forces were segmented by one wing of B-52's on Guam plus the addition of two aircraft carriers and several support tassels to the Seventh Fleet and the use of one sewn Men for operations from a damaged posture such an augmented theater force could 'be capable of 'destroying enough of the Chinese ogrensive sir and missile capability to virtually eliminate than as a further threat to the United States Ari-important aspect of this cormterstrike capability 'was the airborne alert status of the 13-52' 8 Another important aspect was the sex-ly- werning capability of the Seventh Fleet task forces which permitted the launching of all of the ready aircraft before the carriers came under attack - The 11 8 augmnted theater forces sin-vim their first counter- strike mammal-bland- In the event that a seeond strike was rewind additional forces would be necessary The assumed Chinese sir-defense posture is designed primarily to counter the threat of high-altitude attack However as the case studies herein show China is highly vulnerable to low-altitude air attacks early warning GCI and airborne radar capa- bilities against low-altitude penetrators greatly limit air-to-air operations China's ground defenses against this threat are limited to The possession of an extensive SA-3 missile system could have severely hampered the 11 8 air operations over China The U S land bases in the Far East are vulnerable to a Chinese attack because of the limited mmher of targets presented their proximity to China and their limited defense capabilities As was the problem with Cmmist China the 11 5 land bases sniffer from limited air-defense capability against low-altitude attack The primary problem is early warning Island-based radars cannot provide extended low-altitude coverage and the United States does not possess a long-range airborne radar capable of detecting incoming aircraft against 'a land background The United States does possess an airborne long-range radar APB-96 capable of detecting incoming aircraft against a water background Since most of the 11 5 land bases in the Pacific mat be approached over water the use of this airborne radar might have permitted more USAF aircraft to become air- borne safely CHINESE AGGRESSION IN THE rm STRAIT AREA Any invasion attempt against the major Offshore Islands or Taiwan by the Chinese is estimted to involve high risks on their part If the United states chose to intervene militarily in either campaign the costs to the Chinese would he extremly high The chances of a successful invasion of Quemoy are only marginal and the chances of a successful invasion of Taiwan very remote Either cam- paign would involve hid manpomr and material losses for the Camu- nist hinese invaders The possession o f nuclear capability by the Economist Chinese could create political pressures on the United States to limit its response and might necessitate operational and logistic readjustments The use of nuclear weapons by the Commist Chinese in such campaigns would provide the United States with a variety of options for military response including nuclear attacks on Communist China 1 2 3 9o 13 ll I 4 - Blachly R L 1 Genre 8 T Hosmer A L Esieh B F Jaeger P F Longer and M G Weiner A Stud of the m ications of a communist Chinese Nuclear Ca-abili he RAND Corporation December 19- Secret Hsieh A L Bone The ts on Conmunist China's citation of a Nuclear Detonation The new Corporation REE-312 PR May 195 Confidential Morris D 11 Technical acts of Possible Chinese MRBM Designs U The RAND Corporation February 1953 Secret Yeh K C Commist Chinese Petroleum Situation Che Rm Corpora- tion RIM-31 -PR May 1 2 Danger P F an and Chinese Nuclear Power the RAND Corporation to be publisheE Confidential szre Leon Soviet Policies and Chinese Nuclear Power Q Che RAND Corporation RM-B -PR to be published Con dential Weiner M G War Gem Methodolo The RAND Corporation Roi-21443 July 10 1959 Stre and Di osition of Forei Navies Office of Naval Intelligence Chief of Naval Operations Department of the Navy October 1 1961 Secret Order of Battle '8 Fore Ground Forces Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 Department of the Army October 1 1961 Secret Anti-aircraft Artill Order of Battle Communist Far East Forces Air Force Intelligence Center October 1 1931 Secret Radar Order of Battle Sine-Soviet Bloc C Air Force Intelligence Center January 1 19 Secret Milit Assistance Plan 1 fill-68 Office of the Director of Military Assistance Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs July 1962 Secret Directorate of Plans and Programs USAF Aircraft and Missile ui and Conversion Program U PECP 61% Series August 1952 Secret Directo and Station List of the United States Adjutant General' 5 Office Department of the Army July 19% Secret Illdu Iu-u- onn-Am-u a_ n 15 16 17 18 19 20 23 -66 1Wartime Pl Factors Manual Series Division Directorate of Management Analysis Comptroller of the Air Force Headquarters USAF Pl Factors Vol II Missiles and Rockets Dept of the Air Fox-cc Headquarters ADM 172-3 February 1 19g Secret- Restricted Data Staff Officers Manuel-wr zationel Technical and Logistical Data Headquarters Department of the Army FM 101-10 December 1961 Airfields and Sea lane Stations of the World ASSOTJ Assistant - Chief of Staff Intelligence Headquarters USAF and Office of Naval Intelligence Navy Department September 1960 Secret The Effect of eed on the Penetration Effectiveness of a Tactical Aircraft at Low Altitude Wright Air Development Division Technical Report 392 May 1960 Secret Fleet Air Defense Sty Office of Naval Research Department of the Navy August 1 1955 Secret Restricted Data Parson E 1-1 The SIERRA Pro ect A Stud of Limited Wars The RAND Corporation Report R-3l7 May 1 1953 Secret-Formerly Restricted Data Semis Donald 5 En meg Evaluation of the CBU-EZA Disoenser and Donia Aircraft Air Proving Gromd Center 11350 USAF Eglin Air Force Base process-6240 February 1962 Secret Research on Parameters for 9251mm Antigunk Mines Office of Naval Research Department of the Navy August 5 1953 Secret This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu